With the objective of becoming the main transit hub of the TCTC in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has already significantly upgraded Kuryk port infrastructure, is investing in railway expansion and has launched Aktau port renovation and capacity increase. Private sector respondents testify to substantial progress in multimodal infrastructure and digitalised customs procedures. However, to fully realise its ambitions on the TCTC, Kazakhstan should finalise the adoption of the e-TIR and e-CMR systems and address the financial situation of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ) and its impact on tariffs. Longer-term solutions to the shrinking Caspian Sea coastline should be found together with regional partners.
Enhancing the Competitiveness of the Trans‑Caspian Transport Corridor in Central Asia
Abstract
This chapter briefly describes the recent economic performance of Kazakhstan before turning to its involvement in the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC). Drawing on OECD analytical work and best practices, a private-sector survey involving local and foreign firms, fact-finding interviews with government representatives, and the government's responses to an OECD questionnaire, the remaining of the chapter then provides a comprehensive and updated picture of latest developments on the TCTC in the country. The analysis focuses on areas crucial to the corridor's development, including advancements in hard infrastructure, progress in trade facilitation measures, initiatives supporting private-sector growth, and climate change impacts and related policies affecting connectivity.
Growth is steady if unspectacular
The economy has recovered from the COVID shock
The economy recovered from the COVID-19 recession of 2020, but the pandemic underscored Kazakhstan’s reliance on trade and revenues from hydrocarbon exports. Growth has returned to pre-Covid levels and reached 4.8% in 2024 (IMF, 2025[1]). The recovery has been broad-based, led primarily by services and industry, which accounted for 57,3% and 28,2% of GDP in 2023 respectively (QazStat, 2025[2]). Inflation, fuelled by post-Covid consumption, spillovers from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and an expansionary fiscal policy, remains high. The inflation rate declined from 14,5% in 2023 to 8,7% in 2024, but is projected to slightly increase to 9,9% in 2025, reversing the previous downward trend (IMF, 2025[1]). The IMF has advised Kazakhstan to improve tax collection and to strengthen fiscal discipline by reducing reliance on the National Fund, the sovereign wealth fund managing Kazakhstan’s oil revenue1.
Note: The figure for 2024 is an estimate.
Source: (IMF, 2025[3])
Source: (QazStat, 2025[4])
Kazakhstan remains by far Central Asia’s largest economy. According to World Bank, in 2024, Kazakhstan’s GDP accounted for 57,8% of Central Asia’s GDP, making Kazakhstan’s economy more than half of that of the whole Central Asia region (World Bank, 2025[5]). Kazakhstan received $17.1 billion of gross FDI inflows in 2024, mainly from Russia, EU countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium, and Asian partners, such as South Korea and China (National Bank of Kazakhstan, 2025[6]), which represented 63% of Central Asia’s total FDI inflows in 2024 (The Times of Central Asia, 2024[7]). However, net FDI inflows turned negative for the first time in Kazakhstan’s history, owing to the completion of oil and gas projects Tengiz and Kashagan, increased capital outflows to offshore jurisdictions and a shift in investment structure towards debt obligations rather than reinvested earnings (Orda.kz, 2025[8]).
Crude oil and crude oil products represented 52,5% of Kazakhstan’s exports in 2024 (QazStat, 2025[9]). Kazakhstan’s export basket remains relatively undiversified which, coupled with its landlocked geography, hampers the country’s integration into global value chains (OECD, 2024[10]). A prolonged decline in oil prices can lower investment payback and cut into export revenues, budget income and growth, as happened in 2015-2016 when lower global oil demand and price volatility provoked a substantial slowdown (OECD, 2021[11]).
This experience underscores the need for the economy to reduce its dependence on global energy price fluctuations. The current expansionary fiscal policy is maintaining inflationary pressure on an economy that would benefit from higher productivity, investment and tax revenues. At the same time, Kazakhstan’s reliance on primary commodities hinders the dynamism of the private sector and SME development, as large SOEs dominate the mining and manufacturing sectors (OECD, 2024[10]). More reforms are needed to encourage investment in non-extractive sectors and diversify output, exports and employment (OECD, 2021[11]) (World Bank, 2025[12]).
Trade with China is deepening, while Russia remains a key partner
The EU, China and Russia are Kazakhstan’s main trade partners. The EU’s share in Kazakhstan’s exports declined from 53% in 2018 to 26% in 2023, while the United Kingdom’s share increased from 1% to 16%, mainly reflecting one-off gold purchases. On the import side, China’s share in Kazakhstan’s imports increased from 24% in 2018 to 31.2% in 2023, while Russia’s share fell from 35% to 23.5% at the end of 2023 (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2025[13]). According to the government’s official statistics, Russia’s share in the country’s imports declined from 42.5% in 2021 to 34.7% in 2022 and then to 26.5% in 2023, before recovering to 30.5% in 2024, suggesting that international sanctions may have affected Russian exports; however, Russia remains a significant trading partner (QazStat, 2025[14]).
Kazakhstan’s economic relations with Russia remain important and expose the country to trade and financial risks. The countries share a 7600-kilometre border, and Kazakhstan’s membership in the EAEU has deepened economic integration with Russia via trade and investment, with bilateral trade reaching close to 28 Bn USD in 2024. The Kazakh tenge is sensitive to ruble fluctuations. When the ruble appreciates, it increases the price of imported Russian goods and contributes to inflationary pressures in Kazakhstan (Eurasianet, 2024[15]) (Kursiv.media, 2025[16]). Russia also controls Kazakhstan’s main oil export route, the Caspian Pipeline, which handles 79% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, and strategic uranium assets accounting for 25% of Kazakhstan’s uranium production (Chatham House, 2024[17]).
