Co‑operative antitrust in remedy design

4. The architecture of co‑operation in remedy design

The previous section highlighted key reasons for co-operation in remedy design, including the rationale for co-operating with sector regulators, other public bodies and private actors, as well as between competition authorities in cross-border matters. In 2022, the OECD held a roundtable on the “Interactions between Competition Authorities and Sector Regulators” (2022[20]) and identified available tools for the co‑operation between them. This includes necessary legal frameworks, formal and informal mechanisms, and methods to approach the conversation according to the objectives pursued. Following the OECD discussion, the International Competition Network (ICN) published a report in 2024 on co-operation between competition authorities and sector regulators that gathers existing frameworks and experiences in areas such as privacy and sustainability (ICN, 2024[21]).

Similarly, the 2021 joint OECD/ICN Report on International Co-operation in Competition Enforcement (2021[22]) acknowledged key drivers of international co-operation such as the continued growth of interconnectedness and developments in the digital economy, which translate into authorities more likely to investigate the same cross-border matters and to consider the same or similar solutions to these common issues. Moreover, it identified different available legal bases and instruments for international co-operation such as provisions in national competition laws, bilateral and multilateral agreements or treaties and the use of confidentiality waivers.

This section will deepen the discussion of the architecture of co-operation focused solely on remedy design.1 It will present considerations on remedy design with different types of stakeholders at different stages of the process, highlighting opportunities for co-operating in each of them and alternatives to overcome challenges.

It shows that engaging in co-operation with sector regulators, other public bodies and private actors may be valuable to boost remedy effectiveness and implementation. It also reveals that designing effective remedies for cross-border conduct and mergers following a collaborative approach demands strong alignment of competition authorities’ goals and even substantive standards, backed by reinforced co‑operation among authorities. As economic integration deepens, enforcing national competition laws increasingly hinges on respecting international comity and refining mechanisms for international co‑operation. Similar challenges and alternatives to enhance international co-operation emerge for collaboration with national actors.

4.1. Co-operation with sector regulators and other public bodies

Remedy design may benefit from co-operation between competition authorities and sector regulators, ministries, and other public bodies when a transaction or conduct impacts a regulated sector (such as energy, telecoms, or media) or intersects with other policy objectives like data privacy, consumer protection, or intellectual property rights, and there are remedy solutions that can be suitable for the harm to competition and the impact on the relevant sector/policy.

Competition authorities, sector regulators and other relevant public bodies—depending on the sector—operate under distinct mandates and pursue different objectives. As such, effective collaboration, particularly in remedy design, requires a shared understanding of each authority’s goals, roles and the institutional framework that governs their interaction.

Previous OECD work has discussed objectives of competition authorities and sector regulators, concluding that the latter “tend to have broader aims”, some of which are aligned with the promotion of competition, and some which may pursue other goals that may contrast with competition or, at least, considered more relevant (OECD, 2022[20]). The tools that each authority have for carrying out their mandates also differ, which may lead to challenges to consistency in approach.

Misalignment in objectives, preferences and approaches may generate lack of trust between the authorities in the design of remedies. Issues such as unclear law mandates, administrative costs, different levels of independence, risks of regulatory capture,2 and differences in priorities represent a challenge for effective co-operation between competition authorities and other public bodies (Lancieri and Pereira Neto, 2021[23]). However, trust and reciprocity can facilitate collaboration. Clear delineation of roles, and a consistent, long-term relationship between authorities may positively impact the depth of their co-operation when it comes to the design of remedies. To lay the groundwork for trust and facilitate engagement in future remedy design opportunities, competition authorities may collaborate with other national public bodies outside the context of specific cases. Box 4 presents a strategy followed by CADE that has contributed to engage with regulators and put in place co-operation mechanisms that have proven useful in collaborations in remedy design.

Box 4. Building a collaborative environment for remedy design in Brazil

In recent years, the Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE) has carried out market studies in some regulated markets, including fuel, health, payment systems, maritime transport, air transport and port services.

In the process of elaboration of the studies, CADE created collaboration opportunities with sector regulators that have proven to be relevant for subsequent enforcement cases. CADE consulted the relevant regulators to understand the dynamics of the markets and, most importantly, to discuss preliminary measures that could be imposed and would be adequate according to the markets’ particularities.

As a result, some of these studies include entire chapters dedicated to possible remedies to be applied on those markets to increase competition. A handful of the proposed measures have been used posteriorly for enforcement and merger interventions.

Source: Brazil’s contribution to the OECD Roundtable on Remedies and Commitments in Abuse Cases (OECD, 2022[3]) in https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/remedies-and-commitments-in-abuse-cases_b975b0e3-en.html

In a case-specific context, early consultations with regulators to benefit from their perspective before starting the design process are also desirable. Regulators and other public bodies can be asked to provide initial insights and submit opinions that include alternatives for remedies even before a remedy is crafted. This could be relevant even when remedies are put forward by the parties, as part of a preliminary assessment of their sufficiency. Initial information sharing on market dynamics and history may also be relevant as a starting point, for instance, through requests for information at early stages of investigations or merger reviews. Early interactions between competition authorities and regulators during the design of remedies are typically not documented in final decisions, making it difficult to assess whether and to what extent these initial discussions influenced the choice of remedy alternatives.

As the remedy design process must account for causality, the determination of the nature and scope of the harm can also benefit from co‑ordination with sector regulators and other relevant public bodies. The reasoning behind this is that these have deep insights into existing market issues, including persistent anti-competitive behaviour, structural barriers to competition, and the sector’s history—such as mergers and acquisitions, even those that escaped scrutiny by the competition authority.

When the design of the remedy starts taking place, collaboration with regulators and other public bodies can take different forms. A one-time or a continuous sharing of information on market dynamics and players’ conduct may help competition authorities better understand the regulatory framework in which companies operate, and in which the remedy would be implemented, including limitations on their behaviour that are already in place and interactions that the remedy may have with existing or envisaged regulation. Box 5 presents an example. Co-operation can also take the form of commenting directly on the remedy proposal. Deeper co-operation may include the formation of working groups targeted at co‑operation on specific features of the remedy design process or design of complementary measures when the issue is being investigated by both agencies.

Box 5. European Central Bank’s role in Apple commitments

In 2024, the European Commission accepted commitments offered by Apple in an investigation on Apple’s potential restriction to competition for mobile wallets on iPhones. The Commission’s preliminary concern was that Apple had abused its dominant position by restricting access to the technology needed to make payments by iPhones (NFC technology) to competing mobile wallet developers.

