This chapter provides an overview of the public procurement function in the Judicial Council of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. It reviews the different rules and norms regulating procurement activities, as well as the institutional set up to strategically plan, execute, and control the procurement system. It also discusses institutional mandates relative to budgetary, management, and procurement functions, particularly the mandate of the Secretariat for General Administration and Budget (SAGyP) of the judicial branch of the city government. In addition, the chapter assesses the relevance of public procurement in the Judicial Council by analysing procurement volumes and comparing them with those of other judiciaries at the local and national levels.
E‑Procurement Review of the Judicial Council of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires
Abstract
Public procurement is increasingly recognised as a strategic tool to deliver priority policy objectives and a cornerstone of public service delivery not only for national governments, but also for subnational ones. As subnational governments provide important public services for citizens, it is critical that the governance of their procurement systems is robust and fit-for-purpose. Across OECD countries, for instance, 62.5% of public procurement spending was undertaken at sub-national levels in 2023, compared to 61.3% in 2021. (OECD, 2025[1]) The same finding applies in the Latin American context, where subnational governments accounted for 66.2% of procurement spending in 2021 (41.7% at the local level and 24.8% at the state/provincial level). Brazil and Guatemala have the highest local government procurement spending as a percentage of the total compared to nine countries in the region (49.7 and 40.5%, respectively) (see Figure 1.1). (OECD, 2024[2]).
Source: (OECD, 2024[2]), Government at a Glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4abdba16-en.
A clear and predictable regulatory framework that avoids duplicating requirements or conflicting with other legislation contributes to the good governance of public procurement. Updating or revising the public procurement framework has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it allows policies, institutions, and practices to keep up with the dynamic nature of the procurement activities, for example, by recognising technological developments. On the other hand, frequent changes can create challenges and hinder the attractiveness of procurement procedures, leading to a fragmented body of rules and regulations.
Notably, most OECD countries have reformed their public procurement regulatory frameworks between 2019 and 2024 and, in some cases, there were several reform revisions.
According to the findings of the OECD Survey on Public Procurement 2024, while 90% of Respondents (36 out of 40 surveyed countries) adapted their legal frameworks to evolving conditions at least once in the past five years, about a third of them revised it more than eight times, with reforms every 7.5 months on average (see Figure 1.2). (OECD, 2025[3]).
Note: Data are shown for 40 Respondents.
Source: (OECD, 2025[3]), Implementing the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement in OECD and Partner Countries: 2020-2024 Report, https://doi.org/10.1787/02a46a58-en.
Argentina is a federal republic composed of 23 provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CABA). Each province has its own constitution, which defines its powers and institutions. CABA, the nation’s capital since 1 880, was originally administered by an official appointed by the President. After the 1994 constitutional reform, CABA gained an autonomous government. However, National Law 24 588 (1995) limited this autonomy, allowing the national government to retain control over key areas such as security, justice, and transportation. Although this law has been challenged and some functions have been transferred to CABA over the years, developments in the judicial sector have remained more limited. This reflects the complexity of transferring judicial competences in a manner that preserves the separation of powers and safeguards judicial independence as well as ensuring appropriate governance, accountability and co‑ordination arrangements.
In line with the National Constitution, CABA’s constitution, approved in 1996 by the Constituent Convention, defines a republican and representative form of government for the City. Title 5 of CABA’s constitution establishes the functions and competencies of the Judicial Branch of the City. Article 107 states that “The Judicial Branch of the City is composed of the Superior Court of Justice, the Judicial Council, the other courts established by law, and the Public Prosecutor.” (City of Buenos Aires, 1996[4]).
Articles 115 to 117 establish the structure, composition, functions and powers of the Judicial Council (Consejo de la Magistratura, CM). Its competences include “drafting the budget and administering the resources assigned by law to the Judicial branch, selecting and proposing candidates for judges and the Public Prosecutor to the Legislature, receiving complaints, deciding to initiate removal proceedings for magistrates and magistrates, and formulating the corresponding accusation before the Impeachment Jury.
