This chapter explores social policy preferences in the United Kingdom. Based on data from OECD Risks That Matter 2022, it examines whether people in the United Kingdom want more or less from social protection, and where their priorities lie. Results suggest that, similar to many other OECD countries, many people in the United Kingdom want more support from government, especially women, older respondents and those exposed to economic shocks. Health care services are the priority action area for people in the United Kingdom, followed by long-term care services and old-age pensions.
Attitudes Towards Social Risks and Social Protection in the United Kingdom
Insights from the OECD Risks that Matter Survey
Abstract
This chapter focuses on social policy preferences in the United Kingdom and how they compare to other OECD countries. Based on four questions from OECD Risks That Matter 2022 (Box 4.1), it asks what people in the United Kingdom want from social policy, and where their priorities lie. Questions look at whether respondents would be prepared to see taxes increase in order to receive better support, as well as whether they would like an increase in redistribution from the affluent to those on lower incomes.
Results suggest that as in other OECD countries, many people in the United Kingdom want more support from government. Just over three‑quarters of UK respondents to Risks That Matter say the government should be doing more to secure their economic and social well-being – a rate just slightly above the average, and higher than in most other G7 countries. Even when they are reminded about the taxes they might have to pay, large numbers of UK respondents say that they would like the government to increase spending on social policies. Two-thirds think that the rich should be taxed more to help support the poor. This support for an expansion of social protection mirrors evidence from UK sources that show attitudes have been shifting in favour of taxation, spending, and redistribution for about a decade or so.
Health care services are the priority action area for people in the United Kingdom. Just over three‑quarters of respondents in the United Kingdom say they would like the government to spend more on healthcare, even after being reminded about the taxes they pay. Long-term care services and old-age pensions are the next most popular policy areas, but in absolute terms receive far less support than health. Unemployment sits bottom of the UK policy priority list, reflecting the UK’s comparatively hard (if softening) attitudes towards unemployment benefit recipients.
Policy preferences differ across groups, reflecting in part differences in perceptions and satisfaction with existing social protection arrangements. Women, older respondents, and those exposed to economic shocks are all more likely than others to want more spending and more support from government. In most countries, calls for spending and redistribution tend also to fall with education and income. This is notably not the case in the United Kingdom, where demands for spending and redistribution are just as strong, if not stronger, among people with high education or high incomes. Indeed, in the United Kingdom, support for redistribution is higher among high-income respondents than the cross-country average for low-income respondents.
While people in all countries want more from government, demands tend to be stronger where current social supports are limited. Links between current policy and preferences for future policy are known to be complex, but country comparison shows that people are more likely to call for support and spending when they live in countries with comparatively slim social protection systems. However, links between policy and preferences in specific policy areas are mixed, with respondents not always more likely to call for spending when their country spends comparatively little in a given area. In the United Kingdom, for instance, respondents are relatively unlikely to call for increased pension or unemployment spending despite the comparatively low amounts the country spends in these areas. Health care remains top of the list despite it already being the largest item in UK public social expenditure.
This chapter is built around four main questions from OECD Risks That Matter 2022. The first of these questions focuses on respondents’ felt needs for more support from government:
Do you think the government should be doing less, about the same, or more to ensure your economic and social security and well-being?
Possible response options were: 1. Much less; 2. Less; 3. About the same as now; 4. More; 5. Much more; and 6. Can’t choose.
The next two questions concentrate on preferences for increased government spending in a range of social policy areas. The first provides respondents with a soft reminder about the taxes they might have to pay in order to receive better benefits and services in each area; the second explicitly asks respondents whether they would be happy to pay an additional 2% of their income for it:
Thinking about the taxes you and your family might have to pay and the benefits you and your family might receive, would you like to see the government spend less, spend the same, or spend more in each of the following areas?
Would you be willing to pay an additional 2% of your income in taxes/social contributions to benefit from better provision of and access to:
In both cases, the policy areas (items) given were: Family supports; Education services and supports; Employment supports; Unemployment supports; Income supports; Housing supports; Health; Disability/incapacity-related supports; Old-age pensions; Long-term care services for elderly people; Public safety; and Public transport. The second of the two questions also provided respondents with the following two response options: I would not be willing to spend an extra 2% on any of these things; and Can’t choose/don’t know.
The last question focuses on income redistribution. It asks respondents whether the government should increase taxation on the “rich” with the explicit purpose of better supporting the poor:
Should the government tax the rich more than they currently do in order to support the poor?
Possible response options were: 1. Definitely no; 2. No; 3. Neutral; 4. Yes; 5. Definitely yes; and 6. Can’t choose.
Source: OECD (2023) OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022: Core Questionnaire, https://webfs.oecd.org/Els-com/RtM/OECD-Risks-That-Matter-2022-Core-Questionnaire.pdf.
People in the United Kingdom want more support from government
Respondents from across the OECD overwhelmingly call for more support from government, even at the cost of higher taxes (OECD, 2023[1]). On average, just under three‑quarters (74%) of respondents say that the government should be doing more or much more to protect their economic and social security, rising as high as more than 90% in Chile and Mexico (Figure 4.1). Support for more government spending on social policy remains high even when respondents are asked to consider the taxes they have to pay (Figure 4.2).
