Confiscation Measures and Sanctions in Corruption Cases in Kazakhstan

3. Confiscation for high-level corruption

Abstract

This chapter looks into the numerical data of confiscation in corruption cases, including the value of confiscated assets and portion of court judgments imposing confiscation. The chapter also analyses the relation between the type of corruption offense and frequency of the confiscation being imposed. Additionally, the chapter assesses the practice of application of confiscation measures in high-level corruption cases.

For the purpose of analysing the status of criminal confiscation in corruption cases, this study only considers offenses related to corruption as defined by UNCAC (2004[3]), rather than according to the definitions used in statistical reports adopted in Kazakhstan. Accordingly, corruption offenses for this study include acts stipulated by the following provisions of the CC (2014[5]):

• misappropriation or embezzlement of entrusted property (Para 2, Part 3, article 189 of the CC (2014[5]))

• legalisation (laundering) of money and (or) other property obtained by criminal means (Para 1, part 3, article 218 of the CC)

• abuse of official powers (Article 361 of the CC)

• taking a bribe (Article 366 of the CC)

• bribery (Article 367 of the CC)

• mediation in bribery (Article 368 of the CC (2014[5]))1.

According to the official criminal pre-trial statistics for 2021–2023, provided for the purposes of this study, various assets of the following value and in the following amounts were seized during the pre-trial investigation stage for the listed six categories of crimes:

• Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) 411 349 600 (approximately USD 794 509) in 2021,

• KZT 7 434 468 800 (approximately USD 14 359 442) in 2022, and

• KZT 6 240 858 400 (approximately USD 12 054 021) in 2023.

3.1 Statistics on seized and confiscated assets

According to the statistics, from 2021 to 2023, property seizure was not applied at all in cases of money laundering and bribery intermediation. Additionally, the amounts of seized assets in criminal cases represented a minimal percentage of the “established value of material harm” from the relevant crimes in 2021 (4.7%), rising to 62.7% in 2022, but dropping to 13.3% in 2023.

However, even with these figures, it is challenging to clearly discern trends in this area, as the statistics include a column for an aggregate figure of “seized and voluntarily repaid” assets at the investigation stage. For certain types of crimes, such as abuse of office, these “voluntary returns” constitute a significant portion of the total. It is important to note that the statistics are compiled in a way that prevents the separation of seized assets from voluntarily repaid amounts, as these indicators are aggregated into a single figure.

The study analysed 48 verdicts from first-level courts across various regions of Kazakhstan, issued in cases involving corruption-related income-generating crimes during the period from 2021 to 2023. The analysis of these verdicts revealed that property seizure was not imposed in every corruption case; for instance, 25 out of the 48 verdicts (more than a half) did not mention property seizure in the corresponding criminal proceedings at all.

In most cases, seizure is imposed on the object of the bribe, either seized during the apprehension of the individual caught in the act or voluntarily handed over during such an apprehension (the total amounts of seized objects of bribes are generally insignificant). The minor size of the seized bribe amounts is also confirmed by the overall official statistics: in 2021, property worth KZT 91 302 900 (approximately USD 176 349) was seized in bribery cases; in 2022, KZT 49 000 000 (approximately USD 94 642) and in 2023, KZT 56 077 200 (approximately USD 108 311).

Other assets, seized during investigation stage, are often released by the court upon the issuance of a verdict on the grounds that the criminal origin of the seized property has not been proven, in accordance with the requirements of Article 48 of the CC (2014[5]). The available statistics do not allow for a reliable determination of the type of property that was seized whether it was an instrument (tool or means of committing a corrupt crime), proceeds from a corrupt crime, or any other benefit derived from it; whether the seized property belonged to the suspect, the accused, or a third party (individual or legal entity); and so on.

