Asia Capital Markets Report 2025

Report

26 June 2025

2. Equity markets

Abstract

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of equity markets in Asia, covering the growth and transformation of public equity markets alongside the development of private equity markets. It examines the unique characteristics of Asian public equity markets, including those dedicated to high-growth companies and the use of equity by stated-owned enterprises (SOEs). The chapter also explores critical issues in corporate governance, such as regulatory enforcement and ownership concentration, and analyses investor participation trends among institutional and retail investors in Asian equity markets. Drawing on detailed analysis, it identifies key policy considerations aimed at strengthening governance frameworks, broadening investor bases and enhancing market competitiveness across the region.

Key messages

Copy link to Key messages

Over the past two decades, Asian public equity markets have undergone significant growth and transformation, evolving into a diverse ecosystem, but with varying levels of development.
While the region’s developed markets have deep liquidity and advanced regulatory frameworks, many emerging markets still face challenges such as limited market depth, weaker regulations and limited investor participation.
Asia is the leading region in the establishment of public equity markets for growth companies. However, challenges remain. While many countries are simplifying listing procedures and creating alternative platforms to enhance market access, regulatory hurdles and high entry costs continue to restrict smaller companies’ access to financing.
While private equity markets in Asia are growing, they remain underdeveloped compared to public equity markets. This exacerbates access to finance challenges for high-growth businesses that generally rely on private equity to fuel their early-stage growth and eventual expansion into public markets.
While capital markets in Asia have successfully attracted companies, corporate governance issues persist, particularly in emerging markets. Common challenges include enforcement, minority shareholder protection, board independence and related-party transaction disclosure.
Many Asian economies lack sufficient institutional investor participation in capital markets, limiting long-term and stable capital financing for corporations. Expanding the domestic institutional investor base in the region is crucial to offer households diversified investment opportunities and to channel long-term funds to the real sector. Strengthening, and in some cases developing, asset-backed pension systems in the region could contribute to achieving these objectives.
Foreign investor participation remains relatively low in many Asian markets. Index inclusion can enhance market credibility and attract foreign institutional investors.
However, several Asian economies impose sectoral restrictions, preventing foreign investors from fully participating in key industries. Restrictions on fund movement and repatriation make it difficult for institutional investors to exit investments or manage capital efficiently. Moreover, issues related to currency convertibility, hedging limitations and inconsistent disclosure standards complicate investment decisions and reduce foreign investor interest.
Retail investor participation and financial inclusion remain key challenges in several Asian markets. Stock market investment among individual investors remains relatively low, limiting market depth and liquidity. While initiatives to enhance financial literacy and promote FinTech solutions are in progress, further efforts are needed to improve accessibility, boost investor confidence and encourage broader market participation.

2.1. Growth and transformation of Asian public equity markets

Copy link to 2.1. Growth and transformation of Asian public equity markets

Since 2000, public equity markets in Asia have expanded significantly both in terms of the number of listed companies and market capitalisation (Figure 2.1). The number of Asian listed companies almost doubled, reaching nearly 29 000 in 2024, while market capitalisation quadrupled, totalling USD 34.4 trillion in 2024. As a result, Asia now accounts for 55% of all listed companies globally and 27% of total global market capitalisation. This remarkable growth has positioned Asia as one of the most important regions in global capital markets.

The expansion of Asian public equity markets has been driven by domestic reforms and global developments. Following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, many countries introduced measures to strengthen financial systems and promote market-based financing. Regional integration efforts - such as cross-border trading links and regulatory harmonisation - also improved investor access and secondary market liquidity. Globally, low interest rates and ample liquidity following the 2008 financial crisis boosted capital flows into Asia, further supporting market growth. However, public equity markets in Asia are diverse and have developed at a different pace. Among them, China stands out as one of the fastest growing and largest markets in the world. By the end of 2024, China’s total market capitalisation reached USD 13 trillion - twice the size of Japan’s market, the second largest in the region.

Figure 2.1. Number and market capitalisation of listed companies in Asian markets
Copy link to Figure 2.1. Number and market capitalisation of listed companies in Asian markets

Asia has emerged as one of the most dynamic capital markets globally

As a share of GDP, the growth of Asian public equity markets between 2000 and 2024 has also been remarkable (Figure 2.2). In Asia excluding China and Japan, market capitalisation relative to GDP increased by 60 percentage points, while China experienced a notable 51 percentage point rise. The United States also saw notable growth, with an increase of 69 percentage points. In contrast, in Europe the share declined by 17 percentage points, despite a real increase in market capitalisation, suggesting that market capitalisation grew more slowly than GDP.

At the jurisdiction level, Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong (China) have seen exceptional growth, with market capitalisation expanding by 284 and 400 percentage points, respectively. Other countries, such as India and Thailand, also recorded substantial increases. On the other hand, Malaysia saw a decrease of 9 percentage points, while Singapore experienced a significant decline of 65 percentage points, despite an increase in the number of listed companies and market capitalisation in real terms.

Figure 2.2. Evolution of market capitalisation to GDP between 2000 and 2024
Copy link to Figure 2.2. Evolution of market capitalisation to GDP between 2000 and 2024

Most Asian markets have grown in size between 2000 and 2024

Asia’s equity market landscape is diverse, with significant disparities in the level of development across economies. Some markets have highly developed financial ecosystems with deep liquidity, while other less developed markets face challenges such as limited market depth and weak regulatory frameworks, which can diminish their appeal to investors. Asian public equity markets can be grouped into three categories based on market capitalisation to GDP (Figure 2.3). The first group, with market capitalisation to GDP lower than 40%, includes countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Cambodia. These countries also have a relatively low number of listed companies and limited liquidity (measured by the turnover ratio).

The second group, with market capitalisation to GDP between 40% and 160%, includes countries such as China, India, Japan and Korea as well as Malaysia, Philippines, Viet Nam and Indonesia. Within this group, the first four countries have higher liquidity and more listed companies than the others. The third group, with market capitalisation to GDP greater than 200%, includes Hong Kong (China) and Chinese Taipei.

Figure 2.3. Asian public equity markets by different segments of market capitalisation, 2024
Copy link to Figure 2.3. Asian public equity markets by different segments of market capitalisation, 2024

Asia’s capital market landscape is diverse, with significant disparities in the level of development

2.2. Overview of Asian public equity markets

Copy link to 2.2. Overview of Asian public equity markets

The capital raised from public equity markets in Asia has increased substantially, with Asian companies accounting for an increasing share of global capital raised (Figure 2.4, Panel B). Since 2000, Asia’s share of global IPOs has risen significantly, from 31% in 2000-08 to 49% in 2009-24 (Panel B). At the same time, its share of global SPOs has grown from 23% to 37%.

While the amount of capital raised by non-financial companies as share of GDP has declined globally (excl. Asia), in Asia the trend is mixed: It has continued to increase in China since 2009, but decreased in Asia (excl. China and Japan) (Panel C).

Asia’s diverse public equity market landscape is also evident in the varying levels of IPO and SPO activity across countries. As a share of GDP, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam show relatively low use of IPOs and SPOs, with yearly average use of IPOs and SPOs less than 0.2% of GDP over the past five years (Figure 2.5, Panel A). In six jurisdictions, companies made moderate use of public equity markets, averaging between 0.2% and 1% of GDP during the same period (Panel B). In contrast, companies in Hong Kong (China) raised amounts exceeding 2% of GDP, while in Thailand, Singapore, China and Korea, they consistently raised more than 1% of GDP through public equity markets (Panel C).

These figures also highlight an important observation: higher IPO activity often corresponds with higher SPO activity. Once a company is publicly listed, it often returns to the market to raise additional capital for expansion, acquisitions or to overcome challenging economic conditions.

Figure 2.4. Capital raising activity in Asian public equity markets
Copy link to Figure 2.4. Capital raising activity in Asian public equity markets

Asia’s public equity markets serve as an important source of financing for companies

Figure 2.5. Capital raised via IPOs and SPOs to GDP by non-financial Asian companies, 2020-24
Copy link to Figure 2.5. Capital raised via IPOs and SPOs to GDP by non-financial Asian companies, 2020-24

Asia’s diverse capital market landscape is reflected in varying IPO and SPO activity

In Asia, capital markets have played a crucial role in driving innovation by providing essential financing, particularly for high-growth and innovative industries. However, while some capital markets in the region have been successful in financing innovative industries, others have not been able to leverage market-based financing to boost innovation and growth. Technology, financial and industrial sectors lead capital raising both in Asia and globally (Figure 2.6). However, in some countries, traditional sectors such as financials and consumer cyclicals are the most active in raising capital form public markets.

Figure 2.6. Share of IPO and SPO activity by top four industries globally and in Asia, 2000-24
Copy link to Figure 2.6. Share of IPO and SPO activity by top four industries globally and in Asia, 2000-24

Developed capital markets in the region have been successful in financing innovative industries

2.2.1. Equity markets for growth companies

Capital markets in Asia are also increasingly providing financing opportunities for high-growth companies. The region has the most active equity markets dedicated to growth companies. Many regulators and stock exchanges have simplified listing procedures and created alternative market platforms designed for smaller or high-growth companies. These dedicated equity markets have become a vital source of capital for expanding businesses, particularly those rich in intangible assets but lacking the collateral typically required for bank financing.

At the start of 2024, over 16 000 growth companies were listed across 60 countries worldwide, representing almost one-third of all publicly listed companies (Figure 2.7, Panel A). Yet their combined market capitalisation was only about USD 4 trillion, less than 4% of global main market capitalisation. Asia plays a large role, accounting for more than half of all listed growth companies and roughly 80% of their market capitalisation. In total, Asian exchanges list 8 586 growth companies worth USD 3.3 trillion in market capitalisation, equivalent to 10% of the region’s GDP. This trend has been driven by China, which alone hosts over 2 000 listed growth companies with USD 2.5 trillion in market capitalisation.

Figure 2.7. Regional distribution of public equity markets, 2023
Copy link to Figure 2.7. Regional distribution of public equity markets, 2023

Asia plays a growing role in global growth markets, with China as the main market

Robust IPO activity has been a key driver of the maturation of equity growth markets. Between 2019 and 2023, over 4 224 IPOs took place on equity growth markets globally, exceeding the 3 627 IPOs on main markets (Figure 2.8). Asia accounted for over two-thirds of all growth company IPOs and three-quarters of the capital raised by growth companies during the period. Chinese growth companies were by far the biggest users of IPOs, with over 90% of the capital raised. Other markets also performed strongly: Japan hosted 359 IPOs raising USD 13 billion, and Korea saw 264 IPOs raising USD 12 billion. Emerging markets such as India and Indonesia were active too, though the amount of capital raised was smaller.

Figure 2.8. Non-financial growth company IPOs in Asia, 2019-23
Copy link to Figure 2.8. Non-financial growth company IPOs in Asia, 2019-23

China leads IPO activity by growth companies in Asia, followed by Japan and Korea

Flexibility and proportionality in listing requirements enable growth companies to access market-based financing by aligning regulatory expectations with their size and stage of development. Growth markets typically set less stringent criteria than main markets, including lower thresholds for capital or revenue, shorter financial track records and reduced free-float requirements. These tailored standards help attract companies that may not qualify for main market listings. In many cases, regulators also adapt or exempt corporate governance requirements depending on the company’s size or listing venue (Figure 2.9, Panel A). For example, smaller issuers may benefit from more lenient rules on disclosure, board independence and board committees (Panel B). In India, Korea, Chinese Taipei and Thailand, for instance, audit committees are required only for companies listed on main markets. While many countries apply the same standards for board independence across both market tiers, India and Thailand exempt companies listed on growth markets from appointing independent directors.

Several countries require IPO sponsors or advisors for companies seeking to list on growth markets. Under these sponsor schemes, a qualified intermediary - typically approved by the regulator or stock exchange - supports the company throughout the IPO process, and in some cases, after the listing. For instance, Hong Kong (China) and Thailand require sponsorship during the IPO process, while China and Malaysia require sponsorship also for a defined post-listing period. The sponsor conducts due diligence, ensures regulatory compliance and helps mitigate investor risk. A core responsibility of the sponsor is to assess the company’s suitability for listing and guide it through the regulatory and exchange requirements.

