Parliaments play a central role in supporting fiscal responsibility through their functions in budgeting, scrutiny and oversight. This chapter examines how OECD legislatures fulfil these responsibilities using the OECD Best Practices for Parliaments in Budgeting as an analytical framework. Drawing on evidence from the 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight, it assesses parliamentary practices across the budget cycle, including budget approval, oversight, committee organisation and analytical support. The chapter finds that many legislatures have well established structures for budget scrutiny, but that engagement is often more limited in areas linked to long-term fiscal stewardship, such as fiscal risks, sustainability and public participation. It highlights common strengths, identifies remaining gaps and presents examples of evolving practice across OECD countries.
The Role of Parliaments in Restoring Public Finances
Abstract
Continuous parliamentary engagement across the budget cycle matters. When parliaments have structured opportunities to engage at all key stages of the budget process, this puts them in a better position to improve the quality of public spending, strengthen fiscal discipline and reinforce accountability. This principle is embedded in the OECD report on Quality Budget Institutions (OECD, 2025[1]) and reflected throughout the OECD Best Practices for Parliaments in Budgeting.
Across the OECD, legislative involvement is generally strongest around budget approval stages but weakens significantly in oversight thereafter, particularly for interim reporting and performance review (see Figure 2.1). In particular, structured pre-budget debates and ex post scrutiny – including the follow up of audit recommendations and the use of performance information – receive comparatively less systematic attention.
Note: Fiscal framework is scored as high when the legislature debates and approves changes, moderate when it debates without approval, and none when it has no role; pre-budget debate is high when a debate occurs with a report, moderate without a report, and none if no debate occurs; budget proposal is scored as high when legislatures have an approval role, moderate when they discuss or debate it, low when executive can still implement it without the legislature’s approval and as none when indicated not applicable; amendment powers are high with unrestricted authority, moderate when constrained, and none when no amendments are allowed; supplementary budgets are scored by frequency as high (always), moderate (mostly), low (sometimes), and none (never); interim financial reports are high when there’s a formal review process and none when not; audit recommendations are high when fully integrated into the budget process, moderate when no formal integration exists but an Audit or Public Accounts Committee is in place, and none when no Audit or Public Accounts Committee exists.; performance review is high with broad committee involvement, moderate with some involvement, low with minimal involvement, and none with no review; and year-end financial statements are high when debated in plenary and none when not. If a country indicated a response under “Other,” a custom score was applied to ensure an equal treatment across answer categories and countries. Colombia does not use supplementary budgets.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Questions 1, 2, 5.c, 8, 15, 19, 21, 24, 24.1, 25.
The seventeen OECD Best Practices can be grouped into five pillars that together capture whether legislatures are positioned to support fiscal responsibility across the full budget cycle (Figure 2.2). These pillars are used to organise the analysis in this chapter and to anchor the indicators underpinning the OECD Index on Parliaments and Fiscal Responsibility introduced later in the report.
Source: OECD authors’ elaboration.
What the five pillars cover
1. Fiscal responsibility: This assesses the legislature’s role in shaping fiscal strategy before detailed allocations are set, including review and approval of the fiscal framework and its rules, scrutiny of long-term sustainability analysis and fiscal risks, and structured pre‑budget debates on priorities and trade-offs. Strong performance indicates early and strategic influence over fiscal choices.
2. Budget approval: This examines whether the legislature has the time, information and powers to scrutinise, amend and approve the budget before the fiscal year begins, supported by comprehensive documentation, committee hearings and the ability to summon testimony.
3. Budget implementation & audit: This focuses on in‑year oversight and accountability after approval, including review and prior approval of significant supplementary budgets, examination of interim financial reports, and systematic follow‑up of Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) findings in the next budget cycle.
4. Committee organisation: This looks at whether a dedicated budget or finance committee provides co-ordination and discipline across parliament, how sectoral committees contribute specialised scrutiny – especially of performance information – and whether committee arrangements support openness and effective engagement.
5. Analytical resources: This captures access to non‑partisan expertise, including in‑house budget units, research services and IFIs, as well as timely access to data, methods and assumptions. These capacities underpin informed, independent and credible scrutiny.
The pillars translate international good practice into an operational assessment that links institutional design to better fiscal outcomes. OECD work shows that when parliaments engage early on fiscal strategy, exercise disciplined approval procedures, oversee implementation and audit, and are supported by capable committees and analytical expertise, they can reinforce fiscal discipline while improving transparency and inclusiveness (Schick, 2002[2]). This runs counter to the belief that stronger parliaments necessarily weaken discipline.
The framework also reflects the practical realities revealed by recent country experience. Survey data indicates that gaps often occur where forward-looking analysis and end-of-cycle follow through are required – for example, in debating long-term sustainability and in integrating audit recommendations into subsequent budgets. The five pillars therefore highlight not only where legislatures are active, but where attention is most needed to support sustainable public finances.
Why fiscal responsibility matters
Fiscal responsibility is the foundation of sustainable public finances. Parliaments play a decisive role in shaping national fiscal strategy by scrutinising fiscal rules, medium-term frameworks and long-term risks. These can be set out in a variety of legal instruments, such as the fiscal responsibility law, organic budget law (fiscal rules), or in the annual fiscal strategy document or standalone publications (medium-term frameworks and long-term risks). Early legislative engagement can help improve the quality of public spending, strengthen fiscal discipline and ensure that fiscal oversight incorporates a long-term perspective rather than short-term political demands.
What the OECD Best Practices require
Under the OECD Best Practices, legislative responsibility for fiscal strategy includes four core expectations:
Review and approval of core aspects of the fiscal framework, including fiscal rules and fiscal policy objectives.
Examination of long‑term fiscal sustainability analysis prepared by government or an IFI, followed by open debate on risks to the public finances.
Structured pre‑budget debates on priorities and constraints, taking account of medium‑ and long‑term fiscal pressures.
Approval of top‑down fiscal aggregates to frame subsequent detailed budget discussions.
How OECD legislatures perform
Most legislatures review changes to the fiscal framework
A fiscal framework includes the government’s fiscal rules or fiscal policy objectives over a multi-annual period of time as well as projections of fiscal variables, including expenditure, showing the expected path towards meeting these fiscal policy objectives.
A core issue is the credibility of the fiscal framework with the public and parliamentarians. Across 38 OECD countries, 27 legislatures debate and approve changes to the national fiscal framework, including revisions to fiscal rules or fiscal policy objectives over a multi-annual period of time. Seven legislatures debate changes without approving them (Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Korea and New Zealand). Only four legislatures have no role (Australia, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Türkiye).
Note: In the United States, the Congress adopts its own fiscal framework. In France, initiatives regarding change in the fiscal framework are shared by the government and the legislature, so not only does the legislature debate and approves changes, but it can also suggest changes to the fiscal framework. In Ireland, while the legislature debates the annual fiscal framework document, it cannot make changes to it and instead must accept or reject the proposals in entirety.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 1.