Respondents in the United Kingdom express stronger demands for government support than respondents in many of its peer countries. Just over three‑quarters (77%) of UK respondents think that the government should be doing more to secure their economic and social security, with as many as 42% believing they should be doing “much more” (Figure 4.1). Only 3% of UK respondents say that the government should be doing less. The UK’s overall net preference for more government support (58 points) is stronger than in other covered members of the G7 except Italy (61 points), and are far stronger than in Denmark (31 points) and France (32 points) in particular.
Distribution and net balance of responses to the question “Do you think the government should be doing less, about the same, or more to ensure your economic and social security and well-being?”, by country, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, 2022
Note: Net balance is calculated as the average of the responses “Much less” (‑100), “Less” (‑50), “About the same as now” (0), “More” (50) and “Much more” (100), and can range from ‑100 to 100. See Box 4.1 for question wording.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html.
As in many other countries, support for government action falls but remains high when respondents are asked to consider cost. After prompting respondents to think about “the taxes you and your family might have to pay and the benefits you and your family might receive”, Risks That Matter asks whether the government should spend less, the same, or more in 12 policy areas (Figure 4.2). On average across the 12 areas, UK respondents are substantially more likely to want more, rather than less, spending, with the average net preference for more spending standing at 36 points. This is slightly lower than the OECD RTM average (39 points) and roughly similar to Canada (35 points) and Germany (38 points). This broad demand for increased intervention echoes findings from the UK’s British Social Attitudes survey, which show that roughly half of the United Kingdom is in favour of increasing taxes to spend more on “health, education and social benefits” (Curtice, 2022[2]).
Average net balance of responses when asked whether the government should “spend less, spend the same, or spend more” in 12 policy areas, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, 2022
Note: Average net balance is based on a scale measuring respondents’ average response when asked whether the government should “spend less, spend the same, or spend more” in 12 policy areas. The underlying responses are scaled as follows: “Much less” (‑100), “Less” (‑50), “About the same as now” (0), “More” (50) and “Much more” (100). The final scale can range from ‑100 in the case that all respondents in the given country chose “Much less” for all 12 items, to 100 in the case that they chose “Much more” for all items. Estimates exclude respondents with three or fewer valid responses. See Box 4.1 for question wording and Annex A for more detail on scale construction.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html.
Health care services are the clear priority for people in the United Kingdom
Similar to many OECD countries (OECD, 2023[1]), healthcare services are the priority action area for people in the United Kingdom. Just over three‑quarters (76%) of respondents in the United Kingdom say they would like the government to spend more on healthcare, even after being reminded about the taxes they might have to pay (Figure 4.3). This is 10 percentage points higher than in any other policy area. As many as half (50%) of UK respondents say that they’d be prepared to pay an additional 2% of their income in taxes to access better healthcare services, a share well above the OECD RTM average (43%) and the average across members of the G7 (41%) (Figure 4.4). Domestic polling data similarly point to healthcare as the dominant policy priority for many in the United Kingdom (YouGov, 2024[3]).
Long-term care services and old-age pensions are the next most popular policy areas. About two‑thirds (66% and 65%, respectively) of UK respondents say they would like the government to spend more in these areas (Figure 4.3), and just under one‑third (30%) would be prepared to pay an additional 2% of their income in taxes to get it (Figure 4.4). The share of UK respondents prepared to pay more in tax to access better pensions is notably lower than the OECD RTM average (37%), despite people in the United Kingdom being just as concerned about income in old-age as people elsewhere (see Chapter 2 and later in this chapter).
Percentage of respondents who believe that the government should spend more or much more in each policy area, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, the United Kingdom, G7 average and OECD RTM‑27 average, 2022
Note: Data are based on responses to the question “Thinking about the taxes you and your family might have to pay and the benefits you and your family might receive, would you like to see the government spend less, spend the same, or spend more in each of the following areas?”. See Box 4.1 for question wording. G7 refers to the unweighted average across the six available members of the G7 group of major economies.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html.
Family and unemployment supports come bottom of the priority list for people in the United Kingdom. Less than half of UK respondents would like more spending in these two areas (Figure 4.3), with 20% or less willing to pay an additional 2% of their income in taxes for it (Figure 4.4). These shares are similar to the respective averages across G7 members but well below the corresponding OECD RTM averages. This is notable because current UK policy is comparatively limited in both areas: unemployment benefits are among the least generous in the OECD (see Chapter 3), while childcare is more expensive in the United Kingdom than in any other OECD country (OECD, 2023[4]), at least until new entitlements kick in in 2024. However, their low ranking is not unexpected: Brits have historically held comparatively hostile attitudes to unemployment benefit recipients (Box 4.3) and are more likely than people in other (European) countries to see family services like childcare as being outside of government responsibility (Applica sprl et al., 2020[5]).
