Early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean

3. Legal framework in LAC jurisdictions

This section provides an overview of the legal framework of the early resolution of cartel cases in the LAC region, showcasing aspects related to timing, requirements and consequences.

3.1. Preliminary remarks

Early case resolution tools are generally classified as settlements or commitments based on some features. The OECD (2016[1]) identified criteria to differentiate them, such as the establishment of the infringement, the admission of guilt and the imposition of a fine. While settlements typically meet these conditions, commitments do not, and they instead resolve the case by suspending the procedure and binding the party to some conditions which are monitored over time.

In Latin American and Caribbean jurisdictions, it is usual to find a combination of features of commitments and settlements in their tools for the early resolution of cartel cases. In recent years, Brazil and Peru incorporated elements of traditional settlements in their commitment-based systems. Costa Rica, on the other hand, made a clear distinction between both systems in their recent legislative changes, adopting settlements for cartels and commitments for other conducts, similarly to the European Union.

Box 2. Evolution of the implementation of early resolution of cartel cases in some LAC jurisdictions

Evolution of cartel settlement policy in Brazil

Since 2007, Brazil has benefited from an early resolution mechanism for cartels, following a legislative change that enabled defendants to apply for settlements with the requirement of paying a pecuniary contribution corresponding to a part of the estimated fine.

In 2013, an additional requirement was added through internal regulations issued by CADE, namely the need for defendants to admit participation in the facts under investigation.

It should be noted that decisions regarding settlements still bear the name of cease-and-desist agreements (termos de compromisso de cessação) and suspend the administrative proceedings against the settling party until full compliance is certified within a timeline specified in the decision.

Adapting the Peruvian commitment procedure through policy

Legal changes in 2015 and 2018 adapted the mechanism of cease-and-desist agreements (“compromiso de cese”). While the current regulation does not specifically require the acknowledgement of facts, INDECOPI has been applying the requirement when assessing requests from investigated parties.

Costa Rica moves from commitments to settlements

A commitments procedure was available in Costa Rica through a law approved in 1994. The competition authorities could require commitments and a guarantee (not exceeding the maximum possible penalty for the infringement), which could then be enforced in the event of noncompliance. In 2019, a legislative change adopted a settlement system that requires an admission of guilt in addition to a penalty. A commitments system remains in place for non-cartel cases.

Sources: Rosenberg, B.; M. Exposto and J. Krein (2025[17]), “Settlements in cartel investigations: a Brazilian success story”. BMA Review 87, https://www.bmalaw.com.br/en-US/conteudo/competition-law/bma-review-87-settlements-in-cartel-investigations-a-brazilian-success-story; Law No. 7472, article 27, paragraph h) and Regulation No. 37899-MEIC of Costa Rica; Law No. 9736, article 67 of Costa Rica; Reyna García, D. (2024[18]) Compromisos de cese: herramientas efectivas de resolución de procedimientos en materia de libre competencia en Perú. Revista Peruana de Derecho de la Empresa, N° 78, https://rpde.tytl.com.pe/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/13.-REYNA-6.pdf.

There are also jurisdictions where there is more than one early resolution tool available to cartel cases, like Paraguay and Chile, which have different rules depending on the procedural stage in which the early resolution of the case occurs.1

Some jurisdictions have also implemented solutions that may be similar to formal early case resolution tools. One of them involves investigated parties accepting the facts and co-operating with the investigation and, as a result, competition authorities may opt to reward them with a reduced fine.2 These cases derive from the discretion in the sanctioning powers of the authority within the regular procedure, rather than from a specific statutory framework. Another possibility may be to terminate the proceedings due to insufficient grounds to continue,3 while formulating recommendations to the investigated parties regarding future conduct and compliance with competition law.4

The multiplicity of early case resolution tools showcases the differing approaches to the subject in the region, albeit with the same end goal of procedural expediency.

3.2. Timing considerations

Jurisdictions in the region take different approaches when it comes to defining when early resolution proceedings can be started. At least one of the tools available in Paraguay,5 as well as the commitments in the Dominican Republic6 and the Andean Community,7 is specifically designed for the investigation phase. Costa Rica provides that the investigation has to be concluded, and the case brought to the deciding body. Jurisdictions like Ecuador,8 Honduras9 and Brazil10 allow them at any stage before a final decision is made.

