Towards a National Integrity and Transparency System in Peru

2. A National System of Integrity and Transparency with a solid governing entity in Peru

Abstract

This chapter recommends specific changes to strengthen integrity and transparency in Peru. First, a National Integrity and Transparency System (SNIT) could be created to promote mainstreaming of these policies across the public sector (characteristic of an administrative system) and co-ordinated with other relevant actors and systems (characteristic of a functional system). Second, a National Integrity, Transparency and Personal Data Protection Authority (ANITAP) could be created as a specialised technical body attached to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, merging the current Secretariat for Public Integrity, the National Authority for Transparency and Access to Information, and the National Data Protection Authority. Among other things, ANITAP would be the governing entity of a national integrity and transparency policy and ensure co-ordination with different actors and systems. Finally, the chapter provides recommendations for strengthening the Integrity Model.

2.1. Introduction

The idea of strengthening the institutionality for integrity and transparency in Peru is not new. Reforms have already been implemented that represent an improvement over the previous situation. For example, the Secretariat of Public Integrity (Secretaría de Integridad Pública, SIP) was created thanks to a reform to strengthen the General Co-ordination of the High-Level Anti-Corruption Commission (Comisión de Alto Nivel Anticorrupción, CAN) and provide it with technical assistance. However, there are still areas for improvement, including strengthening the SIP in the exercise of its governing functions and authority. This has already been highlighted in previous OECD studies (2021[6]; 2019[4]) and will be subject to discussion also within the context of Peru’s accession process.

In turn, in October 2015, the members of the CAN agreed to create an institution in charge of promoting transparency. In this sense, Legislative Decree 1353 of 2017 established the National Authority of Transparency and Access to Public Information (Autoridad Nacional de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública, ANTAIP) as a general directorate within the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. Although the ANTAIP has done substantial work since its inception, the 2017 OECD Integrity Review recommended strengthening its independence (OECD, 2017[5]). Bill 7870 of 2020, which proposed the configuration of ANTAIP as a specialised technical body with greater autonomy than the current one, was not approved in Congress, but remains an important precedent when considering the strengthening of ANTAIP. Likewise, the Integrity Strategy of the Executive Power for the Prevention of Corrupt Acts of 2022 approved by Supreme Decree 180-2021-PCM (eighth epigraph) committed to strengthening institutionality in matters of transparency and public integrity (Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, 2021[10]). The minutes of the 42nd Ordinary Session of the CAN of 17 May 2024 state that it was agreed to “Advance the design of an institutional arrangement for the establishment of a National Integrity and Transparency System for purposes of presenting a future legislative initiative, in line with OECD standards”. Despite the progress made, such as the Integrity Model, the Institutional Integrity Offices (Oficinas de Integridad Institucional, OII), and the Officials Responsible for Transparency and Access to Public Information (Funcionarios Responsables de Acceso a la Información Pública, FRAIP), there is still no system of integrity or transparency as such (Munive Pariona, 2022[21]; OECD, 2017[5]; OECD, 2021[6]).

Building on these advances, this chapter proposes measures to further strengthen transparency and integrity through greater institutionalisation. Following the CAN’s resolution promoting the creation of a National System for Integrity and Transparency (Sistema Nacional de Integridad y Transparencia, SNIT) the chapter provides options for Peru to consider in its configuration, in alignment with international good practices adapted to the Peruvian context. The SNIT could consist of the following four elements:

1. A hybrid system that has an administrative form as the base structure of the SNIT, but that is also a functional system given the steering of a national policy for integrity and transparency through a new governing entity. Transparency could cover proactive transparency, access to information (reactive transparency), and data protection.

2. A National Integrity, Transparency and Personal Data Protection Authority (Autoridad Nacional de Integridad, Transparencia y Protección de Datos Personales, ANITAP) as the governing body of SNIT and of a national policy of integrity and transparency, which could be created as a specialised technical body attached to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

3. Ensuring the SNIT’s inward and outward co-ordination. Peru could consider reforming the High-Level Anti-Corruption Commission (CAN) to provide a space for inter-institutional strategic dialogue for the SNIT, while ANITAP could ensure co-ordination with other relevant systems.

4. Organisational measures that would ensure and promote integrity and transparency policies at the public and territorial entities level, strengthening the Integrity Model, the OIIs and the FRAIPs.

The following sections delve into more details of the possible design of the SNIT. The system could be created by amending the law creating the CAN.

2.2. The structure of the new National Integrity and Transparency System

2.2.1. Peru could establish the National Integrity and Transparency System (SNIT) as an administrative system with a governing body overseeing a national policy that covers proactive and reactive transparency, data protection and integrity policies

The centralisation of transparency functions, covering proactive and reactive transparency, personal data protection, and public integrity under a single National Integrity and Transparency System (SNIT), could facilitate adopting a holistic and co-ordinated approach among these three areas, which are inevitably intertwined and can be mutually reinforcing. It could also reduce the duplication of efforts and resources, improving administrative and financial efficiency. This unification could also facilitate data collection and analysis, thus enhancing decision-making and monitoring results.

Recognised synergies between access to information and data protection policy areas have pushed some governments to consider centralising these areas through a single institution. This is the case for instance in the United Kingdom, Estonia, Argentina and Mexico (OECD, 2022[22]). In most countries, these two policy areas are treated as separate, given the need for highly technical knowledge to address these rights effectively. In addition, having separate entities could avoid the potential challenge of one right taking precedence over the other, especially in contexts where data protection is a relatively new right while access to information is more established. A separate entity for each of the two rights could create clear champions for such rights, unencumbered by the need to balance potentially competing interests. However, the increasing merging of these areas suggests there can also be significant benefits of having a single body, including the shared expertise and reduction of institutional conflict (World Bank Institute, 2011[23]). This decision tends to be highly context specific, and according to OECD interviews, having both functions together could be fruitful in Peru. Interestingly, Brazil has recently decided to merge the issues of transparency and integrity and create the System of Integrity, Transparency and Access to Information (Sistema de Integridade, Transparência e Acesso à Informação, SITAI) of the Federal Public Administration (Box ‎2.1).

Box ‎2.1. The joint handling of integrity and transparency issues by the CGU of Brazil

The governing body for public integrity and transparency in Brazil is the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU), a body of the Executive at federal level whose mandate is extensive and solid compared to equivalent institutions in the region's countries.

Among the CGU's responsibilities are:

• Contribute to integrity and conflict of interest risk management frameworks.

• Promote probity, social control and transparency in the federal public administration and society as a whole.

• Monitor internal control and audit.

• Carry out disciplinary and Ombudsperson actions.

• Supervise the application of the Law on Access to Information. In this area, the CGU enjoys recognition and well-established leadership.

Recently, Decree 11 330 of 2023 reorganised the CGU and the now called Secretariat of Public Integrity (Secretaria de Integridade Pública, SIP) whose functions are to formulate, co-ordinate, promote and support the implementation of recommendations on the subjects covered by the System of Integrity, Transparency and Access to Information (Sistema de Integridade, Transparência e Acesso à Informação, SITAI) of the Federal Public Administration. These themes are transparency and open government - which include notions of inclusion and citizen participation, public integrity, ethical conduct and management of conflicts of interest. The new SIP is, therefore, divided into three directorates: the Directorate for the Promotion of Public Integrity, the Directorate for Open Government and Transparency, and the Directorate for Studies and Development of Public Integrity.

Source: (OECD, 2021[24]; OECD, forthcoming[25]).

In Peru, administrative law stipulates that the transversal activities of the public administration, such as integrity and transparency, which must be carried out by some or all the entities of the branches of the State, the constitutionally autonomous bodies and the different levels of government, are implemented through functional or administrative systems. Article 43 of the Organic Law of the Executive Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Ejecutivo, LOPE) establishes the rules for these systems without distinguishing between functional and administrative systems:

“Article 43.- Definition

Systems are the set of principles, rules, procedures, techniques, and instruments that organise public administration activities and must be carried out by all or some of the branches of the State's powers, constitutional bodies, and levels of government. There are of two types: 1. Functional, 2. Administrative. A system is created only by law. For its creation, it must have the favourable opinion of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers."

Both alternatives have advantages and disadvantages regarding integrity and transparency, which were widely discussed among stakeholders during the OECD visit to Lima, Peru, in May 2024. Below are presented some key points to consider. Table ‎2.1 summarises the characteristics of administrative and functional systems.

Table ‎2.1. Main characteristics of administrative and functional systems

Characteristics	Administrative	Functional
Norm for creation	Its creation requires the modification of the LOPE.	They are created by law at the proposal of the Executive Branch.
Purpose/focus	Achieve efficient and effective use of public resources/internal management.	Ensure compliance with public policies/towards people.
Function type	Implemented with internal administration functions	It is implemented through substantive or missional functions.
Conformation or members	All public entities unless, unless expressly excluded by law.	Public entities with competencies and functions impacting on the attention of public policy.
Scope of application	Applies to all public entities (transversality) unless expressly excluded by law.	It comprises public entities and, where appropriate, private actors, such as civil society organisations, citizens, companies, and academia.
Governing Body	The system's governing authority is the only one with the competency of conducting and regulating the different phases of the technical processes or matters related to internal management.	The system's governing authority (ministry or public body) coexists with other sectoral authorities with competencies in different material areas related to the system. The Governing Body mainly seeks to standardise to ensure the correct use of public resources. The Governing Body mainly seeks to co-ordinate public interventions to achieve the objectives. The powers of the Governing Body are determined in the LOPE and the complementary regulations specific to each system. The powers of the Governing Body are established in the law, creating the system unless the law itself enables its determination through regulation.

