This chapter assesses the lessons learned from the 2015-2025 National Agenda on the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC), in several priority areas, taking into consideration both the first and second Action Plans from 2015-2019 and 2020-2022 respectively. Additionally, the chapter addresses key findings in strategic sectors that will inform the upcoming Action Plans.
Review of Lithuania’s National Agenda on the Prevention of Corruption
Strengthening Public Sector Integrity Strategies
Abstract
Integrity is essential for building strong institutions and assures citizens that the government is working in their interest, not just for the select few. Integrity is not just a moral issue; it is also about making economies more productive, public sectors more efficient, societies and economies more inclusive. It is about restoring trust, not just trust in government, but trust in public institutions, regulators, banks, and corporations. A system of sound public governance reinforces fundamental values, including the commitment to a pluralistic democracy based on the rule of law and the respect for human rights, and is one of the main drivers for trust in government (OECD, 2022[1]).
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity provides policy makers with a vision for such a public integrity system based on international experiences and good practices (Figure 1.1). It shifts the focus from ad hoc integrity policies to a context dependent, behavioural, risk-based approach with an emphasis on cultivating a culture of integrity across the whole of society (OECD, 2017[2]).
Source: (OECD, 2017[2]).
In the last decade, Lithuania has moved toward consolidating its integrity framework through the approval of subsequent National Agendas on the Prevention of Corruption (Nacionalinė Kovos su Korupcija Programa, NAPC). The first NAPC was launched in 2002, together with the adoption of the Law IX-904 of 2002 (Law on Prevention of Corruption (Government of Lithuania, 2002[3])). Since then, four (4) NAPCs have been enacted (2002-07, 2009-10, 2011-14, and 2015-25) aimed at reducing corruption and increase transparency in the public and private sectors. On the one hand, para. 5 of the NAPC provides that "the implementation of the plan shall be monitored, controlled and co-ordinated by the Commission of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania for the Coordination of the Fight against Corruption". On the other hand, para. 7 states that “the results of the Plan shall be monitored by the Special Investigation Service (Lietuvos Respublikos Specialiųjų Tyrimų Tarnyba, STT)”. Therefore, the responsibility for co-ordinating the developing of the NAPC lies with the STT, in close co-ordination with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), whilst the latter develops and co-ordinates the subsequent actions plans.
The STT is a law enforcement institution in Lithuania serving under the Parliament (Seimas) and the President of Lithuania to combat corruption. With departments in Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda, Panevėžys and Šiauliai, its objectives are to identify and investigate cases of corruption as well as to conduct corruption prevention, analytical anti-corruption intelligence and awareness raising. The STT has four main work strands: investigating corruption-related criminal offences, analysing anti-corruption intelligence, preventing corruption, and promoting anti-corruption education and awareness-raising. In addition, the agency monitors the results of the NAPC Action Plan. More specifically, according to the Law on the Special Investigations Service (No. XIII-938 of 2017) the overall objective of the STT is to reduce corruption as a threat to human rights and freedom, following the principles of the rule of law and economic development.
Furthermore, several legislative changes have occurred in the anti-corruption landscape in Lithuania recently, which are considered in greater detail below (Box 1.1).
The legal landscape in Lithuania has changed positively over recent years as Lithuania moves towards a stronger focus on prevention, which includes embedding a risk-based approach into its integrity policies.
Notable amendments include:
The expansion of the list of terms associated with corruption.
The formation of units or officials appointed in public bodies with anti-corruption responsibilities. These will provide data on infringements and on corruption risk factors and will propose improvements of systems of corruption prevention.
Responsibility of the head of a public institution for integrity and anti-corruption measures.
Public bodies must adopt codes of conduct and provide anti-corruption training for their employees. Furthermore, they must publish any violations to the code of conduct detected over the last three years. The disciplinary process for violating the code of conduct must be published on the institution website, alongside the actions taken during the investigation and the measures to prevent such violations in the future.
Employees of public sector organisations will be obliged to report corruption offenses that come to their knowledge, with assurance under the Protection of Whistle-blowers Act.
Public authorities must make available the findings of corruption risk assessments, as well as the actions they have taken to address these.
At the outset of the implementation period, corruption was widespread. Survey data indicated that there was both a high perception and widespread experience of corruption among citizens. The 2015-2025 NAPC notes that the “2014 Map of Corruption” showed that “69% of residents, 43% of the heads of undertakings and 54% of civil servants believe bribes help solve problems” (STT, 2014[5]). Similarly, the NAPC noted that “when assessing the corruption level of institutions and sectors, the Seimas was perceived as corrupt by 80% of Lithuanian citizens, the judiciary by 79%, political parties by 78% and healthcare institutions by 73% of residents. 26% of Lithuanian residents had to pay a bribe at educational, judicial, healthcare, police, registration and issue of authorisations, public utility, tax, and land use planning institutions” (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]).
The below section will assess several issues related to the 2015-2025 NAPC. First, the report provides an outlook of the design of the strategy and key recommendations for the design of future strategies. Second, it will cover the priority areas and what was accomplished by the action plans. This assessments will be conducted taking into consideration the standards set on the 2017 OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[2]) and the OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PII) (OECD, 2022[7]).
As seen below (Figure 1.2) Lithuania’s previous strategy, the “2015-2025 Anti-Corruption Programme of the Republic of Lithuania” was assessed against the OECD Public Integrity Indicator (PII) on Principle 3 of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (Quality of Strategic Framework) to benchmark the NAS against OECD country practice (OECD, 2021[8]). The indicator showed outstanding areas with a compliance of 100%, such as the “Minimum content in public integrity strategies” indicator. This indicator relates to the situation analysis, as the programme includes a full section entitled “Analysis of the Environment”, which includes data from sociological surveys (“survey Lithuanian Map of Corruption 2014”), and a short assessment of the implementation measures. It also lists and provides a detailed analysis of the priority fields with the highest potential for corruption.
Source: (OECD, 2021[8])
However, as evidenced by the indicator, certain areas may require further strengthening. For example, the indicator requires a minimum duration of at least two weeks for inter-governmental and public consultation established in legislation. Furthermore, it requires that integrity strategies are consistently developed in an inclusive and transparent manner. On this benchmark, Lithuania received a total score of 29%, which was lower that OECD average and the top 10 average performers (Figure 1.3). This low score reflects the fact that although the programme went through an inter-governmental and public consultation, the law on Legislative Framework (2012 No XI-2220) does not specify a minimum duration of at least 2 weeks for consultation periods. Furthermore, even though Lithuania organised open public consultations on the portal of the Government, after the consultations ended, the page was no longer accessible and the comments received were published on the website for only a limited time.
Source: (OECD, 2021[8])
Additionally, to gather data on the design and development of the 2015-2025 NAPC, the OECD conducted a virtual fact-finding mission and a consultation in the first semester of 2022. Furthermore, it implemented a survey to assess the involvement of national entities in the national anti-corruption programme. Measurement of consultation processes is vital as transparent and inclusive processes for public policy decision making are essential for averting capture by narrow interest groups (OECD, 2022[7]). In this survey, institutional stakeholders were broadly of the opinion that they had been sufficiently consulted during the development phase of the strategy and were able to participate adequately in the implementation and monitoring stages (Table 1.1). The only indicator that did not score as highly as others, was consultation during the development of the 2015-2025 NAPC, which somehow reflects the results provided by the PII.
Source: OECD 2015-2025 NAPC Stakeholders Survey, 2022.
Institutional stakeholders also had a generally positive view of the design phase of the 2015-2025 NAPC. Most institutions agreed that the 2015-2025 NAPC reflected national priorities, ensured coherence with previous national anti-corruption strategies, targeted the core corruption issues in their field and proposed suitably specific measures to tackle these (Table 1.2). Only a minority thought that the 2015-2025 NAPC proposed an excessive number of objectives, implying that overall implementing institutions viewed the Action Plans as feasible and realistic.
Source: OECD 2015-2025 NAPC Stakeholders Survey, 2022.
Considering the challenges of the 2015-2025 NAPC, Lithuania could consider developing a clearer cause-and-effect link between planned activities and desired outcomes in the design of future integrity strategies
In line with the 2017 OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity, the 2015-2025 NAPC identified and consolidated integrity policies using a risk-based approach. Most notably, it set out eight (8) at risk priority areas in which corruption was thought to be most likely to occur. The priorities were selected on the basis of an extensive diagnosis that considered the findings of various sociological surveys relevant to corruption, as well as the results of the previous strategy and sectoral analyses (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]). Overall, the only downfall of this process relates to what later became the interventions (or activities) proposed, as these were not organised according to these eight (8) priorities areas, but rather re-grouped into six (6) strategic objectives.
Furthermore, for every strategic objective, specific tasks as well as oodles of more granular measures and activities were set out for each of the two (2) Action Plans (from 2015 to 2019 and from 2020 to 2022, Figure 1.4 and Table 1.3). This has created several difficulties when attempting to assess activities and their role in achieving the objectives. First, this structure added a layer of complexity to monitoring efforts, including by providing fragmented information on different activities over long periods of time. Second, the fragmentation resulted in overlaps between different areas of intervention during implementation. This was perhaps most notable in the case of “political forms of corruption” (priority area 1) and “bureaucratic and administrative forms of corruption” (priority areas 6 and 7) as activities related to these areas were split across multiple objectives. As such, the structure of the Action Plans (built around the six objectives), partially obscured the “results chain” process, initially envisaged to evolve from the eight (8) priority areas. In turn, the corelation between specific activities and the objectives to which they were expected to contribute became hard to assess.
Regardless, the following evaluation of progress made under the NAPC follows the eight (8) priority areas as the unit of analysis. This approach was chosen because the overarching purpose of the NAPC was to reduce risks of corruption in these eight (8) areas, rather than implementing a series of reforms. Organising this evaluation by priority areas allows therefore to obtain a clearer picture of whether the NAPC was able to make progress in addressing the problems identified in each area at the outset and can shed light into future reforms needed.
Furthermore, the assessment uses the specific tasks, measures and activities as reference points, but it does not assess the progress in implementing every single planned activity, in line with previous OECD evaluations (OECD, 2021[12]). Rather it considers progress at a higher level of abstraction, referring to key activities and drawing its findings from external and independent reports, as well as from the monitoring reports compiled by the STT and a survey taken by sixteen participants of the virtual fact-finding mission.
Additional emphasis is put in providing indicators that show an overall picture of the changes in levels of corruption during the implementation of the NAPC. Consideration is also given to whether these changes are likely to be attributed to the NAPC or if other factors may have contributed to positive developments. Furthermore, the evaluation considers several good practices identified in both the process and substance of developing the NAPC and provide recommendations for the 2022-2033 NAPC.
Assessing the Action Plans 2015-2019 and 2020-2022
Progress achieved by the end of the first Action Plan: 2015-2019
By the end of the first Action Plan in 2019, the perception of citizens regarding corruption and integrity had improved in Lithuania. Admittedly, the 2019 Eurobarometer showed that 92% still thought corruption widespread in Lithuania, a figure well above the EU average of 71%. However, on experiencing corruption directly, 56% of those surveyed did not tolerate corruption in any form (favours, gifts, money), a notable increase from a mere 29% in 2013 (European Commission, 2020[13]).
Segmented by the type of respondents, the situation changes slightly. For example, data produced by the Lithuanian authorities on business perception of corruption over the last five years, indicated that the bribery rate had declined from 31% to 16% (from 2014 to 2020), while the proportion of business leaders who stated that corruption was a problem in the business environment had nearly halved to 15%. Similarly, only 9% of business representatives reported paying a bribe, down from 24% in 2014. The proportion of respondents who believed that bribery could help solve problems also declined slightly from 69% in 2014 to 53% in 2020 (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[9]).
Corruption also appears to have become progressively less of an obstacle for companies doing business in Lithuania. The 2019 Eurobarometer Survey, conducted among 300 companies, found that while 68% of companies consider corruption to be widespread in Lithuania (EU average 63%), only 15% of companies consider that corruption is a problem when doing business compared to an EU average of 37% (European Commission, 2019[14]). In the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, Lithuania has moved from the 16th position (in 2016) to the 11th position (2020) (World Bank Group, 2020[15]). However, according to the Lithuanian Map of Corruption 2020, nepotism and cronyism remain forms of corruption that hinder business development in Lithuania (STT, 2020[16]).
During this period, Lithuania has taken important steps to strengthen its legislative framework to promote integrity and prevent corruption. Overall, Lithuania has made significant progress in implementing the recommendations given by several international bodies. The 4th Round of GRECO found that Lithuania has implemented satisfactorily 10 out of the 11 recommendations in its latest evaluation, including recommendations on the prevention of corruption in the legislative and judicial branches (GRECO, 2021[17]). However, recommendations related to establishing internal mechanisms to promote and raise awareness of integrity in Parliament have not been addressed. Similarly, the 2019 follow-up report of the OECD Working Group on Bribery (WGB) shows that Lithuania has fully implemented 16 of the 27 recommendations. This includes, among others, recommendations on anti-corruption prevention and awareness-raising, the offence of foreign bribery, and liability of legal persons. The WGB has recognised Lithuania’s impressive efforts to train judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials, but notes that further efforts are needed to ensure effective enforcement of anti-bribery laws with regards to corporate liability and imposing effective sanctions, including confiscation (OECD, 2019[18]).
Progress achieved in the second Action Plan 2020-2022
After a changing landscape during the first implementation period, Lithuanian authorities consider necessary to cut short the on-going action plan (2015-2025) and propose a new action plan for the 2020-2022 period. According to Lithuanian authorities, there was a need to re-assess and address deficiencies. Furthermore, the process of overhauling the strategy has been the result of a successful self-monitoring process (Lithuania’s Map of Corruption) and a politically flexible context (not sticking blindly to the pre-set objectives). This is turn, allowed Lithuania to adapt its institutional and legal landscapes to emerging realities. The STT substantiated the amendments based on the following conclusions (STT, 2020[11]):
Uneven implementation of integrity measures in institution, including confusions on the roles and responsibilities with regards to anti-corruption leadership.
Some activities were implemented in a disjointed and isolated manner that formally complied with legal standards but did little to make a tangible change or result in positive spill-overs effects and collaboration with other agencies.
There were some notable co-ordination challenges between institutions, both horizontally between central government bodies, as well as vertically between central institutions and local municipalities.
New corruption challenges that had not initially been foreseen in 2015 were emerging, including in the judiciary and in relation to the pharmaceutical industry.
In some public bodies, anti-corruption measures appeared to be viewed by senior management as an administrative burden, rather than a core function.
The criteria used to assess an organisation’s actual exposure to corruption and progress in reducing risk factors were not appropriate, as organisations typically relied on indicators simply listing the number of measures they had carried out, rather than developing more informative outcome level indicators, which give a better impression of the quality of the measures taken.
The private sector was viewed as generally not interested in the anti-corruption agenda and private sector corruption was still not criminalised.
The timeliness and effectiveness of criminal prosecutions remained challenging, despite positive evaluations by some international experts.
Progress in the implementation of the inter-institutional Action Plan for 2020-2022 was significant, and most foreseen measures had either been completed or are on track. One notable achievement is that companies now view corruption as one of the least relevant problems for business development (STT, 2022[19]). However, as highlighted by the STT and noted in the 2021 Rule of Law Report, building an environment resilient to corruption risks in all public administration bodies needs a more systematic approach and some measures remain to be implemented (European Commission, 2021[20]). One major challenge to achieve these changes is, in the words of the Lithuanian authorities, “the formal approach of public sector entities and having planned declaratory measures that do not lead to substantial changes” (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[9]).
According to Lithuania, by the beginning of 2021, corruption indicators had improved. Overall, the STT concluded that: “diagnostic studies in the anti-corruption environment show the changing nature of corruption in Lithuania. Small bribery is steadily decreasing, traditional forms of bribery and bribery in public services are less common, corruption behaviour associated with favouritism and protection, problems of transparency of decisions and other manifestations of systemic corruption become increasingly relevant” (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[9]). However, international indicators show a different picture. Lithuanians experience the highest bribery rates in the European Union (17%), tied with Hungary and followed closely by Romania and Bulgaria. The Global Corruption Barometer found that 1 in 4 Lithuanians who came into contact with key public services, such as healthcare or official document offices, paid a bribe to access the service they needed. This is more than twice the EU average (7%) (Transparency International, 2021[21]). Furthermore, Lithuania scored 61 out of 100 in the 2021 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), ranking 34th in the world. Even though it improved by one point from 2020, it remains substantially below neighbouring countries such as Estonia and Finland (Figure 1.5). According to the Global Corruption Barometer, 48% of Lithuanians think that the government is doing badly in fighting corruption while 42% think it is doing well, nearly matching the EU average of 49% and 43% respectively.
Against this backdrop, the Lithuanian authorities decided to prioritise the following efforts (STT, 2020[16]):
1. Redouble efforts to enhance transparency and publish open data
2. Work towards clearer cause-and-effect links between planned activities and desired outcomes
3. Foster ownership of anti-corruption efforts within public institutions and enhance co-ordination between them
4. Develop better diagnostic tools to compare results of anti-corruption efforts at both central and local, as well as in state-owned enterprises.
Addressing existing policy gaps is key to inform the next steps of public policy formulation. Analysing the existing disparities between policy intentions and actual outcomes helps to understand intended (or unintended) consequences. To assess the respective successes and shortcomings of the 2015-2025 (or in practice the 2015-2022) NAPC and identify implementation gaps, this section first recapitulates the problem statement for each priority area. It then surveys the specific measures taken in both implementation periods (2015-2019 and 2020-2022), considering how well suited and effective these activities were to tackle the core issues. It is notable that the various problems identified in the 2015-2025 NAPC were neither prioritised nor sequenced, so it is difficult to evaluate both the relative severity and urgency of the different issues. Future programmes would do well to explicitly specify the respective relevance of each problem to help inform trade-offs that may arise during the implementation phase.
Before turning to the specific priority areas, Table 1.4 provides a snapshot overview of some of the key findings from the 2022 OECD survey to provide an overall picture of institutional satisfaction. A qualified respondents questionnaire taken from all branches of government shows that most respondents found that significant progress was made in the area of public administration, civil service and asset management, followed by political activities and legislation as well as in the activities of the judiciary and law enforcement institutions. Conversely, the two areas deemed to have achieved the least progress were in the private sector and in healthcare and social security.
Source: OECD 2015-2025 NAPC Stakeholders Survey, 2022.
In terms of institutional stakeholders’ perception of the quality of implementation of the 2015-2025 NAPC, the picture differs slightly (Table 1.5). The majority of institutions surveyed thought that the NAPC was able to address Lithuania’s core corruption problems, and that implementing bodies were able to co-ordinate effectively. Similarly, most institutions agreed that their expected role in implementation was clear, and that the Action Plans helped to prioritise programmatic objectives. Slightly fewer respondents agreed that resourcing had been sufficient, suggesting that the Lithuanian authorities would do well to ensure that future anti-corruption programmes ensure that all participating bodies are allocated sufficient resources. Moreover, a slight decline in positive perceptions has been observed as it relates to the monitoring of the Actions Plans. This was also observed at the virtual fact-finding mission, were governmental and non-governmental stakeholders were of the view that the monitoring system of Lithuania lacked rigour, transparency, and communication.
Source: OECD 2015-2025 NAPC Stakeholders Survey, 2022.
Political financing and lobbying
Public policies are the main product citizens receive, observe, and evaluate from their governments. They largely determine the quality of citizens’ daily lives. While policy makers should pursue the public interest, in practice a variety of private interests aim at influencing public policies in their favour. For example, pharmaceutical or private health insurance companies may try to influence health policies to make them more favourable for their interest instead of for general citizens’ welfare. While this is part of the dynamics of politics in a democracy, the means of influence may be dubious. Such undue influence on the rules of the game has been coined policy capture. Policy capture is when public policy decisions are consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest towards the interests of a specific interest group or person (OECD, 2017[2]).
