This chapter illustrates the growth and development of Asian corporate debt markets – bonds, syndicated loans and private credit – over the last two decades, putting Asian markets into a global context. It highlights specificities of Asian markets and discusses regional and country-specific initiatives related to corporate debt markets. Based on an in-depth empirical mapping, it identifies high-level policy areas where policy makers could focus efforts to foster further market development.
Asia Capital Markets Report 2025
Abstract
Asian corporate debt markets have grown substantially over the last two decades, representing an increasing share of the global market. The expansion of corporate bond markets has been particularly stark. However, the region is still underrepresented relative to its economic weight, especially when it comes to syndicated loans and private credit.
At the end of 2024, Asian corporations owed a total of USD 13.9 trillion across the corporate bond, syndicated loan and private credit markets, equivalent to 23% of total global corporate debt. Corporate bonds represent roughly three-quarters of this debt.
In parallel to this growth, the regional distribution of outstanding amounts has changed drastically. Specifically, China has grown from representing a negligible part of total bond market borrowing in the early 2000s to more than 75% at the end of 2024. There have been similar, albeit less dramatic, developments in the syndicated loan market. The largest relative decline has been in the share of Japanese companies’ borrowing. Asian corporate debt markets are, and have historically been, heavily concentrated geographically, with the five largest markets accounting for the lion’s share of total outstanding amounts.
Despite strong growth in corporate debt markets, most Asian economies remain predominantly bank-based. The vast majority of non-financial companies’ debt financing across Asian economies is bank loans rather than debt securities, which make up an average of 14% of total debt financing. Thailand has the highest ratio of debt securities to total debt financing at 27%.
The share of debt owed by highly leveraged companies is significantly higher in Asia than globally. At the end of 2023, 58% of all debt on Asian non-financial companies’ balance sheets was owed by companies with debt-to-EBITDA ratios above 4. In addition, companies with an interest coverage ratio below 2 represent nearly a fifth of total Asian corporate debt.
In spite of high levels of leverage, credit rating data suggest that Asian debt markets (both bonds and syndicated loans) have significantly higher credit quality than global aggregates. This is partly driven by the large share of unrated bonds: 79% of all bonds issued in Asia between 2000 and 2024 lacked a rating by one of the three main international agencies, and over 80% of all rated bonds are investment grade.
Disclosed uses of proceeds in bond and loan documentation indicate that Asian companies use debt to finance real investment to a greater extent than other companies around the world, which instead tend to use debt to fund financial operations like refinancing, working capital management and shareholder payouts. This holds for both bond and syndicated loan financing and has been consistent over time. However, these data mask important regional differences; outside of China, corporate investment has been flat since 2012, despite clear increases in corporate borrowing.
Based on available whom-to-whom data, foreign investment appears to be very limited in key Asian corporate bond markets. In Japan, foreign investors hold just 4% of outstanding bonds, and in Korea the figure is less than half a percent. This compares to 39% in the United States and 13% in the euro area.
To promote the further development of regional corporate bond markets, policy makers should focus on measures within four key areas: increasing regional integration; incentivising the use of market-based financing; expanding corporate access to debt markets to underserved segments like SMEs; and increasing credit rating coverage.
Asia has rapidly grown to become an increasingly important part of the global economy over the last two decades. At the end of 2024, Asian economies represented 31% of world GDP. Its corporate debt markets have expanded in parallel but remain smaller on aggregate than the region’s economic weight would suggest. This holds across market segments: for corporate bonds, syndicated loans and private credit, although borrowing through the two former market segments has grown more rapidly than the region’s total economy since 2000. Borrowing through corporate bond markets in particular has expanded fast, tripling Asia’s share of the global market from 10% in 2000 to 29% in 2024, eight times faster than relative GDP growth (Figure 3.1). Asia now has two of the world’s six largest corporate bond markets – China (second) and Japan (sixth).
In this context, the present chapter examines developments in Asian corporate debt markets, both at the regional and country levels, illustrating the ways in which Asian markets differ from global trends as well as intra-regional differences. Based on this mapping, it formulates high-level policy messages to promote the further development of domestic markets and expansion of corporate access to market-based debt financing.
The Asian share of global debt markets has increased, but remains below the region’s global economic weight
Note: Refers to both financial and non-financial company borrowing. The green marker for syndicated loans refers to 2010, the first year with available outstanding data.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; Preqin; see Annex for details; International Monetary Fund (2024[1]), Gross domestic product, current prices, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2024/October; World Bank (2023[2]), GDP (current US$) - Sri Lanka, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=LK.
At the end of 2024, Asian corporate debt markets totaled USD 13.9 trillion across the three credit classes covered in this report, 22% of total global corporate debt. Corporate bonds make up the largest share by far, representing roughly three-quarters of the total, with outstanding amounts of USD 10.2 trillion at the end of 2024. Syndicated loans make up most of the remaining amount at USD 3.6 trillion.
Financial and non-financial company debt represent roughly equal parts of total outstanding amounts on aggregate, but the distribution within markets differs significantly. While financial companies owe 60% of outstanding corporate bonds, syndicated loan markets are predominantly used by non-financial companies, representing 82% of total outstanding amounts. The Asian private credit market is much smaller, with total assets under management of USD 86.5 billion in 2024 (Figure 3.2).
Asian debt markets total USD 13.9 trillion across corporate bonds, syndicated loans and private credit
Note: Panel C refers to total assets under management (AUM), which is calculated as the aggregate AUM of private credit funds with Asia as the primary investment focus.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; Preqin; see Annex for details.
The following subsections provide a more detailed picture of developments in each corporate debt segment in Asia, focusing on debt financing to the real economy (non-financial companies).