To address the concerns, Apple offered a set of commitments that was market tested. The Commission got feedback from multiple banks, app developers, card issuers, financial associations and the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB submitted comments during the market testing stage, pointing out remaining gaps, such as Apple not giving access to the secure element in the hardware that, according to the submission, affected user experience.

After the market test, Apple offered improved remedies, which the Commission accepted. In summary, Apple committed to give access to NFC functionality to third-party mobile wallets free of charge within a software solution. Apple Pay would continue relying on the hardware element in the iPhone, but the solution proposed was deemed equivalent in terms of security and user experience, and easier to implement for both Apple and wallet developers.

The ECB confirmed its support for the final set of measures. Given the expected regulation under a potential digital euro (a European digital currency planned to be introduced), also flagged by the ECB in its comments, the Commission made explicit that the commitments were without prejudice to further obligations that may apply under this expected regulation. It also clarified that the commitments accepted concerned practices that are covered by the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and that the measures impose obligations that go further than what is required by the DMA. This showed the complementarity between the two frameworks.

Sources: Case AT. 40452 Apple; EC (2024), Remarks by Executive Vice-President Vestager on the decision to make binding commitments offered by Apple, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_24_3746; ECB (2024), Feedback on commitments offered by Apple over access restrictions to near-field communication technology, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.letter240419_Vestager~8f8210db09.en.pdf

Mechanisms for engaging with other national authorities differ across legal frameworks. In some jurisdictions, consultations are required by law. In others, they are provided as voluntary, and in a small group, they are left out from competition laws and regulators. Specifics of the relationship between agencies are dealt with mostly through MoUs. These agreements shape the extent into which the regulator would contribute to the competition authority’s investigation and can go from general high-level principles to details on how co-operation may occur in practice.

Engaging with regulators and other public bodies may involve certain considerations related to temporal aspects. Bureaucratic procedures may increase the timing of contacts between competition authorities and sector regulators and other public bodies within the jurisdiction, or limit confidential information exchanges, which may be particularly limiting in merger reviews where deadlines are tighter.

Agreeing on substantial issues or aligning objectives to pursue with the imposition of a remedy complicates the task even more. However, differences between competition authorities and regulators’ expertise and legal mandate may serve to exploit their complementarities for the design of a remedy. For example, competition authorities are better placed to conclude that some form of data or asset is essential to competition, given their expertise across a wide range of industries, but may lack expertise (in hands of the regulator) on how to access the data for a specific sector, the periodicity in which it is collected, standards for data sharing, among others (Lancieri and Pereira Neto, 2021[23]). Box 6 illustrates some examples of different levels of co-operation between competition authorities and regulators in the choice of remedies.

The degree of collaboration with the regulator may also vary depending on the conduct or theory of harm identified. Some violations or concerns in merger review may be more directly linked to the activities of the regulator (e.g. refusal to deal, discriminatory conduct) than others. In the design of consumer-faced remedies, collaborating with the consumer protection agency (and consumer associations) may be particularly important. They may have clearer insights on consumer behaviour patterns and biases that can inform the design of the remedy. If the theory of harm involves data interoperability, co-ordination with the data protection authority becomes more pertinent.3

Finally, there could be value in co-operation with regulators and other public bodies for monitoring compliance, even in cases where the remedy design process itself did not benefit from it. Competition authorities may request other bodies for support. For instance, when they interact more often with market players, as this may reduce some costs associated to the monitoring. Regulators may also have better knowledge on how to collect and analyse data for understanding whether the remedy was implemented and if the implementation had the intended effects.4 An alternative that has also been implemented in some cases is joint monitoring. In the form of monitoring committees, competition authorities and regulators could oversee compliance, benefiting from each other’s expertise and responsibilities. In Korea, for example, these committees have been used frequently, particularly in cases where complex and technical data analysis is required.5

Box 6. Selected examples on co-operation with sector regulators for remedy choice and design

United States

In 2020, Spring and T-Mobile merged in the United States. The regulatory process included reviews by the DOJ and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Both companies operated mobile networks and offered nationwide coverage to consumers, accounting for roughly 30% of retail clients on prepaid services. On the side of the FCC’s assessment, the regulator took into account how the merger plan would contribute to the deployment of 5G, one of its immediate priorities, and decided to approve the merger with some remedies. These included the requirement for 5G being deployed to 97% of Americans withing 3 years of the merger closing, with certain speed and latency conditions.

For the DOJ, the transaction raised significant concerns in the prepaid market and the approval of the transaction required additional remedies than those imposed by the FCC. The parties reached a settlement in which divestitures of Sprint’s prepaid business were to be imposed. The DOJ’s main goal was to enable a viable facilities-based competitor to enter the market. The settlement included also divestitures of certain spectrum assets and the obligation to make available a certain amount of cell sites and retail location, as well as access to T-Mobile network for a period of seven years while the acquirer built out its own network. According to the DOJ, “In crafting this remedy, we are also mindful of the significant commitments T-Mobile, Sprint, and Dish have made to the Federal Communications Commission.”

Brazil

In July 2017, Itaú Unibanco S.A., Brazil’s largest private bank, announced its intention to acquire shares issued by XP Investimentos S.A., a nascent company that developed investment products through a digital platform. The assessment of the merger by CADE revealed the following main concerns: (1) weakening of the competition exercised by XP over the other banks, based on the influence of Itaú on its management; and (2) increased barriers to entry into the financial market segment, due to the increase in market power of XP with its association with Itaú.

This case was the first transaction in the banking sector that CADE reviewed after signing an MoU with the Central Bank. The agreement allowed for co-operation between the Council and the Central Bank that began during the Superintendence-General's investigation phase and continued in court, through contact between the technical teams of both agencies, with an exchange of views on issues such as the appropriateness and effectiveness of the potential remedies. The Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) also collaborated with CADE in the investigation phase. CADE’s final decision included the imposition of obligations aiming at minimising Itaú’s influence on XP’s strategic decisions and the prevention of exclusivities, discriminatory practices and other behaviour that could prevent consumers to benefit from innovative products. The collaboration between CADE and the Central Bank ensured that the final decisions were consistent in time and substance.

Mexico

In 2020, The Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica - COFECE, Mexico’s Competition Authority (now Comisión Nacional Antimonopolios - CNA) accepted commitments from the Association of Public Brokers to correct possible anticompetitive conducts in the shape of discriminatory treatment in the market for affiliation services of public brokers. COFECE imposed commitments with some modifications to the Association’s proposal based on the input from the Ministry of Economy, which acts as a regulator as it authorises public brokers to serve as commercial agents. According to COFECE, the support of the Ministry was key in making sure that the commitments were appropriate and legally and economically feasible.

