This chapter explains how infrastructure can promote productive transformation in the region of North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). It presents the infrastructure investment needs and current financing in North Africa as a whole and in its individual countries. The chapter assesses the degree to which regional and national infrastructure plans in the energy and transport sectors contribute to productive transformation. In addition, it addresses the region’s institutional capacity and skills development in infrastructure.
Africa's Development Dynamics 2025
Infrastructure, Growth and Transformation
Abstract
While North Africa often boasts the continent’s best quality infrastructure, boosting infrastructure investment would catalyse its productive transformation. The region’s infrastructure needs for productive transformation are estimated at USD 38 billion per year by 2040, or 4.2% of gross domestic product (GDP). Meeting this target could raise annual GDP growth by an additional 3.5 percentage points. The largest investment needs are in transport (55%), to reduce trade costs and improve connectivity, and energy (22%), to support energy security and the green transition.
North Africa relies more on private investments to finance infrastructure than the continent’s other regions, though financing sources differ between countries. In 2019-20, private sources made up 26% of total infrastructure investment in the region, the second highest share after West Africa (29%). Egypt and Morocco attract substantial private funding, accounting for over 91% of North Africa’s private infrastructure investment between 2013 and 2023 (53% went to Egypt and 38% to Morocco), mainly in large-scale energy and transport projects. Yet, their government spending remains below the continental average, at 0.9% and 1.2% of their GDP, respectively. Tunisia spends 3% of its GDP on infrastructure; however, it draws relatively less private capital. Algeria’s and Mauritania’s government spending on infrastructure is 0.5% and 0.2% of their GDP, respectively. At 1.2% of its GDP, North Africa’s government spending remains below the African average (1.8%) and less than that of Southern Africa (2.4%). In contrast, Mauritania receives the highest inflows of official development finance for infrastructure, reaching 1.6% of its GDP.
To support greater infrastructure investment, North African countries have launched ambitious national plans in the energy and transport sectors. Countries have also invested in the digital sector and smart city initiatives to upgrade urban infrastructure systems. Nonetheless, regional co-ordination remains weak, with no overarching North African master plans.
Delivering these plans requires strong institutional capacity. While public-private partnerships are supported by solid frameworks, skill shortages in energy and transport continue to constrain sustained transformation, despite growing efforts to develop skills.
Note: GDP= gross domestic product. Infrastructure investment needs for productive transformation refer to modelled estimates of the total expenditures required to build new infrastructure to match the infrastructure levels of peer countries that perform well in productive transformation, while also maintaining existing infrastructure. See Annex 1.A for details.
Source: Data sources for the investment needs estimations are listed in Annex 1.A.
Note: Transport = kilometres (km) of paved roads and railways per 100 km2 of non-desert land area. Digital = per cent of the population aged 15+ with Internet access. Energy = installed energy capacity as watt per capita. Water = per cent of the population with access to drinking water. For transport and energy stocks, the averages for North Africa and Africa are population-weighted. For transport and energy stocks, the values for North Africa and Africa reflect aggregated totals relative to population or area, depending on the indicator. For digital and water access, the values for North Africa and Africa represent unweighted averages of country values.
Source: Transport and energy indicators’ sources are reported in Annex 1.A. Water: Drinking water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) estimates, from UNICEF (2024[1]), Drinking water, sanitation and hygiene in households by country, 2000-2022 (database), https://data.unicef.org/topic/water-and-sanitation/drinking-water/; Digital: from Gallup (2020[2]), Gallup World Poll 2020 (database), https://www.gallup.com/analytics/213617/gallup-analytics.aspx.
