Scaling Up Private Action for Nature

2. Enabling environments

Abstract

This chapter explains how strong enabling environments can help shift private incentives, business practices and financial flows towards biodiversity positive outcomes. It sets out why coherent policy and regulatory frameworks are essential to correct market failures, provide long term policy certainty and strengthen investor confidence. The chapter focuses on three complementary levers: regulatory frameworks, economic instruments and market infrastructure. It examines how development co-operation can support partner countries to strengthen biodiversity-related regulation, reform environmentally harmful subsidies and incentives, improve land and resource governance, integrate biodiversity into trade and procurement policies, and strengthen monitoring, reporting and verification systems. The chapter also highlights the importance of policy coherence, institutional co-ordination and country ownership in creating credible and predictable conditions for investment. By strengthening enabling environments, development actors can help internalise the value of biodiversity in economic decision making and lay the foundations for private sector engagement and finance mobilisation at scale.

Strong enabling environments are important for private action and biodiversity

Enabling environments are key to correcting market failures and aligning the incentives of individual economic actors, so that private sector activities and investment appropriately reflect the value of biodiversity in economic and financial decision making. Such failures, including information asymmetries, temporal and spatial mismatches, and weak governance structures, impede the accurate valuation of biodiversity, leading to mispricing, reduced incentives for private investment and unsustainable production and consumption patterns that accelerate biodiversity loss and environmental degradation. Strengthening enabling environments can help align private action with conservation and the sustainable use of natural resources objectives.

In this context, a predictable enabling environment refers to the policy, regulatory and institutional support systems and economic incentives that guide private behaviour and thus shape investment, production and consumption decisions. Regulation sets the baseline by defining minimum requirements, safeguards and boundaries for environmentally harmful activities, ensuring that negative impacts are avoided or mitigated. Policy frameworks, in contrast, go beyond prohibitions to create the conditions for nature-positive transitions by enabling investment, innovation and risk sharing. Together, these elements support the adoption of sustainable business practices, reduce uncertainty for long-term investment and facilitate the allocation of capital towards activities that deliver positive outcomes for businesses, people and the planet (IPBES, 2026[1]).

Conversely, adverse legal and regulatory conditions can reinforce biodiversity loss and deter private action. Lengthy business registration procedures, weak protection of intellectual property rights, complex and changing taxation rules, heavy procedures to obtain proof of origin, and divergent administrative or technical requirements all raise costs and uncertainty (Adriaenssens, 2015[2]). Such barriers disproportionately affect innovative and small-scale actors (chapter 3) and discourage financial innovation (chapter 4), thereby limiting partnerships and the use of blended finance and other mechanisms that are needed to scale biodiversity finance.

Domestic and international trade can amplify these failures by uncoupling consumption from the environmental costs of production, increasing the pressure on the biosphere through resource depletion, pollution and habitat loss (Dasgupta, 2021[3]; FAO, 2022[4]). When biodiversity impacts are not internalised in prices or regulatory frameworks, trade can magnify and spread these pressures across borders. These impacts vary across contexts but are typically most pronounced where regulatory frameworks are weak or poorly enforced. As global demand for commodities and natural resources continues to grow, addressing biodiversity loss requires coherent policy frameworks that internalise environmental costs and realign private incentives with the KMGBF. Reflecting this need, more than 14 000 companies, with combined revenues over USD 7 trillion, have called for robust policy frameworks to shape market conditions (Business for Nature, 2024[5]).

Three key levers shape an enabling environment that supports private action on biodiversity

A strong enabling environment is essential to halting and reversing biodiversity loss and shaping private sector decision making, encompassing capital allocation, supply chain structures and business practices, among others. Achieving systemic change requires effective institutional co-ordination (including with finance ministries) and consideration of local perspectives, for instance farmers, SMEs and commercial banks in developing countries. Private sector engagement (chapter 3) and private finance mobilisation (chapter 4) for biodiversity depend on supportive enabling conditions.

Strong enabling environments operate through a set of complementary levers that address interacting market failures. A mix of these levers is typically required to enable governments to enhance policy coherence, provide regulatory certainty and build investor confidence – all of which are necessary to influence behaviour and direct investment towards biodiversity-positive outcomes.

Three key levers are essential to strengthen an enabling environment for private action on biodiversity: 1

• regulatory frameworks (e.g. sectoral regulation, property rights, intellectual property, innovation incentives, public procurement, trade policies),

• economic instruments (e.g. scaling up biodiversity-positive incentives, addressing environmental harmful subsidies),

• market infrastructure (e.g. monitoring and enforcement systems, registries).

Development co-operation can support partner countries in strengthening these levers through technical assistance, policy support and development finance (OECD, 2013[6]; Zhang et al., 2025[7]). By supporting their design and implementation, development actors can help reduce risks, strengthen institutions, increase private sector participation and finance for biodiversity, and promote market creation for nature. Strong domestic political commitment and ownership in partner countries are also indispensable to translate technical and capacity solutions and regulatory measures into actual outcomes.

The effectiveness and replicability of these levers vary across local and national contexts (Alpízar et al., 2020[8]) and depend on sequencing and institutional readiness. For instance, secure tenure and property rights are preconditions for attracting private investment, including and especially in natural assets; reliable monitoring and enforcement capacity is needed to deter illegal activities (e.g. illegal logging); and integrating biodiversity into development planning requires human and technological capacity as well as standardised metrics of environmental performance (NBSAP Accelerator Partnership, 2024[9]; Tobin-de la Puente and Mitchell, 2021[10]). Attention to sequencing can therefore help manage expectations regarding the pace and scale of efforts.

Moreover, transitioning to sustainable practices and deploying biodiversity-related financial instruments are unlikely to succeed where demand is uncertain and credible market conditions are absent. The creation of nature markets is therefore contingent on the strength of the underlying enabling environment, which underpins the functioning of markets that depend on nature (Box 1.1). Beyond biodiversity-related challenges, developing countries often face weak institutional capacity and enforcement, which can increase reputational, integrity and financial risks for private investors. Ensuring a robust enabling environment is therefore important to foster credible demand and support market development.

Box 2.1. Enabling environments are a precondition for market creation for nature

The term ‘nature markets’ broadly refers to systems where goods or services linked to biodiversity and natural resources (also called natural capital) are traded. Market creation for nature can encompass a broad range of arrangements (OECD, 2004[11]). However, while markets exist for some forms of natural capital, such as provisioned goods (e.g. crops, wood and minerals), only a portion of natural capital is currently reflected in market prices (BlackRock, 2025[12]), with pricing particularly underdeveloped for regulating services (e.g. water filtration) and cultural services (e.g. recreation) (World Economic Forum, 2025[13]).

Constraints on the expansion of markets that value nature include weak regulation and oversight, limited knowledge and transparency of market conditions, inconsistent data and time lags between incurred costs and revenues, all of which discourage market participation (Conservation International and EcoAdvisors, 2024[14]). The availability of core market infrastructure for nature finance – data systems, registries and verification platforms, for example – as well as expectations around consumer behaviour and investor preferences also impact potential expansion, as these can influence how natural capital is valued in markets and shape business decisions related to strategies and supply chains reliant on nature.

Ultimately, the emergence of nature markets is contingent on enabling environments that allow biodiversity-related value to be priced, traded and managed with integrity. With the emergence of new nature market tools and approaches such as nature credits and digital and tokenised instruments, there is a critical need for adaptive, transparent and predictable regulation to reduce the risk of greenwashing (Gómez Mont, Persson and Buenadicha Sánchez, 2023[15]). Ensuring that those on the front lines of nature stewardship – farmers, foresters, fishers, landowners, marine and freshwater resource users, managers of protected areas and local communities – can participate in and benefit from these markets is especially important (European Commission, 2025[16]) if nature markets are to deliver genuine natural capital outcomes and public benefits.