Source: US DOJ (2019). Press release: Justice Department Settles with T-Mobile and Sprint in Their Proposed Merger by Requiring a Package of Divestitures to Dish, available at: https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-settles-t-mobile-and-sprint-their-proposed-merger-requiring-package; CADE (2018). Press release: Cade approves with restrictions Itaú's acquisition of a stake in XP Investimentos, available at: https://www.gov.br/cade/en/matters/news/cade-approves-with-restrictions-itaus-acquisition-of-a-stake-in-xp-investimentos; COFECE Case No. DE-018-2018 and Press release No. COFECE-022-2020 available at: https://www.cofece.mx/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/COFECE-022-2020-English.pdf; Contribution by Mexico to the OECD Roundtable on Interactions Between Competition Authorities and Sector Regulators, available at: https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2022)20/en/pdf

4.2. Co-operation with other competition authorities

Co-operation between competition authorities in remedy design is relevant when transactions or conduct to be remedied cross borders. As recognised by the ICN, it “increases the likelihood of non-conflicting remedies”. This is increasingly more common as globalisation and free trade have created far more interconnections between markets and cross-border activity involving worldwide supply chains and large multinational firms.

Co-operation between competition authorities in remedy design may have different shapes and result in different strategies. It can range from informal, high-level contact – often without detailed discussions on remedy options – to formal, case-specific engagement that may even involve joint work. The nature and depth of this collaboration can lead to varying outcomes, depending on how closely authorities coordinate throughout the process, including:

• Large, uniform, remedy packages that are feasible and appropriate to all participating jurisdictions (even when local particularities require for additional jurisdiction-specific measures).

• Domestic (but co-ordinated) remedy packages that solve concerns identified in each jurisdiction, and that do not contradict one another or even that complement each other.

• Identification of a situation in which concerns do not overlap or the design does not require co-ordinated efforts and, thus, remedy packages that do not necessarily align but have been informed by other competition authorities’ activity.

The extent of co-operation between authorities depends on the nature of the competitive concerns and the specificities considered in each jurisdiction, including characteristics and dynamics in the markets. Given that a transaction or conduct may have varying competitive effects across jurisdictions, the remedies proposed by the merging parties may differ accordingly even when close co-operation takes place.

As it is the case with national regulators, the interaction between competition authorities across jurisdictions is impacted by differences in legal frameworks, rules and standards. While they all have the protection of competition as part of their mandates, they are bounded by their laws to account for harm to competition in their own territory to intervene.6 This makes their enforcement objectives to be domestic, thus not overlapping with other competition authorities from other jurisdictions. Moreover, among their goals, there is heterogeneity, with some competition authorities having goals broader than competition. Divergences may also be originated in the tools and powers available. In remedy design, for instance, some authorities have powers to impose remedies in merger cases, while others are bounded to remedy proposals brought by the parties. Similarly, mechanisms to accept remedies in antitrust investigation vary, as briefly highlighted in section 2.

Recent OECD work reviewed challenges and sources of divergence in cross-border merger review. The OECD background note found that, while the risk of conflicting outcomes is often low (OECD, 2024[6]), it must still be managed. It concluded that, as markets become increasingly interconnected through global supply chains and digitalisation, the need for a cohesive and collaborative regulatory approach becomes ever more critical. In other words, this is where co-operation could be most valuable.

Consistency should also be the starting point in co-operating with other competition authorities. From informal to formal mechanisms to co-operate, authorities may find continuous exchanges as a good baseline for co-operating in case-specific remedy design. This may result from experiences in which the absence of formal co-operation mechanisms has significantly limited their ability to collaborate, reducing opportunities to inform and improve future cases. Box 7 presents some strategies that some jurisdictions have followed to put in place co-operation mechanisms for future collaborations in remedy design.

Box 7. From informal to formal co-operation mechanisms in Central America

In 2019, Telefónica, a Spanish telecommunications operator decided to sell its subsidiaries in several Central American countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama), mostly to two of its main competitors in the region. These transactions impacted the sector in the region and, according to each jurisdiction’s merger regime, regulatory responses had different procedures and outcomes.

Competition authorities in the region discussed informally in the framework of the Central American Network of Competition Authorities (RECAC). The main interactions were between SUTEL, Costa Rica’s telecommunications competition authority and regulator, and the Superintendencia de Competencia, the competition authority in El Salvador. The merger ended up being approved in Costa Rica and approved with remedies in El Salvador, where the Superintendencia required the acquirer to give back some spectrum. The authorities recognised that their co-operation was very limited, as they could not discuss confidential information, for instance, regarding the remedy design in El Salvador. As a result, both authorities decided to sign a MoU that formalised their co-operation mechanisms and opened the door for case-specific collaboration in the future.

Source: SUTEL’s contribution to the OECD Roundtable on Cross-border Mergers (OECD, 2024[6]) in https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/challenges-and-sources-of-divergence-in-cross-border-merger-review_61972545-en.html; Superintendencia de Competencia El Salvador (2020). Convenio suscrito con SUTEL-Costa Rica – ConvenioSC: https://www.sc.gob.sv/index.php/sala_multimedia/convenio-con-sutel/

Beyond the various stages where competition authorities may collaborate with one another, initiating contact at an early stage could include a preliminary discussion on potential remedy planning. Even if the investigation has not yet fully identified the competition concerns, such early coordination can help align timelines and support future decisions regarding the suitability and feasibility of proposed measures. As recognised by the ICN Merger Remedies Guide, initiation of contact between competition authorities may even occur prior to a merger notification, particularly if the possibility of remedies being required arises from pre-notification consultations by the parties. These early contacts could trigger alignment of timeframes and early provisions of confidentiality waivers, as well as initial provisions on timing extensions if needed.

Co-ordination between competition authorities can also reveal the need for considering concerns more broadly than in national borders. Even when remedies still need to be suitable to the local needs, as solutions should be proportional and effective in the jurisdiction, by definition, a broader solution may be required for a broader problem. Identifying the scope of the conduct or effects of the transaction is a good step for the identification of a suitable remedy. Moreover, it could also give initial insights for competition dynamics across jurisdictions (i.e. the possibility of entrants from other geographical areas). This co-operative approach could specially help smaller jurisdictions in the design of remedies suitable to their concerns (OECD, 2024[6]).7

Whenever a transaction or conduct involves firms operating internationally, their competitive effects sometimes extend beyond national borders. As jurisdictions evaluate the effects of mergers in their respective geographical area, this could prevent authorities from fully grasping the overall implications of the transaction or conduct, i.e. they could miss the whole picture. Co-ordinated efforts can occasionally help uncover whether the theory of harm – and consequently the remedy– should reflect global rather than local market dynamics. Box 8 illustrates this by presenting multiple investigations against Amazon by multiple jurisdictions for alleged abuse of dominance conduct linked to the use of its Buy Box where similarities in concerns can be observed.