The basic anti-corruption legal framework in Lithuania was already reasonably well developed at the start of the programming period. A 2013 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) review concluded that a wide range of legal provisions had criminalised most forms of corruption (UNODC, 2013[23]). An evaluation by GRECO in 2014 pointed to the country’s “comprehensive normative and institutional framework to prevent and fight corruption” (Council of Europe, 2015[24]). Indeed, Lithuania had been a pioneer in certain areas, including being one of the first countries in the world to adopt lobbying regulations. Nonetheless, several loopholes remained in need of correction as well as implementation challenges. For example, while numerous legislative amendments were undertaken during the implementation period, 23% of civil servants and 15% of business executives believe that gaps in the legal framework continue to constitute a serious problem (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[9]).
Against this backdrop, the first priority area in the 2015-2025 NAPC related to political activities and legislative processes. Based on their assessment of corruption risks in this field, Lithuania concluded that the core vulnerabilities were related to the following issues (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]):
Opacity in political financing
Legal reforms to address unlawful financing of parties and campaigns
Electoral irregularities, including vote buying
Unlawful lobbying
Undue influence of interest groups when it comes to drafting and amending legal acts
Following up on the identification of these problems, the OECD implementation analysis considers three core issues. First, the measures to increase transparency in political finance and whether the activities planned were able to address the overarching problem. Second, the legal reforms envisaged as necessary to criminalise specific behaviours that could endanger integrity in political campaigns. Finally, issues related to lobbying and undue influence in policy decisions. Unfortunately, the implementation period was coloured by sizeable political corruption scandals. In one case, senior politician were charged with taking bribes from a private consulting firm (LRT English, 2019[25]). An investigation by parliament between 2017 and 2018 reportedly “exposed the undue and corrupt political influence of big business on the branches of central executive power” (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2022[26]). Most recently, after an investigation of nearly six (6) years, starting with an STT search warrant in 2016, the Vilnius Regional Court acquitted all defendants in a political corruption case (LRT English, 2022[27]). This case not only showcases how the lack of transparency in lobbying activities may result in serious bribery offences, but also indicates the lack of timeliness and effectiveness in criminal prosecutions. Apart from large scale political corruption scandals, the problem of undue influence is believed to be especially acute also at municipal level (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2022[26]).
Opacity in political financing
Despite efforts in recent years to increase transparency of political finance, data indicates that Lithuanians are among the Europeans most likely to perceive that links between businesses and politicians generate corruption (86% of respondents) (European Commission, 2020[13]). However, datasets indicate that electoral integrity is relatively robust in Lithuania. According to the V-DEM assessment, requirements to disclose donations to national election campaigns are comprehensive and consistently enforced, and while vote buying was not unheard of, it has declined to the point that there is now only limited use of money and gifts to secure support from voters (V-Dem, 2021[28]). Nonetheless, comparatively speaking, the problem still seems to be worse than in the other Baltic States (Figure 1.6).
Source: (V-Dem, 2021[28]).
The 2015-2025 NAPC sets out a clear commitment to “increase the transparency of funding of political parties and political campaigns and their activities, create a system for online voting, and facilitate better public access to activities and funding of political parties and political campaigns”. One specific measure that was designed to improve the integrity of electoral processes related to the creation of tools to improve the openness and accessibility of information related to elections, in charge of the Central Electoral Commission (Vyriausioji Rinkimų Komisija, CEC). Indeed, the 2015-2025 NAPC explicitly mentioned the concern that citizens were unable to inspect political parties’ finances online to check whether donations had been properly registered. Likewise, the lack of an information system that adequately accounts for party membership fees and non-financial forms of support was viewed as a shortcoming (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]). However, the activity related to making information about electoral procedures and political donations accessible in open data formats was severely delayed, due to a lack of availability of funds (STT, 2020[11]).
Furthermore, this could only be made possible after 2019, when the CEC concluded a funding agreement with the EU to make electoral data available in open data format allowing comparative analysis (STT, 2021[10]), stressing the need for a better planning mechanism of funds available during the 2022-2033 NAPC. Regardless, as part of this new system, political candidates are obliged to report their donations, membership fees and expenditure within ten (10) days on the “Political Parties and Political Campaign Financing Control Subsystem” of the CEC’s VRK IS platform (https://www.vrk.lt/). According to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), this system verifies the legality of financial contributions, and publishes the details of all donations above EUR 12 (OSCE, 2021[29]). As such, information on the funding of political campaigns is now publicly available in a digital, searchable database.
While improving the transparency of electoral data and campaign finance is to be welcomed, it is too early to judge the impact of this activity. In theory, such a system could improve transparency in a much-needed area, but it is as yet unclear whether citizens or journalists will actually take the opportunity to access this data to hold electoral candidates and parties to account. Although the CEC has prepared and posted on its website training manuals on how to use the digital database (https://www.vrk.lt/mokomoji-medziaga), and a subsystem specialised in training at https://mok.rinkejopuslapis.lt/moodle/, as well as regular consultation, interviews conducted for this review showed an increasing demand for training and awareness raising, particularly from journalists, businesses and civil society groups. Similarly, as with the rest of the NAPC, citizens were not consulted or involved in the design of this system and the information available seems to be limited to what the government considered relevant. Making data available to journalists for analysis purposes may be challenging, especially with regards to GDPR regulations. However, openness of information and data may serve a dual purpose. First, to enforce the citizens’ right to know through transparency and access to information, as well as to promote accountability through the participation of advocacy groups, media and “watchdog” organisations. Second, the information can be used by policy makers to inform public decisions.
Legal reforms to address unlawful acts in political financing
Overall, the legal framework regulating party and campaign finance in Lithuania is “comprehensive and provides for accountability” (OSCE, 2020[30]). Although seemingly not included in the scope of the 2015-2025 NAPC itself, Lithuania undertook a raft of legal amendments during the implementation period that sought to increase the transparency of political finance and strengthen financial controls.
Among other reforms, these amendments resulted in changes to the political finance framework by introducing criminal and administrative liability for the unlawful financing of parties and campaigns, establishing financial penalties for parties caught accepting funds from illicit sources and requiring the publication of interim financial reports. Before these amendments, political contestants’ financial reports were published only after the election results were announced. Provided the regulations are enforced in a consistent manner, they appear to have good potential to reduce the risks of corruption associated with the illicit financing of political parties. This will, however, rely on the effectiveness of oversight bodies, primarily the CEC. The State Tax Inspectorate (Valstybinė Mokesčių Inspekcija, VMI) is the tax authority in the Republic of Lithuania and plays an important oversight role in inspecting the eligibility of political donors. The enforcement of these measures could be considered as a key aspect of the 2022-2033 NAPC and its subsequent Actions Plans.
Similarly, the powers of CEC have recently been extended to include investigating financial irregularities, but no information was given on how this would be co-ordinated with other investigative bodies such as the Prosecutor General’s Office (Lietuvos Respublikos Prokuratūra, PGO). Information collected during the virtual fact-finding points to a steady decrease in the number of gross violations of political finance regulations. However, problems do persist in mayoral elections and the STT has noted that, as these amendments are very recent with “no practice of dealing with such cases in the country” (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[9]). There are also some concerns about the CEC impartiality in investigating and adjudicating irregularities (OSCE, 2020[30]). Notably, according to expert assessments (Figure 1.7), even with its formal autonomy and safeguards for political interference, it performs worse than the other Baltic States and there has been a slight downward trend in recent years.
Source: (V-Dem, 2021[28]).
There are also other several outstanding risk factors regarding unlawful acts in political financing. Despite the ban on corporate donations to political parties, the STT reports the continued existence of direct and/or indirect illicit payments made to political parties and decision makers, more broadly, “in exchange for business-friendly decision making” (STT, 2020[11]) or lucrative public contracts (STT, 2021[10]). This appears to be a particular problem at the local level in municipalities that have been dominated by one party for a long period of time. Such illegal payments are naturally not included in official accounts and therefore not captured in the VRK IS Subsystem.
Strengthened co-operation and exchange of information between the CEC and other law enforcement and oversight bodies are particularly important. Indeed, Lithuania could consider strengthening the CEC’s access to information from the State Tax Inspectorate, to enable the tracing of tax income percentage of donations. This could be achieved by implementing cross-agency co-operation agreements between the CEC information system with other state information systems. During the consultation for this report, public officials reported the emergence of technical issues when gathering data from different public entities due to the varying data format used for each database, specifically at the municipal level. In so far, a standardisation of the different formats or ideally the use of a singly format would facilitate the cross-analysis and improve the overall quality of the information. To facilitate such cross-referencing, Lithuania could consider providing training to central and local entities to improve the quality of the information to be collected. As an alternative option, Lithuania could consider programming the VRK IS Subsystem to flag suspicious looking data entries that warrant further human investigation, including inconsistencies between different data sources. A similar approach is followed in Estonia, where different sets of data can be compared to see if they tally (IDEA, 2017[31]).
Strengthening the analytical capacity of the CEC and the VMI to detect irregularities could improve their ability to detect illicit political finance. Therefore, the 2022-2033 NAPC could consider these issues in more detail during its discussion of the upcoming Action Plan, namely: i) co-ordination and exchange of information mechanism between the CEC and other law enforcement bodies; ii) follow-up on gross violations of political finance regulations and the impact of recent laws in practice; iii) assure autonomy and safeguards for the CEC in its investigation role; and finally iv) enable the cross-analysis of available datasets by the CEC. Furthermore, the CEC and the VMI could increase their training and awareness raising activities with political parties focusing on illicit payments and possible sanctions to the violations of the current regime.
Other issues that have yet to be fully resolved include hidden political advertising, whereby certain media outlets favour specific parties and politicians (STT, 2020[11]). With the emergence of new digital platforms, hidden political advertising is an ever-evolving risk for the integrity of political financing systems. Recent initiatives from the Netherlands and Latvia aimed at responding to this new risk (Box 1.2) and might serve as inspiration for Lithuania. Considering this, Lithuania could develop a Code of Conduct on political advertising addressed to political parties and media outlets, as a way of disseminating standards and promoting election transparency.
In any case, recent changes to the Electoral Code have included political advertising to be reported to the CEC. In addition, the CEC has been investing considerable efforts in analysing all available information to address possible risks of hidden political advertising, even during political campaigns. Whether these actions will improve the situation overtime remains to be assessed.
Before the March 2021 parliamentary elections, political parties, and social media platforms (Facebook, Google, Snapchat, and TikTok) in the Netherlands agreed on voluntary rules on online political advertising in the form of a Code of Conduct. The Code is the result of growing concerns in the country regarding both election transparency and disinformation in the digital sphere. With this initiative, Dutch political parties and online platforms jointly aim to uphold the integrity, safety and fairness of Dutch elections. The Code’s core values include guarantees of voter privacy and freedom of expression, as well as providing a better level playing field for political parties in election campaigns without detracting from widely accepted marketing or campaign strategies.
The Code includes agreements to be transparent about the buyers of political advertising, its costs and the target audience. While the guidelines focus primarily on paid online political advertising, they call upon signatories to recognise the importance of unpaid content for fair and democratic online political campaigns. With regards to disinformation, political parties have committed not to posting or spreading misleading information or accepting foreign funding to pay for political advertisements. In addition, social media platforms pledge to publish key data related to online political advertising and help prevent foreign interference in elections through a ban on political advertisements purchased and run outside the European Union.
Similarly, the Latvian Anti-corruption agency (KNAB) has reached agreements with social media networks on information sharing and the removal of illegal campaign material. In 2018, KNAB also proceeded with the development of an easily downloadable and user-friendly “Report to KNAB” application which enables the anonymous reporting of potential foreign electoral interference online through photo, audio or video evidence.
Additionally, analysts have also pointed out that the under-regulation of third-party campaigning presents another vulnerability (OSCE, 2021[29]). For example, the coercion of workers to support certain political parties, such as by donating their time as volunteers (STT, 2021[10]). Lithuania has taken some measures to address this situation, such as the enactment of the new Electoral Code which entered into force on 1 September 2022, and that stipulates that voluntary work is considered as an expenditure of a political election campaign (Art. 109). Therefore, voluntary work must be recorded in a financing calculation sheet, indicating which and how much work was carried out by whom and when. However, the actual implementation of the provisions of this reform and its impact on political financing integrity, remain to be assessed.
Finally, during the consultation for this report, CEC officials stated that although information related to the sanctions for political financing violations has been published since 2012, the CEC should be more proactive in the publication of said information, including the information from the local electoral commissions. This, alongside awareness raising activities for citizens, might create a deterrent effect on political financing violations. Lithuania could therefore consider publishing information about the sanctions for political financing violations imposed and work towards standardising the collection of information on the number of investigations initiated, number and types of sanctions imposed as well as length of proceedings (OECD, 2020[35]).
Lobbying
The Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying (OECD, 2021[36]) provides directions and guidance to foster transparency and integrity in lobbying, both of which are crucial to ensure that stimulus packages and policies are designed and implemented to best benefit the public interest. Lithuania was one of the first countries to adopt legislation in 2000, and is currently one of sixteen (16) OECD countries with a public register of lobbyists that provides citizens with information about their activities (OECD, 2021[37]). Law VIII-1749 of 2000 (Law on Lobbying Activities of the Republic of Lithuania) was first amended in 2017 and subsequently, in 2021. These amendments sought to clarify the role of the Chief Official Ethics Commission (Vyriausioji Tarnybines Etikos Komisija, COEC), specify the rights and obligations of lobbyists, provide more detailed data on lobbying activities on an online portal and introduce obligations for both public sector entities and lobbyists (STT, 2020[11]). Furthermore, the 2017 amendments were not able to prevent several high-profile cases, including an attorney who was investigated by the COEC in 2019 for seeking to influence amendments to the law on health insurance without registering as a lobbyist. The COEC also concluded in several other cases that various company representatives had engaged in illicit lobbying without duly registering as lobbyists (Transparency International Lithuania, 2020[38]). It was perhaps little surprise that the 2019 edition of the Lithuanian Map of Corruption indicated that only around 10% of businesspeople and 20% of public officials viewed decision making in Lithuania as “open”, while the perception that businesses exerted too much influence on politicians remained high (Transparency International Lithuania, 2020[39]).
Following further lobbying scandals in 2020 that implicated the Lithuanian Business Confederation and the Association of Lithuanian Banks, amendments were introduced to Law VIII-1749 of 2000 (Law on Lobbying Activities of the Republic of Lithuania) that sought to address the significant loopholes, including enabling legal persons to register as lobbyists, and that all lobbyists declare their activities (each legislative act) no later than within seven days after the facts occurred. If lobbyists fail to report annually, the COEC is mandated to remove them from the list of lobbyists. Additionally, the process states that if a lobbyist does not declare within the deadline (7 days after the lobbying meeting took place), they will be placed under investigation. Overall, the implications of removal, such as no longer being allowed to interact with MPs/officials and enter parliamentary premises or having to be registered in order to get an audience with MP or public official, are unknown and may be established by practice in the future. The law also included exemptions from the obligation to register as a lobbyist so as not to impede public consultations and petitions, after a petition of civil society groups, including the “activities of non-governmental organisations of public benefit” (CIVICUS, 2019[40]). Considering this, in 2020, the situation showed some improvement as there were 107 officially registered lobbyists, but only 33% made official declarations. By the end of 2022 there were 122 registered lobbyists. On the other hand, between 2017 and 2020, members of parliament declared 3 968 meetings with registered lobbyists and interest groups. Of all 154 MPs in office during this period, only 100 of them declared meetings. Most meetings were held with business representatives (1260 meetings), non-governmental organisation representatives (1184) and representatives of education, science and culture (755) (Transparency International Lithuania, 2020[39]). As shown in the numbers, transparency has been improving overtime, but more needs to be done to address reporting gaps by both lobbyists and MPs (Transparency International Lithuania, 2020[38]).
In 2021, Lithuania passed new amendments to its lobbying regime (Box 1.3). The amendments sought to address previous shortcomings, such as the narrow scope of the law as only certain natural persons rather than legal entities were defined as lobbyists. However, further efforts are required to align national legislation with best practice on lobbying. Indeed, Article 7 of the Lobbying Law still allows several exceptions to the regime. For example, lobbying activities conducted by certain individual and political parties as well as opinions expressed by certain individuals with regards to legislation. Similarly, the participation in public meetings and discussions are not considered lobbying. Legislative changes could aim at expanding the definition of lobbyists to limit the exceptions and Lithuania could consider the upcoming NAPC Action Plans to fast-track these legislative initiatives.
The most recent amendments to the Law on Lobbying Activities came into force on 1 January 2021, introducing obligations for the public sector as well as lobbyists. It includes cross-declaration which requires lobbyists, as well as politicians and public servants, who have contact with lobbyists, to report no later than seven days from the moment the lobbying activities took place.
Additionally, the legal amendments introduced an obligation for high-level officials and parliamentarians to report lobbying interactions related to legislative processes to the COEC electronically no less than seven days after the lobbying activity occurred.
In 2021, the COEC launched the Information System of Transparent Legislative Processes ( Skaidrių teisėkūros procesų informacinę sistemą, SKAIDRIS), a “cross-declaration” system which makes it possible to cross-check entries to ensure that those who receive legislative, regulatory or policy proposals from interest groups declare this.
These legal obligations have been accompanied by several softer measures. The COEC has organised numerous training sessions for public officials, parliamentarians and the private sector on how to comply with their duties to declare lobbying activities. Guidelines on lobbying activities and influence on legislative process, for both parliamentarians and persons performing lobbying activities were made available on the COEC website.
The aim of the new lobbying amendment is to increase understanding of lobbying as a positive phenomenon that can contribute to better decision making and to encourage cross-declaration of lobbying to foster transparency.
Furthermore, COEC officials reported that the high number of unregistered lobbyists remains a problem in 2022. In 2021, COEC launched a new “Information System of Transparent Legislative Processes” (SKAIDRIS) as a central lobbying platform to ensure that the transparency of lobbying activities does not rely on individual public bodies uploading their own specific data in a sporadic or fragmented manner, but rather cross-checking the information reported by lobbying groups and individuals and that of legislators. As of March 2022, it appears that 261 lobbyists are registered (Chief Official Ethics Commission, 2022[43]), which represents a significant increase from the 35 who publicly declared their activities in 2016 (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[9]). The 2021 lobbying register includes only a very limited number of registered lobbyists, which represented only a small fraction of the total number of interest groups that act as de facto lobbyists, including business associations and NGOs. This may be in part regarding problems with the definition of a lobbyist. For example, Lithuanian authorities assert that law firms are not to be considered as lobbyist. Regardless, the 2020 Implementation Review of the 2015-2019 Inter-institutional Action Plan was sceptical that these new measures had much effect, noting that the “impact of undeclared lobbying remains significant and… it is doubtful whether lobbying has become more transparent” (STT, 2020[11]).
