Resilient food systems that can prepare for, absorb, adapt, and transform in response to shocks are underpinned by open and well-functioning markets and reliable access to inputs, finance, infrastructure and information.
Recent volatility in fertiliser markets highlights the interconnections between farm-level decisions and supply-chain vulnerabilities, as well as the trade-offs policymakers may face in balancing short-term interventions with longer-term resilience objectives, with implications for food security.
The impacts of fertiliser shocks and policy responses differ significantly across countries, reflecting varying import dependence, income levels, fiscal space, existing fertiliser use, and capacity of producers and governments to adjust, as well as the wider food security context.
OECD work underscores the need for a holistic approach to resilience focused on upstream preparedness. Policy responses to specific shocks should be informed by a careful assessment of the likely nature, duration and scale of disruptions, and of the benefits and costs of intervention. Where action is warranted, measures should address immediate pressures while minimising market distortions and maintaining incentives for longer-term investments in resilience.
Agricultural resilience and food security in an interconnected world
Agricultural production and agri-food supply chains have faced successive and overlapping shocks in recent years. These have included the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, rising geopolitical and trade tensions, volatile energy markets, and increasingly frequent and severe extreme weather events. While global food supply chains and international trade have continued to ensure food supply, the long- and short-term impacts of these shocks have varied considerably across countries, commodities, producers and consumers. Against this background, OECD work underscores the need for a holistic approach to agricultural resilience that accounts for potential sources of disruption and is based on preparedness, agility and strengthening capacities to absorb, adapt, and transform in response to a wide range of possible shocks.
Global food production is projected to grow by 13% between 2026 and 2035, and while most of this growth is expected to come from total factor productivity gains, production critically depends on reliable and affordable access to energy, inputs (e.g. fertilisers), infrastructure and markets (OECD/FAO, 2026[1]). At the same time, higher food production alone does not guarantee greater food system resilience, nor is it sufficient to address existing global food security challenges. If other aspects (such as vulnerabilities affecting access to nutritious and affordable food, livelihoods and wellbeing, and the environment) are ignored, policymakers may end up strengthening resilience in one area while harming other food systems objectives or undermining long-term resilience of the entire system (Deconinck et al., 2023[2]).
Recent volatility in fertiliser markets illustrates both short- and long-term resilience and food security challenges. Fertilisers are critical for agricultural production and global food security, and their production and trade are closely linked to energy markets. Production and trade also tend to take place in geographically concentrated supply chains (Adenäuer, Laget and Cluff, 2024[3]). Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the price of urea (the most common type of nitrogen fertiliser) peaked in April 2022 at more than three times its 2019 average and, while subsequently declining, has remained volatile. The first half of 2026 saw a renewed spike in fertiliser prices due to the conflict in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz (which not only directly reduced the availability of nitrogen fertilisers but also raised costs for energy, freight and raw materials), combined with new restrictions by China on fertiliser exports. The effects of such shocks reverberate along supply chains. They are felt first at the farm level, as high fertiliser prices can hurt farm profits, reduce fertiliser application rates and even production. Ultimately, this may lead to increased food prices, with the full extent of impacts difficult to assess in real time. While OECD scenario analysis (e.g. OECD (2026[4])) can provide useful insights, further analysis and discussions amongst a range of stakeholders can help clarify the transmission channels and identify responses that address immediate pressures while supporting longer-term investments in efficiency, diversification and resilience.
Note: Chart shows prices of nitrogen fertiliser (as proxied by urea, the most common type of nitrogen fertiliser) and prices of maize and wheat (soft red winter wheat) as reported by the World Bank, indexed to January 2019 = 100.
Source: Calculations based on World Bank commodity price data, https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets (accessed on 21 September 2026).
Fertilisers are critical for global food security. Crops need macronutrients – most importantly nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and potassium (K) – to maintain soil fertility and support higher yields. The invention of synthetic nitrogen fertiliser (produced mostly using natural gas) in the early 20th century enabled an unprecedented increase in global food production and supported rapid global population growth. It is estimated that around half of the world’s population depends on synthetic nitrogen fertilisers for an adequate food supply (Adenäuer, Laget and Cluff, 2024[3]).
Fertilisers represent a major cost for crop farmers. In the United States, fertilisers accounted for around 16% of maize production costs in 2020, rising to 24% as prices increased in 2022 (USDA, 2026[5]). For field crops in the European Union, fertilisers were 12% of direct costs in 2020, increasing to 16% in 2022 (European Commission, 2026[3]). Fertiliser prices tend to increase faster than crop prices, as seen during both the 2022 and now the 2026 shocks (Figure 1). Fertiliser price shocks can therefore place substantial pressure on farm margins and influence input use, planting decisions and crop choice. These effects are stronger for more fertiliser-intensive crops, or where farmers have limited access to credit or alternative nutrient sources.
