This chapter examines how missions engage public authorities within and beyond the realm of science, technology and innovation (STI) to enlist regulatory, behavioural and cross-sectoral action to overcome deployment barriers. It maps different governance models reflecting how national, regional and local contexts shape missions’ design and effectiveness. It emphasises how to avoid the so-called “STI trap” as many experts conclude that most missions remain technology-focused and fail to mobilise sectoral authorities, regulatory levers or broader societal actors needed for systemic change. The chapter argues for tailored, adaptive and systemic governance – leveraging existing structures where possible, creating new ones when needed, linking with industrial policy without being subsumed by it and evolving as missions mature.
Forging New Frontiers in Mission‑Oriented Innovation Policies
Abstract
Many missions remain too technology-focused and led mainly by science, technology and innovation (STI) authorities. To achieve broader societal impact, they must better integrate sectoral policy and regulatory tools, mobilise actors beyond the innovation system, and link with broader transition agendas.
Missions can shift leadership to escape the “STI trap”: from STI to sectoral ministries that “own” the challenges (e.g. climate, health) to centre-of-government bodies (prime minister’s office, transition committees) for whole-of-government co-ordination to regional or local authorities, which are closer to communities and contexts (possibly with a co-ordination umbrella at the national level to enhance the impact) and dedicated mission agencies, with autonomy and broad instruments for implementation.
Effective missions require systemic governance: cross-sectoral and vertical co-ordination and mechanisms to keep actors engaged over time.
Citizen participation and civil society engagement are essential for legitimacy. This should go beyond consultation to co-designing solutions.
Missions must consider “winners and losers,” supporting groups disadvantaged by transitions to maintain cohesion and fairness.
Formal links with industrial policies, with which they increasingly intersect, allow missions to tap into considerable funds and deployment tools. Missions struggle to access deployment funds, but some countries link missions to major transition funds.
Creating “common pots” of funding across ministries is seen as critical for scaling impact.
Demand-side tools like public procurement for innovation are especially important to create markets and scale mission solutions.
Based on all interactions with mission managers and partners, it is clear that one key challenge missions face is engaging a broad range of policymakers with their respective capabilities, legitimacy, networks, budgets and intervention tools. While recruiting mission partners within the STI area itself should not be taken for granted (notably when it comes to connecting authorities in charge of research and business innovation), it is an even greater challenge to enlist people outside of the STI sphere. This is, however, essential, as deployment faces significant behavioural and regulatory barriers and requires different types of instruments and incentives.
This chapter addresses the following main questions:
What are missions’ main governance structures and arrangements?
How can missions be truly systemic, beyond STI?
Governance encompasses the various formal and informal institutional arrangements that guide and support interactions among different actors in the innovation process. It is thus a prerequisite of collective action and, therefore, of missions. A variety of dedicated governance structures and processes support interactions between different partners at both the mission-oriented innovation policy (MOIP) initiative and individual mission levels. These have been conceptualised through several different studies with their own sets of archetypes.
Setting the governance model that fits the national specificities
The OECD identifies four recurring types of mission-oriented innovation policies based on previous work (Larrue, 2021[1]),1 while Uyarra (2024) adds a fifth one related to place-based missions. The rationales underpinning the choice of these types are largely rooted in governance features that stem from the specificities of the country and, to a lesser extent, the characteristics of the challenge to be addressed. For instance, more centralised countries are more likely to resort to larger, more top-down, overarching mission-oriented strategic frameworks. Countries with a stronger tradition of consensus-building and trust between public and private sector actors, such as the Nordic countries, will be more attracted to ecosystem-based mission programmes. Countries that rely more on competitive mechanisms can more easily adopt challenge-based programmes and schemes. As for place-based missions, besides the obvious determinant of the local governance level, they often involve more systemic “co-created” missions, strongly involving and negotiating the mission’s goals and agenda with various local stakeholders and relevant communities, which each have their own governance tasks.