People in the United Kingdom are more likely than people in most other countries to support increasing taxes on the rich
Taxes on high earners are moderate in the United Kingdom relative to other OECD countries (OECD, 2024[6]) and evidence from OECD RTM and elsewhere (Box 4.2) suggests there is growing appetite among many in the United Kingdom for increasing taxes on the rich if it helps better support the poor. Two-thirds (67%) of UK respondents to Risks That Matter say that the government should tax the rich more to help support the poor, with only 13% stating that they should not (Figure 4.5). In comparative terms, only respondents in Greece and Portugal express stronger support for increasing taxes on the rich, although the United Kingdom is followed closely by respondents from several other major economies, including Canada and Germany. Domestic polling from YouGov points to a similar share of people in the United Kingdom (63% in October 2022) who believe that “the rich are not paying enough and their taxes should be increased” (YouGov, 2024[7]). More generally, attitudes in the United Kingdom have been shifting in favour of tax, spend and redistribution for about a decade or so, perhaps as a reaction to declining real spending on many public benefits and services (Box 4.2).
Percentage of respondents who report being willing to pay an additional 2% of their income in taxes/social contributions to benefit from better provision of and access to supports and services in each policy area, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, the United Kingdom, G7 average and OECD RTM‑27 average, 2022
Note: Data are based on responses to the question “Would you be willing to pay an additional 2% of your income in taxes/social contributions to benefit from better provision of and access to...”. G7 refers to the unweighted average across the six available members of the G7 group of major economies. See Box 4.1 for question wording.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html.
Distribution and net balance of responses to the question “Should the government tax the rich more than they currently do in order to support the poor?”, by country, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, 2022
Note: Net balance is calculated as the average of the responses “Definitely no” (‑100), “No” (‑50), “Neutral” (0), “Yes” (50) and “Definitely yes” (100), and can range from ‑100 to 100. See Box 4.1 for question wording.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html.
There is a long-standing debate in political science on the extent to which public opinion tends to favour established policy structures (the positive feedback model) or oppose them (the negative feedback or public thermostat model). Proponents of the positive feedback model argue that policies often shape public attitudes in self-reinforcing cycles, with existing policy structures influencing opinion in ways that favour preservation of the status quo (Pierson, 1993[8]; Pierson, 1994[9]; Pierson, 2000[10]). Established policies (especially highly inclusive ones) build coalitions of support, leading to policy structures becoming “locked in” (Jordan, 2013[11]). In contrast, those in favour of the public thermostat model suggest that the public has a fairly stable “ideal” level of policy activity and adjust their stated preferences as a counter-cyclical response to current policies: put simply, people are more likely to favour expansion when government support is cut, and to remove their support as it increases (Wlezien, 1995[12]; Curtice, 2010[13]; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010[14]). Busemeyer et al. (2021[15]) argue that the two processes can co‑exist, with attitudes potentially adjusting in a “thermostatic” manner in the short-term but following a consistent (and potentially self-reinforcing) trajectory in the longer term.
In the United Kingdom, attitudes have been shifting in favour of taxation, spending, and redistribution over the past decade or so, in a manner that many interpret as a “thermostatic” response to declining real spending on many public benefits and services (Cooper and Burchardt, 2022[16]; Curtice, 2021[17]; Curtice and Scholes, 2023[18]; Defty, 2024[19]). Spending on benefits and services has fallen since the financial crisis, while targeting and conditionality have increased (see Chapter 1). At the same time, support for government intervention has increased markedly (Cooper and Burchardt, 2022[16]). Data from British Social Attitudes show that the share of the population in favour of increasing taxes to spend more on “health, education and social benefits” has almost doubled since the financial crisis, increasing from 31% in 2010 to 55% in 2023, while the share thinking the government should spend more supporting the poor has increased by just under 10 percentage points (Baumberg Geiger et al., 2023[20]; Curtice and Scholes, 2023[18]). Data from the European Social Survey suggest that over a similar period, British attitudes towards redistribution have shifted from some of the least favourable in Europe to above average for European OECD countries (Figure 4.6). This likely represents the continuation of long-running series of thermostat-like swings in UK public opinion. Hudson et al. (2016[21]) examine British opinion towards public benefits and benefit recipients from the Second World War onwards, finding that attitudes have fluctuated back and forth over the period. Curtice and Scholes (2023[18]) demonstrate how attitudes have moved counter-cyclically in response to public spending since the early 1980s.
The latest swing in favour of tax, spend and redistribution presents UK policy makers with a puzzle. On the one hand, it offers a clear signal that the public would like the government to expand social protection. On the other, both public thermostat theory and the history of British public opinion suggest that expansion can only go so far until the public are likely to push back. Polling data is unfortunately not detailed enough to tell policy makers at exactly what level and for how long they’d like expanded social supports (Defty, 2024[19]). The challenge is to find the “middle ground” that fits best with the British public’s longer-term aspirations for social protection.
Percentage that agree (or agree strongly) with the statement “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”, 15+ year-olds, OECD countries, 2002‑20
Note: Respondents were asked “To what extent do you agree or disagree that… The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. Response options were “Agree strongly”, “Agree”, “Neither agree nor disagree”, “Disagree”, and “Disagree strongly”. The OECD‑15 average refers to the unweighted average across the 15 OECD countries with data available for all 10 waves of the ESS.
