This chapter looks at how independent institutions can help strengthen the political will for actions to restore fiscal sustainability. This includes independent fiscal institutions and supreme audit institutions playing a greater role as “fiscal advocates”: that is, being more vocal around the need for government action on major policy challenges, such as putting public finances on a more sustainable path.
The People and the Budget
Empowering Public Understanding of Public Finances
Abstract
The emergence of fiscal advocates: Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) have expanded rapidly across OECD countries, strengthening oversight, transparency and public understanding of long‑term fiscal pressures. As public debt has risen and fiscal risks have grown, many IFIs have moved beyond rule monitoring to become more active voices in explaining policy trade-offs and supporting long‑term fiscal sustainability.
A necessary evolution: The evolution of IFIs from technical fiscal watchdogs to fiscal advocates is helping to build political will for decisions and reforms that support long-term fiscal sustainability. IFIs are well-placed to play the role of champions of fiscal sustainability that highlight major policy trade-offs. Supreme audit institutions also play a key role. Together, these bodies form a distinct and complementary system for financial oversight that promotes transparency, sustainability, and public confidence.
Three pillars of advocacy: To be effective fiscal advocates, institutions need to develop three attributes: a strong vision focused on major long-term challenges; an independent voice that engages the public in plain language; and the ability to enable action through impactful scenario analysis.
The OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index: Measuring advocacy is complex, reflecting both internal factors (resources, independence) and external factors (media environment). The OECD’s “Fiscal Advocacy Index” reveals that, while some institutions have achieved high impact through robust communications and analysis, many others have significant scope to strengthen their influence on the national debate.
OECD countries are increasingly turning to independent institutions to help raise awareness of long‑term fiscal challenges. By 2021, 29 OECD countries had established independent fiscal institutions (IFIs). Their establishment marks one of the most significant reforms in modern budgeting practices. Their growth has strengthened fiscal oversight, improved transparency and created trusted national voices on public finances (Figure 5.1).
Number of OECD countries with IFIs, by year established
Sources: IFI mandates and OECD 2021 IFI database.
Thus far, the role of IFIs has focussed on fiscal oversight and monitoring compliance with fiscal rules. Many countries experienced severe recessions in the late 2000s. This was accompanied by widening deficits, lost creditworthiness, and a need to undertake painful austerity measures at an untimely point in the business cycle. Among the many lessons taken from the crisis was the benefit of having greater independent oversight – specifically, bodies that could better monitor and communicate risks in public finances.
However, the fiscal context in which IFIs operate has undergone a seismic shift and the sustainability of public finances in a number of OECD countries is being called into question. In response, many IFIs have already moved beyond narrow rule‑monitoring roles. Several now produce long‑term sustainability analysis, identify fiscal risks and communicate trade‑offs of policy decisions. Their work has helped foster informed public debate on the major fiscal pressures countries face, including ageing, healthcare costs and rising defence spending as well as the cost of extreme weather events.
This shift reflects the growing need for longer-term thinking at a time when public debt has reached historic highs and when short‑term political incentives can undermine fiscal sustainability.
IFIs in several countries also recognise the need to take a more prominent role in public debate. They are engaging more directly with the public, explaining the fiscal implications of different policy choices, and highlighting the consequences of inaction. This shift is helping to build political will for decisions and reforms that support long-term fiscal sustainability.
In essence, IFIs are pivoting from fiscal watchdogs to becoming stronger fiscal advocates.
5.1.1. What are fiscal advocates?
"Fiscal advocates are independent bodies that focus on long‑term fiscal sustainability. They warn about emerging risks, explain key trade‑offs, and show how short‑term decisions can weaken future stability."
The idea of fiscal advocacy is two-fold. First, it entails promoting more decisive and realistic planning. By constructively setting out scenarios, fiscal advocates can help governments tackle major fiscal challenges. It also means enhancing people’s understanding of the fiscal and economic implications of major policy choices. This can be grounded in terms of the obvious and uncontroversial broad policy choices, such as meeting overarching fiscal targets vs. leaving policies unchanged. It involves actively communicating the challenges in a way that a wide range of stakeholders can easily grasp.