Legislative engagement with the medium-term budget proposal is more limited
Although the medium-term budget proposal is submitted to the legislature in 30 OECD countries, it is only subject to debate in 19 countries, and approval in 11 of these countries (Figure 2.4). In many countries, the medium-term budget proposal is still treated as an executive planning tool (where the first year is binding, but outer years are indicative) rather than a binding multi-year commitment requiring legislative authorisation.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 5a.
Due to the 2024 EU reform set out in Directive (EU) 2024/1265, which strengthens requirements for national budgetary frameworks, many EU legislatures are expected to take on a more prominent role in approving changes to fiscal frameworks as well as authorising medium-term budget proposals. For example, Finland transposed the new EU fiscal framework through legislation adopted in December 2025. Under this framework, Parliament votes on the Government Programme, which must include the draft Medium-Term Fiscal Structural Plan required under the EU framework. Fiscal targets are decided by a Parliamentary Working Group on Fiscal Policy, one for an inter-parliamentary period of eight years and one for the 4-year government term.
Access to long-term sustainability analysis is common, but active scrutiny is not
A large majority of OECD legislatures (28 out of 38) have access to long-term fiscal sustainability analysis (Figure 2.5). In some countries this is a standalone report, but in others the information may be included in the annual budget documentation. Scrutiny of this analysis – whatever form - remains uneven: only 12 legislatures discuss, debate or approve the analysis while the remaining 16 legislatures receive analysis purely for information.
Oversight of fiscal risk analysis shows similar patterns, with most legislatures receiving the information passively and only a small number (Austria, Chile, Finland, Greece, Latvia and New Zealand) debating it.
This gives rise to concern that although information is widely available, legislatures may not be actively scrutinising it, potentially limiting their integration into fiscal oversight. This may reflect a lack of formal powers being granted to legislatures to scrutinise this information, or be a result of the way those powers are exercised in practice.
Note: For long-term fiscal sustainability analysis, the category “Discussed or debated by legislature” covers all legislatures where it was indicated that legislatures that discuss, debate or approve the analysis.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 5i and 5j.
Pre‑budget debates remain uncommon
Only 15 OECD legislatures out of 38 hold a pre-budget debate, and just five of these produce a formal report submitted to the executive (Canada, Greece, Italy, Slovenia and Sweden). Where formal pre-budget processes are absent, legislatures may have fewer opportunities to influence budget priorities before the executive's budget proposal is tabled.
Most parliaments therefore have fewer opportunities to shape budget priorities before the executive's budget proposal is tabled or to facilitate broader public dialogue on fiscal constraints. Nevertheless, there are important institutional differences across OECD countries. While many parliamentary systems concentrate budget formulation within the executive, some legislatures, such as the United States Congress, play a more substantial agenda setting and budget formulating role, reducing the importance of a dedicated parliamentary pre budget debate as a mechanism for influence.
In several of the legislatures that hold a pre-budget debate, the budget or finance committee also conducts public engagement during annual priority setting and budget preparation. These legislatures include Canada, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, New Zealand, Slovenia, and Spain. In addition, Mexico, Norway and the United States also conduct public engagement during annual priority setting and budget preparation, despite not having a pre-budget debate in the legislature.
Top-down budget oversight is not yet commonplace
Top-down budget oversight begins with the legislature voting on overall budget totals before considering sectoral appropriations, thereby protecting fiscal aggregates and enabling more strategic prioritisation. Fixing the totals in advance serves two interlinked objectives: it safeguards fiscal discipline and focuses attention on how resources are allocated within a hard budget constraint (Wehner, 2004[3]). In contrast, when legislative scrutiny is fragmented and revenues and expenditures are considered in isolation, aggregates are only known at the end of the process, weakening both discipline and prioritisation.
Only one-third of OECD legislatures vote on the aggregate budget totals before considering detailed allocations, a key tool for protecting fiscal aggregates and enabling strategic prioritisation (Czechia, France, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United States). This rate has not improved since 2018, reflecting diversity in the form of government and role for parliament as well as persistent procedural and political constraints to change.
Country illustrations
Several country examples demonstrate how legislatures can meaningfully engage in fiscal responsibility:
Austria: Parliament receives and debates long-term fiscal sustainability reports received from independent bodies, such as the Fiscal Advisory Council and the Old Age Security Commission. Discussion takes place primarily through the Budget committee, which examines the reports upon submission.
Canada: Each year, the Finance committee leads a formal pre-budget consultation process. After a sixty‑day online submission period, in-person hearings are held across several cities. The Committee then prepares a report setting out the key themes and recommendations. This report is tabled in the House of Commons and sent to the Minister of Finance, who considers it alongside departmental consultations when finalising the budget.
Czechia: The Chamber of Deputies approves the overall fiscal aggregates during the first reading of the State Budget Bill, including total revenues, total expenditures and the deficit ceiling. These become binding and set the fiscal envelope for all further budget discussions.
Finland: In 2025, parliament debated and voted on amendments to the fiscal framework set out in the Public Finance Law. These transposed requirements related to the EU’s new fiscal framework. The Budget committee scrutinised multiannual obligations, reform commitments and independent oversight roles before final approval.
Lithuania: The parliament (Seimas) must set net expenditure growth ceilings, expressed as percentages, for a five-year period covering the current year and the following four years. This establishes a binding top-down fiscal framework before detailed allocations are considered. Within this context, the Seimas first approves the main budget aggregates, including total revenues, total expenditures and the deficit ceiling, before discussing specific appropriations. This early agreement on the fiscal envelope sets the limits for all subsequent deliberations.
Slovenia: The National Assembly helps shape the budget before the Government finalises its proposal. Committees review the draft budget, consider amendments and the Committee on Finance submits a report and proposes changes to the Government. The Government then evaluates these amendments, prepares a supplemented draft budget and explains how parliamentary proposals were addressed when it submits the revised version to the Assembly.
Implications for strengthening fiscal responsibility
Most OECD legislatures review and approve changes to the fiscal framework, and many have access to medium‑ and long‑term fiscal analysis. These arrangements provide opportunities for legislatures to engage with the budget beyond the annual budget process. For example, the Finnish Parliament has played a role in shaping the country’s fiscal framework, while Canada provides structured opportunities for public engagement early in the budget cycle.
However, persistent weaknesses limit legislatures’ ability to exercise full fiscal responsibility. Medium‑term frameworks are often debated but not approved, long‑term sustainability analysis is frequently received passively, and pre‑budget debates remain rare. Top‑down budget oversight – a key tool for anchoring aggregate discipline – is used by only one third of legislatures. Together, these gaps reduce parliaments’ engagement with fiscal strategy and longer-term fiscal considerations.
Overall, strengthening fiscal responsibility will require legislatures to deepen their upstream engagement in fiscal planning - institutionalising pre‑budget debates, strengthening scrutiny of medium‑ and long‑term fiscal analyses, and adopting clearer aggregate fiscal ceilings which frame subsequent budget discussions. Doing so would enhance their capacity to guide fiscal strategy, support transparency, and reinforce their role in supporting fiscal responsibility.