Janssen et al. (2021[3]) identify three governance models: 1) administration-based (predominantly governmental, can be led by ministries or agencies); 2) network-based (involving selected public and private sector stakeholders); and 3) society-based (focused on societal initiatives) governance arrangements. In the context of MOIP, administration- and network-based governance approaches seem the most relevant. As seen in countries like Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, public administrations can adopt a whole-of-government mission approach, relying on high-level policy strategies to enhance co-ordination within the public sector. This includes fostering new ways of collaborating across departments (horizontal co-ordination) and across different government levels (vertical co-ordination). However, although there can be some more pronounced mission governance profiles, driven in great part by national institutional settings, most MOIPs mix different modes of governance. The Dutch Mission‑Driven and Top Sector Policy, for instance, follows an administration-led approach which also explicitly incorporates characteristics of network governance, for instance by partnering and formulating joint agendas (the Mission-Driven Innovation Programme), which serve as common reference points (or “boundary objects”) for collective action within and across policy fields and sectors (Janssen et al., 2025[4]).
Motivated by the intensifying search for more effective governance arrangements, Fraunhofer ISI recently conducted a comparative analysis of five distinct institutional approaches to the governance of German missions. They range from marginal changes compared to the status quo to more fundamental institutional shifts, such as centralising ministerial responsibilities in a dedicated ministry or the establishment of mission agencies. In view of the need for context-sensitive approaches, the study aims to clarify the respective strengths and weaknesses of the different institutional solutions for the mission governance challenge, thereby providing decision makers with guidance when making design choices (Wittmann et al., 2024[5]).
Adapting the mission governance to the nature of the challenge
The nature of the challenge addressed by a mission also shapes its governance structure. Broadly speaking, the more "wicked" (i.e. complex, uncertain, contested) the challenge, the less fit established governance structures, which tend to operate in well-defined compartments and follow routinised procedures, seem to be for the purpose.
Instead, more complex and diverse, multi-level structures with several entities playing different roles are required. (Wittmann et al., 2021[6]) explored this connection in the case of Germany’s HighTech Strategy 2025.2 The most “wicked” HighTech Strategy 2025 missions are those requiring not only scientific or technological advancements but also changes in individual and collective behaviours and norms – thus involving societal and institutional transformations. These missions engage a broader range of policy domains and actors, require various changes (e.g. regulatory, behavioural), demand more co-ordination, and, as a result, necessitate more complex governance structures.
The features of the challenges will also make different types of missions more or less adapted to deal with them. For instance, “challenge-based missions”, as defined by the OECD, are more suited to challenges defined as narrow scientific or technological bottlenecks, while missions requiring broader societal changes are better served by more systemic initiatives, either “overarching missions” or “ecosystem-based” ones.
Anchoring missions at the right level of governance
Initiatives are anchored, initiated and managed at varying levels of government, which has a broad range of consequences for their governance design and transformative potential. Actors at each level have their strengths and weaknesses in mission leadership and governance (OECD, 2024[7]).
The centre-of-government is, in principle, uniquely positioned to instigate a whole-of-government approach, ensure interministerial co-operation, institutionalise and codify mission efforts, and leverage broad policy mixes (including regulation). However, centralised mission leadership can lead to disengagement and a lack of buy-in by sectoral public authorities if adequate incentives are not in place.
Ministries are essential in missions as they manage the budget and overall policy the most relevant to the challenge at stake. One key question missions can stumble upon relates to which ministry should lead, and what will be the level of actual commitment of the other ministries.
Agencies are well-positioned for in-depth understanding of on-the-ground conditions, strong domain expertise, building on existing organisational capacities, most importantly resources and abilities such as funding, and human resources, as well as collaboration abilities, in ways that are relatively resilient to electoral cycles (Borrás et al., 2024[8]). Agencies are particularly suited to promote collaboration in the ecosystem among academia, business, civil society and the public sector, and to drive shared agendas on specific themes and challenges. However, not all agencies are equipped with the strategic capabilities to develop and lead such a “hands-on” mission approach, where they play the role of system architects or orchestrators. Those agencies that have been confined to an execution role in the past, mainly allocating funding through calls for proposals, will necessitate significant changes in culture, skills, instrument toolbox and structure.
Local administrations provide clear local relevance; the ability to directly affect the delivery of relevant government services; often allow for more flexibility and experimentation; and enable missions to effectively frame challenges, actors and policy levers (Uyarra et al., 2025[2]). Inclusiveness is also a strength of local missions, leveraging collaboration and networks to create an accepted vision for the “transformed territory” and a consensus on the means and modes of collective action (Bianchi et al., 2024[9]). They, however, have more limited influence over broader policy conditions, such as regulatory and funding levers. The vertical connection to the national level, possibly with other local missions, is therefore important to ensure coherence and to scale up impacts.
