Whole‑of‑Government Approaches to Development Co‑operation: Italy
Table of contents
This country note provides an overview of key characteristics of Italy’s development co-operation as it relates to whole-of-government co-ordination. It is based on desk research and interviews held with relevant stakeholders. This note complements the OECD DAC peer-learning exercise, Whole‑of‑Government Approaches to Development Co-operation (OECD, 2026[1]). It highlights institutional arrangements, co-ordination mechanisms and quality assurance processes in place to support a whole-of-government approach to development co-operation. Data in this note reflect the latest available year, 2025-26 budget and strategic plans.
Italy’s whole-of-government approach, anchored in Law 125/2014, positions development co-operation as an integral part of foreign policy and recognises the role of a broad range of public, private and civil society actors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI) provides overall strategic direction, while implementation is shared with the Italian Agency for Development Co-operation (AICS), line ministries, and an expanding set of actors, including Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), Italy’s development finance institution. The Mattei Plan1 has been catalytic for high-level political leadership, strengthening cross-government engagement and increasing Italy’s visibility, particularly in Africa. The system is becoming more complex, with multiple funding channels, growing private sector involvement, and an increasing number of co-ordination mechanisms. Ensuring effective alignment across actors, strengthening coherence between political steering and country-level delivery, maintaining clear lines of responsibility and strengthening quality assurance mechanisms would help Italy sustain an effective and agile whole-of-government approach.
Italy’s whole-of-government approach to development co-operation is formalised and clearly articulated in Law 125/2014. The law enshrines development co-operation as an integral part of Italy’s foreign policy, defines the objectives of Italian co-operation, and formally recognises a broad range of public, civil society, private sector and subnational actors as development partners. The law establishes the governance bodies and co-ordination mechanisms that structure Italy’s whole-of-government approach. The law mandated the creation of the AICS, the Inter-Ministerial Development Co-operation Committee (CICS), the National Council for Development Co-operation (CNCS), and also positioned the Three-Year Programming and Policy Planning Document (PPPD) as the central multi-year strategic planning instrument (OECD, 2026[2]).
MAECI has the overall responsibility for development co-operation and an explicit mandate to co‑ordinate the implementation of Italy’s development policy. Within the ministry, the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGCS) is responsible for strategically steering, overseeing and co-ordinating the implementation of Italy’s development co-operation policy, including international political representation in the broader context of Italy’s support for sustainable development. AICS reports directly to MAECI and performs technical and operational tasks related to programme implementation and evaluation; it operates through 20 country offices. This arrangement is formally outlined in the MAECI/AICS Convention (OECD, 2026[2]).
Italy has a delegated implementation model, whereby policy authority remains primarily concentrated within the lead ministry, but delivery and parts of the budget are delegated to the implementing development agency, embassies or line ministries in a structured manner (OECD, 2026[1]). While policy authority remains with MAECI, the Ministry of Economy and Finance accounts for the largest share of the budget envelope; this is explained by multilateral contributions, notably to the European Union, and the increasing importance placed on supporting private sector engagement (see Table 1). This model can provide a combination of central strategic control and operational flexibility, where co-ordination among the different actors becomes paramount. In this arrangement, there is potential to strengthen the role that the agency plays in becoming a co‑ordination node (OECD, 2026[1]). By leveraging the country-level knowledge and embeddedness in the context and in close collaboration with MAECI, AICS can help facilitate country level co-ordination both horizontally (engaging line ministries in programmes) and vertically (linking country presence with headquarters policy). The 2026 OECD DAC Peer Review found that while it is not yet systematic and there is potential for improvement, AICS currently implements projects on behalf of MAECI and the EU, while there is potential for it to become a more significant implementing partner across Italy’s development co-operation system (OECD, 2026[2]). For example, the Ministry for Disabilities and the Agency for Digital Italy are interested in AICS implementing programmes on their behalf. Working more closely with other line ministries would also allow AICS to draw on their sectoral and technical expertise (OECD, 2026[2])2.
Italy has a strong track record in the development of policies that draw on cross-government buy‑in. The 2024-26 PPPD is the main strategic document that guides Italy’s programming. It also illustrates the contributions of several line ministries and their co-ordination with MAECI, AICS and, when relevant, the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Guidelines such as those on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls demonstrate how all the parts of the Italian system work together to implement and align with international commitments.
