Confiscation Measures and Sanctions in Corruption Cases in Kazakhstan

5. Criminal sanctions, statutes of limitations and immunities

Abstract

This chapter outlines the types of penalties for criminal offenses, provides statistics on their application. It analyses gaps and shortcomings in the criminal sanctioning framework. Additionally, the chapter examines the practices and challenges in enforcing corruption offenses, particularly regarding the immunities enjoyed by high-level officials and the statutes of limitations.

5.1 Types of penalties

According to Article 39 of the CC (2014[5]), a penalty is defined as a measure of state coercion imposed by a court judgment. A penalty is applicable to an individual who has been found guilty of committing a criminal offense and consists of the deprivation or restriction of that individual's rights and freedoms as stipulated by the CC. The imposition of a penalty aims to restore social justice, exonerate the convicted individual, and prevent the commission of new criminal offenses by both the convicted individual and others. The purpose of the penalty is not to inflict physical suffering or undermine human dignity.

In accordance with Article 40 of the CC (2014[5]), an individual found guilty of committing a crime1 may be subjected to the following principal penalties: fine, corrective labour, community service, restriction of liberty, and imprisonment. For the commission of a misdemeanour, the following principal penalties may apply - fine, corrective labour, community service, arrest, and deportation of a foreigner or stateless person.

In addition to the principal penalties, an individual found guilty of committing a criminal offense may be subjected to the following additional penalties: confiscation of property, disqualification from holding a special, military, or honorary title, class rank, diplomatic status, qualification class, and state awards; prohibition on holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities; revocation of citizenship of Kazakhstan; and deportation of a foreigner or stateless person.

Furthermore, more detailed information is provided regarding the penalties that are most frequently imposed in practice for cases involving corruption offenses.

Imprisonment

Imprisonment involves isolating the convicted individual from society by placing them in a penitentiary facility. The term of imprisonment for offenses outlined in the CC ranges from six months to fifteen years. For particularly serious offenses, the term may extend to twenty years or life imprisonment. In cases of offenses by negligence, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed ten years. When substituting a fine, corrective labour, community service, or restriction of liberty with imprisonment, the term may be imposed for less than six months.

In the event of partial or total aggregation of terms of imprisonment when sentencing for multiple offenses (Part 5 of Article 71 and Part 5 of Article 77 of the CC (2014[5])), the maximum term of imprisonment shall not exceed twenty-five years, and when aggregating sentences, it shall not exceed thirty years. Life imprisonment may be imposed for the commission of particularly serious offenses. Life imprisonment shall not be imposed on individuals who committed the crime at an age below eighteen years, on women, or on men aged sixty-three years and older. Furthermore, life imprisonment may, through the mechanism of clemency, be commuted to a fixed-term imprisonment (Article 46 of the CC).

Restriction of liberty

Restriction of liberty consists of the establishment of probationary supervision over the convicted individual for a term ranging from six months to seven years and requiring their engagement in compulsory labour for one hundred hours annually throughout the duration of the penalty. This measure is served at the place of residence of the convicted individual, without isolation from society.

Probationary supervision is implemented by the authorised state body and, by court decision, includes the fulfilment by the convicted individual of the following obligations: not changing their permanent place of residence, employment, or study without notifying the supervising authority; not visiting specified locations; undergoing treatment for designated disorders (illnesses); providing financial support to their family; and adhering to other obligations that facilitate the rehabilitation of the convicted individual and the prevention of further criminal offenses.

In cases of wilful evasion of the terms of restriction of liberty, the unfulfilled term may be replaced by imprisonment, calculated at the rate of one day of imprisonment for each day of restriction of liberty. When a lesser penalty than that prescribed for the given criminal offense is imposed, when a penalty is imposed for an incomplete crime, or when a penalty is substituted, the term of restriction of liberty may be set below the minimum limit established by Article 44 of the CC (2014[5]).

Confiscation of property

Confiscation of property as a measure of sanctioning (Article 48 of the CC (2014[5])) is described in detail in Chapter 2 of this study.

Fine

A fine is defined as a monetary penalty imposed within the limits established by the CC (2014[5]), calculated based on a specified number of monthly calculation indicators2 as determined by the legislation of Kazakhstan in force at the time the criminal offense was committed, or in an amount that is a multiple of the sum or value of a bribe, the amount of money transferred, the value of property transferred, the value of stolen property, the amount of income received, or the amount of payments not remitted to the budget.

For misdemeanour, the fine is imposed within the range of twenty to two hundred monthly calculation indicators, whereas for crimes, the range is from two hundred to ten thousand monthly calculation indicators or an equivalent amount. The court determines the size and deadline for the payment of the fine, considering the severity of the criminal offense, the financial and family situation of the convicted individual, and their ability to earn wages or other income.

The deadline for the payment of the fine is calculated from the moment the judgment becomes final and cannot exceed three years as determined by the court's ruling. In cases of temporary deterioration in the financial situation of the convicted individual due to delays or non-payment of wages, temporary disability, job loss, or loss of income, the court may grant a deferment of payment for a period ranging from one month to one year. The period of deferment is not included in the calculation of the deadline for the payment of the fine established by the court.

In the event of non-payment of the fine within the established deadlines, the court's judgment must be enforced by coercive measures. The unpaid portion of the fine may be replaced by other types of penalties in the proportion established by the CC (2014[5]). When a lesser penalty than that prescribed for the given criminal offense is imposed, in the case of sentencing for an incomplete crime, or when substituting a penalty, the amount of the fine may be set below the minimum limit established by the Article 40 of the CC.

Deprivation of titles, awards and rights

When convicting an individual for the commission of a deliberate criminal offense, the court may revoke their special, military, honorary, or other titles, class ranks, diplomatic statuses, or qualification classes based on the nature of the offender's personality. In the case of a defendant who holds state awards of Kazakhstan, along with special, military, honorary, or other titles, class ranks, diplomatic statuses, or qualification classes conferred by the President of Kazakhstan, the court may submit a recommendation to the President for the revocation of those awards, titles, class ranks, diplomatic statuses, or qualification classes when rendering the judgment, particularly in cases of corruption offenses (Article 49 of the CC (2014[5])).

The penalty of prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities consists of a ban on occupying specified positions in public service, local government bodies, financial organisations, or engaging in certain professional or other activities. This punishment is established for a term ranging from one year to ten years. For the commission of corruption offenses, the prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities is mandatory and consists of a lifetime ban from holding positions in public service, as a judge, in local government bodies, the National Bank of Kazakhstan and its agencies, the authorised regulatory, supervisory, and oversight bodies of the financial market and financial organisations, as well as in state organisations and quasi-public sector entities.

This penalty may also be imposed in cases where it is not provided for in the relevant article of the Special Part of the CC as an additional penalty for the corresponding criminal offense, if, considering the nature and degree of its social danger and the personality of the offender, the court determines that it is impossible to allow that individual to retain the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities (Article 50 of the CC (2014[5])).

General principles and rules of sentencing

In accordance with Article 52 of the CC (2014[5]) (General Principles of Sentencing), an individual found guilty of committing a criminal offense shall be sentenced with a fair punishment within the limits established by the relevant article of the Special Part of the CC, considering the provisions of the General Part. The penalty imposed must be necessary and sufficient for the individual's rehabilitation and for the prevention of new criminal offenses. A more severe form of punishment out of those provided for the committed criminal offense may be imposed only if a less severe form is unable to achieve the objectives of punishment.

More severe penalty than that prescribed by the pertinent articles of the Special Part of the CC (2014[5]) for the committed act may be imposed based on the aggregation of criminal offenses or the aggregation of sentences in accordance with Articles 58 and 60 of the CC. The grounds for imposing a less severe punishment than that prescribed by the corresponding articles of the Special Part for the committed act are determined by Article 55 of the CC.

In determining the punishment, the court considers the nature and degree of the social danger of the criminal offense, the personality of the offender, including their behaviour before and after the commission of the offense, mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and the impact of the imposed penalty on the rehabilitation of the convicted individual and the living conditions of their family or dependents.

The circumstances that mitigate or aggravate criminal liability and penalties are outlined in Articles 54 and 55 of the CC (2014[5]), respectively. The commission of a criminal offense by an individual who has violated an oath (which public officials take upon entering service) constitutes an aggravating circumstance that affects both liability and the severity of the penalty.

