Strengthening the Framework on Pre‑ and Post‑Public Employment in Romania

2. Strengthening the legal framework on pre- and post-public employment in Romania

Abstract

This chapter provides recommendations on strengthening the legal framework for pre- and post-public employment in Romania. In particular, it focuses on expanding the scope of officials, behaviours and activities covered by post-public employment restrictions; introducing pre-public employment restrictions; taking a more tailored approach to the applicability of restrictions; establishing clear and proportionate sanctions and enforcement mechanisms; and defining compensation arrangements for former public officials subject to post-public employment restrictions.

Good practice shows that a post-public employment framework is most effective when it addresses both existing and potential risks, is linked to the existing conflict-of-interest framework, covers all high-risk entities and areas, is proportionate, is effectively communicated and subject to transparent procedures, contains sanctions, and is reassessed and updated regularly (OECD, 2010[1]). Various legal instruments are available to implement the above principles, including primary and secondary legislation, circulars, collective agreements, codes of conduct and guidelines or advice. Box 2.1 sets out 13 principles that can guide governments in developing a comprehensive framework for post-public employment (OECD, 2010[1]).

Box 2.1. The post-public employment good practice framework

Risks arising while public officials are still working in the public sector

• Public officials should not enhance their future employment prospects in the private and non‑profit sectors by giving preferential treatment to potential employers.

• Public officials should promptly disclose their seeking or negotiating of employment and offers of employment that could constitute a conflict of interest.

• Public officials should promptly disclose their intention to seek and negotiate employment and the acceptance of an offer of employment in the private and non-profit sectors that could constitute a conflict of interest.

• Public officials who have decided to take up employment in the private and non-profit sectors should, where feasible, be excused from current duties that could constitute a conflict of interest with their likely responsibilities to their future employer.

• Before leaving the public sector, public officials who are in a position to become involved in a conflict of interest should have an exit interview with the appropriate authority to examine possible conflict-of-interest situations and, if necessary, determine appropriate measures for remedy.

Risks arising after public officials leave the public sector

• Public officials should not use confidential or other “insider” information after they leave the public sector.

• Public officials who leave the public sector should be restricted from lobbying their former subordinates and colleagues in the public sector. An appropriate subject matter limit, time limit or “cooling-off” period may be imposed.

• The post-public employment system should consider appropriate measures to prevent and manage conflict of interest when public officials accept appointments to entities with which they had significant official dealings before they left the public sector. An appropriate subject matter limit, time limit or cooling-off period may be required.

• Public officials should be prohibited from “switching sides” and representing their new employer in an ongoing procedure on a contentious issue for which they had responsibility before they left the public sector.

Duties of current officials in relation to former public officials

• Current public officials should be prohibited from granting preferential treatment, special access or privileged information to anyone, including former officials.

• Current public officials who engage former public officials on a contractual basis to do the same job that these officials did when they worked in a public organisation should ensure that the hiring process has been appropriately competitive and transparent.

• The post-public employment system should consider how to handle redundancy payments received by former public officials when they are re-employed.

Duties of private sector entities in relation to former public officials

• Private firms and non-profit organisations should be restricted in using or encouraging officials seeking to leave or who have left government to engage in activities prohibited by law or regulation.

Source: OECD (2010[1]), Post-Public Employment: Good Practices for Preventing Conflict of Interest, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264056701-en.

Good practices in the area of pre-public employment include integrity and/or reference checks during recruitment, measures that require disclosure of previous employment upon taking office, requirements to resign certain positions upon taking up public employment, ethical guidance for new public officials and “cooling-off” periods or other restrictions on lobbyists taking up certain public sector positions (OECD, 2021[2]). As in post-public employment, pre-public employment measures should address both current and future challenges, link to the existing integrity system, take a risk-based approach, contain clear procedures including proportionate sanctions, be effectively communicated, and be reassessed regularly. Similar thought should also be given to the most effective instruments for implementing agreed-upon measures.

2.1. Romanian authorities could elaborate specific pre- and post-public employment provisions that cover all at-risk positions, clarify sanctions and designate a responsible entity for implementation

Clearly defined standards form the backbone of a public integrity system. Overly complicated or poorly communicated standards can confuse public officials and undermine the standards’ effectiveness (OECD, 2020[3]). For this reason, many countries tend to address pre- and/or post-public employment measures for all public officials in a single law (see Box 2.2). While such an approach helps facilitate public officials’ understanding of the rules in place, it is also important to include sufficient flexibility so that the law does not impose unnecessarily tough restrictions on categories of public officials that are not high-risk (OECD, 2010[1]).

Box 2.2. Regulations on pre- and post-public employment in OECD countries

OECD member countries are increasingly regulating pre- and post-public employment through unified regulations covering relevant restrictions for most – if not all – categories of public officials. Some examples of legislation on pre- and post-public employment include:

• Canada: Conflict of Interest Act and Directive on Conflict of Interest

• Croatia:** Law on the Prevention of Conflict of Interest, 143/2021

• Estonia:* Government of the Republic Act

• Finland:* Civil Servants Act

• France: Law no. 2013/907 relating to transparency in public life, Penal Code

• Greece: Law 4622/2019

• Israel: Law of the Knesset (5754-1994) and Public Service Law (Restrictions after Retirement, 5779-1969

• Latvia:* Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials and Law on Transparency of Interest Representation

• Lithuania: Law no. VIII-371 on the Harmonisation of Public and Private Interests

• Norway: Quarantine Act

• Poland: Act 1997/106 on Limiting the Conduct of Economic Activity by Persons Performing Public Functions

• Slovenia: Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act (69/2011

• Spain: Law 3/2015 regulating the exercise of the high office of the General Administration of the State

• United Kingdom: Business Appointment Rules for Ministers and Business Appointment Rules for Civil Servants

• United States: Section 207 of Title 18 of the US Code (Restrictions on former officers, employees and elected officials of the executive and legislative branches), Section 1280 of Title 12 of the US Code, Section 2104 of Title 41 of the US Code and Executive Order 13989.

Note: Regulations in countries marked with * apply to more limited categories of officials. Countries marked with ** are in the OECD accession process but have not yet completed it.

Source: OECD (2022[4]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2025); supplementary research.

In Romania, the current regulatory framework on post-public employment integrity is composed of the following laws and ordinances (for more information, see Box 2.3):

• Law no. 98/2016 regarding public procurement

• Law no. 99/2016 on sectoral procurement

• Law no. 100/2016 on works concessions and service concessions

• Law no. 161/2003 regarding some measures to ensure transparency in the exercise of public dignities, public functions and in the business environment, preventing and sanctioning corruption

• Law no. 672/2002 regarding public internal audit

• Law no. 21/1996 – competition law

• Law no. 51/1995 on the organisation and exercise of the profession of lawyer

• Government Emergency Ordinance no. 66 regarding the prevention, detection and sanctioning of irregularities in obtaining and using European funds and/or related national public funds.