Source: Based on the Binding Technical Opinion 02-2020-PCM-SGP-SSAP.

Administrative systems regulate the use of resources in public administrations and promote their efficient use. Their focus is directed towards the internal functioning of the public administration, they are national in scope and, to date, cover eleven areas, ten of which are the Executive’s responsibility. Table ‎2.2 shows the administrative systems that currently exist in Peru.

Table ‎2.2. Governing Body and Law for the Creation of Administrative Systems

Administrative System	Governing Body	Law/Legislative Decree
Human Resources Management	PCM – SERVIR	Law 30057, Civil Service Law and Legislative Decree 1023, Legislative Decree creating the National Civil Service Authority
Sourcing	MEF	Legislative Decree 1439, Legislative Decree on the National Sourcing System
Public Budget	MEF	Legislative Decree 1440, Legislative Decree on the National Budget System
Treasury	MEF	Legislative Decree 1441, Legislative Decree on the National Treasury System
Public Debt	MEF	Legislative Decree 1437, Legislative Decree on the National Public Indebtedness System
Accounting	MEF	Legislative Decree 1438, Legislative Decree on the National Accounting System
Public Investment	MEF	Legislative Decree 1252, Legislative Decree on the National System of Multiannual Programming and Investment Management
Strategic planning	PCM – CEPLAN	Legislative Decree 1088, Law on the National System of Strategic Planning and the National Centre for Strategic Planning
Judicial Defence of the State	State Attorney General's Office – MINJUS	Legislative Decree 1326, Legislative Decree that restructures the Administrative System of Legal Defence of the State and creates the State Attorney General's Office
Control	CGR	Law 27785, Organic Law of the National Control System and the Office of the Republic’s Comptroller General of the
Modernisation of public management	SGP – PCM	Law 27658, Framework Law for the Modernisation of State Management.

Note: Acronyms used: Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, PCM), National Civil Service Authority (Autoridad Nacional del Servicio Civil, SERVIR), Ministry of Economy and Finances (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, MEF), National Strategic Planning Centre (Centro Nacional de Planeamiento Estratégico, CEPLAN), Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, MINJUS), Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República, CGR), Secretariat of Public Management (Secretaría de Gestión Pública, SGP).

Source: Adapted from Binding Technical Opinion 02-2020-PCM-SGP-SSAP.

While the issue of integrity, in a narrow definition of “anti-corruption”, is aimed at ensuring the effective use of resources, this view does not consider the importance of involving civil society and private sector actors both to encourage their co-responsibility in promoting a culture of integrity and to incorporate their inputs and proposals in the formulation of integrity policies. Regarding the issue of access to information and transparency, which requires a strong commitment from citizens, civil society and the private sector, an internally oriented administrative system seems even less appropriate for reflecting the content of policies in these areas.

Like administrative ones, functional systems are created by law, with the favourable opinion of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat of Public Management (Secretaría de Gestión Pública, SGP). Their purpose is to ensure compliance with public policies that require the participation of all or several State bodies. While the administrative systems provide support and services in the internal management of all public administration entities, the functional systems are characterised by their focus on specific interventions related to priority public problems identified by the Peruvian State. These systems consist of entities that have specialised competencies and functions to achieve this objective. The law that creates a functional system must explicitly consider the entities that should be involved, their roles and responsibilities, taking into account other relevant factors such as the existing institutional structure, and the participation of stakeholders.

At first glance, it could therefore seem as if a functional system would be better adapted to the characteristics of integrity and transparency policies. It could allow for the co-ordination of the various vital and complementary actors mentioned in Chapter 1, in addition to the involvement of actors outside government, such as civil society, thus allowing for greater co-ordination and effectiveness in the implementation of a national policy (see the section dedicated to co-ordination).

However, it is essential to highlight that, according to interviews and a dialogue with experts in Peru, there is no perfect mechanism to strengthen the institutional framework for integrity and transparency in the country. Each system has its strengths and weaknesses, and the best solution would likely involve a combination of measures. Therefore, adopting a hybrid model combining administrative and functional elements could be considered, taking as a reference the competencies of the SGP, which acts as the governing entity of the Administrative Modernisation System, and the National Policy for the Modernisation of Public Management.

The proposal is based on the following arguments:

• The complexity and transversality of the topics covered by the SNIT require an approach that is adapted to its specific functions and to the Peruvian context. The SNIT would be a key pillar of the national strategy to strengthen integrity and transparency and improve public governance. Given the complexity and transversality of the issues it addresses, the SNIT could not be adequately conceived as an administrative system regulating only specific management support processes nor as a functional system whose sole objective is compliance with public policies.

• As previously mentioned, unlike the administrative systems established in the LOPE, which focus on the regulation of internal management processes, or the functional systems, which focus on the implementation of specific public policies, the SNIT would have a transversal scope, affecting multiple processes within the entities of the public administration, by the logic of ensuring integrity and transparency across the public sector. Moreover, in line with the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity and the OECD Recommendation on Open Government, it aims to improve administrative efficiency and promote a culture of integrity and transparency that permeates the entire governance structure at all levels of government and society. Its specific characteristics would require a system that regulates and co-ordinates action at the national level, as well as with civil society and the private sector to ensure coherent and effective implementation. Implementing the SNIT as an administrative system implies that it could benefit from the characteristics inherent to these systems, such as transversality, the obligation of compliance by all public entities, and the ability to establish precise and uniform standards that facilitate monitoring and evaluating the policies implemented. For the SNIT, adopting elements of an administrative system means ensuring that all public entities, regardless of size or function, apply integrity and transparency policies uniformly and consistently. This is essential to ensure integrity in public management and for SNIT policies to integrate effectively into day-to-day administrative processes.

• On the other hand, while the SNIT would need the structure and standardisation of an administrative system, it also requires a functional system’s flexibility and results-oriented approach. This is because its primary mission is to ensure the implementation of public policies that promote integrity and transparency, which directly impact citizenship and trust in institutions. The SNIT must therefore ensure co-ordination with various bodies and actors within and outside the public sector.

Therefore, the SNIT, as proposed, would be an amalgam of the strengths of the administrative and functional systems. It responds to the specific needs of Peru, where the integration of cross-cutting policies such as integrity, transparency and personal data protection requires an approach that goes beyond the internal regulation of resources and processes and extends to the effective implementation of public policies at the national level.

Additional advantages of adopting a hybrid system could include:

• Increased co-ordination between levels of government and public entities: The SNIT ensures that both national government bodies and regional and local governments are aligned in the implementation of integrity and transparency policies. An example of this is the Administrative System for the Modernisation of Public Management, whose governing entity is the Secretariat of Public Management, which co-ordinates between various institutions to ensure that modernisation objectives are achieved in a uniform manner. This co-ordination avoids duplication of efforts and ensures that the different levels of government move in the same direction.

• Unification of objectives and tools: The integrated system allows the entities involved not only to comply with regulations, but also to adopt tools and good practices in a standardised way. This is key in the management of cross-cutting policies, such as integrity, where OIIs and FRAIPs are instrumental in implementing policies in each entity. Having an integrated approach facilitates the adoption of best practices across the public sector, ensuring that integrity and transparency are not just a formal compliance, but an active process of continuous improvement.

• Greater flexibility to address specific challenges: By integrating an administrative system (focused on internal efficiency) with a functional one (oriented to the implementation of public policies), the SNIT can be better adapted to the particularities of each sector.

• Clarity in the governing body’s responsibilities and mandate: The coexistence of an integrated system allows for a clear allocation of responsibilities. On the one hand, ANITAP exercises its steering role, while the organic units of the SNIT concentrate on supervision, monitoring and policy compliance. This avoids overlaps and facilitates accountability, as each institution is clear about its role in the system.

Therefore, for the SNIT to function effectively, it would need to be based on the goal to implement the National Integrity and Transparency Policy. This institutionalisation would be important to ensure coherence in policy implementation at all levels of government. It involves inter-agency co-ordination and the ongoing oversight and monitoring of policy implementation at all levels of government. The establishment of a National Integrity and Transparency Agency (see next section) with technical, functional, administrative and financial autonomy is essential to provide a centralised governing entity guaranteeing that the Policy and all its ramifications are implemented coherently and consistently while adapting to the specific needs of each sector and region.

Leading the implementation of the National Policy also requires establishing clear accountability and transparency mechanisms within the government and in its interactions with the private sector and civil society. This co-ordination could include creating spaces for citizen participation and dialogue with key stakeholders to ensure that integrity and transparency policies meet citizens' expectations and needs. This co-ordination space could be created through a reformed CAN (see the section dedicated to co-ordination).

The SNIT could also consider the synergy between OIIs and FRAIPs (see the section dedicated to cross-cutting implementation). By working in a co-ordinated manner, they could ensure that integrity and transparency are effectively promoted at all levels of the public administration. The OIIs, with their focus on implementing integrity policies, and the FRAIPs, responsible for managing public information, create a robust framework that strengthens the SNIT's ability to achieve its goals.

One of the key advantages of the hybrid model would be its ability to integrate robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, including the use of key performance indicators and tools such as the Corruption Prevention Capacity Index (ICP). OIIs and FRAIPs could be key actors in this process, providing relevant information that would allow the ANITAP to adjust policies and procedures based on the results obtained.