Second, it is rooted in supporting wider fiscal sustainability. That is, institutions in their role as fiscal advocates can help generate political will for action that will help guide public finances towards a more sustainable long-run path.1
IFIs are natural fiscal advocates, but supreme audit institutions also play a key role (see Box 5.1). While IFIs offer forward-looking analysis of public budgets, supreme audit institutions provide essential scrutiny after the fact. Together, these bodies form a distinct and complementary system for financial oversight that promotes transparency, sustainability, and public confidence.
Supreme audit institutions are known for the core function of holding governments accountable. They do this through rigorous financial and performance audits. However, their trusted status gives them a unique responsibility to improve public understanding of public finances. Beyond technical auditing, they are well-placed to help the public understand the nation's fiscal situation, including budget goals, risks, and uncertainties. Crucially, they also shed light on budgetary outturns and value for money, ensuring the public understands not just what was planned, but what was actually achieved.
Complementing advocacy
Many supreme audit institutions are evolving into active communicators. They actively use social media, visualisations, and digital tools to disseminate their analysis. By explaining complex financial matters clearly, supreme audit institutions foster a more informed public discussion. In doing so, they powerfully complement the advocacy work of IFIs, helping to build the broad public and political will required to take decisive action on fiscal challenges.
The current fiscal environment reinforces the need for independent institutions such as fiscal councils, parliamentary budget offices and supreme audit institutions to evolve. Fiscal challenges demand forward‑looking analysis that clarifies choices and guides the debate. Traditional watchdog roles such as monitoring fiscal rules are no longer sufficient to ensure sustainable reforms are successfully implemented.
These institutions can play a central role in generating political will for action. By showing the costs of current policies, spelling out the risks and illustrating the consequences of inaction, they can help policymakers and citizens recognise the need for timely decisions. This requires constructive analysis that highlights key trade-offs and provides a clear sense of direction.
To take this next step, many of these institutions will need to strengthen their voice, deepen their analytical work on long-term challenges and communicate more actively with the public. This evolution may be demanding, but there are few structural barriers preventing them from pursuing it.
The role of IFIs and supreme audit institutions as independent bodies with a focus on public finances makes them natural candidates to bring greater attention to how public finances need to evolve to address today’s challenges in a sustainable way.
5.2.1. The next step in their evolution
Building on evolutions seen to date, institutions such as IFIs and supreme audit institutions can further develop on their traditional role. They can avail of their independence, their implicit mandates for fiscal sustainability and transparency, and strengthen their existing communications. These institutions can step forward into a more prominent role.
Advances have not been consistent across OECD countries, many institutions still need to make further leaps forward. They need to emulate best practices amongst their peers. For example, IFIs can do this by pivoting from more limited “watchdog” roles that focus primarily on policing fiscal rules. Instead, they can evolve into institutions that lead the way on major fiscal challenges.
This shift in focus will provide these institutions with the space they need to promote a wider culture change in budgeting, where they highlight fiscal sustainability challenges and clearly communicate the implications of government action and inaction.
This involves more focused analysis, different modelling, looking ahead to the major fiscal challenges and tracing a way forward with scenario analysis. More than that, it means stepping into the limelight and communicating with the public in tangible ways that many of these institutions have not yet done.
Fiscal advocacy is in their DNA
Looking more specifically at IFIs, while their mandates vary widely, the role of a forward-looking and outspoken fiscal advocate is arguably at their core. This is evident from the early literature contributing to the IFIs own post-financial crisis “Cambrian explosion” in the 2010s. Despite disparate institutional frameworks, IFIs share a common purpose.
IFIs were envisaged as being able to fulfil several key roles. Chief among these were: 1) assessing the long-term sustainability of public finances; 2) costing fiscal measures; and 3) informing the public about the outlook for public finances. As the following extracts from formative papers show, the genesis of IFIs was one that envisaged independent, far-sighted, and forthright institutions (Table 5.1).
Fiscal advocacy is in their remits
It is clear that the role of fiscal advocate is inherent to the IFIs existence. However, one might argue that specific remits do not permit them to play this role.
The remits of IFIs across the OECD either a) specifically call for them to assess these issues, or b) leave it open to them to decide if such work is required. Indeed, only five OECD countries with IFIs have not already embarked on producing some of the work of fiscal advocates: long-term sustainability analysis, dedicated fiscal risks reports and election costings (Table 5.2). In the case of four of these countries, the IFIs in question are open to interpreting their remits in a way that allows them to assess these areas. Of these five, only one country with an IFI appears to be prevented from doing this work outright.