Why having a role in budget approval matters
Budget approval is the point at which legislative scrutiny translates into binding fiscal authority. When documentation is incomplete or legislative powers are weak in practice, oversight risks become a formality rather than a meaningful check on fiscal policy. By contrast, when legislatures receive sufficient time, information, and procedural authority to examine the budget, they are better equipped to exercise effective and informed oversight.
What the OECD Best Practices require
Under the OECD Best Practices, legislative responsibility for budget approval includes four core expectations:
Opportunity, time and resources to effectively review, debate, and approve the executive’s budget proposal.
Approval of the annual budget prior to start of the new fiscal year at a level of detail that is sufficient to ensure effective control and oversight.
Comprehensive budget documentation covering all government revenue and expenditure, and where relevant and feasible, performance information, to support informed and realistic debate.
Ability to amend the executive’s budget proposal, preferably within previously approved totals.
How OECD legislatures perform
Timely budget submission and approval remain inconsistent across OECD legislatures
Data from the 2023 OECD SBO Survey on Budget Frameworks show that the majority of OECD countries receive the executive’s budget proposal at least three months before the fiscal year (Figure 2.6). Only six OECD countries do not routinely approve the budget before the start of the fiscal year. These are Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States. In Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, this reflects Westminster parliamentary tradition, in which supply is granted after the fiscal year begins. In the United States, Congress is expected to pass the budget before the start of the fiscal year but rarely does so in practice, leading to frequent reliance on temporary measures and occasional government shutdowns. In Poland, the executive’s draft budget governs financial management until the Budget Act is enacted, with dues and contributions maintained at the previous year’s rates.
Note: Where timelines differ for the approval of tax and expenditure policy measures, the timeline for the approval of expenditure measures is shown. In Ireland all of the Estimates that have been voted by the legislature for the budget year are not finally implemented in legislation until the annual Appropriation Act is passed. It is usually one of the last pieces of legislation to be enacted each year. Statutory confirmation of the appropriation of moneys, pursuant to Article 17.1.2 of the Constitution, therefore takes place after these moneys (or almost all of them) have been spent, almost 12 months after the start of the budget year. Canada has since adjusted its budget cycle, which in principle allows more time for parliamentary scrutiny before the start of the fiscal year.
Source: OECD (2023), OECD SBO Survey on Budget Frameworks, results for Q1. Data for Israel, Lithuania and Mexico was collected through country correspondence in 2025.
Comprehensive budget documentation is standard
Comprehensive and accessible budget documentation is a foundational requirement for effective legislative scrutiny and informed public debate. Expectations are clearly set out in the OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, which underscore the need for integrity, completeness and clarity in fiscal reporting (OECD, 2017[4]). In practice, legislatures should be able to determine the preferred structure and level of detail for executive budget submissions, including the format of budget documents and the transparency standards required. OECD best practice also calls for the inclusion of performance information, where relevant and feasible, to allow legislators to assess the effectiveness of expenditure programmes alongside their financial implications. Such requirements ensure that scrutiny extends beyond inputs to encompass programme results, thereby supporting a more informed and realistic budget debate.
Survey findings indicate that most OECD countries provide annual revenue and expenditure plans at a level of detail that is sufficient to ensure effective control and oversight (Figure 2.7). All legislatures receive comprehensive annual financial plan data. Twenty‑five countries report submitting a full annual financial plan to the legislature that covers all revenues and expenditures, including off‑budget items and extra‑budgetary funds.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 7.
Beyond the annual financial plan, legislatures usually receive a broader set of supporting documents designed to strengthen budget analysis (Figure 2.8). The most common elements include the macroeconomic assumptions underlying the budget, medium-term fiscal policy objectives, and information linking appropriations to administrative units such as ministries or agencies. However, the provision of non-financial performance targets for programmes or agencies remains limited, with fewer than two thirds of legislatures receiving this as part of the budget documentation.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 7.
Broad ability to summon testimony before legislative committees
With respect to scrutiny tools and powers, the 2025 Survey shows that almost all OECD legislatures possess the authority to summon testimony, a key element of effective oversight (Figure 2.9). The broad availability of inquiry and hearing powers supports robust legislative engagement during the budget review phase.
Note: Finland is the only legislature that indicates it does not have the power to compel formal testimony. Although Finnish committees regularly hear from ministers, political appointees, executive officials and external stakeholders, these individuals do not testify in a formal sense.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 6.
Amendment powers vary widely
Amendment powers vary widely across countries. Survey findings show that only about one third of OECD legislatures are required to respect budgetary constraints set by the executive when proposing amendments (Figure 2.10). Of those that have unrestricted amendment powers, there is still great variation. At one end of the spectrum, the United States’ Congress reviews the President’s proposal but ultimately adopts its own budget plan and enacts legislation to implement it. At the other end, the Colombian Congress may request changes to the government’s proposal only with explicit approval from the Ministry of Finance, and the government may issue the budget even without congressional approval.
Note: In Australia, Private Members cannot initiate or expand appropriations, and the Senate cannot amend appropriation or taxation bills except by requesting changes. However, all major budget items go through separate bills which are debated and often amended by parliament. In Colombia, any changes to the budget are possible, provided they are endorsed by the government. In France, the legislature can increase revenues, though any other changes must not change the main aggregates of the budget. In Korea, the National Assembly can increase and decrease the budget the executive proposed, but the increase of budget requires agreement from the executive.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 8.
Further, while more than half of OECD countries report broad amendment powers, these are often unused in practice due to political constraints, such as the risk of triggering a vote of no confidence, the case in more than half of OECD countries (Figure 2.11). Even in countries where the budget vote is not inherently a vote of confidence, it still can be a major test of government support, such as in France and Türkiye. This shifts emphasis from amendment to influence. When legislatures are engaged early in the budget process, for example through structured consultation, participation in medium‑term fiscal planning or ongoing dialogue with the executive, their views can be incorporated before the budget is formally tabled. Such early involvement can reduce the need for amendments while supporting better alignment between legislative priorities and the government’s fiscal strategy.
On the other hand, in legislatures where amendment powers are regularly practiced, amendment powers can also introduce fiscal risks when exercised without sufficient analytical support or procedural safeguards. Where there are no robust requirements for costing amendments or verifying their consistency with approved fiscal aggregates, these amendments can generate additional financial obligations that are not adequately assessed. In these cases, having strong scrutiny mechanisms at the committee stage, including access to independent analysis and requirements to demonstrate fiscal neutrality or funding sources, is critical to maintaining fiscal discipline.
Taken together, these contrasting dynamics illustrate that there is no single institutional model for effective legislative influence. Rather, they highlight the interconnectedness of the different pillars of parliamentary budget oversight. Where one channel of influence is constrained, others can be used to compensate.
Note: In the United States, there is no single vote on the budget.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 9.
The Westminster model offers a useful reference point. Although many Westminster-style parliaments do not routinely amend the budget, the model has evolved considerably in recent decades. There is now greater transparency around the fiscal framework, more extensive presentation of pre-budget information, and expanded opportunities for parliamentary debate (Wehner, 2004[3]). These developments demonstrate that even in systems with limited amendment powers, legislatures can play a substantive role in budget oversight provided they are equipped with the right institutional structures and processes.