Reduced cost of listing is another key feature of growth markets. Most exchanges apply a more lenient fee structure for listing on growth markets than on main markets. Instead of charging flat fees, many growth segments use proportional or regressive fee schedules in line with the size of the offering.

However, growth markets often face challenges with respect to low liquidity and limited analyst coverage. Trading volumes for growth stocks tend to be thin, partly due to lower levels of free-float resulting from higher controlling stakes. These also makes these stock less attractive to institutional investors. In addition, many of these companies attract little or no attention from equity research analysts. Limited research coverage further dampens trading activity, creating a cycle of low visibility and low liquidity.

Figure 2.9. Proportionality in corporate governance requirements
Copy link to Figure 2.9. Proportionality in corporate governance requirements

Many countries apply proportionality in corporate governance requirements

To improve the visibility of smaller companies, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore have introduced measures to enhance research coverage of growth companies. These include subsidies for brokers or research firms, as well as exchange-led initiatives. For example, Bursa Malaysia launched the Bursa Research Incentive Scheme to expand analyst coverage, while the Monetary Authority of Singapore supports research houses by promoting the hiring of research talent and the production of high-quality reports (Bursa Malaysia, 2024[5]; The EDGE Malaysia, 2022[6]; MAS, 2021[7]). The research reports are made publicly available on the Singapore Exchange website at no cost.

2.2.2. The use of public equity markets by state-owned enterprises

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a pivotal role in the economy of many emerging markets, as major employers, key providers of public goods and services, and by undertaking large scale infrastructure projects. Many SOEs operate in capital-intensive sectors such as energy, utilities and financial services, ensuring the continuity and accessibility of essential services.

Historically, SOEs have been associated with weaker economic performance, partly due to their broader mandates to engage in non-commercial activities by providing access to essential economic or social services, which would not be provided by the market. SOEs can also suffer from limited managerial accountability for company outcomes and weaker incentives for efficiency and profitability. Listing SOEs on public equity markets can help address these challenges by exposing them to greater market discipline, stricter disclosure requirements and increased transparency, which together can improve efficiency, accountability and professional management practices. From a fiscal perspective, SOE listings can also generate substantial revenues for the government, which can be used to fund public investment in priority areas such as infrastructure, education and health.

In addition to these benefits, listing SOEs can also support capital market development by increasing the depth and liquidity of the market, broadening the investor base and promoting capital markets as a viable source of financing. In fact, many Asian economies have leveraged SOE listings in the early stages of their capital market development. One notable example is China, where the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were initially created as platforms for SOEs to go public, as part of a larger SOE reform programme (Lin et al., 2020[8]). Viet Nam also launched its equitisation programme through the public listing of SOEs, kick starting the development of its capital markets (Nguyen, Oates and Dunkley, 2014[9]).

Currently, 70% of listed SOEs globally trade on Asian exchanges. At the end of 2024, SOEs represented a significant 26% of the total market capitalisation in Asia, well above the 5% in the rest of the (Figure 2.10, Panel A). In China, Malaysia, Singapore and Viet Nam, the share was even higher, representing over one-third of market capitalisation (Panel B).

SOEs are not only collectively significant in Asian economies, but also individually as some of the largest listed companies at the domestic level. In nearly half of Asian economies, the three largest listed SOEs represent more than 10% of the total market capitalisation (Figure 2.10, Panel B). Singapore stands out, with the top three SOEs accounting for nearly one-third of the country’s market capitalisation.

The listing of large SOEs can have a significant impact on the size of the domestic equity market. For instance, in 2006, China’s market capitalisation nearly tripled when a large financial SOE was listed (Figure 2.11, Panel A). In Viet Nam, Japan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, large SOE IPOs each increased domestic market capitalisation by over 75%.

Figure 2.10. Overview of listed SOEs, 2024
Copy link to Figure 2.10. Overview of listed SOEs, 2024

Most listed SOEs globally are in Asia, accounting for a large share of the region’s market capitalisation

Moreover, once listed, SOEs often invest more as they can tap into public markets for financing (Panel B). An analysis of investment ratios around the IPOs of SOEs in Asia’s top four non-financial industries reveals that those in the industrial, technology and utilities sectors had higher investment rates during both the IPO year and the year that followed. In contrast, investment in the energy sector declined slightly in the year after the IPO.

Figure 2.11. Impact of large SOE listings on market capitalisation and investment
Copy link to Figure 2.11. Impact of large SOE listings on market capitalisation and investment

Listing of SOEs drives growth in market capitalisation and investment

The positive impact on the domestic market of listing an SOE depends on a range of factors, including the depth and diversity of the investor base, the presence of domestic institutional investors, a robust pipeline of potential listings from both public and private firms, sound market infrastructure and overall macro-economic stability. In some cases, listing an SOE without adequate preparation or in a weak regulatory environment may yield limited results, or lead to criticism that state companies are being sold for less than their worth and to the benefit of certain groups or individuals at the expense of the broader public interest (World Bank; OliverWyman; The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg; ASEA (African Stock Exchange Association), 2021[10]).

Given their significant role in emerging economies, SOEs represent a substantial share of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index (MSCI EM Index). Nearly one-fifth of the index’s total weight is attributed to SOEs. This compares to their share in the MSCI World Index, where they account for less than 2% of the index. Asian SOEs alone account for 13% of the MSCI EM Index (Figure 2.12, Panel A). SOEs included in the MSCI EM Index are heavily concentrated in strategic sectors such as finance, energy, industry and utilities. Within these sectors, SOEs account for a substantial share. For instance, SOEs make up 73% of the total weight of the utilities sector within the index.

The prevalence of SOEs in emerging market indices is reflected in institutional investors’ high levels of ownership of these companies. Asian listed SOEs included in the MSCI EM Index have up to eight times higher levels of institutional investor ownership than those that are not part of the index (Panel B). Foreign institutional ownership is also higher among Asian SOEs included in the MSCI EM Index.

Figure 2.12. Inclusion of Asian SOEs in the MSCI Emerging Market Index
Copy link to Figure 2.12. Inclusion of Asian SOEs in the MSCI Emerging Market Index

Asian SOEs represent a substantial share of the MSCI EM Index, and have higher institutional and foreign ownership than those not included in the index

The total amount of capital raised from Asian public equity markets has been on the rise since 2000. However, the share of capital raised by SOEs in initial public offerings has declined. In the early 2000s, SOEs accounted for 33% of all capital raised via IPOs in Asia, a figure that dropped to 15% between 2016 and 2024 (Figure 2.13). In contrast, state-owned enterprises are responsible for an increasing share of the capital raised via follow-on offerings. During the 2016-2024 period, SOEs accounted for nearly a quarter of total funds raised through secondary offerings in Asia (Panel C). Follow-on offerings provide SOEs additional funding for expansion, innovation and strategic investments, and also reinforce the role of equity markets as a viable and sustained source of capital.

Figure 2.13. Capital raised by Asian SOEs on public equity markets, 2000-24
Copy link to Figure 2.13. Capital raised by Asian SOEs on public equity markets, 2000-24

After listing, many SOEs continue to raise capital via public equity markets

2.3. Private equity markets

Copy link to 2.3. Private equity markets

Over the last decade, private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) have expanded rapidly as a complementary source of corporate financing. Between 2015-21, assets under management (AUM) of Asian PE and VC firms increased by a factor of 3.6x and 6.2x, respectively. This far outpaced the growth rate in North America and Europe over the same period and was in all markets associated with a combination of increased investments and higher valuations (Figure 2.14).

Figure 2.14. Private equity and venture capital AUM, 2000-24
Copy link to Figure 2.14. Private equity and venture capital AUM, 2000-24

Asian private equity and venture capital AUM grew strongly until 2021

However, since 2021, AUM of Asian PE and VC have contracted, while expanding in North America and Europe (Figure 2.15, Panel A). Venture capital makes up almost half of AUM in Asia, compared to 19% in North America and 12% in Europe, to a large degree backed by government funds, large state-owned firms and corporate venture capital providers (BCG, 2020[11]; Colonnelli, Li and Liu, 2024[12]). As of June 2024, venture capital assets represented 4.8% of GDP, higher than in both North America and Europe. Meanwhile, the traditional PE segment represented 5.3% of GDP, markedly smaller than other markets, notably North America (Panel B).

Figure 2.15. Regional distribution of private equity and venture capital AUM
Copy link to Figure 2.15. Regional distribution of private equity and venture capital AUM

Asia’s share of total AUM levelled off after 2021 and private equity AUM to GDP remains limited

Given the wide range of level of development and market structures in Asia, analysing the Asian PE market as a monolith conceals important differences. Globally, the effect of higher interest rates since 2022 has hit venture capital fundraising especially hard. This has adversely affected some Asian markets where early-stage financing makes up a larger part of private equity markets. The drop in AUM in Asia can largely be attributed to a marked decrease in PE and VC fundraising in China 2022-24 vs. 2019-21 (-68%) – by far the largest market in the region (Figure 2.16). This stands in stark contrast to the stable fundraising in Japan, which has held up better than in North America and Europe. Less developed markets such as India and some Southeast Asian economies have instead experienced substantial growth – although starting from low (or very low) levels. Fundraising as a share of GDP also highlights the developing nature of private equity and venture capital markets in much of Asia. As a share of GDP, it represents only 0.3%, compared to 1.1% in North America and 0.4% in Europe in the 2022-24 period – Korea standing out at 0.5% of GDP.

Figure 2.16. Private equity and venture capital fundraising, 2022-24
Copy link to Figure 2.16. Private equity and venture capital fundraising, 2022-24

Private market activity remains limited across Asia, with venture capital dominant

In most Asian countries private market transaction activity – investments and exits – is still small. Venture capital made up almost half of investments in 2022-24, compared to just 34% and 31% in the United States and Europe, respectively (Figure 2.17, Panel A). This is mainly driven by China. Only a few markets (e.g. Korea) show levels of activity approaching that of the United States relative to GDP. While at a regional level Asian investment activity has decreased alongside fundraising, India and Japan stand out with solid transaction growth.

On the exit side, initial public offerings (IPO) are still the more common exit strategy in several large Asian countries compared to the United States and Europe (Figure 2.17, Panel B). In general, private funds tend to favour other exit forms over IPOs as these can lead to higher valuations with the right strategic fit of the buyer and avoids uncertainty regarding exit valuation. The fact that in Asia IPOs are the main exit strategy can be interpreted as public markets remaining active and attractive (OECD, 2025[4]). Moreover, the existence of large equity markets for growth companies has provided a readily available exit opportunity for many investments. However, it also suggests that private markets are less developed and that other exit opportunities are scarcer. Overall, it is also clear that the contraction in activity during 2022-24 relative to 2019-21 has hit exits harder than investments in Asia (as it has globally) – potentially partially explaining the longer holding periods (Figure 2.18, Panels B-C) and highlighting the difficulties of many private funds in liquidating their holdings in the current environment.

Figure 2.17. Private equity and venture capital investments and exits by deal type, 2022-24
Copy link to Figure 2.17. Private equity and venture capital investments and exits by deal type, 2022-24

In much of Asia, activity in private market investments and exits continues to be relatively limited

2.3.1. Policy implications to the expansion of private markets

The simultaneous expansion of private equity (PE) markets and decrease in the number of listed firms in some developed markets (see Chapter 1) has raised increasing attention. In one sense, this facilitates access to financing for firms, while also offering investors diversification. Public and private markets can also complement each other by providing exit opportunities, valuation benchmarks, increased flexibility in financing and outside pressure to ensure management focus on shareholder value. However, the shift may decrease transparency and restrict investor access to investment opportunities since private markets are less accessible. As public equity remains the largest asset class available to retail investors and provides them with an opportunity to share corporate value creation, this could negatively affect their wealth creation.

Factors for the shift towards private markets include the extended period of low cost of debt, increased regulatory burdens for listings, the changing nature of firms – due to the increased importance of intangible assets over capital expenditures and benefits of mergers with large global firms – and reduced regulation of private capital (Comerton-Forde, 2025[13]). This shit is not only apparent in delisting trends and private market AUM growth. Firms staying private for longer and longer venture capital holding periods are also indicators of this shift (Figure 2.18, Panels A-C).