Ability to publish on long-term fiscal sustainability, fiscal risks, election costings
Note: See detailed table in the online appendix “The Fiscal Advocacy Index”.
Sources: IFI mandates and OECD 2021 IFI database.
OECD countries tend to have at least one IFI that fulfils part of the roles of a fiscal advocate. Looking in more detail at the types of activities IFIs perform, it is clear that many countries have IFIs that have evolved beyond monitoring fiscal rules (Figure 5.2).
However, there is significant room for progress. For instance, there are only four countries where IFIs actively produce both election costings and long-term sustainability analysis. Furthermore, only a few countries have IFIs that produce dedicated reports on fiscal risks. This means that, while many IFIs have embarked on workstreams with a focus on major fiscal challenges, substantial work remains.
Note: “Fiscal rules” refers to IFIs that have an official role in monitoring compliance with fiscal rules. “LT Sustainability” covers IFIs that produce long-term sustainability analysis. “Fiscal risks” covers those that produce dedicated fiscal risks reports. “Normative rec’s” refers to IFIs that make normative policy recommendations as part of their work. “Election costings” refers to IFIs that cost election platforms.
Source: OECD 2021 IFI database.
This study of the origins, remits and work of IFIs yields three conclusions:
First, the mandates of IFIs, when assessed at country level, are mostly consistent with those of fiscal advocates. The mandates require countries to have IFIs that produce independent, public pronouncements on matters of great fiscal responsibility. Moreover, given the rationale for their creation, the intent and general clauses call for this role even if it is not explicit in their mandates.
Second, there are numerous examples where aspects of this work are already being fulfilled, either through the IFIs’ interpretations of their mandates or through an explicit requirement to fulfil the role.
Third, this work nonetheless remains patchy and incomplete. There is scope to build on areas of analysis such as election costings, fiscal risks, and long-term sustainability analysis. Moreover, this work can be deepened and made more impactful.
Their independence demands they play a role as fiscal advocates
As independent institutions, it is to be expected that IFIs champion fiscal sustainability and speak out on major fiscal risks and trade-offs. To do so, IFIs need to have full independence. Yet, these relatively new institutions can have limitations (Box 5.2).
To play the role of fiscal advocates, IFIs need to be able to freely focus their work on major fiscal issues, speak openly and assess policy scenarios. In effect, they need to be granted sufficient independence.
There are several ways independence can be limited. Below are a few case studies.
The United Kingdom’s Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)
The OBR ranks among the highest in the OECD’s independent IFIs for having strong conditions to maintain its independence (Nicol and Von Trapp, 2018[5]). However, even in this context, IFIs can experience conditions that challenge their independence. For instance, the OBR is legally obliged to produce its forecasts on the basis of what the government states as its policy, including the use of the Chancellor’s numbers for future public spending in its forecast. This is the case even if they asses those forecasts to be inaccurate, or if they take into account announcements not yet enacted.
Finally, the Chancellor can ask the OBR not to publish its forecasts alongside major budget changes as it requires a decision from the Chancellor as to when it publishes its forecasts (OBR, 2023[6]). Without that decision, its role can be sidelined.
The French Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques
The Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques is constrained from playing the role of fiscal advocate in two respects. First, it is mandated to focus its work on official macro-fiscal forecasts and compliance with fiscal rules within the context of the public finance programming law. This typically involves an overly narrow four-year horizon – far too short a time horizon in which to assess many major fiscal challenges such as the sustainability of a pensions system, future healthcare needs, and other demographic pressures. Second, it is limited in terms of how it can set its own work programme even within its mandate. Beyond that, its ability to play the role of an effective fiscal advocate could potentially be constrained by its lack of a clear identity and ability to communicate separately from the Court of Auditors with which it shares its leadership.
The Slovenian Fiscal Council
The Slovenian Fiscal Council faced another form of constraint on its independence. The constitutional basis for its operation originally capped the number of employees it could have. Specifically, the original Fiscal Rule Act stated that “not more than four public employees may be employed by the Fiscal Council, performing expert support for members of the Fiscal Council. Administrative and technical tasks for the Fiscal Council shall be performed by the services of the Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia”. Thus, while its mandate allowed it a wide focus and the ability to play the role of a fiscal advocate, the depth of its analysis was constrained by its cap on staff. A revised Fiscal Rule Act in April 2025 removed the constraint.