Regional economic integration and trade facilitation underpin the country’s strategy for increasing and diversifying trade
Kazakhstan has been leading trade facilitation reforms in Central Asia (OECD, 2023[18]). The latest OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFIs) show the country as one of the top reformers in trade facilitation in the Europe and Central Asia region (OECD, 2025[19]). Kazakhstan’s accession to the WTO in 2015 had already served to simplify customs and trade procedures (OECD, 2023[18]).
Kazakhstan has also worked to enhance its regional integration through organisations like ECO and SCO and more importantly the EAEU, which allows for closer integration with Russia, the Kyrgyz Republic and other EAEU members. Kazakhstan’s trade turnovers with the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan both increased by about 60% between 2018 and 2023 (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2025[13]). The EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (EPCA), focused on customs, trade and energy co-operation, entered into force in 2020 (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2020[20]).
Kazakhstan aims to become the main overland transit corridor between East and West
Kazakhstan seeks to become a key transit hub between Europe and China (Trend.az, 2024[24]). In 2023, the government developed a Concept for the Development of Transport and Logistics Potential until 2030, in which it outlines a multi-vectoral investment strategy in road, rail, sea and air transport, as well as logistics infrastructure (OECD, 2024[10]). The strategy emphasises the development of cross-border hubs to adapt to increasing transport volumes, the elimination of non-physical barriers to transit and the modernisation of the existing fleet in road, rail and sea transport. The government aims to significantly improve labour productivity in transport and logistics and to reach 74 million tonnes in transit volume by 2030 (Central Communications Service under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2025[25]).
Kazakhstan is already establishing itself as a key node of the TCTC. It is the only Central Asian country both to share a border with China (with five operational BCPs) and to have access to the Caspian Sea, via the ports of Aktau and Kuryk. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and subsequent logistical disruptions, the route from China to Europe through Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea saw a 125% increase in transport volumes, from under 1.5 to over 3.3 million tonnes of cargo between 2022 and 2024 (Middle Corridor Association, 2025[26]). Much of the increase in trade and transit through the Caspian Sea in 2022 reflected mineral exports, including crude oil (World Bank, 2023[27]).
Source: OECD and Pictoris (2025)
Hard infrastructure
Increased traffic is putting existing infrastructure under strain
Private sector respondents welcomed the government’s attention to the development of the infrastructure on the TCTC. Respondents noted several areas of progress in infrastructure modernisation, freight delivery times and border crossings. They particularly welcomed new multimodal infrastructure projects, such as the Sarzha multifunctional marine terminal in the port of Kuryk currently under construction, the Zhetygen transport and logistics centre near Almaty, the Dostyk TransTerminal near the Dostyk BCP, and the Kazakhstan terminal in Xi’an, China.
Yet, congestion is observed across all transport modes. The problem appears especially acute at border crossing points (BCPs), where limited internet access as well as outdated road and rail infrastructure cannot handle increasing traffic. BCPs on the borders with China thus experience significant delays due to slow vehicle processing. On the border with Russia, the Syrym, Zhaisan, Kairak and Kurmangazy BCPs experience particularly long lines, with an average waiting time of 24 hours at Kurmangazy; the Tajen BCP on the Uzbek border is also very congested (ADB, 2024[28]), while the average waiting time on the Barys parking spot next to the Kordai BCP on the Kyrgyz border stands at 4,5 days (Asian-cba.com, 2025[29]).
The railway network is worn out and not keeping pace with rising freight and passenger traffic. The government estimated in its National Infrastructure Plan until 2029 that the level of wear and tear of the railway network had reached 57% in 2023 (Adilet.kz, 2024[30]). In addition, the processing ability of train stations is constrained, as station infrastructure has largely remained unchanged, while train weight and length have grown. KTZ currently estimates that close to 60% of stations and passing loops cannot accommodate long freight trains (The Times of Central Asia, 2025[31]). The Plan also highlights that the low level of electrification of the network and the predominance of single-track lines limit the capacity of rail transport, affecting speed of delivery.
Port infrastructure development focuses on capacity expansion, logistics efficiency and attracting private investment
The government has identified the ports of Aktau and Kuryk as the main bottlenecks on its segment of the TCTC, due to the lack of vessels and multimodal infrastructure (ADB, 2024[28]). The port of Kuryk in particular lacks loading and unloading capacity. Private sector respondents point to the deficit of seagoing vessels as a significant factor of supply chain disruption, this deficit reportedly preventing them from anticipating delivery times. Respondents also observed that public facilities are not always technologically equipped to handle certain types of cargo. At the same time, Kazakhstan’s cargo transport volumes by sea were 56% higher in January-March 2025 than in the same period in 2024, reaching 1.02 million tonnes (QazStat, 2025[32]), which highlights the necessity to upgrade the existing port infrastructure.