North African countries require significant investments in infrastructure to support productive transformation. While there are differences across the region, on average, North African countries have greater access to infrastructure and more physical stock than Africa as a whole (Figure 6.2). For instance, all North African countries except Mauritania rank among the top 10 in Africa for energy capacity per capita. Similarly, four also rank among the continent’s top 15 in a qualitative score of railway quality: Morocco (first), Algeria (sixth), Egypt (seventh) and Tunisia (twelfth).1 However, to close the gap with their peer countries that have high levels of productive transformation in other world regions (Annex 1.A), North Africa will need to invest around USD 38 billion per year by 2040. Such an investment level is equivalent to 4.2% of the region’s GDP in 2024 (Figure 6.1). By comparison, this is below the African investment need for productive transformation of 5.6% of the continent’s GDP. Investing USD 38 billion per year by 2040 is estimated to increase the region’s annual GDP growth by 3.5 percentage points on average, propelling the region along a path to more sustainable growth.
North Africa relies more on private investments to finance infrastructure than most other African regions. In 2019-20 in North Africa, private sources accounted for 26% of total infrastructure investment (public and private). This represents the second-highest share among the regions after West Africa (29%). In the same period, North African governments spent on average 1.2% of their GDP on infrastructure, below Southern Africa (2.4% of its GDP) and the African average (1.8% of its GDP).
North Africa attracts the continent’s highest volume of private investments in infrastructure. In 2013-23, North Africa secured the largest share of private participation in infrastructure (PPI) investments in volume on the continent: 27%, or a total of USD 22.6 billion. Most of this investment (83%) was directed towards large-scale private infrastructure projects in the energy and transport sectors. Egypt and Morocco were the main recipients, receiving 53% and 38% of North Africa’s PPI investment value, respectively, and hosting 45 of the region’s 65 projects (Figure 6.3).
Note: RHS = right-hand side.
Source: World Bank (2024[3]), Private Participation in Infrastructure (database), https://ppi.worldbank.org/en/ppi.
Government spending on infrastructure and debt servicing varies widely across North African countries. In 2019-20, Tunisia’s government spent the equivalent of 3.0% of its GDP on infrastructure – 3 times more than Morocco (1.2%) and Egypt (0.9%); Mauritania’s government spending was 15 times lower (0.2%). Large differences across North African countries exist in terms of debt service-to-infrastructure spending ratios: in 2019-20, Mauritania spent over USD 363 million – or 28 times more – on its sovereign debt than on infrastructure, the second highest ratio on the continent. In contrast, Algeria had the second-lowest ratio of debt service-to-infrastructure spending in Africa (0.30 times) (Figure 6.4).
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. The indicator in Panel B is calculated based on an average of available data over the past five years for public infrastructure spending (2019-20) and debt servicing (2019-23). Median values are displayed for Africa and North Africa in Panel B to account for extreme cases. No data are available for Libya.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ICA (2022[4]), Infrastructure Financing Trends in Africa 2019-2020, and World Bank (2024[5]) International Debt Statistics (database), https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/debt-statistics/ids.
Official development finance (ODF) in North Africa contributes to a smaller share of infrastructure financing compared to other African regions. From 2019 to 2023, North Africa received USD 18.7 billion in ODF allocated to infrastructure, or 0.7% of its GDP. It is the smallest amount of ODF allocated to infrastructure relative to the GDP of all African regions. At an average of USD 1.9 billion per year, Egypt received more than half of the region’s total ODF. Mauritania received the equivalent of 1.6% of its GDP in ODF for infrastructure, roughly eight times as much as national government spending. In contrast to PPI investments, ODF for infrastructure puts greater emphasis on transport (36% of total ODF), which could indicate that ODF fulfils specific needs not met by private investment (Figure 6.5).
Note: RHS = right-hand scale. Official development finance disbursements include official development assistance (ODA) and other official financial flows that do not meet the conditions for eligibility as ODA (either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or because they have a grant element of less than 25%).
Source: OECD (2025[6]), Creditor Reporting System (database), https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/development-finance-statistics-data-on-flows-to-developing-countries.html.