Although Law 7 (Organic Law of the Judicial Branch of the City of Buenos Aires) of 1998 defines the structure and functioning of the first instance courts and the appellate chambers of the various jurisdictions (fueros), the implementation of these instances was suspended pending an agreement between the Federal Government and the City of Buenos Aires on the transfer of ordinary judicial jurisdictions to the Judicial Branch of the City, together with the corresponding budgetary and administrative resources.
By mid-2025, more than 30 years after the reform of the national constitution that established the autonomy of the City of Buenos Aires, only the following jurisdictions are operational within the city's Judicial Branch:
Criminal, Juvenile Criminal, Misdemeanour and Infraction: Applies the Penal Code (for crimes whose adjudication has been transferred to the CABA), the Misdemeanour and Infraction Code and criminal, misdemeanour, and infraction procedural rules, and the applicable laws of the City.
Administrative, Tax, and Consumer Relations Litigation: Intervenes in all matters where the City is a party, both in the realm of public and private law; and also in tax matters (collection of taxes, fees, and contributions).
Electoral: Resolves electoral disputes. It maintains some administrative functions such as preparing voter registers. It also exercises the electoral jurisdiction assigned to it by law throughout the entire territory of the city.
Law 31 (Organic Law of the Judicial Council) of 1998 establishes the composition, internal organisation, and functions of the Judicial Council. Article 18 defines the bodies that make up the CM: (City of Buenos Aires, 1998[5])
The Plenary: It is composed of nine members, as illustrated in Figure 1.3, whose mandates extend to four years and can be re-elected, but not consecutively.
The Executive Committee, composed of the President and the First and Second Vice Presidents.
The commissions: 1) Administration, Management, and Judicial Modernisation; 2) Selection of Members of the Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor; 3) Discipline and Accusation; 4) Institutional Strengthening and Strategic Planning; 5) Transfer of the National Judicial Branch and the National Public Prosecutor to the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires.
The Secretariat for General Administration and Budget of the Judicial Branch (SAGyP).
Source: (Judicial Council of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, n.d.[6]) Mission and mandate, www.consejo.jusbaires.gob.ar.
Regarding functions related to public procurement and contracting, the law assigns competencies to different bodies of the CM. The functions of the Plenary, detailed in Article 20, include:”14. Approving the Procurement Plan and Action Plan for the Jurisdiction, entrusting the SAGyP of the Judicial Branch with carrying out the procedures established in the corresponding laws”
The Commission for Administration, Management, and Judicial Modernisation has among its powers, listed in Article 37,”4. Monitoring, through reports, the execution of tender, bidding, and other selection procedures for co-contractors, under the responsibility of the SAGyP of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, in accordance with the provisions of the Plenary in the Procurement Plan and Action Plan for the Jurisdiction, ordering the corresponding award in applicable cases.”
Finally, Article 27 establishes, among the functions of the SAGyP, the following: (City of Buenos Aires, 1998[5]).
Executing, under the control of the Commission for Administration, Management, and Judicial Modernisation, the annual budget of the Judicial Branch of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, with the exception of the budgets corresponding to the Superior Court of Justice and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Public Defence Office, and the Guardianship Public Prosecutor regarding the self-administration of each of their branches provided they do not exceed 500 000 purchase units. It has competence in the execution of the budget allocated to activities common to the branches of the Public Prosecutor, according to the corresponding budget programme;”
Carrying out the contracting of goods and services, except for those attributed to the President of the Council and/or the Plenary of the Council by Law. It also carries out contracting related to the leasing, acquisition, construction, and sale of real estate corresponding to the common activities of the Public Prosecutor and the Judicial Branch of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, with the exception of those of the Superior Court of Justice and those corresponding to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Public Defence Office, and the Guardianship Public Prosecutor, according to subsection 4 of this article. Procedural rules ensuring free, transparent, and equal participation of bidders must be applied.
Thus, functions related to procurement and contracting are assigned hierarchically among different bodies of the CM, with the Plenary in the strategic role, the Commission in a controlling role, and the SAGyP in the execution role, as illustrated in Figure 1.4.