In addition, after an assessment by TI Lithuania showed that less than half of MPs made their work calendars publicly available (Transparency International Lithuania, 2017[44]), the new law also requires parliamentarians to make their working calendars available to the public on their website (GRECO, 2021[17]). Since this reform, agendas have included detailed information on procedural issues, but few details on the actual substance of said meetings. The issue was also highlighted by GRECO in its Fifth Evaluation Round Report noting that the lack of detailed information in the agendas creates obstacles for the effective monitoring of contacts of top politicians with third parties, including lobbyists (GRECO, 2022[45]). To this end, in the upcoming Action Plan, Lithuania could consider establishing criteria to be published, including a substantive overview of the meeting discussions, their outcomes and the place where the meeting took place. This information could be cross-checked with the information provided on the lobbying register to analyse the consistency of the information. For example, in Latvia employees covered by transparency requirements are required to disclose the information received from lobbyists, including what interests they represent, what proposals were expressed, and in what way they have been considered (OECD, 2021[46]). Similarly, all lobbyists should declare their activities more regularly, and not only once a year. This would give the system dynamism and would allow the identification of possible irregularities in a more preventive way. Furthermore, stakeholders consulted for this report, stated that the NAPC could consider including strategies for a more proactive review of these agendas by COEC. These developments have been accompanied by other institutional measures. GRECO observes that the COEC has organised numerous training sessions for public officials, parliamentarians and the private sector on how to comply with their duties to declare lobbying activities (GRECO, 2021[17]), and the STT notes that COEC developed guidelines for staff who interact with lobbyists. Priorities for the forthcoming NAPC Action Plan could include training and awareness raising activities targeted at removing the negative connotations about lobbying and clarifying in which cases it could be considered as unlawful. Indeed, lobbying in all its forms, including advocacy and other ways of influencing public policies, is a legitimate act of political participation. It gives stakeholders access to the development and implementation of public policies (OECD, 2021[46]).
Overall, authorities in Lithuania seem to have carefully considered how to tighten up the oversight of lobbying after a series of scandals and made it clear that the initial system had fundamental flaws. Amongst those, the cross-declaration system based on open data appears to have good potential to ensure that fewer lobbying attempts slip through the net. Nonetheless, as stated by civil society representatives during the virtual fact-finding mission, the system would benefit from more strict oversight by the COEC, including subtracting and following up on specific public cases reported by the media. Furthermore, Lithuania could consider increasing oversight and compliance in the upcoming Action Plan, by vetting declarations from both lobbyists and lobbied persons. Also, the influence of illegal lobbying could be reduced by expanding awareness of the law amongst relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, Lithuania could consider increasing oversight and compliance in the upcoming Action Plan, by vetting annual declarations from both lobbyists and lobbied persons.
Undue influence and clientelism patronage and nepotism among elected officials
Clientelism can be defined as the “proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me? It is worth noting that ‘proffering of material goods’ in reality sometimes takes the form of threats rather than inducements” (Stokes, 2009[47]). In turn, patronage and vote buying can be understood as subclasses of clientelism. On the one hand, vote buying is strictly defined as the proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient’s vote (Brusco, M. Nazareno and S. Stokes, 2004[48]). Closely related to lobbying is the issue of undue influence arising from conflicts of interest, political patronage and nepotism. These issues affect both elected and unelected officials, and to avoid duplication much of the discussion around the 2015-2025 NAPC’s attempts to reduce unresolved conflicts of interest is covered in the later section on public administration, including the introduction of a new information system for the control of conflicts of interest (Register of Private Interests, Privačių interesų registras, PINREG).
Nonetheless, there is a clear political dimension to conflict of interest that was not fully reflected in the 2015-2019 NAPC Action Plan. The Lithuanian Maps of Corruption (STT, 2022[19]) have long shown that citizens, business managers and civil servants alike view nepotism and the protection of members of political parties as some of the most common forms of corruption in Lithuania. For example, in 2020, 74% of the population, 61% of businesspeople and 54% of civil servants reported nepotism as widespread. The protection of members of political parties was reported by 66% of the population, 57% of businesspeople, and 61% of civil servants as widespread. See STT (STT, 2022[19]).
Risks related to the political level were noted in the Implementation Review of the 2015-2019 Action Plan, especially at municipal level. These risk factors included the fact that during the analysed period in some municipal administrations, around half of the employees are members of a political party, which brings a heightened risk of politicised decision making (STT, 2020[11]). Moreover, studies have shown that in Lithuania, employees of municipal administrations who are members of a political party have a salary on average 17% higher than colleagues who have no official political affiliation. In some municipalities, this income gap was a remarkable 60%. Additionally, in the latest monitoring report of the STT, a study established that about 17% of employees of Lithuanian municipal administrations are related by kinship or marriage. Additionally, the report states that the indicator of the intensity of nepotism risk in enterprises owned by Lithuanian municipalities was 19%. The highest indicators of the intensity of nepotism risk in municipally owned enterprises are in the Švenčionys District, where the average risk intensity of nepotism of SOEs enterprises is 28% (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[9]).
Various measures were proposed in the 2020 Implementation Review to address undue influence at the municipal level, including increasing data transparency and strengthening independence of local control and audit functions. Specifically, it was proposed to increase transparency in the composition and affiliation of officials in public institutions (STT, 2020[11]). Furthermore, the 2020-2022 Action Plan included a new measure to promote the activities of municipal anti-corruption commissions (Box 1.4) and increase citizen involvement in local decision-making processes.
Citizens experience corruption most acutely at the local level, therefore addressing corruption risks at the municipal level is crucial to a country’s integrity strategy. Although corruption at the local level can mirror corruption at the national level in the form of bribery, facilitation payments, nepotism, and conflicts of interest, the specificities of municipalities and their size, their number of resources and the interconnectedness of citizens needs to be considered in any anti-corruption strategy.
While municipalities face corruption risks dues to their inter-connected networks and the direct link between government and citizens, they also provide opportunities for the restoration of trust between citizens and their national governments. The UNDP established a ‘Guide to Corruption Free Local Government’ as a tool for municipalities to design and implement anti-corruption programmes. Some cities have used Transparency International’s Local Integrity System Assessment Tool to assess their city’s integrity environment.
Providing oversight at the local level can be challenging but some cities, for example, Minneapolis and Philadelphia in the US, have established ethics commissions.
According to the 2021 Implementation Review, the STT submitted an assessment of the effectiveness of municipal anti-corruption commissions to the Ministry of the Interior in 2020. According to Lithuanian authorities, this assessment inspired amendments to the Self-Government Law, which will strengthened and expand the powers of the Municipal Anti-Corruption Commissions. When it comes to force, the law will allow the commission to consider and review public procurements processes carried out by the municipal administration and strengthen the role of the opposition in municipal councils. However, the 2021 Implementation Review noted that municipalities continue to be characterised by weak oversight, as municipal anti-corruption commissions often only have an advisory role and are unable to issue binding recommendations, while also suffering from low administrative capacity (STT, 2021[51]). This continues to provide ample space for nepotism, politicised decision making, and undue influence. Furthermore, the impact of the new reform over these issues remains to be assessed. Further efforts to scale up the activities of municipal anti-corruption commissions and improve independence of local government control and audit services to address such risks is recommended for the 2022-2033 NAPC. Particular attention should be paid in ensuring the necessary political commitment at the local level to address these sensitive issues and implement the institutional checks and balances already in place for the protection of the public interest.
Judiciary and law enforcement
The second priority area in the 2015-2025 NAPC related to the judiciary and law enforcement institutions. Based on their assessment of corruption risks in this field, the authors of the Programme concluded that the core vulnerabilities related to (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]):
Petty corruption, notably bribery and gift-giving, which affected the police force, the State Border Guard Service, customs officers and prison guards.
Cases of corruption in the legal profession, including judges, prosecutors and lawyers.
Low capacity and competence of pre-trial investigatory bodies in the area of corrupt offences.
Lack of legal protection for people reporting wrongdoing, which was believed to contribute to unwillingness to report corruption.
Inability to detect illicit enrichment due to lack of comprehensive data on assets and income.
Corruption in law enforcement agencies
The 2015-2019 Action Plan included several measures designed to curb petty corruption in sectors deemed to be particularly at risk, including law enforcement, healthcare, and local government. The latter two are discussed in subsequent sections. Petty corruption involving police officers was an acknowledged problem at the start of the implementation period. In the first six (6) months of 2013 alone, there were 26 investigations into corruption or abuse of office by Lithuanian police officers, 9 of which related to corruption. During the same period, there were 448 reported incidents of people trying to bribe police officers (Kairienė and Seniutenė, 2013[52]).
A specific activity during the first Action Plan sought to reduce the prevalence of informal payments to the police, largely through the activities of an Immunity Board (Imuniteto Valdybai) of the Police Department that conducted integrity training for police officers, screened recruits, and investigated corruption by law enforcement officials. In addition, police departments conducted risk mapping to identify and tackle bribery hotspots. Overall, petty corruption involving the police seems to have declined sharply in the period from 2014 to 2019. The Implementation Review of the 2015-2019 Action Plan notes that while 1 535 cases of petty corruption were registered in 2014, this had dropped to 533 by 2018 (STT, 2020[11]). Nonetheless, it appears that while street-level bribery is progressively decreasing, more sophisticated corruption schemes are proving harder to eradicate. In 2019, a corruption case was uncovered in Kaunas, which implicated senior police officials in international fraud, money laundering and smuggling. While being an on-going investigation, police officers were allegedly colluding with transnational organised crime groups that used forged documents to acquire goods, and a senior official from the Economic Crime Investigation Board was arrested on suspicion of covering up illegal business activity (Delfi, 2019[53]). The 2015-2025 NAPC’s second Action Plan did not include dedicated measures to tackle the issue. Therefore, Lithuanian authorities could consider measures for the 2022-2033 NAPC to better address the corrupting influence of transnational organised crime groups that have on occasion been able to penetrate the police force.
Corruption in the judiciary
Efforts to tackle corruption in the judiciary had been made during previous periods. These had included reforms to the judicial selection process and measures to enhance transparency such as public and online court hearings. Furthermore, a dedicated effort was made to establish rotation of court leadership and periodic performance reviews (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2022[26]) as well as the development of a dedicated Anti-Corruption Programme for the courts (Council of Judges, 2012[54]). Nonetheless, at the start of the 2015-2025 NAPC, there were some concerning signs about the extent of corruption in the judiciary and the degree of independence of the courts. For example, reports on bribery and irregular payments that were commonly exchanged to obtain favourable judgements were increasing exponentially (GAN Integrity, 2018[55]). A Eurobarometer survey found that 38% of citizens and 28% of companies perceived the independence of judges to be fairly bad or very bad (European Commission, 2017[56]) Similarly, the Global Corruption Barometer 2021 shows that one in five Lithuanians think that most or all judges or magistrates are involved in corruption (Transparency International, 2021[57]). Perhaps more concerning, in 2017, 12% of 147 Lithuanian judges surveyed reported facing inappropriate pressure to decide a case in a specific way, while 11% believed that individual judges had accepted bribes in return for a favourable judgement. The proportion of judges reporting that they had faced the threat of disciplinary action due to how they had decided a case was the highest in Europe (19%), while 30% of judges believed that appointments were made other than on the basis of ability and experience (European Network of Council for the Judiciary, 2017[58]).
Despite this, the first Inter-institutional Action Plan for 2015-2019 itself included no specific measures aimed at improving integrity in the judiciary, although some judicial organisations, such as the Supreme Court, adopted their own tailored anti-corruption plans. The significance of the oversight in not prioritising issues relating to judicial integrity during the first Action Plan period became apparent in 2019, when a large judicial corruption scandal erupted. During the consequent investigation by the STT into alleged bribery, abuse of power and trading of influence in the judiciary, 26 people were arrested including eight (8) judges, one of whom sat on the Supreme Court (Mrazauskaite, 2019[59]). Eventually, 54 people including 12 judges were indicted (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2022[26]). The situation went increasingly downhill in 2019. According to the data of the investigation "Lithuanian Corruption Map 2019" (STT, 2019[60]), Lithuanian courts fell among the institutions that are perceived as the most corrupt in the country and the payment of a bribe to a judge in order to make a favourable judgment was assessed as a very common practice by one (1) in three (3) residents. Lithuanian authorities considered in their 2015-2019 Monitoring Report that several areas needed improvement, amongst these, the case allocation system needs to be automatised and judicial panels have a need for more transparency. Furthermore, a risk assessment for the sector was necessary, alongside an effective internal and external control in the judiciary (STT, 2019[60]). Unsurprisingly, this fundamentally shook public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, which plummeted to around 25% in 2020 (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2022[26]).
Over the 2015-2025 NAPC implementation period, various indicators of judicial integrity present a mixed picture, with some minor improvements. On one hand, data from 2021 Eurobarometer surveys point to some improvements in citizens’ and businesses’ perceptions of judicial independence (European Commission, 2021[61]). Likewise, on the Global Competitiveness Index’s indicator of judicial independence, Lithuania improved from 3.9 out of 7 in 2016 to 4.2 in 2019 (World Economic Forum, 2019[62]). Likewise, the Index of Public Integrity recorded an improvement in judicial independence from 5.44 out of 10 in 2015 to 6.04 out of 10 in 2021 (ERCAS, 2021[63]). Unfortunately, the 2021 edition of the Lithuanian Map of Corruption revealed that courts are still perceived to be highly corrupt (LRT English, 2022[64]). However, it is worth pointing out that the longer-term trend appears encouraging, and previous OECD studies have observed that the proportion of Lithuanian citizens expressing confidence in the judicial system increased from 16% in 2010 to 52% in 2020 (OECD, 2021[37]).
Lithuania has taken some steps to respond to this crisis. The Implementation Review of the first Action Plan noted the need for a comprehensive sectoral anti-corruption plan for the judiciary and a thorough review of legislative and regulatory framework governing the work of the courts to reduce the risk of conflicts of interest on the part of judges and court staff, as well as to further improve transparency in the judicial branch (STT, 2020[11]). As a result, a new secondary objective was included in the second Action Plan for the period 2020-2022, which aimed to “reduce the risk of corruption in the judicial system” (Box 1.5).
The Judicial Ethics and Discipline Commission, with a special focus on the dissemination of professional ethics for judges, has published a practical guide to the Code of Ethics for Judges in electronic format, which is being updated.
The purpose of the practical guide is not only to review the decisions made, but also to help judges make decisions in non-traditional procedural and life situations so that neither the court nor the judge's name is harmed. This contributes not only to building trust in the judiciary, but also to the prestige of the judiciary and the spread of an anti-corruption culture.
The provisions of the Code of Ethics for Judges are introduced to newly recruited judges during introductory training and various meetings with judges. The Judicial Ethics and Discipline Commission also advises judges and judicial authorities on various issues related to judicial ethics (implementation of the principles of judicial independence and impartiality in the context of judicial volunteering and mentoring, reconciling public and private interests, and contributing to strengthening the anti-corruption culture in the judiciary).
Source: OECD Questionnaire, February 2022.
In addition, five (5) measures in the 2020-2022 Action Plan were introduced to improve judicial integrity. Based on a new risk assessment, a sectoral anti-corruption plan was designed, and the intention was for this to be overseen by a dedicated “judicial integrity officer”. By 2021, the COEC collaborated with the Judicial Council and National Administration of Courts to develop guidance for judges and judicial staff on managing conflicts of interest, as well as elaborate policies on gifts, the revolving door and cooling-off periods. This was complemented by awareness-raising activities conducted by the Judicial Ethics and Disciplinary Board, particularly targeted at chairpersons of courts to familiarise with the obligation for judicial impartiality, the Code of Ethics and the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests. The Judicial Council also established an inter-institutional working group, including representatives from the STT, to continue to strengthen judicial integrity (European Commission, 2021[20]). However, Lithuanian authorities report that the working group is currently not active and has therefore not fulfilled its mission.
In February 2022, the Judicial Council issued a Resolution on the Action Plan for the prevention of corruption in the Lithuanian judicial system for the years 2022-2025 and the plan of implementation measures for the years 2022-2023 (Council of Judges, 2022[65]). The 2022-2025 sectoral anti-corruption Action Plan for the judiciary includes activities for training and awareness raising on corruption prevention, establishing a zero-gift policy, and promoting an open and transparent judiciary system. The responsibility for monitoring the overall implementation of the Action Plan is assigned to a central unit with the mandate to create a corruption resilient environment. This is achieved through co-operating with the heads of courts, judicial self-governing institutions, administration and training centres, and other corruption prevention agencies, as well as providing advice to institutions and employees of the judicial system. A novelty of the 2022-2025 sectorial Action Plan is the introduction of the “Judicial Competence Model” used to assess the competencies of judiciary candidates including assessment criteria about resilience to corruption, which are described in detail in Box 1.6.
The Judges’ Competence Model is a tool used to assess the personal competences required to perform judiciary work. The tool is applied in the assessment of personal competences of judiciary candidates. The Model consists of a series of general personal competences, including resilience to corruption. This is assessed based on the degree to which candidates are guided by values, act within the limits of the granted powers and does not exceed them, do not confuse public and private interests and do not tolerate any form of corruption. Overall, the judges’ behaviours should ensure fairness and trust in the judiciary system. The Model further presents a list of ethical judicial conduct that should provide the basis for the assessment. More specifically:
Judges should be able to clearly state their values
The values of judges should be reflected in their behaviours and decisions
Judges should do the right thing, even when it's hard
Judges should act within the limits of their granted powers and do not exceed them
Judges should behave fairly in all relationships
Judges should avoid situations that may lead to conflicts of interest
Judges should openly disclose their connections
Judges should not expect thanks for the work done
Judges should not expect privileges for themselves and do not share these with others
Judges should not try to please the opinion of a person in a higher position
Judges should notice and react to wrongful behaviour like corruption
Judges should engage in anti-corruption activities.
In addition, the assessment takes into account candidates’ ability to create an environment where power and authority are not abused. This is expected to be achieved by prohibiting the provision of privileges to court employees or business entities in reaching and implementing decisions related to court management. The prohibition also includes direct or indirect incentives (for example, unrealistic performance indicators, such as unattainable savings goals, implementation deadlines, etc.) that could motivate court employees to act unethically or make decisions for personal gain or benefit to third parties.
Finally, according to the Model, judges should continuously deepen their knowledge of corruption prevention practices, encourage learning, and educate court employees, be interested in corruption prevention innovations and apply them in their environment. This is expected to be achieved through regular participation in trainings on the judicial code of conduct, judicial ethics and other topics related to the prevention of corruption.
Source: (Council of Judges, 2022[65]).
Currently, a new automated system (LITEKO) to allocate cases to judges is being further developed in response to a 2019 STT risk assessment. A new module, which will be integrated to the LITEKO system, will ensure an even distribution of cases taking into account the number of cases handled by the judge at the moment, their complexity, other types of work carried out by judges and participation in judicial panels, among others. The new module is expected to perform automated controls to check, for example, whether the judge participated in related cases or pre-trial investigations and any other circumstances which might affect the assignment of a particular case. This initiative will allow the objective assessment of circumstances affecting the assignment of cases to judges or leading to their recusal.
Information gleaned during the fact-finding mission indicates that relevant stakeholders believe that the NAPC provided national level cohesion to reform efforts in the judiciary after 2019, and improved co-ordination with the COEC To this end, ongoing initiatives between the judiciary and COEC are underway to provide guidance to judges on how to evaluate possible conflicts of interest. The aim is to provide judges with a tool that would help managing the potential risks of violations of public and private interests and contribute to the prevention of corruption in the judiciary by applying specific measures (i.e. declaring public and private interests and withdrawing from consideration or decision making on certain matters). In addition, leveraging the modernisation of the LITEKO system described above, there are plans to establish an interface between the PINREG digital system for the submission of private interest declarations and the courts’ digital systems for the allocation of cases. The automated checks of the LITEKO system are expected to support the integration with the PINREG. The interlinkage of the two digital systems aims to prevent the allocation of cases to judges whose private interests are somehow involved. The interface integration between LITEKO and PINREG will not automatically prevent the assignment of cases to judges, but it will operate as a complementary tool in the process of sorting cases using data drawn from the two system. In so far, the person allocating the cases would automatically be provided with information about possible connections between the litigants and the judge handling the case. This information will enable an assessment regarding the assignment of the case to another judge or the transfer of the case to other courtrooms or another court.