3.2.1. Corporate bonds
There are notable cross-country differences in the use of non-financial corporate debt securities, reflecting different stages of corporate bond market development within the region. The Chinese market, which is the world’s second largest after the US market, is by far the most significant in the region, with total outstanding amounts of USD 2.6 trillion by the end of 2024. That is nearly four times the size of Japan’s market, the region’s second largest, and more than sevenfold that of Korea, the third largest (Figure 3.3, Panel A). The dominance of the Chinese corporate bond market is relatively recent: Chinese companies went from representing 27% of total Asian bond market borrowing in 2008 to 75% in 2024. Japanese companies have seen the largest corresponding relative decline. While the balance between them has changed rapidly, Asian bond market borrowing has consistently been highly concentrated in the region’s three largest markets: China, Japan and Korea together represent 86% of the Asian total (Panel C).
The use of corporate bond financing is very limited in many other Asian economies, with outstanding amounts of USD 100 million and USD 500 million, respectively, in Bangladesh and Pakistan, and virtually non-existent markets in Cambodia, Mongolia and Sri Lanka.
The region’s largest markets shift when considering market size relative to the size of the economy. Thailand, the fifth-largest corporate bond market in absolute terms, has the highest non-financial bond debt-to-GDP ratio at 22%, above the global figure of 14%. Only four other Asian economies exceeded the global level: Hong Kong (China) (20%), Japan (18%), Korea (16%) and China (14%). Corporate bond market borrowing in India, Asia’s fourth-largest corporate bond market, represents just 3% of GDP (Panel B). The region’s aggregate ratio is no more than 2.8%.
The Chinese market has grown rapidly and now represents over 60% of the regional total
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; see Annex for details; IMF (2024[1]), Gross domestic product, current prices, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2024/October; World Bank (2023[2]), GDP (current USD) - Sri Lanka, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=LK.
3.2.2. Syndicated loans
There is similar cross-country variation in the syndicated loan market. China, Japan and India, three of the region’s largest corporate bond markets, also have the largest syndicated loan markets. However, the distribution between them is more balanced than in the corporate bond market.
China, the largest syndicated loan market with more than USD 1 trillion outstanding, is only about 1.3 times larger than Japan’s USD 759 billion market, the second largest in the region. Some smaller economies that effectively have no corporate bond markets at all do show some activity in syndicated lending (Figure 3.4, Panel A). In fact, as of end-2024, only China, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines had corporate bond markets that exceeded the size of their syndicated loan markets. This underscores two key points: first, China’s outsize role in shaping regional trends, and second, the broader accessibility of syndicated loans, given that the banking sector tends to evolve before bond markets. This is reflected in economies such as Mongolia and Lao PDR, where syndicated loans accounted for more than 10% of GDP (Panel B). Consequently, the syndicated loan market is less concentrated geographically than the corporate bond market, although the five largest markets (China, Japan, India, Chinese Taipei and Singapore) still account for 85% of total regional volume (Panel C).
China has Asia’s largest syndicated loan market, but country shares are more balanced than in the bond market
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; see Annex for details; International Monetary Fund (2024[1]) Gross domestic product, current prices, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2024/October; World Bank (2023[2]), GDP (current USD) - Sri Lanka, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=LK.
3.2.3. Private credit
Private credit – lending to companies by specialised non-bank financial institutions – has expanded rapidly in recent years and become increasingly intertwined with the traditional financial system (OECD, 2025[3]). Globally, assets under management have surged nineteen-fold since 2000, from USD 84.5 billion to USD 1.6 trillion by 2024. This growth has accelerated since the 2008 global financial crisis, driven by low interest rates in public markets, encouraging investment in higher-yielding alternative strategies. Increasingly stringent banking regulations have also contributed by shifting banks towards safer assets, opening a market for non-banks to fill the resulting financing gap for riskier firms.
Asia remains a small part of the global private credit market, both in terms of funds’ assets under management and private credit lending to Asian firms. However, lending to Asian firms has increased rapidly over time, growing from just 1% of global private credit investment in 2010 to 5% in 2024, having peaked at 15% (USD 12.8 billion) in 2019. The largest corresponding relative decline has been in lending to European firms, which fell from 34% of the global total in 2010 to 23% in 2024 (Figure 3.5, Panels A and B).
Four key markets have driven this trend, namely China, Korea, Japan and India, which together account for 91% of the region’s private credit investment from 2010 to 2024 (Panel C). In China, growth has been fuelled by the easing of restrictions on foreign debt and tighter credit conditions for domestic banks, which created a funding gap for companies. In India, private credit gained momentum due to increased defaults in the banking sector and liquidity issues faced by other non-bank financial institutions. Certain Asian economies have restrictions in place that limit the growth of the private credit market. In Chinese Taipei, strict banking regulations prevent funds without a local banking license from issuing loans. Similarly, foreign entities without a banking license are barred from operating in the country. Viet Nam and the Philippines have comparable, though somewhat less restrictive, regulations. In Viet Nam, offshore funds can lend without a license, but domestic funds must be licensed by the State Bank of Viet Nam (SBV) to lend regularly. In the Philippines, licensing is not required for one-off lending deals. In Thailand, interest rate caps on loans pose a barrier to the development of the private credit market (Baker McKenzie, 2024[4]).
Private credit investment in Asian companies has grown but remains a small part of the global market
Note: Panel C excludes jurisdictions that did not have any private credit investment between 2010-24.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; Preqin; see Annex for details.
The evolution of the private credit market in Asia is also reflected in the growing number of funds headquartered in the region, along with a broader geographic spread of these funds across different Asian jurisdictions. In 2010, only five private credit funds were launched in Asia, all in Korea. In 2024, the figure had grown to 24, with new funds established in Japan, Hong Kong (China), India, Korea and Malaysia. Over the past 15 years, Japan and Korea have emerged as the preferred locations for fund headquarters, with 79 and 53 new funds respectively (Figure 3.6, Panel A). Despite Chinese firms being the largest recipients of private credit investment in Asia, commercial databases only record five funds headquartered in China. This may partly be driven by regulatory differences: Japan requires a license for routine lending activities, whereas offshore funds can operate in China without a local license. However, funds domiciled in China must be licensed there (Baker McKenzie, 2024[4]).
