This chapter provides an introduction and overview of the report, offering policy background to the report, an overview of the United Kingdom’s approach to social protection and a sketch of recent trends in social spending. The remainder highlights key findings from the report’s three main chapters. Overall, results point to a population in the United Kingdom that have comparatively strong concerns about social risks and would like the government to spend more on social policies.
Attitudes Towards Social Risks and Social Protection in the United Kingdom
Insights from the OECD Risks that Matter Survey
Abstract
By 2022, the United Kingdom was feeling the effects of a decade of falling social spending. Never one of the OECD’s largest spenders on social programmes, UK social expenditure had fallen over the previous decade as successive governments looked to rebalance public budgets in the wake of the financial crisis. In real terms, on the eve of the pandemic in 2019, per head spending on social issues was close to USD 1 000 lower than at its peak in 2012. Even at the height of the pandemic it remained lower than in the early 2010s both in Dollar terms and as a share of GDP (OECD, 2024[1]).
Going forward, some level of change to the UK welfare state is inevitable. Estimates by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), the UK’s independent fiscal institution, indicate that spending on social benefits is set to rise as a share of GDP even in the absence of major policy change, largely due to demographics and an expected increase in incapacity benefit claimants (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024[2]). Other planned or in-progress reforms, such as the expansion of government-funded childcare, rolling out from Spring 2024, could also raise social spending. Still, the exact shape and size of UK social protection remains at least partially up for discussion.
Where do people in the United Kingdom want social protection to go from here? Are they happy with what they currently receive from government? Would they like social supports to be scaled back further, or might they prefer an expansion of support, even if it means increased taxes or cuts to government spending elsewhere? And how do these preferences vary across groups?
This report examines public perceptions of social protection and attitudes towards the future of social policy in the United Kingdom. Drawing on data from OECD Risks That Matter 2022 (Box 1.1), a multi-country survey on perceptions of social protection systems and social policy preferences, it examines the strength of concerns in the United Kingdom about social and economic risks, and which risks worry them the most (Chapter 2). It also asks how satisfied people are with their access to public services and benefits, as well as their confidence in government income support should they lose their income (Chapter 3), and whether and where they would like more government spending in future (Chapter 4). Details on the data and methods used throughout the report are given in Annex A.
Results suggest that people in the United Kingdom share relatively strong concerns about social and economic risks, especially in comparison to their peers in several G7 countries (e.g. Canada, Germany, the United States) and other wealthy OECD economies (e.g. Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands), and are largely dissatisfied with social protection. In the United Kingdom, as also in many other OECD countries, many people feel that public benefits are both insufficient and hard to access, and few believe the government would provide adequate income support should they lose their income. Looking to the future, there is strong support for an expansion of social protection. Many say they would like the government to increase spending on social policies, with healthcare (including long-term care) the highest priority. Two-thirds think that the rich should be taxed more to help support the poor.
The OECD Risks that Matter (RTM) survey is a cross-national survey examining people’s perceptions of the social and economic risks they face, how well they think their government addresses those risks, and what preferences they have for social protection going forward. This is the most extensive global survey of perceptions of, and preferences for, social protection.
The RTM survey builds and expands on standard data sources like administrative records and labour force surveys, which provide more traditional data on issues such as people’s labour force participation and earnings, their health status, and their level of education. The RTM microdata cover a majority of OECD countries and are updated every two years. Existing cross-national surveys in the area of perceptions of risk, including certain rounds of the International Social Survey Programme or the European Commission’s Eurobarometer survey, are conducted less frequently and/or only in specific regions.
The first RTM survey was conducted in spring and autumn of 2018, covering 18‑70 year‑olds in 21 countries. The second wave ran in September-October 2020, covering 18‑64 year‑olds in 25 OECD countries, and the third wave – presented here – was fielded in October-December 2022, covering 18‑64 year‑olds from 27 countries. The countries participating in the 2022 wave are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. Member countries opt in to participate.