Figure 2.18. Firm age at IPO and private equity and venture capital holding periods
Copy link to Figure 2.18. Firm age at IPO and private equity and venture capital holding periods

Firms staying private for longer, along with extended venture capital holding periods, reflect the broader shift towards private markets

The shift towards private markets has increased the focus on the potential risks associated with greater reliance on private financing. Concerns relate to the low transparency of the industry and the limited oversight investors have of fund managers. Issues include high and opaque fees, misleading performance disclosures, the accuracy of valuations, leverage risks and preferential treatment of some investors over others. Meanwhile, there are also concerns that retail investors are being excluded from a substantial share of investment opportunities. At the same time, they are often regarded as too unsophisticated as investors for these assets and as being at risk of being taken advantage of, as they may be less equipped to address the above-mentioned issues (IOSCO, 2023[14]; SEC, 2023[15]; ASIC, 2025[16]).

In response, in many jurisdictions (e.g. the United States, the EU and the United Kingdom), regulators have tried to simultaneously (1) increase transparency of private markets, (2) broaden access to private markets and (3) facilitate the use of public markets (Official Journal of the European Union, 2023[17]; Council of the EU, 2024[18]; FCA, 2024[19]; FCA, 2025[20]). The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced rules requiring private funds to disclose quarterly information on areas including fees, performance, earnings and separate agreements with large investors – this was overturned by a court in 2024 (United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2024[21]). More recently, the SEC indicated that it intends to focus on increasing flexibility on disclosures and expanding retail investors’ access to private companies, potentially by altering the qualifications for accredited investors (SEC, 2025[22]).

In Asia, the regulatory responses differed possibly because private markets are less developed and delistings not as widespread. Hong Kong (China) and Singapore have made moves to promote access to public markets comparable to other advanced economies (HKEX, 2024[23]; MAS, 2025[24]). China has recently tightened listing requirements, and India has made amendments to its listing rules, recently raising the criteria for SMEs (Reuters, 2024[25]; SEBI, 2025[26]). Initiatives in Korea and Japan to strengthen corporate governance – echoed in several other markets – also emphasise quality of listings rather than loosening rules. The Korean regulator has also recently published reform plans for IPO and delisting rules to increase institutional investors’ lock-up period and encourage underperforming companies to delist (FSC Korea, 2025[27]).

In contrast to other advanced markets globally, the public market in Japan has remained competitive. Low barriers to list and the status associated with a listing, continue to make it attractive to do an IPO. However, this has hampered the growth of private equity and led to a large number of smaller listed companies with little research coverage and lacklustre post-listing stock performance.

To address the concern regarding retail investors’ limited access to private equity, there has been an increase in evergreen funds. These funds allow investors to make long-term investments in private companies with investments as small as USD 25k (Morgan Stanley, 2025[28]). Asia’s large share of high-net worth individuals provides a potentially solid demand for these products. So far, the industry segment is nascent with interest mainly limited to Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong (China) (ION Analytics, 2024[29]). The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) recently issued a consultation paper on improving private market access for retail investors (MAS, 2025[30]). In Japan, allowing the Nippon Individual Savings Account to include unlisted shares could potentially lead to an expansion of alternative assets (Financial Services Agency, 2024[31]; AIMA, 2025[32]).

However, there are potential regulatory and structural challenges to the development of these funds in Asia. For example, in China, private funds adhere to requirements of the Asset Management Association of China – authorised by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. According to these criteria, funds need to have a fixed duration and be structured as closed-end vehicles, restricting the ability of investors to enter and exit funds beyond specific pre-defined situations (Chambers, 2024[33]; WealthBriefing Asia, 2025[34]).

2.3.2. Challenges to the growth of private markets in Asia

Although PE and VC markets have expanded in Asia, their growth has been constrained by market structures, a lack of reliable exit opportunities and regulatory hurdles.

Many Asian economies have historically been organised around large conglomerates and family-dominated businesses, making it difficult for PE firms to penetrate the market. This has also led to antagonism towards outside investors and especially hostile takeovers. The perception among family owners is that outside investors lead to a loss of control and a loss of legacy. In India for example, this has meant that up until recently, the most common deals involved minority stakes and deals securing founding-family members employment terms (ABLJ, 2025[35]). Sprawling conglomerate structures and cross-shareholdings have also implied a smaller supply of potential targets for private equity funds and worked to shield incumbent management from outside actors. In several markets, corporate venture capital has formed the backbone of the nascent industry, sometimes hindering the growth of an independent outsider investor class.

Another challenge for PE funds has been the lack of sufficient exit opportunities – highlighting the important links to public markets. The existence of a discount in valuation in some markets makes exits via IPOs more difficult. Moreover, the combination of uncertainties regarding (geo)political stability and IPO windows staying open, and a lack of market scale, have stymied investor interest, especially in some Southeast Asian markets. These issues are highly market specific. China’s tighter regulations on offshore listings have led many global private equity funds to struggle to exit their holdings (FT, 2024[36]). The more stringent listing criteria announced in March 2024, aimed at increasing the quality of listings, have also had a dampening effect on IPOs. Moreover, the long periods of relatively weak developments on many Asian stock exchanges, also restricts exit opportunities for PE funds. Meanwhile, Southeast Asia suffers from a lack of scale. Fragmented local targets are not large enough for global investors and sparse deal activity means investors are wary of being able to exit investments (KPMG, 2024[37]; PEI, 2024[38]; PEI, 2025[39])

Private equity and venture capital funds in Asia also face various regulatory issues, as authorities strive to balance investment attractiveness with other policy objectives. Capital controls, restrictions on foreign investment, anti-trust rules, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) regulation, uncertain regulatory environments and lack of sophisticated fund structures impact the attractiveness in many of these markets. On the one hand, some financial hubs such as Singapore offer more business-friendly regimes. On the other hand, some countries adopted a stricter regulatory approach. For example, in India, investments in certain sectors need approval from authorities. The competition authority actively scrutinises PE ownership of competing companies (ABLJ, 2025[35]). In China, capital controls and regulatory uncertainty remain barriers. Foreign investors face challenges and uncertainty when deploying and recalling funds from the country. Still, Chinese regulators are enacting some policy relaxations, for example in foreign investment in manufacturing, as well as in the “silver economy” – economic activity related to its large elderly population (ABLJ, 2025[35]; China Briefing, 2024[40]).

While regulations in Japan require some investing companies to provide prior notification to relevant government ministries (via the Bank of Japan), the Japanese government in 2023 issued new M&A guidelines aimed at promoting M&A activity that were welcomed by the PE industry. The guidelines emphasise the fiduciary duties of boards and management to focus on enterprise value, and that the previously over-used defence policies should only be adopted when there is an active bidder and that such policies should be proportional (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2023[41]; ABLJ, 2023[42]).

Regulations affecting private investment fund structures also impact the attractiveness and ease of setting up new funds. The introduction of the variable capital company (2020) in Singapore and open-ended fund company (2018) in Hong Kong (China) has been part of efforts to keep up with regulatory developments in popular fund domiciles globally such as Luxembourg, Ireland and the Cayman Islands. These vehicles allow flexible capital structures, fund governance, payout policies and advantageous tax treatment. In less developed PE markets, such as Thailand, the available fund structures are more limited (Deloitte, 2023[43]; PWC, 2020[44]).

2.3.3. The growth potential of private equity and venture capital in Asia

Despite the recent slowdown in fundraising and deal activity, the overall potential for PE growth in Asia is considerable. Both India and Japan have experienced a boom alongside their strong stock markets, showcasing how positive public market developments complement the private side. In some markets (e.g. Japan and Korea), there is a sizeable mid-market of potential target opportunities for PE funds. The current and future generational shift may also spur changes in corporate management. Coupled with a more positive view of outside investors in markets ranging from India to Japan, this could increase acceptance of outside capital and further expand private markets (KPMG, 2024[37]; BCG, 2020[11]).

Institutional asset allocation also suggests room for growth. Large institutional investors in Asia allocate a lower share of AUM to alternative assets than in North America or Europe and the Middle East (EMEA) (Figure 2.19, Panel A). This is an important factor in the relatively small size of private equity markets in Asia, as these investors make up the bulk of PE funding globally. It is especially evident in the allocation of pension funds, which in 2024 allocated only 8% of AUM to alternative assets in Asia, compared to 37% in North America and 26% in EMEA (Panel B). While this relatively low allocation partly reflects the barriers discussed and different risk preferences, it also points to a large potential for growth. Recently, Japanese regulators have called on the Government Pension Investment Fund to increase investments in alternative assets (Reuters, 2025[45]).

Figure 2.19. Institutional investor asset allocation, 2024
Copy link to Figure 2.19. Institutional investor asset allocation, 2024

Asia’s private equity market shows strong growth potential amid low institutional allocation

Public market reforms designed to address structural issues have had positive effects on the PE industry. This can be seen in the growing pressure on listed companies to focus on corporate governance and shareholder value in many Asian markets. The effect has been strongest in Japan, but initiatives aiming to deliver higher value to shareholders have also been implemented in China, Korea and Thailand (Fidelity, 2024[47]). The result has been an increasing openness to the divestiture of non-core assets, as well as operational changes. The potential for buyout carveouts has thus improved markedly, especially in Japan and Korea. There have also been cases of activist funds successfully pressuring management into overhauling business structures (Bain & Co, 2025[48]; KPMG, 2024[37]; IFLR, 2023[49]).

The positive effects on transparency and valuations of this focus on corporate governance also impact the quality of assets and exit opportunities. A greater emphasis on return on equity – sometimes explicitly stated in reforms to increase shareholder value – can also better align the views of current owners with those of PE funds, remove some of the reticence towards outside capital and increase the appetite for mergers and acquisitions.

2.4. Corporate governance and enforcement in public equity markets

Copy link to 2.4. Corporate governance and enforcement in public equity markets

Sound corporate governance plays a crucial role in supporting healthy and resilient capital markets. As outlined in the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, effective corporate governance frameworks promote economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability. They also build trust in capital markets by protecting investors and fostering fair, transparent and predictable market practices. In addition, sound corporate governance frameworks encourage companies to operate with integrity and accountability, thereby making it easier and cheaper for them to access capital markets.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis revealed severe weaknesses in financial systems and corporate governance frameworks across Asia, following which many economies implemented wide-ranging reforms to restore stability and rebuild investor trust. These reforms were carried out through amendments to company law, stricter securities regulations, updated listing requirements and the introduction or overhaul of corporate governance codes. Regulators aim to align corporate governance frameworks with international standards, for example by introducing legal and regulatory requirements for independent directors and enhancing transparency.

Figure 2.20. Development of corporate governance frameworks in Asia
Copy link to Figure 2.20. Development of corporate governance frameworks in Asia

11 of 18 Asian jurisdictions analysed either updated or introduced their corporate governance codes in the last five years

In Asian jurisdictions, core corporate governance requirements are embedded in binding instruments such as company law, securities regulations and listing rules (Kirchmaier and Gerner-Beuerle, 2021[59]). The legal and regulatory frameworks define the mandatory baseline for corporate governance, including the fiduciary duties of directors, shareholder rights, financial reporting standards and requirements for board committees. For example, disclosure and transparency obligations, including the frequency and scope of financial disclosures, are typically specified in securities laws and listing standards. Additionally, several jurisdictions also legally require companies to establish audit committees, either through legislation, regulations or listing rules (OECD, 2023[50]).

Besides these mandatory baselines, nearly all Asian jurisdictions have adopted corporate governance codes to complement existing laws and regulations. These codes play a key role in shaping national corporate governance practices by providing principles and recommendations that often go beyond the minimum set in law or regulations. Most jurisdictions follow a “comply or explain” approach, where companies are expected to comply with the code’s provisions or publicly explain the reasons for non-compliance (Figure 2.20). In contrast, Cambodia, China and India enforce mandatory compliance. Malaysia takes a more rigorous approach than “comply or explain” by requiring companies to demonstrate how they have effectively implemented the corporate governance code in practice. In Indonesia and Viet Nam, the code is voluntary.

In recent years, many Asian jurisdictions have continued to strengthen their corporate governance frameworks, particularly to improve transparency and minority shareholder protection. Of the 18 jurisdictions analysed in this report, 10 have made updates to their corporate governance codes in the last five years aimed at aligning domestic regulatory frameworks with global best practices. Recent updates of corporate governance codes have primarily focused on strengthening sustainability practices. In addition, there has been an emphasis on enhancing board independence. Updates include clearer criteria for independent directors, higher independence thresholds, tenure limits and the separation of the CEO and chair roles. They also encourage greater board diversity with respect to gender, age and professional background, and reinforce board-level accountability for ESG matters.