To this effect, the development of the Sarzha multifunctional terminal in Kuryk port is under way. The grain and dry bulk terminals are under construction, while 16 km of railway and 1.9 km of roads have been extended to the facility; dredging works were finalised at the grain terminal pier berth (Box 3.1), and the construction of a liquid bulk terminal is going through project and cost estimation documentation. Besides the terminals under construction or study, there are also plans to build an oil terminal with a capacity of 2.6 million tonnes and a container cargo terminal with a yearly capacity of 150 000 TEU, bringing the total capacity of the Sarzha terminal to 4.1 million tonnes per year (Astana International Financial Centre, 2024[33]). The construction of the terminal is conducted by the Kazakh holding Semurg Invest in partnership with the UAE-based AD Ports Group, the latter holding a 51% stake in the project (Qazinform, 2025[34]). The government is also considering building a new railway station near the port, with the objective of streamlining the accumulation of ship consignments to the ferries and making operations on roll on-roll of wagons more efficiently.
In the port of Aktau, a new container hub is under construction, with a projected capacity of 250,000 TEU per year (Astana International Financial Centre, 2024[33]). The construction of new storage facilities around the hub, in partnership with foreign players in the logistics sector, such as Rhenus Logistics, CMA CGM and Wandernet, is planned for delivery by 2030. According to the Aktau port authorities, the container volume processed in 2024 was more than three times higher than in 2023 (54923 TEU in 2024 compared to 16387 in 2023). Despite the low share of container cargo compared to bulk and liquid cargo processed in Kazakhstan’s ports (The Times of Central Asia, 2025[35]), this represents a significant rise. This increase calls for the modernisation and expansion of existing infrastructure: the port authorities plan to conduct dredging works in the port water area and the access channel (Box 3.1), to modernise the port handling equipment and to restore oil loading berths (Azertag, 2025[36]).
The falling level of the Caspian Sea currently prevents the full loading of ships, reducing transport efficiency and increasing transport costs. The low sea levels around the port of Kuryk and Aktau hamper the ports’ competitiveness, threaten their long-term viability, and create significant environmental pressures on the Caspian ecosystem. The government commissioned a European marine engineering contractor to conduct dredging works in the port of Kuryk, including its terminals, turning circle and access channel. Dredging in the port access channel and turning basin was challenging as hard rocks dominated the underwater soil. In four months, over 1.7 million cubic meters of soil were removed and the water depth in the operational port area was increased to 8.5 meters. This allowed the ships in Kuryk to be loaded at full capacity and the Kuryk port to handle increased levels of dry and general cargo. Kuryk became the first port in the Caspian Sea to be fully prepared for the estimated TCTC cargo capacities.
In Aktau, some dredging works have already been conducted, using dredgers in the water and cranes and grabs near the berths. However, these works were not conducted at the same scale as in Kuryk. The government announced the launch of new full-scale dredging works in June 2025, with the objective of achieving a 7.7-meter-depth in the operational part of the port.
The World Bank climate projections suggest different adaptation needs: under low-emission scenarios, minor dredging may suffice; under moderate emissions, further dredging and small-scale modifications could extend the life of existing berths until eventual reconstruction; under high-emission scenarios, with water levels projected to fall by around 5 meters from 2025 to 2100, existing berths could no longer be modified, requiring entirely new berths within the harbour or even relocation of the port.
The government plans to build its own fleet to reduce its dependence on foreign ships and adapt to the Caspian Sea’s changing coastline. Currently, much of Kazakhstan’s maritime cargo is transported by foreign carriers, notably by the Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping Company which operates the largest fleet on the sea (The Times of Central Asia, 2025[44]). This results in foregone revenue opportunities for Kazakhstan in the context of increasing cargo volumes. Currently, Kazakhstan’s merchant fleet consists of 20 ships, including 7 which currently operate on the TCTC (Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023[45]). The government is exploring the construction of a domestic shipbuilding and repair facility in Kazakhstan, starting with 7 additional vessels, including three tankers, two container ships and two ferries. Semurg Invest, which conducts the Sarzha terminal construction project in Kuryk, recently expanded its fleet to two dry cargo ships, with the inauguration of “Nasipkali Marabayev” in April 2025 (Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2025[46]). Semurg Invest will be operating its new vessel in partnership with Freeseas Container Shipping from the UAE and plans to expand its fleet to six vessels by 2027. AD Ports Group, which works with Semurg Invest on the Sarzha project, has concluded an agreement with KazMunayGaz to build two new container ships (Lada.kz, 2025[47]).
Kazakhstan is also investing in Azerbaijan’s port infrastructure. The Kazakh SK-AIH Investment Fund, in partnership with China’s Xi’an Free Trade Port Construction, is building an intermodal freight terminal in the Azerbaijani port of Alyat, with notably A 5000-square-meter warehouse and a container yard with a capacity above 1000 TEU. At the time of writing, the construction of the terminal is being finalised (Railway Supply, 2024[48]).
The government pursues an ambitious strategy of rolling stock and rail network expansion to facilitate cargo transit from China
Rolling stock is being renewed with the purchase of new locomotives (Rolling Stock World, 2024[49]). The first electric locomotive was shipped from China to Kazakhstan in 2025 (Railway Supply, 2025[50]). In September 2025, Kazakhstan also signed a 4.2 bn USD agreement with United States-based Wabtec Corporation, an international locomotive manufacturer, to purchase 300 locomotives and additional railway equipment. Wabtec will also launch production of diesel engines at the Astana Diesel Service plant in 2026, its first facility outside the United States, supporting localisation, technology transfer, and skills development (Astana Times, 2025[51]).