It is worth remembering whose interests IFIs are ultimately serving. It is not the interests of a finance ministry, a government, a parliament, nor any other institution: IFIs are independent and exist to serve key decision makers and citizens by informing them on fiscal matters in a clear manner. It is not an easy role. Indeed, it is one that is likely to be challenged on a regular basis. However, it is a valued role that IFIs have already come to play in modern democracies. The case of the OBR explored in Box 5.2 is reassuring in this context. In seeing its role and independence threatened in 2022, the importance and relevance of the OBR was reaffirmed. Nevertheless, this is an ongoing challenge to be navigated.
Moreover, by not fully fulfilling the role of fiscal advocates, by not speaking out vigorously on the most important fiscal challenges, IFIs risk irrelevance. In this sense, taking the safe route and avoiding falling foul of careful, legalistic readings of their mandate, carries other risks. It can lessen IFIs effectiveness, limit the public’s desire to support them, and gradually undermine their existence.
Analysis of countries where IFIs are successfully shedding light on issues relating to long-term fiscal sustainability suggests that for IFIs to continue to evolve from fiscal watchdogs to fiscal advocates, they will need to:
1. develop their vision,
2. develop their independent voice, and
3. enable action
5.3.1. Developing a vision
IFIs should focus their vision on the major challenges facing the public finances. To stay relevant, they should look ahead to the key policy trade-offs and risks facing governments.
As the previous section showed, IFIs were envisaged as institutions that would fulfil a number of analytical needs. At the core was a need to assess the overall sustainability of public finances. In addition, IFIs were seen as bodies that could cost fiscal measures, inform the public about the outlook for the public finances, and make recommendations around policy plans.
The challenges facing governments are such that only a far-sighted, coherent assessment will suffice. This is why dedicated long-term sustainability reports play such an important role. They serve as the backdrop against which all fiscal policies, challenges and risks can be gauged. Without this, isolated studies of fiscal risks, elections costings, and assessments of fiscal rules lose their sense of perspective.
Developing a coherent vision therefore requires IFIs to do two things. First, they need to identify the broader long-term risks associated with fiscal sustainability. Second, they need to consider major challenges in this context, such as the costs of public pensions, healthcare reforms, specific election promises, and so on.
5.3.2. Developing their independent voice
IFIs exert their influence mainly through persuasion. That is, they do not have formal enforcement tools to enact their influence aside from certain comply-or-explain or endorsement provisions. These provisions can steer governments towards explaining deviations from fiscal rules or present their forecasts in a more realistic manner. However, they cannot compel governments to plan and act on major fiscal challenges in a more forward-looking way.
In 2014, the OECD established a set of “Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions”. These called on IFIs to develop effective communication channels to sharpen their outreach, visibility, and impact (OECD, 2014[7]). The goal was to develop effective independent institutions that could play a key role in guiding budgetary policy in a sensible direction by amplifying their powers of persuasion.
Through its ongoing interactions and in-depth reviews of IFIs, the OECD has seen substantial progress being made on IFIs communications channels. While some IFIs have developed an advanced apparatus for communications, there is wide variation and plenty of room for improvement.
Recent work by the OECD highlights the wide-ranging communications functions in IFIs across OECD countries. Many IFIs are active in disseminating and promoting their research. However, some are more effective than others and there is widespread scope to improve how IFIs track their media impact.
At the same time, there are many IFIs with very low visibility. These institutions still disseminate their work, but they are less strategic in terms of how they achieve wider impact and promote their work.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the communications apparatus dimension of the 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index.
Part of the reason for lower visibility is a question of resourcing. Larger IFIs tend to have stronger communications functions (Figure 5.3). They have dedicated communications staff, and highly developed practices to engage with the media. An example is the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB). The overall institution has around 125 FTEs, with a dedicated communications function comprising around five FTEs. This communications function has developed a communications strategy aligned with the overall mission of the institution. It sets out aspects such as communication goals, target audiences and communication tools.
However, size does not preclude smaller IFIs from developing more rigorous public engagement. Mid-size and smaller IFIs can leverage the skills of their larger counterparts in other OECD countries, and they can take the lead from other institutions, both small and large, that have had success in shaping national discussions. Institutions such as the Scottish Fiscal Commission have a more modest staffing complement (around 25 FTEs) and no dedicated communications staff, but still actively engage with traditional and social media and publish thought-pieces on their own dedicated blog.