2.4.1. Regulatory enforcement

Asian capital markets have been successful in attracting new listings of companies, yet corporate governance standards and practices remain uneven across jurisdictions, particularly in emerging markets. While developed markets generally have corporate governance frameworks aligned with international standards, many emerging markets lag behind both in terms of framework development and enforcement. Weak enforcement is a common issue in emerging and developing Asia, undermining the effectiveness of governance frameworks. Regulatory enforcement is particularly limited in parts of Southeast Asia, including in jurisdictions such as Indonesia and the Philippines (ACGA, 2023[60]). This deficiency is often compounded by a lack of regulatory capacity and the absence of clear strategies for strengthening corporate governance. Adding to this complexity, state ownership continues to play an important role in several markets - particularly in China and India - where governance practices may reflect the unique responsibilities and influence of the state. These differences help explain the varying approaches to enforcement, investor protection and the role of public sector actors across the region.

Besides, many Asian regulators operate with limited financial, human and technical resources, constraining the effective enforcement of corporate governance frameworks. Using as reference the number of staff of relevant securities regulators in selected Asian jurisdictions and in the United States and the United Kingdom, appears that India, Hong Kong (China) (SFC, 2024[61]) and Japan have fewer staff per listed company compared to the United States and the United Kingdom (Financial Services Agency, 2024[62]) (FCA, 2023[63]). For instance, in 2017, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI, 2024[64]) had only 780 employees compared to 4 554 at the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2024[65]). This means that SEBI had roughly one employee for every six listed companies, whereas the SEC had about one per company. Although SEBI increased its staff to more than 1 000 in recent years, this still equates to one employee for every five companies. There is other evidence of constraints in regulatory capacity in the region. For example, in Indonesia and the Philippines, the number of insider trading cases reported is very low, suggesting limited enforcement activity due to a lack of investigate resources (ACGA, 2020[66]).

Low levels of corporate governance enforcement in Asia are also reflected in broader governance indicators, such as the World Bank’s rule of law index (Figure 2.21). While this indicator covers a wide range of areas beyond corporate governance, it nonetheless reflects the overall legal and institutional environment of a country and can thus be seen as related to the enforcement of the corporate governance framework. Most Asian jurisdictions lag behind the United Kingdom and the United States with respect to the legal and institutional environment. Moreover, there are significant differences between Asian economies. Developed economies, such as Singapore and Japan, rank highly, even outperforming the United States and the United Kingdom, while emerging markets such as Pakistan, Lao PDR and Cambodia lag significantly behind.

The limited enforcement of corporate governance regulations in Asia is also reflected in the relatively low levels of monetary sanctions imposed for corporate misconduct. Compared to global peers, fines in many Asian jurisdictions are modest, reducing their deterrent effect. For instance, in 2023, Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) imposed total fines of just HKD 49.9 million (~ USD 6.4 million), less than 0.1% of the USD 8.2 billion levied by the US SEC in its 2024 fiscal year (Caproasia, 2024[67]; SEC, 2024[68]). Even in large markets such as China and India, typical fines for securities violations are in the millions of USD rather than billions. China’s State Commission for Regulatory Compliance (SCRC) recently imposed its largest-ever corporate fine of CNY 4.18 billion (~ USD 572.8 million) against Evergrande (Reuters, 2024[69]).

Figure 2.21. Rule of law
Copy link to Figure 2.21. Rule of law

Most Asian EMDEs lag behind developed markets with respect to the legal and institutional environment

2.4.2. Concentrated ownership and company groups

Public equity markets in Asia are characterised by high ownership concentration, with many listed companies controlled by a few dominant shareholders. Compared to markets dominated by institutional investors such as the United States and the United Kingdom, in Asia, families, company groups and the state often hold significantly more stakes in listed companies. This concentrated ownership structure has notable implications for corporate governance, affecting minority shareholder rights and market valuations.

Company groups often include both listed and unlisted firms and use ownership stakes to maintain internal control and interconnectedness. An OECD analysis of the 50 largest companies in 15 major markets (including some Asian markets) at the end of 2019 found that all were part of a company group structure - either as ultimate parent companies or as subsidiaries (Medina, de la Cruz and Tang, 2022[71]). These groups have historically driven economic growth in Asia, notably benefiting from economies of scale. Company groups also function as internal capital markets, facilitating investments in growth industries and enhancing financial resilience by allocating funds within the group without relying on external capital.

However, concentrated ownership - particularly in family-owned businesses or firms with controlling shareholders - can undermine corporate governance. These ownership structures often blur the lines between ownership and management, which can lead to the appointment of successors based on family ties or loyalty rather than qualifications, increasing the risk of poor leadership and weak oversight. Controlling shareholders may also engage in practices that benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders through related-party transactions, asset transfers or the appropriation of company resources for personal or familial use. This can erode value for outside investors and undermine transparency, accountability and long-term corporate performance.

Ownership concentration is particularly pronounced in several countries across the region. The average equity held by the three largest shareholders in each company exceeds 50% in 11 out of 18 countries. Ownership concentration is particularly high in Mongolia, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, where the top three shareholders, on average, control over 70% of the shares (Figure 2.22, Panel A). In contrast, ownership tends to be more dispersed in Japan, Bangladesh and Chinese Taipei, with the top three shareholders holding less than 40% of the shares on average.

The prominence of large company groups or conglomerates is reflected in the high level of corporate sector ownership, which account for 24.3% of listed shares in the region - significantly higher than the global average of 9.2% (Figure 2.22, Panel B). Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines stand out with corporate sector ownership exceeding 40%. In these jurisdictions, company groups or conglomerates play a dominant role in the economy. For instance, in the Philippines, conglomerates represent at least 20% of GDP (Torio et al., 2021[72]). In contrast, developed markets tend to have lower levels of corporate sector ownership, with Japan exceeding one-fifth, while Hong Kong (China), Singapore, Chinese Taipei and China remain below 20%.

Further, Asia has many state-controlled companies, particularly in China and India. In these companies, minority shareholders often face the risk of having their interests subordinated to the political or non-commercial objectives pursued by the controlling state shareholder. The lack of transparency, preferential treatment and limited avenues for legal redress further exacerbate the vulnerability of minority shareholders in such corporations (Medina, de la Cruz and Tang, 2022[71]).

Figure 2.22. Ownership concentration, 2024
Copy link to Figure 2.22. Ownership concentration, 2024

Ownership concentration in Asian public equity markets is high

Combined with the prevalence of company group structures, this raises important concerns about minority shareholder protection. Despite reforms, gaps remain between practices in Asian economies and international standards (Figure 2.23, Panel A).

In most jurisdictions, the ownership threshold required to place an item on the agenda of a general shareholder meeting is set below 5% (Figure 2.23, Panel B). India, Pakistan and the Philippines set the threshold at 10%, which represents a higher barrier for minority shareholders. To call an extraordinary meeting, most jurisdictions require 10% ownership. Cambodia imposes a particularly restrictive requirement, setting the threshold at 51%, effectively preventing minority shareholders from initiating such meetings. In contrast, jurisdictions such as Korea, Japan and Chinese Taipei have adopted more shareholder-friendly practices, with thresholds below 5% to promote broader minority shareholder participation.

Figure 2.23. Protection of minority shareholders’ interests
Copy link to Figure 2.23. Protection of minority shareholders’ interests

Weak minority shareholder protections persist across Asia

2.4.3. Equity valuations in Asia

Corporate governance practices play a critical role in shaping investor confidence, market attractiveness and equity valuations. In several Asian markets, weak corporate governance, combined with low dividend payout ratios, have been linked to low stock market valuations. Key factors leading to market undervaluation include concentrated ownership structures, such as family-owned businesses, dominant shareholders and state-controlled firms. For example, in Korea, the influence of large family-owned conglomerates (chaebols) has historically contributed to investor lukewarmness. In India, family-controlled businesses dominate certain industries, and in China many major companies are state-owned or have complex ownership ties.

Furthermore, shareholder returns in many Asian markets have remained modest, further reducing the attractiveness of listed equities for both domestic and foreign investors. Many Asian companies have historically favoured retaining earnings or reinvesting in growth over distributing profits to shareholders. Over the last ten years, median dividend payout ratios remained below 30% of net income in Japan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Korea and India (Figure 2.24, Panel A).

Figure 2.24. Corporate payout ratios in Asia
Copy link to Figure 2.24. Corporate payout ratios in Asia

Listed companies in several Asian jurisdictions tend to pay limited dividends to shareholders

By contrast, median payout ratios to shareholders in the United Kingdom were 57% of net income, while those in France and Germany over 40%. In 2023, the company level breakdown also suggests weak shareholder payouts in many Asian markets. In Korea, for example, less than 40% of listed companies have a dividend payout ratio exceeding 30% (Panel B). This ratio is even smaller in India, at 26%. There are signs that Japanese companies are increasing payouts, driven by recent corporate governance reforms and the initiative launched in 2023 by the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) to enhance capital efficiency. The TSE identified higher share buybacks and dividends as effective tools to achieve more efficient use of capital (JPX, 2023[87]). Reflecting this development, in 2023, nearly half of Japanese companies distributed more than 30% of their net income as dividends (Figure 2.24, Panel B).

The limited shareholder returns in many Asian markets may be one factor behind persistently low equity valuations, reflected in the subdued price-to-book ratios observed across the region. The price-to-book ratio (PBR) of the MSCI Asia-Pacific index has consistently remained subdued, aligning closely with the levels seen in the Emerging Markets Index (Figure 2.25, Panel A). Although Asian economies have accounted for almost 80% of the index, the average PBR for Asia-Pacific over the 2015-2024 period stood at 1.5, slightly below the emerging markets average of 1.6, and significantly lower than the global average of 2.6.

At the country level, Korea and Hong Kong (China) have recorded particularly low PBRs, averaging 1.0 and 1.2 respectively over the past decade, with both falling below 1.0 by the end of 2024 (Panel B). In contrast, Chinese Taipei stands out with a much stronger performance, supported in part by a robust technology sector; its average PBR over the past decade is 2.1, rising to 2.5 over the last five years.

Figure 2.25. Equity valuations in Asian markets
Copy link to Figure 2.25. Equity valuations in Asian markets

The equity valuation reflected in the price-to-book ratios varies across jurisdictions

China introduced reforms in 2023 aimed at improving stock market performance. Among these, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council updated the criteria used to assess SOEs, shifting the focus from net profits to return-on-equity Korea has also taken steps to address persistent undervaluation through the introduction of the “Value-Up Program” in 2024 inspired by Japan’s reforms. The programme is built around three pillars: promoting voluntary disclosure of value-enhancement plans with incentives such as tax benefits; strengthening investor engagement via a new Korea Value-Up Index, revised stewardship codes, and improved access to financial data; and establishing support mechanisms within the Korea Exchange (KRX), including training, consulting and a centralised information portal (FSC, 2024[88]).

2.5. Investors in Asian stock markets

Copy link to 2.5. Investors in Asian stock markets

By the end of 2024, the ownership structure of listed companies in Asia was characterised by the strong presence of corporations and the public sector, and high levels of ownership concentration. In terms of the relative importance of each category of investors, there are significant differences between Asia and the rest of the world. Institutional investors constitute the largest category of investors globally, making up 47% of total equity holdings (Figure 2.26). However, this percentage is notably lower in Asia at 18%. Conversely, corporations are predominant owners of public equity in Asia reflecting the prominent existence of company group structures. Particularly, their holdings account for 18% of the total, while globally, corporations only own 9% of public equity. The ownership share of the public sector, as well as that of strategic individuals, is also slightly higher in Asia compared to global levels.

The distribution also varies widely within the region. While in countries such as Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines and Sri Lanka corporations own over 40% of the stock market, in China, Singapore and Hong Kong (China) their importance is much lower. The public sector is also an important owner in China, Malaysia and Viet Nam. While institutional investor holdings are sizeable in Japan, India and Chinse Taipei, in others such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam, their holdings are below 10% of the domestic stock market capitalisation. Moreover, shareholders that are not required to disclose their ownership (Other free-float), contribute significantly to equity holdings in some Asian markets such as Singapore, Japan and Chinese Taipei.

