This chapter introduces the OECD-EU project with the competition authorities of Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece and Romania. It explains the project’s objectives and output, which include technical analysis, recommendations and capacity building. The chapter explains what bid rigging is and how it undermines competition in public procurement. It highlights the importance of advocacy to limit the risk of bid rigging, and to help identify and report red flags. Finally, the chapter mentions the main OECD and EU legal instruments on fighting bid rigging and provides an overview of the law and enforcement against bid rigging in the six project countries.
Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement in Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece and Romania
Improving Competition through Advocacy and Co-operation
Abstract
In September 2024, the OECD started a two-year project with the competition authorities of Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece and Romania. The project is funded by the European Commission (EU) Reform and Investment Taskforce (SG REFORM) through the Technical Support Instrument (TSI).1 It aims to help the six authorities prevent and detect cartels in public procurement, enhance compliance with competition law and foster more competitive public procurement markets. The project combines technical analysis, policy and practice recommendations (through a training manual and this report), and capacity building.
Public procurement constitutes a fundamental instrument for the delivery of public services and the pursuit of key public policy objectives. Across OECD-EU countries, public procurement expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) stood at 14.8% in 2023, 13.9% in 2019 and 15% in 2021 (OECD, 2025[1]). As a share of total government expenditures, it represented 30% in 2023, increasing by 0.2 percentage points since 2019 (29.8%) and 0.8 percentage points since 2021 (29.2%). The six countries’ share of procurement in 2023 was the following (OECD, 2025[1]):
Austria: 15.1% of GDP and 28.6% of total government expenditure
Bulgaria: 11.2% of GDP and 29% of total government expenditure
Croatia: 15.5% of GDP and 33.1% of total government expenditure
Cyprus: 7% of GDP (World Bank, 2022[2])
Greece: 12.6% of GDP and 25.4% of total government expenditure
Romania: 12.2% of GDP and 30.1% of total government expenditure
Given the magnitude of public procurement spending, the risks associated with bid rigging are considerable. Bid-rigging cartels are secret, making it hard to estimate their full impact. However, empirical research suggests that collusion in procurement can lead to overcharges averaging 20% of the final contract price (Smuda, 2012[3]). Given the large sums involved in public procurement, these overcharges can translate into billions in public money lost annually. This financial impact comes on top of a macroeconomic context of persistent inflation,2 in which public budgets are under increasing pressure.
Enforcement trends also reflect the scope and persistence of the problem. According to OECD (2025[4]) data, 44% of all cartel infringement decisions in 2023 concerned bid rigging, up from 39% in 2022 (Figure 1.1). These numbers confirm that bid rigging remains one of the most prevalent and damaging forms of collusion and that competition authorities worldwide continue to scrutinise it.
Note: Data based on the 63 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data on cartel decisions and bid-rigging cartel
infringement decisions for the years 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats; OECD (2025[4]), OECD Competition Trends 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/8c4bd00b-en.
This project was developed in response to these challenges. It aims to strengthen the advocacy role of the six competition authorities, equip public officials with practical tools and knowledge to address bid rigging, and create investigation leads for potential bid-rigging cases. To that end, it focusses on integrating competition compliance into procurement processes as seamlessly as possible, identifying synergies between procurement and competition objectives.
The OECD conducted extensive fact-finding interviews with public institutions in each participating country (see Table 2 of Annex A). These interviews aimed to understand co‑operation between competition authorities and relevant public bodies, including procurement, audit and criminal enforcement institutions. Where formal frameworks (like inter-agency co‑operation agreements) were in place, discussions focussed on identifying opportunities for improvement. Where co‑operation was limited or absent, the interviews helped identify opportunities for engagement and mechanisms to enable or formalise co‑operation.
The OECD also delivered three tailored workshops in each of the six beneficiary countries for key stakeholder groups: contracting authorities; the judiciary and non-competition enforcers; and the private sector (see Table 1 of Annex A). In addition, it conducted three workshops for non-competition enforcement bodies (such as audit institutions, prosecutors and financial police) in Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania. In Austria, Croatia and Greece, these stakeholders participated in the judicial workshops.
The 21 workshops allowed a rich exchange of national and international experiences, and the collection of a diverse set of practices and perspectives. Each group received specialised training designed to address their specific role:
The workshops for public procurement officials and non-competition enforcers focussed on pro-competitive tender design, bid-rigging risks and costs, red flags for collusion/bid rigging and how to report suspicious cases. They also addressed damages claims for victims of bid rigging (in this case, for contracting authorities paying a cartel overcharge).
The workshops for administrative and civil judges covered topics of competition law, such as the evidentiary standards required in bid-rigging cases and the conditions for damages claims.
The workshops for the private sector raised awareness on the legal risks and economic harms of collusion, compliance obligations in tendering, the operation of leniency programmes, whistleblowing channels and the design of internal compliance mechanisms.
This report seeks to consolidate the main lessons learnt in the project, in its fact finding and in the workshops. Unless otherwise indicated, the report reflects the legal, institutional and enforcement situation in the six project countries up to the end of 2025. As one of the project’s main written outputs, this report presents a range of successful advocacy initiatives, including guidance on tender design, models of inter-institutional co‑operation and mechanisms for reporting suspicions (such as whistleblowing systems). These tools aim to support institutional memory, guide future strategies and ensure continuity in co‑operation. The other major output is a training manual for procurers.
The project pursued three objectives: (1) increasing awareness among contracting authorities and other relevant public and private entities of the risks and harms of bid-rigging cartels; (2) strengthening the advocacy activities and presence of competition authorities in promoting compliance with competition law in public procurement; and (3) institutionalising co‑operation between competition authorities and procurement and other oversight bodies. Taken together, these three objectives form complementary pillars of a comprehensive strategy to strengthen competition law compliance in public procurement and combat bid rigging.
Advocacy and co-operation are closely linked. Advocacy equips relevant stakeholders with the knowledge and skills to recognise red flags, design tenders pro-competitively and understand the legal consequences of collusion. Co‑operation then ensures this awareness is channelled into action by creating institutional mechanisms for information sharing, reporting and co‑ordinated enforcement. The report is structured accordingly:
Chapter 1 introduces the project scope and background, sets out the relevant OECD legal instruments, and provides an overview of the regulation and enforcement of bid rigging in the six participating countries.
Chapter 2 addresses the second project objectives of strengthening advocacy methods and content. It discusses target audiences, advocacy tools and mechanisms, and key advocacy topics identified during the project, like bid-rigging identification and reporting, tender design, joint bidding, bidder exclusion (debarment), whistleblowing, leniency, access to procurement data, compensation for cartel harm and compliance programmes.
Chapter 3 addresses the third project objective on institutionalising co‑operation. It reviews models for formal and informal co‑operation, and presents lessons from workshops and insights from country-specific, fact-finding meetings.
Bid rigging refers to collusive agreements between actual or potential bidders in a procurement process who, instead of preparing and submitting bids independently, co‑ordinate their behaviour and/or strategy to predetermine the outcome of the tender. By undermining competition, bid-rigging cartels prevent public purchasers from obtaining the best value for money, as prices are artificially inflated or quality is reduced to maximise profits. Such practices constitute hard core cartels (OECD, 2019[5]) and are strictly prohibited under competition law in all OECD Member countries.3 As highlighted in the OECD Recommendation on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement,
collusion in public tenders, or bid rigging, is among the most egregious violations of competition law that injures the public purchaser by raising prices, reducing quality, establishing output restrictions or quotas, or sharing or dividing markets, thus making goods and services unavailable or unnecessarily expensive for public purchasers, to the detriment of final users of public goods and services, and taxpayers. [OECD/LEGAL/0396]
Bid-rigging investigations (like any cartel investigation) are challenging, as companies’ collusive schemes are secret and designed to avoid scrutiny. Nevertheless, procurement markets are easier to monitor for indications of potential collusion (red flags) because public procurement systems generate structured and traceable data.
Fighting collusion in public procurement is an enforcement priority for competition agencies globally. The six competition authorities of this project are no exception: they have all punished bid-rigging cartels in their jurisdictions (see Section 1.4). However, like most forms of other cartel conduct, bid-rigging schemes operate in secrecy and are hard to detect, particularly since companies find novel and elaborate ways to collude. Therefore, authorities need to find ways to become aware of possible cartels.