The government is also expanding the railway network to address bottlenecks for cargo coming from China. The Khorgos border terminal serviced 2,375 trains in the first quarter of 2025, 28,4% more than for the same period in 2024 (Rail-news.kz, 2025[52]). The finalisation of the second Dostyk-Mointy line was inaugurated in September 2025. It is expected to increase freight volumes fivefold and shorten delivery times (akorda.kz, 2025[53]). In parallel, several major projects are under construction. These include a new 272-kilometer-long line from Bakty, on the border with China, to Ayagoz, with the goal of easing the pressure on existing railway lines (Astana International Financial Centre, 2024[33]). In similar fashion, the construction of a line bypassing Almaty is under way; it is projected to increase cargo capacity by 17 million tonnes annually and shorten delivery times by up to 24 hours (The Times of Central Asia, 2024[54]). The construction of the Darbaza-Maktaaral railway line, which should enhance Kazakhstan’s connectivity with Uzbekistan, is also ongoing and should be finalised in 2025 (Astana International Financial Centre, 2024[33]) (EBRD, 2023[55]).Investments in multimodal and road infrastructure are also under way
Private sector respondents mentioned significant delays at BCPs due to outdated infrastructure, lack of throughput capacity and the poor quality of technical equipment. The government works to address this issue, notably by upgrading the Dostyk border crossing infrastructure to streamline transit from China to Kazakhstan. The Euro Transit Terminal (ETT) Dostyk transport and logistics centre was opened in 2023, with an additional capacity of 150 000 TEU. The new Dostyk Trans Terminal will undergo expansion works from 2025 to 2029, while a new rail logistics park which will be built by Dar Rail. In 2025, the government is planning to conduct renovation works on several BCPs on the border with Russia and the Kyrgyz Republic.
New cross-border logistics hubs are being planned near the Atameken BCP on the Uzbek border and the Kara-Suu BCP on the Kyrgyz border, in the Oral Ak Zhol airport zone near the Russian border, and in the port of Aktau (Lsm.kz, 2025[56]). Near the Bakhty BCP on the border with China, the Chinese company Zhongcai Financial Holdings is going to build a logistics park at a cost of $1 billion, with facilities for agricultural product processing and assembly of heavy-duty vehicles (Transport Corridors, 2025[57]).
The government prioritises road infrastructure projects on the East-West axis and has completed several projects ensuring better connectivity between the country’s regions and on the TCTC. Reconstruction works on the Karagandy-Almaty, Aktobe-Kandyagash, Atyrau-Astrakhan and Oskemen-Taldykorgan highways were completed in 2024 (Astana Times, 2024[58]), while the reconstruction of the Kyzylorda-Jezkazgan highway is still ongoing with EBRD and ADB support (ADB, 2024[59]) (CAREC, 2025[60]). The longest road tunnel in Kazakhstan was opened in September 2024 at Shakpak Baba pass in the Turkistan region, streamlining transit on the Western Europe-Western China corridor (The Times of Central Asia, 2024[61]). In October 2024, Kazakhstan’s longest bridge across the Bukhtarma reservoir, a project realised through a PPP, was opened in East Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan Public-Private Partnership Center, 2024[62]) (Astana Times, 2024[63]).
Several road infrastructure projects are ongoing or planned for the near future. Among key projects, the renovation and upgrading of the Karagandy-Jezkazgan highway will be cofinanced by the AIIB and the World Bank with a total cost of over $1.5 billion (AIIB, 2024[64]). The AIIB will also finance the renovation of the Aktobe-Ulgaisyn section of the M-32 highway (AIIB, 2025[65]). Finally, a new highway was commissioned between Merke and Burylbaytal, linking the central and northern regions of the country to the main TCTC corridors. The government is also building bypass highways around the cities of Almaty, Saryagash, Kyzylorda and Turkestan (Astana Times, 2024[58]) (KazAvtoZhol, 2024[66]). The bypass highway project around Almaty is expected to be carried out as a PPP (Kazakhstan Public-Private Partnership Center, 2024[62]).
Recommendations
Provide internet access to BCPs to facilitate electronic exchanges of documents
The government should ensure an effective network coverage and internet access at BCPs. Stable internet access would ensure there is no need to switch to manual documentation handling during customs and border crossings. The government could invest in internet access when renovating BCPs (OECD, 2019[67]) (OECD, 2023[68]).
Clarify the lease conditions for terminal facility development
Private sector respondents point out difficulties developing their own terminal facilities. Infrastructure development possibilities for the private sector are still not clearly defined, and KTZ’s dominant position in the transport and logistics sector makes it difficult to develop projects outside of its scope, as private sector actors often depend on KTZ for network access while facing barriers to free competition (OECD, 2024[10]). The government should clarify and make available the information about lease conditions for terminal facility construction, as many private actors find the current framework opaque.
Adapt the transport infrastructure to climate risks
Kazakhstan’s transport infrastructure is exposed to various climate risks, such as floods, extreme temperatures and precipitation patterns, landslides and mudslides. Flood-related events could reduce GDP by 1.3% by 2060 (World Bank, 2025[69]), while falling Caspian Sea levels also put into question the adequacy of the current port infrastructure and maritime fleet. Several options exist for the adaptation of road and rail infrastructure, such as the creation of drainage structures to prevent erosion, the use of concrete or bitumen with higher stiffness, the use of sealant joints which would be more resistant to temperature variations, and the building of dams (GIZ, 2021[70]) (UNESCAP, 2022[71]). For port infrastructure and sea transport, building ships adapted to shallower waters and running on a methanol-powered hybrid propulsion system may be a viable solution in the medium term: the government should make use of this expertise to adapt its own ship-building projects. In the event of a critical decline of Caspian Sea levels, the simultaneous development of alternative land routes should be considered.
