Women, work and the population puzzle

2. The challenges of population ageing

Most OECD member countries are experiencing population ageing (OECD, 2024[1]). Population ageing is characterized by relatively low (and declining or stagnant) fertility rates; delayed childbearing in relation to historical trends; and high life expectancy.

Fertility rates have been declining across OECD countries in recent decades. In 1960, the OECD average total fertility rate was 3.3 children per woman, more than double the current level of 1.5 (Figure 2.1) (OECD, 2024[1]). The sharpest decline occurred between 1960 and 2000, when the rate dropped from 3.3 to 1.7, followed by a slower decline to 1.59 in 2022 (OECD, 2024[6]). Projections suggest this below-replacement level will persist for decades (OECD, 2023[7]). These low fertility rates reflect changing lifestyle preferences, family formation patterns, and everyday constraints such as labour market insecurity, difficulties in finding housing, and lack of affordable childcare (OECD, 2024[1]).

Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the OECD, with on average 0.8 births per women in 2022, followed by Japan and Canada, both with 1.3. Other APEC and OECD members include Australia with a rate of 1.6, and New Zealand and the United States with 1.7 each in the 2022. Mexico and Chile had fertility rates of 1.8 and 1.5, respectively, in 2021 (OECD, 2024[6]).　

Figure 2.1. Fertility rates have halved, on average across the OECD, since 1960

Total fertility rates, 1960 and 2022

Note: 2021 instead of 2022 for Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and the United Kingdom

Source: (OECD, 2024[6]), Society at a Glance: OECD Social Indicators, https://doi.org/10.1787/918d8db3-en.

Population ageing also implies an increase in the old-age to working-age ratios – in other words, a growing number of people in retirement relative to the number of people in work. In some countries, the rise in the old-age to working-age ratio has been quite sharp.

On average across all OECD countries, the old-age to working-age ratio increased rapidly since the early 1990s, from 20.4 people aged 65+ per 100 aged 20-64 in 1992 up to 31.3 older people per 100 aged 20-64 in 2022 (OECD, 2023[7]). This pace is projected to accelerate, with the ratio expected to reach 53.8 by 2052 (Figure 2.2) (OECD, 2024[1]).

Figure 2.2. The demographic old-age to working-age ratio is increasing at a fast pace

Number of individuals aged 65 and over per 100 people aged between 20 and 64

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (United Nations, 2022[8]), World Population Prospects 2022, Online Edition (for future periods: medium-variant forecast).

While all countries are expected to see an increase in the proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, about two-thirds of OECD countries are projected to experience an average 11% decline in the working-age population (aged 20 to 64) over the next 40 years. Korea is expected to have the largest decrease, with a 49% decline in its working-age population (OECD, 2024[1]). These population size declines are contributing to labour shortages in many countries, carrying serious implications for economic growth, competitiveness and the sustainability of social protection programmes like pensions and healthcare (OECD, 2024[1]); (OECD, 2024[6]) (OECD, 2023[9]) (Burgalassi and Matsumoto, 2024[10]).

If the growth rate of labour productivity (GDP per person employed) remains approximately constant1, the contraction of the employment-to-population ratio, in percentage terms, translates into an equal percentage effect on GDP per capita. Figure 2.3 shows that if productivity growth rate over the next quarter of a century is set at the level observed in 2006-192, the baseline scenario suggests that GDP per capita growth in the OECD area will be reduced by around 40%, falling from 1.0% per year in 2006-19 to an average of 0.6% per year in the period 2024-60. In other words, by 2060, GDP per capita in the OECD will be 14% lower than what would occur if labour input continued to grow at the same rate as during the previous business cycle. Among APEC and OECD member countries, most are expected to experience a decline in GDP per capita growth from 2006-19 to 2024-60. The largest declines are projected for Chile, where the GDP per capita growth is projected to fall from 2.19% per year in 2006-19 to -0.11% per year in 2024-60, followed by Mexico (0.67% to 0.05%), Japan (0.66% to 0.20%), New Zealand (1.26% to 0.73%), Korea (2.78% to 1.64%), Canada (0.69% to 0.41%), and (Australia 1.06% to 0.77%). The United States is expected to see a slight increase from 1.07% to 1.09% (OECD, 2025[11]).

Figure 2.3. Demographic trends are projected to produce a dramatic slowdown of GDP per capita growth

Recent and projected annual GDP per capita growth, baseline scenario, percentages

Notes: Projected real GDP per capita growth obtained assuming the same growth of GDP per worker as in 2006 19 and the baseline projection scenario for the employment-to-population ratio. Countries ordered by the size of the average projected growth slowdown between 2006-19 and 2024-60. 2006 18 for Australia, 2013-19 for Chile, 2015-19 for Colombia and 2007-19 for Korea instead of 2006-19. OECD: Weighted average of OECD countries. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.