Regulatory frameworks

Regulatory frameworks set the parameters that determine what activities are permitted, restricted or prohibited; allocate rights and responsibilities; and influence the costs, risks and returns associated with biodiversity-related investment. Thus, they serve as supportive mechanisms to broader ecosystem drivers – investor expectations, corporate risk mitigation strategies, upstream and downstream integration of environmental requirements, long-term natural resource dependencies and consumer behaviour, for instance – that reinforce, enable and scale transitions within markets and value chains. As such, they determine whether private action flows towards biodiversity-positive activities or continues to reinforce practices that can place nature at risk.

Despite significant progress, institutions and policies still fall short of what is needed for environmental considerations to be reflected in production and consumption decisions (WTO/UNEP, 2018[17]). In many cases, policies across sectors remain misaligned, sending contradictory signals to markets and investors. Moreover, conflicting policies and insufficient biodiversity mainstreaming – such as transport infrastructure planning frameworks that prioritise network expansion without fully integrating biodiversity considerations – can exacerbate biodiversity loss and drive habitat fragmentation (OECD, 2021[18]). Inconsistencies like these dilute incentives for biodiversity-positive actions and may also perpetuate activities that are harmful for nature. Importantly, the proliferation of policies and standards related to environmental objectives, combined with limited harmonisation, can especially impact small producers and developing countries as they may struggle to deal with rising compliance costs (OECD, 2025[19]).

Policy coherence across sectors (e.g. fisheries, forestry, agriculture, tourism and infrastructure) is therefore essential to align incentives, reduce trade-offs, boost innovation and ensure that regulatory frameworks efficiently support sustainable business and trade practices. Achieving this coherence would require integrating biodiversity considerations into broader economic, fiscal, sectoral and trade policies to ensure that biodiversity goals are not undermined by competing national priorities and to provide consistent investment signals to the private sector.

This subsection focuses on the following key components of policy and regulatory frameworks where development co-operation can support the alignment of finance and investment with biodiversity goals: sector regulation, intellectual property, innovation incentives and benefit-sharing, property rights regimes for natural resources, public procurement and trade policies.

Sector regulation

Sector regulation is essential for operationalising biodiversity considerations through concrete regulatory and policy instruments, and it defines how economic activities take these instruments into account. Effective and coherent regulation can drive alignment of private practices, for example by setting standards that have to be met while also mobilising private investment, thus reducing overall financing needs.

These instruments may include regulatory (command and control) measures such as protected areas and zoning systems, as well as spatial planning instruments and legally designated ecological corridors. Protected areas, for example, through their legal status, management plans and zoning schemes, define permissible uses, reduce regulatory uncertainty and help direct private investment towards biodiversity-positive activities such as restoration, sustainable tourism and certified value chains while safeguarding no-go areas.

Sector-specific regulations are particularly important for mainstreaming biodiversity considerations into nature-dependent sectors. These may include environmental quality or quantity standards (e.g. water use limits or fishing gear specifications); environmental impact assessments (EIAs); permitting systems; and due diligence requirements for certain commodities. For example, pollution from agricultural intensification and increased use of fertilisers and pesticides contributes to soil degradation and water contamination, underscoring the importance of binding regulations on nutrient and pesticide use. To ensure policy coherence, frameworks such as National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) could help align national biodiversity priorities across sectoral policies and regulations, as discussed in Box 1.2.

Development co-operation also can play a catalytic role in supporting the design, adoption and implementation of these sector regulations by providing technical assistance, funding and institutional capacity development. For instance, Sida’s support to the Zambia Environmental Management Agency is contributing to the implementation of new chemicals legislation on pesticide management, including development of administrative tools, co-ordination mechanisms and guidelines, alongside long-term advisory support from the Swedish Chemicals Agency to strengthen management of chemicals by society and Zambian companies (Openaid, 2025[20]). At the regional level, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has helped Southern African governments develop regional pesticide management guidelines aligned with biodiversity conservation (FAO, 2025[21]). Other initiatives support the integration of biodiversity considerations directly into sector policies. For example, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project implemented with technical assistance from the FAO and funding from the GEF focused on mainstreaming conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity resources into sector and national agricultural and land management policies and plans in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (UNDP, 2018[22]).

Development co-operation also supports shared regulatory agendas for the sustainable management and exploitation of transboundary and globally significant natural resources. For example, several DAC members2 support the World Bank’s PROBLUE multi‑donor trust fund, which strengthens the enabling environment for sustainable blue economy investment through marine spatial planning, policy reforms, analytical tools and blue‑finance frameworks (World Bank, 2025[23]). By integrating biodiversity considerations into marine pollution management, sustainable fisheries, circular plastics and coastal resilience strategies, PROBLUE helps align public and private investment with sustainable ocean governance.

Many biodiversity assets extend across national boundaries such as the Amazon forest, marine corridors and shared ocean ecosystems require co-ordinated regulatory frameworks and regional collaboration (OECD et al., 2025[24]). In this context, PROBLUE and the GEF are supporting the Eastern Tropical Pacific Marine Corridor (CMAR), a regional initiative involving Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Panama that aims to strengthen joint conservation planning and resilient governance and promote sustainable blue economy models across national boundaries (Global Environment Facility, 2025[25]; Serrano et al., 2025[26]). Through such interventions, development actors help increase policy coherence across sectors and jurisdictions, and provide clearer signals to private actors.

Box 2.2. National biodiversity strategies and action plans (NBSAPs) as frameworks for mainstreaming and policy coherence

Mainstreaming biodiversity across sectoral policies requires strong cross-ministerial co-ordination to ensure policy coherence and provide clear signals for private action, including action to mobilise private finance for biodiversity and reduce negative flows. NBSAPs can serve as a central co-ordination framework.

NBSAPs are the main instrument through which countries translate global biodiversity commitments under the CBD into national strategies and action plans. As national biodiversity roadmaps, they set national biodiversity priorities and provide long-term policy direction, with the potential to offer a strategic signal to private actors.

Biodiversity finance strategies and clearer roles for private actors are increasingly included in newly updated plans (UNEP-WCMC, 2025[27]). However, NBSAPs tend to be high-level policy documents that, in practice, are not well aligned across ministries and rarely cascade into prioritised, costed and implementable actions linked to national investment planning, fiscal policy or financial sector decision making (World Economic Forum, 2025[13]; UNEP-WCMC, 2025[27]). Limited political ownership and insufficient engagement of finance, planning, economic and infrastructure ministries further reinforce siloed implementation (OECD, 2013[6]; NBSAP Accelerator Partnership, 2024[9]). As a result, private action may go towards ad hoc initiatives rather than nationally endorsed biodiversity priorities, limiting its overall effectiveness.

Strengthening NBSAPs as levers for private action

NBSAPs can be strengthened by defining concrete metrics, prioritised actions and measurable deliverables that allow them to be used as guiding principles for allocating resources and demonstrating impact. Translating priorities into spatially defined investment rules and a clear logic for financing – including protected area management plans, restoration priorities and ecological connectivity measures – can help channel private finance towards nationally endorsed biodiversity outcomes.

Effective implementation also depends on co-ordination across national and subnational governments to ensure enforcement capacity, alignment with broader development objectives and adequate institutional capacity at local levels. Engaging finance ministries in the revision and implementation of NBSAPs is particularly important to ensure that financial considerations are properly embedded and aligned. Raising private sector awareness of the national biodiversity priorities set forth in the NBSAP is a critical entry point for supporting implementation (UNEP-WCMC, 2025[27]). Structured dialogue platforms that bring together ministries, regulators and investors also can help align priorities, address information gaps and foster mutual understanding.

Development co-operation can play a role in strengthening NBSAPs by providing support to integrate biodiversity goals into core public finance and planning instruments, supporting their operationalisation through regulations and investment frameworks, and facilitating multi-stakeholder policy dialogue. Collaborative efforts with platforms such as UNDP’s Biodiversity Finance Initiative (BIOFIN), the NBSAP Acceleration Partnership and the UNDP Sustainable Finance Hub promote policy dialogue and build capacity across ministries and financial regulators to integrate biodiversity into national financial and policy frameworks. BIOFIN, supported by several DAC members¹, helps governments develop biodiversity finance plans and implement evidence‑based finance solutions. For instance, BIOFIN supported Zambia to set up a Green Finance Mainstreaming Working Group, bringing together the three key financial regulators to create a formal mechanism to align financial sector policies and supervision with sustainability objectives and also supported financing for Zambia’s NBSAP (UNEP/WWF, 2024[28]).