The total assets managed by funds in Asia remain relatively small at about USD 126 billion, roughly one-fifth of the amount managed in Europe and just one-fourteenth of that in the United States (Panel B). While private credit is expanding into Asia, most capital is still managed from the United States and, to a lesser degree, Europe. The vast majority (98%) of Asian private credit funds are concentrated in the six largest markets (Hong Kong (China), India, Korea, Singapore, Japan and China). Notably, counter to the corporate bond and syndicated loan markets, advanced economies dominate. Funds headquartered in Hong Kong (China), Korea, Singapore and Japan together represent 72% of the regional total. India has the most significant private credit market among emerging economies, representing 18% of the region’s total assets, the second largest market after Hong Kong (China) (Panel B).
The expansion of private credit is closely interlinked with the rise of private equity. Over 70% of private credit deals globally between 2010 and 2024 involved companies supported by private equity firms (Panel C). Many fund managers oversee both private credit and equity funds, and private credit often serves as a key financing source for companies backed by private equity sponsors (IMF, 2024[5]).
This relationship is equally strong in Asia, with 74% of private credit deals linked to private equity sponsors. The trend is especially strong in China (87%), Korea (88%) and, particularly, Japan, where 99% of deals over the past 15 years involved a PE-backed company. India stands out as an exception with only 17% of deals sponsored by private equity firms. This sponsorship dynamic plays a key role in limiting credit losses. Loss rates in private credit have remained on par with leveraged loans and below those of high-yield bonds. One reason is that private equity sponsors, aiming to protect the long-term value of their investments, may choose to inject additional capital into portfolio companies during periods of financial stress (IMF, 2024[5]).
Advanced markets dominate the private credit fund landscape in Asia
Note: In Panel C, sponsored deals refer to debt provided through private debt funds to finance an investment in or acquisition of a company by a private equity sponsor. Non-sponsored transactions refer to debt provided directly to a company without an acquirer involved.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; Preqin; see Annex for details.
Certain aspects of Asian corporate debt markets differ from other markets globally in notable ways. This section provides an international comparison of Asian markets, focusing on the use of market-based financing; credit risk; the use of proceeds; and the investor base.
3.3.1. Use of market-based debt financing
Despite the substantial expansion of corporate bond markets in Asia, most economies remain heavily bank dependent. On average, debt securities make up just 14% of total debt for non-financial firms in jurisdictions with available data (China, Hong Kong (China), Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Korea and Japan). Since this figure excludes jurisdictions with even less developed bond markets, the true regional share of debt securities is likely even smaller. This is comparable to the euro area (12%), but much smaller than the United States (64%) (Figure 3.7).
There are significant differences in the degree to which companies use bond markets across Asia, reflecting the different stages of development of each market. Thailand, which has the highest ratio of non‑financial bond debt to GDP in the region, also has the highest reliance on non-financial corporate bonds, representing 27% of the sector’s debt. Similarly, companies in Korea and Japan, two of the biggest corporate bond markets in the region, show a relatively strong use of bond financing, at 26% and 15%, respectively. Meanwhile, in China, despite having the region’s largest bond market, loans still account for 90% of non-financial corporate debt. Indonesia, which has one of the smallest bond markets among the jurisdictions shown below and relatively low non-financial bond leverage, shows the third highest reliance on bonds: 19% of total corporate debt comes from debt securities (Figure 3.7).
The corporate sector is heavily bank-dependent in most Asian economies
Note: Loan amounts for China, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are calculated by subtracting the outstanding amount of non-financial corporate bonds from the total credit outstanding to non-financial companies. For these jurisdictions debt securities refer to corporate bonds only. Data for China, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand refer to 2023. Data for Korea and Japan refer to 2024.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; see Annex for details; Bank for Internation Settlements; Bank of Japan; Bank of Korea.
3.3.2. Credit risk
Previous OECD analysis (2024[6]; 2025[3]) has highlighted increases in credit risk and corporate leverage globally, in particular since the 2008 financial crisis. Asia is no exception to this trend. By the end of 2023, highly leveraged publicly listed companies (defined as having a debt-to-EBITDA ratio above 4) in Asia carried a total of USD 7 trillion of debt on their balance sheets (Figure 3.8, Panel A). Although this represents a significant increase from USD 3 trillion in 2001, as a share of total corporate debt it has declined slightly, from 61% to 58% over the same period (Panel B).
Despite this modest decline, the proportion of debt owed by highly leveraged companies in Asia remains above the global average of 48%. Within the region, companies in Hong Kong (China) and Thailand have the highest concentration of debt among highly leveraged firms, accounting for 75% and 70% of total corporate debt, respectively. In contrast, India and Japan have the lowest shares, at 40% and 46%, both below the global benchmark. Meanwhile, Korea, despite recent improvements in credit quality within its corporate bond market, shows a different picture when looking at the broader corporate sector. There, highly leveraged firms still account for as much as 66% of total corporate debt, possibly indicating a selective pattern in which companies choose to tap the bond market (Panel C).
The share of debt owed by highly leveraged companies is much higher in Asia than globally
Note: Highly leveraged companies are defined as those with a debt-to-EBITDA ratio above 4.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; see Annex for details.
Globally, the increase in corporate leverage did not immediately translate into a rise in the share of at-risk companies – defined as those with an interest coverage ratio (ICR) below 2 – owing to historically low interest rates and the extensive use of fixed-rate, long-maturity debt (OECD, 2024[6]). However, the situation in Asia is different; the share of at-risk firms has increased from an average of 20% between 2001 and 2021 to 24% in 2024. Although Asia generally has a lower share of at-risk companies than the global aggregate figure (30%), this is largely due to extremely low figures in Japan. Consistent with the share of highly leveraged companies, Korea had the highest share of at-risk firms in 2023, at 37%, which is 10 percentage points above its average from 2001 to 2021 (Figure 3.9, Panel A).