Figure 2.26. Investor holdings, end of 2024
Copy link to Figure 2.26. Investor holdings, end of 2024

The ownership structure of listed companies varies across regions and countries

2.5.1. Institutional investors

Institutional investors play a pivotal role in global markets. In recent decades, their assets under management have significantly increased fuelled by the transformation of pension systems towards funded plans and the rising popularity of pooled investment vehicles. In Asia, this growth has not been as dynamic as in other regions.

In Asia, both domestic and foreign institutional investments have room to grow. By the end of 2024, domestic institutions only own 8% of the stock market, similar to the holdings of foreign institutions (Figure 2.27). The participation of institutional investors varies widely across markets. Some, including India (12%), Japan (14%) and Chinese Taipei (5%), have a more developed domestic institutional investor base, while others such as the Philippines, Lao PDR, Indonesia and Bangladesh have more limited domestic institutional investor participation.

Figure 2.27. Institutional investor ownership in 2024
Copy link to Figure 2.27. Institutional investor ownership in 2024

Domestic institutional ownership remains low in many Asian equity markets

Evidence shows that liquid markets attract more investments from institutional investors (Figure 2.28, Panel A). Markets, such as Japan and Chinese Taipei with high turnover ratios support large institutional stakes. In both cases, policy reforms have aimed to increase market liquidity. Since the late 1990s Japan has steadily unwound cross‑shareholdings, enforced a minimum‑float rule for the main index inclusion and introduced corporate governance and stewardship codes that pushed banks and insurers to trim strategic stakes. Chinese Taipei has one of the most active retail day trading markets - helped by low trading fees and the absence of capital gains taxes on listed shares. China retail trading and the Stock Connect programme keep turnover at high levels.

Low levels of ownership concentration also allow for more participation of institutional investors (Figure 2.28, Panel B). Markets with higher ownership concentration levels, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Viet Nam and the Philippines have low presence of institutional investors. In India, despite high levels of ownership concentration, institutional investors own 22% of the listed equity. Recent reforms increasing minimum free-float level, a surge in online brokerage accounts and the increasing share of Indian companies in the MSCI EM Index have positively impacted the market.

Globally, foreign institutional investors have become increasingly influential. They are less relevant in Asia and their presence differs across markets (Figure 2.27). The widespread use of investable indices in the asset allocation process by these investors has led to important differences with respect to institutional ownership between markets whether they are included in the index or not. For example, by the end of 2024, USD 16.9 trillion in AUM were tracking or benchmarking against MSCI indices (MSCI, 2024[89]).Therefore the inclusion in global investable indices, triggers significant foreign institutional investor investments.

Figure 2.28. Stock market liquidity, ownership concentration and institutional investor participation
Copy link to Figure 2.28. Stock market liquidity, ownership concentration and institutional investor participation

Higher institutional investor participation is associated with greater market liquidity but lower ownership concentration

Asia lacks representation in global indices but it is well represented in emerging market indices. For example, the MSCI World Index covers only large and mid-cap companies across 23 developed markets, and therefore only includes Hong Kong (China), Japan and Singapore. All three represent 6% of the index. However, Asian companies are better represented in the MSCI Emerging Markets (EM) Index (Figure 2.30, Panel A). By the end of 2024, China, Chinese Taipei and India had the largest weights in the index, with China alone accounting for 23% of the index. Other markets, including Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, maintain lower weights. Notably, the share of non-Asian economies in the EM index have declined from 40% in 2012 to 20% by 2024, highlighting the rising representation and growing attractiveness of Asian markets in the EM Index (Panel B).

Figure 2.29. Asia in MSCI Indices
Copy link to Figure 2.29. Asia in MSCI Indices

Asian countries are better represented in the MSCI Emerging Markets (EM) Index than in the MSCI World Index

However, only the largest companies (measured by free-float adjusted market capitalisation) are included in the index. Therefore, the widespread use of investable indices has led to important differences with respect to institutional ownership between companies included in an index and those not included. In most Asia markets, the average institutional investor ownership is higher in companies included in the MSCI EM Index relative to the companies not included in the index. The gap is more pronounced in the holdings of foreign institutional investors (Figure 2.30).

Figure 2.30. Institutional investors’ holdings at the company level in 2024
Copy link to Figure 2.30. Institutional investors’ holdings at the company level in 2024

Institutional investor’ holdings are higher in companies included in the MSCI EM Index relative to the companies not included in the index

The implementation of globally recognised accounting standards, such as IFRS, facilitates the participation of foreign investors by enhancing transparency and comparability across markets and making it easier to assess risks and returns. Although Asia has started to align with international standards, uneven implementation and selective deferrals continue to raise the cost of cross-border due diligence for cross-border investors. While several jurisdictions - such as Hong Kong (China), Korea, Malaysia and Singapore - have fully adopted IFRS, key markets such as India and Indonesia still maintain local accounting frameworks or modified IFRS versions. These differences create barriers for foreign investors, who must incur additional costs and perform detailed due diligence to reconcile financial statements to global IFRS standards. Moreover, frontier markets such as Viet Nam, Lao PDR and Bangladesh present even greater comparability issues due to outdated local standards and limited regulatory enforcement capacity. A summary of the hurdles investors face is provided below (Table 2.1).

Jurisdiction	Accounting framework	IFRS convergence level	Investor challenges
Bangladesh	Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards (BFRS)	Partially converged	Banks and insurers deviate from IFRS: transparency and enforcement still evolving.
Cambodia	Cambodian International Financial Reporting Standards (CIFRS)	Fully adopted	Limited expertise and oversight constrain practical application despite full IFRS.
China	Chinese Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE)	Substantially converged	Subtle measurement differences: IFRS not permitted for A-share listings.
Hong Kong (China)	Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards (HKFRS)	Fully converged	HKFRS identical to IFRS: minimal reconciliation required.
India	Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS)	Modified IFRS	Carve-outs and dual GAAP (banks still under old GAAP) limit comparability.
Indonesia	Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (SAK)	Partially converged	Most firms follow IFRS-equivalent SAK with a one-year lag; pure IFRS optional only for a few.
Japan	J-GAAP / IFRS / JMIS	Not fully converged	Mixed frameworks: J-GAAP allows goodwill amortisation and other deviations.
Korea	K-IFRS	Fully adopted	K-IFRS equals IFRS; high comparability - language is main hurdle.
Lao PDR	IFRS for PIEs; LFRS for others	Partially converged	IFRS for large entities, but SMEs use simplified outdated GAAP.
Malaysia	Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS)	Fully converged	MFRS equals IFRS: strong enforcement.
Mongolia	Full IFRS for public-interest entities	Fully adopted	Compliance quality uneven due to limited professional capacity.
Pakistan	Pakistan Financial Reporting Standards	Mostly converged	Deferrals of IFRS 9/17 for banks and insurers reduce comparability.
Philippines	Philippines Financial Reporting Standards (PFRS)	Largely converged	Temporary COVID reliefs and IFRS 17 deferral created short-term gaps.
Singapore	SFRS(I)	Fully converged	SFRS(I) word-for-word IFRS: negligible GAAP risk.
Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka Financial Reporting Standards (SLFRS)	Converged with modifications	Minor presentation tweaks, otherwise, IFRS-equivalent.
Chinese Taipei	T-IFRS	Converged with adjustments	High alignment; some timing differences (e.g. IFRS 17 deferred).
Thailand	Thai Financial Reporting Standards (TFRS)	Converged with lag	IFRS adoption lags 1–2 years; gaps narrowing.
Viet Nam	Vietnamese Accounting Standards (VAS)	Not aligned	VAS rules-based; expected IFRS adoption in 2025 - current comparability low.

Source: IFRS (2025[90]), Who uses IFRS Accounting Standards?, https://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction; China Briefing (2023[91]), China’s Accounting Standards, https://www.china-briefing.com/doing-business-guide/china/accounting-and-operations/accounting-standards; IFAC (2020[92]), International Federation of Accountants, https://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership/profile/mongolia; VIR (2024[93]), Business transparency to be improved through IFRS, https://vir.com.vn/business-transparency-to-be-improved-through-ifrs-113807.html; AOSSG (2020[94]), Asian-Oceanian Standard-Setters Group, https://www.aossg.org/images/about-us/vision%2C strategy %26 mou/AOSSG Vision Paper 2020.pdf.

Pension funds, investment funds and insurance companies

The establishment of funded pension schemes have been a successful strategy to increase the sustainability and security of pension systems worldwide. It has also enlarged domestic investor bases and made them key players in local capital markets. However, assets under management by pension funds in Asia today represent only 10% of the global figure. While the region’s more developed economies have sizeable asset-backed pension funds, others lag behind and a few still run pay‑as‑you‑go systems.

Japan, Hong Kong (China), Korea, Malaysia and Singapore stand out for the size of their pension pools. All have seen significant growth in pension assets between 2012 and 2023. Other markets are also growing. For example, between 2012-22, India’s National Pension System doubled its funded assets and Indonesia’s funds1 quadrupled, while Thailand’s funds grew to represent 8% of GDP in 2023 (Figure 2.31).

Several developing economies are also making progress. Bangladesh launched a Universal Pension Scheme in 2023 that will begin pooling contributions in 2025, while Cambodia’s National Social Security Fund started collecting mandatory payments from private‑sector workers in 2022 and is drafting rules to invest its first surpluses in local securities. Lao PDR and Mongolia still run mostly pay‑as‑you‑go systems with only token reserves, but both governments have signalled interest in creating funded pillars as part of wider capital market plans. Elsewhere, the Philippine Social Security System (SSS) “Pension Booster” programme complements existing schemes. Recent changes such as Thailand’s forthcoming auto‑enrolment National Pension Fund and Korea’s gradual loosening of offshore limits demonstrate the intention of policy makers to continue growing asset-backed pension systems in the region.

Figure 2.31. Asset-backed pension funds as a share of GDP
Copy link to Figure 2.31. Asset-backed pension funds as a share of GDP

Pension fund assets in more developed economies have grown significantly

While the growth of pension fund assets is a positive development, their portfolio allocation in many countries remains very conservative and mostly concentrated in government bonds. Investment rules still impose tight caps on equities and alternative assets (Table 2.2). Pension funds in Hong Kong (China), Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Chinese Taipei allow for greater equity allocation and, possibly as a result, are the fastest growing (Figure 2.31). Conversely, Bangladesh, Lao PDR and Mongolia forbid investment in equities. The conservative of Asian pension funds is also visible in the restrictions on investing in foreign assets. Many countries in the region anchor pension portfolios in domestic government bonds. Yet, schemes that now permit 20-60% of assets offshore – Cambodia, China, Korea, Japan, Malaysia and Chinese Taipei – deliver better risk-adjusted returns (OECD, 2024[101]; 2024[102]; KWSP, 2024[103]).

Economy	Foreign assets	Equity	Alternative assets	Regulation/source
Bangladesh	0% AUM	n/a (rules pending)	n/a	Universal Pension Rules 2023
Cambodia	≤ 20% AUM	≤ 80% AUM	n/a	Sub-Decree No. 44
China	≤ 20% AUM	≤ 40% AUM	≤ 20% AUM	Caijin (2006) No. 24; Order No. 12
Hong Kong (China)	No statutory cap	No statutory cap	Unlisted securities ≤ 15% AUM	PRF Code 8.10; UT Code 7.3
India	0% AUM	≤ 15% AUM	≤10% per alternative investment fund	S.O.1071(E); S.O.1710(E)
Indonesia	Foreign debt ≤ 5% AUM	≤ 20% per issuer	≤ 10% AUM	NOMOR 3/POJK.05/2015 1
Japan	≤ 63% AUM	≤ 61% AUM	≤ 5% AUM	Policy Asset Mix
Korea	≤ 53.4% AUM	≤ 62.8% AUM	≤ 14.7% AUM (revised annually)	NPS Mid-term Asset Allocation; Guidelines
Lao PDR2	0% AUM	n/a	n/a	Law   No. 095/NA 2018
Malaysia3	≤ 30% AUM	n/a	n/a	EPF Act 1991 (Act 452)
Mongolia	0% AUM	No-equities until maturity stage	n/a	General Law on Social Insurance 2024
Pakistan	≤ minimum [30% AUM, USD15 million]	≤ 50% AUM	n/a	S.R.O. 1060(I)/2007
Philippines	≤ 15% AUM	≤ 40% AUM	n/a	Social Security Act 2018
Singapore4	0% AUM	≤ 35% AUM	Gold-related ≤ 10% AUM	MOF; CPF Act 1953
Sri Lanka5	No cap	No cap	n/a	Investment Policy Statement 4.3. (a); Annual Report 2023
Chinese Taipei	≤ 60% AUM	n/a	n/a	BLI Regulations

Note: The notes for the table are available at the end of this chapter.