According to the official court statistics provided for the purposes of this study, from 2021 to 2023, confiscation was applied in 57 cases pertaining to criminal cases of corruption. In 2021, there were 15 such verdicts (including 4 for misappropriation, 2 for abuse of authority, 5 for passive bribery and 4 for giving bribes); in 2022, there were 12 (including 1 for misappropriation, 10 for passive bribery and 1 for bribery intermediation); and in 2023, there were 30 (including 5 for misappropriation, 4 for money laundering, 1 for abuse of authority, 14 for passive bribery and 6 for giving bribes).

Table 3.1. Number of corruption cases with a confiscation order

Type of crime	2021	2022	2023	Number of cases
Embezzlement or misappropriation (Article 189 Part.3 Para 2, Article 189 Part 4 of CC)	4	1	5	10
Money laundering (Article 218 Part 3 Para 1 of CC)	-	-	4	4
Abuse of official powers (Article 361 of CC)	2	-	1	3
Receiving a bribe (Article 366 of CC)	5	10	14	29
Giving a bribery (Article 367 of CC)	4	-	6	10
Mediation in bribery (Article 368 of CC)	-	1	-	1
Total	15	12	30	57

Source: Official judicial statistics for 2021–2023 provided by the authorities

It should be noted that the judicial statistics on the number of confiscation orders in corruption cases for 2023, provided for the purposes of this study (30 cases), differ from 25 cases reported by the country for the purposes of the baseline monitoring of the fifth round (OECD, 2024[9]) under IAP. This discrepancy suggests potential challenges related to the collection and processing of statistical data.

The current approach to recording confiscation orders and decisions presents obstacles to drawing reliable conclusions about the use of this tool in corruption cases based on the available statistics. However, there is an opportunity for further improvement in the methods of analysis and assessment.

Nonetheless, the available data indicate that criminal confiscation in cases involving income-generating corruption offenses is not consistently applied, highlighting the potential for enhancing its effectiveness.

The number of confiscations compared to the total number of revenue-generating corruption offenses appears insignificant. According to official pre-trial and judicial statistics, 2728 criminal cases involving potentially revenue-generating corruption offenses were brought to court between 2021 and 2023 (899 cases in 2021, 868 cases in 2022 and 961 cases in 2023). The 57 corruption cases in which confiscation was imposed by the courts during this period represent only 2.09%.

Official judicial statistics do not provide information on the amount or value of assets for which courts have issued criminal confiscation orders. However, the Anti-Corruption Agency2 has collected its own statistics regarding the value of assets confiscated through court orders, contributing to a more complete analysis, though it does not fully account for aspects of actual implementation:

In 2021, the courts ordered confiscation of a total of KZT 429 436 257 (approximately USD 829 443) in embezzlement cases, KZT 2 330 000 (approximately USD 4 500) in bribery cases, and KZT 10 000 (approximately USD 19) in bribery cases.

In 2022, the total confiscation was amounted to KZT 1 565 377 226 (approximately USD 3 023 477) in one embezzlement case, KZT 15 931 062 (approximately USD 30 770) in bribery cases, and KZT 50 000 (approximately USD 97) in a bribery mediation case.

In 2023, the total confiscated amounts were KZT 25 239 485 714 (approximately USD 48 749 269) in embezzlement cases, KZT 904 213 180 (approximately USD 1 746 459) in money laundering cases, KZT 163 755 667 (approximately USD 316 289) in abuse of office cases, KZT 7 259 940 (approximately USD 14 022) in passive bribery cases, and KZT 13 432 598 (approximately USD 25 945) in active bribery cases.