Additionally, Article 55 of the CC (2014[5]) allows for the possibility of imposing a more lenient punishment than that prescribed for a particular criminal offense. According to Parts 4 and 5 of this Article, if there are exceptional circumstances related to the goal and motives of the act, the role of the convicted individual, their behaviour during or after the crime, and other circumstances that significantly reduce the act's social danger, the punishment may be set below the minimum limit prescribed by the corresponding article of the Special Part of the CC. The court may also impose a more lenient type of punishment than what is provided in the relevant article or refrain from imposing an additional punishment that is mandated under the law.

Exceptional circumstances can include individual mitigating factors or a combination of such factors. However, it is important to note that Part 8 of Article 55 of the CC (2014[5]), which outlines exceptions to these rules, does not apply to corruption offenses.

Conditional sentencing

Article 63 of the CC (2014[5]) provides that if, when imposing a sentence of imprisonment, the court concludes that the convicted individual can be rehabilitated without serving the sentence, it shall determine that the imposed sentence is conditional. When assigning a conditional sentence, the court must establish, according to the rules outlined in Part 2 of Article 44 of the CC, probationary supervision for the entire duration of the imposed sentence of imprisonment (Parts 1 and 3 of Article 63 of the CC).

According to Part 6 of Article 63 of the CC (2014[5]), a conditional sentence shall not be applied, in particular, in cases of conviction for a corruption offense.

5.2 Penalties for corruption offenses

In Kazakhstan, the law provides for the following sanctions for corruption offenses in the public sector.

Theft under Part 1 of Article 189 of the CC (2014[5]), which constitutes the basic offense, shall be punishable by a fine of up to one thousand monthly calculation indicators (MCI), or by corrective labour of the same amount, or by community service for a duration of up to eight hundred hours, or by restriction of freedom for a term not exceeding three years, or by imprisonment for the same term, with or without confiscation of property.

Theft under Part 2 of Article 189 of the CC (2014[5]), including acts committed by an individual utilizing their official position, shall be punishable by a fine of up to three thousand MCIs, or by corrective labour of the same amount, or by community service for a duration of up to one thousand hours, or by restriction of freedom for a term not exceeding four years, or by imprisonment for the same term, with confiscation of property and with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specified activities for a term of up to three years, or without such deprivation.

Theft under Part 3 of Article 189 of the CC (2014[5]), including acts committed by a person authorised to perform public functions, or by a person equated to such, or by an official, or by a person holding a responsible government position, provided that such acts are committed in connection with the misuse of their official position as defined in Para 2, shall be punishable by restriction of freedom for a term of not less than two years and not more than seven years, or by imprisonment for the same term, with confiscation of property, and with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specified activities for a term of up to six years, or without such deprivation. In the cases specified in Para 2, the penalty shall include a fine ranging from ten to twenty times the value of the stolen property, or imprisonment for a term of not less than two years and not more than seven years, with confiscation of property, and with a lifelong deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities.

Theft under Para 4 of Article 189 of the CC (2014[5]) shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years and not more than twelve years, with confiscation of property, and with a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities for a term of up to ten years, or without such prohibition. In the cases outlined in Para 2 of Part 3 of this article, it shall result in a lifelong deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities.

Abuse of official authority under Part 1 of Article 361 of the CC (2014[5]), which constitutes the basic offense, is punishable by a fine of up to two thousand MCIs, or by corrective labour of the same amount, or by community service for a duration of up to six hundred hours, or by restriction of freedom for a term not exceeding two years, or by imprisonment for the same term, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities.

Abuse of official power as defined in Part 2-1 of Article 361 of the CC (2014[5]), which pertains to the same act committed by an employee of a law enforcement agency, is punishable by a fine of up to four thousand MCI, or by corrective labour of the same amount, or by community service for a duration of up to one thousand hours, or by restriction of freedom for a term not exceeding four years, or by imprisonment for the same term, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities.

Abuse of official authority under Part 3 of Article 361 of the CC (2014[5]), committed by an individual holding a responsible government position, is punishable by a fine of up to five thousand MCIs, or by corrective labour of the same amount, or by community service for a duration of up to one thousand two hundred hours, or by restriction of freedom for a term not exceeding five years, or by imprisonment for the same term, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities.

Abuse of official authority under Part 4 of Article 361 of the CC (2014[5]), including acts committed by a judge or a person holding a responsible government position within a law enforcement agency, is punishable by restriction of freedom for a term not exceeding seven years or by imprisonment for the same term, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities.

Receiving a bribe under Part 1 of Article 366 of the CC (2014[5]), which constitutes the basic offense, is punishable by a fine ranging from twenty times to fifty times the amount of the bribe or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities.

For aggravated forms of passive bribery, the CC (2014[5]) stipulates the following penalties: under Part 2, Article366, a fine ranging from fifty times to sixty times the amount of the bribe or imprisonment for a term from three to seven years, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities; Under Part 3 of Article 366, a fine ranging from sixty times to seventy times the amount of the bribe or imprisonment for a term from seven to twelve years, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities; and under Part 4 of Article 366, a fine ranging from seventy times to eighty times the amount of the bribe or imprisonment for a term from ten to fifteen years, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities.

Giving a bribe under Part 1 of Article 367 of the CC (2014[5]), which constitutes a basic offense, is punishable by a fine ranging from twenty times to thirty times the amount of the bribe or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities.

For aggravated forms of active bribery the CC (2014[5]) specifies the following penalties: under Part 2, Article 367, a fine ranging from thirty times to forty times the amount of the bribe or imprisonment for a term from three to seven years, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities; under Part 3 of Article 367 of the CC, a fine ranging from forty times to fifty times the amount of the bribe or imprisonment for a term from seven to twelve years, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities, and under Part 4 of Article 367 of the CC, a fine ranging from fifty times to sixty times the amount of the bribe or imprisonment for a term from ten to fifteen years, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities.

Mediation in bribery under Part 1 of Article 368 of the CC (2014[5]), which constitutes the basic offense, is punishable by a fine ranging from ten times to twenty times the amount of the bribe or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities. Mediation under Part 2 of Article 368 of the CC, including acts committed by a person utilizing their official position, is punishable by a fine ranging from twenty times to thirty times the amount of the bribe or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six years, with confiscation of property and a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities.

The money laundering offense under Part 1of Article 218 of the CC (2014[5]), which constitutes the basic offense, is punishable by a fine of up to five thousand monthly calculation indicators (MCI) or by corrective labour of the same amount, or by restriction of freedom for a term not exceeding six years, or by imprisonment for the same term, with confiscation of property. Money laundering under Part 2 of Article 218 of the CC, including acts committed by a person utilizing their official position, is punishable by a fine ranging from three thousand to seven thousand MCIs or by corrective labour of the same amount, or by imprisonment for a term ranging from three to seven years, with confiscation of property. Money laundering under Part 3 of Article 218 of the CC, committed by a person authorised to perform public functions, or by a person equated with such, or by an official, or by a person holding a responsible government position, if connected with the misuse of their official position, is punishable by imprisonment for a term ranging from five to ten years, with confiscation of property, and in cases specified in Clause 1, incurs a lifelong prohibition from holding certain positions or engaging in specific activities.

Additionally, pursuant to Para 6 of the Regulatory Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2015[14]), if the sanction of the article under which an individual is found guilty provides for alternative types of punishment, courts are required to consider the possibility of imposing the most lenient of these penalties.

5.3 Effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of sanctions

According to Article 30(1) of the UNCAC (United Nations, 2004[3]), each State Party is obligated to ensure the application of criminal sanctions for the commission of any crime recognised as such under this Convention, which take into account the severity of the offense. As stated in Article 30(3) of the Convention, each State Party seeks to ensure that the discretionary legal powers provided in its legislation regarding the prosecution of individuals for [corruption] offenses are utilised to achieve maximum effectiveness in law enforcement measures against them, while duly considering the necessity to prevent the commission of such crimes in the future. Furthermore, Article 30(5) of the Convention stipulates that each State Party considers the degree of severity of the relevant offenses when deliberating the possibility of early or conditional release of individuals convicted of such crimes. Additionally, Article 30(7) of the Convention (United Nations, 2004[3]) states that when justified by the severity of the offense, each State Party considers the possibility of establishing procedures to deprive, for a specified period established in its domestic legislation, by court decision or by any other appropriate means, individuals convicted of crimes recognised under this Convention of the right: (a) to hold public office; and (b) to hold a position in any enterprise that is wholly or partially owned by the state.

