The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Blue Economy Framework envisions a future less dependent on development assistance, but any diversification strategy requires understanding the current baseline. This chapter examines ocean-related official development assistance (ODA) to Southeast Asia: its scale, sectoral allocation, geographic distribution and delivery modalities. It subsequently explores the implications of budgetary pressures on ocean-related ODA to Southeast Asia. Understanding these patterns is critical to assessing what gaps alternative capital sources ought to fill.
Financing Southeast Asia's Blue Economy
Development Assistance and Beyond
Abstract
Official development finance (ODF) – comprising both ODA and other official flows (OOF)1 – represents a small but strategically important component of Southeast Asia’s financing landscape. Between 2010 and 2023, total ODF increased from USD 19.4 billion to USD 36.5 billion (see Figure 2.1). ODA rose from USD 11.8 billion to USD 13.1 billion over the same period, having reached a peak of USD 21.8 billion in 2013. OOF volumes also expanded, growing from USD 7.7 billion in 2010 to USD 10.5 billion in 2022, before spiking to USD 23.4 billion in 2023.
ODF forms part of the region’s financing mix – typically defined as the combination of other external finance inflows (i.e. foreign direct investment and remittances) and tax revenues (Cattaneo and Piemonté, 2021[1]). Despite its growth, ODF remains a relatively small component of the broader financing landscape (see Figure 2.1). Between 2010 and 2023, ODF accounted for roughly 6–11% of total external inflows plus tax revenues, with the peak in 2020 (11%). In 2023, ODF represented just under 10% of the overall financing mix.
The small relative volumes mask the importance of development finance – particularly ODA – for Southeast Asia and its blue economy. First, most Southeast Asian countries rely to some extent on development finance, making it a common source of funding across the region. This reliance is especially pronounced among the region’s lower-income countries, which not only benefit from the most concessional forms of development finance but also depend on it more heavily than upper-middle-income countries. Second, the grant-based and highly concessional nature of development finance such as ODA makes it an irreplaceable catalytic instrument: it not only addresses funding shortfalls, but also strengthens the underlying conditions for other sources and types of capital to flow, including into the blue economy.
Source: OECD (2025[2]), Creditor Reporting System, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/; World Bank (2025[3]), Data Bank, https://databank.worldbank.org/.
2.1.1. Most ASEAN countries access development finance, with lower-income countries receiving the most concessional terms
Access to development finance – from both bilateral and multilateral sources – depends on a range of country-level factors, such as income level and creditworthiness, which reflect different dimensions of a country’s development (Cattaneo and Piemonté, 2021[1]). These factors are typically formalised into eligibility criteria used by international organisations and multilateral development banks, determining not only whether a country can access finance, but also the terms on which it is offered. Eligibility for ODA and access to the different lending windows of multilateral development banks are the most salient of these criteria2 (see Box 2.1). ODA eligibility allows countries to receive grant support and highly concessional loans, although the minimum level of concessionality varies by income group (OECD, 2024[4]). Meanwhile, multilateral development banks (MDB) operate multiple lending windows: the lowest-income countries qualify for highly concessional loans similar to ODA, while others receive preferential but near-market-rate finance.
ODA eligibility
Eligibility for official development assistance is governed by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). For countries to be ODA-eligible, they must be classified as low or middle income according to their gross national income per capita. Countries that achieve high-income status for three consecutive years graduate from the list of eligible ODA recipients.
ODA concessionality is also influenced by a country’s income level. The “softness” of an ODA loan is measured by its grant element – the percentage by which the present value of the loan falls short of its face value, due to features such as a below-market interest rate, a long grace period, or a long maturity. For a loan to be considered ODA eligible, it must have a grant element of at least:
45% in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of least developed countries (LDC) and other low-income countries (LICs), calculated at a discount rate of 9%
15% in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of lower middle-income countries (LMIC), calculated at a discount rate of 7%
10% in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of upper middle-income countries (UMIC), calculated at a discount rate of 6%
10% in the case of loans to multilateral institutions and international non-governmental organisations (NGO), calculated at a discount rate of 5% for global institutions and multilateral development banks and 6% for other organisations and international NGOs.