When co-operation with the investigation is one of the main drivers behind the early resolution, the approach may be to facilitate it during this stage. This allows the authority to gather evidence and hastens not only the pace of the investigation, but also the prosecution of other cartelists (Hammond, 2006[6]). There is, however, an inherent risk that an early resolution tool during this stage could impair the authority’s appreciation of the case, an issue which could be of concern when the full scope, duration, or gravity of the infringement still remains unclear. To counter this, there may be a need for safeguards as to the duty of co-operation, including that the competition authority may retain the discretion to withdraw from the early case resolution settlement if the evidence provided is found to be false, misleading, or incomplete.

When an opinion of infringement has been issued, the perception is that the objective of procedural efficiency is to be achieved through the expedited prosecution of the case when the authority knows that there are elements that warrant a penalty. This allows the competition authority to consider whether the case is suitable for the procedure (Pereira, 2022[15]) and what the proper conditions may be based on criteria such as the nature of infringement and other objectives it may wish to pursue, such as the setting of a precedent.

When there is no limit, early resolution tools could be considered by the authority during late stages when a final decision may be imminent. In these cases, while the time and resources gained may be limited, some jurisdictions may still see gains if they can achieve other objectives, such as the certainty of the result of the case, the reduced exposure to judicial review and the immediate implementation of corrective measures or commitments that may restore competition in the affected market. As with other cases, competition authorities should assess whether those results compensate for the time assigned to the case and the partial or total loss of the penalty that would have been collected if the procedure ended normally.

Another issue that impacts timing is that a procedure for early case resolution may be abused by investigated parties to delay regular proceedings (ICN, 2008[5]). In this regard, some jurisdictions have established fixed terms in which negotiations should be concluded, like in Peru (Reyna García, 2024[18]), Brazil11 and Uruguay (UNCTAD, 2016[19]). A short period can encourage time-effective negotiations (Costa Alves de Mattos and Domingos Taufick, 2010[20]) although, if the term is too short, it may be insufficient to deal with complex issues (UNCTAD, 2016[19]). Unjustified delays may also prompt the authority to end the negotiations or negatively affect the reduction of the penalty (CADE, 2016[21]).

3.3. Requirements

Jurisdictions in the region take different approaches as to what they require from the investigated parties in order to agree on the early case resolution, but the most common requirements are:

• Admission of guilt or facts

• Fines or financial obligations

• Co-operation with the authority

• Additional obligations

The following table shows how some jurisdictions approach these requirements in their cases of early resolution.

Table 1. Requirements in selected LAC jurisdictions

	Admission of guilt or facts	Fine or financial obligations	Duty to co-operate with the investigation	Other obligations
Brazil	Required (participation in investigated facts)	Contribution to a fund	Required to provide evidence	Cease and desist; additional measures possible
Chile	Not a requirement, but may be negotiated	Payment to treasury possible	Not a requirement; may be negotiated	Other measures possible
Colombia	Not a requirement	Costs of monitoring compliance possible	Not a requirement	Cease and desist; corrective measures
Costa Rica	Required	Reduced fine (10%)	Required	Corrective measures may be imposed.
Dominican Republic	Required (participation in the alleged prohibited conduct)	Not a requirement; may be exceptionally included	Not a requirement	Cease and desist; corrective measures
Jamaica	May be obtained	Financial obligation may be obtained through negotiations*	Degree of co-operation is assessed	Other remedies possible
Panama	Not a requirement	Required to ensure compliance	Not a requirement	Cease and desist; additional measures
Paraguay (commitments)	Not a requirement	Not a requirement	Not a requirement	Cease and desist; additional measures
Paraguay (settlements)	Required (circumstances of the infringement)	Sanction required	Not a requirement	Cease and desist; corrective measures
Peru	Not required, but negotiated as part of policy	Considered as a complementary measure	Not a requirement; may be negotiated	Cease and desist; additional measures

Note: In Jamaica, a fine may only be imposed by the court.

Sources: Survey and exchanges with LAC competition authorities.

3.3.1. Admission of guilt or facts

Several jurisdictions require some type of admission related to the facts of the case. The acknowledgement may involve guilt as to the infringement itself (Costa Rica12 and Honduras13) or to the facts under investigation (Brazil14).