The questionnaire was developed by the OECD Secretariat in collaboration with OECD member country Delegates and stakeholders participating in an advisory group workshop in April 2022, and subsequently translated into national languages.
RTM uses non-probability samples recruited via the Internet and over the phone, and respondents take part in the survey online. The sampling criteria is based on quotas for gender, age group, education level, income level, and employment status. Survey weights are used to correct for under- or over-representation based on these five criteria. The target and weighted sample is 1 000 respondents per country. Respondents are paid a nominal sum of around one to two euros. The survey contractor is Bilendi Ltd (formerly Respondi Ltd).
RTM is overseen by the OECD Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Committee (ELSAC) and managed in the OECD Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. Financial support for the 2022 survey was provided through voluntary contributions by participating OECD member countries, and specific modules were funded by the OECD Centre for Well-Being, Inclusion, Sustainability and Equal Opportunity (WISE), Kings College London, and the University of Stavanger.
The scope and design of social protection differs considerably across OECD countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990[3]; Castles and Mitchell, 1992[4]; Danforth, 2014[5]). Some countries, such as the Nordic countries, provide expansive protection, often in the form of universal benefit and service provision, and usually in tandem with strong active employment supports that encourage labour participation. Others (e.g. Germany) operate social insurance‑based systems with entitlements more tightly linked to previous employment and earnings, or market-based systems (e.g. the United States) that emphasise self-sufficiency through employment and provide benefits only on a comparatively targeted basis.
The United Kingdom, like other Anglophone OECD countries, runs a largely market-based social protection system. Individual responsibility is encouraged, with public support provided mostly through targeted (often means-tested) social assistance programmes. The main exception is the UK’s universal public healthcare service (the National Health Service, or NHS), which in both eligibility and financing resembles a Nordic-style public service (Bambra, 2007[6]). Contribution-based entitlements make up a small and declining share of the working-age benefit mix (Brewer and Murphy, 2023[7]), and unlike many other OECD countries, especially in Europe, benefit payment rates are rarely linked to past earnings (Timmins, 2023[8]; OECD, 2024[9]). Many working-age benefits come with strong activation requirements in the form of job-search and earnings-increase commitments.
Compared to other OECD countries, the United Kingdom spends moderate amounts on social protection (Figure 1.1). At USD (2015) 8 600 per person (or 19.5% of GDP) in 2019, public social expenditure is close to the OECD average (USD 9 100 per person), though this average includes less wealthy OECD countries like Chile, Mexico and Türkiye. The UK’s spending is well below the levels seen in countries with the most expansive public systems, like Denmark (USD 15 000 per person) and Norway (USD 15 600 per person), as well as France (USD 13 200 per person) and Germany (USD 12 800 per person). Mandatory private social expenditure, a major source of social spending in countries such as Switzerland and the United States (OECD, 2023[10]), plays only a minor role in the United Kingdom (USD 270 per person). Voluntary private social expenditure is more important (USD 2 500 per person), with occupational pension schemes a major component of the old-age pension system (see below). Total net social expenditure, which accounts for both public and private social expenditure plus any amounts reclaimed through taxes paid by benefit recipients, comes to USD 10 200, slightly above the OECD-wide average (USD 9 500). Among the G7 group of major economies, only Japan (USD 10 100) and Italy (USD 9 600) spend less.
Social expenditure per capita (public, mandatory private, and voluntary private), expenditure reclaimed through the tax system, and net total social expenditure per capita, USD 2015 PPP, 2019
Note: Private social expenditure refers to social benefits delivered through the private sector which involve an element of compulsion, inter-personal redistribution or fiscal support for participation. It can be mandatory (stipulated by law) or voluntary. Examples of mandatory private social expenditure include compulsory private health insurance, pension benefits based on compulsory contributions, and sickness payments to employees by employers. Examples of voluntary private social expenditure includes pension benefits based on past voluntary contributions, employer-provided childcare support, and benefits provided by charitable non-government organisations (NGOs). “Reclaimed” expenditure refers to the direct and indirect taxes paid by recipients of public/private benefits.
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/social-expenditure-database-socx.html.