Private sector engagement in the co-development of NBSAPs can further foster strategic business responses and investment planning. For example, the GEF has supported business-government dialogue processes in Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, and South Africa to integrate business action plans and recommendations into NBSAPs (CI-GEF, 2025[29]).

1. DAC members funding BIOFIN are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the European Union, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Property rights regimes

A clear, robust regime of property rights and titling is essential for private investment frameworks. This is particularly relevant for biodiversity, where the allocation of rights and responsibilities directly shape resource use and conservation outcomes. A property right can be understood as the authority to undertake particular actions in relation to a specific resource, including withdrawal (e.g. to determine how, when and where resource extraction may occur) and access, management, exclusion, and transfer; different rights create different incentives to conserve or degrade natural resources (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992[30]; OECD, 2004[11]).

Unclear or contested ownership arrangements often create barriers to sustainable resource management and imply fundamental uncertainties for investment. For example, lack of registered land rights can enable deforestation, undermine traceability systems (e.g. to verify whether agricultural commodities are deforestation free) and deter long-term investment (World Bank, 2024[31]). Moreover, weak legal certainty over land or sea rights; overlapping and competing land uses (e.g. agriculture, infrastructure and urban expansion); and land conflicts further exacerbate ecosystem degradation and present material risks for private investors and financiers. These issues may also limit local stewardship, particularly among Indigenous peoples and local communities facing legal and institutional barriers that constrain their ability to plan and monitor natural resources. Inadequate consultation and weak social legitimacy can increase both social and investment risks, including risks to project durability and investment performance.

Secure property rights help legitimise nature markets and strengthen investor confidence. They enable enforceable contractual arrangements and ensure that access is well defined so that the owner can reasonably expect that today’s investments will generate future returns. This, in turn, can help increase both demand and supply while reducing environmental degradation (Conservation International and EcoAdvisors, 2024[14]; OECD, 2004[11]). For example, the use of individual transferable quotas for fisheries has helped reverse degradation in several fisheries by linking long-term value to sustainable harvesting.

At the international level, legal frameworks governing state sovereignty over natural resources can interact with domestic property and use‑rights regimes by establishing the jurisdiction within which access and management rules apply. For example, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea establishes exclusive economic zones (United Nations, 1982[32]), clarifying sovereign rights over marine resources and creating the legal basis for national authorities to allocate use and access rights that can support sustainable management and investment.

Development actors can support governments in strengthening legal frameworks and institutional capacity for tenure rights which can reduce structural and operational risks and enable biodiversity-related investments. This can include technical assistance for land registration, cadastral development and the formalisation of customary tenure systems (GIZ, 2019[33]) as well as support for the promotion of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) principles that are integral to investment integrity and financial sustainability. For example, the World Bank has helped Côte d’Ivoire deliver land certificates and land-use contracts, train government and private sector stakeholders, and strengthen women’s land rights during the land registration process (World Bank, 2024[31]). Such initiatives can help resolve land disputes, increase tenure security, improve transparency, and enable more sustainable management of land, forest and water resources.

Intellectual property, innovation incentives and benefit-sharing

Intellectual property rights, including patent law and related market regulation, form an important part of a broader enabling environment that shapes private investment incentives, including in biodiversity-relevant markets. Patent and related intellectual property rules are important to motivating private investment (e.g. entrepreneurial researchers) towards innovation in products and processes for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity (UNEP/TESS, 2023[34]). They are particularly relevant in situations of easily replicable knowledge or technologies, ensuring that innovators can obtain profits from the investments over a fixed period of time.

In particular, inventions based on genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge can be subject to both patent protection and access and benefit‑sharing (ABS) requirements. The CBD calls for effective legal, policy, administrative and capacity development measures to secure benefit sharing, linking biodiversity-based innovation to benefit sharing arrangements (CBD, 2022[35]; CBD, 2006[36]). These measures could be considered in the context of the broader international regime on ABS, which includes the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol (CBD, 2011[37]) as well as complementary mechanisms under the World Intellectual Property Organization (2024[38]); the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (WIPO, 2026[39]); the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture; the Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (United Nations, 2026[40]); and the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework of the World Health Organization (WHO, 2021[41]).

Implementing these ABS requirements in practice depends on technical and institutional capacity. However, many developing countries face significant gaps in technology, skilled personnel and biobanking infrastructure (e.g. facilities and systems for collecting, storing and documenting biological samples and associated data), which may hinder the effective implementation of ABS and the sustainable management of genetic resources.

Support from development co-operation can help address these gaps and strengthen capacities related to biological resources. For example, the Development Innovation Office of Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) has supported a project in Tanzania to develop biobanking infrastructure and profit-sharing business models for parasite-derived resources, implemented in partnership with Cocoon, Turbosoft and Chungbuk National University (KOICA Tanzania Office, 2021[42]). The project also supports technology transfer, specialised training on parasite bioresources and the establishment of a laboratory, thereby enabling Tanzania to strengthen sovereign control over its genetic resources and share the benefits arising from their use, including through downstream innovation (e.g. in biotechnology, pharmaceuticals). The initiative illustrates how development co-operation can strengthen enabling frameworks (including intellectual property management), helping to stimulate innovation and ensure that benefits (e.g. royalties) are shared within the countries of origin.

Development actors can also play an important role in facilitating the implementation of ABS and compliance mechanisms and supporting the capacity of Indigenous peoples and local communities to participate in benefit-sharing arrangements.3 For example, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom support the ABS BioTrade platform, which encompasses the ABS Capacity Development Initiative and BioInnovation Africa. The mission of the platform is to help countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific implement ABS provisions within the KMGBF and improve capacities in digital sequence information (DSI) and ensure that Indigenous peoples and local communities participate in ABS agreements (ABS-Biotrade, 2026[43]). The platform also works with key actors (e.g. farmers, cooperatives, MSMEs and research institutions) to strengthen biotrade4 value chains of indigenous species and supports European-African business partnerships for biodiversity-based products and innovations.

Benefit-sharing mechanisms exist in particular at the international level through multilateral frameworks. Multilateral mechanisms for benefit sharing from the use of DSI on genetic resources can help preserve incentives for research and innovation in at least two ways. First, they can ensure that solutions are efficient, feasible and practical, and that they generate benefits that outweigh costs. Second, they can provide legal certainty and clarity for providers and users of DSI (including across sectors such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and animal and plant breeding) (CBD, 2022[44]). An example is the Cali Fund, a multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism designed to mobilise private sector finance from businesses that use DSI on genetic resources (CBD, 2024[45]). Private sector representatives hold two observer seats on its steering committee, alongside representatives of civil society and academia, illustrating the Fund’s whole-of-society approach at the global level that can help reduce transaction and compliance costs, enhance legal certainty and enable more equitable and scalable benefit sharing, including for Indigenous peoples and local communities. The Cali Fund further has the potential to become an innovative setting for collaboration and policy dialogue among public and private entities in support of international resource mobilisation for biodiversity (Box A.B.1). Strengthening these multilateral public-private partnership‑type arrangements could help involve the private sector more effectively in biodiversity-related projects and unlock the innovation and financing they require.

Public procurement

Procurement policies can determine how goods and services are produced, sourced and consumed, influencing how natural resources are used across the economy. As major buyers, governments can shape market demand, provide long-term purchase commitments and set clear sustainability requirements. Countries are increasingly using green public procurement (GPP), the public purchasing of products and services that are less environmentally damaging, to achieve environmental protection objectives (OECD, 2024[46]). As a subset of GPP, the integration of biodiversity considerations into procurement criteria (e.g. deforestation-free supply chains, sustainable sourcing and certified products) enables governments to create predictable demand for biodiversity-related goods and services and incentivise private investment in nature markets. More broadly, public procurement can constitute a strategic instrument for advancing balanced economic, social and environmental objectives. Sustainable procurement requires balancing these three dimensions and comes with trade-offs that are often context specific – an important consideration for developing countries.

