This chapter benchmarks Ukraine’s infrastructure governance against the OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicators (IGIs), using Ukraine’s 2025 assessment against OECD survey benchmarks from 2020 and 2022. It examines performance across five dimensions: long-term strategic vision, fiscal sustainability, affordability and value for money, efficient and effective public procurement, stakeholder participation, and evidence‑informed decision making. The chapter finds that Ukraine’s governance profile is stronger in upstream planning, appraisal and fiscal control than in delivery strategy, stakeholder systematisation and evidence use across the asset life cycle. The results are indicative rather than directly comparable to a current OECD ranking, but they point to a clear reform frontier: strengthening the back end of the infrastructure cycle through procurement strategy, contract management, asset performance, service‑level monitoring and feedback into future planning.
Infrastructure Policy Review of Ukraine
Abstract
OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicators (IGIs) support the implementation and monitoring of the OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Infrastructure (Ruiz Rivadeneira, Dekyi and Cruz, 2023[1]). Ukraine’s performance on the Infrastructure Governance Indicators suggests a governance system with stronger foundations in upstream planning, appraisal and fiscal oversight than in delivery strategy, stakeholder systematisation and life‑cycle evidence use. These results should be interpreted with caution. They compare Ukraine’s 2025 governance environment with OECD survey benchmarks from 2020 for IGIs 1‑3 and from 2022 for IGIs 4‑5, so they are indicative rather than strictly like‑for-like. Their value lies not in ranking Ukraine against today’s OECD average, but in identifying where Ukraine appears stronger or weaker relative to the earlier OECD benchmark profiles while the OECD prepares for launching the new IGIs surveys to better capture the current reality of infrastructure governance across the OECD.
Relative to the OECD 2020 benchmark, in 2025 Ukraine performs above average on long-term strategic vision for infrastructure (IGI 1) and particularly strongly on fiscal sustainability, affordability and value for money (IGI 2). These results are driven by comparatively robust scores on the alignment of plans with strategic objectives and budget allocations, the treatment of contingent liabilities, project appraisal and selection, and independent assessment. By contrast, Ukraine performs below the OECD benchmark on efficient and effective public procurement (IGI 3), with the main weaknesses concentrated not in procedural openness as such, but in the more strategic dimensions of procurement, notably bidder selection, delivery mode choice and balanced contractual relationships.
Against the OECD 2022 benchmark, Ukraine is only slightly below average on stakeholder participation (IGI 4), but substantially below average on evidence‑informed decision making (IGI 5). The stakeholder results indicate that oversight and grievance mechanisms are more developed than the underlying guidance, monitoring and targeting architecture. The evidence pillar shows a clearer structural weakness: Ukraine performs reasonably on needs assessment and some elements of ex ante analysis, but very weakly on evidence for infrastructure management, including asset management, service‑level monitoring, performance benchmarking and ex post learning. Taken together, the IGIs suggest that Ukraine’s reform challenge is no longer only to strengthen front-end project preparation, but to build a more complete infrastructure governance system that connects appraisal, procurement, contract management, asset performance and feedback into a coherent whole.
Note: For IGIs 1‑3 Ukraine is benchmarked against the OECD 2020 Infrastructure Governance Survey, for IGIs 4‑5 Ukraine is benchmarked against the OECD 2022 Infrastructure Governance Survey. These comparisons are indicative and should not be read as a direct ranking against the current OECD average.
The OECD’s broader IGI framework treats these granular sub-pillars precisely as the basis for policy diagnosis, and this is one of the clearest places where such diagnosis matters. Ukraine’s governance architecture appears stronger at the “front end” of the infrastructure cycle – strategy, appraisal, approval and some elements of procurement – than at the “back end”, where governments need systematic evidence on asset condition, service performance, ex post results and portfolio management. The results reinforce the general finding that the policy problem is not simply one of “more data”, but of building a system in which evidence is generated, used and fed back into planning, delivery and management on a continuing basis.