Some jurisdictions have flexibility as to this admission. Jamaican legislation15 expressly provides for the option of acknowledging guilt and entrusts the Commission with the decision on whether the settlement is appropriate under the terms proposed by the investigated party. In Chile, while an admission to any effect is not a requirement, it can be obtained through the negotiation process (Mayor Salas and Lema Abarca, 2024[22]).

The scope and legal consequences of an acknowledgement are important considerations for competition authorities and investigated parties. An admission of guilt may facilitate private damages actions, have implications in jurisdictions where cartel conduct is subject to criminal sanctions, lead to bidder exclusion16 and result in significant reputational harm for the parties concerned (OECD, 2009[4]). These issues may reduce the incentives of investigated parties to opt for an early case resolution and influence the terms of the agreements.

Where there is flexibility to negotiate the admission of guilt or facts, some competition authorities choose to balance this requirement with other policy objectives, such as the maximisation of deterrence, by obtaining a higher payment from the investigated party (OECD, 2008[3]).

Additionally, the competition authority may consider dispensing with the requirement of an admission of guilt or facts if it considers that obtaining a commitment to cease and desist the conduct to stop the effects of the alleged infringement and a reduced exposure to appeals are more important based on the case.

Nevertheless, obtaining an admission from the investigated party may provide additional benefits to the authority. The acknowledgement may allow the authority to use the agreement against other parties (Reyna García, 2024[18]), strengthening the case and facilitating the successful prosecution of other members of the cartel.

For this reason, the extent of the admission by the investigated party, if any, often becomes a main element of the negotiations, as competition authorities seek to assess the incentives for early case resolution and the achievement of other policy objectives.

3.3.2. Fines or financial obligations

A reduction of the penalty that would be expected to be imposed in the event of following through a successful adversarial proceeding is a form of incentivising investigated parties to move forward with early case resolution, recognising in a way the savings of the authority itself in terms of efficiency, but still serving as a factor for deterrence.

Because in some cases, there are no official findings of infringements, jurisdictions have different forms for these financial obligations, including reduced fines (Costa Rica17 and Honduras18), contributions to the treasury or specific funds (Brazil19), compensations or donations to charity (Jamaica20). Investigated parties may also be asked to cover the costs of the investigation based on the gravity and duration of the infringement and the resources already employed, as is the case with the settlements in Jamaica;21 while in Colombia, a payment may be required to cover the monitoring of the compliance with the commitments (SIC, 2023[23]). Regardless, they can be seen as a disapproval of the conduct (Mayor Salas and Lema Abarca, 2024[22]).

There are different approaches to the determination of the amount of the financial obligation. In its guidelines, Brazil’s competition authority has set flexible ranges that vary depending on the moment when the agreement is reached and other factors, including being the leader of the cartel, with or without the coercion of other parties (CADE, 2016[21]). Therefore, the first proponent negotiating with the investigative body would be eligible for a discount of between 30% and 50%, while the ringleader of the cartel would be imposed a higher financial obligation. These different approaches reflect a trade-off between predictability and flexibility, with a view to the achievement of other policy objectives ensuring appropriate financial consequences based on the value of co-operation and the role of the investigated party in the conduct.

Other jurisdictions rely on an assessment of the financial obligation that is specific to the case, without a general rule with a specific discount. In Chile’s case, the calculation is based on the same criteria used for the fines, which include the assessment of the collaboration provided to the national competition authority, the National Economic Prosecutor’s Office (FNE), during or after the investigation, and the severity of the conduct (Mayor Salas and Lema Abarca, 2024[22]). In Peru, the amount is calculated with the starting point being the methodology for the calculation of the potential fine and then concessions and discounts may apply depending on the particularities of the case.

While specific rules for the calculation aim to provide predictability, they may also require clarification as to the starting point for the discount, especially if the law provides different options and factors for the specific determination of the fine (Hammond, 2006[6]). Therefore, guidelines on this topic would provide more information to the investigated parties to assess the scope of the likely discount.

The discount offered also has to be sufficient to have an effective early case resolution programme (Ascione and Motta, 2008[9]). If a payment remains high even with a discount, the probability that investigated parties may opt to participate in early resolution tools instead of the adversarial proceeding may be lower (Fotis and Tselekounis, 2020[24]).