The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of adopted by the Council of Europe (1999[17]), which is not legally binding for Kazakhstan but serves as an example of best practices, contains even more detailed provisions regarding sanctions for corruption offenses. According to Article 19 of this Convention, considering the seriousness of the criminal offenses classified as such under the Convention, each Party provides for effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions and measures regarding these offenses, including, if committed by natural persons, penalties involving deprivation of liberty, which may result in extradition. Each Party ensures that effective, proportionate, and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including financial penalties, are applied to legal entities held liable under Paras 1 and 2 of Article 18 of the Convention.

The official judicial statistics provided during this study indicate that, in 2021, a total of 892 individuals were convicted in criminal cases related to corruption offenses (within the classification of corruption offenses under the CC, which are significantly broader than that under UNCAC (United Nations, 2004[3])), 725 in 2022, and 916 in 2023. An analysis of the statistics on convictions for corruption offenses revealed that, between 2021 and 2023, the following number of individuals were convicted: for corrupt theft (Para 2 of Part 3 of Article 189 of the CC (2014[5])) - 59 individuals in 2021, 61 in 2022, and 81 in 2023; for abuse of official authority (Article 361 of the CC) - 78 individuals in 2021, 65 in 2022, and 57 in 2023; for passive bribery (Article 366 of the CC) - 214 individuals in 2021, 210 in 2022, and 222 in 2023; for active bribery (Article 367 of the CC) - 353 individuals in 2021, 192 in 2022, and 290 in 2023 (the highest number of convictions); for mediation in bribery (Article 368 of the CC) - 24 individuals in 2021, 20 in 2022, and 48 in 2023; and for laundering the proceeds of corruption - 1 individual in 2021. There were no such cases in 2022 and 2023. According to conviction statistics presented, the most common corruption offense is bribery, particularly active bribery of public officials. This may be explained by the fact that, in criminal cases involving active bribery, the perpetrators are predominantly private individuals. Moreover, such cases often involve instances where a public official (for example, a traffic police officer) refuses to accept a bribe and reports the offense. Additionally, many cases involve numerous bribe-givers — for example, drivers who offer bribes to customs or phytosanitary control officers.

The provided judicial statistics do not contain data on convictions for corruption in the private sector (Articles 250, 251, 253 of the CC (2014[5])). It is particularly noteworthy that there are virtually no convictions of public officials or affiliated individuals for the legalisation (laundering) of proceeds of corruption (only 1 conviction in 3 years).

The statistics on the types of penalties applied by national courts in corruption cases in 2021–2023 are presented in the table below.

Table 5.1. Statistics on imposed penalties for corruption offenses

Type of crime	Penalties imposed
	Deprivation of liberty (total number of convicted persons)			Restriction of freedom			Penalty
	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023
Embezzlement	16(59)	21(61)	32(81)	14	15	20	20	15	18
(Article 189 Part 3 Para 2, Article 189 Part 4 of the CC)	25(78)	20(65)	17(57)	45	28	28	4	1	9
Abuse of office (Art. 361 the CC)	74(214)	56(210)	63(222)	4	-	-	135	147	151
Receiving a bribe (Article 366 of the CC)	92(353)	52(192)	92(290)	15	6	7	244	91	183
Giving a bribe Article 367 of the CC	7(24)	2(20)	7(48)	1	-	-	16	15	30

Source: Data provided by Kazakhstan authorities

The statistics indicate that the percentage of imprisonment sentences imposed by courts for corruption offenses has consistently been less than 35%. Specifically, this includes embezzlement at 34%, abuse of office at 31%, passive bribery at 30%, active bribery at 28%, and mediation in bribery at 17%.

Moreover, the most common type of criminal penalty for all forms of bribery has been a multiple fine equivalent to the amount of the bribe. Judicial statistics also suggest that the most frequent prison sentences in cases of corruption offenses range widely from 1 to 10 years.

Of the 48 court verdicts on corruption offenses analysed for this study, 1 verdict resulted in an acquittal, while the other 47 resulted in convictions (some of which included partial acquittals regarding certain incriminated episodes).

The analysis of these sentences revealed the following:

For 2021, out of 11 convictions, 3 cases resulted in sentences of deprivation of liberty (ranging from 4 to 8 years, with actual serving), 8 cases resulted in sentences to fines, and in 1 case a sentence was restriction of liberty.

For 2022, among the 11 convictions, 4 cases imposed deprivation of liberty as a penalty (terms ranging from 1 to 10 years, with actual serving), while 7 cases were sentenced to fines.

For 2023, out of 25 convictions, in 11 cases sanctions were deprivation of liberty (terms ranging from 1.5 to 10 years; 1 case involved a deferred sentence, while the rest involved actual serving), in 12 cases fines were imposed, and 2 cases resulted in imposing restrictions of liberty.

From the 48 sentences analysed for the years 2021–2023, the following conclusions are possible:

• in cases of corruption offenses, the courts of Kazakhstan predominantly impose non-custodial sentences (mainly fines in multiples of the amount of the bribe).

• in cases where the court imposes an actual imprisonment on a public official for a corruption offense - the sentences predominantly look convincing (5-11 years of imprisonment), including in cases of high-level corruption (as a general rule),

• in none of the 48 analysed conviction sentences when imposing deprivation of liberty as a penalty was conditional conviction applied (since part 6 of Article 43 of the CC (2014[5]) does not allow conditional conviction in cases of corruption offenses, which should be noted as a positive approach), but one sentence was found with deferred execution of penalty (Article 74 of the CC, on the basis of the presence of a minor child of the convicted woman).

Box 5.1. Sanctions imposed for high-level corruption offenses

Below is the outline of sanctions in high-level corruption cases imposed from 2021 to 2023.

• The chairman of the state institution was convicted of embezzlement of KZT 6 527 956 994 (approximately USD 12 608 542) and sentenced for 8 years of imprisonment, with lifelong deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities (case No. 7511‑20-00-1/223).

• A Vice-Minister was convicted of abuse of office, causing damages worth KZT 40 638 265 000 (approximately USD 78 491 525). The damage was fully recovered before conviction. The Vice‑Minister was sentenced for 7 years of imprisonment, with lifelong deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities (case No. 7135-23-00-1/338).

• The Chairman of a judicial body of a regional court was convicted of receiving a bribe by extortion in the amount of KZT 19 000 000 (approximately USD 38 000), and sentenced for 9 years of imprisonment, with lifelong deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities (case No. 3911-23-00-1/254).

• The following penalties were imposed based on a plea agreement: a deputy Head of a state institution was convicted of embezzlement for 5 years of imprisonment, with lifelong deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities. The Head of the state institution convicted of complicity in embezzlement and money laundering for 6 years of imprisonment, with lifelong deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities. The manager of the LLC was convicted of complicity in embezzlement and money laundering for 6 years of imprisonment, with lifelong deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities. The value of embezzled property was KZT 14 565 318 010 (approximately USD 28 132 451), which was fully compensated during the investigation stage (case No. 7199-23-00-1a/210).

• A judge of the city court was convicted of receiving a bribe of KZT 2 000 000 (approximately USD 3 860) under aggravated circumstances and sentenced for 3 years of imprisonment, with lifelong deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities (case No. 3140-23-00-1/76).

Note: Information is based on available court rulings issued in 2021–2023 and may not be exhaustive.

It appears that in the first four cases of high-level corruption, the amounts of imprisonment in general can be recognised as meeting the requirements of effectiveness, proportionality and ensuring a deterrent effect, while the last sentence (to the city judge) can hardly be recognised as meeting such standards. The penalty for passive bribery (bribe taking) under aggravating circumstances committed by a judge in the form of only 3 years of imprisonment (although real) does not look like an effective and proportionate criminal sanction, which would provide a sufficient deterrent effect, in particular, for other public officials, including judges.

The analysis of Kazakhstan's criminal legislation regarding criminal sanctions for corruption offenses, along with the practice of its application, leads to the conclusion that, despite significant legislative efforts aimed at aligning the laws with international standards, particularly in terms of ensuring effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties for corruption offenses, there remain areas for improvement both in the legislative framework and in law enforcement practices that require further enhancement.

OECD has already emphasised that high-level and complex corruption continues to be a key challenge in the Central Asian region, with most countries having made insufficient effort to adequately address it. The most common obstacles to effectively tackling high-level corruption in the region are the lack of genuine political will to investigate such offenses. Also of concern are the disproportionate and lenient sanctions that courts have applied in corruption cases (OECD, 2020[18]).