Ukraine’s performance on the OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicators points to a governance profile that is stronger in upstream planning, appraisal and fiscal control than in delivery strategy, stakeholder systematisation and evidence use across the asset life cycle. Relative to the earlier OECD survey benchmarks, Ukraine’s 2025 results are above the benchmark average on long-term strategic vision (IGI 1), and particularly strong on fiscal sustainability, affordability and value for money (IGI 2). By contrast, they are below the benchmark average on efficient and effective public procurement (IGI 3), slightly below on stakeholder participation (IGI 4), and materially below on evidence‑informed decision making (IGI 5). This structure should be read as a comparative profile rather than as a current ranking.
Note: Ukraine’s performance as benchmarked in 2025 against the original OECD country survey was conducted in 2020. These comparisons are indicative and should not be read as a direct ranking against the current OECD average.
Figure 4.2 shows that Ukraine’s relatively solid result on long-term strategic vision is driven by a narrow set of strong sub-pillars rather than by an evenly balanced profile. Ukraine performs above the OECD average on infrastructure plan and project prioritisation, and markedly above average on alignment of the plan with strategic objectives and, especially, alignment of the plan with budget allocations. These are large positive gaps and suggest that Ukraine’s framework places comparatively strong emphasis on linking infrastructure priorities to broader policy objectives and to fiscal decision making. The weaker elements lie in planning co‑ordination mechanisms, political consensus and stakeholder participation in the long-term plan, and monitoring and vision update. The substantive message is clear: Ukraine’s long-term infrastructure vision appears stronger on formal alignment and prioritisation logic than on cross-government co‑ordination, political anchoring and structured updating.
This is broadly consistent with the OECD’s general reading of pillar 1, where the strongest average OECD performance is in infrastructure planning and project prioritisation, while alignment with budget and broader co‑ordination remain more uneven across countries. In Ukraine’s case, however, the alignment functions are stronger than the OECD benchmark, while co‑ordination and monitoring lag behind its own strengths. That is the main point to draw from Figure 4.2: Ukraine does not primarily face a challenge of having no strategic logic, but of ensuring that strategic logic is embedded in a more coherent, co‑ordinated and regularly updated planning system.
Figure 4.3 points to one of Ukraine’s clearest comparative strengths in the IGI set. Ukraine scores above the earlier OECD benchmark on contingent liabilities, project appraisal and selection, independent assessment and infrastructure risk management. Budgeting for multi-year projects and cost estimations remains below the benchmark OECD average. The overall pattern suggests that Ukraine has put in place comparatively strong formal disciplines for project screening and fiscal oversight, especially at the ex ante stage. Ukraine’s survey results suggest that parts of the appraisal and fiscal-control architecture are already comparatively mature, even though there are areas where further improvements are needed.
Note: Ukraine’s performance as benchmarked in 2025 against the original OECD country survey was conducted in 2020. These comparisons are indicative and should not be read as a direct ranking against the current OECD average.
Ukraine records positive responses on formal value‑for-money processes for both PPPs and other infrastructure projects, on methodologies for assessing both PPPs and other infrastructure projects, and on a formal Ministry of Finance gatekeeping role for project approval. At the same time, the lower score on multi-year budgeting and cost estimation suggests that affordability analysis is less complete than appraisal and approval procedures. This is also where caution is needed: strong formal appraisal rules do not by themselves guarantee strong project preparation quality in practice. Figure 4.3 supports a conclusion that Ukraine’s main weaknesses are not in the existence of appraisal and approval gates, but in the completeness and consistency of cost estimation and budgeting practices over the project life cycle. This is fully consistent with the OECD’s general interpretation of pillar 2, which treats appraisal and independent assessment as relatively strong across countries, but identifies risk allocation and some affordability tools as weaker areas.