2.3. Institutional leadership and governance: defining the governing entity of a new national system of integrity and transparency

2.3.1. Peru could consider unifying the governing entities for integrity, transparency and access to information, and data protection, by creating a National Integrity, Transparency and Personal Data Protection Authority as a specialised technical body attached to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers

Following the logic of a SNIT covering the topics of integrity, transparency and data protection, unifying the governing bodies for these areas into a single entity, the National Integrity, Transparency and Personal Data Protection Authority (Autoridad Nacional de Integridad, Transparencia y Protección de Datos Personales, ANITAP) could bring about significant institutional strengthening and governance improvements in Peru. This strategic move could lead to a more transparent and accountable governance system, instilling a sense of optimism in the potential positive changes.

Similarly, providing it with adequate autonomy and greater institutional robustness would contribute to a more effective fulfilment of its corruption prevention functions. This section addresses the main aspects that could be considered by Peru when setting up the governing body of the National Integrity and Transparency System (SNIT) and makes proposals for its administrative status, internal organisation, and institutional position.

As indicated in the analysis below, the new entity could be conceived as a specialised technical body (organismo técnico especializado, OTE) attached to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, PCM). This configuration would provide the new ANITAP with greater autonomy and resilience to fulfil its mission effectively and sustainably, ensuring consistent and reliable promotion and management of a national integrity and transparency policy in Peru. OECD interviews suggested that it would be desirable for the ANITAP to be attached to the PCM in order (1) to facilitate greater inter-agency co-ordination, given the PCM's capacity for integration, and (2) to align integrity and transparency policies with other national strategies, ensuring a more coherent and synergistic implementation of initiatives. It would also give the new ANITAP, together with its conception as an OTE and the creation of the SNIT, a strong political voice, which the SIP and ANTAIP currently lack.

Granting budgetary and functional autonomy to the National Integrity, Transparency and Personal Data Protection Authority

Preventing corruption and promoting transparency require significant operational autonomy to avoid pressures and conflicts of interest, promote the sustainability of efforts in the medium and long term, and provide sufficient convening power and political voice. This is particularly important in areas such as integrity and transparency, where change requires long-term solutions that are costly and time-consuming. In this sense, an autonomous budgetary and functional structure allows for medium- and long-term planning and efficient implementation of programmes and projects that address systemic challenges. This is why many OECD countries grant independence to bodies that promote access to information and, to a lesser extent, integrity. At the comparative level, the number, nature and responsibilities of integrity and transparency bodies vary from country to country.

In most of the countries analysed in this work, integrity efforts are led by one or two agencies, one of which is almost always part of the Executive, while the other may be part of the Executive or an independent body. In the case of France, for example, there are two lead agencies: the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence Française Anticorruption, AFA), which is part of the executive branch of government, and the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (Haute Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique, HATVP), which has the status of an independent administrative authority. Similarly, Chile has a Commission for Public Integrity and Transparency attached to the Secretariat General of the Ministry of the Presidency and an autonomous Commission for Transparency (CPLT). In Romania, the main integrity and transparency bodies are the General Anti-Corruption Directorate (Direcția Generală Anticorupție, DGA) of the Ministry of Justice and two independent institutions: the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (Direcția Națională Anticorupție, DNA) and the National Integrity Authority (Autoritatea Națională de Integritate, ANI). As mentioned in Chapter 1, other bodies play an important supporting role within the integrity and transparency system, such as Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) or public function bodies.

Regarding access to information efforts, there are several systems in which two or more agencies enforce and oversee access to information laws. For example, 52% of OECD countries have a central government agency in charge, 45% have established an independent institution with a specific mandate on the issue, and 27% leave this responsibility to an ombudsperson as part of a broader mandate (OECD, 2023[12]). This is partly because publicly funded and independent monitoring mechanisms are important counterweights to the protection of fundamental rights. In the same vein, the Model Law 2.0 of the Organisation of American States, which is considered an international best practice, proposes in Article 56 that “the guarantor body shall have legal personality and shall be: a) established by law; b) autonomous and independent, with the capacity to decide on the execution of its budget; c) specialised and impartial; and d) endowed with sanctioning capacity within the limits of its competences.” (OEA, 2020[26])

To create a governing body, it is necessary to consider the different options offered by the Peruvian Constitution and the Organic Law of the Executive Power of Peru (LOPE) for this purpose. Firstly, to guarantee the rule of law and greater efficiency in the performance of some tasks, the Peruvian Constitution has created some constitutionally autonomous bodies (órganos constitucionales autónomos, OCAs) that do not depend on any of the powers of the State, such as the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The establishment of the new ANITAP as an OCA would require a constitutional reform by an absolute majority in Congress. Despite the high degree of independence this option would provide, OECD interviews during the project indicated that the complexity and length of this process would make it a difficult option to implement in the short term. However, it could be a valuable option for Peru to consider in the medium or long term. Box ‎2.2 highlights a similar trajectory of Mexico’s National Institute for Access to Information, Transparency, and Protection of Personal Data (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales, INAI) transitioning from a decentralised technical body to a constitutionally autonomous body.

Box ‎2.2. From a deconcentrated technical body to a constitutionally autonomous body (OCA): the example of Mexico's INAI

In Mexico, the National Transparency System is managed by the National Institute of Transparency, Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales, INAI). Its history shows how an agency of the executive power can become a constitutionally autonomous body (órganos constitucionales autónomos OCA). In fact, the INAI's predecessor −the Federal Institute of Access to Information and Data Protection, or IFAI− was created in 2002, when Mexico's first Federal Law on Transparency and Access to Public Government Information was enacted. The IFAI was initially part of the structure of the Federal Public Administration, although it had operational, budgetary and decision-making autonomy. As Mexico is a federal country, it took several years for its 32 states to adopt their transparency laws, which were often uneven and heterogeneous, so in 2007, a constitutional reform established certain principles for the exercise of the right of access to information. These principles included broadening the range of obligated subjects responsible for providing information, imposing the obligation to implement electronic systems in public administrations, and granting the right to request information free of charge, without the need to justify their purpose or use.

Subsequently, the constitutional reform published in the Official Gazette of the Federation on 7 February 2014 stipulated the creation of three General Laws - on Transparency and Access to Public Information, Protection of personal data and Archives - and an autonomous, specialised and impartial body. The IFAI was thus renamed the INAI and given a broader mandate, with jurisdiction over matters relating to access to public information and the protection of personal data of any entity of the “executive, legislative and judicial powers, autonomous bodies, political parties, trusts and public funds, as well as any natural or legal person receiving and managing public funds or exercising any form of authority at the federal level, with the exception of matters falling under the jurisdiction of the Nation’s Supreme Court of Justice”.

Since its creation, the INAI has been “instrumental for some of the most important journalistic investigations of the last decade”. It acts as a counterweight to the concentration of power in Mexico.

Source: Presentation of the INAI “Institutional arrangements for transparency in Mexico, challenges and lessons learned” for a seminar held in Lima on 15 and 16 May 2024, in the framework of the project “Strengthening Integrity and Transparency in Peru”.

On the other hand, the LOPE establishes two types of deconcentrated bodies within the Executive branch, which have legal status under public law and powers of national scope: the executive public bodies and the specialised public bodies, which are created and dissolved by law on the initiative of the executive branch. Within the specialised public bodies category, there are regulatory bodies and specialised technical bodies. The former are created to act in specialised areas such as market regulation or to guarantee the proper functioning of unregulated markets, ensuring the coverage of services throughout the national territory. Their functions and powers include supervisory, regulatory, control and sanctioning actions, as well as settling the disputes and claims provided by the relevant law.

According to article 33 of the LOPE, specialised technical bodies (OTE) are autonomous decentralised public bodies. Their creation responds, exceptionally, to the following needs:

 "Article 33.- Specialised Technical Bodies

Exceptionally, specialised technical bodies are set up when there is a need to:

1. Plan, monitor, or implement and control long-term, cross-sectoral, or intergovernmental public policies that require a high degree of functional independence. 

2. Establish functionally independent bodies that grant or recognise the rights of individuals to enter markets or develop economic activities that are contestable by other subjects of the public or private sector. " 

OTEs are characterised by their technical specialisation and their autonomy in the management of their resources and the exercise of their functions. In this sense, the structure of an OTE would allow the new ANITAP to enjoy technical, budgetary, and functional autonomy, as indicated above. Being an autonomous body would provide greater stability and resilience in the face of political ups and downs, which, in the long run, represent a significant obstacle to the effective implementation of integrity and transparency policies. Unlike bodies that report directly to the Executive and may be affected by changes in government administration, an OTE has a structure and mandate that allows it to operate with continuity and consistency.

In this sense, the format of an OTE would allow the ANITAP to have technical autonomy, that is, the ability to develop and apply its policies, strategies, and procedures on transparency and integrity based on technical and expert criteria, and functional autonomy, which ensures that the authority can carry out its functions and responsibilities independently, including the ability to investigate, supervise and sanction, without depending on other government entities. Table ‎2.3 presents the OTEs that currently exist in Peru and the entities to which they are attached, showing their primarily technical nature, which is aligned with the issues of integrity, access to information, and data protection.