Competition authorities could also take into account each other’s interests, whenever possible, while designing their own remedies, in return for others doing the same (international comity).8 Negative comity could involve a situation in which one or a set of jurisdictions abstain from imposing remedies as their concerns get solved by another jurisdiction’s conditions, and no action avoids entering into conflict with that decision. Positive comity could also be relevant, as requesting other authorities to perform certain actions (e.g. to adjust a remedy) to guarantee alignment may boost effectiveness of the intervention. In both cases, what comity may contribute to is the obtention of effective and non-conflicting remedies that comprehensively address competition concerns (Yeoun Ahn, 2022[24]).

Box 8. Abuse of dominance cases against Amazon – selected cases to illustrate convergence in concerns related to its Buy Box

A recent global trend has been the initiation of investigations into digital platforms by competition authorities across multiple jurisdictions for self-preferencing conduct.^* Amazon has been particularly involved in these investigations for the way its Buy Box operates.¹ However, relatively few remedies have been imposed to address these concerns all of them of a behavioural nature. Some investigations remain ongoing.

In Italy, the competition authority found in 2021 that Amazon had abused its dominant position by giving favourable rankings to products from retailers using its delivery services, making them more likely to appear in the Buy Box than products of other third-party retailers. Given that the Buy Box is displayed prominently on Amazon’s website and allow consumers to purchase items faster, this would give significant advantages to Amazon’s retailers.² The AGCM fined Amazon with over EUR 1.1 billion and required it to change its practices through certain behavioural remedies that included granting sales benefits and visibility to all third-party sellers complying with certain standards on Amazon’s Italian website. The EC and the UK CMA carried out similar investigations that were closed in 2022 and 2023, respectively, by accepting behavioural commitments with the same objective as the remedies imposed in Italy: to ensure equal access to the Buy Box for all retailers using Amazon Marketplace.³

Some investigations are still ongoing. The Competition Bureau in Canada opened an investigation in 2020 to examine whether Amazon’s policies had a negative impact on competition, particularly by affecting third-party retailers. By July 2025, the Bureau had obtained a court order from the Federal Court that required Amazon to produce records and share relevant information with the authority.⁴

In 2023, the US FTC filed a complaint alleging similar behaviour, claiming that Amazon illegally maintained its monopoly power through strategies that included downgrading of third-party retailers’ rankings, among others.⁵ In October 2024, the plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint, and the action is ongoing. Finally, in 2024, COFECE in Mexico, issued a preliminary opinion on its investigation against Amazon and Mercado Libre. The authority concluded that the companies were favouring their own logistic services through their Buy Box and suggests that companies should modify the criteria for retailers to be featured in Buy Boxes to eliminate its concerns.⁶

As evidenced, the outcome has been a situation of de facto convergence after a series of investigations across multiple jurisdictions, leaving other regions where the company operates unaffected.

Note:

^* Self-preferencing concerns in digital markets can arise when platforms use their position in one market to favour their own products in an ancillary market, thus distorting competition in the related market. See (OECD, 2024[25]).

Sources:

¹ OECD (2025[12]), “Remedies in digital markets in Latin America and the Caribbean”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 326, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/34bbc7e4-en.

² AGCM decision of 9 December 2021, A528 FBA Amazon.

³ EC decision of 20 December 2022, AT.40462, Amazon Marketplace and CMA decision of 3 November 2023, 51184, Amazon Marketplace.

⁴ See https://www.canada.ca/en/competition-bureau/news/2025/07/competition-bureau-advances-investigation-of-amazons-marketplace-fair-pricing-policy.html

⁵ Complaint in FTC v. Amazon (Case 2:23-cv-01495-JHC).

⁶ COFECE, File IEBC-001-2022, Preliminary Opinion issued on February 6, 2024.

Some challenges that limit co-operation between authorities in remedy design may arise. A survey conducted by the OECD and the ICN in 2021 revealed five different types of challenges for international co-operation (OECD/ICN, 2021[22]). Although the survey focused on general issues, all may apply to co‑operation in remedy design. These are:

• constrained resources;

• misalignments in timing;

• practical issues such as bureaucratic procedures, language barriers and time differences;

• legal limitations related to information sharing and investigative assistance, including provisions that allow for co-operation but are generic, without specifying the details of how to co-operate in practice or in which stages of a process it is possible to do so

• limited trust and reciprocity.

Within formal co-operation mechanisms, authorities could overcome some of these barriers with confidentiality waivers, bilateral agreements and MoUs. Procedural and resource challenges can be mitigated by early engagement and by developing long-term relationships that reduce transaction costs in individual cases.

As with other areas of co-operation, undoubtedly, the granting of confidentiality waivers is the most common strategy to facilitate co-ordination between competition authorities. In merger cases, this seems to be the norm and co-operation among competition authorities is usually driven by the parties themselves. Parties grant them because it is in their best interest to facilitate information sharing, and authorities request them because in the process of designing remedies, confidential information about the parties’ businesses in other jurisdictions may be crucial. In conduct investigations, waivers are not as commonly observed. In some situations, because the investigated parties’ defense strategy may not involve the proposal of commitments to allow for early discussions. In others, waivers are not considered because the different standards assessing the conduct in the multiple jurisdictions generate asymmetries between the negotiation process.

Practical advice to facilitate co-operation in designing effective remedies is to exchange and compare draft remedies as soon as possible. This allows for deeper collaboration that, when possible, involves co‑ordinated reviews of practical matters, market testing strategies, joint inquiries, co‑ordinated selection of monitoring strategies and the definition of other practical aspects such as timing of the final decision and even the release of the public statement.

Operational hurdles such as language barriers may also imply the use of more resources for translations, or time differences, which extend the delay of communications between authorities, have an impact on the overall length of remedy design. As adding these additional layers to remedy design is costly, availability of time and resources becomes a key consideration that could significantly impact the extent of co-operation. Box 9 presents some key recent findings in Europe on these challenges.

Box 9. Challenges in the implementation of remedies across EU jurisdictions

The 2025 EC ex-post evaluation report on antitrust remedies evaluated some cases where remedies with effects in multiple EU jurisdictions were imposed. It touched upon challenges in the implementation phase due to differences in the different jurisdictions that were not considered in the design of the remedy.