Table 3.2. Increase in the value of confiscated assets under court decisions

Value of assets confiscated by court decisions (USD) *

Type of crime	2021	2022	2023	Total
Embezzlement or misappropriation (Article 189 Part.3 Para 2, Article 189 Part 4 of the CC)	829 443	3 023 477	48 749 269	52 602 189
Receiving a bribe (Article 366 of the CC)	4 500	30 770	14 022	49 292
Giving a bribe (Article 367 of the CC)	-	-	25 945	26 945
Mediation in bribery (Article 368 of the CC)	19	97	-	16
Money laundering (Article 218 Part 3 Para 1 of the CC)	-	-	1 746 459	1 746 459
Abuse of office (Article 361 of the CC)	-	-	316 289	316 289
Total	833 962	3 054 344	50 851 984	54 740 290

Note: * Approximate equivalents in USD

Source: Data provided by the Anti-Corruption Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The statistics presented suggests that most of the property is seized and confiscated in embezzlement cases (Para 2 of Part 3 of Article 189 of the CC (2014[5])), while seizure and confiscation of property for passive and active bribery offenses remain insignificant over years. Considering the scale of the country and the economy, such figures of criminal confiscation in corruption cases do not appear convincing.

These findings are consistent with the conclusions of the OECD analysis (OECD, 2017[8]) that covered a period from 2014 to 2016. The monitoring noted that the analysis of the statistics demonstrated that the amount of seized and confiscated property for the main corruption offenses was decreasing. That was particularly evident in confiscations in passive bribery cases: EUR 7 600 000 in 2014, EUR 1 100 000 in 2015 and only EUR 481 000 in 2016. At the same time, most of the seized and confiscated property was related to such offenses as embezzlement and misappropriation of entrusted property, as well as abuse of office. In general, it can be noted that the volumes of seized (confiscated) property are relatively small, considering the size of Kazakhstan's economy.

Above figures indicate that the situation has remained virtually unchanged from 2021 to 2023, with the amounts of confiscations in bribery cases showing a further decline since 2014–2016.

Overall, the relatively small amounts of seized and confiscated property are notable, especially considering the size of Kazakhstan's economy. As highlighted in the analysis, there has been little change during this period, and the amounts of confiscations in bribery cases have decreased further.

A significant indicator for assessing the effectiveness of the confiscation system is the amount of property actually confiscated and the percentage ratio of this amount to the value of assets specified in court confiscation orders. In response to inquiries regarding the funds received by the state budget as a result of enforcing relevant court decisions on corruption offenses from 2021 to 2023, authorities reported that KZT 58 504 305 (approximately USD 113 000) was credited to the budget in 2021, KZT 211 621 513 (approximately USD 408 740) and USD 14 700 in 2022 and KZT 22 687 305 587 (approximately USD 43 819 814) and USD 50 700 in 2023. Notably, KZT 19 600 000 000 of this amount was the value of a waste disposal plant that was confiscated in one case.

Table 3.3. Increase in the effectiveness of confiscation measures in corruption cases

Value of assets recovered based on confiscation orders (USD)*

	2021	2022	2023	Total
Amount of actually confiscated actives	113 000	423 440	43 870 514	44 406 954
Amount of confiscated assets under court decisions	833 962	3 054 344	50 851 984	54 740 290
Percentage ratio	13.5	13.9	86.3	81.1

Note: *Approximate equivalents in USD

Source: Data provided by the Anti-Corruption Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan

3.2 Confiscation in high-level corruption cases

The legislation of Kazakhstan does not define the concepts of high-level corruption or high-ranking corruption, nor does it establish criteria for categorizing such cases.

For the purposes of this study, the term "high-level corruption" shall be understood in accordance with the definition provided in the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, 5^th Round of Monitoring: Guide (OECD, 2023[12]).

Concept of high-level corruption

“High-level corruption”: corruption offences are offenses which meet one of the following criteria:

A. Involve high-level officials in any capacity punishable by criminal law (for example, as masterminds, perpetrators, abettors, or accessories).

B. Involve substantial benefits for officials, their family members, or other related persons (for example, legal persons they own or control, political parties they belong to).

A substantial benefit means a pecuniary benefit that is equal to or exceeds the amount of 1 000 monthly statutory minimum wages (or the equivalent of the minimum wage if it is not applicable) fixed in the respective country on 1 January of the year for which data is provided.