Co-ordinating and empowering all levels of government to address mission goals
Local, regional, state, provincial and territorial authorities can play an important role in the success of missions as they hold important policy levers (e.g. regulatory authority over healthcare, construction or transportation). Local and regional governments also have functional abilities, facilitating testbeds for new technologies and approaches developed at the national level.3 Despite the important role that these other levels of government could play in addressing mission objectives, missions have been criticised for neglecting local and regional governments (Grillitsch, Coenen and Morgan, 2025[10]). When local public authorities are included, it is generally on a case-by-case basis rather than integrated into the mission governance.
There is a broader debate within the literature on whether regional-, national- or supranational-led (i.e. at the European Union [EU] level) missions are most appropriate for organising efforts to address societal challenges and if some degree of nested mission goals may be appropriate. Societal challenges are manifest differently in various places, so national top-down decision making on mission priorities and strategic agendas may overlook important contextual factors (even when informed through strong bottom‑up engagement) and perpetuate existing inequalities (Uyarra et al., 2025[2]). In the European Union, for instance, there is a subsidiary principle that encourages action to occur at the lowest level necessary, but this comes with trade-offs regarding economies of scale and the presence of cross-border externalities (Wanzenböck and Frenken, 2020[11]). At the same time, developing consensus around more contested global challenges may be easier to achieve at local levels as they are often in closer proximity to those affected by these challenges – further adding legitimacy to the missions (Griniece, Reid and Miedzinski, 2025[12]). Regional governments may also be able to pursue more experimental and diverse pathways for addressing the mission goals based on their local contexts (Grillitsch, Coenen and Morgan, 2025[10]; Uyarra et al., 2025[2]; Wanzenböck and Frenken, 2020[11]). To translate the Horizon Europe Missions into their national contexts and mobilise their citizens, Austria and Romania have established corresponding national governance (all five EU missions in Austria; only the Net Zero Cities mission in Romania). Similarly, to help address the United Kingdom’s 2017 Industrial Strategy’s Grand Challenges, local authorities (e.g. Greater Manchester, the Oxford-Cambridge Arc and the West Midlands) developed local industrial strategies and translated a selection of the national missions into their local contexts. To develop place-based policies that advance broader European Union priorities of green and digital, countries and regions have developed Smart Specialisation Strategies. However, a recent study provided evidence that the bulk of the Smart Specialisation Strategies are missing key elements of a mission approach: they barely embed directionality and system-level change towards sustainability, their governance has limited capacity to orchestrate and mediate alignment and tensions between bottom-up experimental approaches and top-down priorities and their policy mix is limited mainly to supply-side instruments supporting R&D and innovation (Reid, Steward and Miedzinski, 2023[13]). A few strategies have included missions to alleviate these issues, such as in Czechia, the regions of Wallonia and Brussels in Belgium, Västerbotten in Sweden, and Catalonia in Spain.
Addressing societal challenges, and even delivering STI supports to begin with, are new roles for many regional governments, as they do not always have the robust institutions national governments have to deliver these types of programmes (Grillitsch, Coenen and Morgan, 2025[10]). As a result, more capacity building may be required to empower regional governments to take a stronger role in addressing mission goals. In this regard, Austria has funded capacity building within municipalities to help them explore innovative pathways for reaching net zero as part of their work to deliver on the European Union’s Net Zero Cities mission and Austria’s national mission on mobility.
Leveraging existing governance arrangements or building new ones
In the field of innovation, there is a common fallacy to “always start something new” and often there is little motivation and incentive to continue work that others started. In a similar vein, in the context of missions, there too often is too little consideration of existing structures.
– Mission manager
Missions involve additional transaction costs to foster cross-government collaboration. Where possible, mission governance should leverage existing government co-ordination bodies to avoid unnecessary additional transaction costs.