Multilateral windows
MDBs structure their financing through differentiated lending windows that align with countries’ income levels and borrowing capacity. Concessional windows provide grants or highly concessional loans to the lowest income and most vulnerable countries, while non-concessional windows offer loans on preferential but closer-to-market terms to countries with stronger creditworthiness (Cattaneo and Piemonté, 2021[1]).
For example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) allocates concessional assistance to lower-income and more financially vulnerable member states (Group A), while more creditworthy or middle-income members typically borrow through its Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR) (Group C). Some countries receive a mix of concessional and OCR financing (Group B).
Source: OECD (2024[4]), Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Annual DAC Questionnaire, DCD/DAC(2024)40/FINAL/en/pdf; ADB (2025[5]), Classification and Graduation of Developing Member Countries, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/31483/om-a1.pdf.
Nearly all ASEAN countries are ODA-eligible and have access to the different MDB lending windows, making development finance a widely used tool across the region. Nine of the region’s eleven countries – Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam – are eligible for official development assistance (OECD, 2025[6]). These countries also have access to various multilateral lending windows, such as the World Bank’s concessional (International Development Association) and non-concessional (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) arms, as well as the Asian Development Bank’s concessional and OCR windows (see Table 2.1). Only Brunei Darussalam and Singapore are ODA-ineligible and fall outside the scope of MDB lending.
Note: IDA refers to International Development Association. IBRD refers to International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Source: OECD (n.d.[7]), DAC List of ODA Recipients: Effective for reporting on 2024 and 2025 flows, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/oda-eligibility-and-conditions/DAC-List-of-ODA-Recipients-for-reporting-2024-25-flows.pdf; ADB (2025[5]), Classification and Graduation of Developing Member Countries, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/31483/om-a1.pdf; World Bank (2025[8]), World Bank Country and Lending Groups, https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.
Development finance is particularly important for the region’s lower-income countries, which benefit from more concessional loans due to both higher concessionality thresholds for ODA and access to concessional MDB lending. For example, three of the region’s least developed countries – Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar – can access the World Bank's International Development Association, which provides interest-free loans and grants, and are classified as Group A countries by the ADB, making them priorities for concessional lending (see Table 2.1). The other LDC in the region, Timor-Leste, receives a blend of concessional and non-concessional lending from both the World Bank and the ADB (see Table 2.1). This importance is reflected in the extent to which ASEAN LDCs rely on ODA: between 2010 and 2023, ODA accounted for 45 % of the financing mix for Timor-Leste, 24 % for Myanmar, 21 % for Lao PDR and 16 % for Cambodia (Figure 2.2). By contrast, ODA represents less than 1 % of the financing mix in countries such as Malaysia and Thailand, with Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam falling between these extremes at 5–6 %. This concentration of support in lower-income countries makes ODA a critical tool for reducing the development divide within ASEAN – a key priority for regional cohesion under the ASEAN Blue Economy Framework.
Source: OECD (2025[2]), Creditor Reporting System, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/; World Bank (2025[3]), Data Bank, https://databank.worldbank.org/.
2.1.2. Development finance can help overcome the different barriers to blue economy finance and investment
Development finance is indispensable for advancing sustainable development priorities. It can help fund activities that would otherwise be under- or unfunded, such as public goods and basic services – whether healthcare, education, climate change adaptation or social protection. Moreover, when crises occur – from natural disasters to pandemics – development finance functions as a safety net, cushioning contractions in other sources of capital (UNCTAD, 2025[9]). Beyond this direct funding role, development finance also serves as a catalyst for mobilising both private and public resources at significantly larger scales. Blended finance structures can reduce investment risk and mobilise private investment: in 2023, various leveraging mechanisms mobilised nearly USD 70 billion in private finance (OECD, 2025[10]). Development finance can also strengthen the enabling conditions – such as infrastructure and institutional quality – improving the overall investment climate. Meanwhile, support to enhance public finance management can catalyse domestic resource mobilisation and bolster fiscal capacity (Chami, Darkey and Williams, 2021[11]).