Nearly one-fifth of total Asian corporate debt is owed by firms with low interest coverage ratios
Note: The interest coverage ratio is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) to interest expenses. A low interest coverage ratio is here defined as below 2, following Palomino et al. (2019[7]).
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; see Annex for details.
Furthermore, the share of total debt owed by at-risk companies in Asia (19%) exceeded the global average (15%) by four percentage points in 2023. Excluding China and Japan, the share rises to 24%. This regional divergence is primarily due to Japan’s minimal 2% share, while China aligns more closely with the regional average at 22% (Figure 3.9, Panel B). Among the jurisdictions included in this analysis, Japan and India are the only two jurisdictions that show decreasing trends in terms of both the share of companies and the share of debt owed by at-risk companies.
In spite of these figures, the rated credit quality of Asian borrowing has historically been higher than global averages. This holds for both corporate bonds and syndicated loans (Figure 3.10, Panels A and B). In the corporate bond market, this trend has largely been influenced by Japanese issuers, whose average ratings remained above A until 2013. When Japan and China are excluded, the average credit rating in Asia has aligned more closely with the global index, particularly before the 2008 financial crisis. At that time, the global average dropped by nearly two notches, while the Asian index excluding China and Japan fluctuated around an A rating, reflecting, among other things, strong rating improvements in Korea.
Over the past two decades, however, credit rating quality in Asia has declined in line with global trends. The average rating has dropped from well above an A grade in 2000 to somewhere between BBB and A in 2024 (Panel A). This decline is largely due to shifts within the investment grade (IG) category rather than an increase in non-investment grade bond issuances, which remain a small portion of the market. Specifically, the share of AA rated bonds fell sharply from 55% in 2000 to 25% in 2024, while the proportion of BBB rated bonds, the lowest investment-grade level, rose from 23% to 38% (Panel B).
Similar trends are visible in the syndicated loan market. Investment grade loans represent a much larger share of total borrowing in Asia compared to global figures, accounting for 86% of total borrowing in 2024, 37 percentage points more than the global figure. There has been a very slight trend towards riskier borrowing in Asia over time – from 2000 to 2012, investment grade loans made up an average of 80% of annual non-financial borrowing, which fell to 78% between 2013 and 2024, although this was largely driven by higher-risk borrowing in 2015 and 2016 (Panel C). However, like global patterns, the increase in risk exposure has mainly come from a rise in leveraged loans, while borrowing by highly leveraged firms has declined over time.
Credit ratings tend to be higher in Asian corporate debt markets than in global ones
Note: Panels A and B refer to ratings by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. In Panel A, the corporate bond rating index is constructed by assigning a score of 1 to a bond if it has the lowest credit rating and 21 if it has the highest rating. The corporate bond rating index is then calculated by averaging individual bond scores, weighted by issue amounts.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; see Annex for details.
3.3.3. Use of proceeds
A critical part of assessing the sustainability of a growing and increasingly high-risk debt stock is how the proceeds from that borrowing have been used. Debt financing allows firms to expand and undertake investment projects that they otherwise might not be able to and can therefore in effect be fully self-financing provided that the returns from those investments are higher than the cost of the debt. This highlights the need to distinguish between different forms of borrowing. While all borrowing that leads to some type of spending stimulates aggregate demand in the short term, not all such spending creates long-term gains by expanding productive capacity. When it does not, increasing interest costs (or active deleveraging) means there will be less funding available for other spending, eventually creating a drag on aggregate demand.
Asian companies use debt financing for real investment to a greater extent than other firms globally
Note: Based on 36 728 bond issues and 178 197 syndicated loan tranches where the stated use of proceeds is more specific than "general corporate purpose". 169 (for bonds) and 103 (for loans) unique stated uses of proceeds are manually classified into higher-level groups. Refinancing refers to operations to make payments on or restructure existing borrowing. Real investment refers to non-financial investment projects, e.g. "highways", "capital expenditure", "renewable energy, “R&D”. Financial management is non-refinancing operations that refer to balance sheet management, e.g. "invest in liquid assets", "cash reserves", "working capital". Shareholder payouts are either share buybacks or dividends. A bond and a loan can have more than one use of proceeds. Syndicated loans have been excluded from Panel A due to raw data reclassification issues that hamper time series comparability.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; see Annex for details.
Previous OECD analysis (2025[3]) has shown how corporations globally have tended to use the low-interest rate period to do financial operations such as refinancing, balance sheet management and shareholder payouts rather than real investment. Consequently, there has been a disconnection between corporate borrowing and corporate investment globally since 2008. As shown in Figure 3.11, Asia appears to be an exception to this trend, with debt used for real investment being much more widespread than in other regions globally. This holds for both bonds and syndicated loans. Crucially, this has been true even before the interest rate shock of 2022, which means the outstanding Asian debt stock is, in an illustrative sense, backed by some form of assets to a greater extent than is the case globally.
There is no guarantee that these investments will generate sufficient returns to cover the cost of the debt raised to finance them – excess investment in real estate, for example, may equally pose debt sustainability issues, especially given the significant levels of leverage in the industry (see OECD (2024[6])). It is critical to consider not just whether companies use their debt financing for real investment, but also what type of investment. Nevertheless, the broad headline figures do seem to indicate that debt has been channelled towards productive investment to a greater extent in Asia than in other parts of the world in recent years.