OECD has noted (2017[8]) that the CC (2014[5]), adopted in July 2014, revised the sanctions for corruption offenses. The main sanctions for corruption offenses remained unchanged. However, bribe taking and bribe giving by public officials and persons occupying responsible public positions were redesigned from qualified offenses to basic ones. This led to a reduction in the term of imprisonment as a possible sanction for such individuals.

In addition, other changes have been made to the sanctions for corruption offenses:

1) instead of a fine in a certain fixed amount (a certain number of monthly calculation indicators), a fine multiple of the amount of the bribe was introduced,

2) a fine multiple of the amount of the bribe is applied as an alternative sanction for all offenses of receiving or giving a bribe, whereas previously only imprisonment was applied for aggravated bribery

3) instead of depriving individuals of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities for a specified term, mandatory lifelong deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities has been introduced for all categories of corruption offenses. The CC prohibits the application of conditional sentencing, which was a positive innovation that had potential of contributing to the effectiveness of penalties for corruption offenses.

The amendments to certain provisions on prosecution for corruption offenses were welcomed, specifically the linking of the amount of the fine to the amount of the bribe, the mandatory lifetime ban on holding public service positions in case of prosecution for corruption, and the elimination of conditional exemption from liability in case of corruption offenses. These innovations were assessed as progressive and considered as best practices. However, there was concern about the shift in emphasis to financial sanctions instead of imprisonment for serious corruption offenses. Limiting sanctions for bribery offenses to financial compensation may not be sufficiently deterrent and may allow corrupt officials to avoid severe penalty by paying off (OECD, 2017[19]). This was also indicated by the increase in the number of fines compared to the application of imprisonment. In this regard, Kazakhstan was recommended to revise the sanctions for corruption offenses to ensure effectiveness and proportionality, including providing for mandatory imprisonment for serious corruption offenses; and to conduct an annual analysis of the imposed penalties for corruption offenses, assessing their effectiveness, and publishing the results of such analysis.

OECD has further noted (OECD, 2024[9]) that, according to information from NGOs, the analysis of corruption cases for 2023 revealed the following problematic aspects: courts increasingly imposed other sanctions but imprisonment. Most often, these were fines or restrictions of liberty for serious offenses. For example, of 10 randomly selected convictions for abuse of office (Article 361 of the CC (2014[5])) in 2023, 3 sentences included restrictions of liberty ranging from 3.6 to 4 years, without confiscation, and 7 sentences involved fines. Under Article 366 (Receiving a Bribe), out of 10 randomly selected cases, 8 resulted in fines, 1 in imprisonment, and 1 in restriction of liberty. Fines were imposed even for receiving bribes of substantial amounts (KZT 1.5 million and more).

Nevertheless, three sentences issued in 2023 against three vice ministers for corruption offenses resulted in penalties of imprisonment. It aligned with the penalties imposed in 5 high-level corruption cases from 2021 to 2025, specifically, imprisonment without conditional or other forms of release.

Yet not all sanctions for corruption offenses in the current the CC (2014[5]) can be regarded as sufficiently effective, proportionate and dissuasive as required by international standards.

For example, abuse of office (Article 361 of the CC (2014[5])) entails various penalties under Part 1 (as the main corpus delicti), ranging from a fine of up to 2 000 MCI (as of 1 January 2024, approximately USD 14 000), including alternatively correctional work, or community service, or restriction of freedom for up to 2 years, to imprisonment for the same term. The same act committed by a law enforcement officer (Part 2 of Article 361 of the CC) is sanctioned with the same wide range of penalties, ranging from a fine of up to 4 000 MCI (approximately USD 28 000) to imprisonment for up to 4 years. The same act committed by a person holding a responsible public position (Part 3 of Article 361 of the CC) is punishable by the same wide range of penalties, from a fine of up to 5 000 MCI (approximately USD 35 000) to imprisonment for up to 5 years.

Due to the stipulated sanctions, the offense specified in Part 1 of Article 361 of the CC (2014[5]) falls under the category of minor offenses, while the acts outlined in parts 2 and 3 of Article 361 of the CC are categorised as medium offenses (according to the categorisation in Article 11 of the CC). This allows them to be eligible for different types of mitigation of liability, penalties, or serving of sentences (for example, the application of Part 1 of Article 55 of the CC, which allows for non-imposition of imprisonment as a penalty in cases of voluntary compensation for damages and redress for harm caused by minor or medium offenses, etc.).

It should also be noted that provision of a fine as an alternative penalty for abuse of office committed by a person holding a responsible public position raises concerns regarding the effectiveness of sanctions for such high-level corruption.

Similar questions arise in the context of certain provisions of Article 189 of the CC (2014[5]) (embezzlement). For example, when committed by a person using their official position (Part 2), embezzlement is sanctioned for alternative penalties such as a fine of up to three thousand MCI (approximately USD 21 000), corrective labour, community service, restriction of liberty for up to 4 years, or imprisonment for the same term, classifying the act as a medium offense and qualifying it for the potential application of legal mitigations from the listed penalties.

Furthermore, when committed by a person authorised to perform governmental functions, or equivalent, or by an official, or a person holding a responsible state position, if committed in conjunction with the use of their official position, the embezzlement is sanctioned with a fine of ten to twenty times the value of the stolen property or imprisonment for a term of 2 to 7 years. Therefore, in cases of serious high-level corruption (embezzlement under aggravating circumstances), such a high-ranking offender has the alternative option of receiving a fine (albeit a significant one) while still avoiding actual imprisonment.

Similar issues arise regarding penalties for bribery offenses (receiving and giving bribes, Articles 366 and 367 of the CC (2014[5])). The basic offenses of both giving and receiving bribes, due to the prescribed penalties (a maximum of up to 5 years of imprisonment), are classified as medium offenses, regardless of the position of the individual committing them (exceptions include passive bribery committed by law enforcement personnel, individuals holding a responsible state position in law enforcement, or judges, as outlined in part 1-1 of Article 366 of the CC).

The giving or receiving a bribe by an individual holding a responsible state position (apart from the exceptions noted in Part 1-1 of Article 366 of the CC (2014[5])) is not considered an aggravating factor in these offenses. Thus, if a minister or official of that level receives a bribe of an insignificant amount, it would be classified as a medium offense with all the associated legal consequences.

Moreover, for any type of bribery offense (active or passive), as well as for mediation in bribery (whether it is a basic, qualified, or especially qualified offense where applicable), there is always the possibility of imposing one of two alternative types of penalties (imprisonment or a fine equivalent to a multiple of the bribe amount). And despite the impressive ranges of multiples of the bribe amount set as alternative penalties (from twenty times to eighty times the amount of the bribe), this does not enhance the effectiveness of such sanctions, especially in cases involving systemic bribery (for example, a customs officer caught with the daily earnings from 25 drivers amounting to a total of USD 500) or in high-level corruption cases, where a high-ranking official could easily pay a large fine from their overall wealth, the legitimacy of which may raise reasonable questions, merely to avoid imprisonment.

The ability to pay a fine, even a substantial one, instead of being sanctioned with imprisonment does not appear to be an effective, proportionate, or convincing sanction that provides a sufficient deterrent effect, particularly in high-level corruption cases.

The penalty for the aggravated bribery intermediation (Part 2 of Article 368 of the CC (2014[5])), including when committed by an individual using his official position), an alternative penalty in the form of a multiple fine or imprisonment for up to 6 years does not appear convincing enough for cases when the intermediaries are high-level officials, or the amounts of bribes are significant.

An additional issue to ensure the cogency of penalty for active and passive bribery is Article 56 of the CC, which provides for lesser sanctions (term or amount of penalty) for preparation for a crime (cannot exceed a half of the maximum term or amount of the principal type of penalty provided for the relevant completed crime) or attempted crime (cannot exceed 3/4 of the maximum term or amount of the principal type of penalty for the relevant completed crime). The problem arises due to the fact that Kazakhstan has not yet criminalised the offer and promise of a bribe3, as well as the acceptance of an offer or promise of a bribe as a completed offense, which is a recognised international standard, for example, Article 15 of the UNCAC (United Nations, 2004[3]), Articles 2 and 3 of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1999[17]), Article 1 of the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD, 1997[20]). Therefore, before the above elements of bribery are criminalised as a completed offense, it is recommended, as an interim measure, to remove corruption offenses—particularly all bribery offenses—from the scope of Article 56 of the CC (2014[5]).