At the same time, in view of rigid path dependencies and persistent failures to effectively co-operate and co‑ordinate across departmental lines, creating new organisations specifically designed to address the complex governance requirements of transformative missions could prove to be a more effective approach than attempting to redesign existing ministerial structures (Lindner et al., 2023[14]). This could also help to address so-called “transition voids”, or the recognition that the capacity of different stakeholders to act collectively is limited by inadequate modes of organisation and co-ordination (within and outside organisations), insufficient mandates and incomplete understandings. These transition voids often keep the barriers to collective action in place (Homans, Geurts and Wesseling, 2026[15]).
Tailor the mission governance to the specificities of each national system of innovation and the features of each type of challenge. There is no one-size-fits-all governance structure for missions, as these policies exist within an established set of institutions and other initiatives.
Strive to leverage existing co-ordination bodies for mission governance to avoid unnecessary additional transaction costs. At the same time, new organisations specifically designed to address the complex governance requirements of transformative missions may be needed if the current governance structures and routines are not fit for the mission’s purpose.
Begin developing the appropriate governance structure early during the mission definition stage with those actors important for the implementation of the mission.
The context-specific nature of mission governance should not overshadow some universally accepted principles of good governance – applicable to missions as well as other initiatives – such as a clear role and allocation of responsibility, a balanced approach to leadership and participation, the presence of a high-level referee, and accountability.
Even with sophisticated and well-designed governance structures, missions struggle to co-ordinate and foster joint action across silos without high-level political support. An OECD study of about 100 missions aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has shown that although these missions represent a marked improvement over traditional STI policy mixes, they remain led by STI authorities, draw on STI funding and policy instruments, and are too focused on technological innovation. STI public authorities in charge of research or innovation policy have initiated the bulk of the MOIP initiatives with net zero missions and act as the “champions” of mission-oriented policies in their respective national systems. However, these missions struggle to broaden their mandate beyond innovation. Most net zero missions remain focused on supporting research and innovation, and are led by STI authorities and draw almost exclusively on STI funds. This “STI trap” of missions can severely limit missions’ chance of success (OECD, 2023[16]; OECD, 2024[17]).
With storytelling you can create a common vision, then other parts of government feel they have a stake in the process. This is a carrot that keeps them motivated.
– Mission manager
The STI trap is alive and kicking. We are starting fresh with our mission governance, to try to overcome this and find new methods of collaboration.
– Mission manager
This section discusses how missions can escape this STI trap, becoming truly systemic initiatives.
Using mission narratives, system maps and theories of action to inform the governance
As with framing the mission, the storytelling aspect is important for enlisting actors. Creating a common vision makes other ministries feel that they have a stake in the process. Because not everyone in government speaks the same language (particularly when it comes to missions), training and capacity building, as well as simplifying the message, can help enlist actors. For instance, some of Sweden’s SIPs underwent training early in the process of innovation management, involving agency staff and mission stakeholders. The training built trust between the different partners and helped ensure the non-government and government actors had a similar language going forward.
The broader system mapping process to frame the mission (see Chapter 2) is also a way to identify and engage in the governance bodies, key government departments, and agencies relevant to the mission or with policy instruments that could affect it.
The mission governance should be driven by the overall theory of action for the mission and include the actors most needed to realise change. These bodies represent diverse policy fields (STI and beyond) and sectors of society (industry, research institutions and civil society).
Embedding missions in overall national and organisational governance arrangements
Ensuring mission owners have the accompanying legal, strategic and budget mandates to support all the activities that are needed to address their missions gives them legitimacy, and can be used to enlist actors from other relevant areas of government. Formalising these cross-government processes can also encourage continuity beyond the interests of individual bureaucrats and politicians. Austria, for instance, has an “RTI Pact”, which outlines strategies, funding and the institutions responsible for implementing the different multi-year objectives in the STI system. It is using the pacts in part to codify responsibilities for its work on the EU missions. Anchoring the missions in the pacts sets the stage for the missions to become a financial priority for relevant ministries, who then fund work towards the mission goals.
Ensure internal alignment is consistently supported “top down” through executives and annual performance agreements.
– Australia’s CSIRO Missions, conference poster
Cross-sectoral budgeting aligned with mission objectives, transcending traditional ministerial boundaries.
– Korea’s Comprehensive Plan to Solve Social Problems Based on Science and Technology, conference poster
This can also be done through outlining responsibilities in the enabling legislation of initiatives, the terms and conditions of programmes or committee structures, and funding decisions (including allocating funding for government staffing in multiple ministries).