“High-level officials”: The following appointed or elected officials:

A. The President, members of Parliament, members of Government and their deputies.

B. Heads of central executive bodies and other central public authorities and their deputies, members of collegiate central public authorities, including independent market regulators and supervisory authorities.

C. Head and members of the board of the national bank, supreme audit institution.

D. Judges of general courts and the constitutional court, prosecutors, members of the highest judicial or prosecutorial governance bodies (for example, a judicial or prosecutorial council).

E. Regional governors or heads of regional administrations, capital city mayor.

F. Ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions.

G. Any other public officials explicitly designated as politically exposed persons by the national anti‑money laundering legislation.

Source: Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, 5th Round of Monitoring: Guide (OECD, 2023[12])

Out of 48 cases reviewed, only 5 of them qualified as high-level corruption cases: 4 were categorised based on the position held (Head of a central state body, sentenced on 1 February 2021; a Vice-Minister, sentenced on 27 October 2023; Head of the Collegium of the Regional Court, sentenced on 23 November 2023; a judge of a City Court, sentenced on 1 December 2023; and one case qualified based on the criterion of substantial benefit (General Director of a limited liability partnership (LLP), imputed damage from embezzlement of approximately USD 30 000 000, sentenced on 15 September 2023).

Box 3.1. Case of the head of a central state body

The head of a central state body, A, was convicted for conspiracy to commit embezzlement. The court determined that the total amount embezzled was KZT 6 527 956 994 (approximately USD 12 608 542), leading to the conviction of a total of 21 defendants in the case.

In its verdict, the court noted that A was not found to possess any property obtained by criminal means or acquired with funds derived from criminal activity. Therefore, property confiscation as an additional penalty was not imposed. The court also ordered all defendants to jointly and severally compensate the sum of KZT 6 503 045 293 for the damages incurred. To ensure the reparation of damages and meeting the civil claim in the case, the court upheld the prior seizure of the defendants' property, including a 1999 Daewoo Nexia car owned by A.

Source: Court verdict in case No. 7511-20-00-1/223, dated 1 February 2021.

This approach to the confiscation of corruption benefits from a high-ranking official, convicted of an income‑generating corruption offense, can hardly be deemed effective or deterrent for both the convicted individual and other public officials. It appears that the income derived from corruption by the official, Y, has not been established, and their relevant assets that could be subject to confiscation were not identified or seized during the investigation (except for Nexia car). Consequently, no confiscation was imposed.

Moreover, the approach in which 21 convicted individuals, including the high-ranking official, are held jointly and severally liable for compensation of damages under a civil suit with a common claim, applying equally to all convicted persons, does not support the principle that crime should not pay. Under such conditions for compensation of the damages incurred, the official has the opportunity to avoid bearing actual financial costs, at least in proportion to their role in the commission of the crime. The value of damages may be recovered from other convicted individuals or not recovered in part or in full.

Box 3.2. Case of a Vice-Minister for Investment and Development

The Vice-Minister of Kazakhstan for Investment and Development, Y, was convicted for abuse of office. The court determined that Y, by concluding the subsoil use contract for mining with a company affiliated with him, illegally transferred for extraction a nickel-cobalt deposit. As a result of the criminal offense, the state suffered significant losses as not accrued profits amounting to KZT 40 638 265 000 (approximately USD 78 491 525).

The court noted that no civil claim had been filed in the criminal case and that the territory of the deposit had been returned to the state through a judicial process. The verdict lacks any argumentation regarding the calculation of the benefit received by the defendant from the commission of the corruption crime. However, the court found that some property belonging to the defendant were acquired during or after the commission of the incriminated offense. The court was of the opinion that these assets were “accordingly acquired with funds obtained by criminal means,” and thus deemed it necessary to confiscate them for the state. The confiscated assets included various shares in 13 companies, real estate (two land plots, a garden house, and a summer house with land), two luxury cars – a 2021 Mercedes-Benz Maybach S580 and a 2021 Bentley Bentayga V8, and Y's funds in bank accounts in insignificant amounts, as well as five gold bars weighing a total of 70 grams. The court lifted the seizure of apartment belonging to Y, justifying this by stating that it was a service apartment that had been privatised in accordance with the law.