The Mattei Plan demonstrates how strong political leadership can drive a whole-of-government approach that positions development co-operation within a broader foreign policy framework. Anchored by the Prime Minister’s Office and shaped through an inclusive and consultative process, the Plan has generated sustained buy-in across government, public institutions, and private actors, strengthening both ownership and alignment. By integrating political dialogue, development co-operation, migration, energy security, trade, and investment under a single framework, it has enhanced policy coherence and created shared incentives across ministries. This concerted approach has elevated Italian co-operation as a central foreign policy tool, re-energised engagement in Africa, and mobilised unprecedented interest from Italian companies, while enabling the identification of multi-year, multi-sector investments involving a wide range of ministries and other actors (OECD, 2026[2]).
The Italian system benefits from important contributions and engagement from other key ministries and agencies:
Office of the Prime Minister has had a recently enhanced role in development co-operation, and its strategic steering has reinforced perceptions of stronger inter-ministerial alignment and increased visibility in priority African partner countries, especially through engagement in the Mattei Plan governance structure.
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) co-leads with MAECI relations with international financial institutions and contributes financially to multilateral development banks and funds, and manages debt relief. MEF consistently disburses the largest share of Italian ODA (46.4% in 2024) (OECD, 2026[3]).
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) is Italy’s Development Finance Institution, and its growing role mandates it to manage the Revolving Fund for Development Cooperation and the Italian Climate Fund (ICF), as well as its own separate resources. As it is pillar-assessed by the EU, it can also implement EU-delegated co-operation programmes.
Ministry of the Environment and Energy Security (MASE) oversees the ICF, manages Italy’s contributions to multilateral environmental agreements, and handles climate- and biodiversity-related ODA. The ICF is managed by CDP on MASE’s behalf.
Ministry of the Interior is involved in migration-related development co-operation, including refugee protection, governance support, and the funding of asylum-seeker reception.
Ministry of Health co-ordinates with MAECI, AICS and the National Institute for Health, Migration and Poverty (INMP) on international health co-operation, with a focus on universal health coverage and One Health priorities.
Ministry of Education and Merit engages in education and vocational training partnerships.
Ministry of Culture supports cultural heritage conservation, skills building and anti-trafficking efforts, in partnership with Italian Cultural Institutes.
Other contributing ministries include Defence, Economic Development, Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies, Infrastructure and Transport, Labour and Social Policies, and University and Research (Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, 2025[4]).
Source: (OECD, 2026[2]) OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: Italy 2026.
The structure of Italy’s ODA financing reflects a whole-of-government approach, with multiple ministries contributing resources, underscoring the breadth of engagement but also the complexity of ensuring strategic alignment. Italy’s ODA budget is funded through two main streams: the ODA Annex to the Budget Law and the International Missions Decree (see Table 1). The Budget Law includes appropriations for multiple ministries, allowing for the possibility to discuss appropriation and strategically discuss the alignment of each of the contributions to Italy’s development co-operation and MAECI’s strategic direction. Several line ministries beyond the ones identified in the budget law also implement programmes abroad under their own sectoral mandates. Further harnessing these contributions would help strengthen the coherence of the Italian system (OECD, 2026[2]).
1. The International Missions Decree budget for 2026 and beyond has not yet been proposed. For the sake of comparison, this table assumes that 2026-28 will be equal to 2025.
Source: Italian Republic (2024[5]), “ODA Allocations 2025-2027”, https://www.rgs.mef.gov.it/_Documenti/VERSIONE-I/attivita_istituzionali/formazione_e_gestione_del_bilancio/bilancio_di_previsione/bilancio_finanziario/2025-2027/APS_2025_LB.pdf; Italian Republic (2022[6]), “2022 Budget Law”, https://documenti.camera.it/leg18/dossier/pdf/ID0016dvol2.pdf; Italian Republic (2025[7]), “Budget Law estimated allocations 2026-2028”, https://www.rgs.mef.gov.it/_Documenti/VERSIONE-I/attivita_istituzionali/formazione_e_gestione_del_bilancio/bilancio_di_previsione/bilancio_finanziario/2026-2028/APS_2026_LB.pdf.