Country illustrations
Several country examples demonstrate how legislatures can meaningfully engage in the budget approval process:
Austria: The 2013 reform of the Federal Budgeting Act sought to increase parliamentary involvement in political decision making by systematically integrating outcome orientation (performance budgeting) into the federal budget cycle. Each budget chapter includes objectives, indicators and planned measures, all of which may be amended during parliamentary deliberations. Budget committee sessions routinely invite members of parliament from relevant sectoral committees, allowing them to scrutinise the performance information underpinning proposed allocations in their respective policy areas.
Canada: Prior to introducing budget legislation, the government publishes the federal budget document to support parliamentary review. At nearly 500 pages, the comprehensive document lays out the government’s economic assumptions and fiscal plan, along with the expected fiscal impact of new policy measures, summaries of how measures affect different income groups or populations, what legislative measures will need to be introduced, and detailed information on tax measures proposed in the Budget. While carrying no legal weight, this document heavily informs parliamentary debate.
France: Under the 2006 Organic Law on Budget Act, France has built a stable and dependable base of performance data. The budget is structured around missions, programmes and actions, providing a clear framework for tracking public policy implementation. Performance information is incorporated through Annual Performance Plans, which set out objectives and indicators for the year ahead, and through Annual Performance Reports, which assess results against these benchmarks.
Netherlands: The House of Representatives strengthens budget scrutiny with budget and accountability rapporteurs, who play a central role in bringing evaluation findings and performance information into the budget cycle. Drawn from both coalition and opposition parties, these rapporteurs review ministerial documents, spending reviews and Court of Audit reports attached to budget submissions. They prepare targeted questions and report back to their committees, shaping scrutiny of both draft budgets and annual reports. This formalised function strengthens the link between evaluation outcomes and parliamentary decision making, ensuring that committees weigh performance information when considering proposed allocations.
Slovenia: Parliament has limited but meaningful amendment powers that allow influence over budget priorities while maintaining overall fiscal discipline. Amendments may be proposed only if they do not change the deficit or surplus set by the government and do not increase pressure on protected budget items. Within this constraint, parliament can shift resources and adjust programmes during budget approval. Recent practice shows modest amendment activity, but the framework preserves a clear role for legislators in shaping spending choices while adhering to the approved fiscal envelope.
Implications for strengthening budget approval processes
OECD legislatures possess several important strengths in budget approval. Most receive comprehensive annual financial plans that provide a solid basis for oversight, and all have the authority to conduct hearings with experts, which supports informed scrutiny during the budget review process. In many countries, legislatures also benefit from extensive supporting budget documentation that includes macroeconomic assumptions and policy medium-term objectives. These tools allow for more rigorous examination of proposed expenditures and stronger engagement with the executive during budget deliberations.
However, three recurring weaknesses limit the effectiveness of budget approval. Timely submission and approval of the budget remain inconsistent in several OECD countries. In some systems, delays reflect constitutional or procedural tradition, while in others they point to recurrent challenges in meeting statutory deadlines. Gaps in the provision of performance information also weaken the ability of legislatures to assess how proposed spending aligns with policy objectives. While financial data are widely supplied, non-financial performance targets are less consistently available. This limits the capacity of legislators to judge the effectiveness of programmes, evaluate trade-offs or ensure that spending decisions reflect available information on what works. Although amendment powers are broadly available on paper, political incentives often discourage their use, particularly where the budget vote is linked to confidence in the government. This dynamic can narrow the practical scope for legislative influence, shifting approval toward a procedural formality rather than a substantive review. Taken together, these factors risk narrowing allocative debate to the margins rather than the core of the budget.
Overall, strengthening the budget approval role will require legislatures to reinforce both the timing and the substance of their engagement. Ensuring earlier and more predictable submission of the executive’s budget proposal would allow for fuller debate and reduce reliance on temporary measures that weaken fiscal planning. Improving the availability and use of performance information would support more data-driven decision making. Finally, providing more structured and meaningful amendment powers would give legislatures greater capacity to influence priorities without undermining fiscal discipline.
Why budget implementation & audit matters
Effective budget governance does not end at the moment of annual approval. Legislatures safeguard value for money and accountability by overseeing in‑year execution and by scrutinising external audit findings. Ongoing engagement helps detect emerging pressures, ensures spending remains aligned with policy objectives and closes the loop between what was planned, what was delivered and what should change next time.
What the OECD Best Practices require
Under the OECD Best Practices, legislative responsibility for budget implementation and audit includes three core expectations:
Review and prior approval of supplementary budgets, whether reallocation of funds, or an increase or a reduction in spending
Power to examine any interim financial reports, best exemplified through a formal process to review the monthly and mid-year reports.
Review of audit reports prepared by the SAI, which should fall under the responsibility of the Budget committee, its audit subcommittee, or a separate Audit or Public Accounts committee.
How OECD legislatures perform
Legislature approval of in-year budget changes is a common practice
Supplementary budgets are typically used when governments wish to make changes that exceed the flexibility permitted under the legal framework governing budget execution. While some in-year adjustments can be authorised by the executive within predefined limits, more significant reallocations or increases in expenditure generally require a supplementary budget and legislative approval.
Nearly 80 percent of OECD countries require legislative approval for supplementary budgets, reflecting a shared expectation that material changes to approved budgets should be subject to legislative scrutiny (Figure 2.12). Two thirds also indicate that the limits on executive flexibility and the circumstances in which supplementary budgets may be introduced are clearly defined in legislation (Figure 2.13).
Note: The category ‘In some or most cases’ combines responses ‘Yes, mostly’ and ‘Yes, sometimes’. Austria does not use supplementary budgets; instead, limited in-year adjustments are allowed, with major deviations reported to parliament and formal amendments reserved for exceptional cases. In Australia, the government must issue a mid-year economic and fiscal outlook, which may include new policy measures for legislative consideration. Colombia does not use supplementary budgets.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 19.
Note: Australia requires a mid-year fiscal update under the Charter of Budget Honesty Act. In the United States, lawmakers often cap funding for specific purposes, and when those amounts are insufficient, agencies may request supplemental appropriations. Austria does not use supplementary budgets; instead, limited in-year adjustments are allowed, with major deviations reported to parliament and formal amendments reserved for exceptional cases. Colombia does not use supplementary budgets.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 20.
Legislative review of interim financial information is less consistent
By contrast, practices concerning the legislative review of interim financial information are far less consistent. Thirty‑one countries report that they do not have a formal process for legislative examination of interim financial reports (Figure 2.14). In these cases, although reports may be produced, they are not subject to structured parliamentary scrutiny.
This largely reflects practical and institutional constraints. In‑year review is resource‑intensive, interim data are often provisional and reports rarely introduce new policy decisions. As a result, the scope for influencing fiscal outcomes at this stage is limited, weakening incentives for parliamentary engagement. Formal review is therefore often seen as offering limited added value, with legislatures prioritising budget approval and major fiscal legislation instead.