Source: Court verdict in the case No. 7135-23-00-1/338, dated 27 October 2023.

The acquisition of property during or after the commission of a crime can serve as indirect evidence of its illicit origin. However, the mere fact of acquisition within a certain timeframe, without additional supporting evidence, may not be sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the asset's connection to a specific crime.

The following case example demonstrates the practice of not imposing confiscation in the circumstances when a bribe item has been recovered.

Box 3.3. Case of the Chairman of the Judicial Collegium of the Regional Court

The Chairman of the Judicial Panel for Administrative Cases of a Regional Court, M, was convicted of taking a bribe through extortion in the amount of KZT 19 000 000 (approximately USD 38 000) in exchange for issuing an agreed ruling on an administrative case. The court noted that no property obtained through criminal means was established to belong to the defendant, M, and deemed it appropriate not to impose the confiscation as an additional penalty due to the absence of the relevant property. Furthermore, since the tool of the offense, cash in the amount of KZT 19 000 000, was submitted by the victim (a bribe-giver) to the investigative authority during the crime scene examination, the court ordered its return to the victim, i.e., the bribe-giver.

Source: Court verdict in the case No. 3911-23-00-1/254, dated 23 November 2023.

In the following example, the justification for the application of confiscation appears questionable because the only criteria used by the court was the fact of acquisition of the confiscated property after commission of the offenses.

Box 3.4. Case on embezzlement in the private sector

The court accepted a plea agreement for the managers of three private companies, who were charged with conspiracy to commit embezzlement and money laundering. The total value of embezzled assets was KZT 14 565 318 010 (approximately USD 28 132 451). The damage was voluntarily reimbursed by the defendants in full at the investigation stage. In considering the imposition of confiscation, the court referred to Article 48 of the CC (2014[5]) and removed seizure from all property of the defendants acquired by them before committing the offenses. Court noted that “it is not property obtained by criminal means”. And since two defendants were found to have property that was acquired after the commission of the offenses, all the said property was confiscated by the court as “obtained by criminal means and acquired with funds obtained by criminal means” (residential and commercial premises, a land plot, funds in bank accounts). The total value of these assets surpassed KZT 3 000 000 000 and approximately USD 7 850 000. Thus, the court applied the approach that everything acquired by the defendants after the commission of the crime is automatically considered “criminally obtained or acquired with funds obtained by criminal means”.

Source: Court verdict in the case No. 7199-23-00-1a/210, dated 15 November 2023.

It might be possible to presume the criminal origin of assets (even those acquired before the charged offense) if Kazakhstan had a legal framework for extended confiscation. However, such a framework would necessitate clear criteria for recognizing property as subject to confiscation. Mere acquisition of the property after the commission of an offense would not be sufficient. The law should also provide guarantees of a fair trial for the property owner.

The following example illustrates the practice of courts in Kazakhstan, which typically do not consider bribe amounts as criminally obtained property and, consequently, do not apply confiscation on that basis. However, the bribe amount is directed to state income under different legal grounds.

Box 3.5. Case against a city court judge

A judge from a city court was convicted of taking a bribe of KZT 2 000 000 (approximately USD 3 860) in exchange for imposing a non-custodial sentence in a criminal case. In considering the application of confiscation, the court referenced Article 48 of the CC (2014[5]), noting that the defendant did not possess any property obtained by criminal means, nor any property acquired with funds derived from criminal activity, or property that served as a tool or means of committing the crime. Consequently, the court did not impose confiscation as an additional penalty.

The bribe of KZT 2 000 000 was seized during the arrest and searches of the defendant's car and home. The court ordered that the bribe amount of KZT 2 000 000 be converted to the income of the state as "material evidence".

