Early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean

4. Experiences in LAC jurisdictions

The implementation of early case resolution involves analysing the approach to the exercise of discretionary powers of the authority in the assessment of cases and obligations, and the interplay with leniency. Without aiming to be exhaustive, this section explores some of the ways in which authorities in the region are implementing their early case resolution tools and addressing these topics.

4.1. Selection of cases

Where there is an element of discretion in the selection of cases, the decision to move forward with an adversarial proceeding or to use an early case resolution tool may be one of case prioritisation (OECD, 2026[29]). Competition authorities may choose to resolve their cases early if they believe they are not high impact cases because of factors like the sector involved, the magnitude of the potential harm to competition or the effect that the decision on early resolution may have on deterrence.

This exercise of discretion may lead authorities to reach different conclusions on whether to move forward with early case resolution based on factors, like an analysis of the severity of the effects. While Chile’s FNE considered that certain local taxi cases were suitable for settlement because of their limited competitive significance, Colombia’s SIC rejected commitments in a market-sharing investigation because it considered that acceptance would undermine deterrence.

Box 3. Exercise of discretion when analysing cases that could be resolved early

Chile: Taxis

In 2025, FNE agreed and TDLC approved, a settlement with the Municipality of San Bernardo and thirteen taxi lines. The investigated parties had signed a Protocol of Agreement and agreed to prioritise existing lines over potential new competitors in the market in proceedings related to requests of routes and changes of routes, even affecting a tender in 2010 for new concessions.

When explaining its rationale, FNE argued that the case did not affect competition in the markets severely, due to (i) the local scope of the conducts, (ii) the absence of actions to conceal the conduct and (iii) the manifest lack of awareness of competition issues from the investigated parties.

The same factors were also considered in other cases related to the taxi sector in the cities of Coyhaique and Victoria, consolidating the approach that this type of infringements can be solved through early case resolution.

Colombia: Security

In 2025, SIC rejected commitments offered by several security companies that were under investigation for the alleged agreement for geographical market sharing within the framework of public procurement tenders of the National Protection Unit. The commitments included divestments and external audits, among others.

SIC argued that the analysis of commitments in cases of hard core cartels is “more rigorous due to the negative effects that this type of conducts generate in the market”. It then signalled that accepting the commitments offered in this case would have a negative impact in deterrence, undermining SIC’srole in the detection and enforcement against serious infringements.

Sources: Chile’s TDLC Resolution No. 38 dated 11 November 2025, https://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/AE_38-25-San-Bdo.pdf; and on Rol AE No. 25-22 dated 9 January 2023, https://www.tdlc.cl/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/AE_25-22.pdf; and FNE Extrajudicial Agreement dated 25 June 2025, https://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Acuerdo-Extrajudicial-280725.pdf; Colombia’s SIC Resolution No. 31124 dated 23 May 2025, https://normograma.info/sic/docs/resolucion_superindustria_31124_2025.htm#NF7.

4.2. Design of obligations

While the legal framework may authorise the inclusion of commitments, corrective measures or other obligations, competition authorities retain significant discretion regarding their design. As a result, and as mentioned in Section 3, authorities in the region have used early case resolution tools to pursue broader objectives apart from procedural efficiency, such as repairing the effects of the infringement, promoting compliance, restoring competition or addressing structural conditions that may facilitate collusive behaviour.

The Peruvian competition authority may demand measures to revert the effects of the infringement and to support the investigation, promotion or defence of competition (Reyna García, 2024[18]). The scope of these obligations is based on the circumstances of the case and the result of the negotiation with the investigated parties. As a result of this, they can potentially include a direct compensation to affected consumers, like in the water jugs case.

Box 4. Measures to promote competition and revert the effects in the water jugs case in Peru

In 2023, the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI) of Peru approved several commitments from firms and individuals on a price-fixing cartel case in the bottled water market. One of the beneficiaries was Rufo Luna Pacsi.

In addition to the admission of the participation in the conduct and a payment to INDECOPI, Mr. Luna Pacsi proposed measures that were deemed by INDECOPI to be sufficient to promote competition and revert the effects of the anti-competitive conduct in the market.