Table ‎2.3. Specialised technical public bodies existing in Peru in 2024

Specialised technical body	Authority or ministry to which they are attached
National Institute for Agricultural Innovation (Instituto Nacional de Innovación Agraria, INIA)	Ministry of Agricultural Development and Irrigation
National Water Authority (Autoridad Nacional del Agua, ANA)	Ministry of Agricultural Development and Irrigation
National Agricultural Health Service (Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agraria, SENASA)	Ministry of Agricultural Development and Irrigation
Servicio Nacional Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre (SERFOR) (National Forest and Wildlife Service)	Ministry of Agricultural Development and Irrigation
Instituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonía Peruana (IIAP) (Peruvian Amazon Research Institute)	Ministry of the Environment
Organismo de Evaluación y Fiscalización Ambiental (OEFA) (Environmental Assessment and Audit Agency)	Ministry of the Environment
Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas (SERNANP) (National Service for Protected Areas)	Ministry of the Environment
Servicio Nacional de Certificación Ambiental para las Inversiones Sostenibles (SENACE) (National Environmental Certification Service for Sustainable Investments)	Ministry of the Environment
Instituto Nacional de Investigación en Glaciares y Ecosistemas de Montaña (INAIGEM) (National Institute for Research on Glaciers and Mountain Ecosystems)	Ministry of the Environment
Comisión de Promoción del Perú para la Exportación y el Turismo (PROMPERÚ) (Commission for the Promotion of Peru for Export and Tourism)	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism
Organismo de Focalización e Información Social (OFI) (Social Focusing and Information Agency)	Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion*
Agencia de Promoción de la Inversión Privada (PROINVERSIÓN) (Private Investment Promotion Agency)	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y Administración Tributaria (SUNAT) (National Superintendence of Customs and Tax Administration)	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Superintendencia del Mercado Valores (SMV) (Superintendence for the Securities Market)	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Oficina de Normalización Previsional (ONP) (Office of Pension Standardisation)	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Organismo Supervisor de las Contrataciones del Estado (OSCE) (Supervisory Agency for State Procurement)	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Sistema Nacional de Evaluación, Accreditación y Certificación de la Calidad Educativa (SINEACE) (National System for Evaluation, Accreditation and Certification of Educational Quality)	Ministry of Education
Superintendencia Nacional de Educación Superior Universitaria (SUNEDU) (National Superintendence of Higher University Education)	Ministry of Education
Instituto Geológico Minero y Metalúrgico (INGEMMET) (Mining and Metallurgical Geological Institute)	Ministry of Energy and Mines
Superintendencia Nacional de Control de Servicios de Seguridad, Armas, Municiones y Explosivos de uso Civil (SUCAMEC) (National Superintendence of Control of Security Services, Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives for Civilian Use)	Ministry of the Interior
Superintendencia Nacional de Migraciones (MIGRACIONES) (National Superintendence for Migration)	Ministry of the Interior
Superintendencia Nacional de los Registros Públicos (SUNARP) (National Superintendence for Public Registries)	Ministry of Justice and Human Rights
Procuraduría General del Estado (PGE) (State Attorney General's Office)	Ministry of Justice and Human Rights
Superintendencia Nacional de Salud (SUSALUD) (National Health Superintendence)	Ministry of Health
Autoridad Nacional del Servicio Civil (SERVIR) (National Civil Service Authority)	Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Centro Nacional de Planeamiento Estratégico (CEPLAN) (National Center for Strategic Planning)	Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual (INDECOPI) (National Institute for the Defence of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property)	Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI) (National Institute of Statistics and Informatics)	Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Tecnológica (CONCYTEC) (National Council for Science, Technology, and Technological Innovation)	Presidency of the Council of Ministers

Note: *Legislative Decree 1612 strengthens the national targeting system by creating a specialised technical body, the Social Targeting and Information Organisation (Organismo de Focalización e Información Social, OFI), and provides for other complementary measures (2023).

Source: Adapted from Supreme Decree 097-2021-PCM, Supreme Decree that examines updating the classification and relationship of public institutions.

Greater capacity and resources to carry out its functions

If it were established as a specialised technical body (OTE), the ANITAP would have greater capacities and resources than at present, which could allow it to fulfil its mandate effectively and autonomously.

One of the key capacities of the ANITAP would be the mandate to issue specific norms, regulations, and guidelines on integrity and transparency. The ANITAP would have the power to establish a coherent and uniform set of rules and procedures to be followed by all public institutions. This would include regulations on managing conflicts of interest, transparency in public administration, and implementing anti-corruption policies. In addition to the general rules, the ANITAP could issue detailed guidelines addressing specific areas of corruption risks or lack of transparency. This could include guidelines on the active publication of information, the management of whistleblowing, and transparency practices in public procurement. The ANITAP would also be able to regulate and monitor compliance with these rules by other public bodies. This implies the ability to conduct audits, request reports, and evaluate the implementation of integrity and transparency policies.

On the other hand, Peru should consider providing ANITAP with the adequate resources and institutional capacities to carry out its functions effectively, including a team of highly qualified professionals in areas such as public administration, law, auditing, and information technology. The ANITAP would also require adequate infrastructure, including well-equipped offices and advanced technological systems. Technology would play a crucial role in collecting, processing, and analysing data related to transparency, data protection, and corruption prevention.

2.3.2. The National Integrity, Transparency and Personal Data Protection Authority should have a clear mandate, role, and responsibilities regarding integrity, transparency, access to public information, and personal data protection

Establishing clear responsibilities for designing, directing, and implementing integrity and transparency elements in the public sector is crucial to strengthening the system's effectiveness (OECD, 2020[11]). ANITAP would promote, co-ordinate, and oversee policies on integrity, transparency, access to public information, and personal data protection across the Peruvian public sector. It would aim to enhance governance and build public trust in public institutions by enforcing ethical, transparent, and responsible practices.

It is relevant to maintain a single governing entity that continues to bring together the issues of access to information and protection of personal data, as both are closely linked. Digital inclusion and the ethical use of technologies, closely tied to the obligations of proactive and reactive disclosure of information, also interact with substantive aspects of the regulation on personal data protection, particularly with information security measures, data dissociation and anonymisation, and privacy by design and by default, among others.

ANITAP could exercise its powers throughout the public sector and become a technical-regulatory authority under its leadership in the abovementioned matters. Its specific roles could include the following:

• Formulating, proposing, executing, and supervising national public policies on integrity, transparency, access to public information, and personal data protection.

• Issuing advisory opinions arising from applying or interpreting the rules of its competence.

• Issuing technical opinions regarding regulatory projects in matters within its competence.

• Supervising and inspecting compliance with the regulations of the matters under their competence.

• Dictating or proposing the rules that regulate the procedures under their charge and the exercise of their functions.

• Ensuring compliance with the obligations assumed by the State through international conventions in matters within its competence.

• Filing actions of unconstitutionality in the matter of its competence against federal or state laws and international treaties entered by the executive power and approved by the legislative power that violates the rights under its competence. Such actions could be filed by the Executive President with the agreement of the Council.

• Imposing sanctions defined by the commission of infractions of the regulations on these matters.

• Resolving complaints in the different areas under its competence (breaches of both personal data legislation and transparency legislation) and impose sanctions for infringements in these regimes.

• Approving directives and general guidelines for the classification and declassification of information, mandatory for all entities.

• Issuing recommendations and providing corrective measures for the observance of legality in matters within its competence.

• Promoting, guaranteeing, and protecting the rights linked to access to public information and personal data protection. For example, promoting and implementing training and awareness programmes aimed at obligated subjects, in particular public officials, and providing the technical support they require on the topics of their competence, and organise workshops, conferences, seminars, and other similar activities to disseminate the importance of the right of access to public information as a tool to guarantee transparency.

• Acting as the governing body and co-ordinator of the National Integrity and Transparency System.

The responsibility as a governing and co-ordinating body of the National Integrity and Transparency System corresponds to the technical nature of the subject matter covered by such a system, similar to the cases of SERVIR and CEPLAN, which act as governing bodies for the systems related to their mandate (human resources and strategic planning, respectively). Likewise, the nature of integrity and transparency issues, as has been argued throughout this section of the report, requires a level of autonomy that would benefit from the configuration of the governing entity as an OTE.

2.3.3. Peru could define a structure and organisation for the National Integrity, Transparency and Personal Data Protection Authority per its functions and its status as a specialised technical body and transfer the Court of Transparency, Access to Public Information and Protection of Personal Data (TTAIP) to the ANITAP

The organisational structure of OTEs is defined by law. Like other existing OTEs in Peru, the new ANITAP could have a series of senior management bodies: an Executive Council, an Executive President, and a General Management. As already proposed in the 2020 bill about a possible OTE for transparency, the Executive Council could be the management body of the new ANITAP, which could be responsible for the management and organisation of the entity, the approval and direction of the strategy for the realisation of its objectives, goals and institutional action plans. Such an Executive Board could be composed by three to five members. In its Inter-American Model Law 2.0 on Access to Public Information, the OAS points out that these bodies should be composed of an odd number of commissioners greater than or equal to five since a body consisting of three may isolate or obstruct the criteria and participation of one of the commissioners in cases where the other two are closely associated in a philosophical, personal or political way. This dynamic is more difficult in a collegiate body of five or more members (OEA, 2020[26]). However, in the context of Peru, five members could be considered a high number and could be substituted by three members that would have to co-ordinate with the General Directors for some key decisions.

Additionally, four General Directorates could be established to respond to the issues of their competence: (1) Integrity, (2) Access to Information and Transparency, (3) Personal Data Protection and (4) Monitoring, Control and Investigation. Each of these would rely on professional/technical profiles that reflect the particularities and demands of each area, and the fourth Directorate could supervise and investigate sanction cases for infringements to the Transparency and Data Protection Laws. At the same time, there should be clear communication channels and co-ordination between these areas to leverage synergies, ensure consistency between integrity, transparency and data protection policies, and facilitate the sharing of lessons learned.

On the other hand, the Authority could also have internal management bodies and an institutional control body. Details about its internal organisation would be developed in a regulation after the creation of the ANITAP.