Source: Court verdict in the case No. 3140-23-00-1/76, dated 1 December 2023.

The five high-level corruption convictions described above highlight the gaps in the existing criminal confiscation regime in Kazakhstan and generally support the conclusion that it requires further improvement.

Considering the data on the practical application of seizure and confiscation measures in corruption cases, including those involving high-level corruption, it is necessary, following the recommended reforms to the confiscation institution, to implement comprehensive measures aimed at strengthening the capacity of investigators and prosecutors involved in prosecuting corruption cases, as well as judges who preside over these types of cases.

The Baseline Report of the Fifth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kazakhstan under the IAP (OECD, 2024[9]) provides insights from non-governmental stakeholders regarding the current regime for confiscating corrupt assets. In particular, they have noted the following issues:

• Measures to confiscate illegally obtained property in Kazakhstan are applied very ineffectively, despite the existence of an appropriate legislative framework. Article 15 of CPC (2014[6]) states that confiscation may occur before a sentence is issued, but in practice, this tool is rarely utilised.

• Courts primarily focus on ordering the confiscation of the object of the bribe and compensation for damages in cases involving embezzlement or malfeasance. Even when case files contain documented evidence of property transferred to an official as remuneration, the confiscation process is seldom executed. In the best scenarios, only the seizure of property is maintained until the damage is fully compensated.

• In bribery cases with multiple episodes, investigative authorities often fail to identify or evaluate the property acquired through illegal means, leading to courts not ordering confiscation. Similarly, in embezzlement cases, investigations typically do not ascertain how the stolen money was used. If proceeds from crime were utilised to generate more property, indirect proceeds are also excluded from confiscation.

Moreover, courts do not proactively initiate the confiscation of property involved in corruption offenses. Instances of confiscation targeting the property of high-ranking officials remain isolated, highlighting significant shortcomings in the confiscation system and the urgent need for reform.

According to non-governmental stakeholders, the current regime of criminal confiscation in Kazakhstan is ineffective, echoing arguments similar to those identified in the Baseline Report of the 5th round of monitoring for Kazakhstan (OECD, 2024[9]).

Non-governmental organisations stress the importance of transparency in the voluntary asset recovery process. They argue that what is referred to in the country as voluntary asset recovery may reflect aspects of non-conviction-based confiscation of illegally obtained property. A special committee has been established within the Prosecutor General`s Office, marking a step towards a more organised approach to forced asset recovery. However, it is crucial to ensure that the activities of this committee are transparent and accessible to the public.

Additionally, activities and decisions of an asset recovery commission are not publicly accessible. Information regarding the register of entities whose assets are subject to recovery is also unavailable to the public. As a result, both the public and the media lack access to data concerning the processes of tracing or seizing the proceeds of corruption and funds used to commit crimes.

In relation to high-level corruption, non-governmental organisations highlight certain mechanisms that allow individuals to evade accountability for corrupt acts and retain their assets. These mechanisms include plea bargaining, the voluntary return of illegally acquired assets to the state, and the absence of effective confiscation measures. Non-governmental organisations (NGO) further emphasise that accountability for corruption offenses is often influenced by political or temporary considerations.

The OECD has noted (2024[9]) that several criminal trials involving relatives of the former President were recorded in 2023. While these cases may raise questions about potential political motivations, the sentences imposed have been varied. For instance, one influential relative convicted of embezzling KZT 14 billion from a state-owned company, received a prison sentence in September 2023 but was released on 6 November 2023, following the return of illegally acquired assets and the replacement of the unexecuted portion of the sentence with a suspended one. However, journalistic investigations revealed that the actual return of assets did not occur (2025[13]), indicating opportunities for further improvement and development of the law enforcement system.