Achieving impact is not simply a question of resourcing or having the right communications tools. For an IFI’s work to have greater impact, it needs to be relevant and salient. That is, the IFI’s vision for what matters needs to be appropriately focused and its delivery needs to engage the public with clear tangible illustrations.
To become fiscal advocates, IFIs will need to develop their communications. If these institutions are to help policymakers move the policy needle in a direction that entails meaningful action, IFIs should play a more prominent and vocal role in the national debate.
5.3.3. Enabling action
While the vision and communications skills of an IFI matter, they are not sufficient on their own. To truly engage citizens and promote fiscal action, their work needs to be constructive. It needs to identify clear courses of action.
IFIs can enable action by communicating trade-offs clearly. This can be achieved with scenario analysis that draws on the most obvious policy choices. It may often mean assessing the fiscal consequences of action (meeting targets, following through on wider policy objectives) and inaction (a “no policy change” scenario).
This final element, enabling action, can be tricky for IFIs to navigate. Indeed, one of the OECD’s Principles for IFIs (2.1) is that they should be precluded from any normative policymaking responsibilities to avoid even the perception of partisanship.
It is worth clarifying here that fiscal advocacy does not mean advocating specific policies. Indeed, calling for specific policies based on value judgments and illustrating the implications of the most likely policies are quite distinct. In practice, there are standard policy alternatives to consider. This is a well-understood convention, and IFIs can be explicit in saying that they are refraining from expressing a preference for any given policy option. An example is provided by the Canadian Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) and its work analysing the impact of pension reforms in recent years. Instead of praising or criticising proposed changes, the PBO illustrated the fiscal consequences of these changes compared to the current scenario (Office of the Canadian Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2025[8]).
To mitigate the risks to their reputation and independence, IFIs must therefore carefully calibrate their interventions. They must keep their interventions grounded in evidence, set out a number of alternative policy options as scenarios to be considered and avoid political preference.
It is the IFIs role to shed light on what key alternative scenarios entail. This can boost citizens’ understanding and help democracies break the impasse on key decisions. It can empower citizens to express informed preferences, backed up by clear non-partisan analysis that spells out the trade-offs involved.
This section considers fiscal advocacy as it is currently practised. It looks at OECD countries and assesses how well placed they are in terms of ensuring IFIs have the scope and capacity to become greater fiscal advocates. As part of this, it considers the broader environment and develops a new Fiscal Advocacy Index.
5.4.1. Creating the optimal conditions for fiscal advocates
Fiscal advocacy is likely to be easier under certain conditions:
First, a strong media sector, robust parliamentary debate, trust in institutions and well-functioning research bodies will undoubtedly provide a good bedrock. Weaknesses across any of these areas will hamper an IFI’s ability to act as a fiscal advocate. However, their work can also strengthen these factors.
Second, IFIs need to be truly independent to thrive. This means that they should have independent leadership, freedom to make operational decisions, and sufficient access to resources such as to staff and information. This can foster wider trust.
Third, for IFIs to be advocates, they need a strong communications approach. This means a well-designed communications set-up that lets them spread their messages: disseminating and promoting their work and obtaining feedback on its impact. This is both across traditional media and modern digital information networks.
Fourth, IFIs need to focus their work on major issues that attract attention. The kind of fiscal advocacy envisaged is one where IFIs draw awareness to the major fiscal challenges facing OECD countries. To pollinate or spread their ideas effectively, IFIs must produce attractive, convincing and targeted communications. For example, the Slovak Council for Budget Responsibility developed “Budgetary Traffic Lights” as a tool to communicate risks around the government meeting its budget objectives. It is updated monthly and allows the Council to communicate clearly around whether government measures adopted during the course of the year give rise to risks for either the current budgetary year or over the medium-term horizon (Slovak Council for Budget Responsibility, 2026[9]).
Source: Author’s elaboration.
These conditions can be seen as an ecosystem (Figure 5.4). The optimal conditions for fiscal advocates involve a balance of external and internal factors. Externally, the right environmental conditions are needed to support IFIs as fiscal advocates. Internally, IFIs need to maintain strong and impactful communications along with ambitious work programmes.