Likewise, the new ANITAP could have an administrative resolution body on transparency and data protection, the current Tribunal of Transparency and Access to Public Information (TTAIP). The TTAIP could be transferred to this new Authority, ensuring its efficient functioning and operational independence. As in its current configuration, the tribunal would be within the ANITAP but would have autonomy in the adoption of its decisions, with its independence ensured through the rules of appointment of its members (“vocales”) and the finality of its decisions within the executive branch (i.e., they cannot be revised by the head of the institution, for example). In addition to its current competencies, its jurisdiction could be expanded to cover personal data protection issues, following the creation of specialised divisions on the topic. Its new name could be the Tribunal of Transparency, Access to Public Information and Personal Data Protection, though it could keep the same acronym.

Furthermore, its competencies in disputes and administrative appeals related to the sanctioning of civil servants who violated their obligations under access to public information regulations and in the appeals lodged against such penalties (currently assigned to the SERVIR Tribunal) could be broadened. This would enable the leveraging and strengthening of TTAIP’s experience and technical knowledge in matters of transparency and the right to information.

Some additional departments or positions whose creation could be considered within the new ANITAP, according to existing comparative experiences, are:

• Co-ordination team and Secretariat for the National Integrity and Transparency System (for more information on the System, see the next section), including an advisors’ cabinet

• Liaison teams with the different obliged parties

• Education and Training Office

• Office of promotion and liaison with society, social communication and dissemination. Here, it is worth highlighting that the ANITAP would greatly benefit from having its own means and communication channels as part of its functional autonomy, including the capacity to issue press releases and social media publications.

• International Affairs Office

• Office of Legal Affairs and Prosecution

• Office of Information Management, Research and Studies

• Human Resources Office

• Information Technologies Office

• Planning and finances Office

• In each line Directorate General in the areas of Transparency and Data Protection, headquarters could be set up to manager sanctioning processes

• Likewise, trilateral trusteeship and registration procedures could be established for data protection

The strength and independence of an organisation, in addition to the legal and administrative aspects, also depend on its internal organisational culture and on creating a solid identity on the part of public servants (OECD, 2017[27]; OECD, 2016[28]). How a governing body will be able to attract, retain and motivate its staff is ultimately a key determinant of their ability to achieve results, act independently, and make objective, evidence-based decisions. Strengthening a “culture of professionalism”, in which staff are proud to belong to the entity, accompanied by “soft” incentives, could compensate for wage gaps with the private sector (OECD, 2016[28]).

2.3.4. Peru could strengthen the new National Integrity, Transparency and Personal Data Protection Authority by clarifying the processes for appointing and removing its directors, providing it with administrative and financial independence

To ensure the effectiveness and credibility of ANITAP, it would be essential to establish clear and transparent mechanisms for appointing and removing its directors and Executive Chairman and guaranteeing its administrative and financial independence. The Executive President of ANITAP should be appointed through a public merit contest. This process would aim to select the most qualified candidate based on criteria of competence, experience and technical capacity.

The process steps could include the following:

• Public call: announced through official media and communication platforms to ensure the widest possible dissemination.

• Candidate evaluation: A reformulated CAN following the recommendations outlined in this report, would be composed of representatives of various public entities and civil society and could evaluate candidates. Criteria could include a minimum of several years of public management experience, especially working on integrity and transparency issues, knowledge of said topics and a track record of ethical performance in line with the parameters stipulated by law, which could include not having been convicted of any offence, not being prosecuted or indicted for intentional crimes until acquittal or dismissal and being in full exercise of civil and political rights.

• Interview and final evaluation: Shortlisted candidates would participate in panel interviews to assess their leadership skills, ethical leadership, and strategic vision for the entity.

• Appointment: the selected candidate would be appointed for a fixed period by the restructured CAN, with the possibility of renewal, thus guaranteeing management stability.

Furthermore, it should be ensured that the selected person remains in office for at least two years. Re-elections could be subject to a temporal limit, like only allowing one of them, or for non-consecutive mandates. For the removal of the Executive President and members of ANITAP’s Executive Council, specific assessed causes should be established by law, together with a transparent process that guarantees that the removal is not used as a mechanism of political retaliation or undue control. Causes could include serious misconduct in performing their duties or acts of corruption. An independent body, such as a supervisory board, could review and approve the removal decision, and the causes for removal should be serious, substantiated and verified. An example to follow could be the formula of article 15 of Bill 7870-2020-PE, which included the need for a Supreme Resolution to apply the removal of the institution’s head.

In this sense, the Organisation of America States (OAS) has stressed that “to increase trust in the institution, both the executive and the legislative branches should participate in the selection process; that any decision of the legislative branch is adopted by a qualified majority sufficient to guarantee bipartisan or multiparty support (e.g., 60 per cent or 2/3); that the public and civil society have the opportunity to participate in the nomination process; and that the process is transparent. There are two main approaches: appointment by the executive branch, with the nomination and approval of the legislative branch; and appointment by the legislative branch, with the nomination or approval of the executive branch.” (OEA, 2020[26]). Additionally, Box ‎2.3 provides comparative examples for selecting and appointing directors of integrity and transparency entities in other countries.

Box ‎2.3. The selection and appointment of heads of integrity and transparency entities

In contexts where public administration is highly politicised, selecting and appointing the heads of independent bodies and other entities involved in the fight against corruption is critical. Within the countries analysed, two different selection and appointment modalities stand out that seek to avoid the political capture of these agencies by any branch of government or political party.

1. The selection and appointment of the incumbent by the Executive Branch

In some countries, the president of the main integrity and transparency agencies is appointed directly by the Executive Branch, regardless of whether they are part of this branch of government or not. This is, for example, the case of the Access to Public Information Agency (Agencia de Acceso a la Información Pública, AAIP) of Argentina, whose current head was proposed by a resolution of the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers and designated by Presidential Decree. According to Law 27275, this appointment is valid for five years, renewable once, and the selection process of the Executive Branch must be “public, open and transparent”. Similarly, the eight officials who make up the decision-making body of the Public Ethics Office (Procuraduría de Ética Pública, PEP) of Costa Rica are appointed for eight years by the Governing Council, which reports to the President of the Republic. They, in turn, are elected every four years without the possibility of re-election, which limits the risks of political capture of the leading agency for the prevention and fight against corruption in the country. In addition, Costa Rican law recognises the functional independence of the PEP in the exercise of its powers. It specifies that the 31 officials who compose it can only be dismissed under strict conditions stipulated in the Constitution, thus protecting their impartiality (OECD, 2022[29]).

2. Collegiate governing bodies

To establish the independence and credibility of integrity and transparency agencies, some countries opted for their highest decision-making body to be a college of members appointed by different public entities. For example, in France, one of the highest anti-corruption bodies is the High Authority for the Transparency of Public Life (Haute Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique, HATVP), and its deliberative body is a college led by a president and a secretary general. Although the President of the HATVP is appointed by Presidential Decree, the rest of the college is constituted by the Council of State, the Court of Cassation, the Court of Auditors, the National Assembly, the Senate and the Executive Branch. The head of each of these bodies has the prerogative to appoint two members of the college, a man and a woman (HATVP, 2024[30]).

Likewise, the President of the Council for Transparency and Good Governance (Consejo de Transparencia y Buen Gobierno, CTBG) in Spain is appointed by decision of the Council of Ministers for a non-renewable period of five years after a competent committee of the Congress of Deputies has validated the candidate. The other seven members of the decision-making college of the CTBG are appointed on the proposal of the Congress of Deputies, the Congress of Senators, the Court of Auditors (the supreme audit institution), the Ombudsperson, the Spanish Data Protection Agency, the Secretary of State for Public Administrations, and the Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility.

Finally, forming the decision-making Plenary of the National Institute of Transparency (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, INAI) in Mexico requires a consensus between the Executive and Legislative branches. This is because the seven plenary commissioners are appointed by the Senate for seven years, although the President of the Republic –elected every six years without the possibility of re-election– can oppose their vote, which, in theory, ensures a system of counterweights between the different branches of government. As is the case in Costa Rica, the reasons why a political trial can be challenged and the members of the INAI Plenary dismissed are listed in Article 6 of the Constitution (Congreso de México, 2024[31]).

Source: (OECD, 2022[29]; HATVP, 2024[30]; Congreso de México, 2024[31]).

Additionally, ensuring ANITAP's administrative and financial independence would be necessary to protect it from political retaliation or undue control and strengthen its strategic and long-term vision. As an OTE, its budget would be approved by the Congress of the Republic as part of the annual budget law, providing it with sufficient resources for its operational and investment expenses.

Aspects of the financial and administrative independence of ANITAP that Peru could consider imply that the entity would have the ability to:

1. Hire staff autonomously: The ANITAP would be able to define the necessary profiles and hire the appropriate personnel without depending on other State entities. In this context, SERVIR could establish general guidelines to ensure transparency and equity in the personnel selection process, with the final decision being the responsibility of ANITAP.

2. Own voice: ANITAP would be able to conduct its own communications and awareness campaigns without prior approval from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM). This includes issuing official statements and managing its website and social networks, thus ensuring direct communication with the public.

3. Independent budget management: ANITAP could be able to manage its budget autonomously, including allocating resources for specific programmes, staff training, infrastructure, and technology. This could imply that the allocated budget would not be subject to cuts or reallocations without adequate and transparent justification.

4. Definition and implementation of internal policies: ANITAP would be able to develop and implement its internal policies and procedures, including those related to human resource management, procurement, and general administration. This allows an agile and appropriate response to the environment's changing needs and challenges that may arise in their field of competence.

5. Own legal representation: This autonomy would allow ANITAP to represent itself in judicial and administrative proceedings, defending its mandate and decisions before the courts without depending on other State entities. This capacity would be essential to protecting the integrity of its functions and ensuring that it can act with complete independence in defending its actions and resolutions.