However, this gap reduces the legislature’s capacity for continuous oversight during budget execution and weakens the connection between financial monitoring, accountability and policy decisions. Strengthening incentives for interim review would help support more timely scrutiny and more responsive fiscal governance.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 21.
Systematic use of audit recommendations to inform upcoming budgets remains uneven
Most OECD countries report having an Audit or Public Accounts committee that examines the SAI’s work, with five exceptions: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, France and Hungary. However, in practice, the depth and continuity of parliamentary engagement with audit reports vary considerably. Although audit reports provide valuable independent assessments of financial management and performance, they are often retrospective, technical in nature and do not trigger immediate policy or budgetary decisions (INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI), n.d.[5]). As a result, incentives for sustained parliamentary attention can be weaker, particularly where time and analytical capacity are limited or where findings do not attract strong political or media interest.
These factors also help explain why formal mechanisms for integrating audit recommendations into the next budget cycle are far less common. Only seven countries report having such processes in place, specifically Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, Türkiye and the United States. Israel represents an exception to prevailing OECD practice. Unlike other countries, Israel does not have a SAI; instead, the Accountant General within the Ministry of Finance audits ministries and produces the annual financial report.
These findings highlight that while the institutional architecture for audit scrutiny is widely established, the systematic use of audit recommendations to inform upcoming budgets remains uneven and represents an area for further strengthening.
Country illustrations
Greece: The formal process for legislative review of the executive’s interim financial reports begins with the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) analysing the Government’s interim execution reports. The reports, together with the PBO’s assessments, are then examined in committee hearings. This expert analysis supports parliamentarians and strengthens oversight of in-year budget performance.
Lithuania: The Law on the Structure of the Budget and the Statute of the Seimas require the Government to submit quarterly budget execution reports, which are reviewed by the Seimas Budget and Finance Committee. The Committee examines the reports, may invite ministry representatives, request clarification and propose follow-up actions. This formal process ensures regular parliamentary oversight and supports transparency in budget execution.
Netherlands: The Minister of Finance presents the State Financial Annual Report, ministry annual reports and concluding acts on Accountability Day, using a special briefcase. The president of the Netherlands Court of Audit then delivers the Court’s independent assessment in a transparent briefcase, giving Parliament analysis on financial accuracy, compliance and performance. Afterwards, the House of Representatives holds a plenary Accountability Debate and committee discussions, allowing members to question ministers and hold the government to account, allowing for performance information to feed into the next year’s budget.
Slovak Republic: The share of Supreme Audit Office recommendations reflected in committee resolutions has risen notably in recent years, increasing from 17 percent in 2021 to 40 percent in 2024. Parliamentary committees review SAI reports and can request explanations from auditors, consult external experts or question ministries directly on identified weaknesses and required corrective action. Ministries and other recipients must inform committees within 30 days of the measures they have taken, supporting a more structured follow-up process and strengthening legislative oversight.
Implications for strengthening budget implementation and audit
OECD legislatures have several strengths to build on when overseeing budget implementation and audit. Most require legislative approval of supplementary budgets, which supports control of significant in-year adjustments and reinforces the principle that material spending changes should not occur without parliamentary authorisation. Many countries also set clear statutory thresholds that define executive flexibility, giving legislatures a transparent basis for monitoring reallocations and identifying when supplementary approval is required. Institutional arrangements for external audit are also well established in most systems. Nearly all OECD countries have an Audit or Public Accounts Committee that examines the work of the SAI, creating an important channel for independent scrutiny of government performance and financial accuracy.
Despite these foundations, major gaps limit the strength of legislative engagement during execution. Formal processes for reviewing interim financial reports remain rare across the OECD, even though monthly or mid-year reporting is produced in most countries. Without structured examination of these reports, legislatures miss opportunities to detect emerging spending pressures, identify deviations from approved appropriations or question the effectiveness of in-year financial management. There are also weaknesses in the follow-up of audit findings. Although audit reports are widely reviewed, only a small number of legislatures have mechanisms to ensure that committee recommendations feed into subsequent budget cycles. As a result, the potential for audit findings to inform corrective action or shape future budget allocations remains underused.
Strengthening budget implementation and audit will therefore require legislatures to deepen their continuous involvement throughout the fiscal year. Establishing formal procedures for reviewing interim financial information would support more proactive detection of risks and a stronger connection between monitoring and decision making. Clarifying and enforcing follow-up processes for audit recommendations would help ensure that findings lead to concrete improvements and shape future budget decisions. Reinforcing these elements would close the loop between planning, execution and audit, enhance transparency and strengthen the legislature’s role as a guardian of fiscal accountability.
Why committee organisation matters
Strong committee organisation is essential for focusing legislative debate. A clear committee architecture, with a budget or finance committee at its centre, allows parliaments to co-ordinate analysis across portfolios, maintain fiscal discipline and ensure that aggregate totals approved by the legislature are respected. When sectoral committees are not fully integrated, legislatures risk overlooking important programme level insights and may be less able to assess whether spending choices align with policy priorities. When sectoral committees are well integrated into the budget process, their specialised knowledge can be channelled into plenary decision making. Further, having a structured role for the Budget or Finance committee in conducting public engagement increases transparency and strengthens the accountability of both the legislature and the executive. This supports a more informed examination of policy choices, strengthens accountability for results and reinforces the legislature’s role in shaping how public resources are allocated.
What the OECD Best Practices require
Under the OECD Best Practices, committee organisation for budget scrutiny includes three core expectations:
A central Budget or Finance committee to lead and co-ordinate budget work and consolidate sectoral inputs. The committee should be adequately staffed and able to consult or employ external experts and other oversight entities.
Empowered sectoral committees that review portfolio budgets, assess performance information and provide recommendations that align with the fiscal framework set by the Budget committee.
Transparent and participatory processes that inform the public about budget debates and offer meaningful opportunities for engagement through hearings, digital tools and open or broadcast meetings.
How OECD legislatures perform
Across the OECD, committee structures for budget scrutiny are well established. Of the 38 OECD legislatures, 20 are bicameral, and in most of these systems the lower chamber holds primary budget authority. Only six countries report equal budgetary powers between chambers: Australia, Chile, Colombia, Italy, Switzerland and the United States. Mexico represents a unique arrangement where the upper chamber approves the revenue law, but the expenditure side remains the exclusive responsibility of the lower chamber. Even in countries where both chambers review the budget, committee structures often differ across chambers.
Having a Budget or Finance committee is commonplace
Among unicameral legislatures and the lower chambers of bicameral parliaments, the presence of a dedicated Budget or Finance committee that reviews the entire budget is a norm. Only 3 legislatures, who follow the Westminster tradition, do not maintain such a committee: Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. In Australia and Canada, there are Finance committees, but they do not review the entire budget. Sectoral committees formally consider spending in their specific areas. In the United Kingdom, there is no Budget or Finance committee and the role for sectoral committees is even less formal - they may choose to consider aspects of the budget.