Box 2.3. Romanian legislation on post-public employment integrity

Romania currently has several regulations covering post-public employment integrity for certain categories of public officials.

• Article 61 of Law no. 98/2016 on public procurement, amongst other issues, states that the winning bidder with whom the contracting authority has concluded the public procurement contract does not have the right to engage or enter into any other agreements for the provision of services, directly or indirectly, in order to fulfil the public procurement contract, with former employees of the contracting authority or the procurement service provider involved in the tendering procedure, with whom the contracting authority/procurement service provider has terminated contractual relations after the award of the public procurement contract, for at least 12 months from the conclusion of the contract, under the penalty of resolution or automatic termination of the respective contract. Similar regulations are found in Law no. 99/2016 on sectoral procurement and in Law no. 100/2016 on works concessions and service concessions.

• Article 13(1) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 66/2011 on the prevention, identification and sanctioning of irregularities in obtaining and using European and/or national public funds provides that private individuals/legal entities benefitting from these funds do not have the right to employ individuals or legal entities who were involved in the verification/evaluation of funding applications within the selection procedure for a period of at least 12 months from the signing of the funding contract.

• Article 22(5) of Law no. 672/2002 on internal public audit states that internal auditors should not be assigned internal public audit missions in sectors of activity in which they held positions or were otherwise involved; this prohibition can be lifted after three years.

• Article 94(3) of Law no. 161/2003 on certain measures to ensure transparency in the exercise of public dignities, public functions and in the business environment, prevention and sanctioning of corruption, provides that public officials who, in the exercise of their public function, carried out monitoring and control activities regarding commercial companies or other profit-oriented units as provided for in Article 94(2)(c) of the law shall not be allowed to carry out their activities or provide specialised consultancy to these companies for three years after leaving the body of public officials. Article 106 of this law also prohibits judges from representing clients before the court where they formerly worked for two years after leaving office, although Article 20(8) of law no. 51/1995, which establishes a longer cooling-off period, takes precedence as it was enacted more recently.

• Article 70 of Law no. 21/1996 provides that a person who has held a public office or a specialist public function within the Competition Council and wishes to engage in professional activity in the private sector, remunerated or not, within three years of the termination of their mandate or employment relationship, must notify the Competition Council in advance and obtain their favourable opinion. If the proposed activity in the private sector is related to the economic field encompassed by the person’s activities at the Competition Council during the last three years of their mandate and may be incompatible with the legitimate interests of the authority, the Competition Council may, taking into consideration the institution’s interest, issue a negative opinion regarding the request or adopt a favourable opinion that includes the obligation to comply with any conditions deemed appropriate during the exercise of the activity.

• Article 20(8) of Law no. 51/1995 on the organisation and exercise of the profession of lawyer provides that former judges cannot represent clients before the courts where they worked for five years following their departure from office. Former prosecutors and police officers also cannot provide legal assistance to the criminal investigation unit where they worked for a period of five years following their departure from office.

Source: Accession questionnaire responses from Romania (2023); OECD fact-finding mission to Romania (2024).

The current approach to regulating post-public employment in Romania has created several challenges. First, while provisions should be adapted to the specific risks of the sector, current laws vary in terms of measures supporting implementation. For example, only Article 70 of Law no. 21/1996 requires public officials to obtain a favourable opinion on their proposed future employment. Aside from this, there is effectively no mechanism for monitoring former public officials’ compliance with post-public employment rules, nor is there a clear mechanism to sanction them for non-compliance. As noted by stakeholders during the OECD fact-finding mission, the lack of monitoring across all post-public employment provisions greatly undermines their effectiveness.

The various laws are also limited in terms of measures. A comprehensive pre- and post-public employment framework contains complete bans on certain behaviours, temporary restrictions on certain activities (cooling-off periods), requirements to declare relevant information and requirements to seek advice on or approval of certain activities. Under current legislation, post-public employment measures for former public employees are limited to cooling-off periods for certain categories of officials, restrictions on contracting with the state for former public procurement officials and restrictions on representation for judges. Other restrictions, such as bans on using insider information, lobbying former public employers or switching sides in regulatory proceedings, are not included. Similarly, measures on pre-public employment are not included, nor are any softer measures aimed at safeguarding integrity through, for example, integrity counselling. Moreover, stakeholders in the OECD fact-finding mission stressed that the current ad hoc system contributes to a lack of clarity and awareness, both on the part of those subject to the law and those responsible for oversight.

As recognised by the National Agency of Civil Servants (Agenția Națională a Funcționarilor Publici, NACS) and reiterated by stakeholders, there is a need for a coherent and comprehensive legislative approach to pre- and post-public employment. To that end, Romanian authorities could ensure that all relevant at-risk officials are covered by the dedicated measures, either through revising the existing suite of laws (which has been noted as the solution favoured by the Ministry of Justice) or by including measures in a single dedicated law. If Romanian authorities chose the latter option, which would align with international good practice, dedicated provisions could be included in Law no. 161/2003, which is currently the main law regulating conflict of interest. While complemented by other laws, the current provisions in Law no. 161/2003 apply to most public officials, including elected and appointed officials, judges and civil servants. Article 70 establishes the definition of conflict of interest, with more specific conflict-of-interest provisions for specific categories of officials in subsequent articles and administrative, disciplinary, civil and criminal liability for different violations established throughout. Given that pre- and post-public employment activities can constitute a conflict of interest, including provisions in the existing law would increase clarity in the system overall and fill gaps in existing legislation. Regardless of the approach taken, Romania authorities could ensure that dedicated measures cover all relevant at-risk officials and that existing post-public employment integrity safeguards1 are incorporated, introduce additional measures for at-risk officials, include provisions on pre-public employment and ensure that the framework is generally consistent and coherent (see Table 2.1).

2.2. Romanian authorities could ensure articles are included in the relevant legislation to cover persons with top executive functions (PTEFs), management of regulatory authorities and, management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local government officials

In order to be effective, a pre- and post-public employment framework needs to cover all main risk areas in terms of functions, tasks and sectors (OECD, 2020[3]). This includes public officials interacting with the private sector through government functions, such as public procurement, issuing of licences and permits, or distribution of public or European funds, as well as those operating in regulatory functions or a competition authority. More importantly, certain categories of officials are more exposed to risks of undue influence, capture or corruption due to the nature of their position and the information they had access to while in office. These include high-level political officials (ministers, members of parliament and political advisers), senior civil servants, chief executives and managers of SOEs, and officials involved in procurement and contract management in public-private partnerships (OECD, 2010[1]).

When designing a pre- and post-public employment framework, policy makers should consider what integrity risks they aim to mitigate in order to ensure that the regulations they develop are effective and proportionate to the risks faced. Box 2.4 provides more information on some common high-risk circumstances.