Figure 4.4 shows a much less favourable picture. Ukraine performed above the OECD average on open, neutral and transparent procurement, competitive procurement processes and procurement workforce. It is, however, below average on bidder selection, delivery mode, strategic use of procurement to achieve policy objectives and balanced contractual relationships. The zero score on delivery mode is the most consequential result in the pillar. It indicates that, relative to the earlier OECD benchmark and on the basis of the 2025 assessment, a formal and consistently applied methodology for deciding how infrastructure projects should be delivered was not yet clearly reflected in the legal framework and practice. This is consistent with the analysis presented in Section 2.4 Procurement strategy.
Note: Ukraine’s performance as benchmarked in 2025 against the original OECD country survey was conducted in 2020. These comparisons are indicative and should not be read as a direct ranking against the current OECD average.
Ukraine’s procurement challenge is not primarily one of openness or competition in the narrow procedural sense. It is a more strategic in nature. Ukraine has built important elements of transparent procurement architecture but remains weaker where procurement must operate as a project-delivery strategy: choosing the right delivery mode, structuring bidder selection well, and maintaining balanced contractual relationships over time. Open and transparent processes tend to be better developed than delivery mode selection and workforce professionalisation, and that life‑cycle considerations remain underused in award decisions. In Ukraine’s case, the gap is sharper because some strategic dimensions of procurement are not merely underdeveloped but close to absent in the survey results.
Figure 4.5 suggests a mixed profile rather than a uniformly weak one. Ukraine scores well below the OECD average on stakeholder participation guidance, is roughly at the OECD average on stakeholder participation practices, and performs above average on stakeholder oversight. The overall score of 0.48, just below the OECD average of 0.52, therefore masks an important distinction: Ukraine appears to do better on concrete practice and oversight mechanisms than on the existence of a clear, systematic guidance framework. Ukraine appears to have mechanisms for stakeholder participation in spatial planning, a formal requirement to consider and respond to consultation inputs with public disclosure, and stakeholder oversight and monitoring arrangements, but no national guidance on stakeholder participation and no mandatory outreach to under-represented groups.
Note: Ukraine’s performance as benchmarked in 2025 against the original OECD country survey was conducted in 2022. These comparisons are indicative and should not be read as a direct ranking against the current OECD average.
The issue is that stakeholder participation is insufficiently codified, standardised and targeted. Ukraine has elements of participation without a mature participation system. This points to a specific reform gap: the institutional guidance layer that would make participation more systematic, more predictable across projects, and more inclusive of groups that are otherwise likely to remain outside consultation processes.
Figure 4.6 shows a considerable gap for Ukraine’s infrastructure governance in the current benchmarking exercise. Ukraine is only modestly below the OECD average on evidence for strategic planning, is far below average on the use of data for project appraisal and impact analysis, is around the OECD average on use of evidence during the procurement process, and is significantly below average on evidence for infrastructure management. This last gap is the single largest negative deviation in the results. It indicates that the weakest part of the governance chain is not front-end policy vision alone, but the use of evidence once infrastructure moves into management, monitoring and feedback.
Note: Ukraine’s performance as benchmarked in 2025 against the original OECD country survey was conducted in 2022. These comparisons are indicative and should not be read as a direct ranking against the current OECD average.
Taken together, the IGI results suggest that Ukraine’s infrastructure governance framework is comparatively stronger in strategic alignment, project appraisal and fiscal control than in procurement strategy, stakeholder systematisation and evidence‑based asset management. The strongest relative scores are concentrated in the upstream stages of the project cycle, while the weakest results emerge where governance must connect projects to delivery choices, operational management and institutional learning. The main implication for this Review is that Ukraine’s reform agenda should not be framed only as a need for better “front-end” planning. It should be framed more precisely as a need to connect planning strength to delivery mode choice, balanced procurement relationships, structured stakeholder systems and evidence use across the whole life cycle of infrastructure assets.
References
[1] Ruiz Rivadeneira, A., T. Dekyi and L. Cruz (2023), ‘OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicators: Conceptual framework, design, methodology and preliminary results,’ OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 59., OECD Publishing, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-infrastructure-governance-indicators_95c2cef2-en.html.