North African countries have developed ambitious energy and transport infrastructure plans, but stronger regional co-ordination is needed to support deeper trade integration
North African countries' infrastructure plans primarily focus on the energy and transport sectors, and some cities are concentrating on the digital sectors. At the national level, governments have developed ambitious strategies to modernise infrastructure for renewable energy and transport and improve connectivity to support productive transformation. At the local level, some North African municipalities are investing in digital infrastructure to develop smart cities (Box 6.1).
Smart cities use digital technologies to boost citizen well-being and deliver more efficient, sustainable and inclusive urban services and environments as part of a collaborative, multistakeholder process (OECD, 2020[7]). In North Africa, governments are increasingly adopting strategies to develop smart cities to modernise urban infrastructure systems and improve the quality of life for their growing urban populations. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have each followed distinct approaches.
Algeria is developing smart cities to support entrepreneurship. Launched in 2017 and inaugurated during the Smart Cities Global Technology and Investment Summit in June 2018, the Algiers Smart City project aims to create a technological hub and boost the local start-up ecosystem. Key initiatives include the Experimental Lab and the Technology Innovation Hub, which test smart solutions before large-scale deployment and mobilise local talent (Oxford Business Group, 2018[8]).
Egypt stands out for its large-scale investments in new urban developments, anchored in a national strategy launched in 2024, the first of its kind in Africa. The programme includes the construction of entirely new smart cities, such as the New Administrative Capital and New Alamein, and targets the elimination of unsafe and informal residential settlements. These efforts are supported by partnerships with UN-Habitat, technology firms and multilateral donors (Development Aid, 2023[9]; UN-Habitat, 2019[10]).
Morocco has focused on modernising existing urban centres, particularly Casablanca. Through initiatives like E-Madina and active involvement in the IEEE Smart Cities Initiative, the country has strengthened local governance and fostered collaboration between municipalities, academia and private actors. Casablanca’s smart city model integrates transport optimisation, municipal management and citizen engagement (EGE Rabat, 2022[11]; Betis et al., 2018[12]).
Tunisia has given priority to a decentralised approach, launching smart city pilots in secondary cities like Bizerte and Kairouan. It has also invested in skills development, establishing North Africa’s first Smart Industry Readiness Index Training and Certification Centre in 2024 to build professional skills in digital manufacturing and infrastructure planning (Tunisian Smart Cities, 2025[13]; INCIT, 2024[14]).
For infrastructure, regional co-operation is less prevalent than bilateral partnerships, with cross-border co-operation centring on transport corridors. While regional co-operation is advancing through selected initiatives – in partnership with the European Union – progress is limited by the absence of a North African authority dedicated to regional infrastructure master plans. Regional co-operation with non-European Union countries is scarce. Rather, North African countries typically engage in bilateral partnerships. For example, all the region’s countries participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Cross-border co-operation efforts are concentrated around transport development corridors that aim to reduce trade costs and enhance regional integration.
Energy infrastructure plans in North Africa aim to diversify energy sources, reduce reliance on fossil fuels, expand access and create jobs. Across the region, national strategies promote energy efficiency, grid expansion and the development of domestic renewable industries with high job-creation potential. Exporting countries like Algeria and Libya aim to reduce their dependency on oil and gas revenues by investing in solar and wind power; importing countries such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia seek to improve energy security by lowering fossil fuel imports. Interconnection projects – linking national grids across North Africa with the Arab region and Europe – are also central to North African countries’ plans. At the regional level, co-operation with the European Union is advancing through initiatives such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the Southern Hydrogen Corridor, which aim to position North Africa as a key supplier of clean energy and green hydrogen to Europe (Table 6.1).
Note: EU = European Union. GIZ = German Development Agency.