However, these figures mask important differences. Actual investment, defined as the sum of spending on capital expenditure and research and development (R&D), as disclosed in financial statements, has in fact been flat in Asia excluding China since 2012, and significantly below the pre-2008 growth trend. Corporate borrowing through bond markets has, in parallel, grown sharply above pre-2008 trend (Figure 3.12, Panel A). There has been a similar disconnection between corporate investment and bond market borrowing globally since 2008, but global investment levels have followed the pre-2008 trend (whereas borrowing has been significantly above trend) rather than go sharply below trend. Crucially, these dynamics are not visible in China. A representative Chinese data series becomes available only around 2010, but since then Chinese corporate investment has increased nearly threefold. That is significantly less than the increase in bond issuance, but counter to the rest of Asia, both measures show growth (Panel B). In other words, aggregate investment in Asia since the 2008 financial crisis has been heavily driven by Chinese companies.
Investment has flatlined in Asia outside of China since 2012 while bond market borrowing has continued to grow
Note: Dashed lines show extrapolated linear trends based on data from 2001-08.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; see Annex for details.
The differences between global and Asian figures are less pronounced when it comes to private credit markets. Because of the close links between private credit and private equity (see Figure 3.6, Panel C), a large portion of private credit proceeds are used to finance buyouts and public-to-private transactions. This is true both globally and in Asia. However, there are significant differences between Asian jurisdictions even when it comes to the use of proceeds of sponsored deals. Japan is a notable example, where over half of total investment refers to growth capital deals, i.e. funding to expand real operations. This contrasts with other large markets where financial operations are more common; over 90% of Chinese private credit investment is used to take listed companies private, and in Korea buyout funding makes up 59% of total investment (Figure 3.13, Panel A). Because private credit markets have limited disclosure requirements and are by nature more opaque than their public equivalents, use of proceeds information is not available for the vast majority of non-sponsored deals globally, and even less so in Asia (Panel B). However, since the clear majority of private credit deals in Asia are sponsored, with the exception of India, the use of proceeds for sponsored deals will give a largely representative picture of how private credit is used more broadly in the region.
The use of private credit proceeds differs significantly across jurisdictions
Note: In Panel A, sponsored deals refer to debt provided through private debt funds to finance an investment in or acquisition of a company by a private equity sponsor. Non-sponsored transactions refer to debt provided directly to a company without an acquirer involved. PIPE refers to Private Investment in Public Equity.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; Preqin; see Annex for details.
3.3.4. Corporate bond investors
The structure of the investor base has important implications for the functioning of a country’s corporate bond market, including the level of volatility and exposure to fire sale dynamics in times of market stress, as well as corporate access to finance more broadly. Figure 3.14 provides a comparison between four markets that produce and disclose financial accounts with whom-to-whom detail, enabling ownership analysis. There are two key differences between the Asian (Japan and Korea) and non-Asian markets (the United States and the euro area). Firstly, foreign investment is significantly less common in the Asian markets. While foreign investors hold 39% of non-financial US companies’ bonds and 13% in the euro area, the equivalent figure in Japan is only 4%. In Korea, the number is effectively zero. The Japanese and Korean markets are in this sense much less directly connected to the global financial system than the US and euro area markets.
Secondly, banks play a much larger role in the Asian markets, especially in Japan, where they own 40% of the total outstanding stock. This compares to just 4% in the United States and 9% in the euro area. Banks around the world have tended to reduce their corporate bond holdings following regulatory changes in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis that limited their capacity to hold these assets on their balance sheets. Investment funds, which have picked up a significant portion of the demand reduction by banks globally, make up a very minor part of the Japanese market (OECD, 2024[6]). They are also somewhat less active in Korea, although the difference is much smaller compared to the United States and euro area than for Japan.
Foreign bond investors play a much smaller role in Japan and Korea than in the United States and the euro area
Note: The category “Other” includes: other financial intermediaries, financial auxiliaries, public captive financial institutions, central government, local governments and private non-profit institutions serving households for Japan; small loan financial companies for households and small businesses, financial auxiliaries, captive financial institutions and money lenders, general government for Korea; state and local government, federal government, GSE and Agency, credit unions, other unions, other financial businesses, financial companies, brokers/dealers, holding companies for US; and other financial institutions except investment funds and general government for the euro area.
Source: Bank of Japan; Bank of Korea; US Federal Reserve System; European Central Bank.
Given Asia’s increasingly central role in the world economy, there is significant potential to further increase regional integration, including when it comes to corporate debt markets. Judging by the bond ownership data shown in Figure 3.14, for example, cross-market investment is currently exceptionally low despite several Asian financial integration initiatives. Following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, ASEAN+3 (ASEAN members plus China, Japan and Korea) launched several regional financial co-operation initiatives. These included the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) for macro-economic surveillance and the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) as a regional liquidity support mechanism, both launched in 2000. The ERPD was established as a regional peer review and dialogue platform to enhance economic surveillance and promote macro-economic and financial stability by identifying potential risks and implementing timely policy responses. Despite gradual improvements over time, its effectiveness was initially limited due to the lack of robust support mechanisms. In 2005, the ERPD was incorporated into the CMI to strengthen its role, particularly in supporting economies seeking short-term liquidity assistance. Today, the ERPD functions within the framework of the CMI, now known as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). The CMI was created to provide a regional safety net against currency crises and to complement international financial bodies, particularly the IMF. Under this structure, jurisdictions could receive immediate support for up to 10% of a bilateral swap arrangement, with the remaining 90% contingent on an IMF programme. Originally a network of bilateral agreements, the CMI was transformed into a multilateral mechanism in 2010 to improve its cohesiveness and response capacity (Kawai, 2015[8]).