Source: OECD estimates based on the European Social Survey (ESS) Rounds 1‑10 (2002‑20), www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
Women and older respondents want more from government
Across OECD countries, including the United Kingdom, calls for support frequently differ between social groups. In-line with both their risk perceptions and thoughts about existing policies, women are more likely than men to want more support from government (Figure 4.7, Panel A) and for the government to spend more on social policies (Figure 4.7, Panel B) (see also Buser et al., (2020[22])). In the United Kingdom, being a woman is associated with an estimated 5‑point increase in the net preference for more government support, although the association falls just short of statistical significance at the 5% level (Figure 4.7, Panel A). Support for intervention also often increases with age: older respondents to Risks That Matter are more likely than younger respondents to want the government to spend more on social policies (Figure 4.7, Panel B) and to believe that the government should tax the rich more to support the poor (Figure 4.7, Panel C). Evidence from the United Kingdom confirms this age gap in redistributive preferences but suggests it has emerged only recently: in the 1980s and early 1990s, it was younger (rather than older) people who were more likely to support redistribution, with differences narrowing through the 1990s and 2000s, and reversing in the 2010s (Curtice et al., 2023[23]). Baumberg Geiger and colleagues (2023[20]) believe this reflects generational effects and the feeding through of cohorts with persistently strong (those born in the 1950s and 1960s) and weak (those born in the 1970s and, more so, the 1980s) preferences for redistribution.
Estimated point change in net preferences for government to do more to ensure economic and social security and well-being (Panel A), for more government spending across 12 social policy areas (Panel B), and for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor (Panel C) per unit change in each independent variable, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, the United Kingdom and OECD RTM‑27 average, 2022
Note: Summary of results from multilevel mixed effect linear models (OECD RTM: Online Annex Tables A4.17.1, A4.18.1 and A4.20.1, Models 4, 5 and 6) and country-specific linear regression models (GBR: Online Annex Tables A4.17.2, A4.18.2 and A4.20.2, Models 4, 5 and 6). The dependent variables are the net balance of responses to the question “Do you think the government should be doing less, about the same, or more to ensure your economic and social security and well-being?” (Panel A), the average net balance when asked whether the government should “spend less, spend the same, or spend more” in 12 policy areas (Panel B), and the net balance of responses to the question “Should the government tax the rich more than they currently do in order to support the poor?” (Panel C). Error bars set at the 95% confidence interval. See Box 4.1 for question wording and Annex A for more detail on data and methods.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html.
In the United Kingdom, people in advantaged socio‑economic positions are just as likely, if not more likely, to call for more spending and more redistribution
While far from the only driver (Fong, 2001[24]; Cavaillé and Trump, 2015[25]), economic self-interest is known to be one factor affecting preferences for intervention and redistribution. All else equal, individuals with stronger skills, on higher incomes, and/or in more secure positions financially are expected to prefer lower taxes and lower spending (Iversen and Soskice, 2001[26]; Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger, 2012[27]; Durante, Putterman and van der Weele, 2014[28]; OECD, 2021[29]; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011[30]). This includes those with higher education who, despite often expressing a range of progressive social attitudes, tend in many countries to be less supportive of redistribution than their less-educated peers (Gelepithis and Giani, 2022[31]).
The United Kingdom might be different from other countries in this regard. Evidence from Risks That Matter and elsewhere (Cooper and Burchardt, 2022[16]; Baumberg Geiger et al., 2023[20]; YouGov, 2024[7]) suggests that in the United Kingdom, demands for more spending and more redistribution tend to be just as strong, if not stronger, among people in advantaged socio‑economic positions as in disadvantaged positions. Results from Risks That Matter show that calls for support, spending and redistribution vary little with income or education in the United Kingdom, especially after controlling for other individual-level characteristics (Figure 4.7, Panels A, B and C). This stands in contrast to most other OECD countries, as well as the RTM sample as a whole, where respondents with higher education or higher incomes are less likely to call for support, spending and redistribution. The underlying difference lies in comparatively strong calls for support and redistribution among people in socio‑economically advantaged positions. For example, high-income UK respondents express a level of support for increasing taxes on the rich (40 points) that is stronger not only than high-income respondents in most other countries, but also than the cross-country average for low-income respondents (38 points) (Figure 4.8).
Net balance of responses to the question “Should the government tax the rich more than they currently do in order to support the poor?”, by income level, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, 2022
Note: Net balance is calculated as the average of the responses “Definitely no” (‑100), “No” (‑50), “Neutral” (0), “Yes” (50) and “Definitely yes” (100), and can range from ‑100 to 100. Respondents from “low income” households are those in households with equivalised disposable incomes in the bottom three deciles of the national disposable income distribution, and respondents from “high income” households are those with incomes in the top three deciles of the national disposable income distribution. See Box 4.1 for question wording.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html.
Those who report recent receipt of public benefits are more likely to call for government action, in both the United Kingdom as elsewhere. Controlling for other characteristics, including education and income, respondents who report having received at least one public cash benefit in the past 12 months express greater demands for government support (Figure 4.7, Panel A), are more likely to want the government to spend more on social policies (Figure 4.7, Panel B), and are more likely to call for the government to increase taxes on the rich to support the poor (Figure 4.7, Panel C). Given that benefit recipients also report greater satisfaction with benefits and stronger perceived fairness in benefit receipt (Chapter 3), one explanation is that recent recipients may be more likely to believe that increases in government spending will be put to good use.