Source: Government of Mauritania (2024[15]), National Energy Pact for the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (Pacte National de l'Energie pour la République Islamique de Mauritanie); Government of Libya (2023[16]), “Ihya Libya 2030 Vision: Economic Development: Growing and Diversifying the Economy”; IEA (2018[17]), Tunisia Solar Plan (PST) 2010-2016; IRENA (2021[18]), Renewable Readiness Assessment: The Republic of Tunisia; GIZ (2017[19]), Support the Implementation of the Tunisian Solar Plan (APST); UNDP (2018[20]), NAMA Support for the Tunisian Solar Plan; World Bank (2024[21]), The Disruptive Energy Transition and Opportunities for Job Creation in the Middle East and North Africa: Case Study – Tunisia; Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment (2015[22]), The 2015 Global Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries: Algeria; meetMED (2020[23]), Country Report on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Investment Climate: Algeria; IRENA (2018[24]), Renewable Energy Outlook: Egypt; Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment (Morocco) (2013[25]), Morocco's New National Energy Strategy; Ministry of Energy, Mining and Environment (Morocco) (2021[26]), Feuille de route de l’hydrogène vert : vecteur d’une transition énergétique innovante.
Transport infrastructure plans in North Africa focus on expanding networks, improving connectivity and supporting industrial development. Morocco and Tunisia aim to become regional transport hubs by significantly expanding their transport network to boost trade and job creation. At the regional level, co-operation with the European Union under the Union for the Mediterranean framework supports integration through initiatives such as the Regional Transport Action Plan. The lack of a dedicated regional authority limits co-ordination, and most cross-border efforts remain focused on transport corridors. North Africa would benefit from a comprehensive regional transport infrastructure plan for regional integration (Santi, 2012[27]).
Morocco aims to extend its Tanger-Casablanca high-speed railway to Marrakech, expanding the intermodal connection between strategic cities and the largest container port in Africa (Head of Government, Kingdom of Morocco, 2025[28]).
Launched in 2024, the Tunisia Economic Corridors Project aims to improve connectivity and logistics between urban and rural areas by prioritising last-mile roads. The project seeks to make lagging regions more attractive for private investment and help local businesses access larger markets (World Bank, 2025[29]).
Note: AfCFTA = African Continental Free Trade Area.
Source: AfDB (2024[30]), Rapport d'évaluation : Projet de Modernisation des Infrastructures Routières, Phase III (PMIR III) : Tunisie; ONCF (2018[31]), “Plan Stratégique METLE”; Atalayar (2025[32]), “La grande vitesse : un levier économique stratégique pour le Maroc”.
Transport co-operation among North African countries has led to establishing development corridors. These transport and logistics linkages focus on facilitating the movement of people and goods. The Tunisian segment of the Trans-Maghreb Multimodal Corridor has reduced travel time from 3.5 to 1.45 hours and greatly improved transport access. Conversely, the Trans-Saharan Road Corridor (TSR) – linking Algeria, Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Tunisia – has experienced mixed results, with challenges such as weak logistical performance, non-tariff barriers and road safety leading to underutilisation of the corridor’s secondary branches (Table 6.3). The six TSR member countries have shown commitment regarding its gradual evolution into an economic development corridor, with resources allocated to key areas including institutional governance, capacity building and environmental sustainability (UNCTAD, 2022[33]).
Note: AfCFTA = African Continental Free Trade Area. AfDB = African Development Bank. AMU = Arab Maghreb Union. AUDA-NEPAD = African Union Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa's Development. BADEA = Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa. BDEAC = Development Bank of Central African States. ECA = United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. EU = European Union. IsDB = Islamic Development Bank. KFAED =The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. OPEC = Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. SFD = Saudi Fund for Development. UfM = Union for the Mediterranean.
Source: Thorn et al. (2022[34]), “African Development Corridors Database: A new tool to assess the impacts of infrastructure investments”; JICA (2022[35]), Data Collection Survey on Corridor Development in Africa: Final Report; AfDB (2023[36]), Cross-Border Road Corridors: Expanding Market Access in Africa and Nurturing Continental Integration; UNCTAD (2022[33]), The Trans-Saharan Road Corridor – Towards an Economic Corridor: Commercializing and Managing the Trans-Saharan Road; CETMO (2018[37]), The Trans-Maghreb Multimodal Corridor: The Backbone of the Maghreb Transport System.