On the side of promotion, Mr. Luna Pacsi offered that he and his employees would participate in annual training on competition law issues for two years, which were considered to be a useful way for directors and workers to learn about competition and the prohibition of anti-competitive conducts.

The proposal also included posting a statement in social media, on the doors of the business and on its delivery van that acknowledged that price-fixing agreements are against the law, which could also help the public to identify the anti-competitive nature of the conduct.

As to the reverting of effects, Mr. Luna Pacsi offered to distribute, for free, water jugs to the affected consumers, which was seen as a way to provide a direct compensation aiming to revert the damages caused by the anti-competitive conduct.

Source: INDECOPI Resolution No. 028-2023/CLC-INDECOPI dated 24 February 2023 and Technical Report No. 0004-2023-DLC/INDECOPI dated 18 January 2023.

In Colombia, the assessment of commitments is based on SIC’s approved guideline which contains a non-exhaustive list of criteria. While the guideline is not binding, the authority has explained how these criteria are interpreted in the context of several cases, as shown in its analysis of the road safety software case, especially emphasising the aspect of the structural measures demanded.

Box 5. Assessment of proposed commitments in Colombia in the road safety software case

In 2020, the national competition authority (SIC) was studying whether the investigated parties had acted in agreement (i) to reduce the number of bidders in tenders aiming to provide an IT tool that manages biometric information used by institutions in the road safety sector like driving schools, driver fitness assessment centres and vehicle inspection centres, among others; (ii) to influence the fee of driver fitness assessment centres and (iii) to stabilise their market participation across the different institutions where the IT tool was implemented.

The investigated parties offered commitments which involved, among others, the granting of a free license to the patent of the relevant software to manage biometric information to an independent institution so that it can sub-license it, training designed to facilitate know-how transfer, the divestiture of the patent owner and the removal of exclusivity and minimum-term clauses binding IT providers with road safety institutions.

In its analysis, SIC concluded that the commitments were sufficient to address the competition concerns identified in the investigation and accepted them, stating that:

• The commitments go beyond the legal obligations, addressing barriers to entry with the sub‑licensing of the patent, the transfer of the software and the associated know-how, thereby enabling potential entrants to compete under conditions that are similar to those of the incumbent providers.

• The commitments are effective to cease or change the allegedly anti-competitive conduct because they facilitate entry into the market for the biometric-information IT tool, remove contractual restrictions that limited the ability to switch providers, and sever links that could support market-sharing arrangements.

• The commitments are largely structural in nature. In particular, the licensing of the patent, the transfer of know-how, the termination of alliance agreements and the removal of exclusivity and minimum-term clauses, as well as the creation of an independent digital platform, modify market conditions and reduce barriers to competition.

• The commitments are consistent with the objectives of competition policy because they ensure the free participation of companies in the market, consumer welfare and economic efficiency.

Source: SIC Resolution No. 28689 dated 16 June 2020, https://normograma.info/sic/docs/r_siyc_28689_2020.htm.

However, the emphasis on generating benefits beyond those achievable through a monetary penalty is not unique to Colombia. In Brazil, CADE can incorporate structural or behavioural measures into early resolution agreements, tailoring the obligations to the specific circumstances of the case (CADE, 2016[21]). In 2017, a cease-and-desist agreement in the market of fuel retail included clauses of divestment and re-structuration of the company, which were seen as a novelty at the time. The structural measures also influenced the amount to be paid by the party to the contribution fund, since the calculation did not take into account the revenues associated with the assets subject to divestiture (Perius Ramos, 2017[30]).

Box 6. Structural remedies in a cease-and-desist agreement in Brazil

In 2017, CADE approved a cease-and-desist agreement with Cascol Combustiveis para Veículos Ltda. (Cascol) within the framework of a cartel investigation in the fuel market in Brasilia.

In addition to the payment to a contribution fund, the collaboration with the investigation and ceasing and desisting from performing the conduct under investigation, Cascol committed to:

• The implementation of a compliance programme to ensure that its activities comply with the law.