Missions can be anchored in the structure of incentives that partly drive the behaviours of organisations and staff who design and implement the missions. To ensure the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation’s (CSIRO) researchers are committed to the Mission Program, it offers funding to fund internal researchers so that they can reallocate some of their time to research on mission-related projects. This funding is in addition to the funding CSIRO provides for industry and academia to work on projects related to the missions. CSIRO also embeds progress towards the missions in some mission managers’ profiles and individual performance objectives, which can impact promotions in the future. In Canada, the National Research Council Canada has established performance management agreements that can reward innovation investment advisors for their contribution to its Challenge Programs. These missions are also included in Challenge Programs directors’ merit reviews. These incentives could be used to further enlist actors from across government if they were also applied to non-STI ministries, which are expected to contribute to missions.
Gradually broadening the mission governance
Starting with what is often called a “mission coalition of the willing”, the mission may broaden its co‑ordination scope, learning from past approaches and crowding in new actors, as additional types of government support may be required to ensure the success of the mission.
The need changes as partnership develops, and governance models must adapt with changes.
– Denmark’s Innomissions, conference poster
While a mission’s governance structures rarely change due to the considerable lock-in effect once a mission is launched, less apparent changes occur in the background. Some examples show that missions tend to incrementally broaden their scope, benefiting from the “learning by doing” approach and building trust among partners. More significant change can happen when a new initiative is created on the basis of a former one. In Sweden, for instance, the need for a broader, more systemic programme was recommended by the evaluations of the SIPs to allow for more transformative missions. As a result, the 2020 research and innovation bill called for a new MOIP initiative to take over from the former, involving a broader range of national agencies, including Vinnova (Sweden’s innovation agency), the Swedish Energy Agency and the Swedish Research Council for Sustainable Development. Each of the five new impact innovation programmes (initiated in February 2024) has governance structures that engage constellations of stakeholders (from industry, the public sector, civil society, research institutes and academic institutions) and are led by a programme office and board.4
While the governance of missions remains the main challenge for most mission managers, several stress that, besides its scope, the intensity of the co-ordination can also evolve, reflecting changes in governance practices and mindsets. As trust increases and the mission starts delivering results, partners can progressively share more information, align more closely their plans toward the collective goals and agree to commit additional resources to the mission.
Striving to embark sectoral policies in missions
While missions are meant to be pulled by needs and challenges, the absence of tangible commitment of sectoral policy and regulatory authorities – putting their resources and modes of intervention at the service of the mission – makes this demand-pull feature rather artificial and purely declarative. In most cases, sectoral authorities hold the keys to scale up and deploy, without which a good solution remains unexploited, local and still to be fully realised. Deployment cannot be an afterthought that becomes relevant only when a mission matures; it should be the starting point.
There is no ready-made recipe for succeeding in enlisting new actors in a mission, in particular beyond the STI realm. It is largely a matter of trust and learning, which requires time. Although missions can be “experimental governance spaces” to explore novel configurations and portfolios of policy instruments and to pilot the involvement of other ministries or agencies in that endeavour, decades of siloed relations will not be turned around overnight. However, mission experiences provide some insights and good practices.