As in many other OECD countries, healthcare and pensions dominate UK social spending (Figure 1.2). At just under USD (2015) 3 500 per person in 2019, health is by far the largest public social spending item. The vast majority of this spending runs through the NHS, with small amounts directed to related bodies such as the UK Health Security Agency, the UK’s public health body (Harker, 2019[11]). Public spending on old-age support is lower at USD 2 500 per person, but this is complemented by substantial voluntary private spending (USD 2 200 per person). The latter is made up in almost equal amounts by public- and private sector occupational pension spending (both USD 1 100 per person) and represents the fourth highest level of voluntary private social spending on pensions in the OECD, after only Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States (OECD, 2024[1]). Overall, on both health and old age support, total UK social spending (including public, mandatory private and voluntary private spending) is similar to the OECD average but well below the average across the G7.
Social expenditure per capita by branch, public, mandatory private and voluntary private, the United Kingdom, G7 total and OECD total, USD 2015 PPP, 2019
Note: Branches are sorted by the level of public and mandatory private expenditure per capita in the United Kingdom. “ALMP” refers to Active Labour Market Programmes. See Adema and Fron (2019[12]) for details on the scope and coverage of each branch. G7 refers to the weighted average across the seven members of the G7 group of major economies.
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/social-expenditure-database-socx.html.
One area in which the United Kingdom stands out is in the comparatively small amounts spent on unemployment support (Figure 1.2). At USD (2015 PPP) 35 per person in 2019, public spending on unemployment in the United Kingdom is the fourth lowest in the OECD, less than a fifth of the G7 average, and not much more than a tenth of the OECD average. UK unemployment benefits are low by international standards and replace a comparatively small share of earnings for most workers (OECD, 2024[13]), in large part because payments are flat-rate rather than earnings-related (Brewer and Murphy, 2023[7]). One of the two major unemployment benefits, income‑based Jobseeker’s Allowance, is also being phased out, with qualifying new claimants now instead entitled to a more general means-tested income‑support benefit through the Universal Credit programme.
Like many (but not all) OECD countries, the UK’s public benefit system is aimed mostly towards lower income groups. In some OECD countries (e.g. Greece, Italy, Spain), high income groups are the main beneficiaries of public support. In these systems, benefits are closely linked to past earnings and there are large gaps in protection for low-income groups (OECD, 2022[14]). In others, benefit receipt is more evenly spread across the income distribution (e.g. France, Japan, the United States), or concentrated strictly on the poorest (e.g. Australia, Finland, New Zealand). In the United Kingdom, sharp means tests and the widespread use of flat-rate payments mean that lower-income groups are the main recipients of public benefits: the poorest fifth of the UK population receives about one‑third (32.7%) of cash transfers to working-age households, well above the OECD average of just under one‑quarter (23.4%), while the richest fifth receive just 6% (OECD, 2019[15]).
Overall, the UK’s social protection system does a moderate amount to reduce poverty and hardship and produces comparatively moderate final poverty rates. Income poverty reflects both the distribution of market income and the effectiveness of policy efforts to redistribute that income. In the United Kingdom, relative income poverty rates fall by 16.9 percentage points (from 28.6% to 11.7%) after accounting for the taxes paid and benefits received by households (OECD, 2024[16]). This is similar to the OECD average (16.2 percentage points, from 27.6% to 11.4%). As in many countries, the elderly population (65+ year-olds) faces the highest poverty risk (14.5%), but only just, and poverty rates are generally similar across age groups. The child (0‑ to 17‑year‑old) poverty rate (12.7%) sits slightly above the OECD average (12.2%).