Advocacy towards anyone who may be able to prevent or limit the risk of bid rigging, and/or identify a bid-rigging red flag, plays a critical role in cartel enforcement. Public procurement officials who conduct tender processes are best positioned to detect bid rigging, and therefore essential partners for competition authorities. In addition, non-competition enforcers are also relevant. These include public sector auditors, and prosecutors in charge of economic and financial investigations, as well as financial and economic police that enforce the law against fraud, corruption or financial crime. Such enforcers may come across suspicious patterns or indicators of collusion. Targeted advocacy can create knowledge to identify suspicious behaviour; lead to more enforcement and higher prevention of bid rigging; and, ultimately, enable more competitive tender outcomes.
Despite important efforts in recent years (see Section 1.4), Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece and Romania continue to face challenges in preventing and detecting bid rigging. First, public buyers and non-competition enforcers may lack awareness about competition law, especially about the seriousness, signs and legal consequences of bid rigging. As a result, they may overlook collusive red flags or fail to report concerns appropriately. Second, there is often insufficient inter-institutional co‑operation among public sector bodies. Uncertainty about what information can be lawfully shared and when; the absence of co‑operation protocols; and lack of mutual understanding about institutional mandates (what can be requested and expected from different authorities) can all hinder effective co‑ordination and reporting of bid-rigging suspicions. Third, the advocacy reach of competition authorities often remains limited, particularly beyond central government structures. Public officials in contracting authorities (especially at local and regional levels) are therefore often unaware of the risks and signals of collusion, or of the role they can play in supporting enforcement. Thus, reporting of competition law breaches remains low, not necessarily because infringements are absent, but because potential red flags go unrecognised or unreported.
Advocacy is essential to successful competition law enforcement: the more aware and better trained public officials are, the more likely they are to detect collusion. Advocacy builds institutional awareness, encourages reporting by public officials and promotes a culture of compliance among market participants, encouraging cartel members to come forward. Advocacy and enforcement are “two sides of the same coin” and must be pursued jointly to combat bid rigging effectively (OECD, 2019[6]).
Through its Competition Committee, the OECD has long supported governments in designing procurement systems resilient to collusion. A key instrument for this work is the Recommendation on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement [OECD/LEGAL/0396].4 It urges governments to review their procurement systems at all levels to detect vulnerabilities and introduce safeguards that promote competition and deter collusion.
The Recommendation touches on different areas of the fight against bid rigging. These include prevention, detection, assessment of procurement laws and practices, co‑operation, deterrent sanctions for cartel members (including the debarment of cartel participants from tenders) and redress for victims of cartels (including contracting authorities). It calls on public bodies to design tenders that maximise participation, reduce predictability for cartel members and avoid unnecessary barriers to entry, and also advises on strengthening co‑operation in the public sector. To support its implementation, the OECD developed the Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (OECD, 2025[7]), which provide practical advice for procurement and competition officials. Together, the Recommendation and the Guidelines provide a comprehensive toolbox to enhance competition in public procurement and are the conceptual basis of this project.
While OECD Recommendations and Guidelines are not legally binding, they represent a strong political commitment to their principles and entail an expectation of implementation. Indeed, a 2016 OECD report confirmed that the Recommendation (OECD, 2016[8]) was widely used by competition and procurement authorities. The Recommendation served as a foundation for advocacy programmes, and helped guide design tenders and detect collusion.
Importantly for this project, the Recommendation emphasises the need for co‑operation between competition authorities and other relevant actors (such as procurement bodies, audit institutions and anti-corruption agencies) to support awareness and early detection of bid rigging. It also underlines the value of advocacy, calling on competition authorities to engage with procurement officials and the private sector to raise awareness of collusion risks, promote compliance and encourage the use of red flags, whistleblower tools and leniency mechanisms.
Notably, the Recommendation advises to:
“Provide or offer support to procurement authorities to set up training for procurement officials, auditors and investigators at all levels of government, as well as prosecutors and judges (where appropriate), on techniques for identifying suspicious behaviour and unusual bidding patterns that may indicate collusion.”
“Establish a continuing relationship with procurement authorities such that, should preventive mechanisms fail to protect public funds from collusion, those authorities will report the suspected collusion to competition authorities (in addition to any other competent authority) and have the confidence that competition authorities will help investigate and prosecute any potential anti-competitive conduct and that the reporting person may not be exposed to retaliation.”
“Undertake advocacy vis-à-vis possible suppliers and trade and industry bodies, to alert them to bid-rigging risks, sanctions, leniency programmes and whistleblower tools, and seek their engagement in the effective prevention and detection of bid rigging, including, eventually, through competition law compliance initiatives. Such advocacy can include training and guidelines.”
The OECD Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (OECD, 2025[7]) support implementation of the Recommendation. They offer concrete, practical advice for procurement and competition officials. Notably, the Guidelines include two lists that have been used as a basis for capacity building in this project:
The Tender Design List details measures to help plan and carry out procurement in a way that limits bid-rigging risks. Such measures include understanding the market and potential suppliers; adopting pro-competitive bidder participation requirements and contract award criteria; using electronic procurement; and warning bidders of the existence and extent of sanctions for bid rigging.
The Bid-Rigging Detection List sets forth red flags to help identify and report bid-rigging schemes. The red flags include unusual bidding or pricing patterns, or suspicious bidder conduct or statements.
In addition, the OECD has developed two practical checklists to assist procurement officials in specific areas. Both checklists, approved by the OECD Competition Committee in December 2017, complement the Recommendation and Guidelines by offering tools to safeguard effective competition in procurement:
The Checklist for Protecting Competition when Splitting Contracts into Lots (OECD, 2018[9]) provides guidance to ensure that splitting a procurement into lots does not undermine competition. It stresses, among other things, the need to consider the market structure before splitting, and to design the lots in ways that make collusion more difficult (e.g. varying size or composition, introducing unpredictability).
The Checklist for Protecting Competition when Managing the Risks of Very Low Tenders (OECD, 2018[10]) advises on how to address the potential risks of abnormally low bids without deterring legitimate competitive offers. It highlights measures such as ensuring realistic cost estimation, using evaluation criteria beyond price, imposing proportionate sanctions for non-delivery and referring strategic below-cost bidding to competition authorities.
The OECD has developed other instruments relevant to the fight against bid rigging. The Recommendation on Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels [OECD/LEGAL/0452] defines bid rigging as a type of hard core cartel. The Recommendation calls on policymakers to adopt and enforce strong rules against cartels. Sections of the Recommendation particularly relevant for bid-rigging enforcement are those on the use of leniency programmes; proactive analysis of procurement data to detect cartels; and the importance of co‑operation between competition authorities and other public bodies, including procurement and anti-corruption agencies. The Recommendation promotes the use of whistleblower mechanisms.
Beyond the competition policy domain, the Recommendation on Public Procurement [OECD/LEGAL/0411] promotes a strategic and integrated approach to public procurement and provides guidance on transparency, integrity, efficiency, digitalisation, stakeholder engagement and risk management throughout the procurement cycle. Several of its provisions are relevant to reducing the risks of collusion and enhancing detection. In particular, the Recommendation encourages competitive tendering as the default procurement method, supports the use of e‑procurement to increase transparency and traceability, and recommends strong integrity safeguards and training for procurement officials. Moreover, the Recommendation highlights the importance of procurement data to monitor procurement processes.
As Member States of the EU, the six countries follow the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits horizontal agreements that restrict competition in the internal market (including bid rigging). National enforcement procedures and classification of infringements vary (i.e. administrative only vs. administrative and criminal). However, the substantive provisions on bid rigging, the investigatory powers of competition authorities and the imposition of fines are largely aligned under EU competition law.
The following paragraphs present a brief overview of the overarching EU legal framework, as well as the national legal frameworks and enforcement practice of each of the six countries.
At the EU level, Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements and concerted practices between undertakings, as well as decisions by associations of undertakings, that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market and that may affect trade between Member States. Bid-rigging conduct is considered a serious form of cartel behaviour and thus falls under this provision. It is also a hard-core restriction of competition and is unlawful by object, not requiring proof of actual market effects to be deemed illegal. National provisions on anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices, including those of the six countries, are harmonised under Article 101 TFEU and mirror the EU legal framework.