Embedding cross-ministeriality in the formal governance structure is one option. For instance, in Austria, the mission action groups in each of the five missions are co-chaired by a representative of the STI and a sectoral ministry. This model had a number of beneficial effects, including the intensification of interactions across policy areas and the identification of potential synergies associated with joint actions within the mission frame. This model can also involve a partial “transfer of ownership” of the mission to the sectoral authorities. This is the case of the EU “adaptation to climate change, including societal transformation” mission led by a mission manager from the Directorate-General for Climate Action and a deputy mission manager from the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation. The mission secretariat is therefore also located in the Directorate-General for Climate Action, but is comprised of a joint team bringing together staff members from both directorates. The governance of the mission also includes a mission owners group composed of representatives from different directorate-generals. It is tasked with the Commission inter-service co-ordination for the implementation of the mission and links with various other EU policies.5
Although it cannot be taken as a silver bullet for engaging new partners in missions, funding is also critical to set engagement incentives, including at the ministerial level. Some missions benefit from a common pot of funding that can be allocated to different public authorities, either to fund new activities related to the mission or to “top up” the budgets of ministries and agencies that agree to contribute to the mission with their own budgets and instruments. Such a common pot could be found, for instance, in well-endowed national climate, transition or industry transformation funds. This would also help missions access policy and regulatory interventions to support deployment, hence expanding their coverage of the whole innovation chain. To date, this has not been the case in most countries and MOIPs struggle to leverage these funds and related deployment incentives. A few missions have benefited from such funds, such as Austria’s Transformative Missions (which works with the Climate and Energy Fund to support the deployment of technologies supported under the missions), Research Ireland National Challenge Fund Programme (which draws on the Irish Recovery and Resilience Plan), the French Acceleration Strategies (included as an implementation tool in France 2030, the national six-year investment plan endowed with EUR 54 billion) and some of the US Department of Energy’s Earthshots (which were formally connected to the massive funds available via the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act).6
Among different types of science, technology and innovation (STI) policies with transformative ambitions, mission‑oriented innovation policies form an internationally recognised policy approach, with distinct principles and features and a growing body of practical and conceptual knowledge supporting their adoption. A recently published OECD study of about 100 missions aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has found that, despite significant achievements and progress, they fall short of leveraging the complementarities of various policy and regulatory interventions to scale up broad and ambitious solutions. Most remain narrowly focused on technological innovation, led by STI authorities and reliant on innovation funding.
While the challenge to design and, even more, implement missions are numerous and well-documented, the options to make them more transformative are less clear. Based on previous and ongoing OECD work, five main pathways are envisaged.
The first pathway consists of the gradual broadening and strengthening of missions by incrementally enlisting new actors, building trust, and learning and attracting higher commitments from public authorities outside the STI realm and higher investments from private sector actors. Many missions currently pursue this option as it prolongs the approach followed since their launch. Experience suggests that progress is slow and that some missions have already reached their “transformation glass ceiling”: Given the legitimacy of and resources available to STI authorities, which define in large part their convening power, these missions might not extend and deepen much further.
The second pathway involves the transfer of the mission leadership from STI to sectoral authorities who “own” the challenges. Their mandate aligns more closely with the mission objectives (e.g. net zero, circular economy) and they hold essential intervention tools, resources and legal powers to realise the mission's objectives. STI authorities would need to ensure innovation remains a priority in the strategic agendas of these sector-led missions.
Missions can also be led by centre-of-government bodies, such as the prime minister’s office or a powerful “transition” committee that can enforce a whole-of-government approach to realise the mission. A few existing missions in centralised countries follow this approach (e.g. France and Japan), although they still remain in most cases rather innovation-driven. An additional stumbling block in these missions is the possible lack of buy-in from the different participating ministries, which might be tempted to draw on the mission central budgets without fully embracing its specific objectives. A carefully designed combination of carrots and sticks will be necessary.
As national missions face challenges, more interest is manifested in regional or local missions. These smaller scale missions are considered better-equipped to define collective agendas and integrate different interventions, while leveraging the benefits of place-based innovation and various forms of proximity (e.g. geographic, cultural). These “micro-missions” would still need to be articulated with larger (national, global) transformative agendas to contribute meaningfully to grand challenges.
Finally, missions could be led by dedicated mission agencies reporting to several ministries. This model of “co‑ordination from the ground floor” holds interesting promise since agencies focus on implementation and are more protected from short-term political interferences. To succeed they should enjoy significant autonomy once they have been entrusted with one or several missions. They would also require a large portfolio of instruments or the possibility to co-operate with other agencies.
These pathways all have in common the ability to adapt leadership structures and foster co-ordination and collaboration beyond STI authorities to unlock missions’ transformative potential. The choice between these pathways will depend on the trajectory of each mission, but also on the underpinning national or regional institutional specificities.
Source: Adapted from (OECD, 2024[7]). See also OECD (OECD, 2024[7]).
Establishing links between missions and industrial policies
A key question remains as to what formal connections should be established between missions and industrial policy instruments (Box 3.3). Considering recent events and debates, one might rapidly conclude that there is a convergence of the mission approach with new industrial policies. Missions are increasingly considering competitiveness and security issues as national priorities evolve in these directions. As for industrial policies, while still focused on competitiveness, productivity and growth, they can hardly ignore societal challenges such as sustainability, health and social inequalities. What is more, industrial policies are often rooted in the same design dimensions as MOIPs (i.e. strategic orientation, and policy co‑ordination and implementation) – the same dimensions that the OECD’s framework for assessing industrial policies uses (although it does separate evaluation and adaptation from policy implementation) (OECD, 2025[18]).