Crimes of corruption in the private sector (Articles 250, 251, 253 of the CC (2014[5])) have similar shortcomings as described above in the context of crimes of corruption in the public sector.

Thus, it is recommended to revise the sanctions for corruption offenses in order to ensure the effectiveness, proportionality and proper deterrent effect of such sanctions.

In turn, practical application of fines that are multiples of the amount of the bribe or other corrupt benefits is a positive and progressive practice.

Analysis of official judicial statistics of convictions for corruption offenses in 2021–2023 illustrates that the most common type of penalty for corruption offenses in practice (primarily for active and passive bribery) is a fine. For example, 1 012 persons were convicted with a fine only for bribery in 2021–2023 (out of a total of 1 573 individuals convicted for this type of corruption offenses), which is about 65%.

Among the 47 convictions for corruption offenses analysed in this study for the years 2021–2023, fines were imposed as the primary penalty in 27 cases (57%). The examination of the verdicts revealed that courts determine the deadlines for the payment of fines at their discretion, and there are no clear criteria upon which this determination is based. Verdicts with payment deadlines of 15 and 30 days, 1, 2, 3, and 6 months were found, as well as a verdict without a specified payment deadline (Case No. 3511‑22‑00‑1/158). The CC (2014[5]) in Part 4 of Article 41 only stipulates that the deadline for paying a fine is calculated from the moment the verdict becomes final and cannot exceed three years as per the court's ruling. It seems appropriate for the Supreme Court to develop criteria for determining payment deadlines for fines as a penalty based on the law and judicial practice to limit the current judicial discretion in this area to reasonable bounds.

The attachment of the amount of the fine in the criminal law to the amount of the bribe and other types of illicit benefits, using a multiplicative approach to determine fines as penalties for corruption offenses, can generally be regarded as a positive practice (for example, bribery under Part 1 of Article 367 of the CC (2014[5]) can be punished with a fine of 20 to 30 times the amount of the bribe). However, in the CC, the multiplicative fine is stipulated as a primary punishment for corruption offenses, rather than as an additional penalty to imprisonment, restriction of liberty, or other sanctions, even in cases of serious and especially serious corruption offenses.

Thus, in practice, there is a trend towards shifting the focus to financial sanctions (multiplicative fines or fixed fines) instead of applying imprisonment as a primary penalty in every case of serious corruption offenses (such as bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of office). This shift raises concerns about the alignment of such practices with the goals of effectiveness, proportionality, and adequate deterrent effect of the imposed sanctions. As previously noted, limiting sanctions for bribery offenses to financial compensation may not provide sufficient deterrence and may allow corrupt officials to evade strict punishment by paying a fine (OECD, 2017[19]). Below are several examples of typical verdicts from the 48 analysed that illustrate the problematic approaches to imposing penalties in the form of multiplicative fines as applied in practice.

Thus, by the verdict in case № 1956-21-00-1/15 a customs inspector was convicted for 24 episodes of taking bribes totalling KZT 24,000 (about USD 48) to a multiple fine of KZT 1 680 000 (USD 3 400). It appears that such a sentence will hardly have a sufficient deterrent effect on other customs officers prone to systematic bribes. The same sentence sentenced 24 drivers (bribe-takers) to a fine of KZT 10,000 each and were released from this penalty under an amnesty.

By the verdict in case № 3310-23-00-1/197 the Head of Department of the Ministry of Health Protection was sentenced under Part 3 Article 366 of the CC to a fine of KZT 3 850 000 (about USD 7 800) for taking a bribe of KZT 110 000 (USD 220) for issuing a licence for medical services. Given the relatively high level of the convicted person's position and the high corruption risks inherent in this position (given the importance of the licences issued), such a sanction does not look sufficiently effective and convincing either.

Considering the results of the analysis, it is recommended to reconsider the existing approaches to applying multiples of fines to the amount of a bribe or other corrupt benefit as the main alternative sanction for serious corruption and to consider that all serious and especially serious corruption offenses should carry a non-alternative sanction of imprisonment for appropriate periods of time sufficient to ensure effectiveness, proportionality and appropriate deterrent effect. Fines (multiples of the amount of the bribe or other form of corrupt benefit, or fines of a certain amount) could be an additional penalty for corruption offenses, rather than the main penalty for them.

Practical application of deprivation of liberty for corruption offenses

During 2021–2023 courts predominantly imposed imprisonment in high-level corruption cases. All five such cases resulted in actual prison sentences, although one conviction appeared insufficiently convincing. Overall, this can be noted as a good practice. In low- and middle-level corruption cases, the primary penalty was a fine, as outlined above.

As a positive practice regarding the application of imprisonment for corruption offenses in Kazakhstan, it should also be noted that the CC (2014[5]) generally excludes the use of suspended sentences for such offenses (Part 6 of Article 63 of the CC).

Nevertheless, it appears, based on the analysis of the available case-law, that the main issue affecting the effectiveness of imprisonment as a sanction for corruption offenses is that (1) legal provisions still allow options to avoid actual imprisonment in cases where such a penalty would otherwise be effective, proportionate and persuasive; and (2) even in cases where courts impose a penalty in the form of real imprisonment for serious corruption offenses, it is essentially possible for a defendant to be released after a relatively short period of time. This does not ensure the preventive effect of such penalty. In addition, such a practice may undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system. Both of these issues are further analysed below.

According to Para 1 of Part 1 of Article 55 of the CC (2014[5]), if the article or part of the article of the Special Part of the CC, under which a person is found guilty, provides for a less strict, than imprisonment, basic penalty, imprisonment shall not be imposed for crimes of minor or medium gravity, if the person has voluntarily compensated for property damage, amended for moral and other harm caused by the offense. At the same time, some corruption offenses belong precisely to the category of crimes of minor or medium gravity.

In addition, Parts 4 and 5 of Article 55 of the CC (2014[5]) also provide that in the presence of exceptional circumstances related to the goals and motives of the act, the role of the perpetrator, his behaviour during or after the commission of an offense and other circumstances that significantly reduce the degree of public danger of the act, as well as subject to the active assistance of a participant in the group criminal offense to disclose the acts committed by the group, the penalty may be imposed below the lowest limit provided for by the relevant article of the Special Part of the CC, or the court may impose a penalty of less than the lowest limit provided for by the relevant article of the Special Part of the CC. Both individual mitigating circumstances and the totality of such circumstances may be recognised as exceptional. Provisions of the Article 55 of the CC are not applicable to offenses listed in Part 8 of Article 55 of the CC, which do not include corruption offenses. That potentially makes it possible to level out strict custodial sentences for corruption offenses at the stage of determining the penalty. In view of the previously mentioned international standards, it is recommended to exclude corruption offenses from the scope of Part 1 of Article 55 of the CC and exclude them from the scope of Part 4 of Article 55 of the CC, supplementing the exceptions in Part 8 of Article 55 of the CC with an explicit reference to corruption offenses.

In addition, a convict may benefit from replacement of the unexecuted part of penalty by a more lenient kind of penalty or reduction of the term of the imposed punishment under Article 73 of the CC (2014[5]). According to this provision, to the person serving imprisonment for offenses of little or medium gravity or serious offenses, in case of full compensation of damage caused by an offense, or absence of malicious violations of the order of serving the sentence, the remaining unexecuted part of the sentence can be replaced by the court with a milder kind of penalty. Thus, the person can be completely or partially released from serving an additional kind of penalty, except for penalties appointed for life.

The unserved portion of the penalty may be replaced with a milder penalty after a convict has served at least one-quarter of the sentence for committing an offense of minor or medium gravity or one-third of the sentence for serious offenses, as specified in Parts 1 and 2 of Article 73 of the CC (2014[5]). Additionally, Part 4 of Article 73 of the CC allows for the reduction of up to half of the unserved sentence for individuals serving imprisonment for any type of crime, including serious and very serious offenses. This is contingent upon the person having contributed to the disclosure and investigation of crimes committed by a criminal group or having fulfilled all the conditions of a procedural agreement during the period of serving their sentence. This provision also does not specify corruption offenses as an exception to the application of this rule. It is recommended that such exceptions be expanded to include corruption offenses by adding them to both lists of exceptions in Part 1 and Part 4 of Article 73 of the CC.