Jurisdiction to enforce Article 101 is shared between the European Commission (hereafter the “Commission”) and national competition authorities. In practice, national authorities investigate and prosecute most public procurement bid-rigging cases, as they typically occur within procurement processes in national markets, and affect competition mainly within the Member State. Nevertheless, the Commission is particularly well placed to enforce Article 101 TFEU where one or more agreements or concerted practices produce effects on competition in more than three Member States (e.g. in cross-border markets encompassing more than three Member States or in several distinct national markets).
The Commission is especially suited to handle bid-rigging cases that are closely linked to other Treaty provisions falling within its exclusive competence or more effectively applied at EU level (e.g. procurement procedures financed by the EU budget). EU intervention may also be warranted where the adoption of a Commission decision is necessary to further develop competition policy in response to a novel issue or to ensure effective and consistent enforcement across the Union.5 The Commission has broad investigatory powers and may impose fines of up to 10% of an undertaking’s total turnover. While fewer in number than cases by national authorities, there have been significant recent Commission decisions on bid rigging. These include cartels for the supply of military hand grenades,6 canned vegetables7 and optical disk drives,8 involving bid-rigging schemes such as price fixing, market and customer allocation, and co‑ordinated bidding strategies.
In September 2023, the European Commission found that two defence manufacturers, RUAG and Diehl, had participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 TFEU by allocating national markets for the supply of military hand grenades across the European Economic Area (EEA).
Between 2007 and 2021, the companies agreed not to compete in each other’s allocated countries and co‑ordinated their conduct in relation to public tenders and direct procurement requests by national authorities. The cartel covered both offensive and defensive military hand grenades and involved market allocation and exchange of competitively sensitive information, effectively eliminating competition in the affected procurement procedures.
The infringement was uncovered following a leniency application submitted by RUAG, which was granted full immunity from fines. The Commission subsequently carried out unannounced inspections at Diehl’s premises and pursued the case under the settlement procedure. Diehl received a 50% reduction of the fine for co‑operation under the leniency programme and an additional 10% reduction for settlement, resulting in a final fine of EUR 1.2 million.
Source: European Commission (2023), Case AT.40760-Hand grenades, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202350/AT_40760_9770404_1218_4.pdf.
An overview of law and practice against bid rigging in the six countries follows.
1.4.1. Austria
There are two main pieces of legislation for competition in Austria. The Cartel Act (Kartellgesetz) contains substantive competition rules and the procedural rules of the Cartel Courts, while the Competition Act (Wettbewerbsgesetz) defines the investigative tools of the Federal Competition Authority (AFCA). The prohibition of anti-competitive conduct, including hard core cartels such as bid rigging, is laid down in Sec 1 et seq. of the Cartel Act, which corresponds to Art 101 TFEU.
Bid rigging is also a criminal offence under Section 168b of the Austrian Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), punishable by up to three years in prison. Βid rigging can qualify as fraud under certain conditions, and offenders may be imprisoned up to ten years. Criminal enforcement against bid rigging occurred rarely in the past. In recent years, criminal law enforcement authorities have started investigating cases systematically. The standards of proof for a criminal conviction are high.
Article 78(1) of the Austrian Federal Procurement Act foresees debarment from future public tenders. The article provides that contracting authorities must exclude companies from participating in the procurement procedures when there are “sufficiently plausible indications” that anti-competitive conduct, and in particular bid rigging, has occurred. The exclusion does not require a prior decision by the AFCA.
The AFCA investigates violations of bid rigging under the Competition Act and then prosecutes cases before the Cartel Court. The Cartel Court is the Higher Regional Court in Vienna, with jurisdiction over the entire country, and is the first-instance decision making body pursuant to the Cartel Act. The Supreme Court, sitting as the Supreme Cartel Court, hears appeals against the decision of the Cartel Court. Decisions are taken by professional judges sitting in panels of four judges at the Cartel Court and panels of five judges at the Supreme Cartel Court, and two expert lay judges, with the professional judges holding the majority or decisive vote.
Once an investigation is completed, the AFCA may apply to the Cartel Court requesting the imposition of fines and/or an order to cease and desist from the anti-competitive conduct. When applying for fines, the AFCA may either quantify a specific amount or leave it to the court to set the fine at an appropriate level. The Cartel Court may impose fines of up to 10% of the undertaking’s total turnover in the previous business year. The Cartel Court considers the severity and duration of the infringement, the enrichment through the infringement, the degree of fault and the economic capacity of the company, as well as mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Public prosecutors and criminal courts carry out criminal enforcement in keeping with the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. The AFCA is legally obliged to report any bid rigging to the prosecutors and the police. The AFCA and public prosecutors co‑operate and co‑ordinate their investigations, exchanging information and assisting in the execution of unannounced inspections (OECD, 2020[11]). Although criminal enforcement has historically been rare, it has gained momentum in recent years, particularly in the construction sector.
Austria has seen an active enforcement record against bid rigging in recent years. Many of these cases concern the construction market, where the AFCA uncovered a large-scale, long-running cartel involving numerous undertakings and procurement procedures across the country. While individual sanctions have been issued progressively over time, they all stem from the same broader investigation launched in 2017. A summary of the main findings and decisions in this sector is presented in Box 1.2.
The construction sector is widely recognised as particularly vulnerable to collusion and accumulates most bid-rigging decisions across OECD Members. Large contract values; predictable demand (i.e. repeated tendering processes); standardised products; oligopolistic structures with few dominant players; and significant barriers to entry all contribute to an environment where firms have both the incentive and the ability to co‑ordinate. These market characteristics, combined with the visibility and scale of public infrastructure projects, increase the risk of bid rigging. In Austria, this risk has materialised into the largest cartel case ever sanctioned by the AFCA.
The Austrian competition watchdog uncovered the widespread and long-running construction cartel in 2017, spanning both public and private tenders. The collusive practices included price fixing, market allocation, bid rotation and the exchange of commercially sensitive information. These practices were uncovered following a tip from a public auditor, highlighting the importance of training oversight bodies in identifying red flags. The subsequent investigation, launched in close co‑operation with the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Economic Affairs and Corruption, involved extensive unannounced inspections and led to numerous sanctions. The Austrian Cartel Court has so far imposed fines exceeding EUR 195 million, including landmark decisions against major construction groups. Several of these undertakings applied for leniency or settled with the AFCA. The Austrian case illustrates the value of inter-agency co-operation in triggering enforcement action. A detailed overview of the decisions issued to date can be accessed through the frequently asked questions cited in the AFCA (2025[12]).
Sources: AFCA (2025[12]), FAQs on the AFCA’s Construction Cartel Investigation, https://www.bwb.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/FAQ_Construction_Cartel_October_2025_Teil_1.pdf; Mayr (2025[13]), “Main developments in competition law and policy 2024”, https://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2025/04/24/main-developments-in-competition-law-and-policy-2024-austria/; OECD (2025), Competition Trends 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/8c4bd00b-en.
The paragraphs that follow provide an overview of recent bid-rigging cases beyond construction, showing that enforcement efforts have expanded to other sectors, such as joinery and market research studies.
Over the course of 2022, the AFCA filed for sanctions against four companies (AFCA, 2022[14]): Tischlerei Lechner / Fürst Möbel / Norer Tischlereigesellschaft / Krumböck. They were sanctioned for bid-rigging practices in tenders for joinery and cabinetmaking contracts for the healthcare sector in Lower Austria and Vienna (“the joiner cartel”). These practices included the pre-determination of the winning bid, exchanges of information, price fixing and market division. The Vienna Court of Audit informed the AFCA of potential irregularities in tenders and the competition authority conducted unannounced inspections.
Two of the companies (Fürst Möbel and Norer Tischlereigesellschaft m.b.H.) applied for leniency. As the first leniency applicant, Fürst was exempted from fines, while Norer Tischlereigesellschaft m.b.H was granted a reduced fine. The other two (Krumböck and Tischlerei Lechner GmbH) acknowledged their infringement and settled, thus receiving a fine reduction.
In separate decisions, the Cartel Court confirmed the infringement for all four companies: Decision 27 Kt 6/22t (Cartel Court, 2022[15]) (Tischlerei Lechner, fine of EUR 100 000); Decision 127 Kt 1/22t (Cartel Court, 2022[16]) (Norer Tischlereigesellschaft, fine of EUR 69 000); Decision 28 Kt 1/22i (Cartel Court, 2022[17]) (Fürst Möbel); and Decision 26 Kt 5/22p (Cartel Court, 2022[18]) (Krumböck, fine of EUR 128 000). Court proceedings against two other companies involved in the cartel are still ongoing.