Box 2.4. Risk factors to consider when designing pre- and post-public employment regulations

Evidence from OECD countries has found that certain factors can intensify pre-/post-public employment integrity risks. For example, evidence from the United States suggests that post-public employment risks are highest in agencies that simultaneously have broad regulatory power, are largely insulated from supervision by elected officials and regulate industries whose average pay is significantly higher than that of the regulators (Kalmenovitz, Vij and Xiao, 2022[5]), which means that such circumstances may warrant particularly stringent post-public employment restrictions. There is also evidence to suggest that civil servants’ movement between the public and private sectors can be economically beneficial but equivalent movement by political appointees can be economically harmful (Barbosa and Straub, 2017[6]), which highlights the importance of paying special attention to the latter category of public officials.

Likewise, the state government of Western Australia found that risks in pre- and post-public employment tend to be highest when the private sector employer in question meets several criteria related to how much it stands to gain from insider information or preferential treatment (Western Australian Government, 2018[7]). These include:

• The company operates in a related field, is a public and private partner or competes commercially with the public authority.

• The company receives contracts, funding, loans or similar from or through the public authority.

• The company comes under the licensing, regulatory or auditing authority of the public authority.

• The company engages in lobbying ministers, members of parliament or government agencies.

It is important to tailor the approach to regulating pre- and post-public employment to the context of the relevant country, as risks can vary widely. For example, one study conducted in the financial sector found that in Korea, hiring former public officials in the financial sector does not affect a firm’s financial health but leads to a decrease in the probability of the firm receiving regulatory penalties (Rhee and Hwang, 2019[8]), while a similar study in the United States found the exact opposite (Shive and Forster, 2017[9]). Furthermore, in contexts where the public sector may face particular challenges in attracting talent, allowing public officials sufficient exit opportunities is vital to avoid disincentivising individuals from entering the civil service in the first place (Barbosa and Straub, 2017[6]).

Sources: Kalmenovitz, J., S. Vij and K. Xiao (2022[5]), “Closing the revolving door”, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4275137; Barbosa, K. and S. Straub (2017[6]), “The value of revolving doors in public procurement”, TSE Working Papers, No. 17-873, Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse; Western Australian Government (2018[7]), Post-separation Employment: Identifying the Integrity Risks, https://www.wa.gov.au/system/files/2020-06/post%20separation%20employment%20-%20Identifying%20the%20integrity%20risks.pdf; Rhee, K. and S. Hwang (2019[8]) , “Effects of revolving doors in the financial sector: Evidence from Korea”, https://doi.org/10.22740/kdi.focus.e.2019.94; Shive, S. and M. Forster (2017[9]), “The revolving door for financial regulators”, https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfw035.

In Romania, the existing legislative policy suite covers public officials operating in key at-risk areas, including public procurement, distribution of public funds and the competition authority, as well as judges. However, other key at-risk positions, such as PTEFs,2 chief executives and managers of SOEs, are not covered. This gap is a major weakness in Romania’s pre/post-public employment framework and measures are required to mitigate the risks posed (see also GRECO (2023[10])). For example, as noted by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) Fifth Evaluation Report, the frequent departure of PTEFs to take up work in the private sector without being subject to any post-public employment restrictions constitutes a serious problem for public integrity in the country (GRECO, 2023[10]).

Stakeholders consulted during the OECD fact-finding mission also noted several risk categories not covered by existing legislation on post-public employment. These include the education and health sectors with specific risks of managers of public hospitals and universities joining regulatory authorities so they can make decisions that directly affect them and former regulators becoming managers of these institutions and using their connections to secure favourable treatment.

In addition, international organisations and local stakeholders have noted that more work is needed to strengthen integrity at the local level, including in pre- and post-public employment. Interviews with municipal officials have revealed very low awareness of rules surrounding pre- and post-public employment and integrity in lobbying (OECD, 2022[11]). Stakeholders consulted during the OECD fact-finding mission noted that post‑public employment rules for municipal government require more attention due to the small, tight-knit networks that are common in local government.

Given that the current measures do not currently cover these and other at-risk officials, the Romanian authorities could consider extending coverage to PTEFs, top management of regulatory authorities, top management and board members of SOEs,3 high-level officials in the Bank of Romania, mayors and members of municipal and county councils, high-level officials from high-risk sectors like education and health, officials representing the state or a public authority in legal proceedings and officials issuing licenses or permits in the scope of either strengthened provisions in existing laws and additions to the regulations covering the expanded scope of officials or, in line with international good practice, through a dedicated law or a chapter on pre- and post-public employment in Law no. 161/2003. Box 2.5 provides an example of good practice from Lithuania on regulating post-public employment of most public officials through an overarching law on conflict of interest.

Box 2.5. The scope of post-public employment measures in Lithuania

Post-public employment restrictions in Lithuania are established in the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests and apply to most public officials, including state politicians, state officials, civil servants, judges, intelligence officers, military servicemen, heads and deputy heads of SOEs (and legal entities in which the state is a majority shareholder) and certain employees of the Bank of Lithuania. Article 15 establishes that these public officials may not hold positions in legal entities to which the public official previously allocated public funds or over which the public official made decisions on supervision or control for one year after leaving office. These rules apply even if an official stays in public service and moves to a different position. Article 16 prohibits a former public official or one of their close relatives or legal entities in which they have at least a 10% ownership share from entering into transactions with the state for one year after the official leaves office. Article 17 prohibits former public officials from representing natural or legal persons in matters previously under their purview for one year after leaving office.

The Chief Official Ethics Commission (VTEK) monitors compliance with these provisions. VTEK may grant exceptions to restrictions upon request from a former public official in line with Article 18 of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests. The law also prescribes sanctions for offences of varying severity and there is a procedure for VTEK to investigate suspected violations of post-public employment rules. These suspected violations are detected via information submitted to the register of interests. VTEK has also issued guidance on complying with post-public employment rules and publishes detailed answers to frequently asked questions in this area.

Source: Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests; VTEK (n.d.[12]), Homepage, https://vtek.lt/en/home/ (accessed on 19 February 2025).

2.3. For each category of public official included in the provisions, the Romanian authorities could clearly define tailored pre- and post-public employment restrictions

The revolving door phenomenon covers activities that may undermine the public interest before and after public service. In addition to covering all at-risk categories of officials, a comprehensive pre- and post‑public employment integrity framework should also cover all at-risk activities and behaviours.

Pre-public employment integrity risks can emerge when newly appointed public officials enter public service and have potential conflicts of interest with their former role in the private sector (OECD/World Bank/UNODC, 2020[13]). Such integrity risks could emerge due to economic incentives to prioritise the interests of their former employer, including retirement benefits, deferred compensation arrangements and stock interests. The risks can be particularly high in cases where former lobbyists take up positions with an advisory or decision-making capacity in the public service.