Building on these efforts, the 2022-2033 NAPC envisages to ensure resilience to corruption in the judiciary and the justice system. To achieve this, it aims at increasing transparency, openness, and innovation in the judiciary, implementing continuous corruption risk assessment processes, as well as strengthening the management of conflicts of interest and the integrity of judges through a policy framework that will address issues, such as the appointment and promotion processes of judges and the allocation of cases in court. The subsequent Action Plans could promote practical guidance and training for members of the judiciary on how to prevent and manage conflicts of interest and prioritise the efforts towards the interface of the system of declarations and the allocation of cases. Additionally, court officials responsible for the allocation of cases to judges could be supported by training on how to use the data drawn from the LITEKO and PINREG systems to assess possible risks of conflicts of interest.
Finally, as part of measures to regain public confidence in the judiciary, a range of legal amendments and provisions were prepared to pave the way for the establishment of lay judges, so that citizens can play a more meaningful role alongside professional judges. Efforts have also been undertaken to win back citizen trust in the judicial system, including by broadcasting court hearings and meetings of the Judicial Council online. Building on these efforts, officials from the National Court Administration are seeking to implement a project called “Judge for the Media”, where one judge in each court will be always available to explain current issues or provide information to the media. In Lithuania, almost every court hearing is open to the public and the media can broadcast announcements of judicial decisions. However, there is still needed to improve citizens’ awareness about judicial work carried out in courts and strengthen their trust in the judiciary. A decade ago, courts appointed judges to manage media relations aiming to increase public reports and general knowledge about the courts work and certain judicial decisions. While the positions of these judges for media relations continue to exist formally, engagement for the implementation of this project gradually faded. The Judicial Council and the National Courts Administration of Lithuania are currently seeking ways to revive this idea by re-institutionalising the “Judge for the Media”. Their efforts are focused on establishing a reasonable factual and legal basis for this additional activity, as well as on allocating suitable resources for implementation, so that judges appointed in this position are compensated with reduced judicial workload. Indeed, public involvement through communication, public education about judicial work and timely information on corruption prevention activities in courts is one of the priorities of the 2022 Action Plan for the prevention of corruption in the Lithuanian judiciary system (Council of Judges, 2022[65]). Ultimately, it appears that the impact of these measures is yet to be felt.
Against this backdrop, there is a need for a more systemic approach to anti-corruption in the judiciary that adopts a comprehensive framework to improve transparency, minimise opportunities for illicit interactions between judges and parties and prevents undue interference in the operations of the judicial branch. Lithuania might consider taking a bolder approach into fighting corruption in the judiciary in both the 2022-2033 NAPC and its subsequent Action Plan. For this, it needs to involve more deeply members of the judiciary in the process of developing, updating and monitoring the implementation of the sectorial anti-corruption plan, as well as the establishment of clear priorities and indicators. These activities would highly benefit from developing a risk map of the sector, as a first step. Furthermore, it will be important to monitor the work of the newly established “Integrity Officer” of the judiciary to ensure they are adequately able to fulfil their mandate to oversee a more coherent anti-corruption strategy in the judiciary.
Efficiency of law enforcement agencies
According to the interviews conducted in the virtual fact-finding mission, the STT is generally viewed by observers as a competent anti-corruption body that is able to withstand political pressure and effectively pursue high-profile corruption cases in co-operation with the PGO (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2022[26]). However, it appears that citizens are yet to be fully convinced that the prosecution of high-level corruption is sufficiently investigated in Lithuania, as 52% of citizens thought that there are not enough successful prosecutions of corruption to act as a deterrent (European Commission, 2020[13]).
During the implementation period, the STT appears to have made a strategic decision to focus its efforts on fewer but more complex cases of corruption. In 2017, 591 investigations were opened in Lithuania into alleged corruption, of which 8% related to serious offences, while by 2020 only 343 investigations were launched, but serious cases compromised 24% of these (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[9]). According to Lithuanian authorities, similar numbers are found in pre-trial investigations in 2020, with 73 pre-trial investigations initiated by STT, including serious offences. In total, the STT charged 105 people with corruption-related offences in 2018 and 2019, of whom approximately 60% were senior managers. In 2018, politicians from two (2) parliamentary parties were indicted for corruption and in 2019 the STT conducted a major investigation into a complex corruption scheme in the judiciary (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2022[26]).
Relevant commitments in the 2015-2025 NAPC to strengthen law enforcement’s capacity to detect corruption focused predominantly on training. Funding was secured from the EU to train 607 prosecutors and pre-trial investigators to detect, investigate and prosecute corruption in the period 2015-2019. This programme was continued in the 2020-2022 Action Plan, with a further 100 people trained (STT, 2021[10]). In addition, the STT in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs trained 320 diplomats on corruption-related issues, with a focus on foreign bribery, while the government reportedly increased resources allocated to the STT by 47% in 2018 (OECD, 2019[66]). Unfortunately, apart from activity indicators such as number of people trained, Lithuania does not have outcome level data, such as quality evaluations, which would shed light on the effectiveness of these trainings. This may be considered as an issue to be addressed in the 2022-2033 NAPC and its subsequent Action Plan.
As it relates the STT, three (3) new analytical divisions were established in 2018 to go beyond the traditional focus on operational support to criminal intelligence and take an increasingly preventive, data-driven risk management approach. This involved the acquisition of various software packages to analyse data from more than 60 different datasets, including procurement databases and land registers, to identify potentially corrupt relationships or fraudulent activities. In addition to this, the number of people being vetted by the STT increased, from 9 404 in 2018 to 10 226 in 2020 (STT, 2021[51]). As it relates to the PGO a process is on-going to develop a module on international co-operation on criminal matters as part of its data management system, the “Integrated information System of Criminal Process” to expedite data generation and processing (OECD, 2019[66]). The use of big data analytics to inform evidence-based anti-corruption policy making has been highlighted by the European Commission as a good practice (Box 1.7) (European Commission, 2022[67]). Even though Article 38 (2) of the Law on Management of State Information Resources states that data, information, documents and/or copies of data shall be made available to state and municipal authorities (including the STT) for the performance of their duties, the STT has encounter restrictions as it related to access to certain databases. In particular, requests are usually limited to its role in criminal investigations and cannot be used for other purposes such as analytics or corruption risk assessments.
The STT’s analytical anti-corruption intelligence department
In 2018, a new function within the STT was established: the analytical anti-corruption intelligence department. It is composed of a strategic analysis division, a tactical analysis division and an operative analysis division. The overall objective of the department is to strengthen data-driven corruption risk management by developing a big data analytics model that provides a more effective and timely identification and analysis of corruption risks in order to prevent damages from occurring.
The STT has purchased and adapted several IT systems and trained its staff in their use and programming. This strategy enables the STT to more effectively process the data made available to them, and to conduct a number of different analyses.
Some tangible results from the introduction of this department include:
Increased number of reports issued to the public and parliament compared to period before 2018.
Provision of information to decision makers in a timelier, more concrete and more understandable way, i.e. using visualisation software.
Detection of potential conflicts of interest, bribery, and collusion cases.
Provision of data for evidence-based anti-corruption measures (at STT and national level).
While this model depends on access to state-owned registers and financial information, that may not be available in other EU countries, the system itself is still transferable and can function with alternative data sources.
Source: (European Commission, 2022[67]).
The focus of the STT on law enforcement efforts is commendable. However, several issues remain to be tuned internally, amongst those, deepening co-operation with international partners to more effectively target transnational forms of corruption, such as those mentioned above in the case of the Kaunas police department and the so-called Troika laundromat case (OCCRP, 2019[68]). Indeed, in both of these cases, tip offs and a substantial amount of evidence was provided by foreign law enforcement authorities and investigators (Delfi, 2019[53]).
In addition, as stated by stakeholders in the consultation of this report, one of the root causes for the acquittal of defendants could be the standard of proof required by court practice in Lithuania. Although there are good examples of successful prosecution of corruption-related offences, the issue re-emerged after every acquittal in a high-profile corruption-related case. In the Masiulis/MG Baltic Group case (Vilnius District Court, 2022[69]), it became clear that the standard of proof in corruption-related cases remains an issue which could hinder effective prosecution and Lithuania’s overall progress in the fight against corruption.
However, the issue is far from settled, as Lithuanian authorities differ in their views on this issue and its consequences in high profile cases. On the one hand, Lithuanian authorities noted that a restrictive assessment of the evidence by the courts alongside the difficulties to prove intent had hampered successful prosecutions. This view was supported by the 2009 GRECO report stated that “criminal law provisions on bribery and trading in influence are used or interpreted in a restrictive manner, unlike the legal dissociation between active and passive bribery as well as the progressive case-law analysis of the Lithuanian Supreme Court would suggest” (GRECO, 2009[70]). On the other hand, another group of stakeholders were of the view that criminal law and procedure as well as case law on the standard of proof were consistent and satisfactory as is. Furthermore, they asserted that recent difficulties in the prosecution of corruption cases were the consequence of a full and impartial examination of all the circumstances of the case and in accordance with the law (Art. 20 of the CPC).
At any rate, the issue remains problematic and may be affecting a small but very meaningful number of investigations, in accordance with law enforcement agencies. Considering the on-going discussion and disparities between criminal law policy experts and judicial operators, Lithuania could consider conducting a comprehensively analyses of existing and relevant case law accompanied by a study of the practical difficulties law enforcement agencies face on their daily work and possible remedies. At the same time, Lithuanian courts continue to have wide discretionary powers in shaping the required standards of evidence through jurisprudence and court practice, while enforcing the lowest of sanctions. Considering this, Lithuania could also consider conducting training and awareness raising within the judiciary on effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for corruption related offences.
The efficient enforcement of sanctions in relation to corruption offences is also affected by limitations in the Lithuanian Criminal Code (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2000[71]). According to Article 42 (3) of the Criminal Code, a person committing a single crime or misdemeanour may be sentenced to only one type of sentence. The same also applies to legal entities in accordance with Article 43 (3) of the Criminal Code. In so far, corruption convictions may not combine sanctions in the forms of imprisonment and the imposition of fines. The court must choose between the two types of sanctions, even in the case that imprisonment is suspended. This issue was highlighted by GRECO (GRECO, 2009[70]) and the OECD Woking Group on Bribery and according to recent reports from Lithuanian state officials, it persists. In addition, the OECD Working Group on Bribery notes that in the few cases where fines are imposed, there is an established practice of prosecutors and judges seeking and imposing fines well below the required average, thus raising concerns about the effective, proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of sanctions (OECD, 2017[72]). Lithuania could consider developing non-binding guidance and training for prosecutors when determining fines. For example, the UK Sentencing Council has developed a standardised calculator of fines for judges in considering elements, such as the income, the maximum sentence foreseen, plea percentage and the compensation (Sentencing Council, 2016[73]). Other international examples and OECD country experiences could be use as inspiration when designing such trainings and guidance.
Whistleblowing Protection
The 2015-2025 NAPC prioritised whistleblowing as a preventive measure. The Lithuanian authorities decided not only to introduce whistleblower protection laws, but also to establish a system of financial reward for valuable protected disclosures as well as compensation for any detrimental effects experienced by the whistleblower. Lithuania’s Whistleblower Protection Law (Lietuvos Respublikos Pranešėjų Apsaugos Istatymas, No XIII – 804 of 28 November 2017 and as amended by Law No XIII – 1850 of 20 December 2018) allowed whistleblowers to be protected for reporting a myriad of violations including corruption related crimes, threats to public health and safety, threats to the environment, and illegal use of public funds (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2017[74]). The law prohibited retaliation against whistleblowers in both the public and private sector. Public institutions and enterprises with more than 50 employees were required by law to establish internal whistleblowing channels and, where appropriate, liaise with the PGO to ensure whistleblowers receive sufficient protection. In turn, the PGO is the authority that serves as the external channel for receiving whistleblower reports. The whistleblower protection law also specified that someone party to an offence can be exempted from liability when they blow the whistle on the wrongdoing. Consequently, in 2019, 68 people attempted to claim protection under the new law to make a protected disclosure, of which whistleblowing status was granted to approximately half. In addition, the law extended protections against retaliation to family members of whistleblowers and, in the case of any perceived adverse consequences to the whistleblower, placed the burden of proof squarely with the employer to demonstrate that these are unrelated to their disclosure. Furthermore, people who have been granted protected status as a whistleblower are entitled for free legal aid provided by the legal aid service under the Ministry of Justice.
In 2021, the Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas) adopted the Law Amending the Whistleblower Protection, Law XIII-804 (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[75]). In particular, the law aims to implement the Directive on the Protection of Persons who Report Breaches of Union Law (Directive (EU) 2019/1937) into national law. The new law expands the existing definition of the whistleblower, lists the events in which information about the infringements shall be reported, ensures confidentiality, clearer timelines, sanctions for institutions for non-complying with their responsibilities, penalties for persons who hinder or attempt to hinder reporting and retaliation against reporting persons (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[75]).
Complementing this legal framework, the Law on the Prevention of Corruption (Law XIV-471 of 2021) in Article 9 requires public sector employees to report corruption to the PGO, the STT or any other investigative authority. Nevertheless, the proportion of the population willing to report corruption barely changed during the implementation of the NAPC and remains very low (18% in 2014, 19% in 2020), while the number of corporate managers willing to report corruption actually declined from 36% in 2014 to 28% in 2020 (STT, 2014[5]; STT, 2022[19]). This is even though the 2021 Map of Corruption, states that around half of citizens and three-quarters of corporate managers know where to report corruption (STT, 2022[76]). A study by the European Commission presented an even bleaker picture, finding that only 6% of Lithuanian respondents who experienced corruption in practice reported this to the relevant authorities (European Commission, 2020[13]).
As stated, in Lithuania, the legal frameworks allow for the remuneration of whistleblowers, though only a minority of these cases related to corruption offences. According to the questionnaire submitted by the STT, this “undoubtedly” led to an increase in the number of people coming forward to disclose information on illegal and unethical activities. However, it is unclear whether financial remuneration led to increase reporting or if the quality of those reports has been increased by such measure. Lithuanian authorities do not have an annual breakdown of the number of whistleblowers who made protected discloses or an analysis of the quality and usefulness of these reports. Therefore, Lithuanian authorities would benefit from having a more systemic approach to this issue in the 2022-2033 NAPC and its subsequent Action Plans, in particular measuring the effectiveness of the recently passed measures in terms of the quality of the reports. At any rate, the law has greatly contributed to the establishing of reporting channels. A study by TI Lithuania found that 95 out of 105 public sector institutions provided their employees with an internal channel to report wrongdoing, but that of those, only 24 had received any such reports in the preceding two (2) years (Transparency International Lithuania, 2020[77]). This points to a high degree of formal compliance with whistleblowers protection measures but limited use of these channels, which could indicate either low awareness or anxiety of public officials to report illegal or unethical behaviour.
Dedicated whistleblowing legislation has generated other good practices. During the 2019-2022 Action Plan, the PGO issued orders to allow for the pre-trial investigation to begin based on information received from a whistleblower. The PGO also set up a hotline for whistleblowers in August 2020 and within the first four (4) months received 198 tip-offs. Because of the support provided, in 2020 the number of reports was 16 investigations and 11 internal audits (European Commission, 2021[20]). To accompany this, the PGO organised trainings on whistleblowers protection for district prosecutors and assessed how well various public bodies had met their obligations under the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers. In 2021, training was also provided to private sector representatives and public organisations responsible for implementing the requirements of the Whistleblowing Protection Act (STT, 2022[78]). Furthermore, around 60% of those seeking to blow the whistle have been recognised as whistleblowers and granted protection, and the STT recognises that the practice of applying whistleblowers protection is “still at an early stage” (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[9]).
Although progress has been made to improve the framework conditions to encourage whistleblowing, more needs to be done in the next programmatic period to instil a culture of integrity, where public sector employees, the private sector and citizens trust the existing reporting channels. To do so, Lithuania could consider various options. First, each entity could be required to publish statistics and outcomes of whistleblowers cases (once such cases have been anonymised), to foster transparency and accountability. Published information could also include win/loss record for cases of retaliation against whistleblowers, including decisions on the merits (e.g. the cases not decided on procedural grounds, but rather about whether the whistleblowers rights were violated). Second, the publication of cumulative data on taxpayer money recovered from fraud or through fines, as well as savings arising from the elimination of waste or mismanagement, have been very effective in gaining cultural support for whistleblowers and cultivating trust. Building on these PGO initiatives and to increase citizens’ willingness to report, Lithuania could also consider expanding awareness raising activities to implement social media, television, and radio campaigns on existing internal and external reporting channels.
Second, Lithuania could consider implementing additional measures for the protection of whistleblowers’ identity. Currently, Article 9 (3) of the Whistleblowing Protection Act establishes a confidentiality requirement in handling disclosures. More specifically, information regarding the identity of the person providing the information could be disclosed to the employer only in cases where it is necessary to protect the whistleblower from retaliation. And in these cases, the identity is disclosed only if the competent authority has the consent of the whistleblower. Finally, Lithuania could invest efforts in strengthening the effectiveness of internal reporting channels in public entities. According to Article 16 of the Whistleblowers Act and Resolution 1133, internal reporting channels are mandatorily established in public entities, providing for an exception when internal channels may not be implemented in state or municipal institutions belonging to another institution's management area. However, implementation relies at the discretion of the head of each entity.
So far, the majority of public sector entities have established internal reporting channels to allow the reporting of corruption and other illegal or unethical behaviour by their employees. However, almost 74% of the public entities with established internal reporting channels have not received any reports in the last two years (Transparency International Lithuania, 2020[77]). Therefore, public entities could be required to develop specific guidance to raise awareness among public sector employees and citizens about the existence and use of these channels. To this end, managers of public institutions may consider the following elements:
Statements from the organisation that employees are encouraged to disclose misconduct and that such disclosures will be appropriately addressed in a consistent and fair manner
A clear definition of the concerns that are expected to be raised under the policy and clarification that such concerns do not necessarily need to be detailed enough to constitute fulsome evidence
A clear definition of the purpose of internal reporting channels, who can report infringements and how to do so
Identification of the officers who are responsible for receiving disclosures
A commitment from the organisation to protect the identity of whistleblowers and to protect them from potential reprisals, including examples of specific measures that may be applied
Clarification of the follow-up whistleblowers will receive on their disclosure as well as applicable review and analysis timeframes
Publication of data on the effectiveness of the organisations internal reporting channels (e.g. number of reports received, number of investigations, number of cases transferred to other authorities for investigation, number of violations, etc.) (OECD, 2016[79]) (OECD, 2018[80]) (OECD, 2018[81]) (Transparency International Lithuania, 2020[77]).
Public Procurement
The third priority area in the 2015-2025 NAPC related to public procurement. Based on their assessment of corruption risks in this field, the authors of the Programme concluded that the core vulnerabilities related to (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]):
Ineffective control mechanisms over public procurement
Insufficient liability for non-compliance with procurement protocols, especially because offences may be committed by persons falling outside of the remit of Article 171 of the Code of Administrative Offences, who would therefore not be penalised.
Undue influence over the outcome of tenders by politicians
Specific risk factors included informal prior agreements, the tailoring of tender specifications to suit the characteristics of favoured firms, unnecessary purchases, inadequate supervision of the execution of public contracts, and collusive arrangements including cartels.
The difficulty of effectively blacklisting unreliable suppliers
The questionable use in some cases of in-house procurement procedures, where contracting authorities (especially those at municipal level) award contracts to undertakings they control without publishing a call for tender.