In December 2023, the AFCA filed for the imposition of fines on three companies investigated for bid-rigging practices in the sector of market research studies (AFCA, 2023[19]). The investigation was launched in the context of a criminal case (Sabine Beinschab), through co‑operation with the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Economic Affairs and Corruption of Austria (WKStA). The prosecutors provided the AFCA with evidence and documents that could point to cartel law infringements. In July 2023, the Cartel Court confirmed the infringement by BB Research Affairs and Beinschab Business, imposing a fine of EUR 6 000. It acknowledged that a higher fine would undermine their financial viability (Decision 28 Kt 2/23p). Further investigations were completed in October 2024.
Lastly, some bid-rigging cartels have been criminally prosecuted, with participants sentenced to prison. In the context of the construction cartel described above, several criminal proceedings are ongoing. While not exhaustive, the following outline of cases illustrates criminal enforcement against bid rigging in Austria, including instances where bid rigging was prosecuted alongside other serious offences.
In Ruling Os 107/99 (Supreme Court of Austria, 2000[20]), the Supreme Court imposed a five-year prison sentence on the defendants for their participation in bid-rigging agreements, as well as for serious fraud and embezzlement. In Ruling 13 Os 34/01 (Supreme Court of Austria, 2001[21]), the Court convicted several representatives of various construction companies of serious fraud; they had conspired to manipulate tenders for construction contracts. They received fines and were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 9 to 11 months. In Ruling 13 Os 135/03 (Supreme Court of Austria, 2003[22]), the Court ruled on the criminal liability of participants in the Lower Austrian Window cartel. One defendant was sentenced to 6 months in prison followed by 18 months of parole, while others received prison sentences of up to 20 months. However, these sentences were later suspended, and the defendants were released on three years of probation.
1.4.2. Bulgaria
In Bulgaria, Article 15 of the Law on Protection of Competition (LPC) prohibits all cartels, including bid rigging. Criminal sanctions are not available as a penalty under the LPC. The CPC has had guidelines on fighting bid rigging in public procurement in place since 2010. In 2020, the CPC adopted revised guidelines, replacing the 2010 version (adopted by CPC Decision No. 570/20.05.2010), which are currently in force and are modelled on the OECD Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (OECD, 2025[7]) and the Recommendation on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement [OECD-LEGAL-0396].
The CPC guidelines explain the basic principles of competition policy relevant to public procurement and the prohibition in Article 15 of the LPC. They cover the factors conducive to market manipulation (e.g. stability of market shares, similarity of products/services). They also explain restraints of competition by procurers (e.g. unjustified barriers to entry that narrow the number of potential bidders) and by companies (e.g. price fixing and market allocation). The guidelines set out a non-exhaustive list of prohibited “tender manipulations”. These explain the types of measures that contracting authorities can take to limit the risk of bid rigging in public procurement, (e.g. designing appropriate and transparent selection criteria, awareness campaigns), as well as actions available to the CPC in relation to bid rigging.
Officials with a role in public procurement must undergo relevant training at the start of their positions and throughout their career (Art. 244 (1) of the Public Procurement Act and Art. 140 of the Regulation for the Application of the Public Procurement Act). However, these trainings do not include competition law topics.
In the last five years, the CPC has investigated seven bid-rigging cases, summarised in the paragraph below and Box 1.3.
The first bid-rigging case concerned a national energy efficiency programme (Case 114/2016). The case started after a complaint from the contracting authority, the Mayor of Targovishte (a city in the northwest of Bulgaria), related to potential bid rigging in public tenders for energy efficiency surveys and upgrade recommendations for multi-family residential buildings. The CPC conducted unannounced inspections in the premises of three undertakings. Electronic evidence revealed similar agreements in two other municipalities (Plovdiv and Gotse Delchev), resulting in the CPC expanding the proceeding to include additional suspected undertakings. Evidence showed that cartel participants had formed agreements to allocate tenders and agree on the offered price. Three separate decisions were reached based on this evidence (Decisions No. 1312/05.12.2019, 1313/05.12.2019 and 762/22.07.2021). Five of the undertakings applied for leniency. Two undertakings obtained total immunity, and the other three leniency applicants received reductions of 30-50% of their fines. The CPC also imposed a fine of BGN 10 000 (EUR 5 115) to the manager of one sanctioned company for assisting the organisation and functioning of the cartel. However, the Supreme Administrative Court later annulled this sanction, as the manager had acted on behalf of the undertaking, not in his own capacity.
At the time of writing, six bid-rigging cases in Bulgaria are ongoing. Five are based on reports from contracting authorities, and one on a complaint from a competitor.
Case No 509/2021 started by CPC Decision No 635/2021: the case started with a letter to the CPC from the municipal government of Gabrovo in relation to the supply of flowers for public spaces in the town. The Statement of Objections was issued in November 2022.
Case No 786/2021 started by CPC Decision No 920/2021: the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works had alerted the CPC on possible bid rigging in the tendering of construction works for energy efficiency improvement measures to buildings in the town of Zlatograd.
Case 174/2022 started by CPC Decision No 217/2022: the Ministry of Defence sent a letter to the CPC in relation to the supply of shoes and professional clothing. The Ministry of Interior later sent a separate complaint letter, and the scope of the investigation was expanded. The CPC issued the Statement of Objections in June 2023.
The CPC opened Case No 377/2022 by Decision No 503/2022, after the Central Procurement Unit at the Ministry of Finance sent a complaint letter in relation to the supply of toner and other printer and photocopier consumables for the public administration. In June 2022, the CPC conducted inspections at the offices of the investigated undertakings.
In November 2023, the CPC opened Case 1034/2023 after a letter from the Ministry of Regional Development and Works, which reported possible bid rigging in the tendering of construction works in the city of Veliko Tarnovo.
Lastly, the most recent ongoing case (Case No 409/2024) was opened in May 2024, after the CPC received a formal complaint from a competitor. The CPC inspected the offices of two traders of construction machinery and equipment, concluding there was reasonable evidence of bid-rigging practices. The Statement of Objections has not been issued.
Sources: CPC (2021[23]), “The CPC initiated a self-referral to establish a possible prohibited agreement between ‘Total LC’ EOOD and ‘Nai 2015’ EOOD in order to manipulate public procurement procedures”, https://www.cpc.bg/news-217?returnUrl=page%3d15; CPC (2021[24]), “Another procedure for self-referral of the CPC to establish possible manipulation of public procurement procedures”, https://www.cpc.bg/news-254?returnUrl=page%3d14; CPC (2022[25]), “The CPC initiated proceedings to establish the possible existence of a cartel agreement aimed at manipulating public procurement procedures with the subject of production and supply of official clothing and footwear”, https://www.cpc.bg/news-3?returnUrl=page%3d11; CPC (2022[26]), “The Commission carries out on-the-spot inspections at the offices of traders of toners and other printing consumables”, https://www.cpc.bg/news-266?returnUrl=page%3d10; CPC (2022[27]), “The CPC has addressed allegations for cartel agreement between ‘Total El Si’ EOOD and ‘Nai 2015’ EOOD for manipulating numerous public procurement procedures”, https://www.cpc.bg/en/news-314?returnUrl=page%3d3; CPC (2023[28]), “The Commission on Protection of Competition has addressed allegations for cartel agreement between ‘Cavaler Union 2001’ EOOD, ‘Technomat-Mercury’ EOOD and Labor-producing co-operation for handicapped ‘Zdravohod’ for manipulating numerous public procurement procedures”, https://www.cpc.bg/en/news-482?returnUrl=page%3d2.
1.4.3. Croatia
In Croatia, bid rigging is prohibited under Article 8 of the Competition Act and explicitly qualifies as unlawful cartel conduct under Article 2c. It is also the only type of anti-competitive conduct expressly criminalised under Article 254 of the Criminal Code. This article defines two types of bid-rigging offences, punishable depending on their severity and resulting financial gain: a basic form, where an undertaking submits a bid based on a prohibited agreement; and a qualified form, where such an agreement results in significant pecuniary gain for the participants.
Under the Criminal Procedure Act (Articles 19a and 19c), the competent court to hear criminal bid-rigging cases is the municipal court at first instance and the county court on appeal. The State Attorney is the competent body for criminal investigations – from initial information gathering to opening of formal investigations and representation before the courts.
The Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) enforces the provisions of the Competition Act on bid rigging (but not those of the Criminal Code). The State Attorney enforces the provisions of the Criminal Code on bid rigging (but not those of the Competition Act). The two institutions signed a co‑operation agreement on 10 June 2024 on the detection and prosecution of bid rigging, including mutual technical assistance, joint trainings and co‑ordination in public procurement cases. The agreement foresees mutual readiness for co-operation in competition law matters, in line with the applicable legal framework, including the Competition Act, the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Act. Co-operation is structured around expert and technical assistance in ongoing cases, information and data exchanges (including in confidential matters), direct institutional contacts, continuous capacity building of staff, and reciprocal participation in trainings and conferences. Meetings are held online or in person, with designated co‑ordinators from each institution.
To date, the CCA has concluded one pure bid-rigging case concerning food procurement tenders in Zagreb. In parallel, the State Attorney opened 25 criminal investigations on bid rigging in 2018‑2022, of which 1 led to a conviction, 19 were rejected and 5 are pending. The CCA did not undertake a parallel investigation on any of these cases and was not consulted.
The first purely bid-rigging case investigated by the CCA is Agro-Vir doo, Zagreb, Agrodalm doo, Zagreb, Diljexport doo, Zagreb and Marino-Lučko doo Lučko (2022). The Authority found that the parties entered into a prohibited horizontal agreement. The agreement concerned the public procurement of 14 groups of food products by Dobri dom, a social care institution operated by the city of Zagreb, which had launched a four-year framework agreement in 2012 to provide soup kitchen services. The CCA concluded that the firms colluded to fix prices and allocate contracts, co‑ordinating their bids to predetermine the winning party for each group of products and each year within the framework agreement. The conduct involved bid rotation, cover bidding and the submission of courtesy offers, as well as subcontracting arrangements that concealed the allocation of contracts behind nominal competition. The decision was upheld by the High Administrative Court on 14 September 2022. This case started following unannounced inspections of the business premises of two firms by the CCA and not after a complaint. The fine was HRK 2 155 million (approx. EUR 287 000).
Source: Decision UP/I 034-03/17-01/021 of 28 April 2022, CCA v Agro-Vir doo, Zagreb, Agrodalm doo, Zagreb, Diljexport doo, Zagreb and Marino-Lučko doo Lučko.
1.4.4. Cyprus
Cyprus prohibits bid rigging under the Protection of Competition Law No. 13(I)/2022 and its amending Law No. 169(I)/2022. While not explicitly defined, bid rigging is prohibited as a form of collusive agreement under Section 3(1), which forbids price fixing, bid rotation, cover bidding and market allocation.
The Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) is the competition authority in Cyprus, empowered to investigate infringements and impose fines. Its investigatory powers are broad and include unannounced inspections, interviews, interim measures and requests for information. If a bid-rigging infringement is found, the CPC can impose an administrative fine of up to 10% of the turnover of the financial year preceding the infringement decision (Section 47 of the law). The infringement decisions of the CPC can be appealed before the Administrative Court and reviewed in second instance by the Supreme Court.
Enforcement of bid-rigging cases in Cyprus has relied primarily on reports from contracting authorities and auditing bodies. In recent years, the CPC has sanctioned three significant cases.
In Case 58/2010,9 the CPC issued an infringement decision against the Association of Motor Vehicle Importers (SEMO) for engaging in bid-rigging practices. SEMO had circulated a letter instructing its members to boycott a public tender issued by the Cyprus Police for the procurement of 25 vehicles unless certain terms of the tender were modified. The CPC found that SEMO’s actions constituted a violation of Section 3 of the Protection of Competition Law. It consequently imposed a fine of EUR 5 000.
In June 2017, the CPC issued a sanctioning decision against the Mechanical and Electrical Contractors Association of Cyprus (MECAC), in the context of a complaint filed by the municipality of Paphos in June 2016 (Decision 25/2017).10 The municipality had conducted a public tender for the restoration and landscaping of its market. MECAC issued a circular calling on its members to boycott the tender and not submit tenders in projects that do not follow the subcontracting method agreed by MECAC. The municipality complained that, based on this prohibition, only one tender was submitted. The CPC found this circular to constitute an illegal restriction of competition and imposed an administrative fine of EUR 2 121 on the association. MECAC was ordered to inform its members that they were free to submit bids irrespective of the subcontracting method in the tender.
The sanctioning decision against MEAC was overturned by the Cypriot Administrative Court, after MECAC’s appeal. The appeal claimed that the CPC’s investigative procedure had violated the principle of impartiality. This was based on declarations by Paphos’s Mayor on the radio in which he claimed he had discussed the case with the CPC’s Chairperson, who prima facie agreed with the existence of an infringement. The Administrative Court upheld this argument. However, the CPC appealed the ruling in December 2020. Recently, the CPC withdrew the appeal and decided to re-examine its decision. Following the completion of the necessary preliminary investigation, the CPC decided to notify MEAC with a Statement of Objections. The case is now pending before the CPC.11
In July 2018, the CPC issued a sanctioning decision against nine undertakings (Decision No 29/2018).12 The companies were Mattheos Ioannou; C.Kythreotis Skyrodema; Skyramix; Athinodorou & Poullas Super Beton; Top Mix Concrete; I & S Kritonis Limited; Betoman Limited; Alfa Beton; and Psaroudis Beton. Together, they had formed a bid-rigging cartel affecting three public tenders by the Ministry for Transport Communications and Works for the supply and transportation of ready-mix concrete. The investigation was launched ex officio, and the decision imposed a total fine of EUR 1 155 593.
1.4.5. Greece
Article 1 of the Greek Competition Act (Law 3959/2011, amended by Law 4886/2022) contains a general prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, including cartels. Notably, in similar terms to Article 101 TFEU, the Competition Act prohibits “all agreements and concerted practices between undertakings and all decisions by associations of undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the Hellenic Republic.” Bid rigging falls within this broad prohibition.
According to Article 25 of the Competition Act, the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) can impose administrative fines on undertakings or associations of undertakings that committed an infringement of Law 3959/2011 or Article 101 TFEU, including bid rigging. According to Article 25b, fines can be up to 10% of the worldwide turnover of the concerned undertaking in the fiscal year preceding the decision. They are calculated depending on the gravity and the duration of the infringement, among other fining parameters.
Greece has also criminalised hard core cartel behaviour, including bid rigging (European Commission, 2011[29]). Article 44 of the Competition Act provides for criminal sanctions for individuals who, acting individually or as representatives of an undertaking, participate in anti-competitive agreements and thus infringe Article 1 of the Act (or Article 101 TFEU).
The HCC has no criminal enforcement powers. Such powers are exclusive to criminal courts, to which the competition authority must report violations within a period of ten days after issuing an infringement decision (Article 43 of the Competition Act). Criminal sanctions include fines ranging from EUR 100 000 to EUR 1 000 000 and can include prison sentences from a minimum of at least two years (Article 44 of the Act). Successful leniency applications or settlements are a ground for excluding criminal imputability (see Section 3.2.7 below) under three conditions: the accused undertakings must pay the fines imposed by the HCC in full; actively co‑operate with the authorities; and submit their leniency or settlement application before being informed about the criminal prosecution or the possibility of prosecution (Article 44.3A-C of the Competition Act).
In addition to the Competition Act, the Criminal Code provides that anyone who restrains competition by means of agreements or concerted practices between undertakings, by force or threats, or removes with gifts or promises a participant in public tenders, shall be punished. Such punishment comprises imprisonment for at least three years and a fine, if the act is not punished more severely by another provision.
The HCC has developed extensive enforcement experience, particularly in the construction sector. Its largest case to date involved nearly the entire Greek construction industry and several European companies, leading to fines exceeding EUR 80 million. The conspiracy, sanctioned across four decisions between 2017 and 2021, included cover bidding, price fixing and market allocation.
Like Austria, Greece has investigated and sanctioned a major bid-rigging cartel in the construction sector, marking the largest investigation ever launched by the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC). The case, initiated ex officio and developed over several years, concerned collusion among Greek and international construction firms across numerous public infrastructure projects, including roads, metro works, rail and public-private partnership (PPP) schemes.
The case was triggered by unannounced inspections. This led to a successful leniency application by Technical Olympic and the seizure of extensive evidence, including correspondence and digital files. On 18 May 2016, the HCC issued a Statement of Objections to dozens of undertakings, including leading national firms (e.g. Ellaktor, J&P-Avax, Gek Terna, Aegek, Intrakat) and international players (e.g. Siemens, FCC, Hochtief), alleging infringements of Article 1 of the Greek Competition Act and Article 101 TFEU.