5.4.2. Assessing fiscal advocacy – a Fiscal Advocacy Index
With these conditions in mind, the OECD has assessed the state of play across OECD countries by constructing a “Fiscal Advocacy Index” (OECD, 2025[10]). The index provides a measure of fiscal advocacy across the OECD at the national level. It looks at the institutional arrangements enabling IFIs, their analytical focus, their communications apparatus, and their communications impact.
Source: Author’s elaboration.
The outline of the Fiscal Advocacy Index focuses on four of the key elements identified (Figure 5.5) and has a maximum value of four. The index draws on the latest available data and primarily relies on the OECD (2021[11]) database on IFIs.
First, it looks at the IFI’s level of independence, with this dimension based on an update of earlier OECD work on measuring IFI independence (Nicol and Von Trapp, 2018[5]). The original index is updated to include latest available data from the OECD (2021[11]) database on IFIs.
Second, the index looks at the ability of an IFI to focus its analysis on areas of importance. Specifically, it looks at an IFI’s ability to produce long-term sustainability reports, forecasts, dedicated assessments of fiscal risks, and election costings. It also considers how well resourced its analytical functions are.
Third, the Index evaluates the apparatus that OECD IFIs have put in place for disseminating, promoting, and tracking communications. It mirrors the approach used in the 2021 OECD IFI Communications Index (OECD, 2023[12]). The Index considers the institutional arrangements that an IFI has in place, with a view to underpinning its impact in terms of outreach.
Fourth, the Index assesses the communications impact that an IFI has managed to have. The Index draws on new indicators of communications impact produced by the OECD. These indicators use a combination of data on media coverage, developed using tailored Google searches within its “news” search tool, plus Google Trends data based on user data for 2021 to 2023. These are intended to assess the extent to which IFIs have entered the national debate and public consciousness.
Note: A detailed explanation on the components of the 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index is available in the online appendix “The Fiscal Advocacy Index”, including the variables, answer options, scores and weights used to construct the composite index, as well as the statistical analysis carried out.
Sources: 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index.
In general, those institutions ranking the highest in the Index tend to have a high level of independence and a wide analytical focus (Figure 5.6). In addition, they have developed a mature communications apparatus, with substantial impact to show for it. This includes the Canadian PBO, the United States Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Netherlands CPB, and the United Kingdom Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).
Larger institutions have an advantage. They can develop dedicated communications functions and they have the resources to widen their analytical focus to key areas such as long-term sustainability analysis, election costings, and dedicated fiscal risks assessments.
Yet smaller IFIs can also have a significant impact. The Irish Fiscal Advisory Council has managed to have a substantial communications impact, despite its small size, while focusing its analytical work on longer-term fiscal challenges such as ageing. Portugal’s Public Finance Council has also positioned itself strongly, with a highly developed communications function that includes a dedicated communications staff member. With its wide analytical focus, it is primed to make a much more substantial communications impact.
Given that some OECD countries have more than one IFI, it is worth considering outcomes at country level as well (Figure 5.7). A country may have one IFI producing long-term sustainability analysis and developing a more public role in assessing fiscal policy, while another IFI is less prominent in the public debate but plays a vital role by enhancing parliamentarians’ knowledge on fiscal issues and developing costings. For example, in Austria, the Fiscal Council has a formal role in assessing compliance with fiscal rules and assessing long-term fiscal sustainability whereas the Parliamentary Budget Office has a more hands-on role supporting legislators and parliamentary committees in scrutinising the budget.
Recognising this delineation of responsibilities, the Index can be aggregated to national level. It can combine the analytical focus of separate IFIs, the best-placed IFI on the communications front, and their combined levels of independence.
At the country level, fairly similar results can be seen, with just a few notable changes. First, Ireland benefits from the costings work done by its Parliamentary Budget Office, which helps to flesh out its analytical focus when aggregated to the country level. Second, Portugal sees a slightly lower independence ranking on average, pulling it down the rankings slightly. Third, countries such as France and Germany that have only one IFI show up relatively low at a country level when countries with two IFIs benefit from the relative strength of one of their institutions.
Note: A detailed explanation on the components of the 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index is available in the online appendix “The Fiscal Advocacy Index”, including the variables, answer options, scores and weights used to construct the composite index, as well as the statistical analysis carried out.
Sources: 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index.
Some natural groupings emerge in terms of the results. A cluster analysis (available in the online appendix “The Fiscal Advocacy Index”) can establish how the institutions cluster together across the four key dimensions considered.