Calls for support are greater among people exposed to economic insecurity
Over and above objective socio‑economic status, people who have recently experienced financial shocks – and those who are worried that they soon might – tend to express a greater need for support. Evidence from both Europe and the United States suggests that personal experience of economic strain or an economic shock, as well as worries about personal economic shocks, can strengthen preferences for spending and redistribution (Blekesaune, 2013[32]; Margalit, 2013[33]; Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger, 2012[27]; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011[30]). As noted in Chapter 2, worries about economic security were widespread when Risks That Matter went into the field in October 2022, not least in the United Kingdom, where as many as half of respondents reported that their finances had worsened over the past year (see Box 2.2). Results from Risks That Matter show that respondents who believe that their households finances have deteriorated in the past year also express stronger calls for government support (Figure 4.7, Panel A), for increased spending on social policies (Figure 4.7, Panel B), and for increased taxes on the rich (Figure 4.7, Panel C), even after controlling for income and other characteristics. In the United Kingdom, a deterioration in household finances is associated with a 19‑point increase in net preferences for increasing taxes on the rich – one of the largest effects among the 27 covered countries, and well above the OECD RTM average (8 points) (Online Annex Table A4.20.2, Model 5). Respondents who believe that their jobs are insecure also often express stronger calls for government support (Figure 4.7, Panel A) and for increased spending on social policies (Figure 4.7, Panel B) than respondents in (self-reported) secure jobs, although notably not in the United Kingdom.
Those who perceive injustice in benefit receipt are less likely to call for more redistribution – but still want better support from government
Faith and confidence in government and the social protection system also shape calls for support, spending, and redistribution (OECD, 2021[29]). Focusing on measures relating to the tax and public healthcare systems, Svallfors (2013[34]) finds that perceptions of the “quality” of government can influence attitudes to taxes and spending, with those believing that the government is fair and efficient also preferring higher taxes and higher spending. Going one step further, Rothstein, Samanni and Teorel (2012[35]) find that public confidence in the fairness and efficiency of government is central to size and scope of social spending.
Results from Risks That Matter point in a mostly similar direction. In the United Kingdom, as across the OECD RTM sample as a whole, respondents who perceive injustice in the public benefit system (those who agree that “many people receive public benefits without deserving them”) are less likely to call for redistribution (Figure 4.7, Panel C) and are generally less likely to say that they’d pay more in taxes for improved benefits and services (e.g. Online Annex Tables A4.19a.1‑A4.19k.1, Model 6). Not surprisingly, people are less likely to ask for higher taxes and spending if they do not think the funds will be used fairly. At the same time, however, these respondents still often want support from government. Indeed, all else equal, respondents who not agree that they receive their fair share of benefits, who believe others receive benefits they do not deserve, and who do not feel listened-to by government all express stronger (not weaker) calls for more social and economic support from government (Figure 4.7, Panel A), albeit with associations in the United Kingdom falling just short of statistical significance at the 5% level.
Calls for additional government support are stronger in countries where existing support is limited...
Links between current policy structures and preferences for future policy are known to be complex (Box 4.2) (Busemeyer, Abrassart and Nezi, 2021[15]; van Oorschot et al., 2022[36]) but evidence from Risks That Matter suggests that at the most basic level, people often want more support from government when they live in countries with comparatively slim social protection systems. Leaving aside the different potential feedback mechanisms, and even after controlling for population composition and GDP per capita, country comparison suggests that respondents in countries that spend less on social issues tend to call more strongly for additional support from government (Figure 4.9, Panel A; r = ‑0.84; Online Annex Table A4.17.1, Model 11) as well as, to a lesser extent, for additional spending on social policies (Figure 4.9, Panel B, r = ‑0.56; Online Annex Table A4.18s.1, Model 11). Calls for both support and spending also tend to be stronger in countries where benefits are less tightly targeted towards the poor (Online Annex Table A4.17.1‑ A4.18s.1, Models 17 and 18).
Social expenditure (public and mandatory private) per head (USD 2015 PPP), (adjusted) net balance of responses to the question “Do you think the government should be doing less, about the same, or more to ensure your economic and social security and well-being?”, and (adjusted) average net balance of responses when asked whether the government should “spend less, spend the same, or spend more” in 12 policy areas
Note: Estimates based on results from multilevel mixed effect linear models (Online Annex Tables A4.17.1‑A4.18s.1, Model 11). Adjusted estimates account for between-country differences in demographic- (sex, age, and parenthood) and basic socio‑economic characteristics (educational attainment, employment status, and self-reported benefit receipt), plus GDP per capita. Social expenditure (public and mandatory private) per head is controlled for but not included in the adjusted estimates. All estimates are post-hoc corrected for the share of respondents answering “Can’t choose”. Data on total social expenditure per head refer to 2019. For readability, data labels used for selected countries only. See Box 4.1 for question wording and Annex A for more detail on data and methods.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html, and OECD Social Expenditure Database, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/social-expenditure-database-socx.html.