The HCC found that companies had co-ordinated their conduct when bidding for public tenders, agreeing in advance who would win contracts; submitting cover bids; suppressing bids; fixing bid levels; and arranging subcontracting and financial compensation mechanisms. These practices were often implemented through regular meetings and pre-agreed contract structures. The investigation also revealed long-standing collusion dating to 1989, although some infringements were time-barred and could not be sanctioned.
The case was resolved through a hybrid procedure, combining settlement decisions for some undertakings and standard infringement proceedings for others. The HCC adopted four decisions:
Decision 642/2017 found a single, long-running infringement and imposed fines on 11 construction companies that acknowledged their participation. The conduct affected tenders for metro works, PPP projects and other large infrastructure. Total fines exceeded EUR 80.7 million, including a record fine of EUR 38.5 million on one undertaking.
Decision 647/2017 addressed companies that had not settled or sought leniency. Due to limitation periods, only 4 of 24 undertakings were fined, for a total of EUR 27.2 million.
Decisions 748/2021 and 755/2021 sanctioned two companies for bid rigging in the Gournes‑Chersonisos motorway project in Crete. The infringements included cover bidding and financial compensation mechanisms. One decision was adopted under the settlement procedure.
This case also marked the first application of the HCC’s leniency programme.
Sources: Theodorakis (2016[30]), “Hellenic Competition Commission launched its largest investigation to date”, https://ttlfnews.wordpress.com/2016/06/27/hellenic-competition-commission-launched-its-largest-investigation-to-date/; HCC (2017[31]), Decision No. 642/2017 (TECHNICAL OLYMPIC), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/1226-decision-642-2017.html; HCC (2017[32]), Decision No. 647/2017 (ALPINE / FCC / ARCHIRODON / IAKOVOU), https://epant.gr/en/decisions/item/1117-decision-647-2017.html; HCC (2021[33]), Decision No. 748/2021 (MESOGEIOS), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/1905-decision-748-2021.html; HCC (2021[34]), Decision No. 755/2021 (ATHONIKI TECHNIKI), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/2013-decision-755-2021.html.
Outside the construction sector, the HCC sanctioned 11 bid-rigging cartels between 2015 and 2024, affecting at least 50 companies.13 The cartels affected various sectors of economic activity, including the measurement of radio ratings, production and marketing of dairy products, supply of furniture for hospitals, security services, catering services offered to migrants and refugees, and supply of COVID‑19 antigen tests. Eight decisions were adopted through settlement procedures. Overall, fines on individual companies ranged from EUR 230 to EUR 411 154.
Over recent months, the HCC launched five investigations regarding bid-rigging practices, carrying out unannounced inspections at several premises:
December 2023: suppliers of medical equipment for an ex officio investigation into possible bid-rigging violations (HCC, 2023[35]).
January 2024: travel companies suspected of involvement in a cartel or having facilitated a cartel concerning the organisation of educational trips for public and private schools. This case was prioritised in October 2025 (HCC, 2024[36]).
March 2024: several IT and related service providers suspected of bid rigging in violation of Greek and EU law (HCC, 2024[37]).
June 2024: several companies as part of an ex officio investigation into possible bid rigging in smart water metre systems for local water supply networks (HCC, 2024[38]).
July 2024: companies in the urban waste management sector in Crete suspected of bid rigging (HCC, 2024[39]).
Investigations for all the abovementioned cases are ongoing. Following Decision 869/2024, the HCC is expected to conduct a hearing in a case concerning possible bid-rigging practices in land registry survey services and support services for the creation of a national land registry, for the non-settling parties (staggered hybrid settlement procedure) (HCC, 2023[40]).
1.4.6. Romania
In Romania, bid rigging is prohibited under Article 5(1) of the Competition Law. The Romanian Competition Council (RCC) enforces these provisions and may impose fines of up to 10% of the infringing company’s global turnover. Public procurement legislation14 also prohibits bid rigging and foresees a three-year exclusion from tenders for companies sanctioned by the RCC. Criminal liability may apply under Article 246 of the Criminal Code, with imprisonment of one to five years. Criminal enforcement falls under the jurisdiction of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate and the Directorate for the Investigation of Organised Crime and Terrorism.
The RCC has extensive enforcement experience, having investigated many bid-rigging cartels across a wide range of sectors. Enforcement in the natural gas sector has been particularly prominent.
The Romanian Competition Council (RCC) has investigated and sanctioned several bid-rigging cartels affecting procurement procedures organised by TRANSGAZ and ROMGAZ, two state-owned undertakings of strategic importance in the energy sector. These cases illustrate recurrent collusive practices in the natural gas sector, often involving similar firms and co-ordinated tendering strategies. Bid-rigging investigations in this market account for some of the RCC’s most prominent and repeated enforcement actions in public procurement:
Decision No. 71/2012: the RCC fined Condmag and INSPET for exchanging sensitive information and co-ordinating bids in a TRANSGAZ pipeline tender. The case originated from information submitted by the Directorate for the Investigation of Organised Crime and Terrorism. Fines totalled EUR 3 million and were upheld by the High Court of Cassation and Justice in 2015.
Decision No. 72/2012: a separate tender by TRANSGAZ led to sanctions against Moldocor and TMUCB for similar bid-rigging conduct. Fines also amounted to EUR 3 million.
Decision No. 7 of 2015: the RCC imposed a EUR 2.89 million fine on four companies (Dafora, Carivoa, Târgu Mureş and Upetrom) for bid rigging in the procurement of oil and gas drilling works by ROMGAZ. This is one of the largest producers of natural gas in Eastern Europe, of which the Romanian government is the main shareholder. This was the first bid-rigging investigation that started with a leniency application. The leniency applicant, Foserco, was granted full immunity.
Decision No. 75/2018: the RCC fined 13 companies (including several repeat offenders: Inspet, Condmag, TMUCB, Moldocor) for co-ordinating bids in TRANSGAZ tenders. The investigation, triggered by the Directorate for the Investigation of Organised Crime and Terrorism, also led to criminal proceedings against 18 individuals. Although all were ultimately acquitted due to the timing of the conduct (prior to the criminalisation of bid rigging), the RCC imposed administrative fines on the companies.
Decision No. 43/2020: the RCC fined TRANSGAZ itself approximately EUR 6.86 million for facilitating collusion. Evidence from wiretaps and criminal investigations revealed that TRANSGAZ employees discussed the preferred winning bidder and co-ordinated the submission of tenders. This case marked a notable precedent, as the RCC sanctioned both cartel participants and the contracting authority for its role in enabling bid rigging.
Sources: RCC (2012[41]), Decision No. 71, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/decizie_butimanu_brazi_publicare.pdf; RCC (2012[42]), Decision No. 72, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/decizie_girgiu_ruse_publicare.pdf; RCC (2015), Decision No. 7, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Decizie-7_2015-foraj-vers-publicare-site.pdf; RCC (2018), Decision No. 75, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Decizie-pt-publicare-var-neconfidentiala-fara-semnatura-presedintelui.pdf; RCC (2020), Decision No. 43, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Decizia-43-2020-varianta-pt-publicare-site2.pdf.
The RCC has also investigated bid rigging in other markets, including electricity meters, food for schools, ammunition, road works, information technology (IT) equipment and digital services. An overview of the main recent enforcement decisions follows.
By Decision No. 83 of 2016 (RCC, 2016[43]), the RCC imposed sanctions on five milk producers (Albalact, Simultan, Lacta, Dorna and Deltalact) for bid rigging in the procurement of milk for public schools (as part of a nationwide initiative named “Cornul si Laptele Programme”) by the counties of Giurgiu, Ialomita and Dolj. The RCC found that the companies had agreed on bid rotation. Total fines amounted to EUR 1.9 million. Through settlement, two companies (Albalact and Simultan) were granted a 20% fine reduction.