Source: (City of Buenos Aires, 1998[5]), Organic Law of the Judicial Council, Issue No 475, https://mptutelar.gob.ar/sites/default/files/Ley31_Ley_organica_Consejo_Magistratura_CABA.pdf.
Procurement and contracting for the public sector of the CABA are regulated by Law 2095 of 2006, which includes within its scope of application not only the Executive Branch but also the Legislative Branch, the Judicial Branch, and all companies, societies, and other entities in which the CABA has a majority share in the capital or in decision making. (City of Buenos Aires, 2006[7]).
In this regard, the CM regulated the law for the scope of the Judicial Branch through CM Resolution 276 of 2020. This resolution establishes, in its Article 2, that the scope of application is the entire Judicial Branch of the City, except for the Superior Court of Justice and the Public Prosecutor for contracts below 500 000 purchase units.
Law 2095, like most public procurement laws enacted in recent years in different countries and at the subnational level in various districts, organises the system based on the principle of normative centralisation and operational decentralisation. This translates into the establishment of a steering function for the system (which can be through the creation of a specialised body or the assignment of this function to an existing organisation), and an operational function, corresponding to the operational procurement units (Unidades Operativas de Adquisiciones, UOA). In the case of the Executive Branch (Government of the CABA, GCABA), Article 17 defines the General Directorate of Procurement and Contracting under the Ministry of Finance, as the steering body, and the UOAs as the procurement areas of the jurisdictions and entities of the GCABA.
The functions of the steering body, according to Article 1919 of Law 2095, are as follows: (City of Buenos Aires, 2006[7]).
Proposing procurement and contracting policies that the other branches may consider.
Proposing the issuance of regulatory, clarifying, interpretive, and complementary rules on the matter.
Compiling, organising, and keeping updated the current regulations on public sector contracting in the City.
Designing, implementing, and administering an Information System that allows online access for tracking the management of all acquisitions made following the guidelines established in Article 7 777.
Administering the operation of the Computerised Unique and Permanent Supplier Registry; the Computerised Registry of Goods and Services; and the Computerised Registry of Contracting Information of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires.
Supplying all information related to the Procurement and Contracting System to the government of the City’s website.
Applying sanctions to bidders or awardees, at the request of the contracting body.
Proposing manuals of rules and procedures.
Compiling the annual procurement programme, based on the information submitted by the UOAs.
Preparing and approving the unique set of general terms and conditions.
Providing training for the UOAs.
Setting and keeping updated reference prices.
Recommending general and/or specific sustainability criteria.
Promoting the use of mechanisms for preventing and detecting anti-competitive practices.
Likewise, Article 2020 defines the functions of the UOAs: (City of Buenos Aires, 2006[7]).
Preparing the annual procurement programme, based on the annual procurement projects submitted by the programme or project executing units.
Providing the Sectoral Management Office (Oficina de Gestión Sectorial, OGESE) of the jurisdiction with all necessary information so that it can co‑ordinate the contracting system with the budgetary system.
Planning acquisitions together with the OGESE by preparing an Annual Procurement Programme; and reporting them to the Steering Body.
Preparing the specific terms and conditions.
Informing the Steering Body about the progress of the management of acquisitions under its responsibility, supplying all relevant data to integrate it into the information system.
Applying the contractual penalties provided for in this Law and informing the Steering Body of the Procurement and Contracting System accordingly.
Executing the selection processes for co-contractors for those contracts under their responsibility, as established by the regulations of the law.
Co‑ordinating, grouping, and/or centralising the contracts under their charge when deemed convenient.
Providing the Steering Body with all necessary information for the fulfilment of its functions.