The ability to draw on expert input is another important dimension of a strong budget committee. Of the legislatures with a Budget or Finance committee, all report having the ability to consult outside experts. Further, in twelve legislatures, Budget or Finance committees can employ outside experts directly, providing additional specialised support for budget scrutiny.
Sectoral committees often provide input though their influence can vary greatly
The rationale for strengthening the role of sectoral committees in the budget process lies in the structural evolution of public budgeting. Vast growth of government throughout the 20th century led to the consolidation of budget line items into broader categories, such as grouping personnel expenditures, making budgets more manageable but simultaneously reducing legislative control over individual allocation (Schick, 2002[2]). Strengthening sectoral committees within parliament counterbalances this trend. By enabling these committees to analyse specific sections of the budget, legislatures can reclaim oversight over detailed spending decisions and ensure that fiscal scrutiny is both informed and responsive to policy priorities.
Role of sectoral committees varies greatly across OECD legislatures (Figure 2.15). The most common model, used by 17 legislatures, involves a single budget committee co-ordinating a process in which sectoral committees submit recommendations that the budget committee reviews and accepts or rejects. The second most common model, found in seven legislatures, assigns formal responsibility to the budget committee but allows sectoral committee members to participate in its meetings when discussing spending within their areas. In five countries, budget committees focus on aggregate budget parameters, while sectoral committees take primary responsibility for reviewing spending in their respective fields. New Zealand and Norway follow a hybrid model in which the budget committee co-ordinates but does not determine budget ceilings, which remain the prerogative of full legislature.
Note: In the United Kingdom, there is no formal committee involvement, but committees may choose to consider aspects of the budget. In Australia and Canada, there are Finance committees, but they do not review the entire budget. In Iceland and Costa Rica, the Budget or Finance Committee assumes full responsibility for examining the entire budget without any involvement from sectoral committees. In Colombia, two economic committees review the budget before it proceeds to the plenary, again without participation from sectoral committees.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 14.
Upper chambers that participate in budget approval generally mirror this variation. Of the 15 upper chambers that have a role in approving the budget, 10 operate a budget committee with defined responsibilities in the budget process. Of those, nine assign defined responsibilities to both budget and sectoral committees. This indicates that while upper chambers often have less authority than lower chambers, they nevertheless maintain structured committee involvement.
Opposition members as committee chairs
Committee design can also signal institutional intent. Assigning the chairmanship of key oversight committees, such as Public Accounts committees, to opposition members signals a commitment to operate the committee in a nonpartisan and consensual manner. This is a common practice for 11 Public Accounts committees, though the practice is less widespread for Budget committees. Only five legislatures report that their Budget or Finance committee is chaired by an opposition member: Colombia, Costa Rica, Germany, Hungary and Spain. Several countries, including Korea, Finland, Japan, Portugal, Switzerland and the Netherlands, allocate committee chairs through negotiation, tradition or proportional allocation formulas rather than explicit opposition entitlement.
Citizen engagement can be strengthened
Survey results show that many legislatures have taken steps to make the budget process more accessible, though practices vary considerably. Most OECD legislatures report that legislative committee meetings are open to the public (Figure 2.16). In countries such as Canada and Chile, hearings are televised and available online, while in Austria, public access to meetings is permitted only in person. Only five countries, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Sweden and Switzerland, report that either the budget or finance committee or all legislative committees rarely or never meet in public.
Note: In Iceland, budget committee meetings are only in very rare cases open to the public. In Luxembourg, the meetings of some legislative committees are open to the public, however, the meetings of the Finance committee are not. In Norway, committee hearings shall be held in public, but the committee may decide by simple majority that the hearing shall be private. No data available for Mexico.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 30.
In 23 OECD countries, it was indicated that budget and finance committees actively engage citizens in some form around budgets (Figure 2.17). The most common stage is around budget approval once the budget is laid at the legislature. There are still very few meaningful opportunities for citizens to engage on longer term priority setting, such as around the fiscal framework or medium-term budgeting.
Note: No data available for Denmark, Estonia, Hungary and the United Kingdom.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 31.
Budget and finance committees employ a range of methods to engage the public during the budget process, but the most common approaches remain relatively targeted and stakeholder driven (Figure 2.18). The most frequently used method is meetings, workshops or seminars with key stakeholders, reported by nine legislatures, suggesting that committees tend to prioritise structured dialogue with organised actors who have technical or sectoral expertise. Broader channels are used less often. Seven legislatures issue a public call for proposals or submissions, which opens participation beyond organised interests, while three legislatures use online consultations or questionnaires, and another five hold meetings or workshops open to all. More intensive or deliberative formats are rare. Only two legislatures use focus groups, and another two legislatures report using a citizens panel or assembly.
Note: The analysis covers data from OECD countries that implement citizen engagement. No data available for Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 32.
Public consultations are conducted primarily in person in eight legislatures, while another eight rely on a combination of in person and digital formats, suggesting that hybrid engagement practices are becoming more common (Figure 2.19).
Note: The analysis covers data from OECD countries that implement citizen engagement. No data available for Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 33.
The way in which legislatures document and use citizen input is an important indicator of meaningful engagement. The United States represents the most developed practice. Contributors receive individual responses explaining how their input has influenced deliberations or decisions. Six legislatures report that their Budget or Finance committee incorporates public input into decision making and that this is documented in the public record. These include Chile, Colombia, Italy, Lithuania, New Zealand and Spain. Other legislatures demonstrate transparency by publishing all submissions received, providing summaries of input, releasing meeting minutes, or using a combination of these approaches.
Taken together, these findings show that although many legislatures have introduced opportunities for public consultation, meaningful engagement remains uneven. Consultation methods continue to rely primarily on targeted, low-cost approaches, and only a small number of legislatures incorporate public input directly into budget deliberations or document its influence in a transparent way. Most systems still lack practices that consistently link citizen perspectives to committee recommendations or legislative decisions. This suggests significant scope for legislatures to broaden participation, strengthen feedback mechanisms and ensure that public engagement contributes more fully to budget scrutiny.
Country illustrations
Several country examples demonstrate how committee organisation can aid legislatures in meaningfully engaging with the budget process:
Italy: Both chambers exercise equal budget powers, with their budget committees co-ordinating inputs from sectoral committees within fiscal limits set by the Public Finance Documents. Sectoral committees have around ten days to review the parts of the draft budget in their remit, issue opinions and propose amendments, and their rapporteurs may attend budget committee sittings. The budget committees accept or reject these proposals and may introduce their own, before sending a consolidated text to the plenary where further amendments can still be considered.
Korea: Sectoral committees conduct preliminary reviews focused on policy needs and can recommend budget increases or reductions with considerable freedom. Their recommendations are mostly advisory, but proposed cuts carry binding weight that the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts (SCBA) must respect. To restore a cut or add a new item, the SCBA must obtain the sectoral committee’s consent, creating a system that protects downward adjustments while allowing the SCBA to restrain upward spending pressures, while ensuring that sector expertise still shapes the final budget.