UK social spending has fallen over the past decade and a half
Social protection systems are not fixed, and governments can and do make real changes to the way their systems operate. In the United Kingdom, cuts to many social programmes and rising conditionality in the benefit system mean that social spending has fallen over the past decade and a half (Figure 1.3). Having more than doubled between the early 1990s and late 2000s, total public and mandatory private spending plateaued in real terms in the years following of the financial crisis and fell for seven years straight through the 2010s. By 2019, spending per head was about 8.5% (or USD 840) lower than at its peak in 2012. Spending jumped in 2020 but this was due almost entirely to COVID‑19‑related increases in health spending. UK-only figures show that per household spending on social benefits (“welfare”), which excludes healthcare and some other public social services, remained lower in 2022‑23 than a decade earlier than in 2013‑14 (DWP, 2024[17]).
The United Kingdom is one of only a few OECD countries that saw real terms decreases to social spending over the 2010s. In Dollar terms, only three OECD countries (Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom) spent less per head on social issues in 2019 than they did in 2010; as a percentage of GDP, only Hungary and Ireland saw social spending fall by more (OECD, 2024[1]). Moreover, by historical standards, the decline in social spending coincided with a period of sustained high taxation in the UK, even if the tax burden remained below the OECD average throughout (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2023[18]). Tax as a share of GDP has and is forecast to continue rise through the 2020s, due in large part to freezes to income tax thresholds (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024[2]).
Except for healthcare, few areas of UK social spending have escaped real-terms cuts since the early 2010s (Figure 1.3). Spending on families has fallen the most, following the introduction of the High Income Child Benefit Charge (HICBC), a tax charge that applies to Child Benefit recipients, or their partners, who have an adjusted net income of GBP 60 000 or more.1 Spending on old-age support has notably fallen too. Drivers include a decline in spending on housing benefits for people over state pension age due to increasing home ownership, and a decline in means-tested income support for pensioners (pension credit) due to growth in pensioner income (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024[19]). From an accounting perspective, there has also been a reallocation of funds towards “other social policy areas” as Universal Credit, a general means-tested income‑support programme, has taken on an increasingly important role in benefit provision.
Social expenditure per capita (public and mandatory private) by branch, the United Kingdom, USD 2015 PPP, 1990‑2020
Note: Private social expenditure refers to social benefits delivered through the private sector which involve an element of compulsion, inter-personal redistribution or fiscal support for participation. It can be mandatory (stipulated by law) or voluntary. Examples of mandatory private social expenditure include compulsory private health insurance, pension benefits based on compulsory contributions, and sickness payments to employees by employers.
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/social-expenditure-database-socx.html.
Looking to the future, 2019 is likely to represent a recent low-water mark for UK social spending. Forecasts by the OBR suggest that even without major changes to policy, spending on social benefits will rise by about 1 percentage point as a share of GDP before the end of the decade (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024[2]). The main reasons are increased pension spending due to an ageing population and expected increases in incapacity benefit claimants. Spending on families is likely to increase from 2024, partly because of the expansion of the government-funded childcare scheme, but also because of increases in the earnings threshold above which the tax charge is applied to Child Benefit recipients or their partners. While not yet set, health spending can also be expected to increase in real terms, as it has been the case historically (Harker, 2019[11]; The Health Foundation, 2023[20]).
Against this background, results from OECD Risks That Matter suggest that many people in the United Kingdom feel relatively vulnerable to social risks and often want more government support, especially compared to people in comparable peers in the G7 group of major economies.
OECD Risks That Matter asks people how worried they are about a range of short- and longer-term social and economic risks, such as job loss and the possibility of falling ill, as well as their access to healthcare, housing, education, and long-term care. Results suggest that people in the United Kingdom are often more concerned about these things than people in many other OECD countries (Chapter 2). UK respondents to Risks That Matter express stronger average concerns than their counterparts in several other G7 countries, including France, Germany, and the United States, as well as some of the OECD’s wealthiest economies, like Denmark, Norway and Switzerland. Concerns in the United Kingdom are especially strong after adjusting for differences between countries in the composition of the population: on a like‑for-like basis, people in the United Kingdom express stronger concerns about social risks over the next year or two than people in all countries covered other than Chile, Greece and Spain. As elsewhere in the OECD, concerns about social risks in the United Kingdom are stronger among women, parents, and those on lower incomes. Unlike most other OECD countries, concerns fall rather than grow with age: in the United Kingdom, as in a few other English-speaking countries, it is young people who are most concerned about their futures.