By Decision No. 77/2017 (RCC, 2017[44]), the RCC imposed a EUR 15.8 million fine on six undertakings (Energobit, Elster Rometrics, Landis+Gyr, Ecro, Electrica and Electromagnetica) for two bid-rigging agreements. This concerned the market for manufacturing and commercialisation of electricity meters, and ancillary measurement equipment. The investigation was launched ex officio. The RCC concluded that the undertakings had suppressed bids, exchanged information and shared the tenders of the country’s energy distribution operators (Electrica, E-ON and ENEL). One company (AEM) applied for leniency and received immunity from fines. The RCC also found that employees of Electrica facilitated the exchange of information and consequently fined the undertaking. This was the first bid-rigging decision to impose a fine on the tendering authority, as well as on the cartel. The RCC determined that Electrica organised sectoral tenders to procure electricity meters and that its employees were involved in the market-sharing agreement. Namely, they participated in discussions with cartel members to pre-arrange tender specifications, being aware of the anti-competitive nature of their actions and that it was unlawful to share information.
By Decision No. 56/2018 (RCC, 2018[45]), the RCC imposed sanctions on three companies (Forestar, Nico-Paul and Saniral) for bid rigging in the procurement of wood exploitation works by the Forestry Department in Neamt County. The investigation found the companies had agreed on the price of their bids and co-ordinated their submission. Total fines amounted to EUR 497 866.
By Decision No. 90 of 2019 (RCC, 2019[46]), the RCC imposed fines of EUR 667 000 on four companies (Vesta, Helvespid, Loial and Girod) for engaging in bid rigging in the market for road signs and road-marking works. The RCC uncovered two bid-rigging agreements in public and private tenders. Vesta, Helvespid and Loial exchanged sensitive information and co-ordinated their bids, winning public contracts at inflated prices between 2010 and 2017. Additionally, between 2009 and 2016, Girod and Loial secured inflated prices by co-ordinating their bids in public tenders for road signs and related works. Vesta and Loial applied for leniency, co-operated in the investigation and settled, thus benefitting from reduced fines.
By Decision No. 48 of 2020 (RCC, 2020[47]), the RCC imposed a EUR 468 000 fine on five companies (Construct Steel Market, Construcții Drumuri și Lucrări de Artă, Comesad Drumuri, General Trust Argeș and Selca). This concerned bid rigging in street refurbishment works by the city of Pitesti (through the Pitesti Public Domain Administration). Three of the companies accepted the infringement and were granted a fine reduction. The investigation was launched after a complaint filed by the contracting authority, which cancelled the tender.
By Decision No. 71/2020 (RCC, 2020[48]), the RCC imposed fines of EUR 26.6 million on 31 companies in the wood pulp market in Romania. The RCC found bid-rigging agreements and/or concerted practices to divide lots of timber (wood), and to allocate contracts in 45 public tenders organised by various forest fund administrators or owners between 2011 and 2016. The companies exchanged commercially sensitive information regarding raw material needs, wood procurement policies, internal organisation and commercial strategies for specific public tenders. This included bid co-ordination or suppression on certain lots of timber. This bid-rigging cartel in the purchasing market aimed to acquire lots of timber at the lowest possible prices, thereby harming the state. Thirteen companies settled and benefitted from reduced fines.
By Decision No. 99 of 2021 (RCC, 2021[49]), the RCC imposed a EUR 521 000 fine on six companies (Upipsa, Axa, Uzina, Uzimet, Prelmet and GRIMEX) for bid rigging in tenders for road rollers and roller garlands by a state-owned energy company (Societatea Complexul Energetic Oltenia) and a heating power plant (Centrala Electrică de Termoficare Govora).
By Decision No. 80 of 2023 (RCC, 2023[50]), the RCC sanctioned three companies (Dataware Consulting, Kontron Services and Tema Energy) for bid rigging in the procurement of electronic services by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The tenders were part of the “Hub Services” project, by which the ministry planned to develop an electronic service delivery centre. The investigation found that the companies had exchanged sensitive information and suppressed bids to raise prices. The total fines amounted to EUR 4.1 million.
In June 2024 (RCC, 2024[51]), the RCC launched a bid-rigging investigation against 13 companies in the market for IT equipment. The RCC suspected that the companies agreed to share the market in co‑ordination with the equipment supplier (Cisco Systems Romania) and three authorised distributors. In June 2024, the RCC conducted unannounced inspections, and began analysing the collected documents. The investigation was based on alerts by contracting authorities and reports through the RCC’s whistleblower platform, as well as the RCC’s own analysis of public procurement procedures in the market. This is one of the largest and most intensive investigations by the RCC so far.
References
[12] AFCA (2025), FAQs on the AFCA’s Construction Cartel Investigation, Austria Federal Competition Authority, Vienna, https://www.bwb.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/FAQ_Construction_Cartel_October_2025_Teil_1.pdf.
[19] AFCA (2023), “Cartel Court fines BB Research Affairs GmbH and Beinschab Business GmbH EUR 6,000”, https://www.bwb.gv.at/en/news/detail/cartel-court-fines-bb-research-affairs-gmbh-and-beinschab-business-gmbh-eur-6000?sword_list%5B0%5D=Karmasin&no_cache=1 (accessed on 23 July 2025).
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[28] CPC (2023), “The Commission on protection of competition has addressed allegations for cartel agreement between “Cavaler Union 2001” EOOD, “Technomat-Mercury” EOOD and Labor-producing co-operation for handicapped “Zdravohod””, https://www.cpc.bg/en/news-482?returnUrl=page%3d2.
[26] CPC (2022), “The Commission carries out on-the-spot inspections at the offices of traders of toners and other printing consumables”, https://www.cpc.bg/news-266?returnUrl=page%3d10 (accessed on 19 September 2025).
[27] CPC (2022), “The CPC has addressed allegations for cartel agreement between “Total El Si” EOOD and “Nai 2015” EOOD for manipulating numerous public procurement procedures”, https://www.cpc.bg/en/news-314?returnUrl=page%3d3 (accessed on 9 September 2025).
[25] CPC (2022), “The CPC initiated proceedings to establish the possible existence of a cartel agreement aimed at manipulating public procurement procedures with the subject of production and supply of official clothing and footwear”, https://www.cpc.bg/news-3?returnUrl=pa (accessed on 9 September 2025).
[24] CPC (2021), “Another procedure for self-referral of the CPC to establish possible manipulation of public procurement procedures”, https://www.cpc.bg/news-254?returnUrl=page%3d14 (accessed on 19 September 2025).
[23] CPC (2021), “The CPC initiated a self-referral to establish a possible prohibited agreement between “Total LC” EOOD and “Nai 2015” EOOD in order to manipulate public procurement procedures”, https://www.cpc.bg/news-217?returnUrl=page%3d15 (accessed on 9 September 2025).
[52] Cypriot Administrative Court (2020), Ruling 1462/2017, Cypriot Administrative Court, Nicosia, https://trojaneconomics.com/2020/12/09/review-of-the-administrative-courts-decision-in-case-1462-2017/.
[29] European Commission (2011), Case M.9866 – United Group / Forthnet, Article 44 of Law 3959/2011, Government Gazette Issue A, European Commission, Brussels, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020M9866.
[36] HCC (2024), “Press release: Unannounced inspections at the premises of companies active in the travel sector”, https://www.epant.gr/en/information/press-releases/item/2806-press-release-unannounced-inspections-at-the-premises-of-companies-active-in-the-travel-sector.html (accessed on 25 September 2025).
[37] HCC (2024), “Press release: Unannounced inspections at the premises of information technology (IT) and related service providers”, https://www.epant.gr/en/enimerosi/press-releases/item/2827-press-release-unannounced-inspections-at-the-premises-of-information-technology-it-and-related-service-providers.html (accessed on 25 September 2025).
[38] HCC (2024), “Press release: Unannounced inspections at the premises of smart water meter system providers”, https://www.epant.gr/en/information/press-releases/item/2869-press-release-unannounced-inspections-at-the-premises-of-smart-water-meter-system-providers.html (accessed on 25 September 2025).
[39] HCC (2024), “Press release: Unannounced inspections in the waste management sector”, https://www.epant.gr/en/information/press-releases/item/2995-press-release-unannounced-inspections-in-the-waste-management-sector.html (accessed on 25 September 2025).
[40] HCC (2023), “Press release: Case prioritization and assignment to a Commissioner-Rapporteur”, https://www.epant.gr/en/information/press-releases/item/2675-press-release-case-prioritization-and-assignment-to-a-commissioner-rapporteur.html (accessed on 25 September 2025).
[35] HCC (2023), “Press release: Unannounced inspections at the premises of medical equipment suppliers”, https://www.epant.gr/en/information/press-releases/item/2765-press-release-unannounced-inspections-at-the-premises-of-medical-equipment-suppliers.html (accessed on 25 September 2025).