Sources: Secretariat’s calculations based on OECD Data Explorer: Employment and unemployment by five-year age group and sex - levels and Productivity levels; Fluchtmann, J., M. Keese and W. Adema (2024), “Gender equality and economic growth: Past progress and future potential”, https://doi.org/10.1787/fb0a0a93-en ; and United Nations (2024), World Population Prospects 2024, https://population.un.org/wpp/. Gender equality opportunities as populations age.

In light of these ongoing and projected challenges, many countries are assessing how to address labour and skills shortages, including those driven by retiring workers and – importantly – longstanding gender gaps in labour markets. Gender gaps persist in labour market participation, hours worked, progression to management and earnings, and gaps generally worsen over the life course as women’s unpaid workload increases (OECD, 2025[5]); (OECD, 2024[1]). Apart from the human rights imperatives of gender equality, women’s lower engagement in the labour force represents a serious loss of potential for economies and societies.

Significant gender gaps in labour force participation (LFP) persist across OECD countries, including among countries that are members of both the APEC and OECD (Figure 2.4). The OECD average LFP rate stands at 81% for men and 71% for women – a 10-percentage point difference. In Mexico, the LFP rate is 82% for men and 51% for women (31 points gap). Korea also shows a persistent gap, with 79% for men and 63% for women (16 points). In Japan, Australia and the United States, women’s LFP is relatively higher, but women are still less likely than men to work: Japan’s LFP rates are 87% for men and 75% for women (12 points), Australia’s are 82% and 74% (8 points), and United States 80% and 70% (10 points). In contrast, Canada (83% for men and 77% for women) and New Zealand (87% and 80%) show smaller yet persistent gender gaps of 6 to 7 percentage points.

Figure 2.4. Women participate in the labour market less than men throughout the OECD

Labour force participation rates (%), women and men (15-64), 2023

Note: EU-24 and OECD-37 refer to unweighted averages of the 24 EU and 37 OECD countries with available data for this indicator. ↗ indicates that the data is sorted according to this series in ascending order.

Source: OECD Data Explorer “Labour force participation rate” (http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/zr).

Increasing the integration of women into the labour market has the potential to boost labour input and to improve productivity by enabling a better matching of workers to jobs and making more efficient use of the available talent. Increasing women’s employment will be a crucial factor in maintaining economic growth, productivity and living standards in the coming decades (OECD, 2023[4]).

Closing gender gaps in labour force participation and working hours can have substantial effects on economic growth. On average across the OECD, closing gender gaps in labour force participation and working hours could increase annual growth by 0.23 percentage points by 2060. Figure 2.5 presents economic output projections assuming a convergence of male and female labour participation and working hours across different 5-year-age-groups by 2060, most of which implies an increase in female labour force participation and working hours to male levels. The impact varies widely across countries, depending on current gender disparities.

For example, Mexico could see an increase of 0.52 percentage points in annual growth. Japan, Chile, and Australia are projected to gain 0.25 percentage points, Korea 0.24, New Zealand 0.23, Canada 0.20, and the United States 0.16 percentage points in annual growth (OECD, 2023[4]).

Figure 2.5. Gains in economic growth from closing gender participation and working hours gaps

Difference relative to the baseline in projected average annual rate of growth in potential GDP per capita over the period 2022-2060, assuming closure of gender gaps in labour force participation and working hours, percentage points

Note: The projections assume that labour force participation and working hours gaps close by 2060. For labour force participation, this is based convergence of male and female levels to the highest level for each 5-year age groups in each country, following baseline labour force projections over the period 2022-2060. In the absence of future working hours forecasts, projections are based on convergence from a constant 2021 level (or latest year available). See (United Nations, 2022[8]) for a description of the method and data used.

Source: OECD estimates based on OECD Population Data, the OECD Employment Database and Employment Projections and the OECD Long-Term Growth Model.

An OECD study of linked employer-employee data from ten OECD countries suggests that productivity suffers, too, when women are underrepresented. There is an inverted U-shape relationship between the share of women and productivity, peaking at productivity premia of 3% for managers and 2% for workers when women make up around 40% of workers in a firm (Criscuolo et al., 2021[12]). Although gender diversity appears to be associated with higher performance, women face strong “headwinds” in their career progression – particularly related to childbearing/childrearing breaks – which suggest that full potential of gender diversity for productivity might be even stronger. In other words, if barriers to women (e.g. in unpaid work) were reduced or removed, the productivity premia could be even higher (Criscuolo et al., 2021[12]).

The path to gender equality remains steep, even as young women now, on average, have higher levels of educational attainment than young men. Figure 2.6 shows that higher levels of educational attainment among women compared to men have become the norm across countries. Only five countries – Mexico, Türkiye, Germany, Switzerland and Korea – show the opposite pattern. Yet even in these countries, gender gaps are relatively small, averaging around 3 percentage points. In contrast, in other OECD countries, the average gap is around 9 percentage points in favour of women (OECD, 2025[5]).