Based on data collected in the 2015 and 2019 editions of the Eurobarometer, the measures implemented during the 2015-2019 Action Plan had little effect in changing business perceptions of the extent of corruption in procurement processes (European Commission, 2015[82]; European Commission, 2019[14]). While in 2015, 39% of Lithuanian businesses thought that corruption had prevented them from winning a public tender in the previous three (3) years, this figure had only dropped marginally to 37% by 2019 (Table 1.6). More troublingly, there was a tangible increase in the perception that corrupt practices were widespread in many aspects of public contracting.
At the beginning of the implementation period, there were already reasonably solid integrity safeguards in Lithuania’s public procurement system. These included provisions to exclude bidders based on corruption, fraud, and bribery, as well as abnormally low bid prices. Moreover, Lithuania had made notable progress in establishing an e-procurement system and providing online access to centralised procurement data. Between 2009 and 2016, the proportion of e-procurement rose from 7.7% to 90% (US Department of State, 2017[83]). Despite this, some civil society observers expressed concerns about the authorities’ oversight capacity, noting that while the government spent the equivalent of 40% of the national budget on public contracting in 2016, the Public Procurement Office (Viešųjų Pirkimų Tarnyba, PPO) only had the resourcing to robustly evaluate 3.4% of high-value procurement procedures (Transparency International, 2017[84]). This naturally meant that the ability to detect corruption remained limited, and around one in four companies responding to a Eurobarometer survey in 2017 believed they had lost out on a public tender due to corruption (European Commission, 2017[85]). Another study found that companies perceived favouritism in procurement decisions as common (GAN Integrity, 2018[55]).
The 2015-2025 NAPC included several specific anti-corruption commitments regarding public procurement. These included expanding the Central Contracting Authority’s (Centrinė perkančioji organizacija, CPO) electronic catalogue for centralised purchases, updating the Central Portal of Public Procurement, obliging contracting authorities to publicly blacklist unreliable or corrupt firms to prevent them from competing for public contracts, and restricting in-house procurement (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]).
These commitments were followed by a range of measures in the 2015-2019 Inter-institutional Action Plan. The Administrative Code was amended in 2015 to provide for administrative liability for public procurement violations by managers and employees of legal persons who engage in public contracts. Other legal changes included amendments to Law No. I-1491 on Public Procurement in 2019 that made it possible to invite citizen representatives to participate in procurement planning processes (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2019[86]). Furthermore, EU funding was secured to provide IT toolkits to guide contracting authorities through the process of developing technical specifications, conducting market research, and preparing procurement documentation. In addition, between 2016 and 2019, 3 412 representatives of contracting authorities were trained in good procurement practices.
The pledge to expand the CPO’s electronic catalogue was met, as the number of categories of goods, works, and services available increased from 14 in 2013 to 71 in 2021. During the same period, the number of contracts purchased centrally through the e-catalogue increased fivefold while the total purchasing volume doubled. A survey of contracting authorities found that 97.5% approved of the new system, considering it transparent and reliable (Central Procurement Organization, 2022[87]). However, efforts to establish a new Central Information System for Public Procurement encountered considerable delays, and a contract to modernise the system was only secured recently (European Commission, 2020[88]). Additionally, in the last couple of years, the PPO began to publish a list of debarred suppliers on its website. Debarred suppliers are blacklisted for one or three years depending on the list that they are included. The blacklist is publicly available, and all contracting authorities have access to this information. The STT concluded in its review of the first Inter-institutional Action Plan that despite the strong focus on public procurement and the substantial number of technical measures implemented, procurement remained one of the most vulnerable areas to corruption (STT, 2020[11]).
The second Inter-institutional Action Plan (2020-2022) redoubled the focus on centralising procurement to minimise the risks associated with disjointed procurement processes at local level, notably through the further development of the CPO LT e-catalogue. The transition to e-procurement is now essentially complete, as by 2019, 99.8% of procurement tenders were published electronically by the PPO (STT, 2020[11]). In 2021, the Law on Public Procurement was amended (Amendment No. XIV-687) to require contracting authorities to publish market consultations in the Central Public Procurement Information System (Centrinė viešųjų pirkimų informacinė sistema, CVPIS) (CVPIS, 2022[89]). The use of the CVPIS platform is now mandatory for every public procurement procedure above 10 000 EUR, and bids and award notices are published online (PPO, 2021[90]; Central Procurement Portal, 2022[91]). Recent legislative changes also expanded the grounds for exclusion of unreliable suppliers to include broader measures related to professional misconduct. Whereas in the past it was left to the discretion of contracting authorities whether to consider bids from suppliers who had committed professional violations, contracting authorities are now obliged to exclude such firms from tenders (STT, 2021[10]). The revisions to the legal framework also allowed the Lithuanian authorities to mitigate specific risks related to emergency procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic (European Commission, 2021[20]). Alongside these legal changes, the PPO developed further tools to reduce procedural errors, such as a process tree and guidelines on evaluation standards and supplier qualification requirements (STT, 2021[10]).
Nevertheless, the 2022-2033 NAPC still stresses several problems that need to be addressed. First, even though there are clear rules in the Public Procurement Law (Art. 21) preventing conflict of interest in contracting authorities, the problem of corrupt relations between contracting authorities and suppliers remains. Second, the agenda recognises the lack of professional skills in public procurement offices, specifically at the local level, as a key issue affecting the proper identification of needs of contracting authorities and the efficient planning and execution of procurement processes. Third, processes with single bidders remain widespread, even though the PPO publish on their website the names of contracting authorities with the highest proportion of single bidder contracts (European Commission, 2020[92]). Fourth, notwithstanding the extensive use of e-procurement, transparency of procurement related documentation remains limited. According to one assessment from 2018, little information was published in open data format and information related to unsuccessful bids, dispute settlements and contract performance was not made public at all (TPP Rating, 2018[93]).
Similarly, greater competence and impartiality of evaluation committees is still required. Despite the high risk of conflicts of interest on evaluation committees, analysis and verification of interest declarations was not carried out systematically (STT, 2020[11]). A report by TI Lithuania documented that between 2015 and 2018, EUR 1 in every EUR 5 spent by municipalities on publicity went to companies affiliated with politicians (Transparency International Lithuania, 2019[94]). Information gathered during the fact-finding mission provided evidence that some companies still refuse to work with certain municipalities as they are known not to operate with due integrity during public procurement processes.
The 2022-2033 NAPC envisages a strengthened centralised procurement system through professional central purchasing organisations, which can assess the needs of contracting authorities, select optimal procurement methods, and successfully carry out the necessary procurement needs, thus avoiding potential corruption risks. Several areas could be strengthened in the subsequent Action Plans. Lithuania could consider including the development of the new e-procurement system (SAULE IS) to ensure continuity with the commitments of the former strategy. Additionally, it could consider providing access to historical public procurement records and the cross-reference of information with beneficial ownership records as well as assets declarations. Finally, a new project is expected to start by begin of 2023 to analyse data as to why bidders have been rejected by contracting authorities. Building on these developments, Lithuania could consider providing tailored training to contracting authorities on identifying collusion between bidders.
As mentioned before, conflict of interest checks could help to reduce the chance of nepotism and collusion, especially at the municipal level and where public organisations opt for in-house procurement (STT, 2021[10]). A root cause for conflict-of-interest risks are the personal relations often developing between procurement officers and suppliers in small communities. Law No. I-1491 of 2019 on Public Procurement does provide certain safeguards for the prevention and management of conflicts of interest. In any case, controls could be facilitated by the interoperability of the SAULE IS system with the PINREG system, which would allow automated cross-referencing with the interest declarations of procurement officers. Similarly, Lithuania could consider developing consistent training for procurement officers illustrating practical situations of conflicts of interest in public procurement processes and how to solve these.
In this context, it is encouraging to note that as of 2023, contracting authorities’ procurement commissions will need to have at least one certified procurement specialist. Following this reform, Lithuania will also establish a registry of certified public procurement specialists to gather data on the administrative capacity of individual entities in relation to public procurement expertise. Moreover, the fact that the PPO will begin conducting spot checks of contracting authorities and certifications of public procurement specialists in the third quarter of 2022 is to be welcomed as a measure that could help improve oversight. It will be important to ensure that the PPO has sufficient resources to do so, to avoid the situation that was observed in 2016, when the PPO only had capacity to evaluate 3.4% of high-value procedures.
Healthcare Sector
The fourth priority area in the 2015-2025 NAPC related to healthcare. Based on their assessment of corruption risks in this field, the Lithuanian government concluded that the core vulnerabilities related to (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]):
Vague administrative procedures and lack of transparency
Illicit lobbying, as well as conflicts of interest arising from informal relationships between healthcare professionals and private medical companies, or even ownership of private sector healthcare companies by public sector healthcare managers
Insufficient control mechanisms
petty bribery by patients, either because they think informal fees are merited or can result in faster treatment
a particular risk posted by pharmaceutical companies, whose lobbying and marketing strategies are often opaque, and who strike bargains with heads of healthcare institutions to have their medical products covered by the National Health Insurance Fund
abuse of state resources by private sector providers
Healthcare was rightly recognised by Lithuanian authorities as one of the most exposed to corruption. The 2016 Map of Corruption revealed that a higher proportion of citizens (51%) mentioned healthcare agencies as very corrupt. The same assessment revealed that 29% of people believed the Ministry of Health (MoH) was “highly corrupt” (STT, 2016[95]). The 2015-2019 Inter-institutional Action Plan implemented a series of measures intended to tackle the identified corruption risks. A dual pronged approached was launched to curb petty bribery by addressing both the supply and demand side of the problem. On the supply side, a patient feedback mechanism was set up to allow people to anonymously report cases of corruption online and 11 public campaigns were run in newspapers, TV and radio to make citizens aware of their entitlements to try to reduce their proclivity to pay informal fees. Moreover, preparations were made for a more transparent accounting system to track charitable donations made to healthcare institutions. In parallel to this on the demand side, integrity training was provided to healthcare workers, the wages of frontline healthcare staff were increased, and standardised wage criteria introduced. In 2018, an Anti-Corruption and Compliance Unit was created in the Ministry of Health. Although this unit was mandated to conduct inspections and spot checks, the STT found that it had not publish any of the findings of these inspections by 2020 (STT, 2020[11]).
A similar two-pronged approach was adopted to mitigate potential conflicts of interest in the healthcare sector. On the supply side, legislative steps were taken in 2019 to amend the Law on Pharmacy (X-709 of 2019, Art. 35) to require pharmaceutical companies to make annual statements declaring their transferred values, as well as the recipients of these funds. These annual statements began being published by the State Medicines Control Service starting in 2020 (State Medicines Control Authority, 2022[96]). On the demand side, healthcare professionals have been required to declare their private interests since 2014. During the implementation period, the State Accreditation Service for Healthcare Activities signed an agreement in late 2018 with the COEC, according to which the State Accreditation Services periodically submits information on healthcare professionals for the COEC to verify that they have submitted interest declarations. While technical compliance seems to be total, as 100% of health professionals provided declarations during the period of the first Action Plan, the STT noted that the quality of information declared was often very poor as only the cover page was included, and the content of private interests is frequently incomplete. Despite the obligation to submit declarations, it thus appears that the system designed to identify and mitigate potential conflicts of interest is therefore not fit for purpose in the absence of an effective oversight system that can monitor the activities of the country’s 27 000 healthcare professionals. For the 2022-2033 NAPC and its subsequent actions plans, the COEC could consider establishing a systematic means of conducting risk-based spot checks of healthcare to scrutinise professionals’ interest declarations and impose administrative or financial penalties on those whose declarations are deemed to be inadequate. While such a measure is naturally resource-intensive, given the continued public perception that the health sector is deeply corrupt, prioritising measures in this sector seems warranted. Finally, an attempt to extend the mandate of the Ministry of Health to also include primary and secondary healthcare facilities was frustrated when the necessary legal changes were vetoed in parliament in 2018, with the STT observing that this meant that the fragmentation of governance structures in healthcare, thus, continued to remain a problem after the end of the first Inter-institutional Action Plan. Lithuanian authorities assert that the recently enacted Law on Health Care Institutions has allowed mixed ownership between the state and municipalities, partly solving this problem.
Overall, the Implementation Review of the 2015-2019 Inter-institutional Action Plan remained sceptical that the technical reform efforts had translated into meaningful improvements in the healthcare sector by 2019. A particular weakness related to anti-corruption enforcement in the health sector, as the “number of offences investigated remains extremely low.” This scepticism seems justified given that household surveys continued to indicate widespread unhappiness with the healthcare system. In 2020, for instance, only 51% of citizens express satisfaction with healthcare in a Gallup World Poll, considerably below the OECD average of 71% (OECD, 2021[37]). A renewed risk assessment ahead of the 2020 Inter-institutional Action Plan pointed to several novel risks that had not been identified at the outset of the NAPC. These included opacity in the process of referring patients to social care homes, which provides opportunities for distortions in the financial interest of certain care homes, which are not subject to meaningful quality assessments (STT, 2020[11]).
In 2018, a STT criminal investigation of procurement in the health sector revealed collusive arrangements in procurement between private companies and hospitals. The STT’s analytical anti-corruption intelligence department discovered that high value contracts had been won by suppliers that had previously provided financial support to these hospitals and their employees (European Commission, 2022[67]). New risk factors for petty bribery were also discovered, such as the fact that patient waiting times were not handled transparently, which opened door to bribe-based queue skipping. In addition, patients also continued to demonstrate limited awareness about which health services are covered by public health insurance, which leads to situations where people covered by compulsory health insurance are expected to pay for services they’re entitled to free of charge (European Commission, 2022[67]). Considering this, the 2022-2025 NAPC plans to provide a clearer scope and procedure for the provision of paid health care services and ensure the availability of such information in ways acceptable to patients. The impact of such measures in addressing the problem, remains to be assessed.
Considering these risk areas, the Ministry of Health approved a sectoral programme to prevent corruption in the healthcare system in November 2020 (Ministry of Health of the Republic of Lithuania, 2020[97]). One focal point was continuing previous efforts to raise patients’ “health literacy”, in other words their understanding of their entitlements to reduce the risk of extortion and petty bribery. For this, information was distributed in health centres on citizens’ eligibility for various services, standard charges for procedures, penalties for corruption and how to report corruption. To tackle the problem of bribe-paying used to skip the queue in treatment waiting lists, efforts have been made to ensure all patients are pre-registered with healthcare institutions to increase transparency of their access and use of health services through the Electronic Health Services (Elektroninės sveikatos paslaugų, ESPBI) information system. However, it appears that not all healthcare institutions use the pre-registration system, and even those that do use the system don’t always disclose sufficient data, which means patients have limited information on waiting times (STT, 2020[11]). In the area of procurement, technical specifications for medical equipment have been standardised, to minimise discretion or tailoring specifications to fit particular firms. Nonetheless, there appears to be ongoing risks of inflated costs in manipulated procurement procedures, especially where EU funds are used to acquire expensive medical equipment (STT, 2021[10]).
The COVID-19 pandemic naturally led to some disruption as resources were re-prioritised. One of the consequences of this was that the intention to develop a common system for monitoring and assessing corruption in the healthcare system did not proceed any further than a preparatory feasibility study. This was partly because funds were diverted to tackle the COVID-19 crisis as well as a lack of need, in accordance with the MoH. There appear to be ongoing risks related to conflict of interest, as the fundamental issue that many health workers operate both in state-run and private sector facilities, and in some cases direct patients towards private treatment for their own private gain. More pharmaceutical and medical device companies still disclose limited information on their donations and financial support to medical practitioners, which makes identifying conflicts of interest in the prescription of treatments and the authorisation of clinical trials more difficult (STT, 2021[10]).
Overall, the picture regarding integrity in the healthcare sector is rather mixed. Many of the activities for the sector were carefully designed to cater to the identified risk factors, but yet they do not appear to have translated into lower levels of corruption. Furthermore, it seems that all these reporting mechanisms have not contributed to fighting petty corruption and that as such, users experience remains problematic. Indeed, the most recent Map of Corruption from 2021 (STT, 2022[19]) suggests that healthcare remains the sector in which citizens are at the highest risk of paying bribes (LRT English, 2022[64]). According to interviews with Ministry of Health and STT officials, other persisting issues include indirect forms of financial contributions from pharmaceutical companies aim to influence appointments and public procurement processes, particularly at the local level.
Having developed numerous materials during the 2015-2025 NAPC, from training programmes and public information campaigns to standardised procurement specifications, there is now a need to ensure that this trickles-down to the municipal level, where according to the interviews conducted higher risks remain. The 2022-2033 NAPC could consider many of the lessons learned from the previous period, starting with an analysis of the efficacy of the measures taken and the implementation gaps. For example, a thorough sectorial corruption risk assessment could be conducted by the Ministry of Health and its integrity office, as foreseen by the new Law on Corruption Prevention. Similarly, a training and awareness raising campaign could be designed to address integrity issues at the different levels of the sector. As a final recommendation, Lithuanian authorities could consider the design of specific programmes for public procurement officials in the health sector and increase co-ordination between the PPO, the MoH and the STT.
Education Sector
Although not a priority area per se, the 2015-2025 NAPC placed considerable emphasis on cross-cutting strategies to raise awareness and reduce tolerance of corruption among the populace, the business community and civil servants. These efforts included developing anti-corruption training materials, curricula and courses tailored to the needs of groups ranging from schoolchildren to military cadets. Over the course of the NAPC implementation period, there has been some notable progress in sensitising these groups to anti-corruption (Table 1.7). As such, the number of citizens who state they would be prepared to pay bribes has nearly halved, while the proportion of citizens who report having paid a bribe in the previous year has also dropped sharply. Overall, considerably fewer citizens express the view that corruption is a serious problem in Lithuania. However, while awareness reporting mechanisms rose uniformly across all groups, fewer citizens and company executives state they would actually be willing to report corruption. As previously stated, this points to a need to publicise the benefits of blowing the whistle more widely, potentially by devising public awareness campaigns that draw on high-profile, anonymised success stories.
Between 2017 and 2019, 980 corruption prevention specialists and heads of institutions took part in training initiatives. In addition, tests were developed to assess the anti-corruption competency of civil servants working in areas at risk of corruption and during 2019 alone, 1 297 civil servants in vulnerable sectors received professional ethics and integrity training. In 2020, a Transparency Academy was established as a forum to develop a community of practice bringing together public institutions, civil servants, and employees of SOEs to exchange good practices in curbing corruption. Finally, the STT has developed an e-learning platform to provide professional anti-corruption training that is publicly available free of charge and provides those who successfully complete courses with certification.
Despite these, there is a lack of systematic approach in engaging with the overarching education system in Lithuania or integrating these initiatives into the official curricula. To that end, the 2022-2033 NAPC and the relevant Action Plan could include actions for the revision of educational curricula for schools and universities, to include some anti-corruption and public integrity topics for certain grades or careers. Experience from OECD member countries on educating for public integrity has identified three common approaches for mainstreaming education for public integrity into school curricula:
Introducing a specific course on public integrity that incorporates public integrity learning outcomes into age-appropriate modules in primary and secondary schools.
Rewriting existing curriculum frameworks and developing teaching, learning and reading materials for each subject to incorporate public integrity learning outcomes.
Developing materials for educators and students that support the achievement of existing public integrity learning outcomes within existing subjects.
These topics could be explored with the involvement of different stakeholders depending on the subject. For example, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport could consider working with the STT to develop educational materials for mainstreaming education for public integrity into school curricula. Additionally, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport, with methodological support from the STT, could undertake initiatives providing tailored, on-request training to schools, with modules developed around specific learning outcomes (OECD, 2018[98]).
Spatial planning, state supervision of construction and waste management
The fifth priority area in the 2015-2025 NAPC related to spatial planning, construction and waste management. Based on their assessment of corruption risks in this field, the authors of the Programme concluded that the core vulnerabilities related to (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]):
Opacity and complex regulations, which creates incentives for companies to bribe officials to accelerate the process of issuing permits and licences, or to approve construction that flouts regulation or violates permitted land uses.