The report revealed that, for one of the cases reviewed, “although commitments were designed for fast and proper implementation, compliance with regulatory systems and processes of all Member States was time-consuming and complex”. Given that the decision was made at EU level, no co-operation between the Commission and other competition authorities or with different national regulatory agencies (relevant health authorities) was foreseen but proved to be needed.

Language barriers and differences in regulatory requirements also represented significant challenges for the company when engaging with national regulators. If such a remedy were to be implemented outside the EU—where the co‑ordination mechanisms are not as well established as within the Union—the challenge could be significantly greater, due to more variations in regulatory frameworks and enforcement practices.

Source: European Commission: Directorate-General for Competition et al. (2025[15]), Ex post evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of EU antitrust remedies – Final report, on the Aspen decision (AT.40394) of 2021, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a5132bd9-fb05-11ef-b7db-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.

Generally, timing issues may be reduced through early engagements that allow for alignment of timelines or through alternatives that introduce flexibility to the remedy design. On the latter, sunset or review clauses that allow for more flexibility to review the remedies in the future (by any of the competition authorities), particularly those of a behavioural nature, may help reducing differences across jurisdictions. Modifications in the event of changed circumstances may give remedies the sufficient flexibility to adjust for both effectiveness and proportionality. They could also reduce risks of unintended consequences and may release authorities from monitoring when it is no longer necessary, thereby reducing costs. Box 10 shows an example.

As is the case with sector regulators and other national bodies, co-operation with other competition authorities for the monitoring and implementation of remedies is also valuable. Remedies can be difficult to enforce in situations where assets are in other jurisdictions or where monitoring the behaviour implies looking at conduct outside national borders. As referred above, principles of international comity may be the key to ensure that remedy design involve considering extra-territorial remedies only in those situations in which including them is needed to effectively redress harm and is consistent with the relevant jurisdiction’s laws, policies and practices (OECD, 2017[26]). Whenever extra-territorial remedies are chosen, the use of mechanisms to guarantee co-operation in the implementation phase is needed.

When possible, competition authorities rely on the role of a monitoring trustee for co‑ordination purposes and appointing a common trustee can be valuable in cross-border scenarios. Trustees enable authorities to rely on an independent (and shared) source of information regarding remedy implementation. In turn, this reduces duplication of efforts and minimises the risk of inconsistent assessments across jurisdictions. Communication between competition authorities regarding specific issues in the implementation of remedies could also be part of the co-operation between them. Reciprocal consent decrees may be used a strategy to alleviate concerns on asymmetries in the implementation and guarantee enforceability of remedies when involving cross-border considerations.9

Box 10. An amendment to the remedies in the Korean Air-Asiana merger

In 2024, during the OECD roundtable on cross-border mergers, the KFTC presented the Korean Air-Asiana merger as one of the most illustrative cases the authority handled that dealt with co-operation with regulators and other competition authorities for remedy design.¹

When the KFTC first cleared the merger, in February 2022, it did it subject to structural and behavioural remedies that included transfers of slots and traffic rights, limits to fare increases, prohibitions on the reduction of supplied seats, and other conduct measures for a period of ten years. The KFTC highlighted during the OECD roundtable its collaboration with other competition authorities as crucial in remedy design, particularly as the authority lacked experience in evaluating analogous mergers in the sector, as well as the decision to design the remedies rather than accepting a proposal from the merging parties.

The KFTC included in its decision a provision that implied a revision of the remedies in the future, to take into account the review outcomes of other competition authorities, as well as changes in market dynamics due to impacts of COVID-19.² The KFTC used this reviewing clause as a mechanism to guarantee effectiveness and implementability of the remedies.

In December 2024, the KFTC held a plenary meeting to finalise the corrective measures for the transaction. Some of the remedies related to the traffic rights were lifted, as the assessment of the European Commission and the measures it imposed involved the entry of a new competitor in some of the relevant routes. From the original divestiture that included 14 domestic routes, competitive conditions in 6 of those were deemed to have changed, and thus the structural remedy remained only for 8 routes. The KFTC indicated that these changes would limit unnecessary supply reduction, making the measures more proportionate. Times for the divestitures were also adjusted from 3 to 2.5 years post-closing. As for the number of seats supplied, the KFTC determined the percentage required, considering some indicators and that restrictions on seat occupation due to COVID-19 were lifted.³

Sources:

¹ see Korea’s contribution to the Roundtable and the OECD background note for the discussion in https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/challenges-and-sources-of-divergence-in-cross-border-merger-review_61972545-en.html

² KFTC Press Release, KFTC gives conditional approval to Korean Air-Asiana Airlines merger, https://tinyurl.com/56h56869.

³ see (Gu, 2024[27]), Announcement of the results of the review of the amendment to the Korean Air-Asiana merger, https://www.korea.kr/briefing/policyBriefingView.do?newsId=156665399

4.3. Engagement with private actors

Co-operation between competition authorities and private entities – particularly those under investigation or involved in merger proceedings – differs significantly in nature from co-operation with other public bodies, whether national or international. First, co-operation between the competition authorities and companies for remedy design should be distinguished from procedural engagement. It entails a framework of interaction that complements legal duties while respecting due process.

Second, objectives from competition authorities and private actors do not align. While conflicts may not always be explicit, firms focus on profit maximisation, which does not incorporate the enhancement of market competition as a criterion for their strategic decisions. When transactions or conduct are motivated by a desire to gain or consolidate market power, any expected behaviour from the parties would run counter to the objectives of competition authorities. This misalignment of incentives introduces bias into interactions with private actors and raises legitimate concerns about the credibility and reliability of their engagement in competition processes, including remedy design. However, strategies to engage with private actors while mitigating those risks are available, thus allowing competition authorities to benefit from their participation in the design process.

With parties, the misalignment in incentives, together with asymmetries of information on their behaviour and other market dynamics that are not easily observable, constitute a relevant impediment to establishing trust. However, it is this asymmetry that often makes it more challenging to design an appropriate remedy without engaging with the parties responsible for its implementation. To mitigate the impact of private actors and competition authorities having different interests, early engagement is also desired. Legal advisors recommend an early planning of the remedy package (both in mergers and investigations) to save time, minimise business disruptions, have sufficient time to market-test their feasibility and suitability, and even start considering implementation strategies (Harkrider and O’Mara, 2023[28]). In a cross-border context, this may include considerations on setting up a global co‑ordination team that aligns local strategies in all reviewing jurisdictions to a global strategy.