Trade facilitation
According to the 2024 OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators, Kazakhstan is the fourth top trade reformer in the Europe and Central Asia region for the 2022-2024 period (OECD, 2025[19]) and ranks first among Central Asian countries, with an average score of 1.411 in 2024. Kazakhstan has achieved significant progress since 2022 in areas such as internal and external border agency co-operation, information availability and governance and impartiality. Kazakhstan also scores above the OECD average for advance rulings.
Source: (OECD, 2025[72])
Kazakhstan seeks to promote non-primary commodities exports
As of February 2023, Kazakhstan had fulfilled all its TFA implementation commitments, thus simplifying and further automating customs and border procedures (TFA Database, 2025[73]). The government recently established an Export Credit Agency which provided close to $650 million USD of financial support to exporters of non-primary commodities, while Kazakh exports were promoted by the establishment of trade offices in strategic locations, such as the Qazaq Trade House in the UAE or other trade offices in China, Türkiye and Uzbekistan (Astana Times, 2025[74]) (OECD, 2024[10]).
Information about trade has become more accessible. The government launched the Kazakhstan Trade Facilitation Portal which, together with the Central Asia Gateway Portal introduced with ITC support, helps private sector actors access all the necessary information about trade modalities and procedures. Moreover, exporters can benefit from the QazTrade Academy educational platform which was introduced in partnership with UNESCAP in 2023 (QazTrade, 2023[75]) (OECD, 2025[19]) (OECD, 2024[10]). However, some transit information remains difficult to access for private transporters, such as information about new regulations, permits and transit fees for trucks crossing Kazakhstan’s territory, while information about export and import formalities was often reported to not be up to date (ADB, 2024[28]).
The country is deepening integration with other TCTC countries
Private sector respondents point out the lack of regional co-operation and harmonisation in Central Asia, which represents a major barrier to trade facilitation. Nevertheless, many respondents welcomed the 2024 memorandum signed between Kazakhstan and China which aims to introduce a system of transport permit exchange and to switch to electronic permits in the near future (President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024[76]). The government has also introduced an e-permit (“dozvol”) system with Uzbekistan (Kabar, 2024[77]).
To address the lack of co-operation in transport and logistics along the TCTC, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an agreement in 2023 to establish the Middle Corridor Multimodal Ltd., a joint railway company aimed at reducing transit costs on the TCTC. The company pairs KTZ with the national railway carriers of Azerbaijan and Georgia, with plans to form a unified pool of wagons and fitting platforms along the TCTC. Azerbaijan Railways and Georgian Railways will introduce a 30% discount for using fitting platforms on their own territory, whereas such charges will not be applied in Kazakhstan (Caliber.az, 2025[78]).
More recently, the government has been working on visa, transit and permit issues with neighbours. In July 2024, OTS members signed a memorandum of understanding on the use of electronic transport permits (Azertag, 2024[79]). Customs data exchange has been established with China and Uzbekistan, and the government is working to introduce it with Georgia and Azerbaijan, while the technical modalities of the exchange are being discussed with Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Iran and Ukraine (Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023[80]). In early 2025, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had launched discussions on the suppression of the visa regime for Kazakh drivers crossing Turkmen territory (Business.com.tm, 2025[81]).
Between January 2023 and May 2025, KTZ implemented ten tariff increases, ranging from 3% to 35%, making long-term transport cost planning challenging
Private sector respondents mentioned that tariffs on rail transport have substantially increased in recent years. Since the beginning of 2023, KTZ increased rail freight tariffs 10 times, raising tariffs for mainline railway network services by 130% and tariffs for locomotive traction services by 70% (Logistan, 2025[82]). The latest tariff increases were initially unplanned, and there is no visibility about further such increases for private sector actors. KTZ justified these increases by the need to fund the current rail infrastructure projects, notably the Darbaza-Maktaaral line and the line bypassing Almaty (mentioned above) (Kazakh Grain Union, 2025[83]). The government and Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund, Samruk-Kazyna, also intend to sell up to 20% of KTZ shares in an initial public offering (IPO) with the hopes of improving operational efficiency, transparency and governance. The exact date of the IPO has not been announced yet (Kursiv.media, 2025[84]).
Redundant truck controls and informal payments inside Kazakhstan remain an issue
Private sector respondents report that trucks are frequently stopped for controls when going through Kazakhstan. The rationale for these controls can be put in question, as they appear to be identical to the controls that trucks undergo at BCPs before entering Kazakhstan. Most respondents from other countries of the region reported cases of bribes, with foreign drivers having to pay off the transport inspectors to not lose time or to not pay fines for such offenses as driving for too long without taking rest (ADB, 2024[28]).
Digitalisation
Digitalisation of transport procedures is welcome but would benefit from greater regional co-operation
Private sector respondents noted trade facilitation improvements thanks to digitalised procedures. They welcomed the government’s efforts to install automated weight measurement systems for trucks on major roads: to date, 25 such systems have already been installed. Moreover, Kazakhstan is ahead of some of its Central Asian neighbours for the digitalisation of electronic certificates of origin, which are issued in digital form via the Doculite system integrated with the customs Single Window.
However, the lack of cross-border co-operation between different customs agencies reduces the gains from the digitalisation of customs procedures and leads to their duplication and increased border-crossing times. A recent study conducted by GIZ found that in Kazakhstan, customs checks, border controls, and transport control were the most time-intensive procedures at BCPs. The government reports a lack of inspectors, notably for veterinary checks, and the persistent use of paper documentation despite the existence of an e-license system for electronic declarations. The respondents also pointed to the lack of modern systems for data management, the partial digitalisation of transport documents and the inability to track cargo and plan ship delivery or ferry loading in the Caspian Sea ports.