3.3.3. Co-operation with the authority

In cartel cases, an investigated party agreeing with the competition authority on the early case resolution can help advance the case against other parties by providing evidence and information. Through this requirement, the procedural expediencies can be combined with continued support for the investigation and prosecution of the cartel.

Several jurisdictions in the region incorporate a duty to co-operate with the authority on the investigation as part of their early case resolution tools. In Brazil, the co-operation with the authority involves identifying the other agents involved in the cartel and the provision of information and documents that support the finding of an infringement (CADE, 2016[21]). Other jurisdictions that specifically mention co-operation as a requirement are Costa Rica22 and Honduras,23 while the degree of co-operation is a factor for the approval of settlements in Jamaica.24

However, the co-operation with the authority may still be deemed a burden for investigated parties who remain bound to the ongoing proceedings and may incur additional costs (Monteiro, 2013[25]). Therefore, an extensive scope of this requirement may reduce the incentives of parties to go through early resolution, especially if the other benefits are seen as insufficient to cover the consequences of this continued involvement in the proceedings.

There are also risks with this requirement. While it is expected that investigated parties entering into early resolution proceedings should act in good faith (OECD, 2008[3]), they may provide false or embellished information to obtain the benefits of the early resolution (Stephan, 2009[26]) and misrepresent the extent of their involvement or that of competitors, or the seriousness of the antitrust violation, producing unreliable evidence. Because of this, competition authorities must carefully assess the evidence to minimise the effects of this potential bias (Pereira, 2022[15]).

Another issue that relates to a requirement to co-operate with the investigation is that this may reduce incentives for early case resolution if there are fears that this may carry reputational harm within the business community, damaging existing commercial relationships and being perceived as unreliable by other market participants. This is particularly relevant in some jurisdictions and markets where friendships and loyalty play an important role in business and where certain forms of co-operation between competitors have historically been perceived as legitimate and not infringements to competition law (Peña, 2024[27]). Competition authorities may mitigate these concerns by ensuring that the other benefits offset the perceived costs of co-operation and by limiting the scope of the disclosure of information to what is strictly necessary for the investigation. Likewise, competition advocacy aimed directly at the business community may also help to address the negative connotations by showcasing the benefits of strong competition enforcement and the importance of compliance with the law. More broadly, addressing cultural factors that may contribute to the social acceptability of collusive practices should, in itself, be an important objective of competition authorities.

Therefore, where available, the requirement of co-operation is an important feature that can shape the attractiveness and the effectiveness of an early case resolution tool. As a result, the scope of the co‑operation required often reflects the competition authority’s assessment of how best to balance procedural efficiency, investigative objectives and incentives for participation in the early resolution process.

3.3.4. Additional obligations

Early case resolution tools can also include the imposition of commitments or measures, i.e. obligations to perform actions beyond a payment or the co-operation with the authority. Depending on the jurisdiction, these obligations may respond to other policy objectives that go beyond the efficient resolution of proceedings, like restoring competition, repairing harm, promoting compliance or addressing the structural conditions that facilitated the infringement.

Beyond repairing the effects of an infringement and promoting compliance, additional obligations may also be used to achieve broader competition policy objectives. In exchange for the benefits of early case resolution for an investigated party, a competition authority may seek to pursue outcomes that would not arise from the imposition of a penalty alone. In Colombia, this approach can result in structural measures to address the competition concerns, which could have contributed to the conduct, as reflected in the guideline issued by the national competition authority, the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC). The document states that commitments are acceptable if these criteria are met:

• The commitments must go beyond complying with the law.

• The commitments must be effective to cease or change the allegedly anti-competitive conduct.

• The commitments must be preferably structural in nature.

• The acceptance of the commitments must be consistent with the policy of promotion and protection of competition (SIC, 2023[23]).

Additional obligations enable early case resolution tools to pursue substantive competitive outcomes alongside procedural efficiencies. The ways in which authorities in the region have considered the design of these obligations are discussed in Section 4.

3.4. Discretion of the authority

The existence of an early case resolution tool does not necessarily mean that the parties have a right to that outcome. Even if all requirements are satisfied, competition authorities retain the discretion to determine whether a particular case should be resolved through a consensual procedure or under the adversarial proceeding. This reflects a broader principle that competition agencies must decide on how to use their resources and achieve their objectives.