While in the interaction with public actors, co-operation is not impacted by the type of enforcement activity, this does have a role in the extent interaction with private actors. In mergers and market investigations, where procedures are less contentious, co-operation is easier to achieve than in conduct cases. Even within conduct investigations, co-operation is more straightforward when remedies are designed through commitments or other negotiated processes, than when they are imposed as part of an infringement decision (in which case, there is more engagement than actual co-operation). In commitment decisions, companies have incentives to co-operate and propose suitable remedies, as they may want to avoid the impact of an infringement decision on their reputation, especially when there is a formal finding of an infringement against them. Outside the context of a commitment decision, when parties’ participation in remedy design is rewarded by a reduction of the fine in an infringement decision, parties may have more incentives to contribute.10 While this latter scenario is not as common, it is an interesting avenue for authorities to consider in certain cases.

When remedies are proposed by the parties – as in the case of commitments or most merger reviews involving conditions – their engagement in the design is therefore ensured. In those cases, communication at early stages may involve sharing of expectations on processes, including internal deadlines and expectations. Depending on the circumstances, these communications may include initial proposals for potential remedies, with the sharing of preliminary concerns and views. Outside the framework of commitments, co-operation in infringement investigations is not granted and any engagement from companies on the design of remedies that come within an infringement decision is more reactive than preventive. In those cases, their engagement is linked to reductions in fines but may still be beneficial for the authority. Box 11 presents a recent case in which the French Competition Authority used the settlement procedure in an abuse of dominance case in which it accepted remedies and additional co-operation from the investigated party in exchange of a reduction in fines.

Box 11. A settlement with commitments in the EDF abuse case in France

In 2022, the French Autorité de la Concurrence imposed a sanction of EUR 300 million on EDF for having abused its dominant position. The company abusively exploited resources, including customers data at its disposal, as an electricity supplier offering regulated electricity tariffs (TRV for its name in French), to develop the marketing of gas and energy services market offers, and to convert a large part of its customer base at the pivotal moment when TRV electricity was ending for some business customers. The objective was to maintain its market share in the electricity supply sector and to strengthen its position in the related gas and energy services supply markets. The conduct lasted for 17 years, between 2004 and 2021.

After the authority had issued a statement of objections clearly identifying the abusive conduct and the harm to competition, EDF applied for a settlement procedure. As part of the procedure, the company proposed several commitments in addition to waive its rights to contest the facts of the statement of objections in exchange of a reduction in the fine. The commitments included (1) making EDF’s TRV Bleu customer file available to alternative electricity suppliers who requested it, and (2) to separate the telephone subscriptions of clients and prospects of TRV Bleu from those with non-regulated tariffs.

While the commitment proposal came at a late stage, in which the authority had already taken a clear position and decided on a path towards issuing an infringement position, it was highlighted in its press release that co-operation with the parties was essential to guarantee that the remedies imposed not only put an end to the conduct but also that they were proportional and effective to restore competition in the markets.

Source: Autorité de la Concurrence, Decision No. 22-D-06 of 2022 and press release: Dans le cadre d’une procédure négociée, l’Autorité inflige une sanction de 300 millions d’euros à l’encontre d’EDF, et plusieurs de ses filiales, pour abus de position dominante, https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/fr/communiques-de-presse/dans-le-cadre-dune-procedure-negociee-lautorite-inflige-une-sanction-de-300

When competition authorities and courts have defined the competition problem, stakeholders may contribute to the definition of suitable alternatives, if they exist, and may inform the authority on their expected effectiveness. They may also suggest whether the remedy is proportionate to the harm and if there is causality between the two.

One standard strategy followed by competition authorities to trigger the engagement of parties in remedy design is to allow them to come up with an initial remedy proposal, to then assess their suitability. Allowing parties to submit an initial proposal enables competition authorities to begin their assessment of effectiveness and enforceability from a reference point where the likelihood of proportionality is higher. This is because parties are incentivised to propose solutions that are minimally disruptive to their operations, thus making it highly improbable for the parties themselves to propose remedies that are disproportionate. It is particularly important for infringement decisions where the proposed remedy is introduced after the authority or court has already established the theory of harm, leaving limited room for remedy solutions to satisfy the proportionality test. However, these same incentives may work against effectiveness, as parties can leverage their informational advantage to steer the discussion in a direction that serves their interests and design remedies “where they cannot lose” (Bostoen and van Wamel, 2023[10]).

Moreover, competition authorities should seek to avoid situations in which parties may strategically increase the time that co‑ordination on remedy design requires, to extend the timeline for the implementation of the remedy. As identified by the European Commission’s 2025 report on the Ex-post evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of EU antitrust remedies, timing may also be impacted by strategic decisions of the companies involved. For example, in the case of voluntary commitments, investigated parties may have the incentive to “drag on commitments discussions with the Commission for as long as possible, to continue profiting from their possibly anticompetitive behaviour” (European Commission: Directorate-General for Competition et al., 2025[15]). Thus, when engaging in collaboration with other stakeholders, competition authorities should seek for clear timelines and avoid situations that cause unjustified extensions. For conduct investigations, interim measures may be used as a temporary solution to guarantee effectiveness of the remedy when imposed.

In cases where parties are not directly engaged in proposing remedies or participating in their design, there may still be room for their contribution. Generating situations for receiving feedback and instances in which the involved parties agree prior to the imposition may result in a tailor-made remedy with clearly defined terms, rather than a principle-based approach that addresses the conduct but defers the evaluation of technical compliance to a later stage (Ibáñez Colomo, 2025[29]). Parties’ involvement in remedy design may follow formal procedures or may be informal. While in some jurisdictions their interactions with the authority are documented in final decisions, with competition authorities detailing the different proposals received by the parties with modifications during the discussion processes, others contain low or no detail on the procedure, presenting only the final, accepted remedy package.

Third parties’ opinions may also weigh in. Depending on their position in the market, they can contribute to the design of remedies by sharing insights from their experience, their interactions with the investigated or merging parties, and relevant market history. Such input can help counterbalance the subjectivity of information provided by the parties, although their incentives may also be biased according to the interests they aim to protect. Therefore, competition authorities should also carefully balance their involvement in remedy design.

Market testing is the most relevant tool to gather third party views and review ex ante the effectiveness of a remedy. It enables the acquisition of information to identify the most suitable remedy (Domingues Alves and Vasconcelos, 2024[30]). It also and reduces risks of trust as it allows for obtaining evidence and understanding of many practical aspects of remedy design and collect input from stakeholders that otherwise would not have engaged with the competition authority. Finally, market testing can be the source of new information on different forms of behaviour that are not caught by the remedy proposed but that can generate the same outcome (see Box 12).