Policy makers often hesitate to introduce pre-public employment restrictions due to concerns that overly restrictive policies would undermine the ability of the public sector to attract talent. However, there is ample evidence that if no measures are put in place, a culture of favouritism towards certain sectors or actors can develop (Yates and Cardin‐Trudeau, 2021[14]), necessitating some level of policy action. In the context of public procurement, one study found that a lack of integrity in pre-public employment is more economically detrimental than a lack of integrity in post-public employment (Barbosa and Straub, 2017[6]).

Risks also exist for officials leaving public service. Post-public employment risks include:

• A public official seeking future employment while still in office granting undue advantages to a potential employer, such as treating them more favourably in a procurement process or regulatory enforcement case.

• A former public official exploiting their previous office to secure advantages for their new employer. This can include using privileged or familiar access to former colleagues to “lobby back” on behalf of the new employer or using confidential information about planned or future public procurements, regulatory changes, ongoing regulatory disputes or other insider information to unfairly advantage their current employer with regard to other firms in the same sector.

To mitigate these risks, good practice suggests that regulations should clearly identify the prohibitions and restrictions on pre- and post-public employment activities. Measures to mitigate pre- and post-public employment risks include (OECD, 2021[2]):

• integrity checks in the recruitment process, requirements for the disclosure of previous employment within newly recruited officials’ interest declarations and restrictions on hiring former lobbyists for certain public positions

• requirements to recuse oneself from duties related to future employment or request a consultation on or approval for offers of employment

• restrictions on certain private activities, such as accepting board membership or employment or offering consultancy services in entities with which a former public official had significant official dealings

• a prohibition on conducting any lobbying activity or prohibition on influencing or defending the cause of a company, client, business associate or employer with which the public official is or was connected before a public body or official

• a prohibition on giving advice using information not available to the public and obtained during a former public official’s time in office.

Currently, the legislative suite in Romania places restrictions on former public officials accepting employment at – or providing consultancy services to – legal entities that they were previously responsible for regulating, cooling-off periods for certain categories of officials and restrictions on contracting with the state for former public procurement officials. Concerning judges and magistrates, while post-public employment restrictions cover representation before a judge’s former court, they do not cover many other at-risk situations, including representing clients before courts other than those where they presided or directly or indirectly providing consulting services.

Pre-public employment measures are not included and certain post-public employment measures, such as a prohibition on use of insider information or lobbying back, are also absent.

Legislative amendments could clarify the prohibitions and restrictions for each official category to ensure clarity and proportionality. To that end, Romanian authorities could further elaborate on mitigation measures for each category of public official covered to provide more clarity. While this would primarily involve elaborating measures for categories of officials not covered by current provisions, it could also involve developing more comprehensive measures for categories of officials already covered by other laws, such as officials involved in public procurement. To support Romanian authorities in clarifying these provisions, specific measures for the relevant categories of public officials are elaborated in Table 2.1.

Judges are also included in the scope of recommended changes in Table 2.1. According to the Ministry of Justice, the current post-public employment provisions for judges are sufficient. Furthermore, according to the Ministry of Justice, any amendments to include regulations on post-employment restrictions for former judges and prosecutors would affect their statute and therefore the ministry’s existing commitments to refrain from further modifications of the justice laws, particularly those stemming from the National Recovery and Resilience Plan for Romania. The plan specifies a dedicated milestone that requires the adoption and entry into force of the “justice laws” by 30 June 2023, yet to be evaluated. The Ministry of Justice’s position is supported by GRECO’s 2016 Fourth Evaluation Round report, which reached a similar conclusion regarding the current regulation (GRECO, 2016[15]).

However, several stakeholders consulted during the OECD fact-finding mission noted that provisions applicable to judges do not cover all possible at-risk behaviours, and the OECD secretariat came to a similar conclusion after reviewing the relevant legislation. Specifically, current provisions do not cover situations in which former judges work on cases involving their former court but do not directly represent clients in court. There are also no provisions addressing situations where a judge represents a client before a former colleague who has since moved to another court. These are two possible at-risk situations that current provisions would not cover.

The Romanian authorities could adopt a risk-based approach when determining which restrictions to apply in the provisions. Not all officials pose the same risk or magnitude of risk, and standards should therefore be fair, proportionate and reasonable. For example, a cooling-off period on lobbying may be sensible for one or two years until a former public official’s ability to influence former colleagues diminishes, while a restriction on using insider information should apply until the information is public, given that the risk of releasing that information remains constant in the interim. Good practice examples from other OECD countries can provide a useful starting point for evaluating how to tailor measures to specific risks. Beyond the examples listed in Table 2.1, see Boxes 2.6 and 2.7 for more detail on other countries’ steps to regulate risks related to lobbying back and pre-public employment.

Table 2.1. Types of pre- and post-public employment risk mitigation measures per category of public official