Public-private partnerships are supported by solid institutional frameworks, yet skills gaps in transport and energy hinder full infrastructure development
North African countries are relatively well-equipped with mechanisms to implement and monitor public-private partnerships (PPPs). North Africa has longstanding regulatory frameworks facilitating PPPs: the earliest PPP institutional efforts on the continent emerged in Algeria and Egypt in 2006. According to the Benchmarking Infrastructure Development (BID) survey by the World Bank (2025[38]), in 2023, Egypt and Morocco had similar scores in the PPP preparation phase as high-income countries, which could potentially explain their high capacity to mobilise private investment (Figure 6.6). Some North African countries explicitly highlight PPPs in their sectoral infrastructure plans to encourage investments (e.g. Tunisia’s solar plan) and commit to reinforcing the legal basis of PPPs (e.g. Mauritania’s Pact for Energy).
Note: PPI = Private participation in infrastructure. PPP = Private-public partnership. RHS = right-hand scale. LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean. For each country and region, PPI per capita is calculated as the total PPI investment between 2013 and 2023 divided by the 2019 population. PPI project data do not include high-income countries.
Source: World Bank (2024[3]), Private Participation in Infrastructure (database), https://ppi.worldbank.org/en/ppi, and World Bank (2025[38]), Benchmarking Infrastructure Development (BID) (database), https://bpp.worldbank.org/en/global.
Skills development in the energy and transport sectors is increasing among North African countries. Four out of six North African countries offer training in these sectors via technical and vocational education and training programmes, tertiary education (e.g. Pan-African University Institute of Water and Energy Sciences based in Algeria) and internship programmes (e.g. Masen Talents Campus based in Morocco) (Table 6.4).
Yet, the demand outpaces the skill supply. According to the Big Data for Labour Market Intelligence project, electricity and construction are among the five sectors with the highest demand for green skills in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia (ACQF, 2024[39]). A survey by the African Union Commission and the OECD of North African experts in the energy sector reveals that job demand in renewable energy depends on the segment of the value chain. In upstream segments, unmet demand prevails for technical skills in design, engineering and innovation; whereas in downstream segments, skills demand is unmet in operations, maintenance and recycling skills. A number of factors cause the mismatch between skills’ demand and supply, including the narrow scope of skills development strategies and the lack of funding for relevant training (AUC/OECD, 2024[40]).
Note: GIZ = German Development Agency. ONCF = Office National des Chemins de Fer (Morocco). SNCF = Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer (France). TVET = technical and vocational education and training.
Source: GIZ (GIZ, 2019[41]), “Solar energy in Tunisia: Vocational training for experts”; IFF (2025[42]), “Maintenance de l’infrastructure et travaux”; EMTP (2025[43]), “Ecole des Métiers des Travaux publics", emtp.dz (website); THAMM Plus/OIM (2023[44]), Termes de références : cartographie des besoins en compétences dans le secteur du Bâtiment et Travaux Publics en Italie et en Tunisie et analyse de l’offre de formation; Masen (2019[45]), Masen Talents Campus; RCREEE (2022[46]), "RCREEE concluded a cooperation agreement for training services in MENA and GCC regions”.
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[3] World Bank (2024), Private Participation in Infrastructure (database), https://ppi.worldbank.org/en/ppi (accessed on 15 March 2025).
[21] World Bank (2024), The Disruptive Energy Transition and Opportunities for Job Creation in the Middle East and North Africa: Case Study – Tunisia, The World Bank Group, Washington, DC, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099011524131520481/pdf/P17054612bbe400361868c17299ac7f71df.pdf.
[47] World Economic Forum (2019), The Global Competitiveness Report 2019, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2019.pdf.
← 1. Authors’ calculations based on World Economic Forum (2019[47]).