Many countries also are establishing national ecolabels and certification programmes to help procurers identify green products or services or are developing sectoral environmental standards and contract provisions related to recycling, sustainable sourcing, waste management, plastic pollution and the circular economy. For example, South Africa promotes green procurement through circular economy guidelines in the waste sector that encourage integration of circular practices through value chains and lifecycle costing into procurement practices (Erizaputri and Bechauf, 2025[47]); and Brazil has ecolabels that certify environmentally friendly products and responsible suppliers (OECD, 2024[46]).

Despite progress, challenges remain, including a lack of data on the impacts of green procurement strategies and the need to better capture lifecycle costs and environmental impacts of goods and services procured, which can limit the ability of private suppliers to differentiate themselves and compete on sustainability performance.

Development co-operation can support partner countries in embedding biodiversity considerations into public procurement policies and strengthening institutional capacity among procurement authorities and contractors. For example, Germany supports Latin American countries in integrating biodiversity protection in sustainable public procurement policies by helping to define or improve procurement criteria using ecolabels as a means of verification (International Climate Initiative, 2026[48]). The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) supports Serbia through a project implemented by the National Alliance for Local Economic Development that aims to strengthen the capacity of contracting authorities, introduce environmental and sustainability criteria into procurement processes, and improve supply chain management (Naled, 2026[49]). Germany also supports sustainable palm oil supply chains in Asia, combining producer certification with demand-side measures including public procurement guidelines that favour certified products (International Climate Initiative, 2026[50]).

Beyond supporting partner country systems, development actors also influence biodiversity outcomes through specific environmental criteria applied to the procurement activities they directly finance. Development co-operation procurement guidelines can require all parties involved take all reasonable steps to avoid or limit negative effects on nature (e.g. vegetation, biodiversity, soils, groundwater and surface water) and consider environmentally sound products and/or services as well as relevant international and/or national frameworks, conventions and legislation. For example, they may prohibit certain chemicals or fertilisers applicable for the services or goods to be procured (Sida, 2020[51]; AFD, 2024[52]). In these ways, development actors can promote biodiversity considerations both in partner country systems and in their own procurement operations.

Trade policies

Trade links consumption in one country with production and investment in others, shaping demand and private sector incentives along value chains, particularly where production is export-oriented. But trade can have both positive and negative impacts for biodiversity (OECD, 2021[53]). For example, trade can have positive impacts on biodiversity by supporting the diffusion of technologies that enhance production efficiency, thus reducing natural capital depletion, and that connect demand for, and supply of, environmental goods and services that help tackle biodiversity loss (Dasgupta, 2021[3]).

However, the sourcing and trading of resources from nature-dependent sectors can generate significant environmental externalities both at the local and global level. For example, agricultural commodity production (e.g. for cattle, soybeans, cocoa and palm oil) has contributed to biodiversity loss and deforestation, while globalised supply chains mean that these impacts often occur far from the places of final consumption (Green et al., 2019[54]). In this context, increased market integration has contributed to forest conversion and biodiversity loss in exporting regions (FAO, 2022[4]). More broadly, most of the environmental impacts of trade depend on local conditions and tend to be exacerbated in poorly regulated contexts (FAO, 2022[4]). An upcoming OECD report explores additional trade and biodiversity linkages (OECD, forthcoming[55]).

Trade policies and measures can help address these environmental externalities. Environmentally related trade (e.g. wildlife, fish, timber and commodities) can be regulated at national, regional and global levels through a range of instruments. Non-tariff measures (NTMs), for instance, can influence trade flows by affecting quantities traded, prices or both (FAO, 2022[4]). They encompass sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures that ensure food safety and protect animal or plant health as well as technical barriers to trade (TBT) such as technical regulations and standards related to environmental protection, pollution, labour health and safety, and consumer protection (FAO, 2022[4]).

Multilateral trade rules and regional trade agreements (RTAs) are increasingly used as a tool to support biodiversity objectives (FAO, 2022[4]). Trade agreements can help address environmental externalities by embedding environmental-related provisions including preferential access for biodiversity-friendly products, biodiversity safeguards, stakeholder engagement mechanisms and monitoring of implementation. Such provisions can be foreseen under multilateral agreements, such as those under the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) (Box 1.3), and are increasingly being incorporated into RTAs. For example, the European Union (EU) and Mercosur Partnership Agreement includes binding commitments to combat illegal logging and deforestation, ensure the effective implementation of multilateral environmental agreements such as the CITES, uphold environmental standards and co-operate on sustainable supply chains for timber and other commodities. EU legislation, including the upcoming European Union Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), continues to apply to imports under the agreement, preventing the placement of deforestation-linked products on the EU market (European Commission, 2026[56]).

Development co-operation provides a key role in supporting these trade-related frameworks. It provides funding and technical support to policy dialogue and international co-operation on trade and biodiversity, and it helps partner countries implement and enforce relevant agreements, such as the CITES to combat illegal wildlife trade (OECD, 2023[57]). International co-operation through established trade mechanisms also enhances sustainable use of natural resources and at the same time supports livelihoods for the poor. This is in line with the needs stressed by developing countries, which highlight the importance of transparency, consultation and international co-operation in designing environment-related trade policies but also recognising different responsibilities and national sovereignty over natural resources (Kettunen, 2023[58]). Development actors also engage in sector-specific and supply chain initiatives such as the Forest, Agriculture and Commodity Trade Dialogue launched by the United Kingdom (FACT, 2023[59]), which enables government-to-government and government-to-business dialogues to protect forests and other ecosystems while also promoting sustainable international trade of agricultural commodities.

Box 2.3. The role of multilateral and international co-operation for biodiversity-related trade policy

Multilateral co-operation plays an important role in helping countries integrate environmental considerations into trade policy frameworks. Many developing economies are increasingly turning to aid for trade to help them integrate environmental and sustainability considerations into trade, including strengthening customs and SPS/TBT-related procedures, improving trade facilitation for sustainable and green goods, and building capacity to address trade-related environmental externalities as they engage in global value chains (OECD/WTO, 2024[60]). Discussions across WTO bodies are progressively addressing the interface of trade, biodiversity and sustainable development, including in the committees on Trade and Environment (WTO, 2025[61]) and on SPS (WTO, 2025[62]). Countries are also driving initiatives such as the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD) (WTO, 2025[63]) and the Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade (WTO, 2025[64]), further illustrating how the WTO is providing platforms to address environmental externalities embedded in global value chains.

Under WTO rules, countries can adopt trade-related measures aimed at protecting the environment. Dispute settlement rulings under the WTO such as Shrimp-Turtle and Brazil-Retreaded Tyres demonstrate how multilateral mechanisms help reconcile trade and environmental objectives (FAO, 2022[4]). Meanwhile, RTAs have evolved from instruments focused primarily on market access to frameworks that increasingly embed environmental provisions, including commitments on biodiversity conservation, regulatory co-operation, and support for sustainability standards (FAO, 2022[4]). Environment-related NTMs notified under the TBT Agreement have been growing steadily, accounting on average for 15% of all technical regulations and standards, reflecting the rising use of trade policy tools to address soil and water pollution abatement, energy conservation and plant and forestry conservation (Bellmann and van der Ven, 2020[65]).

These multilateral mechanisms support transparency, regulatory certainty and international co-operation, helping countries manage trade-related biodiversity risks and align global value chains with conservation goals. The CITES, an international conservation agreement that regulates cross-border wildlife trade, is another example of a multilateral trade framework to address biodiversity loss through international co-operation. Because the trade in wild animals and plants crosses national borders, efforts to regulate it rely on co-operation to safeguard certain species from over-exploitation (CITES, 2025[66]). The CITES regulates international wildlife trade in over 40 000 species based on a system of permits and certificates issued under certain conditions. The CITES trade-related measures, some of which often have domestic implications, are its core regulatory system and include trade bans, export quotas and science-based analysis of trade’s impact on species conservation.