Measure	Category of officials	Rationale for proposed measures	Relevant country good practice
Pre-public employment
Ban on issuing administrative acts affecting a former employer or representing the state before a former employer for a proportionate period of time (“former employer” includes any legal entity for which a public official provided services as an employee, officer, director, partner or consultant)	All public officials (broad ban)	Officials issuing administrative acts or representing the state or a public authority in legal proceedings may face incentives to treat a former employer more favourably in a particular administrative matter. It is therefore necessary to limit contact between these officials and the private persons and entities whose cases they handle.	Israel, Latvia and Lithuania have all established restrictions on activities related to a public official’s former employer.
	Officials in regulatory enforcement agencies (handling cases involving former employers)
	Officials representing the state in legal proceedings (representing the state in a case against a former employer)
	Officials issuing permits and licenses (issuing a permit or license a to former employer)
	Public procurement officials (awarding a contract or issuing a payment to a former employer)
	Officials responsible for evaluating or verifying applications for European or national funds (evaluating or verifying applications from a former employer)
Requirement to disclose previous employment on interest declaration	All public officials subject to interest disclosure requirements	Certain low-administrative burden requirements can have an outsized positive impact on public integrity. Adding information on pre-public employment to the scope of information that public officials are required to declare on their interest declaration does not create any additional administrative burden but would enable the ANI to identify conflicts of interest related to pre-public employment more effectively.	In Croatia, public officials must declare information about pre-public employment in their interest declarations.
Requirement to sign a statement on pre-/post-public employment as part of terms of public employment	All public officials on an employment contract (including a temporary contract)	Similarly, adding a clause on upholding public integrity in pre- and post-public employment to public sector employment contracts and/or relevant codes of conduct would not create any additional administrative burden. However, it would help to establish administrative liability more clearly in the event of a breach of relevant provisions.	Post-public employment provisions can be included in employment contracts in countries including Finland and Norway and are a condition of employment more broadly in Canada and the United Kingdom. Such a measure could be extended to include pre-public employment.
Cooling-off period for former lobbyists for a proportionate period of time (e.g. one-two years)	PTEFs	Given the nature of their duties, PTEFs have the most decision-making power as well as the most connections and access to confidential information of any category of public official. This makes them a particularly high-risk category of officials for whom higher standards should apply. As the officials most directly involved in policy making, PTEFs should be subject to pre-public employment restrictions mitigating risks associated with lobbying.	Estonia and the United States both have pre‑public employment cooling-off periods for lobbyists. Under these restrictions, lobbyists cannot participate in matters on which they lobbied the government. In the United States they also cannot take up positions in executive branch bodies that they lobbied.
Restriction on becoming a board member of an SOE for PTEFs for a proportionate period of time (e.g. one-two years)	Board members of SOEs	The highly paid nature of SOE board positions means they are often used to reward appointed and elected officials for granting political favours. A restriction on movement between these two sets of positions would reduce incentives to use SOE board positions for that purpose.	The OECD Recommendation on Guidelines on Anti-Corruption and Integrity in State-Owned Enterprises (OECD, 2019[16]) recommends that “Mechanisms should be implemented to avoid conflicts of interest preventing any board member from objectively carrying out their board duties and to limit political interference in board processes. Politicians who are in a position to materially influence the operating conditions of SOEs should not serve on their boards. Former such persons should be subject to predetermined cooling-off periods. Civil servants and other public officials can serve on boards under the condition that they are nominated based on merit and conflict of interest requirements apply to them”.
Post-public employment
Bans on the following: Permanent ban on the use of insider information Permanent ban on granting favourable treatment in exchange for an offer of employment (quid pro quo) Permanent ban on switching sides in an administrative or regulatory proceeding	All public officials	In order to increase awareness of and compliance with post-public employment restrictions, it is important to explicitly define which behaviours are problematic and prevent contact between former public officials and their public sector employer for a limited period of time.	Countries such as Canada, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States have established blanket bans on certain behaviours related to post-public employment that could harm the public interest.
Restrictions on the following: Ban for a proportionate period of time on the provision of services to or participation in the management or ownership of entities that the former official was responsible for regulating Ban for a proportionate period of time on the person or an entity in which the official or a family member has at least a 10% stake concluding a contract with the authority where they were formerly employed Ban for a proportionate period of time on representing a natural person or legal entity before the authority where they were previously employed	All public officials (general ban)		Countries such as Canada, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States have established blanket restrictions on certain behaviours related to post‑public employment that could harm the public interest.
	Regulatory enforcement officials (limitation on providing services to an entity whose case they handled and limitation on representing an entity in cases involving a former public employer)
	Public procurement officials (limitation on providing services to the entity to which they issued a contract and limitation on bidding for contracts with their former employer or in bidding processes overseen by their former employer)
	Officials representing the state or a public authority in legal proceedings (limitation on providing services to an entity against whom they represented the state in a case and limitation on representing private clients before that authority)
	Officials issuing permits and licenses (limitation on providing services to the entity to which they issued a license or permit and limitation on applying for a license or permit at the same office where they were formerly employed, unless there is only one office granting that license or permit within a certain geographic radius)
	Officials of the Bank of Romania (limitation on providing services to the entity they examined or engaging in official business with the bank on behalf of a private entity)
	Officials responsible for evaluating or verifying applications for European or national funds (limitation on providing services to the entity to whom they awarded funds and limitation on applying for funds from former employer on behalf of a private entity)
Requirement to inform of planned post-public employment activities	PTEFs	Given the nature of their duties, PTEFs have the most decision-making power as well as the most connections and access to confidential information of any category of public official. This makes them a particularly high-risk category of officials for whom higher standards should apply. Good practice across the OECD suggests requiring PTEFs to request approval for post‑public employment activities as an extra precaution.	High-ranking political officials are required to obtain approval for their post-public employment activities in countries including Croatia, France, Greece, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom.
	Members of the Competition Council
		As noted by government stakeholders, current resource constraints preclude the possibility of formal advisory opinions. As such, PTEFs could be required to inform the ANI and prohibitions could be issued where movements could create a conflict of interest.
		The current system within the Competition Council should also be retained since stakeholders believe that it is working well.
Requirement to declare professional activities for one year after leaving public office	All public officials subject to interest declaration requirements	The ANI or another authority needs information about an individual’s post-public employment activities to monitor post-public employment effectively. Extending the period covered by interest declaration requirements would leverage the existing interest declaration system to better monitor conflicts of interest arising after leaving public office.	Officials are required to declare information on post-public employment after leaving office in Croatia and Spain.
Recusal from duties related to future employment while in office (“gardening leave”)	All public officials (optional)	While not possible in all scenarios, allowing public officials to request a form of “gardening leave” to reduce or eliminate their cooling-off period could reduce the number of cases where the state must expend resources on monitoring and/or compensation once the official leaves office.	In the United Kingdom, officials can already be placed on general gardening leave once they have handed in their notice. Such a general contractual provision could be expanded to focus specifically on post-public employment.
Cooling-off period for a proportionate period of time on becoming a lobbyist	PTEFs	As the officials most directly involved in policy making, PTEFs should be subject to post-public employment restrictions mitigating risks associated with lobbying.	Many countries have cooling-off periods on post‑public employment lobbying including Canada, Estonia, Greece, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Cooling-off period for a proportionate period of time on becoming a board member of an SOE	PTEFs	The highly paid nature of SOE board positions means they are often used to reward appointed and elected officials for granting political favours. A restriction on movement between these two sets of positions would reduce incentives to use SOE board positions for that purpose.	OECD Recommendation on Guidelines on Anti‑Corruption and Integrity in State-Owned Enterprises (OECD, 2019[16]) recommends that “Mechanisms should be implemented to avoid conflicts of interest preventing any board member from objectively carrying out their board duties and to limit political interference in board processes. Politicians who are in a position to materially influence the operating conditions of SOEs should not serve on their boards. Former such persons should be subject to predetermined cooling-off periods. Civil servants and other public officials can serve on boards under the condition that they are nominated based on merit and conflict of interest requirements apply to them.”
Expansion of cooling-off period to prohibit any involvement with a case before a court where one previously worked, not just direct representation and proportionate restriction on representing clients before other judges with whom they worked1	Judges	Given the close-knit, collegial nature of the judiciary, it is also necessary to expand current restrictions on a judge representing a client as counsel before their former court to address instances where a judge advises on a case in their former court but does not represent a client directly or represents a client before another court in which they are likely to have close connections.	In Ireland, according to the Code of Conduct for the Bar, former judges may not practice in a court of equal or lesser jurisdiction than the court in which they were a judge.
			In France, Paragraph 16 of the Code of Ethics of Administrative Judges establishes a five-year cooling-off period for former administrative judges during which they may not submit applications or briefs or appear at hearings. For high-ranking positions, the cooling-off period is ten years.
			In Germany, Paragraph 16 of the Ethical Guidelines for Judges of the Federal Constitutional Court establishes that former judges of the court should not undertake any advisory work, submit any opinions or appear in the court for one year after leaving their position.

