(Adopted by the Global Forum in June 2026)
Ireland joined the Global Forum in 2009. Ireland underwent its Second Round of EOIR Peer Review in 2017 (Ireland’s 2017 Report),1 which assessed its legal and regulatory framework in force as at 24 May 2017 and its practical implementation, including in respect of EOI requests received and sent during the review period from 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2016. Ireland received an overall rating of Compliant and the individual Elements were rated as follows:
|
A.1 |
A.2 |
A.3 |
B.1 |
B.2 |
C.1 |
C.2 |
C.3 |
C.4 |
C.5 |
Overall |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Determinations |
i.p. |
i.p. |
i.p. |
i.p. |
i.p. |
i.p. |
i.p. |
i.p. |
i.p. |
n.a. |
C |
|
Ratings |
C |
C |
C |
C |
C |
C |
C |
C |
C |
C |
Ireland received one in-box recommendation in relation to Element A.3.
This monitoring report assesses the actions taken by Ireland to address the recommendation issued in its EOIR Peer Review Report and the peer input received for the monitoring period 2023-2024.
The report concludes that Ireland’s recommendation on the legal and regulatory framework is “considered provisionally addressed in the context of the monitoring process, subject to detailed validation” and issues one new corresponding recommendation to monitor the implementation of the legislative change to address this recommendation. In addition, a new recommendation has been added following the analysis of the peer input received on Ireland (see EOIR experience and next steps sections).
|
Recommendation (A.3, framework) |
Ireland should ensure that banks are required to identify all of the beneficiaries of the trust which has an account with a bank in Ireland as required under the standard. |
|
Underlying factor |
The CJA [Criminal Justice Act] 2010 only requires the identification of beneficial owners holding a vested interest in at least 25% of the capital of the trust, or the class of individuals in whose main interest the trust is set up or operates, or a person that has control over the trust. Beneficiaries who are entitled to less than 25% may, in principle, be considered a beneficial owner, however, not necessarily in all cases. (see paragraphs 185 and 186 of Ireland’s 2017 Report for more information) |
|
Summary of actions reported |
Ireland has amended the definition of beneficial owners of trusts by removing the reference to the 25% threshold in the Criminal Justice Act in 2018. The amended definition is aligned with the standard. The Central Bank of Ireland supervises the financial institutions in respect to their customer due diligence obligations and has not identified any issues as regards identification of the trusts’ beneficial owners. The Central Bank of Ireland has confirmed that the definition is well understood by the industry and that in the course of their customer due diligence, while handling customers that are trusts, banks also look through the parties to the trust where such parties are legal entities or arrangements. Ireland has also implemented a Central Register of Beneficial Ownership of Trusts since 2021 under the overall supervision and oversight of a dedicated Registrar. The register’s guidance document requires that where parties to a trust are legal entities, the natural person behind them should also be reported to the register. Banks are required to consult the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership of Trusts while conducting their own customer due diligence. All financial institutions are required to confirm on an annual basis their compliance with the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act that require to identify and take reasonable measures to verify beneficial owners of customers. |
|
Conclusion |
Ireland appears to have taken appropriate action to address the legal issue by amending the beneficial owner definition for trusts through deletion of reference to a threshold and requiring the identification of all beneficiaries of a trust among the other parties to a trust. While conducting customer due diligence and identifying beneficial owners, all natural persons benefitting from or controlling the trust must be identified as beneficial owners. To demonstrate implementation of the amended definition, Ireland has provided excerpts from the procedures of several banks, where for the purposes of customer due diligence bank employees are required to collect information on beneficiaries of trusts without application of any threshold. However, no specific information was provided on inspections carried out on customer due diligence files to verify whether banks have correctly applied their procedures and designated all beneficiaries as beneficial owners of trusts and have also systematically looked through the parties to a trust where such parties are legal persons or legal arrangements. Further, since the amendment was made in November 2018, it is not clear if pre-existing trust customer accounts have been systematically updated with the new definition. Ireland is expected to report further information on the implementation of this legal change under a new recommendation – Ireland is recommended to supervise the implementation of the definition of beneficial owners of trusts by banks to ensure the availability of accurate, adequate and up-to-date information on the beneficial owners of trusts in line with the standard where trusts are banks’ customers. |
|
Status determined |
Existing recommendation: Considered provisionally addressed in the context of the monitoring process, subject to detailed validation. New recommendation issued. |
|
Actions required |
Existing recommendation: No immediate action required New recommendation: In its next self-assessment, Ireland should –
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Over the monitoring period, Ireland received 1 093 requests and sent 30 requests. Italy, France and Costa Rica were the top three partners in respect of incoming requests. United Kingdom, Spain and Germany were the key partners in respect of outgoing requests. Ireland reported providing full and final responses in 95% of all the received requests, indicated 4% as pending requests and 1% of requests were withdrawn.