2.3.5. The creation of a new entity would present an opportunity to align the criteria when conflicting interpretations between ANITAP and TTAIP emerge and strengthen the enforcement of TTAIP resolutions

The OECD interviews and focus groups have pointed out that in practice, there are occasional contradictory interpretations of the Law of Access to Information between the resolutions of the ANTAIP and those of the TTAIP, which create confusion, especially in their practical application by the FRAIP. Creating a new entity, such as ANITAP, could represent a key opportunity to address and clarify the hierarchy of criteria in advance when contradictory resolutions are presented between the ANITAP Executive Council and the Tribunal.

This could imply defining by law that the resolutions of the TTAIP on access to public information will take precedence over the decisions of the Executive Council of the ANITAP on specific matters related to transparency. It could be established that, when issuing advisory opinions, ANITAP must necessarily cite the resolutions that the TTAIP has issued in this regard, and vice versa, it could be stated that the TTAIP must include in its resolutions those advisory opinions that refer to the matter under examination, regardless of whether or not it follows the same criterion. Additionally, another option for reaching a consensus on the interpretation of the TTAIP and ANITAP could be that the Binding Precedents must bear the signatures of all the members that make up the majority of the TTAIP, plus the signature of the Executive President of ANITAP.

Although in theory this is already the case, in practice, it is not always clear whether all the guidelines or resolutions of the ANTAIP are modified based on new criteria issued by the TTAIP. Additionally, the competencies of each organisation must be precisely delineated, thus limiting the areas of possible conflict.

Another essential aspect that could be taken advantage of with the creation of the new entity is strengthening the enforcement of the resolutions issued by the TTAIP. Until now, a challenge faced by Peru has been the lack of effective mechanisms to ensure that the resolutions of the TTAIP are complied with by public entities. Since they are administrative acts, the enforcement process must be carried out by the affected entity itself. With the creation of the ANITAP, it would be possible to create a more robust and efficient system for the supervision and compliance with these resolutions, for example, giving this entity the ability to initiate the administrative process of enforcement when the entity does not initiate it by itself within a certain period. If the entity has been sanctioned, the penalty could be increased if its external enforcement is needed to promote compliance.

Finally, when establishing the regulations of the new TTAIP, it could be considered to legally enable the Tribunal or some selected members to have access to the information that underlies a dispute, to enable the effective resolution of the case.

2.4. Promote inter-institutional co-ordination within the SNIT and co-ordination with other relevant actors and systems

2.4.1. The National Integrity and Transparency System could promote the co-ordination between the primary and complementary actors for integrity and transparency through a redesign of the High-Level Anti-Corruption Commission (CAN)

Establishing a National Integrity and Transparency System would provide the opportunity to formally institutionalise strong linkages and co-ordination among key actors for integrity and transparency in Peru.

The main and complementary actors that should make up this system, in addition to the ANITAP as the governing body, are:

• PCM: The PCM, through its leadership in the SNIT and its link to the new ANITAP and the SGP, could ensure effective integration and co-ordination between the various State institutions, thereby guaranteeing that integrity and transparency policies are applied consistently and efficiently throughout the country.

• The Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República, CGR): Within the framework of the SNIT, the CGR could have a fundamental role as the country's SAI. Through control and external audit, the CGR would be able to evaluate the system's management and provide information and recommendations for improvement. In addition, as mentioned above, Peru could consider transferring the governing entity of internal control to the executive, for example, to the SGP.

• Secretariat of Public Management (Secretaría de Gestión Pública, SGP): As the entity responsible for modernising and improving public management and for implementing the Institutional Integrity Offices, the SGP could promote simplifying and digitalising procedures about integrity, transparency and data protection. The SGP also has a fundamental role in promoting open government based on transparency and citizen participation. As internal control is a key dimension of public management, the SGP could become its governing entity and co-ordinate with the CGR to promote a good co-ordination of external and internal control, maintaining their respective independence (OECD, 2024[32]).

• National Civil Service Authority (Autoridad Nacional de Servicio Civil, SERVIR): Responsible for managing the civil service, it is a key actor in promoting ethics and integrity in the civil service, including ethical leadership in co-ordination with the Secretariat of Public Integrity. Likewise, SERVIR’s Tribunal sanctions public officials for disciplinary offences. SERVIR would continue to work on training and awareness of public servants and implementing mechanisms for evaluating and controlling ethical performance.

• National General Archive (Archivo General de la Nación, AGN): The AGN plays a crucial role in preserving and managing public documents, ensuring that relevant information is available in a timely and appropriate manner when requested. Their participation in the system would ensure consistency between archiving and transparency policies, facilitating access to historical and administrative information.

• State Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General del Estado, PGE): As the legal representative of the State, in its role as part of the SNIT, the PGE would have a crucial role in collecting and analysing data regarding corruption cases and facilitating their prevention.

• Ombudsperson’s Office (Defensoría): As a guarantor of citizens’ fundamental rights and an entity that supervises the actions of the public administration, the Ombudsperson's Office has an essential role in respecting the rights of access to information and data protection in public management. The Ombudsperson's Office also receives and manages citizen complaints about acts of corruption or maladministration.

To achieve co-ordination at the strategic level between these actors that could make up the SNIT, reforming the CAN could be considered. The reform could make the CAN a more effective, reduced, preventive dialogue table that combines the mentioned entities. The CGR and the Ombudsperson's Office could participate with a voice, but without a vote, to maintain their independence as supervisory bodies. However, due to their key role and the information available, it seems important that they are present at the table. In this way, the new CAN could become more prone to strategic decision-making. In addition, the new governing body (ANITAP) could take on the role of technical secretary of this space, currently performed by the SIP. ANITAP could present its annual report to the CAN in order to keep it informed of the advances and challenges in the matters under its jurisdiction.

At the same time, the opportunity offered by the CAN today to promote a broader dialogue should be revamped. In this regard, the next section highlights options to ensure a routine or a regular mechanism of consultation and interaction with the actors of the legislative and judicial branch, with other relevant OCAs (e.g., National Board of Justice and Public Prosecutor's Office), with the National Assembly of Regional Governments and with the Association of Municipalities, as well as with the private sector and civil society.

2.4.2. The ANITAP could ensure effective co-ordination with other relevant systems and actors

To ensure a harmonious and effective implementation and operation, and that integrity and transparency are integrated and considered in relevant systems already existing in Peru, the future SNIT could maintain a dialogue and effective co-ordination with the other relevant and complementary systems and actors for integrity and transparency. Similarly, to guarantee that the SNIT considers relevant elements of different systems, it would be necessary to provide constant dialogue and proper co-ordination. As mentioned above, such co-ordination could be secured through the regular invitation of representatives of these key actors to some sessions of the CAN and the establishment of regular mechanisms for consultation and interaction, such as working groups, discussion forums, and joint committees.

The key areas of interdependency in existing systems identified as relevant and complementary to integrity and transparency are detailed below:

• National Archives System (Sistema Nacional de Archivos): Proper file management ensures transparency and accountability. The specialised management of documents guarantees their preservation, organisation and access, and therefore, the file system must be closely linked to the transparency system. This could be achieved by integrating the AGN into the SNIT and a reformed CAN, with the AGN continuing to be the governing body of the National Archives System. This ensures that archiving and transparency policies are consistent, facilitating access to public information and correctly preserving historical and official documents.

• National Control System (Sistema Nacional de Control): It is a fundamental pillar for supervising and controlling public resources and administrative management. Co-ordination with the SNIT would be essential to, for example, allow the Comptroller to access relevant data and reports to identify potential irregularities or areas of risk, facilitating more informed and timely monitoring. On the other hand, the observations and recommendations generated by both systems could be crucial for the other to implement continuous improvements, respectively sanctioning or preventing irregularities. As highlighted in Chapter 1, internal control could be strengthened by incorporating the governing entity for control and internal audit to the executive power, preferably into the SGP.

• Justice System (Sistema de Justicia): Co-operation between the justice system and the SNIT would be crucial for effectively prosecuting corruption cases. Besides, the information and research generated by the SNIT could feed judicial processes. Likewise, the creation of joint mechanisms to protect whistleblowers could be promoted. On the other hand, the awareness and training of justice operators on integrity and transparency issues is crucial for them to understand the importance of their role in the fight against corruption and to act quickly and correctly in cases involving these issues.

• Electoral System (JNE, ONPE and RENIEC1): co-ordination between the SNIT and the Electoral System would strengthen monitoring and control in electoral processes. This collaboration is essential to ensure that campaign financing and political party accountability are conducted transparently and within the legal framework. In this way, the National Office for Electoral Processes (Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales, ONPE) can improve supervision over the origin of electoral funds, detecting and preventing illicit financing that could compromise the legitimacy of elections. In addition, this co-ordination would make it possible to implement joint strategies to educate political actors and the public on the importance of integrity in electoral processes.

• Procurement System: This co-ordination would be crucial to ensure that all procurement processes are fair and open and that public resources are used efficiently. As a high-risk area for corruption at all levels of government, the integration of joint monitoring systems can help strengthen the oversight of tenders, contracts and awards, facilitating the identification and prevention of acts of corruption. This collaboration would also allow the Supervisory Agency for State Procurement (Organismo Supervisor de las Contrataciones del Estado, OSCE) to update and harmonise public procurement regulations and guidelines with the principles of the national system, promoting a more transparent and reliable procurement environment.

