186. The new international taxation framework set forth in this Blueprint recognises that in an increasingly digital age, taxing rights can no longer be exclusively determined by reference to physical presence. It therefore contains new nexus rules for in-scope revenue referred to in Chapter 2.
187. As explained in Chapter 2, the scope tests seek to capture those large MNEs that are able to participate in an active and sustained manner in the economic life of market jurisdictions through engagement extending beyond the mere conclusion of sales, in order generate profits, without necessarily having a commensurate level of taxable presence in that market (as based on existing nexus rules). In this regard, Chapters 2 and 3 need to be read together as they translate a common underlying rationale.
188. The nexus rules design intends to protect the interests of smaller jurisdictions, and in particular developing economies, and their desire to benefit from the new taxing right. It recognises the need for low and proportionate compliance costs.
189. The new nexus rules determine entitlement of a market jurisdiction to an allocation of Amount A only. They do not alter the nexus for other tax purposes, customs duties or for any other non-tax area. The new nexus rules will be designed as a standalone provision to limit any unintended spill-over effects on other existing tax or non-tax rules.
190. The new nexus rules could apply differently for ADS and CFB. For ADS, exceeding a market revenue threshold could be the only test to establish nexus. The very nature of the ADS allows them to be provided remotely and such businesses generally have a significant and sustained engagement with the market even if there is not a physical presence, which is one of the key challenges in taxing the digitalising economy.
191. For CFB, the ability to participate remotely in a market jurisdiction is less pronounced. This, together with the additional complexity and compliance costs associated with sourcing revenue derived by CFB (e.g. third party distribution) and the broad acknowledgement that profit margins are typically lower for CFB compared with ADS, could justify a higher nexus standard for CFB. Although many Inclusive Framework members, seeking simplicity, would prefer a nexus threshold based solely on revenue, other members consider that a higher nexus standard for CFB is essential. One approach for satisfying this higher nexus standard is through a higher threshold and the presence of additional indicators (“plus” factors) which would evidence an active and sustained engagement in that jurisdiction beyond mere sales.
192. The Blueprint therefore sets out an approach based on the following elements. A nexus is achieved:
for ADS:
with revenues of more than [EUR X million] a year;
for CFB:
with revenues of more than [EUR X million] a year and;
a “plus factor” to indicate a significant and sustained engagement with the market. One plus factor could be a subsidiary, or a “fixed place of business” (e.g. a permanent establishment based on the commonalities of the UN and OECD Model definitions), with the requirement that the entity or PE is carrying out activities that are connected to in-scope sales. Consideration will be given to the possibility of treating revenues of more than EUR XX million as a plus factor (where the MNE would be deemed to have an active engagement beyond mere sales). Other plus factors may also be considered (which may be unconstrained by physical presence).
193. Depending on where threshold amounts are set, consideration will be given to using a lower nexus standard for smaller developing economies, with GDP below a certain level while also considering compliance simplifications.