This carries important value in the blue economy, where its concessional nature – especially of ODA – and focus on social returns make it well suited to addressing barriers to finance and investment. These barriers operate at two levels: generic constraints, which limit overall capital availability, and project-specific challenges that deter individual investments (see Figure 2.3).
Source: Adapted from OECD (2025[12]), Promoting Sustainable Ocean Economies: Guidance for Development Co-operation, https://doi.org/10.1787/72055d7f-en.
Generic constraints significantly shape blue economy finance and investment (OECD, 2025[12]). Limited fiscal space and high public debt, particularly when debt service takes up a large share of budget revenue, are well‑known constraints in developing countries (Isgut, 2025[13]) (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the fiscal constraints facing Southeast Asian countries). Recent overlapping shocks – including the COVID-19 pandemic – have further pressured domestic budgets and limited the availability, affordability and accessibility of external finance, as well as exposing borrowers to foreign exchange risks (United Nations, 2024r[14]). For the blue economy, this means that governments have less room to finance capital‑intensive, long‑term investments. Insufficient regulatory and policy frameworks also deter necessary investment: in particular, policies to strengthen sustainable marine resource management, establish clear community rights and incentivise sustainable ocean enterprises remain nascent (OECD, 2025[12]). Simultaneously, systemic capacity shortfalls – at both institutional and individual levels – reduce both investment readiness and the ability to absorb available capital.
At the project level, multiple constraints can directly impede capital deployment in the blue economy (OECD, 2025[12]). High development costs for activities such as offshore renewables mean that multi-year grant support is often required to achieve investment readiness, yet grant financing remains limited and short term. The ticket sizes for small-scale fisheries projects mean that due diligence costs typically exceed the deal size – deterring investor interest (OECD, 2025[12]). Nature-based solutions (e.g. mangrove restoration for coastal resilience) frequently lack clear revenue profiles due to insufficient performance data, while ocean-focused small and medium-sized enterprises often fail standard creditworthiness assessments. Meanwhile, the longer‑term time horizons required for blue economy investments, such as coastal protection infrastructure or large‑scale ecosystem restoration, to generate financial returns conflict with investor preferences for shorter time frames for a return on investment (OECD, 2025[12]).
These macroeconomic and project-specific barriers are interrelated. Limited fiscal space reduces the public co‑financing needed to de‑risk projects; weak regulatory environments heighten project‑level uncertainty and deter private investment, reinforcing a cycle of underinvestment in the region’s blue economy; and systemic capacity constraints are compounded by the specialised technical expertise often required in blue economy activities (for example, marine biotechnology).
These macroeconomic and project‑specific barriers help explain why development finance remains vital for Southeast Asia’s blue economy. It occupies parts of the financing landscape that other sources typically avoid – funding public goods such as marine data systems, ecosystem restoration and regulatory reforms, and supporting countries and communities with limited market access – while also catalysing other forms of capital by de‑risking projects and strengthening foundations. In practice, concessional resources and ODA often absorb early‑stage and policy risks, cover project preparation and technical assistance costs, and provide guarantees that make blue economy investments acceptable to domestic and international investors. This same catalytic function underpins many of the instruments discussed later in the report. Blue bonds, debt‑for‑nature swaps, blue carbon markets and parametric insurance, examined in Chapter 4, have typically relied on development partners for their design, piloting and scaling, whether through credit enhancements or capacity‑building.
The OECD’s framework for tracking development finance for the ocean economy3 centres on ODA (see Figure 2.4). Data on non-ODA development finance (e.g. OOF) are not available. In particular, the OECD tracks:
ODA for the ocean economy encompasses support to all ocean economy activities, regardless of sustainability.
A subset, ODA for the sustainable ocean economy, captures only activities promoting sustainable resource use, management and environmental protection.
The third indicator, ODA for land-based activities that reduce harm to the ocean, recognises that land-based activities spill over into marine and coastal environments.
For the purposes of this report, the sum of ODA for the ocean economy and ODA for land-based activities that reduce harm to the ocean will be referred to as ocean-related ODA. Meanwhile, the sum of ODA for the sustainable ocean economy and ODA for land-based activities that reduce harm on the ocean will be referred to as sustainable ocean-related ODA.