1. Indonesian regulation number 3 issued by Financial Services Authority (OJK).

2. As of June 2025, the “specific regulation on investment” foreseen in Article 82 of Law No. 095/NA of Lao PDR had not yet been issued publicly; consequently, the Fund is de facto invested only in domestic bank deposits and government bonds.

3. Malaysia has no statutory percentage limits and asset mix is governed by Section 26-27 of the EPF Act 1991 and by Minister of Finance directions (internal SAA sets working ranges as a policy and not by law).

4. In Singapore, all assets from the Central Provident Fund are invested in government securities. The system provides more investing options through the CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS).

5. In Sri Lanka despite not having limits to invest abroad and in equities, the fund doesn’t invest in foreign assets and historically have kept investment in local equity of less than 5% of AUM.

Source: publicly available sources.

While asset-backed pension funds can provide the cornerstone of Asia’s home-grown institutional investor base, the growth of investment funds and insurance companies is also important to mobilise household savings and deepen capital markets.

Investment fund assets in Asia have grown and they currently represent 22% of the global figure. Since 2012, investment fund AUM have grown significantly in Hong Kong (China), Singapore and Chinese Taipei. The industry has also expanded in Korea, supported by tax-advantaged schemes such as ISA (Business Korea, 2025[104]), and in Japan, supported by NISA and Tsumitate NISA (Hay Insights, 2024[105]). Fund assets in India and China also rose. The size of investment funds in the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan remains below 5% of GDP (Figure 2.32, Panel A). Less developed markets in the region lack a sizeable investment fund sector. Bangladesh, Cambodia and Lao PDR have yet to launch retail collective investment schemes. While legal frameworks now exist, assets under management remain close to zero because the capital market infrastructure is thin and institutional investors favour bank deposits and government securities. Mongolia also has virtually no investment funds despite recent legislation to promote them, as low liquidity and limited custodial services deter fund sponsors.

Alongside pension and investment funds, the insurance sector is playing an increasingly important role in Asia’s capital markets. The assets managed by the industry in Asia represent 27% of the global figure. With long-term investment horizons and a growing asset base, insurers are well-positioned to provide stable, patient capital that supports growth. Since 2012, insurance assets have grown in Japan, Hong Kong (China), Korea, Singapore and Chinese Taipei. Most South and South-East Asian markets also saw their insurance assets grow, but at lower rates (Figure 2.32, Panel B).

Regulatory changes, savings patterns and market infrastructure explain the development observed in the investment fund and insurance industries in Asia. Tax incentives for collective investment in Malaysia and Thailand, streamlined electronic know-your-customer procedures in India and Indonesia, and expanded investment limits for insurers in Korea and Chinese Taipei has spurred asset growth. High household saving in North-East Asia provides a deep asset pool, whereas lower-income ASEAN and South Asian economies are still reallocating savings from property or deposits into financial products. In Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan the market infrastructure has also support rapid asset growth.

Figure 2.32. Assets under management of investment funds and insurance companies
Copy link to Figure 2.32. Assets under management of investment funds and insurance companies

Investments fund assets under management have grown more than those of insurance companies

2.5.2. Retail investors

Retail investors can better manage their savings and take part in value creation by participating in capital markets. The rise of commission-free trading platforms and higher levels of financial literacy have increased their participation and influence in equity markets in recent years. However, in Asia, their participation varies widely between countries.

In some markets - Korea, Singapore and Chinese Taipei - retail investors play a significant role in equity trading, often accounting for a substantial portion of the daily turnover. In Chinese Taipei, for instance, domestic individual investors represented 54% of the daily turnover in 2024 (TWSE, 2025[106]), and in Korea, they accounted for 64% in 2023 (Park, 2023[107]). The influence of retail investors in the domestic equity market has also grown in Singapore (SGX, 2024[108]). This robust retail activity is facilitated by widespread use of digital brokerages, integrated wealth platforms and growing financial literacy levels. Digital innovation, including mobile-based platforms, are easing the process to open accounts and reducing transaction costs. Initiatives such as “Yuk Nabung Saham” in Indonesia, “InvestSmart” in Malaysia and the “Tsumitate NISA” framework in Japan are examples of targeted efforts to promote long-term, disciplined retail participation.

In some Asian countries, retail participation is constrained by the low ability to save. Only in China, Malaysia and Thailand over 60% of adults report having savings. Moreover, according to the World Bank’s Global Findex 2021, a majority of adults in countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Bangladesh expressed concern about meeting common financial obligations such as medical expenses, school fees or utility bills (World Bank, 2021[109]).

Financial literacy also remains a challenge in some countries of the region. Many adults have a limited understanding of financial products and basic money management, which also drives disparities in digital payment use (Figure 2.33). In Bangladesh, Cambodia and Pakistan, bank account penetration and digital‑payment use are low. On the contrary, in China, Thailand and Mongolia, four in five adults hold a formal banking account, more than half can explain core financial concepts, and over 60% use digital payments, on par with the United States and Europe. China, Malaysia, Mongolia, Thailand and Sri Lanka have very widespread bank account ownership (over 80%). Digital‑payment penetration is high in China, Mongolia and Thailand, but overall remains low.

Figure 2.33. Accessibility to financial products
Copy link to Figure 2.33. Accessibility to financial products

Disparities in the share of the population with access to financial products remain pronounced across Asia

Financial technologies are the main lever countries use to increase access to financial services and promote inclusion. India, Indonesia and Viet Nam focus on cost and convenience. By implementing commission‑free mobile brokers such as Ajaib, micro‑investment wallets like GInvest, and Aadhaar‑based e‑KYC removed paperwork and minimum‑balance hurdles, bringing more than a million first‑time investors online in each market during 2021 alone (Table 2.3).

Upper‑middle income economies with extensive smartphone penetration are shifting from access to depth. Korea’s Kakao Pay Securities and Chinese Taipei’s odd‑lot trading reform offer fractional or one‑share purchases and real‑time analytics, sustaining retail turnover above 50% of market value - double the share seen in the United States or Europe. Initiatives such as bKash in Bangladesh and LAO M‑Money in Lao PDR are building basic digital‑cash ecosystems first; only once trust, identity and payment rails are in place can stock exchange apps (e.g. CSX Trade) gain traction.

Country	FinTech / Initiative	Year	Core feature
Bangladesh	bKash + AmarStock	2011 / 2019	Mobile wallet for 60 million+ users DSE trading app builds on wallet ID for stock investing
Cambodia	CSX Trade App	2019	Exchange app for remote account opening and orders
China	Yu’e Bao (Ant Group)	2013	No‑minimum money market fund embedded in Alipay 600 million+ investors
Hong Kong (China)	SoFi HK (ex‑8 Securities)	2020	Zero‑commission multi‑market mobile broker
India	Zerodha / Upstox	2010 / 2013	Discount online brokers with paperless Aadhaar e‑KYC (ID Number)
Indonesia	Ajaib / Bibit	2019	Commission‑free stock & fund apps; gamified interface
Japan	LINE Securities	2019	One‑share trading inside LINE messenger
Korea	Kakao Pay Securities	2020	Brokerage in super‑app; 7 million+ accounts
Lao PDR	LAO M‑Money	2017	Nationwide mobile‑money network
Malaysia	Rakuten Trade	2017	First fully digital broker; flat RM 7 fee
Mongolia	Ard App	2018	Super‑app combining banking & stock trading
Pakistan	Roshan Digital Account	2020	Diaspora online access to PSX and bonds
Philippines	GCash – GInvest	2021	Micro‑fund investing (₱50 minimum) inside e‑wallet
Singapore	Tiger Brokers SG	2020	Low‑fee global trading app with social community
Sri Lanka	CSE Mobile Appv	2020	100% online certificate of deposit account opening; IPO subscription
Chinese Taipei	Intraday Odd‑Lot Trading	2020	1‑share trades during normal hours
Thailand	e‑KYC Brokerage Onboarding	2020	National Digital ID-enabled instant online account opening
Viet Nam	e‑KYC for securities	2021	App‑based brokerage account creation

Source: publicly available sources.

2.6. Key policy considerations

Copy link to 2.6. Key policy considerations

Over the past two decades, public equity markets in Asia have experienced significant growth and transformation, emerging as some of the most dynamic markets globally. However, levels of market development differ widely across the region. Institutional and foreign investor participation continue to be limited, while retail investor participation remains low. Strengthening corporate governance and broadening investor participation will be crucial to sustain the growth and competitiveness of Asia’s public equity markets.

Strengthening public equity markets to continue supporting economic growth. Asian public equity markets have grown remarkably since the early 2000s, becoming an increasingly vital source of financing for companies in the region. However, while some economies have developed vibrant and liquid markets, others lag behind, underscoring the need for targeted policy action. While the capital raised by non-financial companies as a share of GDP has continued to rise in China and Japan, it has started to decrease in all other economies.

Tailored strategies are needed to continue growing the use of equity markets, while also expanding access in less developed markets. This includes streamlining listing procedures, improving disclosure standards, supporting cross-border integration and broadening the domestic investor base. Continued regional co-operation and regulatory harmonisation can also help bridge the gap between advanced economies and emerging markets in the region. Overall, more developed public equity markets will enhance corporate resilience and increase competitiveness.

Enhancing the effectiveness of equity markets for companies with high-growth potential. Equity markets have become a vital source of financing for growth companies. However, targeted policy measures are needed to enhance the effectiveness of these equity markets for growth companies and address the remaining challenges. To strengthen access to capital for high-growth companies, policy makers in Asia should continue to streamline listing procedures and support the development of dedicated growth markets. Tailored regulatory frameworks, featuring proportional and flexible requirements, sponsor mechanisms and reduced listing costs, can ease access for companies with strong growth potential but limited collateral and/or financial history.

At the same time, jurisdictions should also consider providing incentives to increase research coverage on smaller companies and promoting initiatives that could enhance their visibility among investors. These efforts can help ensure that equity markets for growth companies serve as effective platforms for innovation and scale-up financing.

Unlocking the full potential of SOEs through strategic listings and governance reforms. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are central to Asia’s economic structure and capital markets. However, to unlock their full potential, decisions on strategic listings and reforms to improve their governance are needed. To maximise the benefits of listing, policy makers should prioritise profitable SOEs with sound governance structures and support these listings with broader market reforms.

For already listed SOEs, several structural challenges remain. Many exhibit low free-float levels and concentrated ownership, which constrain market liquidity and limit broader investor participation. Moreover, unresolved corporate governance issues, such as limited board independence or weak minority shareholder protections, can reduce the appeal of these companies to institutional investors. Increasing the free-float and addressing governance shortcomings would not only enhance transparency and accountability but also contribute to more liquid and deep public equity markets.

Strengthening private equity and venture capital ecosystems to ensure availability of funding at all stages of development (from start-ups to large caps). Private and public equity markets complement each other. In Asia, this is the case in some countries where public markets have been thriving. In others, private equity and venture capital are less developed, due to the very few exit opportunities and scarce number of deals. While regulators in Asia should ensure transparency and subject private funds to appropriate rules. It is also important ensuring local markets remain attractive by providing flexible fund structure options that align with international best practices and are not unduly cumbersome or restrictive.

In markets where the funding ecosystem is not be fully developed, authorities could consider supporting the system at key development stages. Regulators should ensure that capital controls, restrictions on foreign investment, anti-trust and M&A regulations do not unduly inhibit private equity dynamism. Finally, policy makers could assess the potential benefits of directing more funding from public institutional investors towards alternative assets and of establishing private-public funds.