Lithuania: The Seimas first approves the main fiscal aggregates and then assigns detailed scrutiny to standing committees, which review ministry budgets and submit written, justified proposals to the Committee on Budget and Finance. The Budget and Finance Committee evaluates these proposals using input from the National Audit Office and the Bank of Lithuania, ensuring compliance with fiscal rules and expenditure ceilings. It then consolidates committee recommendations into a single report for plenary debate.
Sweden: The committee structure is based on the principle that each committee handles all matters related to its policy field, including legislation, budget issues, and performance follow-up. This principle ensures that all fifteen sectoral committees participate in assessing the Government’s results reporting in the Budget Bill. Within this framework, sectoral committees review the Government’s assessment of results for the expenditure area that falls under their responsibility, examine alignment of results to targets, and assess whether the resources allocated through previous appropriations were used effectively. In carrying out this work, committees often comment on the structure and clarity of the performance information provided by the Government and frequently request greater transparency in the reporting of results.
Ireland: Ireland’s Citizens’ Assemblies enable the legislature to integrate informed public input into policy and budget-related decision making. Each Assembly brings together 100 randomly selected citizens to consider important legal and policy issues and make recommendations to the legislature. Once the Assembly completes its deliberations, it votes on draft recommendations and submits a report to which the Government must formally respond and arrange a parliamentary debate. Since its introduction, six Assemblies have addressed a range of topics using this model. In 2017, the Assembly examined how to respond to the challenges of an ageing population, demonstrating how citizen deliberation can help structure debate on complex issues with significant fiscal implications.
Implications for strengthening committee organisation
OECD legislatures have a solid foundation on which to strengthen committee-based budget scrutiny. Most operate a dedicated budget or finance committee with the authority to co-ordinate analysis, consolidate sectoral inputs and guide plenary debate. The widespread ability to consult with or employ external experts provides an important source of specialised support. Sectoral committees also play a significant role in many legislatures, offering detailed examination of portfolio budgets and performance information. In addition, many legislatures have taken steps to improve transparency by opening committee meetings to the public and incorporating citizen engagement into parts of the budget cycle.
Despite these strengths, several gaps limit the potential of committee structures to support full and effective budget scrutiny. The role of sectoral committees varies widely across OECD countries, and in some systems their involvement remains limited or purely optional. This reduces the ability of legislatures to bring subject specific expertise into budget decisions and to scrutinise performance information systematically. Practices around committee openness and citizen engagement also differ significantly. While in most legislatures, committee meetings are often accessible to the public, meaningful consultation opportunities are few. Lastly, although many legislatures have established budget or finance committees, opposition chairing of these committees is relatively rare, which may weaken perceptions of independence and non-partisan scrutiny.
Strengthening committee organisation will therefore require clearer and more consistent structures for managing budget work. Legislatures should continue to reinforce the central co-ordinating role of budget or finance committees while formalising the contribution of sectoral committees in sector specific scrutiny. Expanding the use of public consultation tools would support greater transparency and broaden the information available to parliament. Finally, use of opposition chairing for key oversight committees could help build trust in the impartiality and rigour of legislative review. Together, these features create a more coherent and effective committee system, better positioned to support high-quality top-down budget oversight.
Why analytical resources matter
Robust analytical capacity enables legislatures to scrutinise fiscal policy on an equal footing with the executive. Access to specialised expertise allows parliaments to evaluate compliance with fiscal rules, assess macroeconomic and long-term risks and test the credibility of government assumptions. Analytical capacity also supports committees in interpreting complex budget documentation, understanding programme performance and identifying emerging fiscal pressures. When legislatures lack independent expertise, they must rely heavily on government analysis, which limits the depth and independence of budget oversight.
Control over the legislature’s own budget is also central to effective analytical capacity. Adequate and autonomous resourcing ensures that legislatures can recruit and retain skilled experts, maintain nonpartisan research services and access high-quality data. Without such autonomy, analytical capacity becomes vulnerable to executive influence, undermining the legislature’s ability to provide robust scrutiny.
What the OECD Best Practices require
Under the OECD Best Practices, analytical resources for budget scrutiny includes three core expectations:
Specialist in‑house support: legislatures should have a non‑partisan research or scrutiny unit supported with sufficient resources and granted timely access to relevant data, methods and assumptions.
Independent fiscal institutions: having an established IFI (independent parliamentary budget office or fiscal council) to provide objective analysis of fiscal strategy, forecasts, fiscal rules, policy costings and long-term sustainability, with clear accountability to the legislature and consistent with the 2014 OECD Recommendations on Independent Fiscal Institutions.
Control of the legislature’s own budget: legislatures should prepare and approve their budgets independently of the executive, act transparently, and meet clear internal reporting and audit requirements.
How OECD legislatures perform
Budget research capacity
Survey data demonstrates that legislatures have made notable progress in developing their analytical capacity, though significant variation persists. Nine legislatures report having an in‑house specialised budget unit, with an average staff size of around 20 personnel (Table 2.1). Budget or Finance committees also typically have access to approximately eight specialised staff members, although this ranges widely. On the higher end, Japan reports twenty committee staff, while the United States notes seventy‑seven staff dedicated to budget and fiscal analysis. In addition, elected members benefit from broader legislative research services in twenty‑four countries, which provide an average of six staff with budget expertise.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 27.
The presence of IFIs has also grown across OECD countries. 12 countries have established a PBO, and 21 have fiscal councils, with fiscal councils more prevalent in Europe and PBOs more common elsewhere (Figure 2.20). Only five OECD Members have no IFI: Israel, Japan, Türkiye, New Zealand and Norway. This largely confirms the increasing reliance on external, non‑partisan expertise to support legislative scrutiny of fiscal policy.
Note: Despite not being fully independent, Mexico’s Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas (CEFP) operates like a parliamentary budget office.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 27 & 2021 OECD IFI database.
The effectiveness of IFIs depends not only on their technical capacity but also on the quality of their communication. The 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index finds substantial variation across IFIs in both communication capacity and communications impact, indicating that institutions differ considerably in their ability to communicate fiscal analysis to policymakers and the public. Clear, accessible communication of analysis is essential for empowering public understanding around public finances. This supports debate around the choices that need to be made to restore public finances and greater understanding of the consequences of inaction (OECD, 2026[6]).
Budget of the legislature
Survey results show wide variation in how legislatures exercise budgetary autonomy, though the majority can prepare their budgets without modification by the executive (Figure 2.21). About a quarter of OECD legislatures follow the same procedures applied to other government entities. Several countries operate hybrid systems. In Estonia, for example, legislatures draft their own budgets but rely on government macroeconomic assumptions. Japan generally follows the same executive budgeting procedures for other government organisations but can formulate its own budget when disagreements arise. A small number of countries diverge significantly from best practice. In Ireland, legislative funding is set on a three‑year cycle as non‑voted expenditure determined through a ministerial bill, while in New Zealand parliamentary agencies follow standard executive budget procedures, but no unified parliamentary budget exists.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 39.