The duration and timing of disruptions matter. Short-lived supply shocks may be partly absorbed through stocks, advance purchases or temporary adjustments in fertiliser application. For instance, producers across Europe, North America and northern parts of Africa had already secured supplies for the planting season in the northern hemisphere before the price increases of early 2026, helping to limit the initial effects (AMIS, 2026[6]). However, as disruptions persists, stocks become depleted and producers face successive planting seasons with fertilisers at higher prices or reduced availability and thus the risks to crop yields and agricultural production become larger over time (Adenäuer, Laget and Cluff, 2024[3]). Impacts are compounded when importers must switch rapidly to more distant suppliers, increasing freight costs and procurement uncertainty or when disruptions coincide with planting periods.
The food security impacts of a shock can differ substantially across countries. The same global shock can have substantially different implications for food security in different countries, depending on input or food import dependencies, income levels, price transmission along supply chains, and the capacity of producers to adjust (IFPRI, 2025[7]). OECD scenario analysis suggests relatively limited reductions in cereal production across OECD countries, but more pronounced effects in some low-income and fertiliser import-dependent economies, particularly those reliant on nitrogen fertiliser supplies from the Gulf (OECD, 2026[4]). Lower global fertiliser affordability is projected to have larger effects on cereal production and per capita calorie availability in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia (OECD, 2026[4]).
Fertiliser use also involves environmental and health trade-offs. While fertilisers support high crop yields and soil fertility, excessive or poorly targeted use can contribute to water and air pollution (OECD, 2018[8]; OECD, 2026[9]). In contexts where fertiliser use is excessive, higher prices may prompt more efficient use and reduce environmental pressures; but where use is low or soil nutrient deficits persist, further reductions can constrain yields, deplete soils and have adverse impacts on food security (Jones and Deuss, 2024[10]). The appropriate policy response therefore depends on country and production-system circumstances, including fertiliser application rates, soil nutrient balances, and local food security impacts (OECD, 2026[11]).
Options exist to optimise nutrient use, by applying the right product, at the right time, in the right place, and at the right rate (IFA, WFO and GACSA, 2016[12]). Soil testing, monitoring and precision application enabled by digital technologies can reduce over-application; crop rotations, legumes and cover crops can lower nitrogen requirements; and manure, crop residues and other recycled or organic nutrients can supplement synthetic fertilisers. These options are not universally affordable or applicable and require investment, changes in farm management and supportive policy frameworks (Jones and Deuss, 2024[10]).
Diversifying sources of supply can provide an additional layer of resilience (OECD, 2025[13]). Fertiliser production is geographically concentrated in part due to the location of phosphate and potash reserves and the need for substantial, reliable and cost-effective energy supplies for synthetic nitrogen production. In 2024, the top five producing countries accounted for 62% of global production of nitrogen fertilisers, 74% of phosphate fertilisers, and 84% of potash fertilisers (FAO, 2026[14]). Countries with more limited relevant resource endowments are often dependent on imports, with major grain producers such as Brazil, Türkiye and Australia, as well as several African countries, particularly reliant on supplies from the Gulf (OECD, 2026[15]). Increasing the range of import sources can strengthen resilience, but recent disruptions illustrate that diversification depends on more than the number of suppliers and includes the availability of alternative transport routes, the timing of shipments and the ability to switch sources when markets tighten. Several countries have also introduced policies to stimulate domestic production of nitrogen fertilisers, which can generate additional options but will not be feasible or cost-effective everywhere given the importance of mineral and energy resources in the production process.
The recent volatility in fertiliser markets thus illustrates broader agricultural resilience challenges, highlighting the interconnections between farm-level decisions, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and the trade-offs policymakers may face when balancing short-term interventions with longer-term resilience objectives. As agri-food systems confront a wider range of risks, resilience will remain a central consideration for food security and agricultural policy. Insights from OECD work on agriculture and food systems resilience are relevant here (see box “Insights for policymakers”).
Invest in resilience against a wide range of shocks. The disruption in fertiliser markets is the latest in a series of shocks affecting global agri-food supply chains. It is therefore important to design long-run resilience policies that are adaptable to a broad array of possible shocks, in addition to dealing with challenges in the short run (Deconinck et al., 2023[2]).
Recognise the roles and responsibilities of different actors. Shocks that are relatively small and local are best dealt with by farmers or supply chain actors as part of their normal business activities; other intermediary shocks can be dealt with by transferring risk through market instruments; and yet other large and systemic shocks may require governments to step in (OECD, 2009[16]). Governments can use their convening power to bring stakeholders together, supporting a shared understanding of risks and responsibilities (OECD, 2020[17]).