Italy stands out among DAC members for its formalised and publicly visible practice of embedding diplomatic advisers across line ministries. This is an institutional arrangement that provides a strong structural foundation for whole-of-government co-ordination. By opting for a more systematic and transparent approach that keeps international policy coherence visible at the ministerial level, Italy is able to better embed incentives for cross-government collaboration. Building on this strength, Italy is well positioned to leverage these arrangements and establish clearer criteria on how Team Italy actors can engage, at what stage and with what responsibilities (OECD, 2026[2]).
As the number of actors involved in private sector engagement grows and CDP-managed financing takes on greater importance, Italy is making progress toward a more coherent approach in this area. Three additional entities contribute to Italy’s private sector engagement and co-ordinate with parts of the system: SACE (Servizi Assicurativi del Commercio Estero), Italy’s export credit agency, provides guarantees for the private sector; SIMEST (Societá Italiana per le Imprese all’Estero), part of the CDP Group, supports the international expansion of Italian companies through technical and financial support; and the Italian Trade Agency (ICE) promotes the internationalisation of Italian companies, particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises, through promotion, information sharing, assistance and training. The establishment of Team Italy offices in partner countries, bringing together AICS, CDP, ICE, SACE and SIMEST under one roof, further strengthens coherence by fostering joint working and giving the private sector a single point of access to Italy's development co-operation instruments. The forthcoming Private Sector Engagement Guidelines offer a timely opportunity to sharpen mandates, reinforce complementarity across instruments, and better tailor support to different private sector players while keeping development impact at the centre (OECD, 2026[2]).
Italy’s development co-operation system is supported by a multi-layered set of formal co-ordination bodies designed for strategic alignment, operational coherence and cross-government and multi-stakeholder participation.
At the highest political level, the Inter-Ministerial Development Cooperation Committee (CICS), chaired by the Prime Minister, brings together all line ministries and provides overall strategic direction and ensures cross-government policy coherence. Its mandate includes clearing the PPPD prior to its formal adoption and arbitrating potential conflicts between sectoral policies and development objectives. However, despite its central role, CICS has convened only three times since 2019 (in 2020, 2021 and 2024), raising concerns about its practical influence (OECD, 2026[2]).
Complementing this high-level body, the Joint Development Co-operation Committee (JC) serves as the main operational decision-making mechanism. Chaired by the Minister or Deputy Minister for Development Co-operation, it brings together senior representatives from MAECI, AICS and the MEF. Meeting approximately every one to two months, the JC approves all multilateral initiatives, bilateral projects above EUR 2 million, and concessional loans. It also issues binding opinions on operations of CDP beyond the Revolving Fund, thereby ensuring alignment with development co-operation principles. While the JC plays a key role in translating strategy into financing decisions, the extensive co-ordination required during the annual programming process preceding approvals can slow implementation (OECD, 2026[2]).
The Mattei Plan also introduced a politically-driven governance structure to support its implementation (Senato della Repubblica, 2023[8]):
A Steering Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, meets every four months and brings together ministries, state-owned enterprises, civil society organisations and other stakeholders. This multi-actor composition mirrors system-wide approaches and reinforces high-level political steering.
A permanent Task Force within the Prime Minister’s Office oversees implementation, promotes synergies across stakeholders, and facilitates co-ordinated action on strategic projects. Although the PMO does not deploy staff to embassies, its strategic steering has reinforced perceptions of stronger interministerial alignment in Rome and increased visibility in priority African partner countries.
Italy’s institutional architecture also includes a strong multi-stakeholder dimension through the National Council for Development Co-operation (CNCS). Established under Law 125/2014, the CNCS provides a permanent platform for dialogue among public institutions, civil society organisations, local authorities and private sector actors. The CNCS meets at least once a year3 and contributes formal opinions on programming and policy matters, although its involvement in newer initiatives such as the Mattei Plan has been limited (OECD, 2026[2]).