This question is at the core of the debate regarding the future of EU missions (and EU support to oriented research more generally) in the context of the future European Competitiveness Fund recommended by the Draghi report delivered to the European Commission (Draghi, 2025[19]). Interestingly, this report calls for adopting an approach that draws on the mission concept, notably the co-ordination and combination of multiple policies – research, development and innovation; investment; fiscal; regulatory; among others – for achieving ambitious goals related to decarbonisation and competitiveness. It also recommends developing competitiveness action plans for each EU strategic priority, with well-defined objectives, governance and financing. Missions, especially those with a strong technological focus, need to be more closely aligned with industrial policy, with formal connections allowing missions to leverage industrial policy mechanisms and funding, as demonstrated in recent examples from France and the United States. However, a high degree of integration between industrial property and MOIPs is generally not advisable, as it risks neglecting other critical policy goals, such as societal challenges addressed by thematic or sectoral policies (Wanzenböck and Weber, 2024[20]).
There has been a normative turn in innovation policy in recent years reflected in the prominence of societal challenges in guiding funding programmes and mission-oriented innovation policy (MOIP) approaches, as well as a widening of the strategic orientations of industrial policy from purely economic considerations (competitiveness and productivity, in particular) towards matters of sovereignty and security and social and ecological concerns.
Industrial policy has also changed approach in response to changes in strategic orientation, and this is also the case with the most recent shifts towards net zero emissions and sovereignty, which has led to the use of more mission-oriented elements in the “new” industrial policy, though often without necessarily using the term “missions”. This inclusion of mission-oriented elements points to a growing overlap with MOIP, even if, for instance, the European Union’s missions have so far been driven strongly by societal rather than economic challenges, to address longer time horizons and draw on a broader stakeholder base. The extent to which “new” industrial policy and mission-oriented policy should be aligned thus remains an issue for debate.
A productive intersection between “new” industrial policy and MOIP is faced with many challenges in terms of strategic orientation, policy co-ordination and the implementation of policy instruments, including issues such as:
Agreement and on the overarching purpose and vision guiding the design and implementation of mission‑oriented approaches at the intersection of industrial policy and MOIP.
Moving from mission-oriented research and innovation funding programmes to comprehensive “packages” of policy instruments comprising research and innovation funding; investment funding; and regulatory, procurement and other adjacent measures (e.g. in trade or competition policy).
Designing and timing of measures to accelerate the deployment and industrial scaling of novel mission‑oriented solutions in response to societal challenges, possibly in conjunction with the phase-out of unsustainable and outdated solutions.
Enhancing the attractiveness of mission-oriented approaches for industrial investors through a combination of incentives and reliable regulatory environments.
Monitoring and measuring how to stay on track and anticipate the need for change and adjustment of policy measures in both fields.
Overcoming the mismatch in governance structures and processes between industrial policy and MOIP.
Source: Wanzenböck and Weber (2024[20]), based on insights from the pre-conference seminar on missions and industrial policy.
It is also important to note that some missions, particularly those with more societal and systemic objectives, may follow non-industrial deployment paths, often through the public sector rather than via industrialisation or commercialisation. These types of missions have been less thoroughly studied, partly due to an inherent bias in STI fields, in which many mission analysts and researchers specialise.
Create a common narrative that includes the relevant government actors. As with the framing, this can help motivate actors and show how they fit into the implementation of the mission.
Develop governance structures that include the relevant actors for achieving the mission from across government (horizontal co-ordination) and at different levels of government (vertical co-ordination).
Use framing mission tools such as mission theories of action, mission narratives and system mapping to support decisions around the governance. Mobilise social sciences and humanities researchers in the development and use of these tools.
Leverage mission governance to build buy-in to the missions. Assigning roles (e.g. co-chairs of a mission) to important governmental stakeholders (including in non-science, technology and innovation ministries or agencies) can foster a culture of shared responsibility and increase the degree to which they enlist.