Corruption in the process of administering pollution taxes, such as bribing officials to turn a blind eye to the false categorisation of waste (such as classifying hazardous waste as non-hazardous), or paying off inspectors to avoid penalties for excessive pollution.
Unlike the health sector, survey data suggests that even at the start of the NAPC implementation period, relatively few Lithuanian citizens or businesses experienced corruption when interacting with officials in the construction sector. Indeed, although 61% of Lithuanian citizens questioned in a 2017 Eurobarometer survey thought that corruption was widespread among officials issuing building permits, only 1% reported that they’d been asked to offer a gift or a bribe to such officials (European Commission, 2017[99]). Likewise the 2019 edition of the Eurobarometer revealed that only 1% of Lithuanian citizens reported being asked for bribes when seeking a building permit (European Commission, 2020[13]). Fewer citizens (48%) thought that corruption on the part of officials issuing building permits was widespread (European Commission, 2020[13]).
Moreover, comparative assessments of the business environment suggest that procedures in Lithuania were already fairly efficient. The World Bank’s 2015 Doing Business assessment scored Lithuania 79.3 out of 100 on the indicator “dealing with construction permits”, and 92.2 out of 100 on the indicator “registering property”, which was notably above the average score for OECD high-income countries (World Bank Group, 2015[100]). During the implementation period, Lithuania further reduced the time needed to obtain technical conditions and building permits (World Bank Group, 2018[101]), so that by the 2020 edition of the Doing Business assessment, Lithuania score 84.9 out of 100 on the “dealing with construction permits” indicator (World Bank Group, 2020[15]). Given this relatively strong performance, it is perhaps not surprising that there were only a couple of measures included in the NAPC Inter-institutional Action Plans to address corruption risks. During the first Action Plan, a common information system (GPAIS) was established in 2018 to account for packaging and waste, although as of 2020 its functionality was reportedly limited (STT, 2020[11]).
Under the second Inter-institutional Action Plan, the Ministry of the Environment has digitalised the process of applying for pollution and emissions permits to reduce opportunities for corruption in face-to-face interactions between companies and officials. Furthermore, a new Pollution Prevention Process Information System is being developed to help ensure compliance with environment impact assessments. The second major activity relates to the development of an electronic system (Infostatyba) to process and issue construction permits. Again, the rationale is that electronic services are expected to reduce direct communication between officials and clients are thus reduce opportunities for corruption. This measure was delayed from the first Action Plan, but as of February 2022 it appears that Infostatyba services and documents such as construction permits are being migrated to the Territorial Planning and Construction Gateway. Notwithstanding the measures included in the NAPC, recent editions of the Lithuania Maps of Corruption indicate that corruption risks are seen as particularly problematic at municipal level, and the State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate still seen as one of most corrupt public bodies (STT, 2022[19]).
Particularly noteworthy are that planning processes in the State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate are reportedly still open to manipulation, especially in relation to buildings listed as cultural heritage which are not sufficiently distinguished from other types of property. Other issues include fraudulent certificates for emissions trading and waste reduction schemes, and the fact that violations of planning codes by people who enjoyed close relationships to planning officers were not submitted for due investigation. This lack of oversight is compounded by the fact that there is as yet little interoperability between relevant datasets and limited co-ordination between the various public bodies responsible for spatial planning, construction inspection, waste management, pollution prevention and emission trading schemes. To a large degree there seems to have been a misalignment between the corruption risks diagnosed and the specific activities implemented to tackle these forms of corruption, which points to flaws in the Action Plan design stage. More coherence will be needed in the 2022-2033 NAPC and its subsequent plans to ensure that where violations do occur, these are consistently investigated and penalised. Ensuring better co-ordination and interconnectivity of various datasets has been identified by the STT as a critical enabling factor in improving oversight (STT, 2021[10]). In interviews conducted in July 2022, state officials reported that there are ongoing initiatives to open datasets related to pollution, waste management and the permit process. Building on these initiatives, Lithuania could consider making these datasets publicly available as to allow the possibility of analysis by think tanks, journalists and other relevant stakeholders.
Supervision of activities of economic operators
The sixth priority area in the 2015-2025 NAPC related to the supervision of Lithuania’s more than 200 000 private enterprises. Based on their assessment of corruption risks in this field, the authors of the Programme concluded that the core vulnerabilities related to (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]):
lack of co-ordination among the more than fifty institutions responsible for controlling the activities of Lithuania’s private enterprises, which leads to excessive red tape and generate incentives for businesses to pay speed money
inspectors extorting bribes from businesspeople in exchange for turning a blind eye to regulatory violations
unchecked conflicts of interest, whereby businesses that have close links with or have provided financial support to inspectors enjoy widespread immunity for violations
lack of transparency during auctions related to businesses that have filed for bankruptcy.
Relevant activities under the NAPC fell into two broad camps: first enhancing co-ordination between the fifty (50) institutions (Ministry of Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, 2022[102]) charged with supervising economic entities and second, reducing corruption risks in bankruptcy proceedings. In the first area, alignment was sought with Lithuania’s Digital Agenda, and supervisory authorities have been encouraged to add their datasets to the Open Data Portal (https://data.gov.lt/). In addition, guidelines were developed to standardise inspection criteria and performance assessment, as well as on professional ethics and impartiality for supervisory bodies (Ministry of Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[103]). More than 2 000 employees of supervisory bodies received training on these matters in 2019 (STT, 2020[11]). Building on this work, the second Inter-institutional Plan included a commitment to produce guidelines for joint co-ordinated inspections of private enterprises by the end of 2021, in an effort to reduce their administrative burden (STT, 2021[10]).
The second area was the target of activities during the first Action Plan to digitise auction proceedings. Auctions are now announced electronically by bailiffs while municipalities and the Property Bank organise the auctions themselves. The Implementation Review of the first Inter-institutional Action Plan concluded this digitalisation had increased transparency, raised demand, and ensured that sale prices were brought into closer alignment with market prices (STT, 2021[10]). Nonetheless, inefficiencies have not been eradicated from the inspections system. In fact, according to the Index of Public Integrity, Lithuania’s administrative burden score worsened from 9.17 out of 10 in 2015 to 7.75 out of 10 in 2021, signifying that red tape on businesses actually increased during the period (ERCAS, 2021[63]). Furthermore, it appears that not all supervisory authorities have risk assessment systems in place. This means that in practice inspections are not always prioritised according to the level of risk, and the rationale for selecting entities to inspect is unclear and rarely made public (STT, 2020[11]). Indeed, decisions of which firms to target for on-site unscheduled inspections appears arbitrary in some cases, which creates opportunities for discretion and abuse of power (STT, 2021[10]).
Overall, the modest steps taken to curb corruption in inspections appear to have only partly tackled the problem. On one hand, the proportion of businesses reporting have been extorted decreased from 21% in 2015 to 7% in 2019 (European Commission, 2015[82]). On the other hand, there is a need for greater transparency in the process of selecting entities for inspection, conducting inspections, and publishing the findings of the inspection, and hosting this data on the Open Data Portal in machine-readable format. Ensuring accountability of both inspectors and inspected firms could be enhanced by logging all inspections electronically and wherever possible, encourage supervisory authorities to assess the rectification of violations by other means, such as having photographs confirming that a violation has been eliminated. If violations persist, follow-up visits could be considered, as a last resource. Furthermore, repeat offenders who have been penalised for serious infringements could be publicly listed and potentially debarred from public contracts.
Drawing from these steps, the 2022-2033 NAPC prioritises the optimisation and improvement of an oversight system for economic operators (Government of Lithuania, 2021[104]). The new agenda stresses the need to improve risk assessment tools and processes of supervisory authorities. To this end, it aims at implementing measures that will enhance verification processes for the selection of economic operators, as well as ensure objective and sound planning of relevant inspections. Indeed, the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity calls for a strategic approach to risk management that includes assessing risks to public integrity, addressing control weaknesses (including building warning signals into critical processes) as well as establishing an efficient monitoring and quality assurance mechanism for the risk management system (OECD, 2017[2]).
This requires a tailored approach that adapts risk management activities to the unique conditions of a public sector organisation and implementing risk assessments and controls that are fit for purpose. In general, organisations can assess specific risks, risk factors, or a combination of both. Specific risks are the relevant corruption or fraud schemes that can have an impact on organisational objectives. Risk factors also link to objectives, but they refer to the characteristics of the organisation’s policies, procedures or activities that, when assessed and scored, can highlight high-risk areas of operations and subsequently shape priorities. For instance, the complexity of procedures can be a risk factor that can make it harder for an organisation to conduct effective oversight and prevent fraud or corruption (OECD, 2020[35]).
In developing the respective measures for the next Action Plan, Lithuania could consider developing a risk-based approach to supervision that would enable supervisory authorities to allocate their resources and attention based on identified risks. To that extent, supervisory authorities could be encouraged to develop a supervisory strategy that is risk-based and graduated using the information obtained as part of the risk assessment process. The strategy should provide clear links between the risks and indicate how the proposed strategy and supervisory tools address these risks. In addition, the strategy could establish clear criteria to guide inspectors, inspection agencies and supervisory authorities to adopt risk-based approaches (FATF, 2021[105]) in accordance with the established criteria (Box 1.8).
An important plan of implementing supervisory strategy when it comes to inspections is developing an inspection plan, which should list:
The entities subject to planned inspections during a specified period,
The type and scope of those inspections, taking into account the level of risk associated with each entity,
Where relevant, the focus of each inspection or review, taking into account specific risks that have been identified or specific objectives that have been agreed (e.g. fact-finding to inform an ongoing risk assessment), and
The resources required for each inspection, as well as a specific timeline.
Inspection plans should:
Include the approach to be taken on entities with different levels of risk exposure, in line with the supervisory strategy
Leave sufficient flexibility to accommodate or address unplanned inspections triggered by risk events or new information that could not have been foreseen when the plan was agreed
Be adequately documented and amended where the risk exposure of an entity included in the plan has changed or if a new risk is identified during on‐site or off‐site supervision, and
Be governed by an internal policy that sets out at what level the plan should be agreed/approved within the supervisory unit, how progress against the plan can be reviewed, the approval process for changes to the plan, and the extent to which an overview of the plan can be published (e.g. number of inspections per risk rating)
Source: Adapted from guidance from the European Banking Authority & IMF, (FATF, 2021[105]).
Public administration, civil service, and asset management
The seventh priority area in the 2015-2025 NAPC related to public administration. Based on their assessment of corruption risks in this field, the authors of the Programme concluded that the core vulnerabilities related to (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]).
A lack of transparency in the management, use and disposal of state assets, especially a dearth of information on revenue and expenditure of state and municipal bodies.
Collusion between public officials and businesspeople in the sale and acquisition of property to the disadvantage of the public interest, as well as the abuse of state resources for private purposes.
Undue influence and nepotism affecting appointments to public positions, especially in state-owned enterprises (SEOs).
Inadequate measures taken by public bodies and SEOs to comply their obligations to institute internal integrity management functions, and lack of publicly available information about steps taken by these bodies to prevent corruption.
Insufficient co-ordination between state institutions on matters related to corruption, as well as between the public and private sectors.
Poor oversight and control of potential conflicts of interest in the civil service, as well as overly narrow restrictions on the type of official required to declare private interests.
Petty corruption in local government
To strengthen transparency in state and municipal authorities, the 2015-2025 NAPC envisaged measures to reduce and eliminate informal payments in the public sector, including local government (STT, 2020[11]). Despite some efforts by the Municipal Association to achieve this objective, it seems there has been very little progress in reducing the perceived levels of corruption in municipal government. While 22% of citizens expressed the view that municipal authorities were highly corrupt in 2005, this figure was 23% in 2019. One area of progress, according to information collected during the fact-finding mission, is the growing number of municipalities with a dedicated anti-corruption Action Plan, from 18 in 2016 to all 60 in 2021. Likewise, more municipalities now publicise corruption reporting channels.
Indeed, subnational governments (states, provinces, municipalities, etc.) can be drivers for innovation, economic development and productivity and also play a key role in promoting social capital and well-being. However, weak governance structures can undermine their ability to do so. Vulnerabilities in governance structures and processes due to lack of integrity, transparency and accountability provide opportunities for corrupt practices and policy capture. At the same time, those benefitting from corruption have incentives to maintain the status quo and undermine effective reforms. In this way, corruption perpetuates and exacerbates governance weaknesses. A lack of integrity undermines the institutional capacity of the subnational government to effectively deliver public services and hinders the design and implementation of effective public policies. When citizens do not perceive their government to be working in the public interest and deliver public service effectively, public trust can be undermined (OECD, 2018[106]).
While integrity is a concern at all levels of government, opportunities for certain types of corruption can be more pronounced at subnational levels. The increased frequency and closeness of interactions between subnational government authorities with citizens and firms as compared to the national level can create both opportunities, especially by facilitating subnational accountability, and risks for integrity. Subnational government responsibilities for the delivery of a large share of public services (e.g. education, health, security/justice, waste management, utilities, granting licences and permits) as well as for spending and investment, increase the frequency and directness of interactions between government authorities and citizens and firms, which creates opportunities to test the integrity of subnational governments (OECD, 2017[107]).
Following up on this, the 2022-2033 NAPC aims to bring greater attention to strengthening the anti-corruption potential of municipal councils and municipal executive bodies and to improving anti-corruption competences. In addition, the new agenda recognises that ineffective application of the right of recourse, and ineffective control of internal administration, among others, weaken accountability of heads of municipal institutions and bodies, who have taken unlawful decisions. Considering the upcoming 2022-2033 Action Plan, Lithuania could consider strengthening governance at the sub-national level by increasing the independence of control and audit systems. Indeed, as reported by state officials, the heads of external audit offices are appointed and dismissed by municipalities, thus raising concerns about their functional independence and impartiality in fulfilling their mandate. In addition, organised civil society could be more involved in monitoring the implementation of accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, Lithuania could make publicly available datasets on corruption at the local level that can be used for analysis by think tanks, journalists and other relevant stakeholders.
Open government, budget transparency and access to information
In line with the 2017 OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[2]), the 2015-2025 NAPC prioritises the improvement of open government, budget transparency and access to information. The Recommendation calls adherents to promote transparency and an open government, including ensuring access to information and open data, along with timely responses to requests for information. Transparency is necessary for public integrity, as it increases the costs of concealment and fraud associated with corrupt activities. From a behavioural perspective, transparency can also reduce unethical behaviour, because the perception that one’s behaviour is visible and potentially observed introduces an element of accountability that makes justifying unethical action more difficult (OECD, 2018[108]). Open government, access to information and open government data are three critical tools that governments can use to ensure transparency and accountability.
Open government can be defined as “a culture of governance that promotes the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation in support of democracy and inclusive growth” (OECD, 2017[109]). Access to information laws, another key component of transparency, necessitates balancing access with both individual rights to privacy and the confidentiality of information which if disclosed could harm the public interest. Beyond this dual challenge, an effective access to information regime requires an enabling legal framework, clearly defined and limited exemptions and barriers, adequate resources, and timely responses. When published proactively, in open and machine-readable formats, and if possible free of cost, open government data can contribute to improving the design and delivery of public policies and services (OECD, 2018[110]). The enhanced access to, sharing and reuse of open government data also allow better understanding and monitoring of governments’ activities, spending and functioning (OECD, 2020[35]).
In so far, numerous measures were implemented during the NAPC implementation period to improve the openness of information relating to the operations and performance of public sector entities. One of the key areas for improvement identified related to improving the transparency of public bodies’ financial data to allow for public scrutiny (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]). According to the 2015 edition of the Index of Public Integrity, Lithuania ranked 89th out of 109 countries assessed in terms of budget transparency, and was one of the worst performers in the Europe and North America region with a score of 5.93 out of 10 (ERCAS, 2021[63]).
To address this deficit, the Ministry of Finance launched an information system called “Open Lithuanian Finance” to provide structured data of the country's public finances collected from different data sources (Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania., 2022[111]). This portal provides information on national revenue streams and expenditures, as well as state assets and liabilities (OGP, 2021[112]; STT, 2020[11]). By 2019, the platform included data from 479 state budgetary institutions (STT, 2020[11]). Currently, both past and present public expenditure data are available online at the websites of line ministries and other public entities, as are the annual reports of the National Audit.
In parallel, action was taken to publicise information concerning the annual tasks, objectives, and result indicators for public institutions. Other measures have also been introduced to make data on officials’ use of state resources public in an attempt to reduce opportunities for misuse. For instance, information on official missions is now published on the Civil Service Portal, while each public institution is expected to publish information about the use of its official cars. To increase transparency in the sale or acquisition of state assets, a digital auction portal has been established to ensure that state assets are sold in line with market prices (STT, 2020[11]). Moreover, a government order in 2020 stipulated that all real estate transactions involving state property must to be published online, a commitment which appears to have been fulfilled (Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[113]; STT, 2021[10]). In a similar vein, the State Enterprise Lithuanian Road Administration is reportedly working on e-government project about road data. The expectation is that this system will result in more objective, public and transparent allocation of funds for road construction and maintenance, and thereby prevent favouritism of certain districts and reduce the chance of inflated costs (STT, 2021[10]). In accordance with the Law on Lobbying, a large number of public officials ranging from the President to members of municipal councils are now obliged to make their meeting agendas public on their institutional website (Council of Europe, 2015[24]).
At the local level, there have been some promising initiatives to make budget processes more participatory. While not directly foreseen in the NAPC, in 2021, 22 out of Lithuania’s 60 municipalities have already implemented participatory budgeting at least once and 40 000 citizens have participated in the allocation of their municipal budget. According to TI Lithuania, in 2022, 35 municipalities will implement participatory budgeting (Transparency International, 2021[114]). Ongoing legislative amendments to make the publication of municipal revenue and expenditure data in open format mandatory should help make budget data more accessible (STT, 2021[10]). Nonetheless, it is clear that some problems remain at local level. A report by the National Audit Office in 2020 found that more than half of state-owned real estate managed by municipalities was not used for its intended purpose, and that there is no effective means of monitoring and controlling the use of this property (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[9]). According to the STT, state assets controlled by the municipalities are frequently leased in a non-competitive manner at below-market prices, which points to collusion and unchecked conflicts of interest (STT, 2021[10]).
While seemingly not a direct part of the NAPC, actions taken as part of the Lithuania’s Fourth Open Government Partnership Action Plan led to the creation of the country’s first centrally managed open data portal (https://data.gov.lt), which provides public sector data in a single platform and free of charge. This platform now includes more than 1 150 datasets from 28 public sector institutions (OGP, 2021[112]). In future, synergies between OGP commitments and anti-corruption programmes could be further developed.
Building on the actions implemented during the previous programmatic cycle 2015-2025, the 2022-2033 NAPC stresses the importance of access to public information and data in order to ensure transparency in public sector decision making (Government of Lithuania, 2021[104]). It also recognises the importance of open data as a means that enables public engagement in decision making and monitoring. Indeed, the new agenda provides measures that are expected to inform citizens more effectively about public sector activities, decisions taken and also enable budget transparency. Finally, the agenda envisages the use of open data to prevent conflicts of interest and opportunities of illegal lobbying.
Overall, progress has clearly been made to open up public data in Lithuania during the course of the 2015-2025 NAPC. However, the availability of this kind of data is largely a means to an end, namely greater oversight. Despite the considerable amount of data that the Lithuanian authorities have made available online, responses collected during the fact-finding missions indicated that the impact and use of this information is not always entirely clear to the bodies publishing this information. Lithuania could consider developing an open government data strategy in order to maximise the value of the already available information and expand their possible uses by public organisations, businesses, individuals, civil society and investigative journalists (OECD, 2020[35]).