For the United Kingdom, current spending is likely one factor feeding into policy preferences. Box 4.2 discusses how demand for spending and redistribution has grown in the United Kingdom as a response to declining social spending and increased conditionality over the past decade or so (Cooper and Burchardt, 2022[16]; Curtice, 2021[17]; Curtice and Scholes, 2023[18]). More generally, even in the absence of recent cuts, respondents in a country with a mid-sized, tightly targeted system like the UK’s (Chapter 1) might be expected to express a relatively strong preference for expanded support.
… but low spending in a given policy area is not always matched by strong demands for more spending
Links between current spending and preferences for future spending in specific areas are mixed. In some (but not all) areas, respondents are more likely to call for expansion when they live in a country that spends relatively little in that area. For example, respondents are more likely to say they’d like increased spending on housing when they live in countries that spend comparatively little on housing supports (Online Annex Table A4.18f.1, Model 20), increased spending on employment supports when they live in countries that spend comparatively little on active labour market policies (Online Annex Table A4.18c.1, Model 20), and increased spending on unemployment when they live in countries that spend comparatively little on unemployment supports – although notably not in the United Kingdom (Box 4.3). However, this is not the case everywhere, and in several policy areas (e.g. disability supports, health services, and pensions), calls for expansion seem largely uncorrelated with current spending (Online Annex Table A4.18h.1, Model 20; Online Annex Table A4.18g.1, Model 20; Online Annex Table A4.18i.1, Model 20). On pensions, for example, calls for more spending are often not much stronger in countries that spend relatively little (e.g. Mexico, Türkiye) than in some countries that spend comparatively large amounts (e.g. Austria, France, Italy) (Figure 4.10, Panel A; r = ‑0.27), especially after controlling for population composition and GDP per capita (Figure 4.10, Panel B; r = 0.27).
In the United Kingdom, there is little to suggest that respondents prioritise areas in which the country spends comparatively little. Indeed, when put in comparative perspective, respondents provide a certain degree of implicit support for the current distribution of spending across policy areas. Take pensions for example: relative to other OECD countries, the United Kingdom spends comparatively little on public pensions (Chapter 1) and yet support for increased spending, while substantial, remains lower than in many other countries (see Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4). This possibly reflects the comparatively widespread view that pensioners’ standards of living are not the responsibility of government alone (Hadler, Eder and Mayer, 2019[37]), as well as the relatively moderate role played by the public pension system and the UK’s strong reliance on private pensions (OECD, 2023[38]). In a similar vein, the United Kingdom stands out among OECD countries as spending little on unemployment support (Chapter 1) but increased spending on unemployment continues to come bottom of the UK priority list (Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4; see Box 4.3). Health care remains top of the list despite it already being the largest item in UK public social expenditure (see Chapter 1).
Social expenditure (public and mandatory private) per head on old-age and survivors (USD 2015 PPP) and net balance of responses to the question “Thinking about the taxes you and your family might have to pay and the benefits you and your family might receive, would you like to see the government spend less, spend the same, or spend more in each of the following areas? Old-age pensions”, before and after adjusting for population composition and GDP per capita
Note: Estimates based on results from multilevel mixed effect linear models (Online Annex Tables A4.18i.1, Model 20). Net balance is calculated as the average of the responses “Much less” (‑100), “Less” (‑50), “About the same as now” (0), “More” (50) and “Much more” (100), and can range from ‑100 to 100. Adjusted estimates account for between-country differences in demographic- (sex, age, and parenthood) and basic socio‑economic characteristics (educational attainment, employment status, and self-reported benefit receipt). Social expenditure is controlled for but not included in the adjusted estimates. All estimates are post-hoc corrected for the share of respondents answering “Can’t choose”. Data on social expenditure refer to 2019. For readability, data labels used for selected countries only. See Box 4.1 for question wording and Annex A for more detail on data and methods.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html, and OECD Social Expenditure Database, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/social-expenditure-database-socx.html.
People want more support and more redistribution when they live in countries where concern about inequality is more widespread
Away from policy, a range of additional economic and political factors are thought to play at least some role in shaping preferences for social protection (van Oorschot et al., 2022[36]; Mengel and Weidenholzer, 2023[39]).
Economic inequality, and its link with the demand for redistribution, is one of the most widely studied factors (van Oorschot et al., 2022[36]). Early work on the topic argued that calls for redistribution should rise with inequality, largely because the average voter will have more to gain from redistribution when they live in a less equal society (Meltzer and Richard, 1981[40]; Jæger, 2013[41]; Schmidt-Catran, 2016[42]). This so-called “Meltzer-Richard” model has received only mixed empirical support, in part because several high-inequality societies (including the United Kingdom) continue to vote for governments that redistribute comparatively little (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001[43]; Kenworthy and McCall, 2007[44]; Iversen and Soskice, 2009[45]; Mengel and Weidenholzer, 2023[39]). More recent work, including by the OECD (2021[29]), has built on Meltzer and Richard by suggesting that it is not inequality itself that matters for policy preferences, but rather the public’s perceptions of (and preferences for) inequality: changes in objective inequality are associated with changes in demand for redistribution, but only as long as changes in peoples’ image of and concern about inequality move in the same direction (OECD, 2021[29]; Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018[46]).