Economic instruments

Economic instruments complement regulatory command-and-control instruments by providing price signals that incentivise biodiversity protection (by encouraging positive behaviour and discouraging negative behaviour). Many can also generate revenue (e.g. biodiversity-relevant taxes) and mobilise finance for biodiversity (e.g. PES and biodiversity-motivated subsidies) (OECD, 2021[53]). By influencing production and consumption choices, such instruments help internalise environmental externalities and address the absence of market incentives for the provision of ecosystem services (e.g. incentives that support farmers in transitioning to agroecological and regenerative models).

Certain types of subsidies may, however, have unintended effects on biodiversity. Overall support for production and consumption remains skewed towards activities that distort markets and can put nature at risk, often surpassing support for biodiversity-related activities (OECD, 2025[67]). For example, on average 66% (USD 412 billion) of support to agricultural producers in 54 countries was identified as having high distorting potential, most of it market price support and budgetary transfers to individual producers (e.g. for the use of inputs such as fertilisers or fuel) (OECD, 2025[19]). In contrast, budgetary support directed to the supply of environmental public goods (e.g. planting hedges that provide habitat for insects and birds) represented less than 0.3% (USD 1.7 billion) of all positive producer support on average over 2021-23 (OECD, 2024[68]). Distorted price signals can create path dependencies between public subsidies and private behaviour that can reinforce environmentally harmful practices.

Target 18 of the KMGBF aims to reduce incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity and to scale up positive incentives for biodiversity (CBD, 2024[69]), key features to support the transition towards more sustainable production and consumption behaviours (IPBES, 2019[70]). This entails the identification and assessment of harmful incentives, consideration of alternatives against long-term welfare and environmental gains and, in particular, improvements in policy coherence, as it would be economically inefficient to finance biodiversity-positive incentives with scarce public resources while continuing to subsidise environmentally harmful activities (Matthews and Karousakis, 2022[71]).

This sub-section looks at both positive incentives and the reform of environmentally harmful subsidies as complementary components of an enabling environment for private action for biodiversity.

Positive incentives

Positive incentives for biodiversity aim to incentivise actions that conserve, restore or sustainably use biodiversity. They include a range of economic instruments: payments for ecosystem services (PES), tradeable permits, biodiversity offsets and emerging (voluntary) credits as well as environmentally motivated subsidies, taxes and charges – including on pesticides, fertilisers, natural resources extraction, wastewater discharges and entrance fees to natural parks – that integrate environmental costs and benefits into economic decision making (OECD, 2025[67]).

Depending on the instrument, they can either discourage activities harmful to biodiversity (e.g. pollution taxes) or reward positive outcomes (e.g. PES for reforestation). By aligning private incentives with environmental objectives, they enable markets to support conservation and the sustainable use of natural resources. For example, catch share reforms (including individual transferable quotas) may halt, and even reverse, the trend toward fishery collapse, by providing stewardship incentives for sustainable harvesting (Costello, Gaines and Lynham, 2008[72]).

PES schemes reward landholders or resource users for maintaining or enhancing ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration, watershed protection or habitat provisioning. Their effectiveness is greatest where property rights are clear, beneficiaries are well identified and organised, and are spatially targeted (OECD, 2025[67]; Engel, 2016[73]; Matzdorf, Sattler and Engel, 2013[74]).

Development co-operation can play an important role in helping to align incentives. For example, Sida supports policy dialogue and capacity building of high-level policymakers and decision makers in East African partner countries to reform policies and instruments (e.g. taxes, fees, pollution charges, green investments and subsidies), promoting a transition towards an inclusive green economy (Openaid, 2023[75]).

Development co-operation can also support partner countries to design, pilot and scale biodiversity-positive incentives. For example, funding from Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom supported a willingness-to-pay survey and the digitisation of payment systems in Tanzania’s Marine Conservation Areas, which enabled an increase in tourist fee revenues from USD 1.3 million to USD 4.3 million per year, with funding also channelled to conservation efforts including reef restoration and environmentally friendly fishing gear for local communities (BIOFIN, 2025[76]). In Peru, Canada and the United States supported the Natural Infrastructure for Water Security (NIWS) programme, enabling water utilities and local actors to use water tariffs and PES mechanisms to co‑finance natural infrastructure projects, including watershed restoration, reforestation, wetland restoration, improved grazing practices and pre‑Incan canal rehabilitation (Global Affairs Canada, 2025[77]).

Development co-operation actors are also supporting the emergence of biodiversity offsets and (voluntary) credits by helping partner countries identify appropriate use cases and develop high-integrity project pipelines. This includes strengthening the regulatory and market infrastructure to ensure that credits channel finance towards credible, measurable and additional conservation actions (revenue generation from integrating biodiversity into carbon mechanisms is explored in chapter 4). An example is the International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits, co-launched by France and the United Kingdom, which runs a policy lab to help governments develop regulatory guidance and frameworks and works globally (including in developing countries), notably through the Panel’s Framework for High-Integrity Biodiversity Credit Markets (United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 2025[78]; International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits, 2024[79]). In parallel, the European Commission has launched a Nature Credits Roadmap aimed at developing standards and reliable certification for nature-positive actions to ensure that biodiversity credits are effective and trustworthy. It is also piloting a project in Peru to assess how EU-based companies can contribute to biodiversity conservation abroad while meeting EU sustainability reporting standards (European Commission, 2025[16]). Peru is concurrently establishing a national biodiversity credit project registry to ensure transparency, traceability and integrity of conservation initiatives, reinforcing the enabling environment for such pilot efforts (Peru Ministry of Environment, 2026[80]). Pilot initiatives illustrate how development co-operation can test emerging biodiversity credit frameworks while managing risks related to integrity, additionality and greenwashing.

Removing or reforming environmentally harmful subsidies

Environmentally harmful subsidies can increase the financial attractiveness of unsustainable activities, undermining the potential for biodiversity-positive incentives and the activities they promote (OECD, 2025[67]). For example, production or input-related agricultural support can encourage intensification (e.g. higher use of fertilisers and pesticides) or expansion of cultivated land into semi-natural areas. These incentive effects can increase pollution pressures and contribute to habitat conversion and fragmentation, thereby accelerating biodiversity loss (Lankoski, Nales and Valin, 2025[81]).

Reforming or removing such environmentally harmful subsidies can therefore help correct distorted price signals and reduce conflicting policy incentives, including agricultural subsidies that encourage the more intensive use of damaging inputs or the expansion of production to the detriment of natural ecosystems. By realigning incentives with environmental objectives, subsidy reform can reduce pressures on ecosystems while improving policy coherence. However, developing countries in particular may face multiple barriers in addressing such subsidies (IPBES, 2024[82]). Concerns over industry competitiveness and income distribution may also create political and public resistance since the reform of a subsidy can “generate some losers from the policy change” (OECD, 2005[83]). Yet, this opposition may be easier to overcome if changes are clearly communicated to the public and accompanied by a policy mix including complementary measures such as compensation mechanisms or alternative production support for the affected sectors (Matthews and Karousakis, 2022[71]).

Development actors can support efforts to identify, understand and reform environmentally harmful subsidies, including where these distortions affect international trade and global value chains. The Caribbean Development Bank (2024[84]), for example, is supporting Caribbean countries to ratify and implement the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies through regional workshops and technical assistance; in parallel, several countries are contributing to the WTO Fisheries Funding Mechanism Trust Fund, which helps partner countries engage in negotiations, implement the new fisheries subsidies disciplines and strengthen fisheries management to meet the requirements of the agreement (WTO, 2025[85]). These efforts are critical for biodiversity as they aim to curb subsidies that contribute to overfishing and depletion of marine resources, thereby helping to sustain fish stocks and protect marine ecosystems.

Together, scaling up positive incentives and correcting market distortions are central to realigning economic signals with biodiversity objectives, reducing support for damaging activities while improving the economic viability of conservation and sustainable use.