In addition, more attention could be paid in the next evaluation period to training civil servants, businesspeople, journalists, CSOs and citizens in how to meaningfully use this data to hold duty bearers to account. This could include encouraging the use of available open data to identify irregularities that could indicate corruption. One area in particular where civil society groups report that greater transparency is needed on the part of public institutions is accessible disclosure of the resources each body allocates to anti-corruption work. Clearly making this information available could facilitate greater co‑operation between civil society and public administration.
It is also worth noting that while in general Lithuania’s legal provisions related to freedom of information (FOI) requests are considered to be moderately robust, there are no legal sanctions specified for FOI violations such as obstruction of access (EuroPAM, 2021[115]). This is a loophole the Lithuanian authorities could consider closing in the next programmatic period.
Conflict of Interest
A “conflict of interest” (CoI) involves a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official (OECD, 2004[116]). When conflict of interest situations are not properly identified and managed, they can seriously endanger the integrity of organisations and result in corruption in the public sector and private sector alike. Conflicts of interest have become a major matter of public concern worldwide. In addition, a public sector that increasingly works closely with the business and non-profit sectors gives rise to the potential for new forms of conflict between the individual private interests of public officials and their public duties. In the private sector, conflicts of interest have been identified as a major cause behind corporate governance shortcomings (OECD, 2004[116]). Of key importance is the understanding and recognition that everybody has interests; interests cannot be prohibited, but rather must be properly managed.
The 2017 OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[2]) has called for countries to set high standards of conduct for public officials, through:
Setting clear and proportionate procedures to help prevent violations of public integrity standards and to manage actual or potential conflicts of interest
Providing easily accessible formal and informal guidance and consultation mechanisms to help public officials apply public integrity standards in their daily work as well as to manage conflict-of-interest situations
Averting the capture of public policies by narrow interest groups through managing conflict-of interest situations
Parliamentarians
At the national level, parliamentarians are obliged by the new Law on Adjustment of Public and Private Interests to provide a declaration of interests within the first month of their term in office. These declarations are made public on the COEC’s website, and the parliamentary commission for “Ethics and Procedure” is charged with supervising potential conflicts of interests. Where parliamentarians fail to comply with their obligations under this Law, the Commission can impose administrative penalties and compel parliamentarians to issue a public apology. GRECO has recently praised Lithuania for the considerable improvement since 2015 in terms of operational level co-ordination between the COEC and oversight bodies responsible for supervising parliamentarians, most notably the commission for Ethics and Procedure (GRECO, 2021[17]).
However, legislative amendments implemented in 2020 raise concerns over the liability for failure to declare or to declare correctly interests of members of Parliament. The Ethics Commission Law provides that the COEC may not initiate an investigation if the declarant supplements missing information and if such information did not give rise to a conflict of interest. According to media reports, this has caused a situation where Parliamentarians do not provide comprehensive information in their declarations, and some being submitted empty. This, in turn, may cause a general sense of impunity, as the amended provisions could create a perception that liability is easily avoidable. Moreover, too much flexibility in accepting delayed submissions of declarations and additional clarifications may render initial declarations obsolete. To that end, Lithuania may consider in the subsequent Action Plans to include actions aiming at establishing fines or other types of sanctions as counterincentives to avoid an excessive delay in the effective oversight and control of interest declarations. Furthermore, it could consider introducing an obligation for Parliamentarians to submit their declarations yearly and not only at the beginning of their term in office.
Civil servants
The core activity during the NAPC involved the creation of an information system able to detect and control conflicts of interest. While conflict declarations had been electronically submitted to the COEC since 2012, the COEC reportedly “struggled to monitor, analyse and verify this large volume” of information (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2022[26]). The problem was becoming more acute as the number of declarations rose sharply. According to information provided by the Lithuanian authorities to UNODC in 2018, the number of submitted declarations rose from 160 000 in 2015 to 274 134 in 2017, and it was known that these figures would continue to increase as legal changes meant that more people would be obliged to submit interest declarations, including public procurement experts and board members of SOEs (UNODC, 2018[117]). Additionally, the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests in the Civil Service was amended in 2019 to ensure adequate disclosure and registration of civil servants’ private interests, as a means of deterring and detecting corruption by ensuring that the public interest always trumps private gain. The legal changes set out that where an official has a private interest, they are forbidden from participating in or influencing decision-making processes that could affect that interest. Officials are also required to update their interest declarations within 30 days of any changes occurring.
During the implementation period, several issues became problematic in the implementation of the registry. First, the absence of a single registry of interest meant that the COEC lacked ability to determine the number of officials who failed to submit declarations as the system was not integrated with other state and municipal registers. Given this, the COEC did not have the capacity to validate declarations in a rigorous manner and it is likely that conflicts of interest went undetected (European Commission, 2019[118]). This was finally solved with the completion of the PINREG in 2021 (Chief Commission for Official Ethics, 2021[119]). The system is designed to assist public organisations and the COEC to track employees’ private interests and prevent conflicts of interest from going undetected. So far, the COEC has provided training to over 1 200 people responsible for monitoring and mitigating conflicts of interest at various levels of government. Indeed, the PINREG provides useful functionalities for the reception and cross-checking of information included in the declarations, but the large number of declarations proves challenging. In practice, the analysis and verification process require a more strategic approach to include a risk-based approach for a few selected individuals (as is the case in many countries with Politically Exposed Persons) and an enhanced due diligence for such group.
In any case, the PINREG allows clarity on the information to be reported and is interoperable with other relevant state registers and databases (Council of Europe, 2015[24]). For example, it automatically sends notifications to the 150 000 people required to declare their interests and assets (Council of Europe, 2015[24]). Furthermore, the system may conduct detailed analysis of interest declarations, assess trends, and identify risk factors by automating part of the process. The majority of data contained in officials’ declarations is public available (Chief Commission for Official Ethics, 2021[119]), and it appears that the system has seen some initial success in increasing the number of declarations while reducing the likelihood of errors and inaccuracies (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021[9]). The upcoming Action plans may include the expansion of the system to also include, amongst others, declarants’ individual activities, shares held by spouses’, cohabitees, or partners.
As it relates to prevention and management of conflict-of-interest situations, centralised guidance relies heavily on the internal management of each institution, including ethics officers. According to the subsidiarity principle, each public entity is responsible for creating a corruption resilient environment. In so far, each entity has dedicated ethics officer, who are responsible for monitoring and mitigating conflicts of interests, as well as ensuring the timely and correct submission of interest declarations. Liaison officers conduct a preliminary assessment of submitted interest declarations, which can be verified by the COEC. While the COEC communicates with the ethics officers to provide them with guidance, this is rather sporadic. Therefore, conflict-of-interest management lacks a centralised and unified unit that advice ethics officers on how to manage difficult situations. In many countries, integrity officers or HR offices have the role of advising public officials over what constitutes an actual, potential, or perceived conflict of interest. Lithuania could include, as part of its upcoming Action plans, in elaborating clear definitions on these types of conflicts in guidelines and regulations and working with ethics officers in overcoming challenges in the management of each.
Furthermore, Lithuania could complement this effort by the creation of a network of ethics officers to improve co-ordination, oversight, and compliance with conflict-of-interest guidelines. In fact, in the consultation for this report, COEC officials stated that the establishment of such a network is already planned and including it in the upcoming Action plans would provide the political weight needed to accomplish this reform. A first step for the establishment of the network would require the identification and registration of these officers in each public entity. The network could be then used as a channel for providing standardised guidance, but also for identifying common challenges across agencies and resolving these in a harmonised way.
Finally, in Lithuania the only instance for managing and advising on conflict of interest is the immediate superior. In the interviews conducted for this review it became clear that this line of reporting, although valid by OECD standards (OECD, 2017[2]), could create additional problems as many public officials may seem less incline to ask advice if they believe conflict of interest equal corruption. Furthermore, a hierarchical relationship may sometimes be permeated by distrust, tensions, and wariness. Lithuania may consider adjusting their conflict-of-interest management system in the upcoming Action Plans by establishing internal channels of consultation, different than their direct superior, within public institutions. This would be a step forward as the current system places great emphasis on the declarants’ understanding of potential conflicts of interest, which may create problems if not accompanied by a comprehensive framework of rules of conduct, as well as in depth guidance and awareness raising activities (GRECO, 2022[45]). Lithuania may consider existing digital tools to assist civil servants in the identification and management of conflict of interest, such as the self-assessment simulator used in Argentina (Box 1.9).
The Anticorruption Office of Argentina (Oficina Anticorrupción, OA) implemented an online simulator where public officials can seek guidance to assess whether they are in a situation of conflict of interest. The OA has identified those areas that are most at risk of corruption and has provided specific support to prevent, manage and resolve conflict-of-interest situations.
Through the selection of answers to certain questions, public officials receive an assessment to assess whether they are in a situation of current or potential conflict of interest. The simulator is available for future, current and past public officials. By asking the public official various questions, the simulator determines if the official is in a conflict-of-interest situation. If a potential conflict of interest is detected, the simulator informs the official of the violated norm of the Public Ethics Law and advises the public official to seek guidance of the OA. The simulator is a useful tool to enable officials to clarify any doubts they might have about a situation.
Source: (Zimmermann et al., 2020[120])
As it relates to sanctions, in Lithuania, the person submitting a declaration is liable for the accuracy of the data provided. Fines and administrative penalties up to dismissal can be imposed for failure to comply with the regulations, although there are no civil or criminal sanctions for violations of conflict-of-interest regulations (UNODC, 2018[117]). Resourcing of the COEC was ramped up to strengthen its oversight capacity. However, interviews conducted for this review indicated that the COEC’s resources could be further improved to be able to fully fulfil its mandate. Indeed, COEC receives annually over 150 000 interest declarations, and the responsible Prevention and Control Department is staffed with 5 employees. To this end, as stated previously, the Action Plans could consider including measures for the more strategic use of information contained in the declarations and providing managers with feedback on the most common mistakes in the report of conflicts-of-interest situations to avoid penalties further down the line.
Pre- and post-employment regulations are also an important issue in conflict-of-interest regimes. Movement between the private and public sectors results in many positive outcomes, notably the transfer of knowledge and experience. However, it can also provide an undue or unfair advantage to influence government policies if not properly regulated (OECD, 2021[46]). Provisions in the revised Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests stipulate a one-year cooling-off period for civil servants before they are permitted to take up employment at an entity they had previously overseen or made decisions about (European Commission, 2021[20]). Therefore, Lithuania has the appropriate legal provisions to regulate the interaction with the private sector in post-public employment situations, but lacks regulations related to pre-employment situations. Besides the legal provisions, more concerning is the fact that Lithuania lacks a policy or procedure for detecting and timely addressing situations, such as pre-employment screening integrity checks or reference checks. The upcoming Action Plans could therefore contain guidance for institutions on how to conduct these screenings, identify problematic areas and stablish special procedures when a public official may take part in a decision-making process involving a former employer.
On post-employment restrictions, the situation is no different from other OECD countries, where public officials who leave the public sector, move beyond administrative government control (Table 1.8) (OECD, 2022[121]). Therefore, the STT and the COEC would benefit from having in place institutional arrangements to provide support to both public institutions and the private sector seeking advice on existing regulations.
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation Indicators (2018) and additional research by the OECD Secretariat.
A final area of interest is asset declarations or financial disclosures, in which the quality of Lithuanian regulation is assessed at being notably above average in the European region (EuroPAM, 2021[122]). Along with elected officials, civil servants are obliged to disclose real estate, movable assets, cash, debts, and gifts upon taking office as well as providing annual updates. In the case of late filing, non-filing, or false disclosure, they are subject to fines and criminal sanctions (EuroPAM, 2021[122]). The VMI is charged with receiving financial disclosure and in collaboration with the COEC verifies the accuracy of submissions. As part of the NAPC, in 2016 amendments to the Law on Tax Administration came into force expanding the scope of sources of information on individuals’ assets and income while tightening controls on reasonable acquisition of property and income. In addition, 2017 amendments to the Law on the Declaration of Property of Residents further expanded the list of persons required to declare property and income to include deputy heads of institutions and well as managers of SOEs and their family members. Lithuania may consider expanding this list to include politically exposed persons (PEPs) into that category in its 2022-2033 NAPC and its subsequent Action Plans. As stated by civil society representatives during the virtual fact-finding mission, compliance rates with financial disclosure obligations are unknown to the general public, including how many irregularities were detected in recent years and how many of those resulted in investigations and penalties. Lithuanian authorities also expressed that in some cases, authorities have lacked the sufficient capacity and resources to verify all declaration effectively in line with a risk-based approach. Therefore, Lithuania may consider giving transparency to this system in the subsequent Action Plans as well as making sure the VMI receives the necessary resources to conduct this risk-based approach.
Private sector
The final priority area in the 2015-2025 NAPC related to the private sector and business environment. Businesses' perceptions of corruption as recorded by the Eurobarometer were remarkably high in 2015, and overall declined marginally during the implementation period. As shown in Table 1.9, one notable success was a significant drop in the number of enterprises surveyed who viewed corruption to be an obstacle to business in Lithuania.
Anti-corruption efforts in Lithuania have historically concentrated on the public sector and neglected private sector corruption. The 2016 edition of Lithuania’s Anti-Corruption Handbook for Business observed that corruption in the private sector did not lead to liability and was in fact often tolerated. Indeed, a 2019 study on private sector corruption in the country noted that “good business practices are only in their initial stage and ethical codes of business conduct are only [just] being implemented” (Pakstaitis, 2019[123]). A particular problem appears to be that the concept of private sector corruption is clouded by legal uncertainty since an interpretation by the Court of Cassation has stipulated that specific damage to the public interest must be present. However, this issue has been far from settle. Lithuanian authorities stated that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has established a wider interpretation of “public interest “, which may include the prevention, investigation, and detection of a crime. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Lithuania had stated that "the public interest is a legitimate interest of a person or a group of persons, reflecting and expressing the fundamental values of society, which are generally enshrined in the Constitution” (Supreme Court of Lithuania, 2014[124]; Supreme Court of Lithuania, 2015[125]). At any rate, a recent study of private sector corruption in Lithuania noted that the interpretation by the Court of Cassation did open “a huge gap in the criminalisation of corruption in the private sector” and even when the specific criteria are fulfilled, prosecution of private sector bribery is rare (Ambrazevičiūtė, 2021[126]). Furthermore, this was the opinion of key law enforcement agencies, as well as key civil society stakeholders and academics.
The 2015-2025 NAPC sought to make the business environment less conducive to corruption by publishing guidance and methodological tools for businesses on establishing internal integrity management functions (STT, 2020[11]). Information gleaned during the fact-finding mission indicates that despite the production of such materials, interest among private firms in the anti-corruption agenda remains limited. Indeed, the uptake of these resources by the private sector is not clear. The STT observed in the Implementation Review of the first Inter-institutional Action Plan that 57% of companies surveyed had not established an internal code of conduct, 59% of company employees did not think that the firm encourages staff to report potential corruption, and 84% of private companies did not provide anti-corruption training (STT, 2020[11]).
Promisingly, recent amendments to the Law on the Prevention of Corruption (Law No XIV-471 of 2021) entered into force in January 2022. Before these changes, the Law made no reference to the private sector. However, the new amendments extended obligations to establish integrity management functions to SOEs and encouraged the private sector to likewise implement preventive measures such as codes of conduct and integrity trainings (Law No XIV-471 of 2021, Art. 22). Nonetheless, much as before, the new regulations are essentially voluntary and still do not prescribe penalties for corporate entities that do not take steps to prevent corruption in their operations. Some Lithuanian analysts have been critical of this self-regulatory approach, noting that codes of conduct do not have “practical significance” in the Lithuanian business environment, and such measures are really only applicable to “large, hierarchical and well-organised” companies. Even within large professional organisations, unchecked conflicts of interest have been documented to lead to the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. In 2017, an auditor from Ernst & Young Baltic was reportedly convicted for distorting financial statements of the commercial bank SNORAS in which he had personal financial interests (Pakstaitis, 2019[123]).
Alongside softer preventive measures, the 2015-2025 NAPC intended to tighten up the legal framework to ensure that private sector corruption is adequately criminalised. Amendments to the Criminal Code in 2017 were undertaken to ensure the criminal liability of state-owned enterprises and improve definitions of foreign state and foreign civil servants (STT, 2020[11]). A measure has been included in the second Inter-institutional Action Plan to establish to strengthen private sector corruption, but as yet little headway seems to have been made towards this goal by the Ministry of Justice. As stated by an STT Report, it appears that the legal amendments to the Criminal Code so far have not fully established criminal liability for all private sector entities and legal persons, which naturally inhibits efforts to prosecute them for corruption (STT, 2021[10]). The 2015-2025 NAPC noted that at the beginning of the implementation period, there were no direct official statistics on the incidence of private sector corruption, as this data was not systematically collected by authorities (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]).
Similarly, in 2021, the STT fulfilled its commitment under the 2020-2022 Inter-institutional Action Plan to prepare recommendations for Lithuanian businesses operating abroad to assist them in identifying and responding to foreign bribery risks (STT, 2022[78]). Nevertheless, the transnational dimensions of corruption did not receive adequate attention during the 2015-2025 NAPC. Indeed, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in its Follow-up to Phase 2 report recommends that Lithuania takes steps to facilitate direct access by procurement authorities to corruption convictions of natural and legal persons and ensure effective exclusion from future procurement in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Public Procurement (OECD, 2019[66]). This shortcoming and the need to ensure effective enforcement of anti-bribery laws on corporate liability and the application of sanctions for foreign bribery are reflected in the 2022-2033 NAPC. To that end, the new agenda aims to improve the implementation of anti-corruption laws regarding the liability of legal persons for foreign bribery through the effective enforcement of sanctions with a special focus on assets confiscation.
One further measure was targeted at improving transparency of media outlets. Opacity in their operations was thought by the STT in 2015 to bring certain integrity risks, such as hidden political advertising, undue political influence over news media, unresolved commercial conflicts of interest, and the use of libel and other legal threats to suppress certain stories (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015[6]). Through the creation of the VIRSIS system, the State Enterprise Centre of Registers sought to make public information about the ownership structures and operations of newspapers and broadcasters in the country. This involved publishing data about their shareholders, managers, revenues, sources of income, expenditure and beneficiaries. The VIRSIS system was intended to draw on data sourced from a range of datasets, including the Register of Legal Entities, Information System of the Participants of Legal Entities, Address Register, Population Register, and Licenses Information System (Registrų centras, 2022[127]). While necessary legal amendments to the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public were made in 2018, technical complications led to delays in implementation until 2020 (STT, 2017[128]). It is not clear how this data has been used in practice to expose hidden political advertising, undue influence and conflicts of interest, and by extension the effectiveness of this measure in reducing corruption remains open to question. The 2021 edition of the Map of Corruption revealed that 69% of business executives believed that information about the revenue streams of Lithuanian media outlets are not sufficiently publicised (STT, 2022[19]).
In general, considerable work remains to be done to increase integrity and reduce corruption vulnerabilities in the Lithuanian business sector. This will require a concerted effort to clamp down on corrupt actors in the private sector as well as preventive activities in order to ensure a level playing field for firms regardless of their political connections. As mentioned in the section on law enforcement above, a coherent approach will also require a strategy that is sensitive to the transnational dimensions of dirty money, and links private sector corruption, foreign bribery, money laundering, and beneficial ownership transparency.