The growing number of actors and initiatives bring the risk of increasing co-ordination pressures within the system. The emergence of additional bodies, such as the Italian Climate Fund Technical Committee, which manages significant financial resources under the Mattei Plan’s climate pillar, further complicates the landscape. Overall, while Italy’s development co-operation system benefits from a comprehensive set of co-ordination mechanisms grounded in a whole-of-government approach. As the number of actors grows and political steering through the Prime Minister’s Office is strengthened under the Mattei Plan, co-ordination demands are likely to increase. Clarifying complementarities and mandates could help keep the system agile and fit for purpose.
Italy is advancing a more joined-up whole-of-government approach to country-level delivery through Team Italy. Under Team Italy embassies, AICS, CDP, SACE, SIMEST, ICE, line ministries, civil society organisations, universities and research institutions are brought together under a shared vision, working towards more coherent action on the ground. In partner countries, Team Italy configurations vary according to context, typically placing embassies and AICS at the core. In Africa, however, there is an expanding presence and co-location of a broader range of actors to facilitate more integrated work across development co-operation, trade and diplomacy. In Ethiopia, for example, co-location of the embassy, AICS and ICE has facilitated collaboration on business-to-business initiatives, trade fairs participation and support to local enterprises (OECD, 2026[2]). Further openings of CDP and SACE offices are planned in Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire4. By leveraging this local presence and long-standing partnerships, Italy can better respond to partner country priorities. Shared staffing arrangements or the pooling of resources could be useful to further strengthen the approach (OECD, 2026[2]).
Whole-of-government ambition under the Mattei Plan is operationalised through the participation of line ministries at political and implementation levels. Ministers lead sectoral engagement alongside PMO and MAECI, as illustrated by the 2024 agreement in Algiers, where the Italian Minister of Agriculture, Food Sovereignty and Forests advanced a flagship irrigation project with Algerian counterparts (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2025[9]). However, political ambition delivers results when translated coherently at the country level. Embassies and AICS offices play a central role as facilitators ensuring alignment across actors and linking Mattei Plan priorities to concrete partnerships and programmes. This is exemplified by the Terna Innovation Zone in Tunisia, a joint Italian-Tunisian initiative in the energy sector5 developed through collaboration between the Prime Minister’s Office, MAECI, the Italian embassy in Tunis, MASE, and the Ministry for Universities and Research (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2024[10]).
System-wide country missions are a practical tool to translate political ambition into co-ordinated delivery at the country level. The missions are usually led by MAECI's Director-General and bring together AICS, CDP, line ministries, private sector representatives, and the Mattei Plan Task Force from the Prime Minister's Office when relevant. These missions send a strong signal of collective commitment to partner countries. Authorities report that more than half of newly-developed initiatives originate from ideas generated during these missions, pointing to meaningful improvements in upstream alignment and joint programming. The outcomes are strengthened when the missions are used as structured moments to formalise shared priorities, clarify roles and responsibilities, and agree on expected results, thus ensuring that the political impetus generated at headquarters consistently translates into operational alignment at the country level (OECD, 2026[2]); (OECD, 2026[11]).
A more effective whole-of-government approach to development co-operation in Italy will depend on integrating information systems and strengthening knowledge sharing across institutions and country programmes. The ongoing development of a centralised information system for DGCS/AICS’ “data warehouse” represents a critical opportunity to address current fragmentation. If inter-operable and systematically adopted across all implementing agencies, it could provide embassies, AICS offices and other parts of the administration with a shared, comprehensive view of Italy’s engagements, enabling more coherent planning, reporting and communication at the country level. Currently, however, the lack of a unified system, combined with limited mechanisms for sharing lessons learned across headquarters and field offices, continues to constrain collective learning and alignment. Pilot initiatives, such as ActivityInfo in Ethiopia, illustrate the potential of integrated, geo-localised data tools to support co-ordinated decision making and alignment with partner country priorities. Further developing such approaches has the potential to enhance transparency, and facilitate learning and a whole-of-government perspective of Italy’s different investments (OECD, 2026[2]).