Market infrastructure

Market infrastructure for nature – such as monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems, enforcement mechanisms, data systems, public registries – plays a foundational role by ensuring compliance, transparency, accountability and safeguarding the integrity of biodiversity-related markets and investments. Beyond their public oversight role, these systems influence whether biodiversity-positive activities can be credibly measured, verified, priced, financed and scaled by private actors, particularly in contexts where institutional capacity and enforcement are weak.

This sub-section looks into monitoring and enforcement systems, as well as broader market infrastructure, that enable biodiversity markets and investments, and it highlights entry points for development co-operation to support these.

Monitoring and enforcement systems and other market infrastructure

Market infrastructure operationalises the enabling environment for nature markets by supporting nature-related financial instruments and standardising data and reporting, reducing information asymmetry between project developers, buyers and regulators and enabling due diligence (UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2023[86]). Credible monitoring and enforcement systems are prerequisites for market participation as private investors need assurance that rules will be applied consistently and claims verified robustly.

MRV systems in particular generate the evidence needed for results-based finance (chapter 4) and private investment. In practice, the effectiveness of these systems relies on reliable, locally relevant and updated data. To reduce conflicts, improve transparency and prevent double counting, MRV systems and public registries benefit from being geospatially explicit – clearly identifying project boundaries, baseline conditions and safeguards – and interoperable with national protected area and land-use databases.

Establishing or reinforcing agencies that have clear mandates, adequate resources and authority for verification, monitoring and enforcement further reduces regulatory and reputational risks while helping to prevent greenwashing; these can include environmental regulatory agencies and oversight bodies for nature markets and registries (Conservation International and EcoAdvisors, 2024[14]). In this regard, some countries and subnational state-based schemes have created enabling environments for registries that link purchasers and investors to certified projects. Strengthening alignment between certification systems, markets and registries can reduce fragmentation, improve transparency and enhance access.

Development actors can support market infrastructure such as registries, standards and governance arrangements to crowd in private capital by building confidence, trust and accountability. They can also help partner countries develop and institutionalise MRV systems. An example is the United Kingdom’s Accelerating Innovation Monitoring For Forests (AIM4Forests) programme, which supports countries to institutionalise national forest monitoring systems (NFMS) with the aid of modern monitoring technologies while also enabling Indigenous peoples and forest communities to participate (FCDO, 2025[87]). By improving monitoring capacity, this and similar initiatives facilitate access to finance and increase consumer confidence in the integrity of forest and land use carbon credits (e.g. the UN framework Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, or REDD+). Paraguay’s reforms under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Resilience and Sustainability Facility, for instance, are strengthening institutional and financial capacities to protect native forests and respond to deforestation alerts (IMF, 2024[88]). Measures include creating a national directorate for the NFMS to adopt an emissions MRV system, improving co-ordination among public agencies to respond to illegal land-use change and establishing a biomass consumers registry to support biomass certification processes.

Enabling environments are fundamental for internalising the economic value of biodiversity and unlocking private action and financing for biodiversity

Private finance and investment respond to the credibility, coherence and policy signals provided by the enabling environment. Persistent market failures distort incentives and steer private action towards activities that can be detrimental to nature. Strengthening the enabling environment – particularly through mainstreaming biodiversity considerations across sectors and policies – provides an opportunity to address these failures, encourage more sustainable practices and reduce pressures on biodiversity.

Three key levers underpin an enabling environment for private action for biodiversity: regulatory and institutional frameworks, economic instruments= and market infrastructure. When deployed coherently, they internalise environmental costs, reduce uncertainty, foster environmental integrity and create investable opportunities. Weaknesses in any lever can undermine the others, limiting private participation or leading to superficial or misaligned outcomes.

Development co-operation has an important function in strengthening these levers by addressing institutional gaps, supporting policy coherence and building market confidence. Through this support, it contributes to enabling environments that better align private sector responses with biodiversity objectives, including changes in investment decisions, business models and supply chains.

References

[43] ABS-Biotrade (2026), Biodiversity-based Value Chains, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Bonn, https://www.abs-biotrade.info/ (accessed on 19 February 2026).

[2] Adriaenssens, P. (2015), “How to involve the private sector in development cooperation”, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht, https://ecdpm.org/work/private-sector-matters-volume-4-issue-5-august-september-2015/how-to-involve-the-private-sector-in-development-cooperation (accessed on 14 October 2025).

[52] AFD (2024), Procurement Guidelines for AFD-Financed Contracts in Foreign Countries, Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Paris, https://www.afd.fr/sites/default/files/2025-11/afd-r0097-directives-pm-2024-v2_va_0.pdf (accessed on 27 February 2026).

[8] Alpízar, F. et al. (2020), Mainstreaming of Natural Capital and Biodiversity into Planning and Decision-Making: Cases from Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank, https://doi.org/10.18235/0002667 (accessed on 14 October 2025).

[65] Bellmann, C. and C. van der Ven (2020), “Greening regional trade agreements on non-tariff measures through technical barriers to trade and regulatory co-operation”, OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers, No. 2020/04, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dfc41618-en.

[76] BIOFIN (2025), “Zanzibar boosts conservation efforts with new digital payments system and raised visitor fees for marine parks”, https://www.biofin.org/news-and-media/zanzibar-boosts-conservation-efforts-new-digital-payments-system-and-raised-visitor (accessed on 2 March 2026).

[12] BlackRock (2025), Investment stewardship: Our approach to engagement on natural capital, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-commentary-engagement-on-natural-capital.pdf (accessed on 23 April 2025).

[5] Business for Nature (2024), Recommendations to Governments: The Policies, Legislation, Regulation and Incentives Needed to Create a Nature-positive Economy, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d777de8109c315fd22faf3a/t/668f92d3a1744f40d8b94584/1720685274150/BfN+Policy+Recommendations+2024+FINAL.pdf (accessed on 20 November 2025).

[84] Caribbean Development Bank (2024), “Technical Workshop on WTO Fisheries Subsidies Agreement”, https://www.caribank.org/newsroom/news-and-events/technical-workshop-wto-fisheries-subsidies-agreement (accessed on 25 August 2025).

[45] CBD (2024), Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity: 16/2 - Digital sequence information on genetic resources, https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-16/cop-16-dec-02-en.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2026).

[69] CBD (2024), Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework: Target 18, https://www.cbd.int/gbf/targets/18 (accessed on 19 January 2025).

[44] CBD (2022), Conference of the Parties to the Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity: 15/9 - Digital sequence information on genetic resources, CBD/COP/15/L.25, https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-15/cop-15-dec-09-en.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2026).

[35] CBD (2022), Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework: Target 13, https://www.cbd.int/gbf/targets/13/ (accessed on 10 February 2026).

[37] CBD (2011), Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf (accessed on 2025 July August).

[36] CBD (2006), Article 15. Access to Genetic Resources, Convention on Biological Diversity, https://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/default.shtml?a=cbd-15 (accessed on 8 April 2026).

[29] CI-GEF (2025), Business Action and Advocacy for the Planet Project: Terminal Evaluation Report, Conservation International, Arlington, VA; Global Environment Facility, Washington, DC, https://publicpartnershipdata.azureedge.net/gef/GEFDocuments/1c6fba85-7795-ec11-b400-0022480b3d13/TE/TerminalEvaluationTE_20250722BfN%20TE%20Report10930DMP.pdf (accessed on 1 March 2026).

[66] CITES (2025), What is CITES?, https://cites.org/eng/disc/what.php (accessed on 27 November 2025).

[14] Conservation International and EcoAdvisors (2024), Enabling Policies for High-Integrity Nature Markets: An Overview of Supportive Policies for Market Infrastructure, https://d2iwpl8k086uu2.cloudfront.net/docs/default-source/s3-library/publication-pdfs/nature-market-report-2024.pdf?sfvrsn=d63e38b4_3 (accessed on 14 October 2025).

[72] Costello, C., S. Gaines and J. Lynham (2008), “Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?”, Science, Vol. 321/5896, pp. 1678-1681, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1159478 (accessed on 8 April 2026).

[3] Dasgupta, P. (2021), The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review, United Kingdom HM Treasury, London, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/602e92b2e90e07660f807b47/The_Economics_of_Biodiversity_The_Dasgupta_Review_Full_Report.pdf (accessed on 16 April 2025).