Strengthening corporate governance regulation and practices to protect investors and enhance market integrity. While many Asian countries have in recent years updated their corporate governance frameworks, weak enforcement remains a critical challenge. Regulatory authorities often lack the financial and human resources necessary for effective supervision and enforcement, particularly in emerging markets. Enhancing the autonomy, staffing and technical capacity of regulators is essential to ensure consistent and credible rule enforcement.

Moreover, high ownership concentration across Asian public equity markets raises concerns about the protection of minority shareholders. Some jurisdictions should adopt stronger rules requiring independent director oversight and disclosure of and appropriate mechanisms to deal with material related party transactions. In addition, corporate groups, including family-owned businesses, dominate many Asian economies and present unique governance risks. Transparent disclosure of group structures, beneficial ownership and related party transactions are necessary to improve accountability and investor confidence. Regulators should establish clear group governance guidelines and mandate comprehensive disclosure of control and risk-management structures across listed entities.

Strengthening the domestic institutional investor base. The size of domestic institutional investors - particularly pension funds - is smaller than what would be expected given the region’s economic size. Widening pension fund coverage, moving to asset-backed pension systems and fast‑tracking the professional management of the new pension funds could improve the sustainability of pensions in the region, while also providing a larger pool of long-term patient capital to support corporate investment and economic growth. Policy makers can also help by giving pension funds, insurers and local asset managers prudent room to invest beyond bank deposits and sovereign bonds. This can generate a steady domestic demand for securities and reduce the reliance on more volatile foreign flows.

To enlarge the investable universe of securities, authorities may need to incentivise higher minimum free-float levels and promote the unwinding of cross-shareholdings, while boosting liquidity via market-making incentives, lower transaction costs and real-time disclosure upgrades.

Asian markets should accelerate full IFRS adoption and strengthen regulatory enforcement to improve financial transparency, reduce investment barriers and facilitate cross-border comparability to incentivise foreign investments. Policy makers could also implement targeted reforms to enhance liquidity, increase free-float levels and improve corporate governance to achieve greater inclusion in investable indices to attract more foreign investors. Enhancing retail investor participation in equity markets is another challenge for the region. Simple savings accounts, digital investment tools and regulatory sandboxes to test new products can certainly provide the right incentives to increase savings and reduce the cost of accessing capital markets for retail investors.

References

[35] ABLJ (2025), Comparison of legal developments in private equity, https://law.asia/private-equity-disputes-china-india-trends-resolution/ (accessed on 28 March 2025).

[42] ABLJ (2023), A comparison of M&A laws, Asia Business Law Journal, https://law.asia/comparison-mergers-acquisitions-laws-asia/ (accessed on 28 March 2025).

[60] ACGA (2023), CG Watch 2023: A New Order, https://www.acga-asia.org/cgwatch-detail.php?id=482 (accessed on 1 April 2025).

[66] ACGA (2020), CG Watch 2020: Future Promise, https://www.acga-asia.org/cgwatch-detail.php?id=425 (accessed on 27 March 2025).

[32] AIMA (2025), Golden opportunities in Japan: A new era for global asset managers, Alternative Investment Management Association, https://www.aima.org/article/golden-opportunities-in-japan-a-new-era-for-global-asset-managers.html (accessed on 5 May 2025).

[51] Allen, J. and L. Rui (2018), Awakening Governance: ACGA China Corporate Governance Report 2018, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/25/awakening-governance-acga-china-corporate-governance-report-2018/ (accessed on 2 April 2025).

[94] AOSSG (2020), Asian-Oceanian Standard-Setters Group: IFRS Adoption / Convergence Status, https://www.aossg.org/images/about-us/vision%2C strategy %26 mou/AOSSG Vision Paper 2020.pdf.

[57] Asghar, T., T. Mortimer and M. Bilal (2022), “Corporate Governance Codes in Pakistan: A Review”, Journal of Law & Social Studies, https://www.advancelrf.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Vol-4-No.-3-2.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2025).

[16] ASIC (2025), Australia’s evolving capital markets: a discussion paper on the dynamics between public and private markets, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, https://download.asic.gov.au/media/44hh5ctv/australia-s-evolving-capital-markets-a-discussion-paper-on-the-dynamics-between-public-and-private-markets.pdf (accessed on 14 April 2025).

[48] Bain & Co (2025), Asia-Pacific Private Equity Report 2025, https://www.bain.com/insights/asia-pacific-private-equity-report-2025/ (accessed on 30 March 2025).

[84] Baker McKenzie (2025), Global Public M&A Guide, https://resourcehub.bakermckenzie.com/en/resources/global-public-ma-guide/asia-pacific/taiwan/topics/before-a-public-takeover-bid#:~:text=1 (accessed on 23 April 2025).

[85] Baker McKenzie (2025), Global Public M&A Guide, Thailand, https://resourcehub.bakermckenzie.com/en/resources/global-public-ma-guide/asia-pacific/thailand/topics/overview (accessed on 23 April 2025).

[11] BCG (2020), The Promise for Private Equity in Asia-Pacific, https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/navigating-growing-asia-pacific-private-equity-market (accessed on 28 March 2025).

[5] Bursa Malaysia (2024), Issuer Services, https://www.bursamalaysia.com/listing/get_listed/issuer_services (accessed on 7 May 2025).

[104] Business Korea (2025), Korea’s ISA Subscribers Surpass 6 Million, Driven by Investment Brokerage Type, https://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=238720 (accessed on 27 May 2025).

[58] CA Sri Lanka (2017), CA Sri Lanka launches revised Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance 2017, https://www.casrilanka.com/casl/index.php?option=com_content&id=2596:ca-sri-lanka- (accessed on 2 April 2025).

[67] Caproasia (2024), Hong Kong SFC Report 2023/2024, https://www.caproasia.com/2024/07/05/hong-kong-sfc-report-2023-2024-2611-hong-kong-listed-companies-with-3-8-trillion-market-value-30-6-billion-ipo-proceeds-raised-in-2023-asset-wealth-management-aum-at-3-9-trillion-926-hong-ko/#:~:text=match%20at%20L716% (accessed on 27 March 2025).

[33] Chambers (2024), Challenges Facing Evergreen Funds in China, Chambers and Partners, https://chambers.com/legal-trends/the-practice-of-evergreen-funds-in-china (accessed on 15 April 2025).

[76] Chambers and Partners (2024), Shareholder’s Rights & Shareholder Activism 2024, https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/shareholders-rights-shareholder-activism-2024/china/trends-and-developments/O18371#:~:text=in%20the%20New%20Company%20Law,This%20change%20significantly%20broadens (accessed on 23 April 2025).

[40] China Briefing (2024), Unlocking China’s Elderly Market: Tapping into the Power of the ’Silver Economy’, Dezan Shira & Associates, https://www.china-briefing.com/doing-business-guide/china/sector-insights/unlocking-china-s-elderly-market-tapping-into-the-power-of-the-silver-economy (accessed on 5 May 2025).

[91] China Briefing (2023), China’s Accounting Standards, https://www.china-briefing.com/doing-business-guide/china/accounting-and-operations/accounting-standards (accessed on 23 May 2025).

[100] Chinese Taipei’s Bureau of Labor Funds (2024), Annual Report 2023, https://www.blf.gov.tw/media/ti2lgz05/2023.pdf.

[99] Chinese Taipei’s Bureau of Labor Funds (2013), Annual Report 2012, https://www.blf.gov.tw/media/ffjfh434/2012.pdf.

[12] Colonnelli, E., B. Li and E. Liu (2024), “Investing with the Government: A Field Experiment in China”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 132/1, pp. 248-294, https://doi.org/10.1086/726237.

[13] Comerton-Forde, C. (2025), “Report REP 807 Evaluating the state of the Australian public equity market: Evidence from data and academic literature”.

[18] Council of the EU (2024), Listings on European stock exchanges: Council adopts the listing act - Consilium, Council of the EU, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/08/listings-on-european-stock-exchanges-council-adopts-the-listing-act/ (accessed on 5 May 2025).

[43] Deloitte (2023), Future of the Thai startup and venture capital ecosystem, Deloitte, https://www.cmri.or.th/uploads/images/1675822828VC_FullReportFinal_Print_Version_7Feb2023.pdf.

[56] EBRD (2016), Corporate Governance in Transition Economies, Mongolia Country Report, https://www.ebrd.com/content/dam/ebrd_dxp/assets/pdfs/legal-reform/corporate-governance/sector-assessment/m/Mongolia-SUMMARY-FINAL.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2025).

[54] ECGI (1999), Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance, https://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/codes/documents/code_korea.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2025).

[110] EPF (2023), Annual Report 2023, https://epf.lk/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/EPF-2023-English-Final.pdf.

[97] EPF (2023), Employees Provident Fund Annual Report 2023, https://www.kwsp.gov.my/documents/d/guest/9-epf_iar23-financials.

[96] EPF (2012), Annual Report 2012, https://epf.lk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/financial_highlights_2012.pdf.

[98] EPF (2012), Employees Provident Fund Annual Report 2012, https://www.kwsp.gov.my/documents/d/guest/financial_statements.

[20] FCA (2025), Private market valuation practices, Financial Conduct Authority, https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/private-market-valuation-practices (accessed on 5 May 2025).

[19] FCA (2024), FCA overhauls listing rules to boost growth and innovation on UK stock markets | FCA, Financial Conduct Authority, https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-overhauls-listing-rules-boost-growth-and-innovation-uk-stock-markets (accessed on 5 May 2025).

[63] FCA (2023), Annual Report and Accounts 2022/2023, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/annual-reports/annual-report-2022-23.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2025).

[47] Fidelity (2024), Asian stocks enter the dividend age, Fidelity International, https://www.fidelityinternational.com/editorial/article/asian-stocks-enter-the-dividend-age-b65424-en5/ (accessed on 12 October 2024).

[62] Financial Services Agency (2024), Organisation chart, https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/about/organization/fsa_org_chart_jp.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2024).

[31] Financial Services Agency (2024), Policy Plan for Promoting Japan as a Leading Asset Management Center, Financial Services Agency, https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/policy/pjlamc/20231214.html (accessed on 5 May 2025).

[88] FSC (2024), Active Support to be Provided to Promote Voluntary Efforts of Listed Companies in Enhancing Their Value, https://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/pr010101/81778 (accessed on 17 April 2025).

[27] FSC Korea (2025), Press Releases - Reform Plans for IPO and Delisting Rules, Financial Services Commission, https://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/pr010101/83926?srchCtgry=&curPage=&srchKey=&srchText=&srchBeginDt=&srchEndDt= (accessed on 15 April 2025).

[36] FT (2024), Private equity investors trapped in China as top firms fail to find exit deals, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/0575e216-8dae-4df6-bf50-312f78468e99 (accessed on 28 March 2025).

[105] Hay Insights (2024), “HayInsights”, Maximizing Mutual Funds Growth with Japan’s new NISA 2024, https://hayinsights.com/mutual-funds-investments-japans-new-nisa-2024/ (accessed on 27 May 2025).

[23] HKEX (2024), Joint Statement on Enhanced Timeframe for New Listing Application Process, The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, https://www.hkex.com.hk/News/Regulatory-Announcements/2024/241018news?sc_lang=en.

[92] IFAC (2020), International Federation of Accountants: Mongolia, https://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership/profile/mongolia.

[49] IFLR (2023), M&A Report 2023: South Korea, https://www.iflr.com/article/2bdnonw0fz7uobkgwudj4/sponsored/m-a-report-2023-south-korea (accessed on 30 March 2025).

[90] IFRS (2025), Who uses IFRS Accounting Standards?, https://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/ (accessed on 2025).

[29] ION Analytics (2024), Putting private wealth into PE: The evolution of evergreen products in Asia, https://ionanalytics.com/insights/mergermarket/putting-private-wealth-into-pe-the-evolution-of-evergreen-products-in-asia/ (accessed on 27 May 2025).

[14] IOSCO (2023), Thematic Analysis: Emerging Risks in Private Finance Final Report, International Organization of Securities Commissions, https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD745.pdf (accessed on 15 April 2025).

[52] ISS (2024), 2024 Market IQ: India, https://insights.issgovernance.com/posts/2024-market-iq-india/ (accessed on 2 April 2025).

[87] JPX (2023), Action to Implement Management that is Conscious of Cost of Capital and Stock Price, https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1020/dreu250000004n19-att/dreu250000004n8s.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2025).