Italy’s monitoring, evaluation and reporting architecture is structured and transparent, but remains only partially adapted to an increasingly complex and multi-actor system. MAECI retains responsibility for assessing the impact of development co-operation and publishes evaluation results. However, evaluation efforts do not systematically encompass all actors, and practices remain fragmented. For instance, CDP reports on the Italian Climate Fund to relevant committees, but these reports are not currently published online, limiting transparency and the circulation of knowledge across the system. This fragmentation constrains opportunities for shared learning and weakens the alignment of priorities across institutions. Emerging practices point to gradual improvements in system-wide oversight and collaborative learning, but these remain disjointed. Reporting to Parliament on the Mattei Plan has contributed to a degree of collective accountability, although it has so far been limited in frequency and depth. Similarly, the introduction of regular in-depth reviews (“deep dives”) involving MAECI, embassies, AICS and, where relevant, CDP reflects a growing effort to enhance cross-institutional engagement in programme implementation. These in-depth reviews help identify implementation challenges and support high-level engagement with partner governments, in complement to AICS’ operational and monitoring activities (OECD, 2026[2]).
Italy is working towards a coherent approach to migration and development through a whole‑of‑government approach and strategic partnerships. Guided by the Rome Process,6 this approach is anchored in a structured policy framework and supported by active engagement across government and with external stakeholders (OECD, 2026[12]).
Italy’s 2023 migration-development nexus guidelines (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, 2023[13]) provide a clear strategic foundation. As the first of their kind among DAC members, the guidelines were developed through a multi-stakeholder consultative process and were approved by the Joint Committee. These guidelines focus on strengthening migration governance, boosting the development impact of legal migration, mainstreaming migration across policies and ensuring protection for vulnerable people.7
Italy’s whole-of-government institutional engagement is a central feature. Strategic alignment is ensured though close collaboration and leadership by the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, while mobilising multiple institutions with differing mandates:
Prime Minister’s Office: Provides overall political direction, including at high-level summits and system-wide missions; Chairs CICS, Mattei Plan Steering Committee and ICF Technical Committee.
DGIT (MAECI Directorate-General for Services to Citizens Abroad and Immigration Policies): Co-ordinates assisted voluntary returns, multi-sector assistance and protection to refugees, vulnerable populations, other migrants and their host communities along the main migratory routes, capacity building of local authorities in management of migration flows, and bilateral Memorandums of Understanding on migration and mobility.
DGCS and AICS: Address root causes of migration through job creation, regular pathways and basic services in conflict-affected states; diaspora engagement; re-integration of returnees; and humanitarian corridors.
Ministry of Interior: Manages mixed migration through support to police and training to manage borders, decreasing irregular migration to Italy.
CDP: Channels Italian co-operation plus Italian Climate Fund resources to support fragile countries in tackling climate-change drivers of migration.
Ministry of Labour: Enhances migrant employability through regular mobility channels by identifying priority sectors for partner countries to maximise supply and match demand.
Ministry of Economy and Finance: Manages contributions to multilateral development banks addressing root causes of migration.
Ministry of Education: Offers language teaching and technical and vocational education programmes.
Italian regions and municipalities: Support social and economic integration of migrants in Italy through training programmes to address labour shortages (OECD, 2026[2]).
Italy also adopts multi-stakeholder approaches in partner countries. In regions such as the Horn of Africa, Italian government works with the European Union, private-sector actors, civil society organisations, multilateral agencies and international organisations including UNHCR and IOM. These partnerships support integrated responses combining humanitarian assistance, resilience-building and professional opportunities for migrants, refugees and host communities (OECD, 2026[12]).
Overall, Italy’s approach demonstrates strong political leadership and commitment to policy coherence in the migration-development nexus. This is clearly supported by co-ordination across government at central and sub-national levels. The active involvement of regional and local authorities strengthens implementation, particularly in supporting the integration of migrants.
Further progress could be achieved by consolidating engagement between the different actors of the Italian system and common partners. While mandates differ, more systematic alignment and joint engagement would enhance strategic coherence, enable a more unified policy voice, and strengthen the integration of migration as a cross-cutting issue across development co-operation. As recommended in the 2026 DAC Peer Review, greater coherence across thematic interventions, particularly in areas such as refugee inclusion, resilience and labour mobility, within initiatives such as the Mattei Plan would further reinforce the effectiveness and impact of Italy’s approach (OECD, 2026[2]).