1. In relation to expansion of the cooling-off period to prohibit any involvement with a case before a former court, not just direct representation and proportionate restriction on representing clients before other judges with whom they worked: the Ministry of Justice is of the opinion that the existing cooling-off period of five years is sufficient and, as such, no further legislative intervention is required in this area.

The provisions, whether included in the existing laws or, in accordance with international good practice, in a dedicated law such as Law no. 161/2003, could also allow room for the responsible authority (the National Integrity Agency, ANI, as discussed below) a degree of discretion whereby it can grant exemptions to ensure fairness, integrity and adaptability to specific circumstances. In countries such as Canada, Israel and Lithuania, the body responsible for overseeing post-public employment measures has such a competence.

Box 2.6. Restrictions on lobbying back in Canada and Slovenia

Canada

In Canada, the Conflict of Interest Act prohibits post-public employment lobbying for certain public office holders for a period of five years after leaving office. The Lobbying Act extends the five-year ban on lobbying to a broader group of “former designated public office holders”. This category includes both elected and appointed officials, such as ministers, ministers of state, ministerial staffers and former designated members of the prime minister’s transition team, as well as senior executive positions in the public service, such as deputy minister or chief executive officer.

The Commissioner of Lobbying is responsible for overseeing provisions related to post-public employment lobbying and may issue exemptions to the rules upon request. The commissioner may also investigate violations of the Lobbying Act and impose sanctions, which can include fines and prison sentences. The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner performs similar enforcement functions regarding requirements under the Conflict of Interest Act.

Slovenia

Slovenia has established cooling-off periods for public officials becoming lobbyists in Article 56 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act. This act prohibits public officials (including elected and appointed officials) from lobbying for two years following the date of termination of their public employment. The Commission for the Prevention of Corruption may impose sanctions on lobbyists violating this rule as per Article 73, which may include a written reminder, a ban from lobbying of three months to two years and removal from the register of lobbyists.

A public official must notify their current or former public employer of any changes in their activities, and these notifications must then be forwarded to the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption. Both former public officials and responsible officials within public bodies can be fined for failing to comply with Article 36 or to notify the commission of activities outlined in Article 36.

Sources: OECD (2010[1]), Post-Public Employment: Good Practices for Preventing Conflict of Interest, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264056701-en; Canada: Conflict of Interest Act (S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2); Lobbying Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 44, 4^th Supp); Slovenia: Law 45/2010 on Integrity and Prevention of Corruption.

Box 2.7. Pre-public employment restrictions in Israel and the United States

Israel

In Israel, pre-public employment restrictions imposed on private sector employees hired to fill a government post vary according to each case’s circumstances. A candidate who was a partner in a law firm or an accounting firm before being appointed to public office must retire from the partnership and refrain from dealings involving that business, its other partners and its employees for two years. In addition, the candidate must forgo professional relations with the business, its partners and its employees and agree not to view the accounting records, documents or any other information relating to the business. A candidate who, prior to appointment, was part of the management of a private corporation is required to resign from this position and refrain from dealing with issues related to the organisation and engaging with the holders of controlling interests in the corporation for two years. These restrictions are defined in an internal document prepared (and updated) by the Ministry of Justice and are used by all government ministries and their subsidiary units.

United States

In the United States, pre-public employment rules are more formalised. In accordance with Section 2635.502 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, former private sector employees are subject to a one-year cooling-off period in situations where their former employer is a party or represents a party in a particular government matter. This restriction applies not only to former private sector employees and lobbyists but also to any executive branch employee who has, in the past year, served as an officer, director, trustee, general partner, agent, attorney, consultant, contractor or employee of an individual, organisation or other entity. In the case of an employee who has received an extraordinary payment exceeding USD 10 000 from their former employer before entering government service, the employee is subject to a two-year cooling-off period with respect to that employer.

Executive Order 13989 defines similar restrictions for former lobbyists and foreign agents as defined by the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Paragraph 3 of this regulation establishes that an executive branch appointee who was a registered lobbyist or registered foreign agent during the two years before the date of appointment cannot participate in any matter on which they lobbied or engaged in foreign agent activity, participate in the specific issue area in which that particular matter falls or seek or accept employment with any executive agency which they lobbied.

Sources: OECD (2021[2]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en; United States: 5 CFR § 2635.502; Executive Order 13989 of 20 January 2021.

2.4. The Romanian authorities could define specific, proportionate sanctions and establish enforcement mechanisms

Assigning clear and proportionate administrative or disciplinary sanctions can help promote compliance with pre- and post-public employment rules (OECD, 2020[3]). Indeed, both the absence of measures and ineffective measures for tracking and enforcing compliance signal that a pre- and post-public employment framework lacks sufficient dissuasiveness to ensure compliance. To be effective, however, sanctions must be clear, foreseeable and proportionate to the severity of the offence. They must also be supported by a system of monitoring approval decisions (see Chapter 3 on institutional arrangements for oversight and control).

Good practice in OECD member countries has found a mix of different sanctions, including penal and disciplinary measures, is most effective in promoting compliance with the pre-and post-public employment framework. Despite evidence pointing to the effectiveness of such sanctions, Romania’s current post‑public employment framework includes few sanctions related to pre- and post-public employment. Laws no. 161/2003, 672/2002 and 51/1995 do not contain any specific sanctions on post-public employment and Government Emergency Ordinance no. 66/2011 only stipulates that contracts concluded in violation of post-public employment rules regarding European funds may be cancelled. Under Article 70 of Law no. 21/1996 on the Competition Council, the only sanction foreseen is that an official may be required to pay damages if they fail to comply with the opinion on their post-public employment activities. Article 224 of Law no. 98/2016 on public procurement contains a blanket regime of fines for violating the principles set out in Article 2 (including equal treatment and transparency). In addition, failure to observe Article 61 of Law no. 98/2016, Article 74 of Law no. 99/2016 and Article 45 of Law no. 100/2016 results in the resolution or automatic termination of the respective contract.

The Ministry of Justice acknowledged the limited sanctions currently available in its 2021 comparative study, which noted a need for sanctions for both former public officials and their private sector employers for violations of established rules, which could include fines and exclusion from public procurement processes (Ministry of Justice of Romania, 2021[17]). In preparing the new provisions, the Romanian authorities could consider defining specific, proportionate sanctions that vary according to the severity of the offence. These sanctions could include administrative sanctions such as a loss of position (relevant for pre‑public employment rules), restrictions on holding future positions or administrative fines. To safeguard proportionality, the Romanian authorities could group offences by their level of seriousness and establish corresponding penalties for each group in the new law. For example, accepting an offer of employment in violation of a cooling-off period is a more serious offence that should incur higher penalties, while forgetting to declare previous employment on one’s interest declaration is comparatively less serious. Sanctions should also be higher for higher-ranking officials owing to their heightened responsibility and risk level.