The exercise of discretion is not necessarily unconstrained. In addition to regulation, such as the one in the Dominican Republic,25 the discretion of the authority when assessing whether to go through the early case resolution is framed by guidelines in some jurisdictions in the region. Even though these guidelines are non-binding, they can provide benchmarks for the analysis of proposals and the decision‑making process to provide clarity to firms, individuals and the staff of the competition authority itself on how to handle early case resolution tools.

Table 2. Specific guidelines related to early case resolution in selected LAC jurisdictions

Jurisdiction	Content
Brazil	While the guideline is not binding, it provides more information about the requirements for the signing of cease and desist agreements: co-operation, pecuniary contributions, the acknowledgment of participation in the investigated conduct and the commitment not to practice the conduct again and other measures. The document also contains templates of agreements used in the negotiations.
Colombia	The guideline has the objective of providing general information about how SIC studies and handles the requests of early case resolution, including an illustrative list of criteria used to determine if the guarantees are sufficient to suspend or modify an investigated conduct.

Source: CADE (2016[21]), Guidelines: Cease-and-desist agreement for cartel cases (“TCC”), https://cdn.cade.gov.br/Portal/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/guias-do-cade/guidelines_tcc-1.pdf; SIC (2023[23]), Guía de Ofrecimiento de Garantías, https://www.sic.gov.co/sites/default/files/files/2023/Garantias%20de%20Avalado%2008-01-23-1004am.pdf.

3.5. Consequences

3.5.1. On the main proceeding

Early case resolution tools sustain a relationship between the investigated party and the competition authority through the terms of the agreement. This means that certain elements of the cartel proceeding may persist even though the case was resolved. In this context, the proceedings may be suspended or fully closed with respect to the party that engages in early resolution, depending on the jurisdiction, while continuing against other parties. The design choices can have implications in the monitoring of obligations, enforcement costs and the consequences of non-compliance.

In Brazil, cease-and-desist agreements suspend the proceedings with respect to the specific party until the Tribunal of CADE verifies that the terms of the agreement have been complied after the relevant monitoring term has expired (CADE, 2016[21]). Similar approaches are found with commitments in Paraguay26 and the Dominican Republic27. In the Dominican Republic,28 the regulation establishes a one-year compliance period.

In these systems, the competition authority is bound to supervise compliance and resume the investigation of the original cartel case with respect to the specific party in the event of non-compliance. While this may strengthen the incentives to comply with the agreement, it may require the authority to devote resources to monitoring and potentially resume the original investigation, with the possibility of a duplication of the workload and use of resources (Reyna García, 2024[18]).

A different approach is seen with the commitments in Peru, which cause the conclusion of the case with respect to the specific party and any non-compliance with the terms of the agreement would result in a new case for an autonomous infringement (Reyna García, 2024[18]).

The distinction between these models reflects different approaches and may be linked to the requirements of the case. To illustrate this, the settlement in Paraguay29 closes the original cartel case with respect to the settling party, unlike the commitments referenced above. Because the settlement already includes an admission as to the circumstances of the cartel infringement and potentially a reduced fine, any non-compliance with the additional obligations or the payment that are imposed on the investigated party would mean that the efforts of the authority would focus on the breach of the settlement itself, rather than revisiting the substantive issues of the original cartel case.

3.5.2. On recidivism

The participation of an investigated party in an early case resolution may also have consequences on the possibility of recidivism.

One of the issues is whether a decision on early case resolution can be considered for the purposes of defining recidivism in a future case. This may be related to the scope of the terms of the agreement and whether an admission of guilt and finding of infringement were established, or if they only contain commitments and other obligations were imposed. As a result, the treatment of recidivism may vary depending on whether responsibility was reflected in the resolution.

Another issue to ponder is whether an investigated party with a previous record of a similar infringement or early resolution can apply for the benefits of early resolution for a new case. This can be a factor for the assessment of the terms of the agreement, as regulation may provide that these investigated parties are not eligible for penalty discounts in case of a new infringement, as in Honduras,30 or may consider this factor as an aggravating circumstance when calculating the amount of the contribution, as in Brazil (CADE, 2016[21]). In Peru, a party in a new case was asked to modify the terms of the compliance programme it had approved for another case.31

A previous infringement or participation in an early resolution may also affect the assessment of competition authorities of specific cases. If deterrence concerns were significant, an adversarial procedure may be chosen as a more appropriate path than the benefits of early case resolution.