There have also been initiatives related specifically to bond markets. In 2002, the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) was established to foster the development of local currency bond markets in Asia: even though developing local currency market is a national agenda, regional arrangements can support and complement the efforts of individual economies, tackling common issues. The initiative established four task groups, each chaired by a different member country and addressing a common problem encountered in the growth of the local currency bond market. Task Force 1 promotes local currency bond issuance, including support of green bonds. In 2010, the task force established the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF) as a trust fund of the Asian Development Bank to provide guarantees for bond issuance. Task Force 2 focuses on facilitating the demand for local currency bonds and launched the AsianBondsOnline (ABO) in 2004 to disseminate market information. Task Force 3 focuses on improving the regulatory framework and established the ASEAN+3 Bond Market Forum (ABMF) in 2010 to standardise market practices and harmonise regulations and settlement procedures. It also promotes the ASEAN+3 Multi-Currency Bond Issuance Framework (AMBIF) to standardise bond issuance documents and procedures by focusing on the professional investor bond markets in the region. Task Force 4 works on improving bond market infrastructure. The task force established the Cross Border Settlement Infrastructure Forum in 2013 to discuss the improvement of cross border bonds and cash settlement infrastructure in the region. The same task force launched the Prime Collateral Forum in 2017 to study the possible use of regional government bonds as collateral for cross border transactions (Ministry of Finance Japan, 2023[9]).
The composition of foreign currency borrowing is one aspect of regional integration. On aggregate, Asian corporations primarily issue domestic currency bonds. Home currency bonds made up 89% of total issuance between 2000 and 2024 and has not changed significantly over time. Foreign currency issuance is primarily concentrated in smaller, less developed economies. Indonesia and Hong Kong (China) stand out among larger markets, having a majority of their corporate bonds denominated in foreign currencies. Notably, issuance in the currencies of other Asian jurisdictions is minimal – effectively all foreign currency issuance is non-Asian (Figure 3.15, Panel A). There are some notable exceptions, including Hong Kong (China), where Chinese yuan denominated issues are relatively common, and Lao PDR which has sizeable portions of its borrowing in Thai baht.
The US dollar (USD) is by far the dominant foreign currency for non-financial corporate bond issuance in Asia. Its share of bonds issued in non-domestic currencies grew from 80% during 2000-13 to 85% in the period from 2014 to 2024. Euro and Chinese yuan denominated bonds also increased during this period, with the most significant corresponding relative decline being in Japanese yen denominated bonds. Within Asia, Japan has been the largest issuer of euro-denominated bonds, accounting for 29% of the country’s non-domestic currency issuances since 2000. Korean companies are relatively significant issuers of bonds denominated in Japanese yen, representing 8% of its foreign currency bonds. Chinese yuan denominated bonds are not widespread outside of Hong Kong (China) (Figure 3.16).
Foreign currency issuance in Asia is primarily denominated in non-Asian currencies
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; see Annex for details.
The US dollar is by far the most common foreign currency denomination for Asian corporate bonds
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; see Annex for details.
Deep corporate debt markets can complement bank financing in an economy. Because market-based financing, in particular bond markets, tend to be less procyclical than bank lending, expanding corporate access to debt markets can help increase financial resilience more broadly, in addition to widening the availability of corporate funding. However, for these benefits to materialise, the use of corporate bond markets should not be limited to large companies. Looking at the median issue size gives an indication of the accessibility of corporate bond markets to smaller companies (although it bears noting that decreasing issue sizes could also be a reflection of fragmented issuance, whereby large firms choose to issue in smaller amounts across multiple tranches (Surti and Goel, 2023[10]).
Both globally and in Asia, the size of the median bond issue has decreased since around 2012. It has consistently been smaller in Asia than globally, although recent years have seen significant convergence. In 2012, the median size of non-financial corporate bonds globally was USD 356 million, USD 146 million more than the median Asian bond and more than USD 200 million larger than in Asia excluding China and Japan. In 2024, the difference was down to USD 20 million and USD 68 million, respectively, owing primarily to rapid reductions in the global median figure. Since their respective peaks, the median issue size has dropped by about 70% globally and 62% in Asia (Figure 3.17, Panel A). The consistently smaller median issue size of non-financial corporate bonds in Asia compared to the global figure over the past two decades reflects the prominence of smaller firms in the region.
Developments differ in the syndicated loan market. While there has been a decrease in the median size since 2000 both globally and in Asia, there is no clear trend break in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, like there is for bonds. Indeed, the median loan size in Asia has remained around USD 60 million over the past decade without significant fluctuations. Like the bond market, loans are smaller in Asia compared to global figures but, unlike the bond market, there has not been a convergence over time (Panel B). However, there are significant differences across Asian economies. The median syndicated loan size in Asia excluding China and Japan is significantly larger than for Asia as a whole, and very similar to the global median. China and Japan thus have significant effect on the regional figure – loans to Japanese firms have consistently been smaller than the global average, averaging USD 48 million since 2000.
Median borrowing size is smaller in Asia than globally, primarily reflecting smaller firm size
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; see Annex for details.
Several Asian jurisdictions have implemented measures to support domestic corporate bond market development and expand access. Twelve of the eighteen jurisdictions examined in this report have implemented at least one initiative aimed at enhancing access to corporate bond markets, ranging from legal or regulatory provisions to industry initiatives (OECD, 2024[11]). For example, in China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) has recently updated its guidelines for the issuance and listing of corporate bonds, aiming to better channel funding into sectors of national strategic importance, such as technological innovation and green development. The new guidelines emphasise support for high-tech firms working on critical technologies by refining eligibility criteria for scientific and technological innovation bonds and broadening the range of eligible issuers, including those involved in research and incubation (SSE, 2024[12]).