[73] Engel, S. (2016), “The Devil in the Detail: A Practical Guide on Designing Payments for Environmental Services”, International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 9/1-2, pp. 131-177, https://www.usf-cms.uni-osnabrueck.de/fileadmin/DE/Institut/Mitarbeiter/Tolzmann/IRERE_PES_review_Engel_Authors_copy.pdf (accessed on 16 October 2025).

[47] Erizaputri, S. and R. Bechauf (2025), Advancing Green Public Procurement in South Africa: Challenges, opportunities and strategic pathways, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, MB, Canada, https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-02/green-public-procurement-south-africa.pdf (accessed on 27 February 2026).

[56] European Commission (2026), Factsheet: EU-Mercosur partnership agreement - Trade and sustainable development, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement/factsheet-eu-mercosur-partnership-agreement-trade-and-sustainable-development_en (accessed on 27 February 2026).

[16] European Commission (2025), “Roadmap Towards Nature Credits”, No. COM(2025) 374 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0374#footnote44 (accessed on 2 March 2026).

[59] FACT (2023), Forest, Agriculture and Commodity Trade: The FACT Dialogue, https://www.factdialogue.org/ (accessed on 27 November 2025).

[21] FAO (2025), “Harmonizing biodiversity strategy and pesticide risk reduction in SADC/EAC”, https://www.fao.org/pest-and-pesticide-management/news/detail/fr/c/1738327/#:~:text=FAO%20also%20supported%20the%20development,trade%2C%20and%20disposal%20of%20pesticides (accessed on 20 January 2026).

[4] FAO (2022), The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 2022, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Rome, https://doi.org/10.4060/cc0471en (accessed on 24 November 2025).

[87] FCDO (2025), Development Tracker: Accelerating Innovation Monitoring For Forests (AIM4Forests), United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), London, https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/programme/GB-GOV-25-ICF-0046-AIM4Forests/summary (accessed on 25 August 2025).

[33] GIZ (2019), Secure Land Tenure Rights for All: A Key Condition for Sustainable Development, Successful Approaches and Their Impacts, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Gmb, https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2019-en-secure-%20land-tenure-rights-successful-approaches.pdf (accessed on 7 August 2025).

[77] Global Affairs Canada (2025), Project profile - Natural Infrastructure for Water Security in Peru, https://w05.international.gc.ca/projectbrowser-banqueprojets/project-projet/details/d003709001 (accessed on 2 March 2026).

[25] Global Environment Facility (2025), “GEF approves project for the Eastern Tropical Pacific Marine Corridor”, https://www.thegef.org/newsroom/news/gef-approves-project-eastern-tropical-pacific-marine-corridor (accessed on 27 February 2026).

[15] Gómez Mont, C., S. Persson and C. Buenadicha Sánchez (2023), Digital Tokens for Climate Action and Nature-Based Solutions: Exploration of Opportunities and Considerations, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, https://doi.org/10.18235/0004834.

[54] Green, J. et al. (2019), “Linking global drivers of agricultural trade to on-the-ground impacts on biodiversity”, Sustainability Science, Vol. 116/46, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1905618116 (accessed on 26 November 2025).

[88] IMF (2024), “Second Review Under the Policy Coordination Instrument, Request for an Extension of the Policy Coordination Instrument, Modification of Targets, Inflation Band Consultation, and Request of Arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility”, IMF Country Report, No. 24/001, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington, DC, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/view/journals/002/2024/001/002.2024.issue-001-en.pdf (accessed on 25 August 2025).

[79] International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits (2024), Framework for High Integrity Biodiversity Credit Markets, https://www.actu-environnement.com/media/pdf/news-44975-iapb-cadre-credits-biodiversite-cop16.pdf (accessed on 19 July 2025).

[48] International Climate Initiative (2026), “Project: Greening supply and demand: Advancing Eco-Labels and Sustainable Public Procurement for climate and biodiversity protection (Eco-Advance)”, https://www.international-climate-initiative.com/en/project/greening-supply-and-demand-advancing-eco-labels-and-sustainable-public-procurement-for-climate-and-biodiversity-protection-eco-advance-22-i-457-latin-america-g-greening-supply-and-demand/ (accessed on 8 January 2026).

[50] International Climate Initiative (2026), “Project: Sustainable, climate-friendly palm oil production and procurement”, https://www.international-climate-initiative.com/en/project/sustainable-climate-friendly-palm-oil-production-and-procurement-18-iii-092-asia-g-palm-oil-production-and-procurement/ (accessed on 8 January 2026).

[82] IPBES (2024), Summary for Policymakers of the Thematic Assessment Report on the Interlinkages among Biodiversity, Water, Food and Health, IPBES Secretariat, Bonn, https://zenodo.org/records/13850289 (accessed on 2 March 2026).

[70] IPBES (2019), Global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, IPBES Secretariat, Bonn, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3831673.

[1] Jones, M. et al. (eds.) (2026), Summary for Policymakers of the Methodological Assessment Report on the Impact and Dependence of Business on Biodiversity and Nature’s Contributions to People, IPBES Secretariat, Bonn, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15369060 (accessed on 11 February 2026).

[58] Kettunen, M. (2023), “Nature-positive trade for sustainable development”, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, MB, Canada, https://www.iisd.org/articles/policy-analysis/nature-positive-trade-sustainable-development (accessed on 27 November 2025).

[42] KOICA Tanzania Office (2021), KOICA Tanzania Office’s Post, https://www.facebook.com/koica.tanzania/posts/-ibs%EC%82%AC%EC%97%85-%EC%88%98%ED%96%89%EA%B8%B0%EA%B4%80-%EC%BD%94%EC%BF%A4-%EC%B6%A9%EB%B6%81%EB%8C%80%ED%95%99%EA%B5%90%EC%99%80%EC%9D%98-%EB%AF%B8%ED%8C%85-%EC%95%88%EB%85%95%ED%95%98%EC%84%B8%EC%9A%94-% (accessed on 3 April 2026).

[81] Lankoski, J., E. Nales and H. Valin (2025), “Assessing the impacts of agricultural support policies on the environment: Economic analysis, literature findings and synthesis”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 223, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/808f110c-en.

[71] Matthews, A. and K. Karousakis (2022), “Identifying and assessing subsidies and other incentives harmful to biodiversity: A comparative review of existing national-level assessments and insights for good practice”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 206, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3e9118d3-en.

[74] Matzdorf, B., C. Sattler and S. Engel (2013), “Institutional frameworks and governance structures of PES schemes”, Forest Policy and Economics, Vol. 37, pp. 57-64, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.10.002.

[49] Naled (2026), “Projects: Enhancing competitiveness through more effective public procurement and sustainable supply chains”, https://naled.rs/en/projekti-efikasne-javne-nabavke-i-odrzivi-lanci-snabdevanja-za-unapredjenje-konkurentosti-9945 (accessed on 27 February 2026).

[9] NBSAP Accelerator Partnership (2024), Challenges and opportunities for countries in achieving the Global Biodiversity Framework, https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/11de/5df8/377614b9edf75bda378ce9dd/nbsap-accelerator-capacityneedsassessment-sbi-04-en.pdf (accessed on 13 October 2025).

[19] OECD (2025), Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2025: Making the Most of the Trade and Environment Nexus in Agriculture, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a80ac398-en.

[67] OECD (2025), Scaling Up Biodiversity-Positive Incentives: Delivering on Target 18 of the Global Biodiversity Framework, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/19b859ce-en.

[68] OECD (2024), Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2024: Innovation for Sustainable Productivity Growth, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/74da57ed-en.

[46] OECD (2024), Harnessing Public Procurement for the Green Transition: Good Practices in OECD Countries, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e551f448-en.

[57] OECD (2023), A Decade of Development Finance for Biodiversity, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e6c182aa-en.

[18] OECD (2021), “Biodiversity, natural capital and the economy: A policy guide for finance, economic and environment ministers”, OECD Environment Policy Papers, No. 26, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1a1ae114-en.