3.5.3. On exposure to private damages and criminal law

As presented in Section 2, early case resolution tools can have an impact on the exposure to private damages and criminal law, and this could affect the incentives of investigated parties to agree on using procedural alternatives in the name of expediency.

Balancing these incentives has been addressed in Brazil through legislation,32 as the current law states that investigated parties that have entered into a cease-and-desist agreements with the competition authority will only be liable for the actual damages caused, rather than the double damages and joint liability (i.e. damages caused by the entire cartel, not specific to one or another cartelist) applicable for other parties that were found guilty of cartel conduct.

With respect to criminal law, in Brazil, where criminal and administrative cases may run in parallel in different institutions, there are no provisions granting criminal immunity in cease-and-desist agreements in the same way as with leniency beneficiaries (CADE, 2016[21]). Consequently, the early resolution does not reduce the exposure to criminal action.

Chile, on the other hand, has adopted a mechanism that creates a closer connection between competition and criminal law. This is due to FNE having the facultative power to file a complaint (querella). In the exercise of this power, FNE has to assess if there was a serious effect in the market, considering factors like the finding of a collusive agreement by resolution of the Competition Tribunal, the severity of the infringement, having affected markets of mass consumption or basic items, and the prolonged duration or the geographical scope of the effects of the cartel (FNE, 2018[28]). Some of these factors resemble those that FNE has considered for the taxi sector illustrated in Box 3. This suggests that considerations relating to the gravity of the infringement may influence decisions across both competition and criminal enforcement.

3.6. Monitoring compliance of obligations

The effectiveness of early case resolution mechanisms depends not only on the obligations imposed on investigated parties and the legal consequences attached to non-compliance, but also on the ability of competition authorities to verify whether those obligations are being fulfilled. Jurisdictions in the region have adopted different approaches to monitoring compliance, reflecting differences in institutional arrangements and constraints, seeking not to negate the benefits of saving time and resources obtained through early resolution.

The system may be similar to the monitoring of remedies imposed after an adversarial proceeding, although early case resolution tools may provide a more collaborative environment for the design of the strategy. In some jurisdictions, the way in which compliance will be monitored may be proposed by the investigated party itself. However, in these situations, as recognised by SIC (2023[23]), the competition authority should provide sufficient consideration to ensure the proper supervision of compliance and may opt to introduce different measures.

The monitoring may be entrusted to a division of the competition authority which could be the investigative body, as in Peru,33 or another unit, like in Colombia.34 In any case, this activity may be assisted by information provided by the party, such as periodic reports, receipts of payments, training certificates and studies proving the effects of the measures on competition, among others.

Self-reporting may be related to the obligation of implementing a compliance programme, requiring a compliance officer to verify and certify the progress and conformity with the law.35

Competition authorities in the region may also request that an external auditor is hired by the party to supervise the fulfilment of all obligations and submit the reports to the competition authority. The reasoning behind this is that the independence of the auditor may provide an additional level of credibility and assurance regarding the accuracy of the information submitted, while reducing the burden of the authority and facilitating the timely detection of potential breaches.

The information collected through these ways may be supplemented by performing inspections, as provided for in Colombia’s guideline (SIC, 2023[23]) or the filing of requests of information to then assess the impact of the measures in the market.

A performance bond may be asked to guarantee compliance with the obligations that are part of the agreement, as is the case in Panama.36

Considering all of these, the design of monitoring mechanisms may influence the overall effectiveness of early case resolution programmes. While extensive monitoring can strengthen compliance and increase confidence in the commitments undertaken by investigated parties, it may also reduce some of the procedural efficiencies associated with early resolution. Competition authorities then must strike a balance between the need for effective supervision and the objective of conserving enforcement resources.

Notes

← 1.  Chile and Paraguay have more than one proceeding for the early case resolution. In Chile, the extrajudicial agreement (acuerdo extrajudicial) might be agreed upon during the investigation by the National Economic Prosecutor’s Office (FNE) and the defendant and brought to the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, TDLC); while the conciliation (conciliación) can allow for a settlement after the procedure has started before the TDLC. In Paraguay, the settlement (terminación convencional) can only be agreed during the investigation, before the accusation and involves the imposition of a sanction; while the commitments (compromiso de cese) may be resolved at any stage before the final decision and it involves the agreement of obligations for the party, instead of a sanction.