Korea has a specific measure in place applicable only to growth companies. The Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT) supports SMEs through indirect credit guarantees to bond issuers. SME bonds are pooled and securitised as collateralised bond obligations through a Special Purpose Vehicle with KODIT providing credit guarantees for the senior tranches. Participating companies bear a portion of the risk by acquiring part of the subordinated (junior) tranche (KODIT[13]). The scheme was first introduced in 2000 to stabilise the capital market and alleviate capital shortages for SMEs and middle-standing companies1 resulting from the Asian Financial Crisis (OECD, 2024[11]). The guarantee played a particularly important role in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2020, KODIT introduced a dedicated pandemic facility, providing USD 9.2 billion in liquidity between 2020 and 2022 (KODIT, 2023[14]). More broadly, many jurisdictions facilitate corporate bond issuance through credit support schemes. For instance, the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) provides guarantees for bonds issued by Japanese subsidiaries operating abroad, helping them access local capital markets (JBIC[15]).
Outside of Asia, certain jurisdictions have implemented frameworks specifically for bonds by smaller companies. This includes the Italian minibond framework from 2012, which allows unlisted SMEs to issue bonds below EUR 50 million with less stringent requirements than those that apply to regular bonds. These issues can also benefit from state credit guarantees at the request of investors. Evidence suggests that the minibond framework has helped familiarise SMEs with the basics of capital market financing, and even subsequently improve the conditions of their bank financing (OECD, 2024[16]).
Credit ratings play a key role in institutional investors’ asset allocation, both due to regulatory constraints and index investment strategies, and can therefore have significant impact on corporate access to and cost of debt financing. Widespread use of credit ratings also gives regulators a way to measure market-wide developments in credit risk. Expanding the coverage of credit ratings, weighing the associated costs, is therefore a legitimate policy objective.
An OECD survey of 18 Asian jurisdictions shows that two-thirds of regulators require companies to get a credit rating to issue bonds. In Malaysia, this is limited to bonds marketed to retail investors. Most countries limit this requirement to a single rating, but some regulators (in Bangladesh and Korea) mandate two separate ratings. Four of the surveyed countries (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) only allow for issuance of investment grade bonds (Figure 3.18, Panels A-C), although the approaches differ somewhat. In Sri Lanka, the minimum rating is one notch above investment grade. In Indonesia and Pakistan, the investment grade requirement applies only to public bond offerings. In Bangladesh, it extends to both public and private placements, but the rating thresholds differ: bonds placed privately must have at least a BBB long-term rating, while publicly issued bonds must attain a minimum long-term rating of A.
Two-thirds of Asian regulators require companies to obtain a credit rating to issue bonds
Note: Panels B and C refer to Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Lao, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand.
Source: OECD (2024[11]), Corporate Bond Markets in Asia: Challenges and Opportunities for Growth Companies, https://doi.org/10.1787/96192f4a-en.
In most markets, these ratings will be provided by domestic agencies. In China, for instance, domestic companies issuing bonds in the local market must obtain ratings from domestic agencies, while international CRAs assess Chinese firms issuing bonds abroad (BIS, 2017[17]). While one of the three main international credit ratings agencies operate in over half of all surveyed economies (together with domestic and/or regional agencies in all countries but Singapore, which only has international agencies), six jurisdictions (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan and the Philippines) only have domestic agencies (Figure 3.19, Panel A). Globally, domestic agencies often assign other ratings than international ones, a trend which can also be observed in for example Japan, China and Korea (GlobalCapital, 2013[18]; Packer, 2002[19]; BIS, 2017[17]). Domestically provided ratings tend to be higher than international ones, which may result from differing methodologies, the subjective element in the rating process, or limited understanding of local credit risk by international agencies (BIS, 2017[17]; Cantor and Packer, 1994[20]).
The use of alternative rating systems (based on non-traditional sources such as data provided by telecom companies, utility companies and social media platforms) is limited to Korea, Malaysia and Hong Kong (China), and in the latter is focused on expanding access to bank rather than bond financing (Panel B).
While domestic rating agencies can offer regulators and local investors a useful measure of credit risk, drawing from local expertise, having a rating from a large, internationally recognised credit rating agency is still important to attract large, international institutional investors which sometimes (either by choice or regulatory constraint) limit the agencies from which they consider ratings for their asset allocation. In Asia, the vast majority (79%) of bonds issued between 2000 and 2024 (weighted by amount) did not have a rating from one of the main three international agencies. That is nearly three times higher than the global figure, and has been increasing over time, rising from 69% in 2000 to 89% in 2024. While this trend is observed throughout the region, China, where 92% of corporate bonds are unrated by international agencies, is an important driver of the regional aggregate (Figure 3.20). In China’s domestic market, issuers are required to obtain ratings from local agencies, which reduces their incentive to seek international ratings (BIS, 2017[17]).
Many Asian jurisdictions only have domestic credit rating agencies
Note: International credit rating agencies refer to Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. Regional credit rating agencies refer to CRAs whose headquarters or operational headquarters are in another Asian country. Domestic credit rating agencies exclude subsidiaries of international agencies. Panel A considers Japan Credit Rating Agency in Hong Kong (China) and Indonesia as a regional agency, even though it is not registered for bond ratings, but rather for bank loan ratings (Hong Kong (China)) and other financial instruments (Indonesia).
Source: OECD (2024[11]), Corporate Bond Markets in Asia: Challenges and Opportunities for Growth Companies, https://doi.org/10.1787/96192f4a-en.
However, not all companies can be expected to obtain, and would not necessarily benefit from, a rating from one of the main international agencies. It can be prohibitively expensive for smaller companies in particular, which in addition often lack the financial and technical capacity to engage with these agencies and may not have the necessary credit history or even documentation to access traditional bank lending. It is therefore appropriate to consider the expansion of rating coverage for smaller companies as a separate policy concern. In certain cases, when private agencies’ coverage is insufficient or inaccessible, government agencies can step in. For example, in India, the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank of India have established the SME Rating Agency of India (SMERA) focused specifically on this market segment (SMERA[21]). In France, the central bank supplies a form of simple credit rating through its FIBEN system.