Source: OECD (2020[15]), Sustainable Ocean for All: Harnessing the Benefits of Sustainable Ocean Economies for Developing Countries, https://doi.org/10.1787/bede6513-en.
An analysis of ocean-related and sustainable-related ODA to Southeast Asia shows that there are several challenges. High year-over-year volatility – driven by concentration in large infrastructure projects – creates unpredictability. Significant gaps persist between commitments and actual disbursements, also driven by the skew of ocean-related ODA commitments towards large projects. Allocations do not always align with countries' ocean and ODA dependencies, while heavy reliance on loans rather than grants and dominance of project-type interventions can limit strategic coherence.
2.2.1. Ocean-related ODA has increased but exhibits high year-over-year volatility driven by large individual transport projects
Ocean-related ODA to ASEAN grew substantially between 2010 and 2023. It increased from USD 367.7 million in 2010 to USD 773.7 million in 2023 – more than doubling and outpacing the 1.67-fold increase in ocean-related ODA to all developing country recipients. Between 2010 and 2023, ocean-related ODA's share of total ODA to ASEAN oscillated between 6% and 14% – noticeably larger than the 2% global average, suggesting ocean priorities feature more prominently in ASEAN ODA allocations.
However, extreme year-over-year volatility also characterises ocean-related ODA to ASEAN. Between 2010 and 2023, commitments ranged from USD 331.3 million (2015) to roughly USD 2.4 billion (2017). Despite the generally increasing trend, spike years are followed by pronounced dips. After ocean-related ODA crossed USD 2 billion in 2017 and 2020, marked decreases followed: -64% from 2017 to 2018 and -80% from 2020 to 2021.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD (2025[16]), Data Platform on Development Finance for the Sustainable Ocean Economy, https://oecd-main.shinyapps.io/ocean/.
This volatility stems primarily from a small number of large ocean economy projects that dominate ocean‑related ODA to ASEAN, most of which are in transport and storage, typically single large port upgrading and expansion projects. In 2022-2023, transport and storage accounted for USD 1.3 billion – over 60% of ocean‑related ODA to ASEAN – while the next three largest sectors together received only 27% (Figure 2.6). While this concentration in transport and storage aligns with the region’s largest blue economy financing gap and the sector’s high capital intensity, it also introduces substantial volatility. At the same time, the near absence of investment in other areas of need – especially in emerging, equally capital‑intensive sectors such as marine renewable energy – represents a potential missed opportunity. Moreover, although the financing gap is useful for identifying underfunded areas, excessive reliance on it risks skewing resources towards capital‑intensive activities at the expense of lower‑cost but essential functions for the blue economy. Taken together, the pronounced concentration of ODA in the transport sector raises important questions about the balance and long‑term resilience of blue economy development in Southeast Asia.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD (2025[16]), Data Platform on Development Finance for the Sustainable Ocean Economy, https://oecd-main.shinyapps.io/ocean/.
Over the 2010-2023 period, only 34% of ocean-related ODA to Southeast Asia supported the sustainable ocean economy. Including ODA for land-based activities that reduce ocean harm increases this share to 66%. This implies, nonetheless, that over 30% of ocean‑related ODA projects do not explicitly target environmental sustainability.
While sustainable ocean economy ODA has grown substantially – from USD 49.1 million in 2010 to USD 565.5 million in 2023, with its share of ocean-related ODA rising from 13% to 73% – this apparent progress masks considerable year-to-year volatility driven by the transport sector's dominance. In years with major ocean-related ODA spikes – 2017, 2020 and 2022 – sustainable ocean economy ODA accounted for only 27%, 45% and 26% of total ocean-related ODA respectively. This pattern reflects how large transport infrastructure projects, particularly port expansion and upgrading, drive overall commitments upward while often lacking explicit sustainability criteria. The result is an unpredictable sustainability trajectory determined by project-specific funding cycles rather than strategic prioritisation of environmental objectives, making it difficult to assess whether ocean-related ODA is genuinely becoming more sustainable or simply experiencing cyclical fluctuations tied to infrastructure investment timing.