Sixteen peers provided peer input on Ireland. Peers reported general satisfaction in respect of their EOIR experience with Ireland.
While peers are generally satisfied with their relationship with Ireland, one peer raised a matter in relation to complex transfer pricing requests and Ireland’s application of the principle of foreseeable relevance in such cases. The peer indicated that in respect of its transfer pricing requests covering multinational groups, Ireland frequently asked clarifications on the foreseeable relevance of separate pieces of information sought under its EOI requests. Even though the peer provided responses to the clarifications sought by Ireland, Ireland responded only to a minority of questions with an explanation that Ireland was not convinced of the foreseeable relevance of the remaining questions. The peer indicated that responses were not provided in respect of group entities which were not parties to the international transaction being examined in its transfer pricing audits, even when the peer had explained the necessity of such information in the context of transfer pricing. Ireland did not consider that the information requested on group entities that are not parties to the transaction would be foreseeably relevant for the peer’s transfer pricing audits.
Ireland’s decision to decline the requested information, upon receiving clarifications about its relevance in the context of the requesting peer’s tax investigation or examination, was found to be not in line with the standard. In this regard, Ireland is recommended to ensure that it exchanges the requested information in line with the standard where the requesting jurisdiction explains that there is a reasonable possibility that the requested information will be relevant in the context of its underlying tax investigation or examination.. In its next self-assessment, Ireland should indicate measures taken to address this recommendation.
Ireland has reported progress in the implementation of a Central Register of Beneficial Ownership of Companies and Industrial and Provident Societies (introduced in 2019) hosted by the Companies Registration Office, a Central Beneficial Ownership Register for Certain Financial Vehicles (introduced in 2020 and supervised by the Central Bank), and a Central Register of Beneficial Ownership of Trusts (introduced in 2021 and supervised by the Irish Revenue). All three registers are operational with supervisory activities at varying degrees of maturity.
In respect of the work of the EOI unit and monitoring requests, Ireland is developing a Competent Authority Case Management System which is an upgrade to the current digital case management system. The Competent Authority Case Management System will manage and track all aspects of EOI work. The system will contain templates to streamline and standardize EOI tasks (e.g. information request letters) and assist with management of deadlines in relation to EOI cases. It will contain statistics and reporting functionality. System testing is scheduled for early-2026.
Ireland should continue taking actions towards implementing the standard effectively.
Under the first round of enhanced monitoring, two new recommendations are issued to Ireland.
|
Recommendation (A.3, practice) |
Ireland is recommended to supervise the implementation of the definition of beneficial owners of trusts by banks to ensure the availability of accurate, adequate and up-to-date information on the beneficial owners of trusts in line with the standard where trusts are banks’ customers. |
|
Underlying factor |
To demonstrate implementation of the amended definition, Ireland has provided excerpts from the procedures of several banks, where for the purposes of customer due diligence banks instruct to collect information on beneficiaries of trusts without application of any threshold. However, no specific information was provided on inspections carried out on customer due diligence files to verify whether banks have correctly applied their procedures and designated all beneficiaries as beneficial owners of trusts and have also systematically looked through the parties to a trust to identify natural persons as beneficial owners where such parties are legal persons or legal arrangements. Further, since the amendment was made in November 2018, it is not clear if pre-existing trust customer accounts have been systematically updated with the new definition. |
|
Recommendation (C.1, practice) |
Ireland is recommended to ensure that it exchanges the requested information in line with the standard where the requesting jurisdiction explains that there is a reasonable possibility that the requested information will be relevant in the context of its underlying tax investigation or examination. |
|
Underlying factor |
Ireland provides the requested information, including on transfer pricing requests, where it determines the requests to be foreseeably relevant. Input from one peer indicates that there have been instances where requested information pertaining to transfer pricing was not provided by Ireland. In these cases, Ireland consulted the peer to seek clarifications on the foreseeable relevance of the requested information. Although the peer provided these clarifications, Ireland ultimately declined to provide information because it concluded that the information lacked relevance to the peer’s underlying tax investigation or examination. In doing so, it was apparent that Ireland analysed the relevance of the requested information considering its own understanding of transfer pricing examinations and did not accept the peer’s explanations justifying its relevance for the peer’s tax investigations or examinations. This approach is not in accordance with the Commentary to Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention which states that, “once the requesting State has provided an explanation as to the foreseeable relevance of the requested information, the requested State may not decline a request or withhold requested information because it believes that the information lacks relevance to the underlying investigation or examination”. |
The following next steps are expected from Ireland:
Submit the next self-assessment, including on the new recommendations issued, under the second round of enhanced monitoring in 2028.