The concerns expressed by UK respondents about social and economic risks are mirrored in their (lack of) confidence in current social protection (Chapter 3). Similar to many elsewhere, UK respondents have mixed feelings about public service access but little confidence in public benefits and income support. Only a minority believe they could “easily” receive public benefits if they needed them (Figure 1.4). Overall, dissatisfaction with public benefits and services is stronger in the United Kingdom than in some of the UK’s G7 peers, especially Canada and the United States, as well as several OECD countries with more extensive social protection systems, such as the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland. However, dissatisfaction is lower in the United Kingdom than in Italy and, most notably, France – a major spender on social protection, albeit one with a population that tends to be strongly critical of the state and the future direction of their country (Senik, 2014[21]). As in other OECD countries, dissatisfaction with public benefits and services tends to be stronger among women and older respondents, and especially among people who report that their household finances have worsened over the past year. This echoes research elsewhere suggesting that economic shocks can play an important role in shaping attitudes towards the state and social policy (Blekesaune, 2013[22]; Margalit, 2013[23]; Hacker, Rehm and Schlesinger, 2013[24]).
Distribution and net balance of responses to the question “To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement?… I feel I could easily receive public benefits if I needed them”, by country, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, 2022
Note: Net agreement is calculated as the weighted sum of the shares responding “Strongly disagree” (‑100), “Disagree” (‑50), “Neither agree nor disagree” (0), “Agree” (50) and “Strongly agree” (100), and can range from ‑100 to 100. See Chapter 3 for more details.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html.
Feelings of injustice and abuse in benefit receipt are comparatively mild in the United Kingdom (Chapter 3). Like people in many other OECD countries, many in the United Kingdom believe that they do not receive their fair share of public benefits and that others receive benefits they do not deserve. However, these feelings are less common in the United Kingdom than in several other OECD countries, most notably again, Italy and France. This is consistent with evidence from UK sources, which shows that attitudes towards benefit recipients, previously very hard, have softened markedly in the past decade or so (Baumberg Geiger et al., 2023[25]).
Looking forward, many people in the United Kingdom want more from government (Chapter 4). Just over three‑quarters of UK respondents to Risks That Matter say that the government should be doing more to secure their economic and social well-being – higher than in most other G7 countries. Large numbers say that the government should increase spending on social policies, even when reminded about the taxes they might have to pay. Even larger numbers favour increased redistribution, with the United Kingdom having the third strongest level of support for increasing taxes on the rich in order to support the poor (Figure 1.5). Calls for additional support are understandably larger among people exposed to economic insecurity, measured as those reporting that their household finances have worsened over the past year. However, in the United Kingdom unlike in most other OECD countries, demands for spending and redistribution are just as strong, if not stronger, among people with high education or high incomes than for people with less education or lower incomes. Overall, results from OECD Risks That Matter are consistent with evidence from UK sources, which show that attitudes have been shifting in favour of taxation, spending, and redistribution for about a decade or so (Curtice, 2021[26]; Cooper and Burchardt, 2022[27]; Baumberg Geiger et al., 2023[25]).
Distribution and net balance of responses to the question “Should the government tax the rich more than they currently do in order to support the poor?”, by country, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, 2022
Note: Net balance is calculated as the weighted sum of the shares responding “Definitely no” (‑100), “No” (‑50), “Neutral” (0), “Yes” (50) and “Definitely yes” (100), and can range from ‑100 to 100. See Chapter 4 for more details.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html.