During interviews conducted for this study, investigators and prosecutors noted that establishing material harm is essential to proving the elements of corruption offenses. Although this requirement is not explicitly stated in the law, it reflects prevailing practice. In some cases, establishing such harm necessitates conducting an audit or economic forensic expertise. They also pointed out that the concept of illicit gains from corruption (i.e., corruption proceeds) is not applied in practice, largely due to legal traditions that have persisted since the Soviet era. Furthermore, they indicated that the application of certain confiscation mechanisms, such as confiscation of property transferred to third parties, value-based confiscation and confiscation before conviction, poses practical challenges.

The existing system for statistical reporting on property confiscation, including cases of high-level corruption, requires further improvement. Notably, data on high-level corruption cases is absent from the statistics, as current legislation lacks definitions or criteria for such cases, and no statistics are maintained in this regard. The statistical data—along with practice—primarily reflect so-called voluntary returns, which do not constitute confiscation in an international legal sense as defined in Article 31 of the UNCAC (United Nations, 2004[3]).

Existing statistical reports fail to differentiate between types of confiscations (criminal confiscation under Article 48 of the CC (2014[5]); confiscation of evidence under Article 118 of CPC; confiscation without conviction pursuant to Section 15, Chapter 71 of CPC (2014[6])) or between the subjects of confiscation measures (including instruments (tools and means), proceeds of crime (both direct and indirect), profits, other benefits, mixed proceeds, equivalent confiscation, and confiscation from third parties (individuals and legal entities)).

Confiscations conducted in absentia and based on various types of procedural agreements are also not separately identified. Additionally, there is a lack of data regarding the amounts and values of assets subject to court decisions on confiscation and the sums received in the budget as a result of enforcing such confiscation orders. The list of corruption offenses in statistical reports extends well beyond the internationally recognised definition of corruption offenses, distorting the statistics and excluding offenses in the private sector, among others.

A properly configured statistics system for confiscation measures would enable an accurate assessment of the current situation regarding criminal confiscation in practice, identification of trends, formulation of precise conclusions, and planning of measures to improve the existing confiscation system, particularly in corruption cases.

Considering the data collected on the practical application of property seizure and confiscation measures in criminal proceedings related to corruption—including high-level corruption—it seems necessary, following the recommended reforms to the institution of confiscation, to adopt comprehensive measures aimed at strengthening the capacity of investigators and prosecutors handling corruption cases, as well as judges presiding over these categories of cases. It may also be advisable to consider introducing specialization for investigators and prosecutors involved in the criminal prosecution of corruption, particularly high-level corruption, focusing exclusively on financial investigations, asset detection, and recovery.

Additionally, it would be advisable to improve the approach to criminal confiscation statistics so that all the indicators described above are reflected in the new reporting forms where possible and that the updated statistics are made publicly available to ensure that they are transparent and accessible to the public.

Recommendations

• Make it a priority for investigators and prosecutors to fully pursue the confiscation of proceeds of corruption (or their equivalents), particularly in cases of high-level corruption.

• Consider introducing a specialisation for investigators and prosecutors focused exclusively on financial investigations, asset detection, and recovery in corruption cases, particularly of high‑level corruption.

• Implement measures to ensure that property seizure and confiscation are systematically and consistently applied in practice in cases of corruption offenses involving illicit income.

• Improve keeping the statistics on criminal confiscations by including detailed data that distinguishes between types of criminal confiscations and objects of confiscation measures, including confiscation from third parties (natural and legal persons). This should include differentiating between the types and levels of officials subject to confiscation measures, as well as the types of corrupt benefits obtained and confiscated. Additionally, include data on the amounts or value of assets subject to court confiscation orders and the total funds received by the budget as a result of these confiscations.

• Ensure that detailed statistics on criminal confiscation in corruption cases, including high-level corruption, are published periodically (at least annually) to guarantee transparency and accessibility for the public.

Notes

← 1.  It should be considered that the official statistics does not cover corruption in the private sector in the list of corruption offenses (Articles 250, 251 and 253 of the CC (2014[5])).

← 2.  By the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 30 June 2025 the Anti-Corruption Agency was reorganised through its merger into the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2025[24]).