Take a holistic and proportionate approach to policy responses. Food security, farm incomes, environmental performance and market functioning are related but distinct objectives and may require different instruments. Targeted social protection can support vulnerable consumers, while temporary support can help farmers to absorb the shock in the short term. These policies need to be well-designed to avoid distorting production decisions and maintain incentives for continued investments in adaptation and transformation that are essential for resilience (OECD, 2019[18]; OECD, 2021[19]). Responses should be coherent, evidence-based, and reflect the nature, duration and scale of the shock (OECD, 2020[17]; OECD, 2021[20]). Policymakers should also take into account trade-offs between different objectives, and should avoid measures that strengthen resilience in one dimension at the expense of resilience in other dimensions (OECD, 2025[21]; Jones and Deuss, 2024[10]).
Keep markets open and build trust through transparency. During previous shocks, export restrictions imposed by major exporters often exacerbated tensions in global markets (Jones and Deuss, 2024[10]). Open and predictable markets, timely information such as that transmitted by the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), and transparency on policy measures can help supply adjust and reduce uncertainty (Deconinck et al., 2023[2]; OECD, 2020[22]).
This Policy Brief brings together existing OECD work and provides a narrative framework for discussions at the 2026 OECD Global Forum on Agriculture, entitled Agricultural resilience and food security in an interconnected world: Lessons from fertilisers and beyond, and held at the OECD Conference Centre in Paris, France on 3 November 2026. More information is available here:
https://www.oecd.org/en/events/2026/11/oecd-global-forum-on-agriculture.html.
References
[3] Adenäuer, M., E. Laget and M. Cluff (2024), “Fertile Futures: Scenario Analysis on the Interconnected Dynamics of Fertiliser and Agricultural Markets”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 207, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b1606a57-en.
[6] AMIS (2026), Impacts of the Hormuz crisis on fertilizer and fuel markets: findings from an AMIS survey, https://www.amis-outlook.org/list-details/news/ydaqsltbwl1lwic4tvpob1ah (accessed on 6 August 2026).
[25] Deconinck, K. (2021), “Concentration and market power in the food chain”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 151, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3151e4ca-en.
[2] Deconinck, K. et al. (2023), “Towards resilient food systems: Implications of supply chain disruptions and policy responses”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 205, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f7998e46-en.
[23] European Commission (2026), Fertiliser Use and Costs in EU Farms, European Commission, https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/FertiliserReport/FertiliserReport.html.
[14] FAO (2026), Fertilizers by Nutrient, https://www.fao.org/statistics/highlights-archive/highlights-detail/inorganic-fertilizers.-2015-2024 (accessed on 18 September 2026).
[12] IFA, WFO and GACSA (2016), Nutrient Management Handbook, https://www.fertilizer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2016_Nutrient_Management_Handbook.pdf.
[7] IFPRI (2025), How do food and fertilizer price spikes and volatility impact Central America and the Caribbean?.
[10] Jones, D. and A. Deuss (2024), “Understanding the resilience of fertiliser markets to shocks: An overview of fertiliser policies”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 208, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/43664170-en.
[11] OECD (2026), Environmental Performance of Agriculture in OECD Countries 2026: Key Trends and Insights, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5bbd8f58-en.
[9] OECD (2026), Global shocks, fertiliser use and the importance of data: Insights on the environmental performance of agriculture.
[15] OECD (2026), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2026 Issue 1: Under Pressure, https://doi.org/10.1787/2d1956f0-en.
[4] OECD (2026), “The impact of the conflict in the Middle East on agricultural markets”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 225, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3324cfee-en.
[13] OECD (2025), OECD Supply Chain Resilience Review: Navigating Risks, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/94e3a8ea-en.
[21] OECD (2025), “Practical approaches to develop resilience strategies for food systems”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 217, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/caa2b274-en.
[19] OECD (2021), Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2021: Addressing the Challenges Facing Food Systems, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2d810e01-en.
[20] OECD (2021), “Keep calm and carry on feeding: Agriculture and food policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis”, OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/db1bf302-en.
[17] OECD (2020), Strengthening Agricultural Resilience in the Face of Multiple Risks, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2250453e-en.
[22] OECD (2020), “The role of transparency in avoiding a COVID-19 induced food crisis”, OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d6a37aeb-en.
[18] OECD (2019), Getting the policy mix right for global food security and nutrition, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a3a834d2-en.
[8] OECD (2018), Human Acceleration of the Nitrogen Cycle: Managing Risks and Uncertainty, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307438-en.
[16] OECD (2009), Managing Risk in Agriculture: A Holistic Approach, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264075313-en.
[1] OECD/FAO (2026), OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2026-2035, OECD Publishing, Paris/FAO, Rome, https://doi.org/10.1787/47874669-en.
[24] OECD/FAO (2025), OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2025-2034, OECD Publishing, Paris/FAO, Rome, https://doi.org/10.1787/601276cd-en.
[5] USDA (2026), Commodity Costs and Returns, United States Department of Agriculture, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/commodity-costs-and-returns.
Contacts
Kurt Niquidet (kurt.niquidet@oecd.org)
Carla Barisone (carla.barisone@oecd.org)
Trade and Agriculture Directorate (tad.contact@oecd.org)