[59] Kirchmaier, T. and C. Gerner-Beuerle (2021), Corporate Governance in South Asia: Trends and Challenges, Asian Development Bank, https://doi.org/10.22617/TCS210011-2.

[37] KPMG (2024), Asia Pacific Private Equity Barometer 2024 PE investment trends and opportunities, KPMG, https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmgsites/xx/pdf/2024/11/kpmg-aspac-private-equity-barometer-2024.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf (accessed on 30 March 2025).

[103] KWSP (2024), “Employees Provident Fund”, EPF Records Total Investment Income of RM57.57 Billion for 9M 2024, https://www.kwsp.gov.my/en/w/epf-records-total-investment-income-of-rm57-57-billion-for-9m-2024-1 (accessed on 30 May 2025).

[8] Lin, K. et al. (2020), “State-owned enterprises in China: A review of 40 years of research and practice”, China Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 13/1, pp. 31-55, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2019.12.001.

[24] MAS (2025), A comprehensive set of measures to strengthen Singapore’s equities market, Monetary Authority of Singapore, https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/media-releases/2025/a-comprehensive-set-of-measures-to-strengthen-singapores-equities-market.

[30] MAS (2025), Consultation Paper on Providing Retail Access to Private Market Investment Funds, Monetary Authority of Singapore, https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas/resource/publications/consult_papers/consultation-paper-on-providing-retail-access-to-private-market-investment-funds.pdf (accessed on 15 April 2025).

[7] MAS (2021), Grant for Equity Market Singapore Scheme, https://www.mas.gov.sg/schemes-and-initiatives/grant-for-equity-market-singapore-scheme (accessed on 7 May 2025).

[71] Medina, A., A. de la Cruz and Y. Tang (2022), “Corporate ownership and concentration”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 27, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/bc3adca3-en.

[74] Ministry of Commerce (1994), The Companies Act, 1994, https://www.icsi.edu/media/portals/86/bare%20acts/Bangladesh%20COMPANIES%20ACT.pdf.

[41] Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2023), Guidelines for Corporate Takeovers-Enhancing Corporate Value and Securing Shareholders’ Interests, https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2023/08/20230831003/20230831003-b.pdf (accessed on 28 March 2025).

[77] Ministry of Justice, Korea (2020), Commercial Act, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=54525&lang=ENG.

[80] Mongolian Parliament (2011), Law on Companies, https://legalinfo.mn/en/edtl/16532642401271.

[28] Morgan Stanley (2025), Evergreen Private Equity Funds: Democratizing Private Equity, Morgan Stanley, https://www.morganstanley.com/im/en-us/individual-investor/insights/articles/evergreen-private-equity-funds.html (accessed on 15 April 2025).

[89] MSCI (2024), MSCI Indexes - Bringing clarity to global markets, https://www.msci.com/indexes (accessed on 30 May 2025).

[78] National Assembly, Lao PDR (2023), Enterprise Law, http://www.ned.moic.gov.la/Downloads/Enterprise%20Law/Eng_Enterprise%20Law_%20Final.pdf.

[86] National Assembly, Viet Nam (2020), Law on Enterprises, https://vbma.org.vn/storage/legal-documents/July2021/59_2020_QH14_451799.doc (accessed on 23 April 2025).

[75] NBC (2005), Law on Commercial Enterprises, https://www.nbc.gov.kh/download_files/legislation/laws_eng/88376-Law-on-Commercial-Enterprises-2005.pdf.

[53] NCG (2006), Indonesia’s Code of Good Corporate Governance, https://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/codes/documents/indonesia_cg_2006_en.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2025).

[9] Nguyen, H., G. Oates and M. Dunkley (2014), “A Review of the Establishment of the Stock Market in Vietnam–In Relation to other Transitional Economies”, International Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 6/10, https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v6n10p17.

[4] OECD (2025), Equity Markets for Growth Companies (forthcoming).

[102] OECD (2024), Annual Survey of Investment Regulation of Pension Providers, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/asset-backed-pensions/2024-Survey-of-Investment-Regulation-of-Pension-Providers.pdf.

[101] OECD (2024), OECD Pensions Outlook 2024: Improving Asset-backed Pensions for Better Retirement Outcomes and More Resilient Pension Systems, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/51510909-en.

[95] OECD (2024), Pension Markets in Focus 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b11473d3-en.

[50] OECD (2023), OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6d912314-en.

[17] Official Journal of the European Union (2023), REGULATION (EU) 2023/606 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, Official Journal of the European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32023R0606 (accessed on 5 May 2025).

[81] Pakistani Authority (2017), Companies Act, 2017, https://www.secp.gov.pk/document/companies-act-2017/?wpdmdl=28472.

[107] Park, A. (2023), “The Korea Times”, Retail investors take up 64% of Korean stock market, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/economy/20231114/retail-investors-take-up-64-of-korean-stock-market (accessed on 20 May 2025).

[83] Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (2007), Companies Act, No. 07 of 2007, https://www.parliament.lk/uploads/acts/gbills/english/3776.pdf.

[39] PEI (2025), What to expect from APAC private equity in 2025, Private Equity International, https://www.privateequityinternational.com/what-to-expect-from-apac-private-equity-in-2025/ (accessed on 15 April 2025).

[38] PEI (2024), Asian GPs hope for a SEA change, Private Equity International, https://www.privateequityinternational.com/asian-gps-hope-for-a-sea-change/ (accessed on 15 April 2025).

[44] PWC (2020), The Singapore Variable Capital Company - An analysis of comparative structures, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/asset-management/assets/svacc/svcc-comparatives.pdf (accessed on 15 April 2025).

[45] Reuters (2025), Japan lawmakers urge pension fund to invest in domestic private equity, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/japan-lawmakers-urge-pension-fund-invest-domestic-private-equity-2025-04-23/ (accessed on 5 May 2025).

[25] Reuters (2024), China drafts rules on tighter stock trading, listing regulations, https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/china-strengthens-stock-market-trading-listing-regulations-2024-04-12/.

[69] Reuters (2024), China fines Evergrande’s Hengda $577 mln for fraudulent bond issuance, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-fines-evergrandes-hengda-577-mln-fraudulent-bond-issuance-2024-05-31/#:~:text=BEIJING%2FHONG%20KONG%2C%20May%2031,(CSRC)%20said%20on%20Friday. (accessed on 27 March 2025).

[55] SC Malaysia (2025), Corporate Governance, https://www.sc.com.my/regulation/corporate-governance (accessed on 2 April 2025).

[26] SEBI (2025), Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements (Amendment) Regulations, Securities and Exchange Board of India, https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/regulations/mar-2025/securities-and-exchange-board-of-india-listing-obligations-and-disclosure-requirements-amendment-regulations-2025_93156.html (accessed on 5 May 2025).

[64] SEBI (2024), Annual Report 2023-24, https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/publications/aug-2024/annual-report-2022-23_74990.html (accessed on 21 March 2024).

[22] SEC (2025), Remarks at the Florida Bar’s 41st Annual Federal Securities Institute and M&A Conference, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/uyeda-remarks-florida-bar-022425 (accessed on 5 May 2025).

[65] SEC (2024), Fiscal Year 2023 Agency Financial Report, https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2023-agency-financial-report.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2024).

[68] SEC (2024), SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024, https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024-186#:~:text=The%20Securities%20and%20Exchange%20Commission,highest%20amount%20in%20SEC%20history (accessed on 27 March 2025).

[15] SEC (2023), Private Fund Adviser Reforms: Final Rules, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/files/ia-6383-fact-sheet.pdf.

[82] SEC Philippines (2021), SEC Memorandum Circular No.7, https://law.upd.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/SEC-Memorandum-Circular-No-7-S2021.pdf.

[61] SFC (2024), Annual Report 2023-2024, https://www.sfc.hk/en/Published-resources/Corporate-publications/Annual-reports/2023-2024 (accessed on 11 April 2024).

[108] SGX (2024), “Singapore Exchange”, Retail investors net buy S$1 billion of Singapore stocks in early 2024, https://www.sgx.com/research-education/market-updates/20240219-retail-investors-net-buy-s1-billion-singapore-stocks (accessed on 20 May 2025).

[79] SSM (2016), Companies Act, 2016, https://www.ssm.com.my/Pages/Legal_Framework/Companies%20-Act%20-1965-(Repealed)/aktabi_20160915_companiesact2016act777_0.pdf#:~:text=,capital%20held%20as%20treasury%20shares.

[6] The EDGE Malaysia (2022), Bursa RISE scheme’s 60 participants see 4% rise in share price, https://theedgemalaysia.com/article/bursa-rise-schemes-60-participants-see-4-rise-share-price (accessed on 7 May 2025).

[46] Thinking Ahead Institute (2024), The Asset Owner 100 - 2024, Thinking Ahead Institute, https://www.thinkingaheadinstitute.org/research-papers/the-asset-owner-100-2024/ (accessed on 31 March 2025).

[72] Torio, P. et al. (2021), Philippine Conglomerates: Their Role in Promoting Inclusive Development, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3919558.

[106] TWSE (2025), Fact Book 2025, https://www.twse.com.tw/downloads/zh/about/company/factbook/2025/3.04.html (accessed on 20 May 2025).

[21] United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (2024), United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Petition for Review of an Order of the Securities & Exchange Commission, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-60471CV0.pdf (accessed on 2 May 2025).

[93] VIR (2024), Business transparency to be improved through IFRS, https://vir.com.vn/business-transparency-to-be-improved-through-ifrs-113807.html (accessed on 26 May 2025).

[34] WealthBriefing Asia (2025), Evergreen Funds A Bright Star For Private Markets – Hamilton Lane, WealthBriefing Asia, https://wealthbriefingasia.com/article.php/Evergreen-Funds-A-Bright-Star-For-Private-Markets-%EF%BF%BD-Hamilton-Lane?id=203870 (accessed on 15 April 2025).

[73] WEF (2019), Global Competitiveness Index 4.0, https://prosperitydata360.worldbank.org/en/dataset/WEF+GCI (accessed on 22 April 2025).

[3] World Bank (2025), Stocks traded, turnover ratio of domestic shares (%), https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators/Series/CM.MKT.TRNR.

[1] World Bank (2024), Listed domestic companies dataset, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO (accessed on 13 March 2025).

[2] World Bank (2024), Market capitalization of listed domestic companies, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD (accessed on 13 March 2025).

[70] World Bank (2024), Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2024 Update, http://www.govindicators.org/ (accessed on 11 April 2025).

[109] World Bank (2021), The Global Findex, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/globalfindex/Data (accessed on 20 May 2025).

[10] World Bank; OliverWyman; The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg; ASEA (African Stock Exchange Association) (2021), Listing State-Owned Enterprises in Emerging and Developing Economies: Lessons Learned from 30 Years of Success and Failure, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/984431624443117178/pdf/Listing-State-Owned-Enterprises-in-Emerging-and-Developing-Economies-Lessons-Learned-from-30-Years-of-Success-and-Failure.pdf.

Note

Copy link to Note

← 1. Employment Social Security (PBJS), Employer Pension Fund (DPPK) and Financial Institution Pension Fund (DPLK).

Featured topics

Agriculture and fisheries

Climate change

Development

Digital

Economy

Education and skills

Employment

Environment

Finance and investment

Governance

Health

Industry, business and entrepreneurship

Regional, rural and urban development

Science, technology and innovation

Society

Taxation

Trade

Energy

Nuclear energy

Transport

Featured topics

Agriculture and fisheries

Climate change

Development

Digital

Economy

Education and skills

Employment

Environment

Finance and investment

Governance

Health

Industry, business and entrepreneurship

Regional, rural and urban development

Science, technology and innovation

Society

Taxation

Trade

Energy

Nuclear energy

Transport

Countries A - C

Countries D - I

Countries J - M

Countries N - R

Countries S - T

Countries U - Z

Regional and global engagement

Countries

Countries A - C

Countries D - I

Countries J - M

Countries N - R

Countries S - T

Countries U - Z

Regional and global engagement

Publications

Publications

Featured publications

Data

Data

Featured data

News & events

News & events

Featured events

About OECD

About

Engage with us

Work with us

Featured topics

Agriculture and fisheries

Climate change

Development

Digital

Economy

Education and skills

Employment

Environment

Finance and investment