← 2.  As seen in Colombia, SIC’s Resolution No. 57600 dated 28 October 2019, https://sedeelectronica.sic.gov.co/sites/default/files/estados/092021/RESOLUCI%C3%93N%20CLORO%20SODA%2057600.pdf.

← 3.  As in Costa Rica, Law No. 9736, Article 65 and Regulation of Law 9736, Articles 104 and 105.

← 4.  As seen in Chile, FNE’s Resolution in Rol N°2713-22, https://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/arch_2713-22_2024.pdf.

← 5.  In Paraguay, the settlement is only available during the investigation stage.

← 6.  Dominican Republic, Regulation of Law No. 42-08, Article 21.

← 7.  Andean Community, Decision 608, Article 27.

← 8.  Ecuador, Organic Law of Regulation and Control of Market Power, Article 89.

← 9.  Honduras, Decree 357-2005, Article 51 and Agreement No. 001-2007, Article 52.

← 10.  Brazil, Law No. 12529/11, Article 85.

← 11.  Brazil, Statues of Cade, Articles 181 and 182.

← 12.  Costa Rica, Law No. 9736, Article 66.

← 13.  Honduras, Decree 357-2005, Article 51 and Agreement No. 001-2007, Article 52.

← 14.  Brazil, Statues of CADE, Article 184.

← 15.  Jamaica, The Fair Competition (Notices and Procedures) Regulations, 2000, Regulation 20(2).

← 16.  As seen in Costa Rica, Law No. 9736, Articles 67 and 119.

← 17.  Costa Rica, Law No. 9736, Article 69.

← 18.  Honduras, Decree 357-2005, Article 51.

← 19.  Brazil, Law No. 12529/11, Article 85 and Statutes of CADE, Article 184.

← 20.  Jamaica, The Fair Competition (Notices and Procedures) Regulations, 2000, Regulation 23(2).

← 21.  Jamaica, The Fair Competition (Notices and Procedures) Regulations, 2000, Regulation 24.

← 22.  Costa Rica, Law No. 9736, Article 67.

← 23.  Honduras, Agreement No. 001-2007, Article 53.

← 24.  Jamaica, The Fair Competition (Notices and Procedures) Regulations, 2000, Regulation 23(1).

← 25.  Dominican Republic, ProCompetencia Resolution No. 011-2011 dated 24 June 2021, https://procompetencia.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/cd-011-2021-reglamento-compromiso-de-cese.pdf.

← 26.  Paraguay, Decree No. 1490/2014, Article 89.

← 27.  Dominican Republic, Procompetencia Resolution No. 011-2011, Article 11.

← 28.  Dominican Republic, Procompetencia Resolution No. 011-2011, Article 10.

← 29.  Paraguay, Decree No. 1490/2014, Article 88.

← 30.  Honduras, Decree 357-2005, Article 51 and Agreement No. 001-2007, Article 52.

← 31.  Peru, INDECOPI Technical Report No. 000022-2022 dated 31 May 2022.

← 32.  Brazil, Law No. 14470 dated 16 November 2022, Article 1.

← 33.  The monitoring of compliance with the commitments in Peru is entrusted to the National Directorate for the Investigation and Promotion of Free Competition of INDECOPI.

← 34.  The monitoring of compliance with the guarantees in Colombia is entrusted to SIC’s Directorate for Compliance.

← 35.  As seen in Brazil, CADE’s cease-and-desist agreement with Álya Construtora S.A. dated 1 April 2025, https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?HJ7F4wnIPj2Y8B7Bj80h1lskjh7ohC8yMfhLoDBLddbqITKyuX97gsEhcFODpLIcnwgyuqpmEIY6QxEnkabZ6HtOhfWQpYFRcdw-Xpaw75AXT820NU_dvQhHkEn0IEiq; Peru, INDECOPI Technical Report No. 028-2022/DLC-INDECOPI dated 27 June 2022; and Panama, Cabinet Council Resolution No. 169 dated 1 September 2011.

← 36.  Panama Cabinet Council Resolution No. 80 dated 17 May 2011.