Mirroring the organisation in the Executive branch, CM Resolution 276, Article 17, regulates the organisation of the contracting system for the Judicial Branch:
“a. Steering Body: The function of preparing and approving the unique set of general terms and conditions applicable within the scope of the Judicial Branch, excluding the Superior Court of Justice and the contracting carried out individually by each branch of the Public Prosecutor, provided they do not exceed 500 000 purchase units, corresponds to the Plenary of Councillors, as does proposing procurement and contracting policies for the consideration of the other branches. The other functions attributed to the Steering Body by Law No 2095 are exercised within that same scope by the SAGyP, as provided by Law No 31.
b. Operational Acquisition Units: For the purposes of applying this Law, within the scope of the Judicial Branch, excluding the Superior Court of Justice and the contracting carried out individually by each branch of the Public Prosecutor, provided they do not exceed five hundred thousand (500 000) purchase units, the functions attributed by Law No. 2095 to the operational acquisition unit will be exercised by the General Directorate of Procurement and Contracting (Dirección General de Compras y Contrataciones, DGCC), provided these functions are not attributed by these Regulations to another body.”
In contrast to what happens in the Executive Branch, in the CM the functions of the UOAs are concentrated in the DGCC, which receives and centralises the requirements of all courts, chambers, and prosecutor’s offices and carries out their procurement and contracting through the CM’s system. In this way, the regulation alters the principle of normative centralisation and operational decentralisation established in the Law, replacing it with a system of normative centralisation in the SAGyP, which acts as the governing body, and operational centralisation in the DGCC, which hierarchically reports to the SAGyP. So far, the system appears to be functioning well for the procurement volume usually managed by a judiciary. However, it will be necessary to evaluate what the additional workload will be both in terms of the number of processes and the diversity and complexity of the items and categories to be contracted when the future transfer of national courts to the scope of the CABA is carried out. If that evaluation determines that the additional workload will be significant, which is possible, there will be two alternatives to guarantee the correct functioning of the CM’s procurement system: i) Strengthening the DGCC so that it can handle the additional requests, which would require investments in, for example, IT solutions and human resources, or ii) advance towards operational decentralisation by creating procurement units throughout the institution. However, the transfer process depends on political decisions; therefore, the possibility of conducting the study also hinges on those decisions, which fall entirely outside the scope of the CM.
Law 2095 establishes the “Principle of the Electronic Channel” as the axis of public procurement in the government of the CABA, stating that: “Procurement and contracting procedures must be executed through the electronic channel...” and CM Resolution No. 276/2020 of the Judicial Council of the CABA provides for the implementation of the e‑procurement system in the Judicial Branch of the CABA. (City of Buenos Aires, 2006[7]).
Regarding the enabling of the electronic channel in the processes of the public sector of the CABA, Law No 4 736 regulates the use of electronic files, electronic documents, electronic signature, digital signature, electronic communications, electronic notifications, and established electronic addresses in administrative procedures and judicial processes. Furthermore, it establishes the Digital Signature Infrastructure, granting the Executive Branch of the CABA the role of licensor for the implementation of the digital signature infrastructure of the government of the CABA. This must be used by all units and co‑ordinated with the Legislative and Judicial Branches for its operability and implementation.
Returning to CM Resolution No. 276/2020, Article 3 delegates to the SAGyP the issuance of the necessary operational manuals and complementary rules to implement an Electronic Procurement System.
CM Resolution No. 2/2022, later supplemented by SAGyP Resolution No. 20/2022, approved the operational manuals of the JUC system (Justicia Compra), and established that it was to begin implementation from 1 February 2022, for all public tenders, and from 1 April 2022, for all direct contracting of the Judicial Branch of the CABA, with the exception of the Superior Court of Justice and the Public Prosecutor.
The 2024 budget approved by the CABA Legislature allocated a total of ARS 148 billion to the CM, equivalent to approximately USD 158.2 million (average 2024 exchange rate applied. This represents 2.48% of the CABA’s total budget.
The following table shows the distribution of the CM’s total budget across the different expenditure categories. Given the nature of the CM’s activity, 80.5% of the budget is allocated to personnel expenses. The rest of the expenditure, with the exception of the 0.8% destined for transfers, amounts to 19.4%, which is designated for consumer goods, capital goods, and non-personnel services. Those ARS 28.7 billion, equivalent to approximately USD 30.7 million, are the maximum budget amount that could be executed through the CM’s procurement system.