The provisions regarding conditional early release from sentence should also be considered in this context. According to Part 1 of Article 72 of the CC (2014[5]), a person serving a sentence of restriction of freedom or imprisonment can be granted conditional early release after serving the terms specified in Parts 3 and 4, and 5 of this article, if the court determines that complete execution of the sentence is not necessary to achieve rehabilitation. The same category of persons is also eligible for conditional parole, provided they have fully compensated for the damage caused by the crime and have not committed serious violations of the sentence enforcement order.

Part 1 of Article 72 of the CC (2014[5]) also permits the court to grant parole to certain categories of offenders after they have served the periods specified in parts 3 and 5 of this article. These categories include pregnant women, women with young children, men raising young children alone, women aged 58 and over, men aged 63 and over, and persons with Group I or II disabilities who are serving imprisonment sentences for serious or especially serious offenses, including corruption offenses.

Additionally, a person serving imprisonment for a serious or especially serious corruption offense may be eligible for parole if they have fulfilled all the conditions of a procedural agreement on co‑operation, and after serving the periods outlined in Parts 3 and 5 of Article 72 of the CC (2014[5]).

In this case, a person may be fully or partially released from serving an additional penalty. Although this provision includes specific rules for its application to certain types of corruption offenses under certain conditions, there is a risk that general parole rules for serving sentences could be applied independently to corruption offenses in practice. This could lead to unjustified leniency, including in cases of high‑level corruption. Therefore, it is recommended to exclude corruption offenses from the scope of Article 72 of the CC (2014[5]) altogether or to restrict its application to corruption offenses to exceptional cases that are clearly and explicitly defined.

During the interviews conducted for this study, especially among non-governmental stakeholders, respondents confirmed that in Kazakhstan there are practical problems caused by legislative flaws and gaps. These issues, particularly during sentencing and, more often, during sentence execution, enable individuals convicted of corruption offenses to avoid imprisonment or proper enforcement of their sentences. Consequently, this undermines the effectiveness of existing penalties for corruption offenses as provided by law.

Similar data were obtained during the baseline monitoring of anti-corruption reforms in Kazakhstan (OECD, 2024[9]). According to non-governmental sector, in practice, parole is often granted in Kazakhstan for serious and especially serious corruption offenses. For example, one of the influential relatives of a former state leader was sentenced in September 2023 to six years of imprisonment for embezzling KZT 14 billion from a state-owned company. By 6 November 2023, he was already reportedly released. This early release was due to the return of illegally acquired assets and replacing the unserved portion of his sentence with a suspended sentence. However, journalists later revealed that the "return of assets" did not actually occur (2025[13]).

Application of dismissal from office

The analysis of verdicts revealed that in every case where defendants were found guilty of any corruption offense, they were consistently sentenced to an additional penalty of life (indefinite) deprivation of the right to hold specific positions or engage in particular activities, without exception.

This is confirmed by the findings in the Baseline Report of the Fifth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kazakhstan (OECD, 2024[9]), which established that, in 2023, all public officials found guilty of corruption offenses were dismissed from their offices (OECD, 2024[9]).

In this regard, it is important to highlight the provisions of Part 2 of Article 50 of the CC (2014[5]), which establish that, for committing corruption offenses, deprivation of the right to hold specific positions or engage in certain activities is mandatory. This includes a lifetime ban on holding positions in civil service, judiciary, local self-government bodies, the National Bank of Kazakhstan and its agencies, the authorised body on regulation, control and supervision of the financial market and financial organisations, state organisations and subjects of the state sector. Thus, subjects of quasi-state sector are state enterprises, limited liability partnerships, joint stock companies, including national management holdings, national holdings, national companies, the participant or shareholder of which is the state, as well as subsidiaries, affiliates and other legal entities affiliated with them in accordance with legislative acts of Kazakhstan (Article 3 of the Budget Code) (2008[21]).

Such legislative regulation, as well as the application of these provisions in practice by prosecutors and courts, should be noted as an example of a best practice approach to this issue in the region.

Liability of legal persons for corruption offenses

In accordance with article 26 of the UNCAC (United Nations, 2004[3]), each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, considering its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in the offenses set forth in the Convention. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative. The imposition of liability of legal persons shall not prejudice the criminal liability of natural persons who have committed the offenses in question. Each State Party shall ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with this article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.

Practice shows that corruption offenses, in particular high-level corruption, are often committed in the interests or for the benefit of legal persons, especially when substantial corrupt proceeds (benefits) are involved. However, the complex corporate structures and collective decision-making processes of large corporate structures often make the detection and prosecution of such acts of corruption much more difficult. Often the ultimate beneficial owners of companies, the real perpetrators and initiators of complex corporate criminal schemes find ways to cover themselves with the so-called corporate veil and avoid responsibility. In such cases, the individual liability of corporate agents, rank and file or even more senior corporate officers will not have an adequate deterrent effect on the corporation and its owner(s), who may in the future reap the benefits that the commission of a corruption offense has brought to them and their company. In many such cases, only an effective model of corporate responsibility for corruption, with substantial sanctions, including financial penalties, can ensure that sanctions for serious corruption offenses are truly credible, i.e., effective and dissuasive.

For this reason, Kazakhstan has been repeatedly recommended in the past by various international organisations to introduce into its legislation and practice an effective model of corporate liability of legal entities for criminal offenses of corruption.

For example, GRECO explicitly recommended Kazakhstan to "take necessary legislative measures to establish adequate liability of legal entities for corruption offenses and to provide effective, proportionate and convincing sanctions in this part", having previously analysed and recognised the existing model of liability of companies in Kazakhstan based on the Code of Administrative Offenses and the practice of its application as irrelevant and ineffective (2022[11]).

This recommendation was also made by the OECD within the monitoring under the framework of the IAP. Thus, the Report of the 4th Round of Monitoring of Kazakhstan under IAP (OECD, 2017[8]) noted that the relevant recommendation of the previous (3rd round) monitoring was not implemented by Kazakhstan, accordingly, the Report formulated a new recommendation #19: to establish effective and efficient liability of legal entities for corruption offenses with proportional sanctions that will be commensurate with the crime committed, in accordance with international standards and best practices.

Finally, the Baseline Report of the Fifth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kazakhstan (OECD, 2024[9]) confirmed that there were no liability of legal persons for corruption offenses in Kazakhstan (only administrative liability). The existing provisions of the Code on Administrative Offenses of Kazakhstan (2014[22]) were analysed in previous rounds of the OECD Istanbul Action Plan assessment of Kazakhstan and were found to be ineffective and insufficient (OECD, 2024[9]).

Thus, it remains only to recommend once again to the country to introduce an effective mechanism of liability of legal entities for corruption offenses, based on both international standards and best practices of the countries of the region. All arguments in favour of such a need have already been repeatedly presented in the above-mentioned and other reports of international organisations and are not duplicated in this study.

Statistics on penalties for corruption offenses

The current official judicial statistics on sanctions imposed by courts in cases of corruption offenses and laundering of proceeds thereof could be more informative if they comprised data on the types of sanctions imposed on different categories of officials (i.e., disaggregated by the level and type of officials sanctioned). It is recommended that the official statistics be further developed so that such data can be included in the future.

5.4 Statute of limitations and immunities against prosecution

Statute of limitations for corruption offenses

The UNCAC (United Nations, 2004[3]) provides in article 29 that each State Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law a long statute of limitations period for the commencement of proceedings in respect of any offenses established in accordance with that Convention and shall establish a longer statute of limitations period or the possibility of suspending the running of the statute of limitations period in cases where a person suspected of having committed an offense has evaded the administration of justice.

According to Article 71 of the CC (2014[5]), a person shall be exempted from criminal liability if the following terms [general rule] have expired from the date of committing a criminal offense: 10 years after the commission of a serious offense, a corruption offense of minor or medium gravity, and 15 years after the commission of a particularly serious offense.

The statute of limitations shall be calculated from the date of commission of the criminal offense and until the court sentence enters into legal force (Paras 1 and 2 of Article 71 of the CC (2014[5])). In addition, in accordance with Part 4 of Article 71 of the CC, the statute of limitations shall be suspended if the person who committed the offense evades investigation or trial. In this case, the statute of limitations shall be resumed from the moment of apprehension of the person or his or her confession. At the same time, a person may not be held criminally liable if, since the commission of the crime, the statute of limitations has not been interrupted and the following time limits have expired: 15 years after commission of a serious crime, a corruption offense of minor and medium gravity, and 20 years after commission of a particularly serious crime.