Results from Risks That Matter 2022 support the argument that preferences for redistribution may be linked to public perceptions of and concern about inequality. Calls for spending and redistribution are no more or less frequent in countries with higher levels of income inequality (Online Annex Tables A4.17.1‑A4.20.1, Model 9) but are more common in countries where concerns about inequality are stronger (Figure 4.12; Online Annex Tables A4.17.1‑A4.20.1, Model 19): people in countries (like Chile and Portugal) where large numbers believe differences in income are “too high” tend to express stronger support for increased spending on social policies (Figure 4.12, Panel A; r = 0.52) and increased taxes on the rich (Figure 4.12, Panel B; r = 0.54). In the United Kingdom, income inequality is comparatively high (OECD, 2024[47]) but concern about inequality (as measured by the share that believes differences in income are “too high”) is only moderate (OECD, 2023[48]). Calls for redistribution are stronger than might be expected for a country with its level of concern (Figure 4.12, Panel B).
It is not because of confidence or satisfaction that unemployment benefit sits bottom of the UK’s policy priority list. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this report, unemployment benefits are comparatively limited in the United Kingdom, and many Brits lack confidence in the government’s ability to provide adequate income support if they were to lose their job. Many (although not all) countries that spend relatively little on unemployment benefits (e.g. Chile, Türkiye) have comparatively large numbers of respondents calling for increased spending (Figure 4.11). Only a minority do so in the United Kingdom.
One possible reason relates to the perceived deservingness of unemployment benefit claimants in the United Kingdom. Attitudes towards deservingness vary between countries and across different types of recipients, with the unemployed often ranking towards the bottom (van Oorschot, 2006[49]). Building out from van Oorschot’s influential CARIN (Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need) deservingness model, several studies have found that solidarity with the unemployed is frequently weaker than with other groups, such as the elderly or people with disabilities (van Oorschot, 2006[49]; Roosma, van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014[50]). This is particularly the case in the United Kingdom, where at least until recently comparatively many people have considered misuse of unemployment benefits to be wide‑spread, unemployed people’s standards of living to be comparatively high, and the government to have comparatively little responsibility for ensuring the unemployed have access to a “reasonable” income (Applica sprl et al., 2020[5]; van Oorschot et al., 2022[36]).
There are signs that attitudes to unemployment benefit recipients are softening in the United Kingdom (see also Box 4.2). Baumberg Geiger et al. (2023[20]) show that the share of the population who agree that “most people on the dole [unemployment benefit] are fiddling [cheating]” has almost halved since the mid 2000s, while the share that agree that “most unemployed could find a job if they wanted one” has fallen too. Support for increases to unemployment benefit has almost doubled over the same period. Nonetheless, in relative terms support for expanded unemployment benefits remains low, both in comparison to other countries and in comparison to other policy areas inside the United Kingdom.
Social expenditure per head on unemployment (USD 2015 PPP) and net balance of responses to the question “Thinking about the taxes you and your family might have to pay and the benefits you and your family might receive, would you like to see the government spend less, spend the same, or spend more in each of the following areas? Unemployment supports”, before and after adjusting for population composition and GDP per capita
Note: Estimates based on results from multilevel mixed effect linear models (Online Annex Tables A4.18d.1, Model 20). Net balance is calculated as the average of the responses “Much less” (‑100), “Less” (‑50), “About the same as now” (0), “More” (50) and “Much more” (100), and can range from ‑100 to 100. Adjusted estimates account for between-country differences in demographic- (sex, age, and parenthood) and basic socio‑economic characteristics (educational attainment, employment status, and self-reported benefit receipt). Social expenditure is controlled for but not included in the adjusted estimates. All estimates are post-hoc corrected for the share of respondents answering “Can’t choose”. Data on social expenditure refer to 2019. For readability, data labels used for selected countries only.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html, and OECD Social Expenditure Database, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/social-expenditure-database-socx.html.
Percent who believe that differences in income are too high or far too high, (adjusted) average net balance of responses when asked whether the government should “spend less, spend the same, or spend more” in 12 policy areas, and (adjusted) net balance of responses to the question “Should the government tax the rich more than they currently do in order to support the poor?”
Note: Estimates based on results from multilevel mixed effect linear models (Online Annex Tables A4.18.1 and A4.20.1, Model 19). Adjusted estimates account for between-country differences in demographic- (sex, age, and parenthood) and basic socio‑economic characteristics (educational attainment, employment status, and self-reported benefit receipt). Concern about inequality is controlled for but not included in the adjusted estimates. Panel A: Net balance is calculated as the average of the responses “Much less” (‑100), “Less” (‑50), “About the same as now” (0), “More” (50) and “Much more” (100), and can range from ‑100 to 100. Panel B: Net balance is calculated as the average of the responses “Definitely no” (‑100), “No” (‑50), “Neutral” (0), “Yes” (50) and “Definitely yes” (100), and can range from ‑100 to 100. For readability, data labels used for selected countries only. See Box 4.1 for question wording and Annex A for more detail on data and methods.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html, and (OECD, 2023[51]), “Working hand in hand? Exploring people’s views of the role of different actors in fighting inequality”, https://doi.org/10.1787/dbd54315-en.