See also Chapter 1 (Scope and Methodology), section on “PRMG decisions – Statuses determined and actions required”, which explains the next steps expected on recommendations that are “considered provisionally addressed in the context of the monitoring process, subject to detailed validation”.
Ireland would like to thank the Secretariat, the Peer Review and Monitoring Group (PRMG), the assessment panel, and our peers for their assistance and contributions in the preparation of our enhanced monitoring report. Ireland is fully committed to the exchange of information for tax purposes and considers the work of the Global Forum to be of the highest importance for effective tax administration.
In general, we are in agreement with the content of the report and believe it accurately reflects our performance over the monitoring period and our progress in addressing the recommendation from Ireland’s 2017 Peer Review. Ireland notes the conclusion that the 2018 legislative amendment to the definition of beneficial ownership of trusts addresses the earlier legal gap and acknowledges the new recommendation to monitor the implementation of this change in practice.
Regarding the new recommendation under Element C.1 concerning certain transfer pricing requests, Ireland holds a different view on the conclusion reached. While we remain fully committed to exchanging information to the widest possible extent, consistent with Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention and its Commentary, we believe our actions in the cases in question were fully aligned with the standard.
The issues raised by a peer relate to a small subset of highly complex transfer pricing cases, set against a backdrop of 1 093 incoming requests during the monitoring period and consistently strong peer feedback. In these specific matters, Ireland engaged extensively with the peer, provided all information where the standard of foreseeable relevance was met, and sought targeted clarifications on the remainder.
Ireland agrees that the standard requires a broad interpretation and does not demand proof of ultimate relevance; a reasonable possibility is sufficient for Ireland to provide the information requested in these cases. However, the standard is also clear that foreseeable relevance must be demonstrated in the request itself, and it explicitly prohibits "fishing expeditions". The OECD Commentary states that the standard is not to be interpreted in a way that obligates the provision of information that is "unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of the taxpayer under investigation".
In the limited cases concerned, Ireland concluded that the explanations provided did not sufficiently articulate a nexus to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the specific additional information would be relevant to the audited taxpayer’s tax position. Ireland maintains that the standard requires the requesting jurisdiction's explanation to be substantive; it does not compel an exchange of information where the stated link to the taxpayer's affairs remains speculative. Where this threshold was met, Ireland exchanged the information; where it was not, Ireland declined specific items, consistent with its obligation to apply the standard correctly.
These complex cases highlight a broader challenge. Ireland is of the view that additional guidance in the OECD Commentary on Article 26, specifically in relation to applying "foreseeable relevance" in the context of a modern transfer pricing audit, would be highly beneficial. Such guidance would enable all jurisdictions to apply the standard more appropriately and consistently.
Therefore, Ireland maintains that its decision to decline the broader aspects of these requests was a valid application of the standard. While holding a different view on this specific recommendation, Ireland remains committed to working collaboratively with all partners to facilitate complex transfer pricing exchanges and to contribute to the ongoing refinement of the global standards.
← 1. OECD (2017), Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: Ireland 2017 (Second Round): Peer Review Report on the Exchange of Information on Request, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264280229-en.