Many jurisdictions have specific legal provisions for market testing remedies. Market testing remedies is more common in negotiated procedures, and less so when the remedies come as an imposition complementary to a sanction in an infringement decision.11 Market testing may be a static one‑time exercise in some jurisdictions, while conceived as an iterative process in others.12 Other authorities follow similar procedures, even when subsequent consultations are not provided by the law.13 When market testing is not available or is inconvenient, directed consultations with external technical experts may be a suitable alternative. 14 This is mostly the case for the imposition of remedies in infringement decisions, as the process tends to be less public and revealing information on remedies is not explicitly provided in the procedure.

Market testing may also be time-consuming. As stated previously, this is a particularly pressing issue in merger cases, where deadlines are tight. It can also be a situation to avoid in dynamic markets, as the longer it takes to remedy the action, the less effective the measure may be. However, shorter processes can be achieved by designing targeted tests that focus on the key aspects of the remedy requiring robustness checks, and by shortening the timeframe for stakeholder feedback. Early engagement with third parties also facilitates this, as it ensures that market test participants are already familiar with the general context of the case.

Box 12. The role of market testing in the CMA’s private healthcare market investigation

In 2012, the Competition Commission in the United Kingdom (predecessor of the Competition and Markets Authority – CMA) started a market investigation into private healthcare. As a result of the investigation, a number of remedies were imposed, including divestitures in the London market.

After an appeal, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) sent the case back to the CMA to reconsider its structural remedy, giving some errors in the pricing analysis used to justify some of the competitive concerns found. The CMA updated its analysis and published the provisional findings report again in 2015 with similar findings but having corrected the errors. The CMA also published a notice of provisional remedies, including the initial thought divestiture, as well as behavioural remedies such as the provision of greater information on the hospitals’ performance for patients.

The CMA held hearings with a range of industry customers and interested parties and published the provisional remedies for market consultation. After evaluating the responses, the CMA reached the conclusion that none of the proposed remedies would be effective and proportionate. While still concluding that the market required more competition, it observed that the proposed divestiture was no longer a proportionate remedy, as new evidence on a probable entry in the short term was presented during the testing phase. Other remedies considered, such as price controls, were deemed to be ineffective, particularly as some behavioural measures were already introduced by the first set of remedies.

Source: CMA (2016) CMA publishes final report on private healthcare remittal, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-publishes-final-report-on-private-healthcare-remittal; Case webpage: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/private-healthcare-market-investigation.

After all, the use of strategies that allow participation from market players help the competition authority to acquire detailed operational knowledge and insights into market dynamics that otherwise it would not be able to fully capture alone. By involving the parties subject to the remedy, as well as competitors, providers, consumers and other relevant businesses, competition authorities can better understand potential implementation challenges, identify unintended consequences, and more likely tailor solutions that are proportionate and sustainable. This collaborative approach not only enhances the likelihood of compliance but also contributes to remedies that genuinely restore competition without imposing unnecessary burdens.

Finally, “A remedy should be capable of being implemented, monitored and enforced” (ICN, 2016[18]). This means that once remedies have been designed, co-ordination may still be needed and valuable for implementation and monitoring. Having co-operated with the parties in the design of remedies may also foster their compliance and reduce the risk of implementation and monitoring happening in a confrontational procedure. However, for all instances, having an appropriate monitoring and sanctioning framework for non-compliance is essential to secure proper implementation. The ICN Merger Remedies Guide suggest, particularly for non-structural remedies, that “competition authorities should ensure that monitoring and enforcement are feasible and that non-compliance or evasion is detectable and subject to effective sanctions or penalties” (ICN, 2016[18]).

4.4. Learning from past experiences

Past experiences from similar cases, including in other jurisdictions, may also inform remedy design. Reviewing past experiences may also involve co-operation with other authorities or market players (those that were object to the past remedies), even if indirect. Retrospective studies are a relevant tool to review effectiveness and implementation of remedies (OECD, 2025[31]) and to learn from past experiences. Whenever they provide useful insights on what went right or wrong or what could have gone better, they provide a valuable source of information for future remedy design.

In recent years, few competition authorities have published ex-post assessments of mergers and antitrust remedies, as well as broader studies evaluating their interventions or decisions.15 One of the most recent reports was the 2025 EC Report on the Implementation and Effectiveness of Remedies in Antitrust Behavioural Cases (European Commission: Directorate-General for Competition et al., 2025[15]), reviewing more than 100 enforcement cases in Europe involving non-cartel agreements and unilateral conduct. Regarding co-operation with stakeholders, the report made four recommendations:

• Encouraging market testing in remedies within infringement decisions to the extent possible and simplify formalities around market testing in the interest of agility;

• Formalising a co-operation procedure;

• Appointing independent advisors in remedy design whenever the process requires technical expertise, or the implementation may be particularly complex;

• Exploiting synergies between antitrust remedies adopted in different decisions and using the experience and market knowledge gained from antitrust remedies to inform and pro-competitively enhance sector regulation.

Past experiences may also inform about opportunities for more co-operation. In Brazil, CADE published a working paper in 2020 analysing how the authority applied antitrust remedies between 2014 and 2019. The paper concluded that although the practice mainly follows what the Guide on Remedies (published in 2018) establishes, some tools, like the use of market testing, have been underused and that a broader use may encourage parties to submit their opinions and would allow CADE to receive more representative feedback on the measures proposed (CADE, 2020[32]). The authority also considered that it is a good practice to review similar cases where remedies have been imposed and adjust the current design for any missed considerations or to strengthen their effectiveness. Box 13 presents an example in which CADE imposed interim measures in an investigation against Apple considering remedies imposed in other jurisdictions and adjusting the measures according to some non-compliant behaviour observed in such cases. The review of similar cases serves as a natural experiment and, although competition authorities must be able to differentiate conditions that were relevant at that point and are not anymore, they may serve as a good starting point.

Finally, cases in which competition authorities observed limited or no co-operation, yet where such co-operation could have added value, may also offer important lessons for future enforcement actions. Non-compliance with measures may reveal less co-operation with parties than the optimal, including with third parties that could have informed the authority of current or potential practices to circumvent or avoid the remedy. Opposing or inconsistent action by sector regulators also expose lack of co-operation between public bodies at national level. These conflicting dynamics could reduce or prevent the effectiveness of the remedies and generate opposite consequences, thereby reducing competition further in the market and, often, giving the companies an objective argument not to comply with the remedies.16

Box 13. Interim measures against Apple in Brazil – a learning process

In November 2024, the Office of the Superintendent General at CADE in Brazil imposed interim measures against Apple in an investigation for an alleged abuse of a dominant position in the distribution market of apps on iOS devices. Apple appealed the decision, but in May 2025, CADE’s tribunal unanimously decided to uphold the interim measure.