Drilling down to specific policy areas, healthcare is the priority for many in the United Kingdom. A recent report based on the British Social Attitudes survey found that satisfaction with the UK National Health Service is at its lowest level in 40 years (Jefferies et al., 2024[28]). Results from OECD Risks That Matter suggest that while people in the United Kingdom are no less satisfied with their access to healthcare than with other public services (Chapter 3), many are concerned about the availability of “good quality” healthcare services going forward (Chapter 2). Indeed, 71% of UK respondents to OECD Risks That Matter report feeling at least somewhat concerned about their ability to access good-quality healthcare over the next year or two – the eighth highest share among covered OECD countries. These concerns are mirrored in their preferences for future spending, even at the risk of higher taxes and social contributions (Chapter 4). Despite already representing the largest area of public social spending (see above), just over three‑quarters of UK respondents say they would like the government to spend more on healthcare, even after being reminded about the taxes they pay. As many as half say they’d be prepared to pay an additional 2% of their income in taxes for better healthcare services.
Pensions are also an important issue, although not to the same extent as healthcare. Finances in old age are the most cited concern for UK respondents when they are asked to think about risks that stretch beyond the next ten years (Chapter 2) and, as in many other OECD countries, only a minority believe that the government will provide adequate income support on their retirement (Chapter 3). However, support for increased government spending on pensions is markedly lower than support for spending on healthcare, and is also lower than in many other OECD countries: about two‑thirds of UK respondents say they’d like the government to spend more on pensions, and just under one‑third would be prepared to pay an additional 2% of their income in taxes to get it (Chapter 4). This possibly reflects the comparatively moderate role played by the public pension system in the United Kingdom (see above), as well as the relatively widespread view that government is not solely responsible for pensioners’ standards of living (Hadler, Eder and Mayer, 2019[29]).
Notably, unemployment supports come bottom of the priority list for people in the United Kingdom. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the United Kingdom spends comparatively little on unemployment benefits, and as in other areas, relatively few respondents to RTM have confidence in government income support in case of job loss (Chapter 3). However, only a minority of UK respondents support increased spending on unemployment benefits. Although having softened in recent years (Baumberg Geiger et al., 2023[25]), many in the United Kingdom hold comparatively hard attitudes towards the unemployed with large numbers believing the government has comparatively little responsibility for ensuring the unemployed have access to a “reasonable” income (Applica sprl et al., 2020[30]; van Oorschot et al., 2022[31]).
What shapes country differences in attitudes and preferences toward social policies? And why are people in the United Kingdom (currently) more likely to call for support than people in several of its peer countries? OECD Risks That Matter cannot provide causal evidence on the drivers of attitudes and preferences, and the number of countries covered by the survey (27) means it can be difficult to separate different possible influences. Nonetheless, country comparison points to a few factors that help explain why attitudes differ from one country to another.
Unsurprisingly, the size and shape of current social protection is one factor that might contribute to perceptions and attitudes. Links between current policy and attitudes towards future policy are known to be complex (Pierson, 1993[32]; Wlezien, 1995[33]; Busemeyer, Abrassart and Nezi, 2021[34]; van Oorschot et al., 2022[31]) but results from Risks That Matter suggest that to varying degrees, respondents in countries with more expansive social protection systems are also less likely to express concern about social risks (Chapter 2), are less likely to report dissatisfaction with public benefits and services (Chapter 3), and are less likely to call for increased support and spending from government (Chapter 4). For example, even after controlling for population composition and GDP per capita, respondents in countries with higher social expenditure per head tend to call less strongly for additional government support (Figure 1.6, Panel A; r = ‑0.84) and, to a lesser extent, for increased spending on social policies (Figure 1.6, Panel B, r = ‑0.56). In some cases, attitudes and preferences in specific policy areas can also be linked to policy structure and design. Confidence in income support following job loss tends to be higher in countries where unemployment benefits are more generous, for instance, as does confidence in old-age income support in countries with more generous pensions (Chapter 3). However, attitudes do not always correspond to policy design. There are few clear links between policy indicators and satisfaction with public service access (Chapter 3), for example, while limited spending in a given policy area does not always lead to strong demands for more spending in that same area (Chapter 4).