On the other hand, the SNIT could maximise its effectiveness by involving various complementary actors through regular consultation and interaction mechanisms such as those mentioned above:

• Collaboration with relevant OCAs: co-operation with key entities such as the National Board of Justice and the Public Prosecutor's Office would be crucial to strengthen the system's capacity to prevent acts of corruption and ensure their proper monitoring and sanction. These OCAs, by engaging in an ongoing dialogue with the SNIT, could co-ordinate efforts to ensure that investigations and sanctions are conducted efficiently, and that disciplinary and judicial decisions contribute to a more transparent and ethical environment.

• The National Assembly of Regional Governments and the Association of Municipalities of Peru: Engaging regional and municipal governments in the SNIT could ensure that transparency policies are implemented and realistic for all levels of government. These entities' participation in exchange forums would address local particularities and challenges, guaranteeing that policies are adapted to regional and municipal realities and promoting a culture of integrity throughout the public administration.

• Inclusion of the private sector and civil society: Collaboration with the private sector and civil society is essential to create an environment of integrity that goes beyond the governmental level. Being a key partner in public procurement and the economy in general, the private sector should be involved in discussions on corruption prevention and transparency. As for civil society, it acts as a critical watchdog, promoting accountability and citizen participation in the oversight of public policies. Establishing regular consultation mechanisms with these actors would ensure that all sectors of society support and monitor integrity and transparency policies.

In practice, ANITAP could ensure co-ordination and coherence with these other systems. As mentioned above, ANITAP could hence benefit from a team dedicated to co-ordinating SNIT and its interaction with different actors and systems.

2.5. Implementation of integrity and transparency policies at the level of national and territorial entities

It is challenging to achieve effective and consistent implementation of integrity and transparency policies across public administration. As mentioned, there is often a gap between the regulatory framework's requirements and its effective and coherent implementation at the organisational and territorial levels.

Specifically, translating integrity and transparency standards to various organisational realities is a fundamental challenge. For example, a regulatory agency differs from a ministry, and a small municipality has different capabilities and a different reality than a large municipality. In line with the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity, implementation must go beyond formal compliance with existing regulations to achieve a real change in officials' behaviours and organisational cultures (Rangone, 2021[33]; OECD, 2018[34]).

2.5.1. A National Integrity and Transparency System provides the opportunity to strengthen OIIs, FRAIPs and to review and refine the Integrity Model to reflect lessons learned from its implementation to date

Integrity and public transparency are the responsibility of all public servants, regardless of the branch, sector or level of government in which they work. Leadership within a public organisation is key to showing commitment to integrity and transparency. For example, by fulfilling their role as ethical leaders and leading by example, public managers at all levels play a crucial role in effectively promoting a culture of integrity (OECD, 2017[16]; OECD, 2009[35]; OECD, 2020[11]). In Colombia, the Integrated Planning and Management Model (MIPG) requires public managers to report regularly on their actions related to integrity, transparency and other cross-cutting issues (Función Pública, 2017[36]). In France, senior management is personally accountable for effectively implementing and promoting their organisation’s integrity programme (Agence Française Anticorruption, 2020[37]).

Additionally, dedicated support actors, such as units or committees, contribute to overcoming the challenge of mainstreaming the implementation of integrity and transparency policies. As actors of the second line (IIA, 2020[18]), they provide support and guidance to public servants on integrity and transparency issues, co-ordinate with other key units and monitor the implementation of public policies in these areas. Ideally, their role goes beyond a traditional compliance function. They can be key in promoting an open organisational culture where employees feel confident discussing ethical issues and raising their integrity questions. International experience shows the value of having a dedicated and specialised person or office that is accountable for internal implementation and promotion of integrity policies and laws (OECD, 2009[35]; G20, 2017[38]; OECD, 2019[14]). The same applies to access to information officers, who have been established by law in 50% of OECD countries to comply with and follow up on requests for access to information in their institutions (OECD, 2023[12]). Box ‎2.4 shows some examples of implementation bodies or persons at the organisational level.

Box ‎2.4. Organisational-level implementation bodies: Mexico, France and Costa Rica

In Mexico, national legislation details the modalities for establishing integrity and transparency implementation systems at the institutional level. Indeed, in the Official Gazette of the Federation of December 28, 2020 (DOF 12-28-2020) is the “Agreement by which the General Guidelines for the integration and operation of Ethics Committees are issued”, which explains the process to be followed to form an Ethics Committee in a federal public entity, establishes its mandatory nature and details the powers, obligations and resources of said committees (SEGOB, 2020[39]). Likewise, articles 45 and 46 of the General Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information list the functions of the Transparency Units present throughout the public administration and specify, for example, that they must promote “agreements with specialised public institutions that could help them deliver the responses to requests for information, in the indigenous language, braille or any corresponding accessible format”.

In France, Decrees 2016-483 and 2017-519 indicate that public officials and agents have the right to consult a “deontological reference”, which obliges administrations, territorial entities and health establishments to provide one. The referent's raison d'être is to advise public servants to help them avoid conflicts of interest, apply the principles and obligations of public service (integrity, impartiality, secularism, professional secrecy, patrimonial declarations, etc.) in the daily exercise of their activities, and resolve ethical dilemmas. However, public entities have a lot of flexibility in the implementation of these regulations, so the figure and functions of the Ethical Referent changes from one institution to another (HATVP, 2020[40]).

The Costa Rican Ethical Management Model is another example of how national public administrations can adapt institutional integrity and transparency arrangements according to their specificities. Although not mandatory under Executive Decree 23944-JC of 1995, many entities have a Commission of Institutional Ethics and Values (Comisión Institucional de Ética y Valores, CIEV) as the executing arm of the National Commission of Ethics and Values (Comisión Nacional de Ética y Valores, CNEV). This independent body governs the National Ethics and Values System and co-ordinates the implementation of policies in the executive branch of the State. In addition to a CIEV or group of officials with equivalent responsibilities, some entities have implemented institutional commissions focused on Open Government issues, from transparency and access to information to participation and social inclusion (OECD, 2022[29]).

Source: (SEGOB, 2020[39]; HATVP, 2020[40]; OECD, 2022[29]).

Peru has made significant progress in overcoming the challenge of permeating integrity and transparency policies across the public sector. The Integrity Model, with the Institutional Integrity Offices (OII), lays the foundations for institutionalising integrity in the Peruvian public sector. At the same time, the FRAIP aim to ensure that the Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information is correctly implemented and promote their entity’s active and reactive transparency.

However, OECD interviews and focus groups in Peru showed that OIIs and FRAIPs face significant challenges that limit their ability to effectively promote integrity and transparency in Public Administration entities. One of the main problems is their limited autonomy and resources, which hinders their operation and reduces their ability to act independently. This is compounded by high staff turnover and insufficient ongoing training, impacting policy implementation quality and continuity.

Additionally, co-ordination between OIIs and FRAIPs with public entities at all levels of government is often poor, leading to duplications and gaps in the execution of integrity and transparency policies. This lack of cohesion translates into uneven and often ineffective policy implementation at the national level. Monitoring and oversight are equally limited, preventing an accurate assessment of policy compliance and making it challenging to identify areas for improvement.

Finally, the legitimacy and visibility of OIIs and FRAIPs is sometimes questioned both within public entities and by the public. This is because their role is misunderstood or undervalued, reducing their influence and ability to effect significant changes in organisational culture. This problem is exacerbated by resistance to change within public institutions and limited political will to prioritise and strengthen their functions.

Therefore, the creation of a National Integrity and Transparency System would be an excellent opportunity to review some aspects of the Integrity Model, the OIIs and the FRAIPs based on the lessons learned and following the recommendations of the OECD Report on Institutional Integrity Offices (OECD, 2019[4]).

Thus, the bill creating the SNIT could contemplate the following:

• OIIs could report directly to the entity head and the new ANITAP. Reporting directly to the head and ANITAP has several advantages (OECD, 2019[4]). First, it points out to the outside world, especially to employees, that integrity is a priority issue for the entity. Second, it strengthens the real independence of the OII by reporting directly to the entity's head. Third, it helps strengthen co-ordination with other units and ensures timely response to requests for information. The key function of the OII is to co-ordinate the integrity and anti-corruption efforts within the entity, which also implies developing integrity actions at the institutional level in the internal planning and monitoring of these actions. To fulfil this function, it is essential that the other units respond promptly to requests for information and that they are willing to collaborate with the OII. The ISO 37001 Anti-Bribery Standard also highlights the importance of having “direct access to senior management to communicate relevant information” and the risk that the communication of the Officer or the Integrity Office is not “fully or clearly received by senior management” if it must be communicated to another chain manager who then informs senior management (INACAL, 2017[41]). Finally, reporting efficiently to ANITAP would give them an out-of-entity visibility that could prevent an internal capture of the OII and the FRAIP. It can also make it easier for ANITAP to identify the capacity development needs of OIIs and FRAIPs.

• Ensure the professionalisation of the civil servants with responsibilities in the OIIs and FRAIPs. It is recommended that profiles be standardised to recruit OII and FRAIP personnel. This standardisation could be developed jointly between the new ANITAP and SERVIR. In addition, it should be ensured that both OII and FRAIP teams are selected on the grounds of a merit-based competition and according to the Civil Service Law. It could also be considered that the ANITAP participates in selecting the personnel of the OII and FRAIP. During the interviews of this project carried out in Peru, the possibility of the OII teams being part of the new governing body in the image of the OCI was raised. However, this logic comes from the perspective of control, and it is recommended that both OIIs and FRAIPs depend on the same entity because, as second-line (support) units, they mustn't be perceived as external to the organisation.