A related factor is social mobility and beliefs about the determinants of (or barriers to) social and economic success. By and large, research finds that support for redistribution tends to be weaker when people believe more strongly in meritocracy, and stronger when people believe that success in life comes from factors beyond individual control (Fong, 2001[24]; Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018[52]; OECD, 2021[29]). In this instance, results from Risks That Matter are only partly consistent with the literature. Using the perceived importance of hard work as a proxy for beliefs in meritocracy (Mijs, 2021[53]; Mijs et al., 2022[54]; OECD, 2021[29]), results suggest that demand for redistribution tends to be stronger (not weaker) in countries where people more often believe in meritocracy (Figure 4.13, Panel A; r = 0.42; Online Annex Table A4.20.1, Model 20). At the same time, and more in line with expectations, demand for redistribution also tends to be stronger in countries where people more often recognise structural inequalities (Figure 4.13, Panel B; r = 0.49; Online Annex Table A4.20.1, Model 21), as measured by the share that consider coming from a wealthy family as important for getting ahead in life (Mijs, 2021[53]; Mijs et al., 2022[54]; OECD, 2021[29]). Shaping both associations are a group of Nordic and Baltic countries (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Norway) where beliefs in the importance of hard work, beliefs in the importance of a wealthy family, and demands for further redistribution are all comparatively low.
Percentage who believe hard work is very important or essential for getting ahead in life, percentage who believe that coming from a wealthy family is very important or essential for getting ahead in life, and net balance of responses to the question “Should the government tax the rich more than they currently do in order to support the poor?”
Note: Estimates based on results from multilevel mixed effect linear models (Online Annex Tables A4.20.1, Models 20 and 21). Net balance is calculated as the average of the responses “Definitely no” (‑100), “No” (‑50), “Neutral” (0), “Yes” (50) and “Definitely yes” (100), and can range from ‑100 to 100. Both panels use adjusted estimates accounting for between-country differences in demographic- (sex, age, and parenthood) and basic socio‑economic characteristics (educational attainment, employment status, and self-reported benefit receipt), plus GDP per capita. Percent believing hard work (coming from a wealthy family) is very important or essential is controlled for but not included in the adjusted estimates. For readability, data labels used for selected countries only. See Box 4.1 for question wording and Annex A for more detail on scale construction.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html, and (OECD, 2023[48]), “Hard work, privilege or luck? Exploring people’s views of what matters most to get ahead in life”, https://doi.org/10.1787/e1903ab2-en.
Links with economic development are not clear, but economic (in)security may shape calls for support, spending and redistribution
In line with its role in shaping perceived risk (Chapter 2) and satisfaction with social protection (Chapter 3), economic development may also influence policy preferences (van Oorschot et al., 2022[36]). Looking across countries, respondents in less wealthy economies often issue the strongest calls for greater government support, and those in the wealthiest some of the weakest (Figure 4.14, Panel A; r = ‑0.63; Online Annex Table A4.17.1, Model 4), especially if Ireland is excluded as an outlier (Online Annex Table A4.17.1, Model 7; r = ‑0.79). However, this association may be driven by the fact that the OECD’s wealthier economies often already have more expansive social protection systems: after controlling for public social expenditure, any correlation between GDP per capita and calls for government support disappears and if anything, reverses (Figure 4.14, Panel B; r = 0.36; Online Annex Table A4.17.1, Model 11).
Log GDP per capita (USD 2015 PPP) and net balance of responses to the question “Do you think the government should be doing less, about the same, or more to ensure your economic and social security and well-being?”, before and after adjusting for population composition and public social expenditure per head
Note: Estimates based on results from multilevel mixed effect linear models (Online Annex Tables A4.17.1, Models 4 and 11). Net balance is calculated as the average of the responses “Much less” (‑100), “Less” (‑50), “About the same as now” (0), “More” (50) and “Much more” (100), and can range from ‑100 to 100. Adjusted estimates account for between-country differences in demographic- (sex, age, and parenthood) and basic socio‑economic characteristics (educational attainment, employment status, and self-reported benefit receipt), plus public social expenditure per head. Log GDP per capita is controlled for but not included in the adjusted estimates. All estimates are post-hoc corrected for the share of respondents answering “Can’t choose”. For readability, data labels used for selected countries only. See Box 4.1 for question wording and Annex A for more detail on scale construction.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html and OECD National Accounts, www.oecd.org/sdd/na/.
Independent of economic development, economic security and the experience of economic shocks can also shape attitudes (Margalit, 2019[55]) (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011[30]). As already noted in this chapter, individuals who have recently experienced financial shocks tend to be more supportive of government intervention and redistribution (Blekesaune, 2013[32]; Margalit, 2013[33]; Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger, 2012[27]; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011[30]). The same applies at the country level, at least for redistribution: calls for increased taxes on the rich tend to be stronger in countries where larger numbers of respondents report a deterioration in their household finances in the past year (Online Annex Table A4.20.1, Model 5). Perceived insecurity may be important for the United Kingdom in particular, given the comparatively high share of UK respondents reporting deteriorating household finances over the previous year (Chapter 1).
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