[33] HCC (2021), Decision No. 748/2021 (MESOGEIOS), Hellenic Competition Commission, Athens, https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/1905-decision-748-2021.html.
[34] HCC (2021), Decision No. 755/2021 (ATHONIKI TECHNIKI), Hellenic Competition Commission, Athens, https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/2013-decision-755-2021.html.
[31] HCC (2017), Decision No. 642/2017 (TECHNICAL OLYMPIC), Hellenic Competition Commission, Athens, https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/1226-decision-642-2017.html.
[32] HCC (2017), Decision No. 647/2017 (ALPINE / FCC / ARCHIRODON / IAKOVOU), Hellenic Competition Commission, Athens, https://epant.gr/en/decisions/item/1117-decision-647-2017.html.
[13] Mayr, M. (2025), “Main developments in competition law and policy 2024”, Kluwer Competition Law Blog, https://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2025/04/24/main-developments-in-competition-law-and-policy-2024-austria/ (accessed on 26 September 2025).
[1] OECD (2025), Government at a Glance 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en.
[4] OECD (2025), OECD Competition Trends 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8c4bd00b-en.
[7] OECD (2025), OECD Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (2025 Update), OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/cbe05a56-en.
[11] OECD (2020), Criminalisation of Cartels and Bid Rigging Conspiracies – Note by Austria, OECD, Paris, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2020)1/en/pdf.
[5] OECD (2019), Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels, OECD/LEGAL/0452, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0452.
[6] OECD (2019), Review of the Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels, OECD/LEGAL/0294, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2019/09/review-of-the-1998-oecd-recommendation-concerning-effective-action-against-hard-core-cartels_23b865d3.html.
[9] OECD (2018), OECD Checklist for Protecting Competition When Splitting Contracts into Lots, OECD, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/fighting-bid-rigging-in-public-procurement/oecd-checklist-for-protecting-competition-when-splitting-contracts-into-lots.pdf.
[10] OECD (2018), Protecting Competition When Managing the Risks of Very Low Tenders, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/fighting-bid-rigging-in-public-procurement/oecd-checklist-for-protecting-competition-when-managing-the-risks-of-very-low-tenders.pdf.
[8] OECD (2016), Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement: Report on Implementing the OECD Recommendation, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/57b223af-en.
[51] RCC (2024), “Competition Council launches investigation into IT&C equipment marketing in Romania”, Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Eng-ITC.pdf.
[50] RCC (2023), Decision No. 80, Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/DECIZIE-80_06062023-versiune-publicare-site.pdf.
[49] RCC (2021), Decision No. 99, Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Decizie-role-publicare-site.pdf.
[47] RCC (2020), Decision No. 48, Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Decizia-48-2020-publicare-site.pdf.
[48] RCC (2020), Decision No. 71, Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Decizia-nr.-71-din-14.12.2020-conf-redacted-.pdf.
[46] RCC (2019), Decision No. 90, Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/decizie_90_neconf_finala_site.pdf.
[45] RCC (2018), Decision No. 56, Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/decizia_cc_nr_56-2018.pdf.
[44] RCC (2017), Decision No. 77, Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/decizie_77_20122017_publicare_site.pdf.
[43] RCC (2016), Decision No. 83, Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/decizia83_2016.pdf.
[41] RCC (2012), Decision No. 71, Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/decizie_butimanu_brazi_publicare.pdf.
[42] RCC (2012), Decision No. 72, Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest, https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/decizie_girgiu_ruse_publicare.pdf.
[3] Smuda, F. (2012), “Cartel overcharges and the deterrent effect of EU competition law”, Centre for European Economic Research, Vol. 12/050, http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp12050.pdf.
[22] Supreme Court of Austria (2003), Ruling 13 Os 135/03, Supreme Court of Austria, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Justiz&Dokumentnummer=JJT_20041006_OGH0002_0130OS00135_0300000_000&Suchworte=RS0098194.
[21] Supreme Court of Austria (2001), Ruling 13 Os 34/01, Supreme Court of Austria, https://gesetzefinden.at/judikatur/ogh/jjt_20010926_ogh0002_0130os00034_0100000_000.
[20] Supreme Court of Austria (2000), Ruling Os 107/99, Supreme Court of Austria, https://ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Justiz&Dokumentnummer=JJT_20000628_OGH0002_0140OS00107_9900000_000&Suchworte=RS0094164.
[30] Theodorakis, N. (2016), “Hellenic Competition Commission launched its largest investigation to date”, TTF Newsletter of Transatlantic Antitrust and IPR Developments, https://ttlfnews.wordpress.com/2016/06/27/hellenic-competition-commission-launched-its-largest-investigation-to-date/ (accessed on 12 June 2025).
[2] World Bank (2022), Cyprus Country Profile, (dataset), http://www.globalpublicprocurementdata.org/gppd/country_profile/CY (accessed on 8 August 2025).
← 1. Information on the project is available here: www.oecd.org/en/about/projects/fighting-bid-rigging-in-public-procurement-in-austria-bulgaria-croatia-cyprus-greece-and-romania.html.
← 2. For further detail, see the latest figures of the European Central Bank’s inflation dashboard: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/macroeconomic_and_sectoral/hicp/more/html/data.en.html.
← 3. Beyond administrative competition law infringements, bid rigging is also subject to criminal sanctions in 30 OECD Member countries. For further details, see: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/competition-enforcement/fighting-bid-rigging-in-public-procurement.html.
← 4. All OECD Members (thus Austria and Greece) adhere by default to the Recommendation on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement [OECD-LEGAL-0396]. Romania has also adhered to the Recommendation as an Associate to the Competition Committee of the OECD and is currently in the process of accession to the OECD.
← 5. For further detail, see the Commission Notice on co‑operation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, pp. 43–53.
← 6. For further detail, see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_23_4531/IP_23_4531_EN.pdf.
← 7. For further detail, see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_19_5911/IP_19_5911_EN.pdf.
← 8. For further detail, see: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016XC1224(03).
← 9. For further detail, see: https://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/All/E42EFFF2966E624EC2257EA1003EB3D9?OpenDocument&highlight=58/2010
← 10. For further detail, see http://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/All/A7D885126163C030C225842C001E1D4D/$file/Decision%20CPC%2025_2017.pdf.
← 11. Cypriot Administrative Court (2020[52]), Ruling 1462/2017. For further detail, see: https://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/All/E2D0811C288C826BC2258D8F00381222?OpenDocument&highlight=%CE%A3%CE%95%CE%9C%CE%97%CE%95%CE%9A
← 12. For further detail, see http://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/All/DB0C3771B42D9FEBC22583FB00235F85?OpenDocument&highlight=bid%20rigging.
← 13. Decisions are the following: 620/2015 (Mrb / Focus), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/1111-decision-620-2015.html, 668/2018 (Frieslandcampina Hellas / Mandrekas), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/1313-decision-668-2018.html; 703/2020 (Papanastasiou / Pichas), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/1177-apofasi-703-2020.html; 703/2020 (Grammi Goitrou/ Mar Epipla, https://www.epant.gr/en/information/press-releases/item/986-press-release-settlement-procedure-leniency-program-decision-on-the-ex-officio-investigation-in-the-furniture-and-professional-equipment-market-703-2020.html; 721/2020 (Mega Sprint Guard / Drasis Security Group / Dias Sprint Guard / Stefanidis d. Konstantιnos), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/1323-decision-721-2020.html; 731/2021 (Mondiapol Hellas Security Services / Esa Security Solutions / Kalogerakis Security / Security Services Trade Association), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/2119-decision-731-2021.html; 742/2021 (Toi Toi Hellas / Europrise Environmental / Dragonas / Alba Textile / Neilos Recycling), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/2330-decision-742-2021.html; 767/2022 (Plieades / Pot & Pan / Tzanetos / Salas), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/2208-decision-767-2022.html; 772/2022 (Dritsa-Kagli / Elviex / Knc / Bionrgwood), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/2209-decision-772-2022.html and 828/2023 (Violak International / Inex Medical / Bbd Nik. Lainotis), https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/2729-decision-828-2023.html.
← 14. Law No. 98 of 2016, Government Decision no. 395 of 2016; Law No. 99 of 2016, Government Decision No. 394 of 2016; Law No. 100 of 2016 and Government Decision No. 867 of 2016.