To encourage expanded credit rating coverage across the region, there is also room to further increase collaboration between Asian markets. The Association of Credit Rating Agencies in Asia (ACRAA) was formed in 2001 under the aegis of the Asian Development Bank, with the goal of fostering collaboration and sharing of best practices among rating agencies. ACRAA addresses common challenges faced by its members, such as maintaining objectivity, transparency and analytical rigour in the rating process, through workshops and collaborative forums. In recent years, it has also taken on a broader role, gathering information on global regulatory standards for CRAs and compiling data on Asia’s bond markets and mandatory credit rating requirements. However, these initiatives are frequently impeded by local differences in accounting standards and legislative frameworks, as well as the fact that capital markets in different jurisdictions are at varying stages of development. In addition, rating scales differ significantly across countries in Asia, creating an impediment to the integration and growth of regional bond markets (Japan Credit Rating Agency, 2023[22]; ADBI, 2009[23]).
In Asia, the vast majority of bonds does not have a rating from one of the main three international rating agencies
Note: Refers to ratings by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P.
Source: OECD Capital Market Series dataset; LSEG; see Annex for details.
Out of the 18 Asian jurisdictions reviewed in this report, 13 have at least one domestic credit rating agency that is a member of ACRAA, with China and India each contributing five agencies (Japan Credit Rating Agency, 2023[22]). The domestic rating agency in Pakistan, VIS Credit Rating, is not only part of ACRAA but also serves as a technical partner to the Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA). Established in 2005, IIRA provides independent ratings for issuers and instruments that adhere to Islamic finance principles (IIRA[24]). As Islamic finance continues to expand beyond Malaysia into other parts of Southeast Asia, the influence of IIRA is expected to grow. Cambodia and Mongolia have local rating agencies but are not affiliated with ACRAA.
Asia has significantly expanded its share in global corporate debt markets over the last two decades. However, the region remains largely bank-based and regional market integration is limited. The level of market development differs significantly between countries. Policy makers should promote both further development of domestic corporate debt markets and increased regional integration.
Regional integration. Foreign investment plays a minor role in key Asian corporate debt markets. Expanding cross-border investment would help unlock greater amounts of financing for companies across the region, allowing them to invest in growing their operations. One avenue to do so is by increasing intra-Asian investment, which would benefit from greater interoperability between markets. Efforts should be made to this end. There is an existing infrastructure for such co-operation upon which policy makers can build, including the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) and the Association of Credit Rating Agencies in Asia (ACRAA). Priority should be given to measures that remove barriers to international credit investment flows, such as harmonising rating scales, knowledge-sharing/coordination of insolvency systems and withholding taxes, as well as the availability of creditor-relevant, comparable data. In addition, policy makers should ensure that there are markets in place for the appropriate instruments to manage cross-border investment risk.
Incentivising the use of market-based debt financing. Policy makers should seek to create an environment that offers companies a more diverse range of debt funding, complementing bank financing with market-based credit funding. Each jurisdiction should review its domestic policy landscape to ensure there are no hurdles that create a bias towards a certain type of financing, notably if it disincentivises the use of debt securities. This includes e.g. differences in tax treatment across debt instruments, complex or onerous issuance requirements and possible undue restrictions on institutional investors’ (notably pension funds and insurance companies) allocations to corporate debt securities (including both outright caps and capital surcharges). Efforts should also be made to foster greater awareness and understanding of different types of debt financing among companies, for example through capacity building workshops organised by e.g. business associations or exchanges.
Expanding corporate access to debt markets. In addition to reviewing the conditions for market-based debt financing more broadly, specific efforts should focus on expanding access to these markets among underserved segments, notably smaller and higher-risk companies. For instance, policies that restrict bond issuance to investment grade securities could be reconsidered. Such requirements can be differentiated depending on the characteristics of the target investor group if retail investor protection is a concern. Policy makers could also consider the establishment of dedicated markets for smaller companies, such as the minibond framework in Italy. This has the benefit of creating a single, easily accessible venue through which investors can find smaller issuers’ debt securities. These markets can also impose less stringent requirements and lower the cost of issuance for smaller companies. If deemed relevant, limited credit guarantees can support investor demand in the riskiest securities, while ensuring the risk of moral hazard is minimised. These credit guarantees could for example apply to securitised pools of smaller company loans and bonds.
Increasing credit rating coverage. In addition to measures such as harmonising regional rating scales (see above), policy makers should seek to expand the credit rating coverage of their domestic debt markets. These initiatives should differentiate between two similar but distinct policy objectives: increasing the availability of credit information about smaller companies and expanding the rating coverage of larger companies by internationally recognised rating agencies. The share of bonds without a rating from one of the main three international rating agencies is nearly three times higher in Asia than globally. While this is affected by the large share of unrated Chinese companies, it is not limited to China. It should be evaluated whether a large share of companies that are suited to obtaining an international rating, i.e. large firms with the capacity to engage with the rating agencies and whose debt might be of interest to international investors, are refraining from doing so and, if so, the reasons should be identified. Expanding the rating coverage of large firms would contribute to increased index inclusion and help unlock international investment flows. This effort is not limited to the three main international agencies and should include promoting the further international recognition and quality of regional/domestic agencies. When it comes to smaller companies, efforts could focus on the development of domestic rating systems that can draw from local expertise and data access. If a private market does not develop independently, the provision of some type of credit information through public agencies (such as the central bank) could be considered.
More broadly, for these initiatives to be successful, they must be underpinned by an environment of predictability and macro-financial stability. Policy makers need to ensure proper contract enforcement, predictable mechanisms for dispute resolution, no undue restrictions on capital flows and moderate and stable inflation. This provides the foundation on which corporate debt market development can be built.
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← 1. A middle-standing company is defined in the Korean Special Act on the Promotion of Growth and the Strengthening of Competitiveness of Middle-Standing Enterprises and associated enforcement decree. They are non-SMEs (following the definition in the same Act) with certain characteristics, such as thresholds for maximum average annual turnover.