Four distinct groups emerge from this analysis (see online appendix “The Fiscal Advocacy Index”). The first is notable for having relatively low levels of independence compared to other IFIs as well as more narrow analysis and negligible communications impact (Figure 5.8). The second group achieves a similar level of independence to the next two groups, but, unlike those, it is marked out by a relatively narrower breadth of analysis. The third cluster comes with a wider analytical focus and a slightly stronger communications apparatus. However, it is notable for having very limited communications impact despite the communications functions being reasonably well developed. By contrast, the final cluster has a pronounced level of communications impact in addition to the other attributes seen in the third cluster.
Note: Size of bubbles indicates relative communications impact, with larger bubbles indicating more impact.
Sources: 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index.
This offers some important insights. Some institutions may have put in place robust communications functions. For example, they may have a reasonable communications strategy and employ press releases, press conferences, and other tools to get their message out, but coverage of their work in traditional and social media may still be relatively limited. The index suggests that fostering informed constituencies, which can, in turn, encourage governments to take responsible actions requires more than public releases. An IFI needs to have a credible level of independence as an important pre-condition for its views to become influential. In addition, it is important that IFIs have a steady media presence and ensure that their messaging is convincing, focused and provided when it matters most during the budget process.
Overall, these results highlight the scope for improvement that remains across many OECD countries in terms of developing fiscal advocates. Some countries have IFIs that are making a substantial impact on the public debate, with analysis that can generate the political will for action on major fiscal challenges. However, others have IFIs with weaker levels of independence, a narrow analytical focus, and relatively undeveloped communications practices.
Fostering informed citizens will be essential to addressing major fiscal challenges. Generating the political will to tackle challenges such as ageing populations and increased spending in priority areas will not be easy.
IFIs can help foster the will for political action. Ensuring their success means certain standards will have to be maintained. This means ensuring credible levels of independence, adequate discretion for IFIs to focus their work on major fiscal challenges, sufficient analytical capacity, and the ability to develop their own public voice.
Independent institutions such as fiscal councils, parliamentary budget offices and supreme audit institutions are increasingly central to helping governments and citizens understand the long‑term implications of today’s fiscal decisions. Their evolution into fiscal advocates reflects both the scale of the challenges ahead and the demonstrated value of independent, analytically rigorous and publicly accessible fiscal commentary. This chapter shows that IFIs already make an important contribution, but it also highlights the substantial scope for them to deepen their impact.
The experience of OECD countries demonstrates that IFIs can shape national debates when they combine credible independence, strong analytical capacity and clear public communication. Institutions that articulate long‑term pressures, quantify policy trade-offs and explain the consequences of inaction can help shift attention away from short‑term incentives and towards decisions that safeguard fiscal sustainability. This is particularly important in an environment marked by high debt, demographic pressures and rising demands on public services.
At the same time, not all relevant institutions are yet equipped to play this role fully. In some cases, mandates constrain the analytical scope; in others, timing rules or resource limitations restrict the institution’s ability to speak clearly on emerging risks. These constraints can limit the relevance of these institutions at precisely the moment when their presence as trusted, independent voices is most needed. Strengthening their independence, analytical capacity and communications functions would help ensure they remain effective contributors to national fiscal discussions.
The analysis also stresses that fiscal advocacy does not mean independent institutions endorse specific policies. Rather, it requires them to illuminate the fiscal implications of choices, providing governments and citizens with a clearer understanding of the risks and trade-offs. By framing alternative scenarios in a balanced, non-partisan way, institutions such as IFIs can help build public understanding and support more informed political decision making. This role complements that of other oversight bodies, including supreme audit institutions, which help citizens understand budget execution and value‑for‑money outcomes.
As pressures on public finances intensify, the ability of independent institutions to act as fiscal advocates – anchoring debates in robust independent analysis, communicating clearly with citizens and illuminating fiscal choices – will be vital. A clear long‑term vision, a strong and independent public voice and scenario analysis that helps clarify options will remain essential tools in helping governments respond to today’s challenges while ensuring a sustainable fiscal future.
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← 1. Fiscal sustainability can be taken here to mean “debt sustainability” with a high probability. However, that may be too narrow a definition. It can, of course, involve more complex assessments of, for example, the sustainability of the revenue base, the interest burden, the structure of debt instruments, net worth, contingent liabilities and so on.