Italy has built a strong institutional foundation for whole-of-government co-ordination, but the system's effectiveness increasingly depends on how these structures perform in practice. Takeaways include:
High-level political leadership has fostered cross-government buy-in. Engagement of the Prime Minister's Office and the Mattei Plan has meaningfully strengthened cross-government alignment and relevance of development co-operation in the Italian government. Clarifying how new initiatives complement existing mechanisms and maintaining clear lines of responsibility will help sustain this momentum.
MAECI plays a pivotal role in co-ordination. Building on the established co-ordinating role, MAECI can continue to support alignment across a system that is growing in complexity.
Strengthened governance to keep pace with growing complexity of the system. Italy's expanding range of actors, financing instruments and thematic priorities reflects the expanded visibility of development co-operation policy. Reinforcing existing joint governance arrangements, such as the CICS, will ensure that the whole-of-government ambition translates into coherent, effective delivery.
Embassies and AICS country offices have the potential to be stronger co-ordination hubs. Italy's delegated implementation model offers valuable flexibility. Strengthening the co-ordination between headquarters, AICS offices, embassies and line ministries would sharpen the translation of strategic intent into coherent country-level implementation.
Practical tools for co-ordination can be built upon. Team Italy, system-wide missions, and inter-ministerial partnerships demonstrate progress toward co-ordinated delivery. Investing in clearer definition of roles and responsibilities depending on country contexts will allow these models to reach their full potential.
Strengthened knowledge-sharing systems, monitoring, evaluation and learning would further consolidate Italy’s whole-of-government approach. Advancing systems like the data warehouse and scaling collective evaluation monitoring and learning tools to capture the breadth of Italian investments would allow the system to act with greater coherence and transparency.
References
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← 1. The Mattei Plan is a foreign policy and development strategy to deepen Italy’s partnership with African countries. The plan seeks to integrate political dialogue, development co-operation, migration, energy security, trade and investment under a coherent framework that positions Italy as a bridge between Europe and Africa.
← 2. A recently signed framework agreement between the Ministry of Health, MAECI, AICS and the National Institute for Health, Migration and Poverty (NIHMP) represents a step towards strengthening a whole-of-government approach, including between line ministries and AICS. This marked the launch of a structured, long-term collaboration among Italian administrations engaged in global health. The agreement recognises the complementary roles of each institution and draws on NIHMP's technical expertise in migrant health, vulnerable populations and tackling health inequalities, with priority areas in Africa, linked to the Mattei Plan. One of the central pillars of the accord is strengthening operational co-ordination between the parties, with the five-year renewable model designed to maximise impact by fostering synergies across institutions and reducing duplication, in alignment with Italy's strategic development co-operation priorities. The focus on the joint action ranges from capacity building and service delivery to research and prevention is a signal of Italy’s efforts to move beyond siloed action (INMP, 2026[14]).
← 3. Its thematic working groups meet more frequently.
← 4. In Côte d’Ivoire, co-location within an embassy co-operation unit is intended to serve as a focal point for integrated programme design and implementation, including with partners such as the African Development Bank.
← 5. The centre is designed to develop and transfer technical expertise and innovation capacity within the energy sector, supporting start-ups and leveraging opportunities created by electricity inter-connection projects. Its core activities focus on specialist technical training for Tunisia's public energy operator STEG, accelerating emerging start-ups, and building a broader innovation ecosystem, with an advanced training programme for university students also in development. It is related to the ELMED project, which will allow Italy and Tunisia to play a strategic role for electricity in the Euro-Mediterranean area. The interconnection will link the transmission systems of Europe and North Africa to achieve an increasingly safe, sustainable and renewable future for energy.
← 6. Is Italy’s key framework for migration, promoting dialogue with countries of origin and transit, and linking migration management with development co-operation and regional stability.
← 7. The CNCS’ dedicated working group on Migration and Development, which includes members of the diaspora, was a key contributor to the 2023 migration and development guidelines approved by the Joint Committee. The group, however, is not regularly consulted nor involved in providing regular feedback as to how programmes associated with the Mattei Plan might fully reflect the migration and development guidelines.