2.2.2. The dominance of large individual projects creates delivery and modality challenges
Ocean‑related ODA commitments to ASEAN consistently exceed disbursements, and by a wider margin than ODA to ASEAN overall. Over 2010-2023, commitments exceeded disbursements by approximately USD 5 billion, meaning 38% of committed funds remained undisbursed (Figure 2.7). This exceeds the 14% undisbursed of overall ODA to ASEAN over the same period. The most striking feature is the pattern of large commitment spikes, particularly in 2017, 2020 and 2022, that are not matched by corresponding disbursements in the years that follow. These spikes correspond to years when transport sector commitments peaked, particularly for port-related projects.
LHS: Ocean-related ODA to ASEAN; RHS: Total ODA to ASEAN
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD (2025[16]), Data Platform on Development Finance for the Sustainable Ocean Economy, https://oecd-main.shinyapps.io/ocean/.
The mismatch remains salient when evaluating individual projects and countries. In a sample of ocean-related ODA projects with consistent reporting between 2010-2013, only 50% of committed funds had been disbursed by end-2023, compared to 66% for overall ODA. Strong heterogeneity exists across recipients: Thailand has received over 90% of committed funds whereas Cambodia has received less than 25% (see Figure 2.8).
Note: Sample of projects with continuous reporting (i.e. same CRSID used between 2010 and 2023).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD (2025[16]), Data Platform on Development Finance for the Sustainable Ocean Economy, https://oecd-main.shinyapps.io/ocean/.
Virtually all ocean-related ODA to ASEAN takes the form of project-type interventions. Over 2010-2023, project-type interventions never dropped below 85% of total ocean-related ODA, often exceeding 90%. This contrasts sharply with overall ODA to ASEAN, where project-type interventions constitute just 45-47% of activities over the same period. This echoes the significant skew of ocean-related ODA towards singular large projects, typically in the transport sector. Excessive reliance on project-type interventions, at the expense of other modalities like budget support or technical assistance, can represent an ad hoc, fragmented approach to development co-operation, generating high transaction costs for recipient countries (e.g. multiple reporting and accounting requirements) and potentially undermining long-term development progress due to lack of strategic coherence across projects.
Loans account for nearly 80% of ocean-related ODA over 2010-2023 (Figure 2.9), significantly exceeding loan shares in overall ODA to ASEAN. This reflects large infrastructure investment projects prevalent in ocean-related ODA, particularly in the transport sector, which are typically loan-financed. Even in other ocean-related sectors like fisheries and water supply and sanitation, loans predominate. Environmental protection is the only exception, being entirely grant-funded.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD (2025[16]), Data Platform on Development Finance for the Sustainable Ocean Economy, https://oecd-main.shinyapps.io/ocean/.
2.2.3. ODA allocations do not consistently reflect countries' ocean and aid dependencies
The largest recipients of ocean-related ODA to Southeast Asia have shifted over time. Before 2017, Viet Nam was the largest recipient. Indonesia emerged as the largest in 2017. Recently, Cambodia has become prominent. For these recipients, ocean-related ODA accounts for a significant share of total ODA. In 2022-2023, ocean-related ODA represented nearly 19% and 13% of Indonesia and Cambodia's total ODA respectively.
Examining relationships between ocean-related ODA allocations and two types of dependency provides insight into allocation patterns: ocean dependency (indicated by exclusive economic zone (EEZ) size and coastline length, proxying reliance on ocean resources) and ODA dependency (indicated by ODA's share of the financing mix, proxying reliance on development assistance).
Some alignment exists between ocean-related ODA allocations and ocean dependency as proxied by EEZ and coastline size (Figure 2.10). Indonesia, with the largest EEZ and coastline, receives the largest ocean-related ODA. However, notable exceptions exist. Myanmar receives relatively small amounts despite considerable EEZ and coastline – particularly striking given that Cambodia, with smaller EEZ and coastline, receives the second-largest amount. While this likely reflects competing priorities in Myanmar, where development assistance focuses on conflict and fragility challenges, other countries including the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam also receive smaller amounts despite having larger EEZ and coastlines than Cambodia.