• Incorporate FRAIPs as part of the OIIs, which could be renamed “Integrity and Transparency Offices” (OIT), to co-ordinate both functions internally. The OECD focus groups have highlighted that there is currently minimal co-operation between the members of the OIIs and the FRAIPs. Despite this, both functions are interconnected, which will be of greater importance to the extent that these officers may be under the same governing body. For example, the Integrity Model has a “Transparency” component that involves ensuring the publication of information on the Standard Transparency Portal (personnel, hiring and procurement, official activities, registration of visits, planning and budget documents, investment projects, etc.) and guaranteeing access to public information (including compliance with the procedures to classify information properly). In addition, this component calls for contributing to data openness and promoting accountability. Integrating FRAIPs into the Integrity Offices and expanding their mandate can facilitate this co-ordination and strengthen the performance of both functions. In no case should it be considered that both functions should be merged with the same person since this would result in a workload that is too high and make it difficult for them to be properly completed.

• Add accountability functions to the OIT. There is currently an institutional and legal vacuum regarding the implementation of institutional accountability obligations (Munive Pariona, 2022[21]). The OII reform could present an opportunity to bring this function under its mandate and fill it with content at all levels of administration. Likewise, the SGP, as the governing body of the Public Management Modernisation Policy, could develop a framework for co-ordination with the SNIT that allows the OIIs and FRAIPs to co-ordinate more effectively with other areas of public entities, such as internal control and audit offices. This co-ordination should focus on ensuring that the new accountability functions do not generate duplication but reinforce the effectiveness of the system.

Finally, the reform could be used to eliminate the function of receiving complaints from the new OITs. As already warned in the 2019 OECD report, having OIIs receiving complaints implies certain risks (OECD, 2019[4]). On the one hand, OIIs do not have the power to give investigative follow-up or sanction a complaint. This creates false expectations on the part of whistleblowers who submit a complaint to an OII and the risk that it will be perceived that the prior investigation work by the OII was not done correctly if it decides not to submit the complaint to the competent authorities. On the other hand, the focus group developed within the framework of this work demonstrated that the OII must devote significant time and resources to complaint receipt and processing that are needed for potentially more relevant tasks, such as management support in risk management or handling conflicts of interest, for example.

If it is decided that the new OITs will not have the function of receiving complaints, this should be accompanied by a more profound reform to avoid creating a vacuum and clarify to any whistleblower where to go and what protection measures are available.

In addition, the receipt of complaints could be assigned to the entities that have the power to follow up on them, namely:

• For integrity breaches or suspicions of corruption, the units responsible for the Disciplinary Administrative Process (Proceso Administrativo Disciplinario, PAD), the Institutional Control Bodies (Organismos de Control Institucional, OCI) that depend on the CGR, and the public prosecutors could be reported internally. Externally, the Attorney General's Office, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the National Office of Electoral Processes, the Ombudsperson's Office, and even the police and the Judiciary play a relevant role under their respective mandates and powers.

• For the issue of access to information, the current procedure could be maintained: A citizen who sees their request for access to information denied can address the entity itself, which must submit it to the TTAIP within two business days, or directly to the TTAIP. The resolution of the TTAIP ends the administrative channel, so if the applicant does not obtain a response or if the response is negative, they can appeal judicially or go to the Ombudsperson's Office. Alternatively, the applicant can go directly to court without raising the case to the TTAIP if they wish.

Ideally, it should not be the burden of the public servant or citizen to know where to direct their complaints. Instead, improving and strengthening the Unique Digital Platform for Citizen’s Complaints could be considered, taking advantage of technology and with an effective co-ordination mechanism between the different responsible entities to follow up, as is already done in the case of appeals to the FRAIP, which transmits them directly to the TTAIP.

On the other hand, the OECD focus groups with OII and FRAIP have pointed out the need to increase co-operation between these officers throughout the administration to share good practices and support each other when facing similar cases. Box ‎2.5 details two co-operation networks for integrity and transparency officers in different countries.

Box ‎2.5. Integrity and transparency officer co-ordination networks

Morocco

The Moroccan government created an inter-ministerial network of officials responsible for access to information in their respective institutions through Circular 05/2020, of June 17, 2020, under the auspices of the Ministry of Digital Transformation and Administrative Reform (MTNRA). It was created to facilitate exchange, consultation, awareness and training on new measures taken and improvements made in applying the right of access to information.

To reinforce the effectiveness of this network, MTNRA launched in March 2023 the ReDAI platform (redai.chafafiya.ma), a virtual space for the exchange of ideas, experiences and knowledge among network members, thus contributing to the institutionalisation of communication within the network with a view to co-ordination. The platform aims to promote the dissemination of good practices related to the application of the right of access to information, identify and collectively propose solutions to problems associated with the organisation of information and the management of requests, share developments, innovations and news at the national and international level in the field of the right of access to information and, finally, participate in the strengthening of the capacities of the members of the network.

Austria

In Austria, the Federal Anti-Corruption Office (Bundesamt zur Korruptionspraevention und Korruptionsbekaempfung or BAK) created the Austrian Integrity Network (Integritaetsbeauftragten-Netzwerk) intending to strengthen integrity by anchoring it firmly as an essential element in the public sector. To this end, BAK trains public officials to become experts in integrity and corruption prevention within the framework of the Integrity Network. These integrity officers provide advice and guidance in their agencies to strengthen integrity in specific agencies. Integrity officers can access more information about compliance, corruption, ethics, integrity, and organisational culture.

In addition to the online platform, BAK provides regular follow-up meetings for integrity officers to discuss topics such as risk management, ethics, and values. For example, during the ethics and values meeting, participants presented their current values model. Following their treatment in divided groups and plenary sessions, participants identified good practices for implementing a value statement in an agency.

Source: ReDAI website, accessible at redai.chafafiya.ma (2023) and Circular 05/2020 of 17 June 2020 accessible at http://redai.chafafiya.ma/redai/javax.faces.resource/files/Circulaire_DAI_05_2020.pdf, https://integritaet.info/.

2.5.2. Due to the challenges and particularities in the territory, the mandatory criteria for the implementation of integrity and transparency policies should be adapted so that they can respond to the realities of local governments

It is key to reach the territorial level to impact the development of a culture of integrity and transparency at the national level, especially in municipalities. Considering their responsibilities in the provision of public services (such as regulating public transport, circulation and traffic; zoning and urban planning; co-operating with initial and primary education, culture, recreation and sport; tourism; and cemeteries, for example) and local development in general (Law 27972), integrity and transparency policies can achieve highly visible results for citizens. In addition, the closeness of interactions between territorial authorities, on the one hand, and citizens and the private sector, on the other hand, can carry corruption risks if adequate integrity policies that respond to local contexts are not in place.

Despite this, integrity and transparency policies are generally not designed or implemented in a differentiated manner at the local level. On the contrary, they are established at the national level, following homogeneous patterns, without considering the differences and capacities of local contexts (e.g. coastal municipalities with ports may have integrity risks associated with drug trafficking, while municipalities with reserves or natural resources may have integrity risks associated with illegal logging of forests or illegal mining).

The territories’ specific risks, characteristics and particularities require a contextualised analysis and differentiated integrity and transparency policies that respond to the realities of each municipality. The challenge lies in achieving a certain coherence at the national level to ensure the quality of the integrity and transparency measures of the different municipalities while allowing a certain flexibility for municipalities to adapt policies to their contexts (e.g. specific risks, opportunities, availability of resources, etc.).

Peru does not escape this challenge. The OECD report on integrity in Peruvian regions highlighted several challenges, which were reconfirmed in the interviews and focus groups conducted to prepare the current report.

Among others, the report mentioned the following aspects (OECD, 2019[14]):

• The great regional diversity accentuates economic differences, social inequalities, and vulnerabilities to corruption. This diversity calls into question the claim of implementing an equal model for all. Rather, the specific context should be considered when developing a method to strengthen integrity at the subnational level.

• Since 2002, Peru has made progress in administrative and political decentralisation, with the election of regional governments and delegating important responsibilities to the subnational level. However, the process is underway, fiscal decentralisation remains limited, and the degree of autonomy to make decisions remains limited.

• Most senior officials in the territory have limited knowledge of the benefits and scope of the integrity model and functions. As such, they have and perceive very little incentive to undertake integrity reforms other than to comply with nationally established obligations.

• Budgetary and capacity constraints undermine the effective implementation of integrity and transparency policies and measures.

• With each change of political mandate, there is a great turnover of staff in the territorial public administrations. While the discretionary power of local authorities to hire and fire regional staff is part of the decentralisation process, this poses risks to the stability and professionalism of the workforce and, thus, to integrity.

In Peru, the reform proposed with the creation of the SNIT and the ANITAP could enable the adaptation of certain requirements of the Integrity Model for local governments. In the process of Peru’s accession process to the OECD, it is emphasised that the country must increase efforts to reach the municipalities by adapting the implementation of the Integrity Model to the realities of the municipal level. For this, Peru could take advantage of the lessons learned from implementing a pilot carried out by the SIP in 28 municipalities, which evidenced important knowledge gaps concerning the Integrity Model.

For example, it seems unfeasible for small municipalities to have an OII or a reporting channel. Equally, its capability to implement internal controls may be very limited. As several municipalities do not have the size or resources necessary to develop and implement integrity and transparency policies, Peru could consider the development and pilot implementation of “shared” OIIs that provide their services to several small municipalities. These shared OIIs could, for example, be located at the regional government level or in larger municipalities.

Note

← 1.  JNE: Junta Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Board), ONPE: Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (National Office for Electoral Processes), RENIEC: Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil (National Identification and Civil Registry).