Most OECD legislatures publish year-end financial reports, either as standalone documents or within the government’s consolidated financial statements (Figure 2.22). Audit practices generally follow this commitment to transparency. Over two thirds of legislatures are audited as part of the government’s general year end audit or undergo a separate audit (Figure 2.23). A further five indicated that audits occur but results are not published. Only in United States and Spain is the legislature not audited.
Note: The Netherlands includes the legislature’s year-end financial report in Budget Chapter IIA of the central budget, whereas New Zealand has no separate legislative report; its parliamentary agencies produce a joint report that undergoes the same scrutiny as government bodies.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 40.
Note: Germany reported that information on legislative audit arrangements was not known. In New Zealand, parliamentary agencies are separately audited and their results published in a joint year‑end financial report. In Poland, the legislature’s budget is audited and the results are public, though the Supreme Audit Office may exclude low‑risk entities. In the Slovak Republic, the Chancellery’s internal audit department prepares risk‑based audit plans and annual reports, which are approved by the head of the office and submitted to both the Ministry of Finance and the Supreme Audit Office.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 41.
Other areas for consideration
Although not explicitly detailed in the OECD Best Practices, two emerging areas linked to analytical resources are increasingly shaping the capacity of legislatures to undertake effective budget scrutiny: support for understanding public finances and the use of artificial intelligence (AI). Both influence how well legislators can interpret complex fiscal information and how efficiently analytical teams can support scrutiny.
Support to understand public finances
Analytical resources deliver their full value only when legislators can understand and use the information provided. Legislators carry the responsibility for decisions that shape the economic trajectory of nations across generations, yet key aspects of public finance and fiscal sustainability are difficult to grasp (OECD, forthcoming). In-house budget units are well-positioned to build understanding of the public finances among OECD Members, and survey findings show encouraging progress. Of the thirty-three legislatures that have in-house budget specialists, thirty actively promote greater understanding of public finances among legislators. The most common methods are through publishing briefing papers, targeted briefings or training sessions, and having a confidential inquiries service (Figure 2.24).
Note: Australia, Austria, Costa Rica, Denmark, and Latvia do not have in house budget specialists in the research service, on the Budget/Finance Committee secretariat or in the form of a specialised in house budget unit. However, both Australia and Austria have independent parliamentary budget offices.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 28.
OECD also sees a growing need for legislatures to increase understanding of public finances among the public. However, efforts to strengthen understanding outside parliament are far less widespread. Fewer than one third of legislatures have targeted initiatives aimed at improving public understanding of the budget process, suggesting a missed opportunity to strengthen informed engagement with the budget process (Table 2.2). Existing efforts range from outreach events and school programmes to citizen guides that explain key fiscal concepts. Expanding these initiatives would support more informed public engagement and help strengthen the transparency and legitimacy of budget debates.
Source: 2025 OECD Survey on Parliamentary Budget Oversight; Question 37.
Innovation and artificial intelligence
Innovation in AI is beginning to create new opportunities for enhancing legislative analytical capacity. When applied effectively, AI can improve productivity, responsiveness of public services, and strengthen government accountability (OECD, 2024[7]). Although adoption remains at an early stage, several legislatures are piloting applications that illustrate the potential benefits.
Examples include France, where AI is used to streamline internal procedures within the Finance Committee, and Italy, where both chambers are experimenting with AI tools to synthesise and manage legislative texts. In the United States, multiple initiatives apply natural language processing to legislative tasks such as redlining, document comparison and the development of AI assisted dashboards. Switzerland is investing in internal training with the expectation of applying AI tools to budget analysis in the future.
Country illustrations
The following country examples highlight how analytical resources can strengthen legislative scrutiny:
Czechia: The Parliamentary Institute plays a central role in both analytical support and greater understanding of public finances. It prepares detailed analyses of the draft budget and the state accounts, produces briefings and explanatory notes, and publishes all materials online to promote transparency. Beyond supporting legislators, the Institute conducts seminars for students and teachers, helping to build understanding of fiscal policy and parliamentary budget oversight. This dual focus on analysis and education strengthens both the quality of legislative scrutiny and the broader public’s capacity to engage with fiscal issues.
Italy: The Italian Parliament is supported by a multilayered analytical support system that strengthens fiscal scrutiny. The Italian PBO (Ufficio Parlamentare di Bilancio) provides independent assessments of forecasts, fiscal rules and the fiscal impact of proposed measures, while chamber budget services conduct ex ante analysis of the draft budget. Additional analytical units deepen the evaluation of public finances and policy effects. Together, these complementary resources give legislators a robust base to inform budget decisions.
Implications for strengthening analytical resources
OECD legislatures have made meaningful progress in building analytical support for budget scrutiny. The growing presence of fiscal councils and PBOs has strengthened independent oversight, often complementing the work of in-house specialised units and research services. Many legislatures also demonstrate good practice by publishing their financial reports and subjecting their budgets to audit, which supports transparency and accountability.
However, significant gaps remain. Analytical resources are unevenly distributed across legislatures, leaving some heavily dependent on government analysis. Staffing levels vary widely, and in many countries specialist support remains modest relative to the scale and complexity of fiscal oversight. The absence of IFIs in several legislatures limits their ability to undertake objective analysis of fiscal strategy or long-term sustainability. While budget autonomy is generally high, a sizeable minority of legislatures do not publish audit results or are not audited separately, affecting accountability for their own financial management. Finally, efforts to promote greater understanding of the public finances among both members and the public remain limited, weakening the practical impact of existing analytical tools.
Addressing these gaps will require legislatures to ensure that analytical support grows in step with the demands of modern fiscal oversight. This includes better leveraging specialist capacity and IFIs. Emerging innovations in artificial intelligence also present opportunities to strengthen analytical capacity. Strengthening internal audit arrangements and ensuring that legislative finances are subject to transparent, published audits would further reinforce credibility and accountability. There is also a strong need for legislatures to develop more substantive supports for strengthening understanding of public finances, both for members and for the public, in line with growing complexities of modern fiscal landscapes. Together, these steps would equip parliaments with the expertise and tools needed to provide more rigorous, independent and forward-looking scrutiny of fiscal policy.
References
[5] INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI) (n.d.), Global SAI Report 2023 – Chapter: SAI Audit Impact, https://gsr.idi.no/sai-audit-impact.
[6] OECD (2026), The People and the Budget: Empowering Public Understanding of Public Finances, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/81674d37-en.
[1] OECD (2025), Quality Budget Institutions: Developments in OECD Countries, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8e811202-en.
[7] OECD (2024), “Governing with Artificial Intelligence: Are governments ready?”, OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers, No. 20, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/26324bc2-en.
[4] OECD (2017), OECD Budget Transparency Toolkit: Practical Steps for Supporting Openness, Integrity and Accountability in Public Financial Management, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264282070-en.
[2] Schick, A. (2002), “Can National Legislatures Regain an Effective Voice in Budget Policy?”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, https://doi.org/10.1787/budget-v1-art15-en.
[3] Wehner, J. (2004), Back from the Sidelines? Redefining the Contribution of Legislatures to the Budget Cycle, World Bank Institute, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/483121468763494781.