Establish mechanisms for reviewing and potentially adapting the mission governance as missions mature, including adding additional government support and convening new actors.
Institutionalise critical aspects of the governance through legislation, the terms and conditions of programmes or committee structures, and funding decisions (including employees implementing missions across government).
Create a common funding pot that can be used flexibly to incentivise engagement from sectoral policy fields and support activities across ministries.
Invest in capacity building within the public administration to develop a common language around missions and increase a “mission way of working”.
Enlist new actors in the mission through ad hoc co-operation such as joint calls for proposals and joint procurement initiatives.
Where possible, align mission governance with industrial policy interventions, where large-scale funding for deployment may help meet the mission objectives, without being subject to industrial policy.
The OECD conducted a template-based consultation of mission practitioners. A total of 30 responses were received, representing as many MOIP initiatives. Based on these inputs, the OECD developed a series of posters, validated by the mission teams. The results of the survey were later coded by inference by the OECD to identify common themes across the key issues. The results related to enlisting actors to support missions are presented in this box.
Notes: STI: science, technology and innovation. The top five strengths and weaknesses related to enlisting actors represent, respectively, 70% of the 97 responses and 70% of the 47 responses under this pillar.
Strengths
The most prominent strength is cross-sectoral governance and commitment in their initiatives (representing 21% of the responses). Across responses, key strategies to create commitment highlight the importance of leveraging existing bodies and programmes to support missions (e.g. Korea leveraging its Presidential Advisory Council on Science and Technology). Other initiatives have opted to secure commitment by creating new interministerial bodies and ways of working (e.g. Sweden’s Impact Innovation programme). Partnerships between science, technology and innovation (STI) and non-STI actors are the second most common strength (16%). These partnerships were highlighted in advisory and co-ordination roles, as well as public-private partnerships, at the local, national and international levels. For instance, the Finnish Flagship programme integrates both municipal and private sector actors in the water industry to connect problem owners with solution providers. The third most common strength identified by respondents is dedicated mission leadership and management (13%), underscoring the importance of allocating sufficient resources to oversee the work of thematic agendas, provide advice, manage fundraising, build capacity and enhance cross-departmental co-operation. Participants also recognise central or co-ordinated mission funding (12%) as a strength. Some initiatives include a large, dedicated budget from government sources and smaller dedicated budgets from other funding sources (e.g. private investors, funding agencies, etc.). Last, representing 7% of the responses, cross-ministerial funding models are helping support a whole-of-government approach to deliver on missions.
Weaknesses
The main core weakness indicated are persistent difficulties mobilising actors across government (23%). For instance, the 100 Climate-Neutral Cities missions in Mannheim, Germany points to siloed governance structures posing significant challenges for co-ordinating ministries and departments, as missions attempt to align programmes across government. Similarly, respondents indicate their missions have weak governance (17%). The lack of regulatory changes and limited ability to mobilise cross-governmental action impacts the governance of the overall initiative and alignment of partnerships toward effective policy co-ordination. Another weakness is the lack of collaboration in adopting the mission-oriented approach (15%). Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation reported that it has faced an entrenched tendency towards “programme by programme” investments by industry and governments, which can lead to shorter term thinking at the expense of longer-term strategy. Closely related to this issue is the lack of consensus on how to tackle the mission (9%). Finally, it is difficult to secure stakeholder buy-in (6%). This is particularly related to a misalignment of individual timescales and benchmarks for the targets in different programmes, and competition between mission programmes and other STI interventions.
References
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← 1. See Annex F for a synthesis of the different types of MOIPs.
← 3. In the Japanese Cross-Ministerial Strategic Innovation Programme (SIP), municipal governments are encouraged to test technological deployment developed through the national missions (e.g. autonomous vehicles). See: https://stip.oecd.org/covid/moip/case-studies/15.
← 5. All EU missions follow a similar co-leadership governance structure. As claimed by European Commission staff, “bringing together two DGs to steer the joint implementation of the mission is a novel approach, a new way of working” (European Commission, 2023).
← 6. See, respectively, https://stip.oecd.org/moip/case-studies/29, https://stip.oecd.org/moip/case-studies/40 and https://stip.oecd.org/moip/case-studies/32. The DOE Earthshots have discontinued as part of broader reforms undertaken in the United-States.