The running of the statute of limitations shall be interrupted if, before the expiration of the time limits specified in Para 1 of Article 71 of the CC (2014[5]), the person who committed a serious or especially serious crime commits a new serious or especially serious crime. In such cases, the calculation of the statute of limitations shall begin anew from the date of commission of the new crime. In other cases, if before the expiration of the statute of limitations the person commits a crime again, the statute of limitations for each crime shall run independently. In accordance with Para 4-1 of this article, the statute of limitations shall be suspended from the moment of receipt by the court or criminal prosecution body of a motion to conclude a procedural agreement on confession of guilt and return of illegally acquired assets from a suspect, accused, defendant or his defence counsel until the moment of its full execution. If one of the parties refuses to conclude a procedural agreement on plea bargain and return of illegally acquired assets, the statute of limitations shall be resumed. At the same time, Part 6 of Article 71 of the CC (2014[5]) provides for crimes, when, by way of exception, statutes of limitations are not applied to persons who committed them. This list in the current wording of the article does not include corruption crimes or certain types thereof and legalisation (laundering) of proceeds of crime, including from corruption.

Analysis of the norms of the current criminal legislation of Kazakhstan in terms of statutes of limitation allows to conclude that the increased statutes of limitation established by law for corruption offenses of minor and medium gravity (10 years as a general rule and 15 years in case of evasion of investigation or trial) are certainly a positive practice (although the same statute of limitation of 10 years for ordinary cases and 15 years for cases of evasion - as for serious corruption offenses - looks insufficiently progressive in terms of the statute of limitation for corruption offenses). At the same time, it should be borne in mind that until 12 July 2018, Part 6 of Article 71 of the CC (2014[5]) included corruption offenses in the list of crimes to which statutes of limitations did not apply at all, which was considered by the OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ACN) as a best practice and was separately positively assessed in the Report of the Fourth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kazakhstan (OECD, 2017[8]). Therefore, the exclusion of corruption offenses from the list of crimes to which statutes of limitations do not apply should be considered as a step backwards in reforming this institution in Kazakhstan, and it would be advisable to return to the wording of Part 6 of Article 71 of the CC, which was in force before it was amended on 12 July 2018, as well as to consider adding legalisation (laundering) of proceeds of corruption offenses to the list of crimes to which statutes of limitations do not apply.

In addition, attention should also be paid to the approach in Part 2 of Article 71 of the CC (2014[5]), according to which the statute of limitations is calculated until the court judgment enters into legal force, which could potentially create problems in practice and lead to the expiration of the time limits, for example, in cases of several rounds of court proceedings. To prevent such potential problems, an alternative approach could be suggested - to provide for the suspension of the statute of limitations from a prior point in time (e.g., from the moment criminal proceedings are initiated against a person, or a person is suspected/accused, or the case is sent to court for indictment, etc.).

It should also be noted that the official criminal pre-trial and judicial statistics for 2021–2023, which were provided for the purposes of the study, do not allow identifying cases of termination of criminal proceedings at the investigative and judicial stages on this very ground (Para 4, Part 1 of Article 35 of CPC (2014[6]) – for the expiration of the statute of limitations for bringing to criminal responsibility), as they combine in the corresponding column a variety of grounds for the pre-trial stage (the number of criminal offenses for which criminal cases have been terminated based on Paras 3), 4), 9), 10), 11), and 12) of part 1 of Article 35 and Article 36 of CPC). This way of keeping statistics does not also make it possible to determine whether cases were terminated on this basis against public officials or other categories of persons. It is recommended that the approach to statistics be changed to ensure that such data can be obtained in the future.

For the purposes of this study, no decisions of investigation bodies or courts on the termination of criminal cases on corruption in 2021–2023 on the basis of Para 4, part 1, Article 35 of CPC (2014[6]) (due to the expiration of the statute of limitations) were provided, so it was not possible to draw conclusions about the practice of application of this norm on the basis of procedural decisions.

In 2023, according to the information provided by authorities, no criminal cases were terminated due to expiration of the statute of limitations (OECD, 2024[9]). This information was consistent with verdicts of 48 corruption cases analysed for this study, since they did not include data on cases against any of the defendants or their accomplices being closed on the grounds of expiration of statute of limitation.

Investigators, prosecutors and judges interviewed for the study did not see any challenges with the application of statutory statutes of limitations in corruption cases and could not recall any cases terminated due to the expiration of statutes of limitations in 2021–2023. Representatives of non-governmental stakeholders also did not see significant problems with the application of the statute of limitations in corruption cases and stated that cases were dismissed due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, but not frequently, and did not pose a systemic problem. Nevertheless, they could not recall any specific examples of corruption cases being dismissed due to the expiration of statutes of limitations during the period covered by the study.

Immunities of public officials against enforcement steps

Pursuant to article 30(2) of the UNCAC (United Nations, 2004[3]), each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish or ensure, in accordance with its legal system and constitutional principles, an appropriate balance between any immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to its public officials in connection with the performance of their functions and the ability, if necessary, to effectively investigate, prosecute and adjudicate in accordance with its legal system and constitutional principles. Thus, as can be seen from the relevant provision, the UNCAC allows for the existence of functional immunities only and not general immunities.

In Kazakhstan, the following persons have procedural immunity4 against criminal procedural actions: the President and ex-President, members of Parliament, candidates for the Presidency and Parliament, the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, judge of the Constitutional Court, judges, the Prosecutor General and the Commissioner for Human Rights. At the same time, immunities are not limited to acts committed in connection with the performance of official duties (i.e. immunities are of a general rather than functional nature).

Detailed information on the legislative regulation of Kazakhstan with regard to the criteria and procedure for lifting immunities from the specified types of public officials and existing shortcomings of such regulation in terms of international standards is contained in the Report of the Fourth Round of Monitoring of Anti‑Corruption Reforms in Kazakhstan (OECD, 2017[8]). The existence of challenges with clarity of grounds (criteria) for lifting immunities and detailed regulation by legislation of procedures for their removal in Kazakhstan was confirmed during the Baseline Report of the Fifth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kazakhstan (OECD, 2024[9]).

The main problems with legislative regulation of immunities in Kazakhstan can be summarised as follows:

• Immunities are general in nature and are non-functional (not tied to job-related actions).

• The range of public officials with immunities and the procedural limitations associated with immunities is too broad.

• There are no clear criteria in the law for the consent of the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan to continue a pre-trial investigation or to refuse such a pre-trial investigation after the registration of a reason for the initiation of a pre-trial investigation (Article 547 of CPC (2014[6]) (in relation to a member of Parliament), Article 549 of CPC (judges of the Constitutional Court), Article 550 of CPC (judges), etc.).

• There are no clear criteria in the law for the decision to consent to the detention, custody, house arrest, bail or criminal prosecution of a judge by the President, based on the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Council, or by the Senate of the Parliament.

• Provisions of CPC (2014[6]) or other legislative acts do not regulate in detail the procedures for lifting immunities from criminal prosecution in respect of judges.

Para 10 Part 1 of Article 35 of CPC (2014[6]) provides a separate ground for termination of a criminal case (in connection with the refusal to consent to criminal prosecution of a person who has privileges or immunity from criminal prosecution). The legislation does not regulate the question of what can happen to such a criminal case further - whether it can be reopened or whether the decision to terminate the case can be reversed if the person loses his position (and with it the past immunity) or if the composition of the body that refused to lift immunity changes, etc. It seems that the legislation should be amended in such a way that it gives the possibility of reviewing a decision to terminate a criminal case in connection with a refusal to lift immunity if the relevant circumstances change.

In addition, it seems that this issue is not clearly regulated by the legislator, but immunity in Kazakhstan extends in practice to acts committed prior to assuming a position entitling to immunity. This was confirmed by practitioners during the interviews. This problem will be eliminated with the transition from general immunities to functional immunities, which the country is recommended to do as a matter of priority.

Also, the current legislation of the country does not give a clear answer to the question of whether it is possible to reapply for the lifting of immunity in case of an initial refusal (for example, on the basis of new arguments or in connection with new evidence) and practically staff - investigators and prosecutors during interviews with them could not give an unambiguous answer to this question either, rather leaning towards the idea that it would be impossible to reapply. It would be advisable to clearly regulate such a possibility and clear grounds for its application in the law. In addition, national legislation did not contain any provisions that would suspend the statute of limitations for criminal liability for corruption if immunity was waived. If there was a norm on non-application of statutes of limitations to cases of such category (as it was before 12 July 2018), this would not be an issue. However, in the absence of this rule, it would be advisable to provide in the law for such a ground for suspending the statute of limitations for criminal liability.