• The re-structuration of the company in terms of the administration, with more rigorous controls and more professionalism in the management of the business.

• The divestment of some gas stations in Brasilia within specific terms.

CADE argued that the divestment had the goal of reducing market concentration and mitigating the risks for collusion.

As a result of the divestment commitment, the amount that would be paid to the contribution fund was reduced. The basis for the calculation, the invoicing of the company, did not take into consideration the invoicing of the gas stations that would be sold.

Sources: CADE (2017[31]), Cade celebra acordo em investigação de cartel no mercado de revenda de combustíveis no Distrito Federal, https://www.gov.br/cade/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/cade-celebra-acordo-em-investigacao-de-cartel-no-mercado-de-revenda-de-combustiveis-no-distrito-federal; CADE’s Termo de compromisso de cessação de prática dated 5 April 2017, https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?DZ2uWeaYicbuRZEFhBt-n3BfPLlu9u7akQAh8mpB9yMPNPjHPGG0zCIGPdwZ1Nga8cmCfcRW1vUe9-dFdFTHj9A7fDTqc-kv1mnc62uIl2_P340yblE5yvjWkRPmJoVW;Perius Ramos, R. (2017[30]), O Cade e as inovações no TCC celebrado com a Cascol, https://www.jota.info/opiniao-e-analise/artigos/cade-acordo-com-compromisso-de-desinvestimento.

The Colombian and Brazilian examples illustrate how structural obligations can be used as part of negotiated outcomes. As mentioned by the OECD (2022[32]) in a study on remedies in abuse of dominance cases, structural measures are easier to monitor than behavioural remedies. However, because of their intrusive and often irreversible character, some jurisdictions maintain that structural remedies should be reserved for situations in which the harm to competition is inseparable from the organisational or ownership arrangements of the party.

4.3. Experiences with leniency

As discussed in Section 2, leniency policy and early case resolution may pursue some similar objectives, the main focus is different, as leniency aims to detect and investigate cartels while early case resolution aims for procedural efficiency.

In jurisdictions where leniency programmes do not exist, the early resolution tools could be a tool to achieve the co-operation that could otherwise come from such programmes. In Chile, the successful experience of the Farmacias case led to significant support to the idea of leniency policy, inspiring policymakers to approve a law introducing the tool.

Box 7. Early resolution case contributed to adoption of leniency policy in Chile

In the Farmacias case, FNE started a proceeding against three pharmacy companies for agreeing on prices for pharmaceutical products. One of the investigated parties, Farmacias Ahumada, came to an agreement with the authority that included a confession from the company and the co-operation in the proceeding against its former fellow cartelists, in addition to the payment of a penalty.

At the time, the competition framework in Chile did not have a leniency programme in place. The positive effects of the settlement of this case contributed to the legitimisation of leniency and is recognised as having influenced the political support for the approval of changes to the law that included leniency.

Additionally, when the issue was brought to the Supreme Court to resolve on the validity of the use of the confession of the settling party as evidence against the other cartelists, the judges established factors for the assessment of the confession that would not only serve as precedent for other settlements, but also for leniency applications.

Source: Carrasco Delgado, N. (2023[33]), “Análisis de los elementos jurisprudenciales de valoración de la delación compensada en Chile”, Derecho Global. Estudios sobre Derecho y Justicia, Vol. 8/23, pp. 245-271, https://doi.org/10.32870/dgedj.v8i23.573; and Bernedo, P. (2013[34]) Historia de la libre competencia en Chile, Fiscalía Nacional Económica, Santiago, https://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Historia_libre_competencia.pdf (accessed on 9 April 2026).

The experience highlights that leniency programmes and early case resolution mechanisms are not necessarily competing instruments. If clearly and appropriately designed, they can be used in complementary ways to strengthen cartel enforcement. As expressed in Section 2, the interaction between both mechanisms therefore requires careful design to preserve incentives for cartel detection while also enabling competition authorities to benefit from procedural efficiencies from early case resolution.