Criminal sanctions could also be considered for high-risk officials such as PTEFs, with appropriate reference to the existing articles in Romania’s Criminal Code. However, for such sanctions to be proportionate, there would need to be a clear system for permitting or prohibiting officials from taking up certain positions or performing certain activities after leaving the public sector, after which a former official could be criminally sanctioned for ignoring such a prohibition, as exists in France (see Chapter 3 on institutional responsibilities for monitoring). Given that the extent of revolving door use in Romania is still poorly understood, Romanian authorities could consider introducing criminal sanctions at a later date following an evaluation of the dissuasiveness of expanded administrative sanctions. If administrative sanctions prove ineffective, criminal sanctions for PTEFs could be included in a future reform. However, as discussed below, the effectiveness of such a system would also be contingent on the ANI having sufficient resources to monitor post-public employment activities and investigate potential breaches.

Romanian authorities could also consider encouraging compliance by the private sector with post‑public employment restrictions. In particular, specific sanctions could be included for legal entities that have hired former public officials subject to such restrictions, thereby recognising that firms are responsible for behaving with integrity and should encourage former public officials to do the same. These sanctions could include fines and/or payments for damages and more targeted measures such as debarment from contracting with the state. Box 2.8 provides more information on measures Spain has taken to hold private sector actors accountable for violating post-public employment measures.

In addition to including a provision for the private sector in the new provisions, Romanian authorities could also consider amending relevant legislation to include private sector violations of post-public employment cooling-off periods as corruption offences. This would enable authorities to use Article 164(b) of Law no. 98/2016 regarding public procurement, which establishes that a contracting authority must exclude any bids from economic operators (natural or legal persons) found to have committed corruption offences as defined in Articles 289-294 of Law no. 286/2009 or Articles 10-13 of Law no. 78/2000 from the tender process. Romanian authorities could also consider broader changes to Law no. 98/2016, which would establish a formal debarment list of entities banned from contracting with the state rather than requiring relevant authorities to evaluate the need for exclusion in the context of each individual tender. This would decrease the possibility of inconsistent application of the law and therefore increase the dissuasiveness of sanctions imposed on private entities for post-public employment violations.

Box 2.8. Sanctions for violations of post-public employment restrictions in Spain

Post-public employment restrictions for senior public officials in Spain are regulated under Law 3/2015 regulating the exercise of the high office of the General Administration of the State, which establishes post-public employment restrictions for senior officials. This law establishes in Article 15 that senior officials cannot provide services to private entities affected by their decisions or enter into contracts with public bodies where they previously worked for two years following their departure from office. Members of regulatory and supervisory bodies also cannot provide services in private entities that they supervised or regulated for a period of two years. Former senior officials must declare their post-employment activities to the Conflict of Interest Office for two years following their departure from public office and the Conflict of Interest Office must then issue an authorisation within one month. It examines and verifies the content of these declarations and publishes authorisations for post-employment activities on the national transparency portal.

Sanctions for public officials include a prohibition on occupying public office for a period ranging from five to ten years in the event of a serious or very serious violation of the law. Former public officials can also be required to return compensation that they received while undergoing their cooling-off period and/or have their public service pension reduced.

The legal framework also compels companies to comply with post-public employment legislation. Law 9/2017 on public sector contracts establishes that companies contracting with the state that have hired anyone subject to the two-year cooling-off period in violation of the prohibition on providing services in private companies directly related to the competencies of their former position are prohibited from contracting with any public body if the violation has been published in the Official State Gazette. This debarment remains for as long as the person is employed, with a maximum limit of two years from their termination as a high-ranking official.

Sources: OECD (2010[1]), Post-Public Employment: Good Practices for Preventing Conflict of Interest, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264056701-en; Law 3/2015 of 30 March regulating the exercise of the high office of the General Administration of the State; Law 9/2017 of 8 November on Public Sector Contracts, by which the Directives of the European Parliament and of the Council 2014/23/EU and 2014/24/EU of 26 February are transposed into the Spanish legal system.

2.5. Romanian authorities could consider specifying compensation measures in the new provisions for officials whose employment prospects would be excessively limited by post-public employment restrictions

In some circumstances, pre- and post-public employment restrictions can have an impact on an individuals’ ability to earn a living during the cooling-off period. To address this, some countries provide proportionate arrangements, such as indemnities, allowances or compensations involving all or part of the former salary to substitute income the public official would have otherwise received if they were not subject to a cooling‑off period (OECD, 2010[1]). The benefit of such measures is that they can increase compliance with the relevant pre- and post-public employment restrictions. However, the measures can also pose an additional burden to the state or viewed unfavourably by the public.

Stakeholders consulted during the OECD fact-finding mission agreed that Romania’s public budget could not finance widespread compensation for officials undergoing cooling-off periods and that if such a measure was introduced, it could face backlash from the population. To that end, Romanian authorities could define applicable cooling-off periods to restrict former public officials’ ability to engage in business relating to their former employer or specific cases they worked on but not their ability to engage in business with the public sector as a whole. This would leave the employment opportunities of former public officials sufficiently numerous that compensation would not be necessary.

If compensation is required because former public officials lack viable opportunities for private employment in their field due to post-public employment restrictions, remuneration received from other private employment could be deducted or compensation could be contingent on proving one’s inability to find employment in their field. In Norway, elected officials subject to a cooling-off period under the Quarantine Act (70/2015) are entitled to remuneration, but income that they receive from positions they take up during the cooling-off period is deducted from the remuneration. Therefore, in sectors where salaries are high, Romanian authorities could consider introducing remuneration for public officials where any income earned during the cooling-off period is subtracted from the amount they receive. Remuneration could even be contingent on the official proving their inability to find employment in their field to a relevant authority, such as the ANI or the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity. This could reduce the need to remunerate former public officials in practice to a limited number of cases. It could also be prudent to base the overall post‑public employment measures on data on salaries in relevant industries to ensure the employment prospects of former public officials are not restricted to the point that they require remuneration.

Compensation should be limited to the period for which the post-public employment restrictions are in place, and it need not necessarily cover the full salary of former officials. In Spain, Laws 74/1980 and 31/1991 provide that compensation for former ministers and state secretaries is limited to 80% of their former public salary and ends after 24 months (the cooling-off period). Romanian authorities could consider similar provisions to safeguard these officials’ rights while reducing the financial burden on the state.

Finally, the need for a cooling-off period and compensation in the first place could be reduced in many cases through a “gardening leave” system. Romania authorities could include provisions in the legal framework whereby a former public official who knows well in advance that they plan to take up employment outside the public sector could notify their current employer and request recusal from duties pertaining to future employment. If requested far enough in advance, this would allow the official to effectively serve the cooling-off period while still in public office and eliminate any need for remuneration after leaving. While this would not be feasible in all cases, given that changes in employment are not always foreseeable so far in advance, providing this option to public officials could reduce administrative burden by requiring monitoring of fewer officials once they leave office.