While EAEU membership offers significant trade opportunities for Kazakh firms, it also presents challenges for digitalisation efforts with non-EAEU countries such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and China. Private sector respondents mentioned that specific legislative requirements associated with EAEU membership hinder Kazakhstan’s ability to collaborate with other Central Asian countries on developing a regional customs system. Additionally, EAEU membership has slowed the implementation of the e-TIR system in Kazakhstan due to conflicting provisions between the EAEU and the International Road Transport Union (IRU)2.
Digital customs procedures are being streamlined
Keden, a new automated customs system, is under development. Starting from January 2025 (Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2025[85]), the government is merging the Astana-1 customs information system created in 2017 and the Single Window introduced in 2019 with the objective of creating a unified and modernised automated customs system called Keden. Keden is meant to unify all information and documentation for private import and export actors, as well as for the government bodies responsible for the different administrative procedures during the transit of goods; the system will also streamline the work of the State Revenue Committee by providing information about the work of local customs offices and by facilitating cross-border data exchange with the customs agencies of other countries, especially Kazakhstan’s EAEU partners, Russia and the Kyrgyz Republic. The Keden mobile application, which was launched in 2023, provides exporters with permits and other necessary documentation, while streamlining customs clearance processes (OECD, 2024[10]).
In 2023, KTZ and the Singapore-based company PSA launched the Digital Trade Corridor platform (DTC). A DTC customs system model, Tez Customs, was introduced at the border with China with the goal of streamlining preliminary information preparation, automatic registration and declaration issuance (Container News, 2024[86]). Private sector respondents noted the success of this new system, with the declaration issuance time shortened from 2-3 hours to 30 minutes. The DTC platform is currently being integrated with different railway systems: the platform has already been integrated between KTZ and Azerbaijan’s national railway company systems; its integration with the Georgian national railway company system is under way.
Since 2022, Kazakhstan has been developing its own electronic queue management system on border-crossings: the CargoRuqSat system, available on the Qoldau.kz platform, has been implemented at almost all BCPs at the Chinese, Uzbek, Turkmen and Russian borders (qoldau.kz, 2025[87]). In 2025, CargoRuqSat will be gradually introduced at BCPs on the Kyrgyz border (Kazinform, 2025[88]). The system allows transporters to pre-book a spot for customs and other controls on BCPs. Planned regulatory changes aim to enhance the system’s effectiveness by introducing guarantee payments for bookings and priority corridors for certain types of cargo. However, because pre-registration on CargoRuqSat is still not mandatory, its impact on reducing traffic at BCPs remains limited, while queues on the Kazakh-Uzbek border may last from 6 to 24 hours. Moreover, Kazakhstan still does not have a comprehensive system providing real-time information about traffic at BCPs (ADB, 2024[28]) (kapital.kz, 2025[89]).
The government pursues the digitalisation of road and rail transport documentation
Kazakhstan has not yet acceded to the e-CMR Additional Protocol for road transport. However, discussions are ongoing on the implementation of the e-CMR system. In 2024, OTS members formed an ad-hoc sub-working group involving experts from transport ministries, customs administrations and national transport associations to discuss the legal and technical aspects of e-CMR implementation (OTS, 2025[90]).
The government is launching the digitalisation of CIM/SMGS consignment note for rail transport and plans to switch to a fully digitalised CIM/SMGS in 2026. KTZ, along with national rail operators from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkiye and Ukraine, has successfully finalised a second pilot phase testing the electronic CIM/SMGS. An electronic CIM/SMGS consignment note would considerably facilitate data sharing between different rail carriers and streamline transit between countries.
Data exchange is being generalised for sea transport with other Caspian Sea countries
Data exchange has been implemented between the port of Aktau and KTZ via the Solvo electronic system. Besides vessels dispatching and dispatching railcars and cargo vehicles to the port territory, Solvo is also used for the preliminary planning of storage and the loading of containers on vessels. This data exchange is planned to be extended to the port of Kuryk in 2025 after the implementation of the Terminal Operating System. Data exchange has also been put in place between the ports of Aktau and Baku for mutual preliminary information sharing about container cargo, with the Baku port information system connected to Azerbaijan national rail operator system. This data exchange co-operation is to be extended to the port of Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan (UNECE, 2024[91]) (UNECE, 2025[92]). However, Solvo has not been integrated with the customs and sanitary inspection bodies’ electronic systems yet, resulting in a partial digitalisation of documentation.
Recommendations
Streamlining customs procedures requires additional veterinary inspectors and the full digitalisation of documentation
The government should address the problems that prevent the streamlining of customs procedures. More inspectors should be hired, especially in the territorial organs of the Committee of Veterinary Control and Supervision. The e-license system should be fully digitalised. In the port of Aktau, the Solvo system should be integrated with the systems of the customs and sanitary organs to ensure full digitalisation of documentation. In addition, modern inspection complexes (scanners) should be constructed in Aktau to enable non-intrusive checks of container contents, speeding up cargo clearance and reducing the need for manual inspections.