LHS: EEZ vs. ocean-related ODA; RHS: Coastline vs. ocean-related ODA
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD (2025[16]), Data Platform on Development Finance for the Sustainable Ocean Economy, https://oecd-main.shinyapps.io/ocean/.
The relationship between ocean-related ODA and overall ODA dependency shows no clear pattern (Figure 2.11). Malaysia, receiving the least ocean-related ODA, is also least reliant on ODA generally, suggesting alignment. This also holds for Thailand, which receives below-median ocean-related ODA and is not ODA-reliant. However, Myanmar and Timor-Leste present contrasting cases: despite heavy ODA reliance (24% and 45% of their financing mix respectively), both receive relatively small amounts of ocean-related ODA, trailing countries like Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam that rely far less on ODA overall. This pattern suggests that ODA dependency alone does not determine ocean-related allocations.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD (2025[16]), Data Platform on Development Finance for the Sustainable Ocean Economy, https://oecd-main.shinyapps.io/ocean; and OECD (2025[2]), Creditor Reporting System, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Bilateral official development assistance is under significant strain. After falling by 9% in 2024, ODA is projected to decline by a further 9–17% in 2025 (OECD, 2025[17]). This sustained contraction stems from announced cuts by eleven OECD DAC members, including a historic development: four major providers – France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States – are cutting aid simultaneously for two consecutive years, the first time this has occurred in nearly three decades. These four countries have collectively accounted for close to two-thirds of total ODA over the past decade, with the United States alone representing one quarter. If current trends continue, ODA is projected to fall back to 2020 levels by 2027, threatening to reverse recent gains at a time when global needs are rising (OECD, 2025[17]).
Ocean-related ODA to Southeast Asia is vulnerable to these broader pressures, given the composition of bilateral providers supporting the region’s ocean priorities. Three of the four OECD DAC members announcing cuts (France, the United States and Germany) were among the top ten providers (both bilateral and multilateral) of ocean-related ODA (OECD, 2025[16]). Their relative importance varies across countries: Germany dominates ocean-related ODA to Thailand and Timor-Leste, while France is a major provider to Viet Nam (OECD, 2025[16]). These countries therefore face pronounced exposure to cuts in ocean-related ODA.
Indeed, simulations based on announced aid reductions suggest that ocean-related ODA flows to ASEAN could contract in 2025. In 2023, Development Assistance Committee members provided approximately USD 756.5 million in ocean-related ODA to ASEAN member states. Under a low-cut scenario, this volume is projected to decline to USD 698.4 million. Under a high-cut scenario, funding could fall further to USD 689.2 million, representing an overall decline of roughly 8–9% (Figure 2.12).
Note: The key distinction between these two projections lies in how United States’ Official Development Assistance is calculated. In the first projection ("lower cut"), United States’ foreign aid through United States Agency for International Development is estimated to decrease by 38% compared to 2024 levels, drawing on conservative estimates from the Center for Global Development's analysis of funding reductions for the 2024-2025 fiscal year. The second projection ("higher cut") anticipates a more dramatic 82% reduction in United States Agency for International Development funding from 2024 levels, corresponding to the United States’ Secretary of State's March 2025 announcement regarding the cancellation of 82% of the agency’s programmes.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on OECD (2025[16]), Data Platform on Development Finance for the Sustainable Ocean Economy, https://oecd-main.shinyapps.io/ocean; and OECD (2025[17]), Cuts in official development assistance: OECD projections for 2025 and the near term, https://doi.org/10.1787/8c530629-en.
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← 1. ODA consists of grants and sufficiently concessional loans (see Box 2.1 for a more detailed explanation of concessionality) provided by official agencies to promote economic development and welfare in developing countries (OECD, 2024[4]). OOF includes non-concessional official lending that does not meet ODA criteria but still comes from official sources (OECD, 2024[4]).
← 2. There is overlap in the underlying factors that dictate a country’s ODA eligibility and its access to different windows of multilateral development banks. But they are governed by different institutional processes and affect access to different types and sources of development finance.
← 3. While these indicators do not capture the full spectrum of blue economy activities in Southeast Asia, given that they do not include freshwater resources, they help assess the overall landscape. For more detailed information on the methodology, see OECD (2020[15]) and OECD (2025[16]).