[53] OECD (2021), “Biodiversity, natural capital and the economy: A policy guide for finance, economic and environment ministers”, OECD Environment Policy Papers, No. 26, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1a1ae114-en.

[6] OECD (2013), Scaling-up Finance Mechanisms for Biodiversity, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264193833-en.

[83] OECD (2005), Environmentally Harmful Subsidies: Challenges for Reform, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264012059-en.

[11] OECD (2004), Handbook of Market Creation for Biodiversity: Issues in Implementation, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2004/11/handbook-of-market-creation-for-biodiversity_g1gh481c/9789264018624-en.pdf (accessed on 25 November 2025).

[55] OECD (forthcoming), “The trade and biodiversity nexus”, OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/18166881.

[24] OECD et al. (2025), Latin American Economic Outlook 2025: Promoting and Financing Production Transformation, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/80e48de5-en.

[60] OECD/WTO (2024), Aid for Trade at a Glance 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7a4e356a-en.

[20] Openaid (2025), Explore Data - KemI Technical Assistance to ZEMA on Pesticide Management, https://openaid.se/en/contributions/SE-0-SE-6-13038?tab=1 (accessed on 25 August 2025).

[75] Openaid (2023), Explore Data - Gothenburg University Inclusive Green Economy, https://www.openaid.se/en/contributions/SE-0-SE-6-14368 (accessed on 25 August 2025).

[80] Peru Ministry of Environment (2026), “Minam liderará registro de proyectos de créditos de biodiversidad para proteger los ecosistemas del país. Minam will lead a registry of biodiversity credit projects to protect the country’s ecosystems”, https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minam/noticias/1350590-minam-liderara-registro-de-proyectos-de-creditos-de-biodiversidad-para-proteger-los-ecosistemas-del-pais (accessed on 2 March 2026).

[30] Schlager, E. and E. Ostrom (1992), “Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis”, Land Economics, Vol. 68/3, pp. 249-262, https://doi.org/10.2307/3146375 (accessed on 21 November 2025).

[26] Serrano, C. et al. (2025), “A sanctuary without borders: Protecting the eastern tropical Pacific”, World Bank Blogs, https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/latinamerica/protecting-the-eastern-tropical-pacific (accessed on 27 February 2026).

[51] Sida (2020), Sida Procurement Guidelines (SPG), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Stockholm, https://cdn.sida.se/app/uploads/2020/12/15105721/sida-procurement-guidelines.pdf (accessed on 27 February 2026).

[10] Tobin-de la Puente, J. and A. Mitchell (eds.) (2021), The Little Book of Investing in Nature, Global Canopy, Oxford, UK, https://www.afd.fr/en/ressources/little-book-investing-nature.

[86] UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2023), Nature markets: A framework for scaling up private investment in nature recovery and sustainable farming, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/642542ae60a35e000c0cb148/nature-markets.pdf (accessed on 7 January 2026).

[22] UNDP (2018), Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Lao PDR’s Agricultural and Land Management Policies, Plans and Programmes, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York, https://www.undp.org/laopdr/projects/mainstreaming-biodiversity-lao-pdrs-agricultural-and-land-management-policies-plans-and-programmes#:~:text=,their%20families%20in%20Phonexay%20District (accessed on 20 January 2026).

[34] UNEP/TESS (2023), Nature-positive trade for sustainable development: Opportunities to promote synergies between the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and work on sustainable trade at the WTO, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), New York/Forum on Trade, Environment & the SDGs (TESS), Geneva, https://lyrical-cormorant.files.svdcdn.com/production/assets/images/Publications/Nature-Positive-Trade-for-Sustainable-Development-2023_FINAL.pdf?dm=1678392496 (accessed on 6 August 2025).

[28] UNEP/WWF (2024), Navigation Nature-Related Regulations for Banks, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Finance Initiative, New York/World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Geneva, https://www.unepfi.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/UNEP-FI-WWF-Navigating-Nature-related-Regulations-for-Banks.pdf (accessed on 17 April 2025).

[27] UNEP-WCMC (2025), Mobilizing Finance for Biodiversity: The Private Finance Sector and the Implementation of National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs), United Nations Environment Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC), Cambridge, UK, https://resources.unep-wcmc.org/products/WCMC_RT695 (accessed on 1 March 2026).

[78] United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (2025), “UK and France pledge joint funding for international biodiversity”, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-france-pledge-joint-funding-for-international-biodiversity (accessed on 19 July 2025).

[40] United Nations (2026), Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, https://www.un.org/bbnjagreement/en#:~:text=The%20Agreement%20under%20the%20United,Biodiversity%20of%20Areas%20Beyond%20National (accessed on 9 February 2026).

[32] United Nations (1982), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Agreement relating to the implementation of part XI of the Convention, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (accessed on 27 February 2026).

[41] WHO (2021), Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits (second edition), World Health Organization (WHO), Rome, https://iris.who.int/server/api/core/bitstreams/4e22d25c-7084-4832-a0ff-667eac7ed714/content (accessed on 9 February 2026).

[39] WIPO (2026), WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), https://www.wipo.int/en/web/igc (accessed on 23 March 2026).

[23] World Bank (2025), PROBLUE: Healthy Ocean, Healthy Economies, Healty Communities, https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/problue (accessed on 7 July 2025).

[31] World Bank (2024), Scaling Up Customary Land Rights Registration for Inclusion and Sustainability, https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2024/03/08/cote-ivoire-scaling-up-customary-land-rights-registration-for-inclusion-and-sustainability (accessed on 7 August 2025).

[13] World Economic Forum (2025), Finance Solutions for Nature: Pathways to Returns and Outcomes, https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Finance_Solutions_for_Nature_2025.pdf (accessed on 17 September 2025).

[38] World Intellectual Property Organization (2024), “Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources”, Background Brief, No. 10, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo-pub-rn2023-5-10-en-intellectual-property-and-genetic-resources.pdf (accessed on 9 February 2026).

[61] World Trade Organization (ed.) (2025), Committee on Trade and Environment, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm (accessed on 26 November 2025).

[64] WTO (2025), Trade Topics - Plastics pollution and environmentally sustainable plastics trade, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ppesp_e/ppesp_e.htm#fnt-1 (accessed on 26 November 2025).

[62] WTO (2025), Trade Topics - Sanitary and phytosanitary measures, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_e.htm#work (accessed on 26 November 2025).

[63] WTO (2025), Trade Topics - Trade and environmental sustainability, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tessd_e/tessd_e.htm (accessed on 26 November 2025).

[85] WTO (2025), “WTO Fish Fund launches Call for Proposals for implementing Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies”, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news25_e/ffm_06jun25_e.htm (accessed on 25 August 2025).

[17] WTO/UNEP (2018), Making Trade Work for the Environment, Prosperity and Resilience, World Trade Organization (WTO), Geneva/United Nations Environment Programme, New York, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/unereport2018_e.pdf (accessed on 26 November 2025).

[7] Zhang, Z. et al. (2025), “International cooperation for a biodiverse future: Opportunities and challenges under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework”, Global Ecology and Conservation, Vol. 58, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gecco.2024.e03385 (accessed on 14 October  2025).

Notes

← 1.  While these levers are categorised individually, their success depends on strategic sequencing and the direct involvement of finance ministries. When economic incentives are not aligned with regulatory requirements, environmental objectives often fail due to not being a political priority, insufficient budget allocation or the absence of a pipeline of bankable projects for local actors.

← 2.  PROBLUE DAC donors include Australia, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

← 3.  Development co-operation support related to the genetic diversity of living species or involving Indigenous peoples needs to be context specific and guided by clearly defined targets – for example in relation to the introduction of genetically modified organisms in developing countries or the use of new molecular biological techniques such as gene editing. Given its complexity and scope, this topic would benefit from a more comprehensive discussion beyond what is provided in this report.

← 4.  Biotrade involves sustainably sourcing, producing and commercialising biodiversity-based goods and services. For further information, see https://unctad.org/publication/biotrades-contribution-to-the-kunming-montreal-global-biodiversity-framework.