Consider using the new UNECE solution to implement the e-TIR
UNECE has created a e-TIR national application which was designed specifically for EAEU members to resolve the compatibility issue with EAEU requirements for customs data. This UNECE solution is also relatively easy to implement and does not require any additional digital development on the part of the countries. The e-TIR national application can also be used by Kazakhstan with non-EAEU members, such as Uzbekistan, with which Kazakhstan is currently piloting the use of e-TIR, and with Azerbaijan (UNECE, 2025[93]) (ADB, 2024[28]). Therefore, the application can be used with other TCTC countries. Kazakh authorities could consult with Kyrgyz ones, as the latter are also working to address the issue.
Implement the e-CMR in consultation with the business community and regional neighbours
Kazakhstan should accede to e-CMR and ensure private sector involvement in its introduction. Private actors should be free to develop their own solutions, while the government should discuss some common standard for the customs to be able to connect to different applications, while piloting different solutions available on the market to identify the best options. Regional co-operation is also necessary for the smooth operationalisation of the e-CMR: Kazakhstan should work with other Central Asia countries towards the mutual recognition of electronic signatures and discuss the possibility for a common platform which would connect the different e-CMR applications developed by the private sector to the national customs agencies (UNECE, 2024[94]).
Make the eQMS pre-registration mandatory
The government should make pre-registration on the CargoRuqSat platform mandatory to reduce confusion between registered and non-registered vehicles at BCPs. The existence of an eQMS system is beneficial for transportation flows on BCPs, however the optional character of pre-registration can lead to confusion on BCPs as the existing queues may block the access to reserved spots for transporters which have booked a border-crossing time and place through the platform. Mandatory pre-registration on CargoRuqSat would streamline customs procedures through better queue management on the border while giving border authorities a better idea of expected traffic on BCPs.
Make rail tariff-setting mechanisms more transparent and predictable
The frequent and unpredictable increase in rail freight tariffs increases the cost of Kazakhstan’s exports and creates uncertainty for the private sector. As a first step towards more transparent and predictable tariff-setting, KTZ could consider the “inflation plus” tariff indexing method (Fitch Ratings, 2024[95]). Inflation plus tariff indexing would include adjusting tariffs to the inflation rate while adding a fixed margin to account for KTZ’s investment needs and debt servicing. Thus, KTZ could make its tariff-setting mechanisms more predictable while adapting them to rising costs, thus giving more visibility to private actors on future tariff changes and finance its infrastructure projects in a more transparent way.
Sustainability and climate change
The decline of the Caspian Sea could question the long-term viability of the TCTC
The level of the Caspian Sea has been steadily decreasing since the 1990s, reaching a historical low of -29,5 m in 2025, leading to an important recession of the sea’s coastline and shallower waters (World Bank, 2025[43]). The current levels are projected to further drop by several meters by the end of the century, making navigation and docking in the ports of Aktau and Kuryk challenging, with many vessels no longer able to operate at full load The northern part of the sea, boarded by the Atyrau and part of the Mangystau regions, is expected to completely disappear, reducing the sea’s total area by 23% to 34% and putting at considerable risk Kazakhstan’s oil and fishing industries in the region. While climate change is believed to be the main cause of the crisis, with higher temperatures and declining rainfalls causing more water to evaporate, the role of Russia’s water policies is being cited as well: indeed, the Volga river provides the Caspian Sea with around 80% of its riverine inflows, but its flows are being altered by 40 existing dams and the Don-Volga canal; Russia plans to build 18 more dams on the river in the future, as the current sanctions lead it to exploit more of its domestic resources (Commun Earth Environment, 2023[96]) (The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 2023[97]) (Channel News Asia, 2024[98]) (CNN, 2024[99]).
Short-term solutions to the crisis, such as dredging, may not be sufficient, and continued regional co-operation on the matter is needed. The Caspian Sea’s decreasing levels may soon put into question its navigability in certain areas and make Kazakhstan’s current commercial fleet unsuited for navigation in shallow waters. Kazakhstan recently called for regional cooperation to preserve the water body during an environmental conference in Russia; however, coordinated action, particularly the integration of environmental sustainability into regional transport policy, remains to be seen (Qazinform, 2025[100]).
Private sector development
KTZ financial difficulties and its dominant role in both infrastructure and operations pose a challenge to the development of railway transport
KTZ has significant market power due to its monopoly status, limiting competition in transport and logistics services and the development of railway transport. The company owns or operates most of the country’s railway network, stations, ports, wagons and transshipment terminals. This limits private actors’ ability to invest in railway infrastructure projects and terminal construction in ports and transshipment points, as they can initiate projects in locations permitted by KTZ only (OECD, 2025[101]). In addition, private sector respondents report that KTZ grants preferential treatment to its subsidiaries and has denied the granting of licences for new private freight carriers, further limiting competition.
As recently as 2024, a vertical agreement was found between KTZ and Hill Corporation, a locomotive motor oil supplier, according to which KTZ applied discriminatory practices during its tender process to favour Hill Corporation over alternative suppliers (Kursiv.media, 2025[102]). According to the investigation, these practices included longer testing periods and requirements for additional documentation. Such preferential treatment further distorts competition in the transport sector, while disincentivising private sector participation in KTZ’s projects.
KTZ’s debt has increased in recent years, driven by currency risks linked to borrowing in foreign currency for modernisation, refinancing needs and investments in large infrastructure projects. This instability challenges KTZ’s ability to maintain operations in the long run. The Supreme Audit Chamber has already warned that KTZ is in the “red” zone of credit risk and at risk of default if asset deterioration and debt growth continue without significant management reforms (Inbusiness.kz, 2025[103]) (The Times of Central Asia, 2024[104]). At the same time, the repeated tariff hikes have boosted revenues but have also increased transport costs for both passengers and freight. The government plans to conduct an IPO in the near future to sell 20% to 25% of KTZ shares; however, enhancing governance and transparency is essential to increase the likelihood of a successful offering.