It should also be noted that statistics on applications to lift immunity and the results of their consideration are not publicly available, and at the national level statistics on refusals to lift immunity and statistics on the termination of criminal cases separately on the basis of Para 10 Part 1 of Article 35 of CPC are not kept. The absence of such statistics makes it impossible to assess the extent to which immunities of high‑ranking officials from prosecution for corruption-related offenses function in practice and to draw full conclusions about the practice of its application and the extent to which they hinder the investigation and prosecution of corruption offenses. It is therefore recommended that approaches to the maintenance of such statistics be improved.

With regard to the issues of application of the institution of immunities in practice, during the interviews with investigators, prosecutors and judges conducted as part of this study it became clear that the latter do not see the existing immunities as any obstacles in their practical work. One part of practitioners noted that there were no refusals to lift immunities in 2021–2023 at all. Another part reasonably noted that cases of refusal are not public, so even if there were such cases in 2021–2023, they would hardly be publicly known. Representatives of non-governmental stakeholders considered the general nature of immunities and the overly broad range of persons enjoying immunities to be a problem.

Out of verdicts analysed for this study, only two of them concerned individuals enjoying immunities, in particular judges (both verdicts were issued in 2023). The analysis of these two sentences showed that they lacked any data on the procedure for lifting immunities from defendants, including any impediments to proceedings it may have caused.

The Anti-Corruption Agency provided information that 22 persons with privileges from prosecution were convicted of a criminal offense between 2019 and 2024 (6 in 2019, 5 in 2020 and 2021, 1 in 2022, 3 in 2023 and 2 in 2024). All of them were judges. At the same time, the consent of the President (Article 79 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan (1995[23])) was not required for bringing to criminal responsibility for any of them, since the committed crimes were classified as serious and especially serious crimes. According to the data of the Agency for Combatting Corruption of Kazakhstan, in its practice during 2021–2023, there were no facts of refusal to lift immunities, and criminal cases were not terminated on such grounds.

Thus, the continuation of the pre-trial investigation in these cases was considered by the Prosecutor General and, according to the information provided, the necessary procedural consent was granted without delay.

In the process of conducting this study, there was no evidence that the procedures for lifting privileges and immunities would pose challenges to the investigation and prosecution of corruption offenses in Kazakhstan.

Database of Court Sentences

The current database of court decisions in Kazakhstan is a very restrictive tool in the context of searching for case law for research purposes. In particular, it does not allow searching for court decisions based on elementary search criteria (such as categories of offenses or articles of the CC under which sentences were issued) or keywords (confiscation, corruption, etc.) or the period of the judgment (e.g., for 2021–2023). In order to find a particular sentence in this database, it is necessary to enter the name of the convicted person, the exact date of the sentence and the exact name of the court that passed the sentence, which makes the search for judicial practice for the purposes of its generalization and research from the outside extremely problematic and difficult.

In this regard, it is recommended to significantly improve the public part of the database of court verdicts of Kazakhstan in order to make it possible to search for verdicts and other decisions on criminal cases on the basis of the above and other relevant search criteria.

Recommendations

• Ensure, through effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions, that high-level corruption offenses (in terms of the level of the public official's position and/or the size of the corrupt benefit) are always categorised as serious or particularly serious offenses, including corruption in the private sector (under the criteria of the size of the corrupt benefit).

• Establish an aggravated form of bribery (active and passive) in the CC when this is committed by a person holding a responsible public position.

• Ensure that all serious and especially serious corruption offenses, particularly high-level corruption, are subject to custodial sentences of imprisonment that are non-optional, with durations sufficient to ensure their effectiveness, proportionality, and deterrent impact. Fines (multiples of the amount of the bribe or other form of corrupt benefit, or fines in a certain amount) may be an additional penalty (in addition to non-alternative sanctions of imprisonment) for serious and especially serious corruption offenses rather than an alternative to them. Fines could also be an additional penalty for other types of corruption offenses (of minor or medium) rather than the principal penalty for them.

• Exclude all corruption offenses from the scope of Part 2 and Part 3 of Article 56 of the CC (2014[5]) (imposing punishment for an incomplete crime). Exclude all bribery offenses from the scope of Part 2 and 3 of Article 56 of the CC or criminalise the offer and promise of a bribe, as well as the acceptance of an offer or promise of a bribe as a completed offense (for bribery in both the public and private sectors).

• Exclude corruption offenses from the scope of Part 1 of Article 55 of the CC (2014[5]) (imposition of a more lenient punishment than is provided for this criminal offense) and the scope of Part 4 of Article 55 of the CC, supplementing the exceptions in Part 8 of Article 55 of the CC with a reference to corruption offenses.

• Exclude corruption offenses from the scope of Article 72 of the CC (2014[5]) of Kazakhstan (parole from serving a sentence) or further limit the scope of its application to such offenses to exceptional cases that are clearly and unambiguously formulated.

• Exclude corruption offenses from the scope of Article 73 of the CC (2014[5]) (substitution of the unexecuted part of the sentence with a more lenient type of punishment or a reduction of the sentence).

• Introduce the liability of legal entities for corruption offenses in legislation based on international standards and best practices in the region, establishing effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions for such legal entities, including financial sanctions.

• Ensure that judicial statistics on corruption offenses include data on the types of penalties imposed by courts on different categories of officials (i.e., a breakdown by level and type of official on whom certain penalties are imposed).

• Consider re-including corruption offenses in the list of crimes specified in Part 6 of Article 71 of the CC (2014[5]), to which the statute of limitations on criminal liability does not apply. Additionally, consider adding the offense of legalisation (laundering) of proceeds from corruption. Alternatively, consider expanding the grounds for suspending the statute of limitations in criminal cases by establishing that suspension applies at any stage of the proceedings prior to the entry into legal force of the judgment. This could include periods from the initiation of criminal proceedings, the suspicion or accusation of a suspect, or the referral of the case to court for indictment, among others.

• Ensure that official statistics clearly identify the number of persons whose criminal cases were terminated on the basis of Para 4 of Part 1 of Article 35 of CPC (2014[6]) (due to the expiration of the statute of limitations for bringing to criminal responsibility), and the number of those who belonged to the category of public officials.

• Ensure implementation of the recommendations of the Report of the Fourth Round of Monitoring under the IAP (OECD, 2017[8]) and address the shortcomings noted in the Baseline Report of the Fifth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kazakhstan under the IAP (OECD, 2024[9]) regarding immunities, in particular, ensure that general immunities are replaced by functional immunities, substantially reduce the number of public officials with immunities and procedural limitations on immunities.

• Consider amending legislation to permit review of decisions to terminate criminal cases due to refusal to lift immunity when relevant circumstances change, such as the loss of immunity entitlement or changes in the body authorised to lift immunity. Additionally, allow for submitting a repeated application to lift immunity based on new arguments or evidence. Lastly, include provisions to suspend the statute of limitations during these review processes to ensure timely prosecution.

• Ensure that official statistics include data on the number of applications to lift immunity from public officials and the outcomes of their consideration. Additionally, record the number of criminal case terminations under Para 10 of Part 1 of Article 35 of the CPC (2014[6]), with a breakdown by level and type of officials, and make this information publicly accessible.

• Enhance the public segment of the court verdicts database to enable searches for verdicts and other court decisions in criminal cases based on various criteria. These criteria may include crime categories, articles of the CC (2014[5]), keywords, the date of the ruling, and other relevant parameters.

Notes

← 1.  Criminal offenses are categorised into crimes and misdemeanours. A crime is a more severe form of a criminal offense. A misdemeanour poses lesser social danger, cause minor harm or create a threat of harm to individuals, organisations, society, or the state.

← 2.  Monthly calculation indicator was KZT 3 692 (approximately EUR 6 30) in 2024 and KZT 3 932 (approximately EUR 6 70) in 2025.

← 3.  At the time of drafting the study, the Parliament of Kazakhstan was considering amendments to the CC (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014[5]), criminalising a promise and an offer of a bribe as autonomous offenses.

← 4.  The legislation of Kazakhstan distinguishes between the concepts of immunity and privileges from criminal prosecution, but both legal institutions provide guarantees against the conduct of criminal proceedings.