Social expenditure (public and mandatory private) per head (USD 2015 PPP), (adjusted) net balance of responses to the question “Do you think the government should be doing less, about the same, or more to ensure your economic and social security and well-being?”, and (adjusted) average net balance of responses when asked whether the government should “spend less, spend the same, or spend more” in 12 policy areas
Note: Adjusted estimates account for between-country differences in demographic- (sex, age, and parenthood) and basic socio‑economic characteristics (educational attainment, employment status, and self-reported benefit receipt), plus GDP per capita. Social expenditure (public and mandatory private) per head is controlled for but not included in the adjusted estimates. See Chapter 4 for more details.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html, and OECD Social Expenditure Database, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/social-expenditure-database-socx.html.
One complication is that it is sometimes difficult to separate the potential effects of social spending from other factors, especially economic development. The two are strongly correlated, with wealthier OECD countries often spending more on social issues than less wealthy countries, and one or both sometimes falls out of statistical significance when the two are put in the same statistical model (see Chapter 2, for example). However, social spending usually remains at least moderately correlated with perceptions and attitudes even after controlling for economic development, and in several cases (e.g. confidence in government income support, calls for additional government support, calls for increased spending on social policies) links remain statistically significant.
Current policy structures are likely to be one factor feeding into preferences and attitudes in the United Kingdom. As discussed in Chapter 4, evidence from the British Social Attitudes survey in particular suggests that demand for spending and redistribution has grown as a likely response to cuts to social programmes over the past decade and a half (Curtice, 2021[26]; Cooper and Burchardt, 2022[27]). More generally, even in the absence of recent cuts, respondents in a country with a mid-sized, tightly targeted system like the UK’s (see earlier in this chapter) might be expected to express a relatively strong preference for expanded government support.
Economic development, economic inequality, and economic security may all also play a role in shaping attitudes and preferences
Away from policy, a range of additional economic and political factors are thought to play at least some role in attitudes and preferences for social protection (van Oorschot et al., 2022[31]; Mengel and Weidenholzer, 2023[35]). Related to the discussion above, economic development is one potential factor, with respondents in wealthier countries often expressing fewer concerns about social risks (Chapter 2) and greater satisfaction with benefits and services (Chapter 3) than respondents in less wealthy countries. Economic inequality (or rather, perceptions of economic inequality) is another: in line with recent OECD work on links between inequality and demand for redistribution (OECD, 2021[36]), calls for increased spending on social policies and increased taxes on the rich tend to be stronger in countries where people express stronger concerns about income inequality (Figure 1.7; r = 0.52 and 0.54; Chapter 4). Income inequality is comparatively high in the United Kingdom (OECD, 2024[16]) but concern about inequality (as measured by the share that believe differences in income are “too high”) is only moderate. Economic security and the experience of economic shocks potentially matters too, at least for attitudes towards redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011[37]; Margalit, 2019[38]). As well as shaping preferences at the individual level, countries with larger numbers of respondents who report a deterioration in their household finances in the past year also have larger numbers calling for increased taxes on the rich to support the poor. The United Kingdom notably has a large share of respondents who report that their household finances have weakened in the past year, suggesting this could be one factor behind its comparatively strong calls for increased redistribution.
Percent who believe that differences in income are too high or far too high, (adjusted) average net balance of responses when asked whether the government should “spend less, spend the same, or spend more” in 12 policy areas, and (adjusted) net balance of responses to the question “Should the government tax the rich more than they currently do in order to support the poor?”
Note: Adjusted estimates account for between-country differences in demographic- (sex, age, and parenthood) and basic socio‑economic characteristics (educational attainment, employment status, and self-reported benefit receipt). Concern about inequality is controlled for but not included in the adjusted estimates. See Chapter 4 for more details.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter Survey 2022, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html, and OECD (2023[39]), “Working hand in hand? Exploring people’s views of the role of different actors in fighting inequality”, https://doi.org/10.1787/dbd54315-en.
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← 1. HICBC increases gradually for those with adjusted net income between GBP 60 000 and GBP 80 000 and is equal to percentage of a family’s Child Benefit for every GBP 200 of ANI that is over GBP 60 000 each year. Where adjusted net income exceeds GBP 80 000, the tax charge is equal to that individual’s total Child Benefit.