Restrictions on the import of new vehicles prevent fleet upgrades
A business association shared that new restrictions on the import of new vehicles prevent truck fleet renewal. Regulatory changes introduced in December 2024 in Kazakhstan have tightened the rules for importing cars less than three years old: only legal entities that are official dealers of the manufacturer can import them, while individuals can only import one vehicle per year. a significant shift from previous practice where most vehicles - including trucks - were imported by individuals rather than official dealers, allowing businesses to more flexibly update their fleets (InBusinessKz, 2024[105]). Previously, businesses could obtain a Certificate of Vehicle Safety issued by private laboratories in Kazakhstan, but now, when a legal entity imports a vehicle, it must secure a Vehicle Type Approval, a complex process requiring manufacturer confirmation and approval from all five EAEU member states. This system, originally designed to protect domestic manufacturers, now creates substantial barriers for the market, as only the legal entity holding the approval for a specific model range can import those vehicles for three years, effectively limiting competition and complicating fleet renewal for Kazakh businesses.
Public-private sector dialogue
Private sector respondents would welcome greater consideration of their interests
Local private sector actors are involved in public-private dialogue across several platforms. The main ones mentioned include the Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, the Council of Domestic Entrepreneurs, and several platforms under the Ministry of Transport, including working groups on the development of containerisation and the revision of the current legislation, as well as the ministry’s public council. European private sector respondents participated in EU events such as the EU-Central Asia Economic Fora and the EU-Central Asia Investors Forum, are aware of the EU Global Gateway Initiative in Central Asia and are involved in regional TCTC projects. Some European companies even have representative offices for Central Asia based in Kazakhstan. Both Kazakh and European private sector actors report having frequent contacts with KTZ.
However, private sector respondents call for greater consideration of their requests from the Ministry of Transport and KTZ. The business community fears that its interests may be overlooked in favour of the development of Kazakhstan’s transit potential and increased revenues for KTZ. Transit potential development is indeed an important concern for private actors, as they are worried that the prioritisation of transit over exports by KTZ, which is illustrated by higher tariffs for transit, strong traffic growth, the creation of the Middle Corridor Multimodal Ltd. and a recent container train transit agreement with China (Transport Corridors, 2025[106]), might disadvantage Kazakhstan’s private sector. Firms have reported that transit growth has complicated export-import activities due to the saturation of the railway network at key nodes. Similar concerns are likely to be shared by businesses from the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan that transit their goods through Kazakhstan.
Recommendations
Address domestic firms’ concerns on the prioritisation of transit revenue and vehicle import
Becoming a transit hub should not come at the expense of supporting Kazakhstan’s own international trade, particularly its domestic exports and strategic imports as currently reflected in KTZ’s tariff policy. Promoting Kazakhstan’s exports, especially those from the manufacturing sector, should be one of the cornerstones of Kazakhstan’s policy of economic diversification (OECD, 2024[10]). The drastic increase in KTZ’s freight tariffs in recent years should be brought in check or at least be conducted in consultation with businesses and with sufficient prior notice.
In addition, the government could re-consider some of its latest regulations on vehicle imports. In particular, it should consult with the business community and evaluate whether these restrictions align with transport emission mitigation strategies. It could for instance evaluate whether restrictions can be lifted for the import of trucks with emissions below a defined standard.
Improve KTZ’s communication strategy
KTZ plays a strategic role for the TCTC’s development and addressing debt concerns with a clearer communication strategy could support the attraction of long-term capital. While the topic of KTZ’s performance and financial viability goes beyond the scope of this analysis, the OECD recommends that KTZ provides a detailed roadmap of its debt management, including funds allocation, refinancing plans and government guarantees. It should highlight that it benefits from strategic advice and financing from international financial institutions such as the EBRD and AIIB, and that the majority of its short- and medium-term debt is government-held. During the roadshows ahead of the IPO, KTZ could emphasise the rationale for its monopoly role, the transit growth potential in Kazakhstan and mitigation strategies to address environmental risks.
Integrate environmental sustainability into regional transport cooperation among Caspian littoral states, particularly in the development of the TCTC
Caspian Sea coastal states, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Iran and Kazakhstan, need to build on existing co-operation to integrate environmental sustainability into regional transport infrastructure development, in particular within the framework of the TCTC. The issue could also be raised on the different platforms which Kazakhstan is involved in, such as the EAEU, ECO and OTS, as the consequences of the Caspian Sea’s dropping levels are as much environmental as they are economic. Countries should commit to assessing the environmental impact of their investments in the Caspian Sea region and review their use of water resources, from the sea as well as from the rivers feeding it. On the national level, the government should adapt its ship-building projects to shallower waters, continue dredging activities in the ports of Aktau and Kuryk, and look for less emissive means to transport cargo by sea, such as ships running on a methanol-powered hybrid propulsion system.
The table below summarises the findings described in the chapter and suggests a set of measures to address the challenges identified.
Source: OECD analysis
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← 1. Kazakhstan’s National Fund is intended to stabilise fiscal spending across economic cycles by reducing the impact of oil price volatility on budget. It also performs a savings function by preserving oil revenues for future generations.
← 2. see also the chapter on the Kyrgyz Republic for further discussion of this issue