For its decision, the Tribunal analysed in-depth the design of the remedies. When doing it so, it took into account analogous remedies imposed in jurisdictions such as the European Union and the United States, as well as the resulting behaviour and changes that Apple did to its practices in those jurisdictions. For instance, the Tribunal considered that in Europe, amendments to Apple’s App Store Review Guidelines were not sufficient to address concerns that were similar to CADE’s and that further technical and contractual provisions had to be adjusted. It also took into account that in the United States, the District Court for the Northern District of California also found that Apple had violated a court order, requiring the imposition further restrictions to the company’s conduct.

In light of those precedents, the Tribunal considered that there was a “substantial risk that Apple will implement technical or informational obstacles that could create friction in the user experience, undermining the effectiveness of the competition remedy”. Therefore, it acknowledged that the conditions imposed by the Superintendent General were necessary to guarantee that the company could not use any mechanism that undermined the main objective of the interim measure.

Source: Appeal No. 08700.009932/2024-18, https://www.gov.br/cade/en/matters/news/cade-upholds-interim-measure-against-apple/copy_of_AppleAppealCADEsDecisionEnligshversion.pdf

Notes

← 1.  Competition authorities have the choice of completing an enforcement investigation, a market investigation or a merger review in different ways. Accepting commitments or imposing remedies are at the discretion of the authority and involves a balancing exercise on advantages and disadvantages of each option. Willingness to co-operate by the investigated/merging parties may impact this decision. This section leaves aside situations in which authorities rule out remedies, as other instruments such as simple cease-and-desist orders or merger prohibitions are deemed more appropriate.

← 2.  In June 2025, the Competition Committee discussed issues on corporate influence in competition policymaking, differentiating it from legitimate corporate engagement (OECD, 2025[35]).

← 3.  See, for example, the collaboration between the French Competition Authority (Autorité de la Concurrence) and the National Commission for Information Technology and Civil Liberties in France (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés – CNIL) for the design of interim measures against GDF Suez (now Engie) in 2014 (decision 14-MC-02 of September 9, 2014, relating to a request for interim measures filed by Direct Energie in the gas and electricity sectors). See also the Apple ATT decision (decision 21-D-07 of March 17, 2021), relating to a request for interim measures (rejected).

← 4.  As an example, Article 41 of the Spanish Competition Act (Ley 15/2007) provides the CNMC the possibility to request co-operation of Competition authorities of Spain’s autonomous communities and sectoral regulators in monitoring the fulfilling of remedies, commitments and decisions. In practice, the CNMC has signed MoUs with different bodies to operationalise the co-operation mechanisms. It is important to note that the CNMC is also the regulator in multiple sectors (telecommunications, energy, transport, post and audio-visual), which means that this Article has helped mostly when co-ordination with other competition bodies and ministries is required.

← 5.  The Korean Air/Asiana case described above is an example. Parties had to inform a monitoring committee, composed by the KFTC and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, who would supervise compliance. Moreover, some duties for the collection of data and periodic analysis were also delegated to the Korea Fair Trade Mediation Organisation (Gu, 2024[27]).

← 6.  Similarly, the European Commission is bounded to effects in the European Economic Area to take action.

← 7.  For example, in the responses to the OECD/ICN survey in 2021, several authorities highlighted the 2018 Praxair/Linde merger as a clear example of the benefits of substantive co-operation between authorities for the definition of relevant markets and theories of harm. As noted in the report, authorities in the Americas and Asia (e.g. Colombia, Chile and Korea) benefited from their co-operation with other authorities to define relevant geographic markets and understand theories of harm that accurately reflected the global nature of the companies and their innovative technologies. The Korean Competition Authority (KFTC) specifically highlighted that this co-operation was “very useful to ensure the credibility and acceptability of remedies” (OECD/ICN, 2021, p. 122[22]).

← 8.  For example, the US Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation issued in 2017 by the DOJ and FTC include principles on comity. They acknowledge the relevance of international comity to reach effective remedies and suggest that both agencies would aim to co-operate on remedy design with foreign competition authorities to the extent possible. See https://www.justice.gov/atr/internationalguidelines/dl

← 9.  This was the case, for example, in the 2015 Holcim/Lafarge merger, reviewed by multiple authorities including in Canada and the United States. In both jurisdictions, competition authorities announced their consent decrees on the same day and referred to one another. See press releases: https://competition-bureau.canada.ca/en/how-we-foster-competition/education-and-outreach/news-releases/holcimlafarge-merger-sale-all-holcims-operations-canada and https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-requires-cement-manufacturers-holcim-lafarge-divest-assets-condition-merger

← 10.  In Europe, the Commission adopted an infringement decision in 2016 against the company ARA for abusing its dominant position in the market for the exemption of household packaging waste by preventing the entry of competitors. ARA initially proposed commitments. However, the Commission considered that a commitment was not suitable given changes in the conditions in the market. ARA kept co-operating with the Commission, including by acknowledging its liability, and suggested structural remedies that the company considered appropriate and proportionate. This set of remedies were imposed by the Commission together with a fine, reduced by 30% as a reward for co-operation. See Case No. COMP D3/35470.

← 11.  For example, while market testing is explicitly considered in Article 9 Regulation 1/2003 for commitments, it is not considered for remedies under Article 7.

← 12.  For example, in Bulgaria, legal provisions mandate the competition authority to start a second consultation process and inform the relevant parties in case the initial remedy proposal has been substantially modified by the results of the market testing. Article 75(3) of the Law on Protection of Competition.

← 13.  This is a regular practice followed by the CMA. In one of its most recent decision accepting commitments, in its investigation on the Atlantic Joint Business Agreement between five airlines, the CMA consulted twice on proposed commitments. Following feedback on the first consultation, the companies offered modified measures, which were tested by the CMA in a second public consultation. After further feedback received, the CMA decided to accept the modified commitments in August 2025. See case page: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-of-the-atlantic-joint-business-agreement#case-information

← 14.  For instance, through public hearings or seminars that are not case-related but are specific enough to gather relevant input from stakeholders.

← 15.  In 2025, the OECD Working Party 2 on Competition and Regulation discussed methodologies for assessing the impact of competition authorities’ activities (OECD, 2025[31]). More specifically, in 2022, the Competition Committee held a roundtable on the Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies (OECD, 2023[2]). During both sessions, authorities shared experiences and main findings of their work evaluating interventions, including when imposing remedies.

← 16.  The Uber/Grab merger in the Philippines, presented in Box 11 in the OECD background note on Challenges and Sources of Divergence in Cross-border Merger Review illustrate with a case the consequences that the lack of co-operation between competition authorities and sector regulations may have (OECD, 2024[6]).