Figure 2.6. Women are more likely to have completed tertiary education than men

Share (%) of men and women (25-64) whose highest level of educational attainment is tertiary, 2023 or latest

Note: EU-25 and OECD-38 averages are unweighted. Data for Chile are from 2022. Tertiary education refers to ISCED 2011 Levels 5 8, and includes short-cycle tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent, Master’s or equivalent, and Doctorate or equivalent.

Source: OECD Data Explorer (2024) “Adults' educational attainment distribution, by age group and gender”, (http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/16o).

Despite these gains, restrictive gender stereotypes and the unequal division of unpaid care work constrain the number of hours women can spend in paid work, blocking women from reaching their full potential. Parenthood is often the point where women and men’s paid work outcomes diverge, with women spending more time at home and less likely to commit to, and advance in, the labour market (OECD, 2025[5]). This so-called “child penalty” persists, but it is now compounded by rising demand for long-term care of older people, which often lands on women (Figure 2.7).

Figure 2.7. Many older individuals have daily caregiving responsibilities, and the burden of caregiving largely falls on women

Share (%) of unpaid carers among the population aged 50 and over providing daily (left axis), and share of women among unpaid daily carers aged 50 and over (right axis), 2019 or latest

Note: The definition of unpaid carers differs between surveys. See “Definition and comparability” box in OECD (2021) for more details. *No data on the share of women among unpaid carers for Switzerland, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic. OECD is the average of 23 countries for the share of daily carers, and 20 countries for the share of women.

Source: OECD (2021), Health at a Glance 2021: OECD Indicators, https://doi.org/10.1787/ae3016b9-en.

Unpaid long-term care is often provided by family and friends, acting both as complement to and a substitute for paid care. In 2019, around 13% of people over 50 years old provided some type of unpaid care at least weekly (OECD, 2021[13]), and around 7% provide care every day. This estimate includes all forms of unpaid care – including childcare, care for people with a disability, and care for elderly people. As with all caregiving activities, unpaid caregiving is gendered, with women representing over 62% of people aged 50 years or over (in a comparison of 25 OECD countries) providing daily unpaid care (Figure 2.7). Over half of those providing unpaid care are providing this care to their spouse or their parents (OECD, 2024[1]).

Gender differences in the impact of caregiving often stem from variations in both the intensity and nature of care tasks. Evidence from Canada shows that men are more likely to engage in flexible, irregular, and less time-demanding activities such as home maintenance or outdoor tasks, while women more often provide routine, time-intensive care involving personal support, managing appointments and medications, and offering emotional assistance (Statistics Canada, 2024[14]) (OECD, 2025[5]). These gendered patterns not only increase women’s overall care burden but also constrain their time, flexibility, and labour market participation, reinforcing gender inequalities in both paid and unpaid work (OECD, 2025[5]).

The paid caregiving workforce is also highly gendered. Approximately 87% of paid long-term caregivers are women, on average across the OECD (OECD, 2024[1]). Improving pay and working conditions in this field is critical both for enabling women’s economic empowerment and supporting healthy ageing.

Unfortunately, gender segregation in the care workforce reflects deeply segregated labour markets overall. Recent OECD work suggests that gender segregation is the norm in most occupations, with only 7 out of 42 occupations in EU‑27 countries in 2023 showing evidence of gender balance, defined as a workforce composed of between 40% women and 60% women (OECD, 2025[5]). Of the remaining 35 occupations that show a gender imbalance, 13 show extreme gender segregation, with less than 20% women or more than 80% women (OECD, 2025[5]). Extremely segregated occupations include many occupations related to the trades, which are men-dominated, and many occupations related to care, which are women-dominated. Since the occupations in which women are concentrated are more likely to be low paid and many have poor working conditions (OECD, 2019[15]; 2023[16]; World Economic Forum, 2023[17]), occupational segregation is an important factor contributing to the gender pay gap (see below) and to other gender inequities in the labour market.

Notes

← 1.  0.7% per year in the case of the whole OECD area. This assumption could be considered prima facie realistic in the long run. Recent OECD work in this area, including the OECD long-term projection model, indeed assumes constant returns to scale and constant capital-labour ratios in the long run – see e.g. Guillemette and Turner (2018[33]; 2021[34])) and Fluchtmann, Keese and Adema (2024[35]).

← 2.  More recent years are excluded from the calculation of benchmark productivity trends to avoid the influence of the COVID‑19 crisis. The period 2006-19 is chosen to cover a full business cycle and to have start and end points corresponding to similar stages of the business cycle. Robustness exercises (available upon request) using different periods (2007-19, 2006-18 and 2007-18) show similar results – that is a projected drop of OECD GDP per capita of about 40%, and a projected growth reduction in all OECD countries except Ireland and the United States.