To fully understand the relevance of procurement in the CM, it is important to compare it with other judiciaries. A first relevant comparison would be against an Argentinian province, given that, as mentioned previously, all of them have the same republican system, featuring independent judiciaries. The province of Córdoba is the second largest in terms of population. Although it has very different characteristics from CABA, given its large territorial extension, the weight of personnel expenses in the Judicial Branch (JB) budget is also predominant, even greater than in the CM.
Another case of interest could be the Judiciary of the Federal District and Territories of Brazil (TJDFT), given that the Federal District (DF) is the country’s capital city. Unlike the Executive and Legislative branches of the Federal District, which operate under local autonomy, the TJDFT is integrated into the federal judiciary. This arrangement reflects Brazil’s constitutional design whereby judicial functions remain under federal responsibility while local executive and legislative functions are exercised at the district level. Within this framework, the TJDFT operates with a dedicated budget allocation within the federal judicial budget. Here, again, the high incidence of personnel expenses as a percentage of the total budget is confirmed.
Finally, the CM budget can also be compared with the budget of the National Judiciary Branch (PJN) of Argentina. Although it is a branch of government at a different level, one that has courts and chambers across the entire national territory, not only in the CABA, the predominance of personnel expenses (in this case, over 90%) is also verified here. Given that the total budget of the PJN in 2024 was about USD 1 529 million and the maximum amount spent via public procurement is about 6%, the maximum procurement volume for that year would be about USD 91.7 million.
These comparisons show that 80.5% of the budget allocated to staff remunerations in the CM is in line with what occurs in other judiciaries, as it reflects the nature of the justice service. The remainder of the budget in the cases analysed is allocated to consumer goods, non-personal services, and investments (e.g. construction, capital goods, etc.), and this is the maximum amount that the judiciaries can execute through their procurement and contracting systems. The importance of each of these items depends on the characteristics of each judicial system and surely varies over time, but they always constitute a relatively minor amount within the total budget, especially considering that it includes general expenses such as electricity, gas, water, and telephone services.
According to the estimates above, the amounts spent via procurement in the PJN are about threefold those of the CM, but it is worth noting that the PJN includes the national tribunals throughout the country, not only those based in the CABA. Therefore, the comparison with the PJN suggests that the future transfer of national jurisdictions to the CABA could have a moderate impact on the CM’s procurement system. Indeed, the share of staff remunerations is significantly higher in the PJN, at 93.3%. If the 0.27% allocated to transfers and the portion of non-personal services corresponding to the payment of general services are subtracted, the budget executed through the procurement and contracting system likely does not exceed 6% of the total.
References
[8] City of Buenos Aires (2024), City Budget, https://data.buenosaires.gob.ar/.
[7] City of Buenos Aires (2006), “Ley de Compras y Contrataciones de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires”, Official Gazette of the City of Buenos Aires, https://boletinoficial.buenosaires.gob.ar/normativaba/norma/91501.
[5] City of Buenos Aires (1998), “Ley Orgánica del Consejo de la Magistratura”, Official Gazette of the City of Buenos Aires 475, https://mptutelar.gob.ar/sites/default/files/Ley31_Ley_organica_Consejo_Magistratura_CABA.pdf.
[4] City of Buenos Aires (1996), Constitución de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/constitucion-caba.pdf.
[11] Government of Argentina (n.d.), Open Budget, https://www.presupuestoabierto.gob.ar/.
[6] Judicial Council of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (n.d.), , http://www.consejo.jusbaires.gob.ar.
[9] Ministry of Economy and Public Administration Argentina (2024), , https://economiaygestionpublica.cba.gov.ar/publicacion/presupuesto/.
[10] Ministry of Planning of Brazil (2024), , https://www.gov.br/planejamento/pt-br/assuntos/orcamento/orcamentos-anuais/2024.
[1] OECD (2025), Government at a Glance 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en.
[3] OECD (2025), Implementing the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement in OECD and Partner Countries: 2020-2024 Report, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/02a46a58-en.
[2] OECD (2024), Government at a Glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4abdba16-en.