2.6. Summary of recommendations

The following table provides a detailed summary of the recommendations to the government of Romania for preparing changes to the legal framework on pre- and post-public employment. The recommendations contained herein mirror those contained in the analysis above.

 

Issue	Recommendations
There is a lack of legal clarity arises from spreading provisions on post-public employment across several laws and regulations.	Romanian authorities could introduce legislative reforms that would clarify existing post-public employment provisions, either in existing laws or in one chapter under Law no. 161/2003 and supplement these provisions with additional provisions covering other types of public officials and clarifying monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, as well as pre-public employment measures.
There are gaps in coverage of certain high-risk officials in post‑public employment legislation.	Romanian authorities could ensure that the new provisions also cover the following categories of officials: persons with top executive functions (PTEFs) top management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) officials in regulatory enforcement agencies officials in the Bank of Romania officials issuing licenses or permits officials representing the state in legal proceedings officials evaluating or verifying applications for national funds (in addition to European funds).
There are gaps in at-risk activities and behaviours covered by current post-public employment legislation.	Romanian authorities could define tailored measures for different categories of officials based on existing risks, their magnitude and their likelihood of emerging. Some categories of measures could include: Pre-public employment temporary bans on issuing administrative acts related to a former employer cooling-off period for former lobbyists cooling-off period for PTEFs entering top positions at SOEs requirement to disclose previous employment on interest declaration requirement to sign a statement swearing to maintain integrity in pre- and post-public employment (potentially as part of a general code of conduct). Post-public employment permanent ban on using insider information gained during public employment in the context of private employment permanent ban on exchanging an offer of employment for favours (quid pro quo agreement) permanent ban on switching sides in administrative or regulatory proceedings cooling-off period for PTEFs seeking to become lobbyists cooling-off period for PTEFs entering top positions at SOEs temporary limitations on providing services to entities previously regulated or examined temporary limitations on official dealings with a former public employer requirement for PTEFs to inform of planned post-public employment activities before leaving requirement to declare post-public employment activities for a limited period of time after leaving office option to request gardening leave instead of serving a cooling-off period expanded scope of cooling-off periods for judges.
Sanctions applicable to violations of pre- and post‑public employment provisions are unclear and insufficiently dissuasive in many cases.	Romanian authorities could define specific, proportionate sanctions for violations of pre- and post-public employment measures and assign responsibility to the National Integrity Agency (ANI) for implementation. These sanctions could include: administrative fines loss of position for current public officials violating pre-public employment rules restrictions on holding future public positions for former public officials violating post-public employment rules fines and/or payments for damages for private entities debarment from public procurement for private entities.
Former officials subject to post-public employment restrictions may face difficult securing employment in their field.	Romanian authorities could elaborate provisions that provide appropriate compensation to former public officials subject to post-public employment restrictions for the duration of those restrictions. This compensation could be contingent on proving an inability to find work and any other earned income could be deducted from the amount paid by the state.

References

[6] Barbosa, K. and S. Straub (2017), “The value of revolving doors in public procurement”, TSE Working Papers, No. 17-873, Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse.

[10] GRECO (2023), Fifth Evaluation Round: Preventing Corruption and Promoting Integrity in Central Governments (Top Executive Functions) and Law Enforcement Agencies: Romania, Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption, https://rm.coe.int/grecoeval5rep-2022-4-final-eng-evaluation-report-romania-public/1680ac7782.

[15] GRECO (2016), Fourth Evaluation Round: Corruption Prevention in Respect of Members of Parliament, Judges and Prosecutors: Romania, Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption, https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680a9c84f.

[5] Kalmenovitz, J., S. Vij and K. Xiao (2022), “Closing the revolving door”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4275137.

[17] Ministry of Justice of Romania (2021), Evaluation of Legislation on the Institution of Public Interest Whistleblower and Post-employment Prohibitions (Pantouflage), Ministry of Justice of Romania, Bucharest.

[11] OECD (2022), Evaluation of the Romanian National Anti-corruption Strategy 2016-2020, OECD, Paris.

[4] OECD (2022), OECD Public Integrity Indicators, OECD, Paris, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2025).

[2] OECD (2021), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.

[3] OECD (2020), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.

[16] OECD (2019), Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines on Anti-Corruption and Integrity in State-Owned Enterprises, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0451.

[1] OECD (2010), Post-Public Employment: Good Practices for Preventing Conflict of Interest, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264056701-en.

[13] OECD/World Bank/UNODC (2020), Preventing and Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector: Good Practices Guide, OECD, World Bank and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2020/Preventing-and-Managing-Conflicts-of-Interest-in-the-Public-Sector-Good-Practices-Guide.pdf.

[8] Rhee, K. and S. Hwang (2019), “Effects of revolving doors in the financial sector: Evidence from Korea”, KDI Focus, No. 94, Korea Development Institute, Sejong, https://doi.org/10.22740/kdi.focus.e.2019.94.

[9] Shive, S. and M. Forster (2017), “The revolving door for financial regulators”, Review of Finance, Vol. 21/4, pp. 1445-1484, https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfw035.

[12] VTEK (n.d.), Homepage, Chief Official Ethics Commission of Lithuania, https://vtek.lt/en/home/ (accessed on 19 February 2025).

[7] Western Australian Government (2018), Post-separation Employment: Identifying the Integrity Risks, Public Sector Commission of Western Australia, Perth, https://www.wa.gov.au/system/files/2020-06/post%20separation%20employment%20-%20Identifying%20the%20integrity%20risks.pdf.

[14] Yates, S. and É. Cardin‐Trudeau (2021), “Lobbying “from within”: A new perspective on the revolving door and regulatory capture”, Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 64/2, pp. 301-319, https://doi.org/10.1111/capa.12412.

Notes

← 1.  This recommendation also supports the finding of the Ministry of Justice’s comparative study of post‑public employment in 2021, which examined similarities and differences between post-public employment measures in Romania and select OECD countries (Ministry of Justice of Romania, 2021[17]) and concluded the need for a unified law specifying the officials covered by post-public employment rules.

← 2.  In Romania, PTEF positions include the president, the prime minister, deputy prime ministers, ministers, secretaries and undersecretaries of state, presidential advisers, state advisers, state councillors and ministerial advisers.

← 3.  If Romanian authorities chose to regulate pre- and post-public employment in a single law, it could be prudent to regulate SOEs separately. Indeed, SOEs lie outside the scope of central government, have their own oversight agency and are not currently covered in Law no. 161/2003. Romanian authorities could therefore consider introducing pre- and post-public employment restrictions for management and board members of SOEs in Government Emergency Ordinance no. 109/2011 on the corporate governance of SOEs.