State Owned Enterprises
The Implementation Review of the first Inter-institutional Action Plan noted that corruption vulnerabilities in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had not been adequately addressed. A particular risk concerned the ability of SOEs to design and approve the sale of state assets with limited oversight from government, which provided opportunities for fraud and collusion between SOE employees and businesspeople (STT, 2020[11]). The lack of public interest safeguards in decision making in entities in which the state is a partial owner was also of concern to the STT especially with regards to the sale and use of land (STT, 2020[11]). Similarly in public-private partnerships there exists a perceived risk that decisions are not taken in the public interest due to collusion or corrupt arrangements, a problem believed to be particularly acute at the municipal level (STT, 2020[11]).
While the second Interinstitutional Action included a specific commitment to produce a guide on anti-corruption measures for state-owned enterprises, it appears that limited progress has been made as the Lithuanian authorities are awaiting the publication of a forthcoming OECD guide on the same topic (STT, 2021[10]). The failure to include further measures to improve integrity standards in state-owned enterprises seems striking given that they were identified as a corruption hotspot in the initial diagnosis used to prepare the 2015-2025 NAPC. Therefore, concerted efforts could be made in the next programmatic period to target corrupt practices in the operations of SOEs, not least as these organisations are widely acknowledge to pose unique corruption challenges (Transparency International, 2018[129]; Transparency International, 2017[130]).
The recommendations detailed in this chapter provide input on ways through which Lithuania could develop and improve its anti-corruption measures in key strategic sectors, including political finance and lobbying, undue influence, judiciary and law enforcement, whistle-blower protection, public procurement, supervision of economic operators, and public administration. These recommendations can inform current and ongoing reforms and strengthen Lithuania’s capacity to respond to corruption.
1. First, Lithuania could consider taking steps to further regulate lobbying, political finance and undue influence by:
Increasing data availability in relation to political finance to promote openness and enable the analysis of this information by citizens, journalists and CSOs. Furthermore, consider developing trainings for journalists, businesses, and civil society groups on the usage of the platform.
Strengthening the effectiveness of oversight bodies, primarily the CEC and the State Tax Inspectorate, in enforcing recent reforms to the political finance framework, to reduce risks of corruption associated with the illicit financing of political parties.
Standardising the different data formats of political finance declarations or ideally the use of a single format that would facilitate the cross-analysis and improve the overall quality of the information. To facilitate such cross-referencing, Lithuania could consider providing training to central and local entities to improve the quality of the information to be collected.
Following-up on gross violations of political finance regulations and the impact of recent laws in practice.
Assuring autonomy and safeguards for the CEC and its investigation role.
Increasing the training and awareness raising activities of the CEC and the State Tax Inspectorate with political parties focusing on illicit payments and on-line campaigning, while considering increasing sanctions to the violations of the current regime.
Developing a Code of Conduct on political advertising addressed to political parties and media outlets, as a way of disseminating standards and promoting election transparency.
Prioritising training and awareness raising activities targeted at removing the negative connotations about lobbying and clarifying in which cases it could be considered as unlawful.
Strengthening oversight and compliance of lobbying reporting obligations, by vetting declarations from both lobbyists and lobbied persons and using available sanctions when encountering non-compliance with the established obligations.
Taking further efforts to scale up the activities of municipal anti-corruption commissions, as well as improving the independence of local government control and audit services. For example, CEC could develop training materials on identifying malpractice in political finance and the most recurrent conflict of interest typologies at the local level.
Ensuring the necessary political commitment at the local level to address these sensitive issues and implement the institutional checks and balances already in place for the protection of the public interest.
2. Secondly, Lithuania could strengthen the capacity of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to respond to corruption by:
Implementing measures to better address the corrupting influence of transnational organised crime groups that have on occasion been able to penetrate law enforcement agencies.
Providing law enforcement agencies with access to all available databases, including cross-analysis features that would help improve the effectiveness of investigations.
Consider conducting a study that analysis the difficulties in prosecuting private sector corruption in order to assess the need of further reforms.
Enacting practical guidance and training for members of the judiciary on how to prevent and manage conflicts of interest.
Prioritising the ongoing efforts towards the interface of the system of declarations (PINREG) and the system for the allocation of cases (LITEKO).
Supporting court officials responsible for the allocation of cases to judges through training activities on how to use the data drawn from the LITEKO and PINREG systems to assess possible risks of conflicts of interest.
More actively engaging members of the judiciary in the process of developing, updating and monitoring the implementation of the sectorial anti-corruption plan, as well as the establishment of clear priorities and indicators.
Establishing clear priorities and indicators and to monitor closely the work of the newly established “Integrity Officer” of the judiciary to ensure that appointed officials are adequately able to fulfil their mandate to oversee a more coherent anti-corruption strategy in the judiciary.
Utilising an indicator for training quality, in order to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption training for investigators, prosecutors and judges.
3. Thirdly, Lithuania could strengthen whistleblower protection by:
Adopting a more systemic approach regarding the implementation of whistleblower protection regulations by measuring the effectiveness of the recently passed measures in terms of the quality of the reports.
Provide training to public officials/private sector employees responsible for receiving reports, including by providing them with guidelines on how to evaluate reports, whilst assuring resources and independence necessary to comply with their obligations.
Establishing a requirement for public entities to publish statistics and outcomes of whistleblowers cases (once such cases have been anonymised), to foster transparency and accountability. Published information could also include win/loss record for cases of retaliation against whistleblowers, including decisions on the merits (e.g. the cases not decided on procedural grounds, but rather about whether the whistleblowers rights were violated).
Encouraging public entities to publish cumulative data on taxpayer money recovered from fraud or through fines, as well as savings arising from the elimination of waste or mismanagement, in order to gain cultural support for whistleblowers and cultivate citizens’ trust.
Expanding awareness raising activities to implement social media, television, and radio campaigns on existing internal and external reporting channels.
Developing specific guidance to raise awareness among public sector employees and citizens about the existence and use of internal reporting channels and the types of protections granted, in order to increase their use and effectiveness.
4. Fourthly, Lithuania could complement ongoing policy reforms in public procurement regulations by:
Providing the central purchasing organisations with proper training to enhance the capacities and skills of their officers, so that reporting of bidders becomes more consistent across the public administration.
Gradually expanding the use of SAULE IS that is expected to alleviate human interference in public procurement processes, thus contributing to increased transparency and efficiency.
Providing access to historical public procurement records and the cross-reference of information with beneficial ownership records as well as assets declarations.
Implementing legislative amendments to address potential concerns of the relationship between contracting authorities and problematic suppliers, that may in turn, prevent the notification to the PPO.
Providing tailored training to contracting authorities on identifying possible collusion between two bidders.
Consider adopting a Code of Ethics for officers involved in public procurement and more robust conflict of interest checks, which could help to reduce the chance of nepotism and collusion, especially at the municipal level and where public organisations opt for in-house procurement.
5. Fifthly, Lithuania could take specific actions in high-risk sectors (healthcare, education, spatial planning, state supervision of construction, waste management and supervision of economic operators) to respond to corruption in these areas. This could be by:
Establishing a systematic means of conducting risk-based spot checks of healthcare to scrutinise professionals’ interest declarations and impose administrative or financial penalties on those whose declarations are deemed to be inadequate.
Designing training and awareness raising campaign to address integrity issues at different levels of the healthcare sector.
Develop a Code of Professional Ethics for the Officials of the Ministry of Health and hospital personnel and provide training to health care professionals and public procurement officials in the health sector on the obligations under the Code.
Revising educational curricula for schools and universities, to include anti-corruption and public integrity topics for certain grades or careers. These topics could be explored with the involvement of different stakeholders depending on the subject.
Opening up datasets related to pollution, waste management and the permitting process to allow their analysis by think tanks, journalists and other relevant stakeholders.
Strengthening transparency in the process of selecting economic operators for inspection, conducting inspections and publishing the findings of the inspection, as well as hosting this data on the Open Data Portal in machine-readable format.
Enhancing the accountability of both inspectors and inspected economic operators by logging all inspections electronically and conducting follow-up site visits to ascertain whether violations have been rectified. Repeat offenders who have been penalised for serious infringements could be publicly listed and potentially debarred from public contracts.
6. Finally, Lithuania could consider making updates to its anti-corruption strategy in the areas of public administration, civil service and asset management, including petty corruption in local government, open government, budget transparency, access to information, conflict of interest, the private sector and state-owned enterprises, by:
Strengthening governance at the sub-national level by increasing the independence of subnational enforcement systems to address petty corruption at the local level.
Involving organised civil society in monitoring the implementation of accountability mechanisms at the sub-national level.
Make publicly available datasets on corruption at the local level that can be used for analysis by think tanks, journalists and other relevant stakeholders.
Develop a risk-based methodology in carrying out audits on asset declarations.
Establishing fines or other types of sanctions as counterincentives to avoid delays in the effective oversight and control of interest declarations.
Creating a network of ethics officers, who are responsible for the submission of interest declarations within each public entity and with the objectives of improving co-ordination, oversight, and compliance with conflict-of-interest regulations.
Providing public servants, including parliamentarians, with further guidance on the conflict-of-interest definitions, regulations, and its applicability, including by considering establishing internal channels of consultation, different than their direct superior, within public institutions. For example, COEC could carry out a survey on the level of civil servants’ awareness regarding available integrity tools to inform future interventions.
Implementing measures for a more strategic use of information contained in declarations. Additional measures could be focused on providing managers responsible for the collection and preliminary control of conflict-of-interest declarations with feedback on the most common typologies of conflicts-of-interest encountered by the COEC. These typologies could also be useful for the STT, in the framework of its risk assessments.
Implementing regulations for pre-employment screening integrity checks or reference checks for public institutions and the private sector.
References
[126] Ambrazevičiūtė, K. (2021), Korupcija privačiame sektoriuje [Corruption in the Private Sector]., https://teise.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Korupcija-privaciame-sektoriuje.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[26] Bertelsmann Foundation (2022), Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Lithuania Country Report 2022, https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/LTU (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[48] Brusco, V., M. Nazareno and S. Stokes (2004), “Vote buying in Argentina”, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 39/2.
[87] Central Procurement Organization (2022), “Central Procurement Organization CPO LT: Efficient and Effective, Transparent and Professional Public Procurement”, https://www.cpo.lt/en/eu-support/ (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[91] Central Procurement Portal (2022), Purchase announcements from 1st July 2017, https://cvpp.eviesiejipirkimai.lt/ (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[119] Chief Commission for Official Ethics (2021), Register of Private Interests (PINREG), https://pinreg.vtek.lt/app/ (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[43] Chief Official Ethics Commission (2022), List of Lobbyists on Information System of Transparent Legislative Processes (SKAIDRIS), https://skaidris.vtek.lt/public/lobbyist/listPublic?filter=%7B%22page%22:1,%22pageSize%22:10,%22resourceStatusEnumList%22:%5B%22ACTIVE%22,%22BLOCKED%22%5D,%22viewType%22:1,%22offenderType%22:%22LOBBYIST%22,%22orderBy%22:%22name%22,%22sortingOrder%22:%22asc%22%7D (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[40] CIVICUS (2019), CSOs in Lithuania concerned new amendments of the law on lobbying may unnecessary overburden NGOs, https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2019/07/17/csos-lithuania-concerned-new-amendments-law-lobbying-may-unnecessary-overburden-ngos/ (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[24] Council of Europe (2015), Fourth Evaluation Round. Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. Evaluation Report Lithuania, https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c7660 (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[65] Council of Judges (2022), Resolution No. 13P-46-(7.1.2.) of 25 February 2022 on the approval of the action plan for the prevention of corruption in the Lithuanian judicial system for the years 2022 – 2025 and the plan of implementation measures for the years 2022 – 2023, https://www.e-tar.lt/portal/lt/legalAct/bdc5066098a311ecaf3aba0cb308998c.
[54] Council of Judges (2012), Anti-Corruption Program of the Courts of Lithuania, https://www.lat.lt/data/public/uploads/2018/01/teiseju-tarybos-patvirtinta-antikorupcijos-programa.pdf (accessed on 29 March 2022).
[89] CVPIS (2022), Central Public Procurement Information System, https://pirkimai.eviesiejipirkimai.lt/login.asp?B=PPO (accessed on 11 May 2022).
[53] Delfi (2019), “Police carries out international probe over police corruption in Kaunas”, https://www.delfi.lt/en/politics/police-carries-out-international-probe-over-police-corruption-in-kaunas.d?id=82660523 (accessed on 29 March 2022).
[63] ERCAS (2021), Index of Public Integrity: Lithuania 2021, European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building, https://integrity-index.org/country-profile/?id=LTU&yr=2021 (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[122] EuroPAM (2021), Financial Disclosure in Lithuania, http://europam.eu/index.php?module=country-profile&country=Lithuania#info_FD (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[115] EuroPAM (2021), Freedom of Information in Lithuania, http://europam.eu/index.php?module=country-profile&country=Lithuania#info_FOI (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[67] European Commission (2022), Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania (STT), https://ec.europa.eu/antifraud-knowledge-centre/library-good-practices-and-case-studies/good-practices/special-investigation-service-stt_en (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[20] European Commission (2021), 2021 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Lithuania, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021SC0717 (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[61] European Commission (2021), Flash Eurobarometer 490: Perceived independence of the national justice systems in the EU among companies, https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s2492_490_eng?locale=en (accessed on 7 April 2022).
[92] European Commission (2020), 2020 European Semester: Assessment of progress on structural reforms, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011. Country Report Lithuania 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2020-european_semester_country-report-lithuania_en.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[88] European Commission (2020), Lithuania-Vilnius: IT services: consulting, software development, Internet and support 2020/S 174-420406, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:420406-2020:TEXT:EN:HTML&src=0 (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[13] European Commission (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: Corruption, https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s2247_92_4_502_eng?locale=en (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[118] European Commission (2019), Country Report to Lithuania 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/file_import/2019-european-semester-country-report-lithuania_en.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[14] European Commission (2019), Flash Eurobarometer 482: Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU, https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s2248_482_eng?locale=en (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[85] European Commission (2017), Flash Eurobarometer 457: Businesses’ Attitudes towards Corruption in the EU, https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s2177_457_eng?locale=en (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[99] European Commission (2017), Special Eurobarometer 470: Corruption, https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s2176_88_2_470_eng?locale=en (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[56] European Commission (2017), The 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/justice_scoreboard_2017_en.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[82] European Commission (2015), Flash Eurobarometer 428: Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU, https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/S2084_428_ENG?locale=en (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[58] European Network of Council for the Judiciary (2017), Independence, Accountability and Quality of the Judiciary, https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/workinggroups/independence/encj_report_ia_ga_adopted_ga_13_6.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[32] European Parliament (2021), Financing of Political Structures in EU Member States, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/694836/IPOL_STU(2021)694836_EN.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2022).
[105] FATF (2021), Guidance on Risk-Based Supervision, Financial Action Task Force, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/Guidance-Risk-Based-Supervision.pdf.
[55] GAN Integrity (2018), Lithuania Corruption Report, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/lithuania/ (accessed on 2 April 2022).
[104] Government of Lithuania (2021), National Agenda on Corruption Prevention 2022-2033.
[3] Government of Lithuania (2002), Law on Prevention of Corruption, https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/cf4e54225ce611e7a53b83ca0142260e?jfwid=bkaxlvme (accessed on 26 April 2022).
[9] Government of the Republic of Lithuania (2021), “Draft National Agenda on Prevention of Corruption 2022-2033”.
[45] GRECO (2022), Fifth Round Evaluation Report on Lithuania - Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680a6420a.
[17] GRECO (2021), Fourth Evaluation Round. Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. Addendum to the Second Compliance Report Lithuania, https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680a25d7d (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[70] GRECO (2009), Third Evaluation Round Report on Lithuania on Incriminations (ETS 173 and 191, GPC 2) (Theme I), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c7618.
[4] HSE University Anti-Corruption Center (2021), “Lithuania Amends Anti-Corruption Legislation”, https://anticor.hse.ru/en/main/news_page/lithuania_amends_anticorruption_legislation (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[34] IDEA (2022), Regulating Online Campaign Finance - Case Study on Latvia, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/regulating-online-campaign-finance-latvia-en.pdf.
[31] IDEA (2017), Digital Solutions for Political Finance Reporting and Disclosure, A Practical Guide, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/digital-solutions-for-political-finance-reporting-and-disclosure-a-practical-guide.pdf.
[52] Kairienė, I. and D. Seniutenė (2013), “Corruption prevention in Lithuania’s Police and in the State Border Guard Service”, https://www.jomswsge.com/pdf-92818-26918?filename=Corruption%20prevention%20in.pdf (accessed on 29 March 2022).
[27] LRT English (2022), “Court acquits defendants in Lithuania’s MG Group corruption case”, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1676255/court-acquits-defendants-in-lithuania-s-mg-group-corruption-case (accessed on 27 April 2022).
[64] LRT English (2022), “Lithuania’s corruption map: healthcare and courts seen as most bribery-ridden sectors”, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1603638/lithuania-s-corruption-map-healthcare-and-courts-seen-as-most-bribery-ridden-sectors (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[25] LRT English (2019), “MG Baltic owner calls Lithuania’s biggest corruption trial ’political reprisal’”, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1115804/mg-baltic-owner-calls-lithuania-s-biggest-corruption-trial-political-reprisal (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[102] Ministry of Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania (2022), List of public administration entities supervising the activities of economic entities, https://eimin.lrv.lt/lt/veiklos-sritys/verslo-aplinka/verslo-prieziuros-politika/ukio-subjektu-veiklos-prieziura-atliekanciu-viesojo-administravimo-subjektu-sarasas (accessed on 7 April 2022).
[103] Ministry of Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania (2021), Business supervision policy, https://eimin.lrv.lt/lt/veiklos-sritys/verslo-aplinka/verslo-prieziuros-politika/teises-aktai-ir-Documents (accessed on 7 April 2022).
[113] Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania (2021), State Property Information Search Engines, https://www.valstybesturtas.lt/ (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[111] Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania. (2022), Open Lithuanian Finance, https://lietuvosfinansai.lt/en/lithuanian-finance-2/ (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[97] Ministry of Health of the Republic of Lithuania (2020), Įsakymas Dėl Šakinės Korupcijos Prevencijos Sveikatos Priežiūros Sistemoje 2020–2022 Metų Programos Patvirtinimo [Order on Approval of the Program for Prevention of Branch Corruption in the Healthcare System for 2020–2022], https://sam.lrv.lt/uploads/sam/documents/files/%C5%A0akin%C4%97s%20programos%20nuora%C5%A1as.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[33] Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations of the Netherlands (2021), Dutch Code of Conduct Transparency Online Political Advertisements, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/news/news-pdfs/Dutch-Code-of-Conduct-transparency-online-political-advertisements-EN.pdf.
[59] Mrazauskaite, R. (2019), Lithuania’s Judicial Scandal Shows Why Public Communication Matters in Corruption Investigations. Global Anti-Corruption Blog, https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2019/03/15/lithuanias-judicial-scandal-shows-why-public-communication-matters-corruption-investigations/ (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[68] OCCRP (2019), The Troika Laundromat, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, https://www.occrp.org/en/troikalaundromat/ (accessed on 10 May 2022).
[1] OECD (2022), Building Trust to Reinforce Democracy: Main Findings from the 2021 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions, Building Trust in Public Institutions, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b407f99c-en.
[7] OECD (2022), OECD Public Integrity Indicators.
[121] OECD (2022), “Regulating corporate political engagement: Trends, challenges and the role for investors”, OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 13, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8c5615fe-en.
[12] OECD (2021), Evaluation of the Romanian National Anti-corruption Strategy 2016-2020, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/evaluation-romanian-national-anti-corruption-strategy-2016-2020.pdf (accessed on 29 March 2022).
[37] OECD (2021), Government at a Glance 2021: Country Fact Sheet Lithuania, https://www.oecd.org/gov/gov-at-a-glance-2021-lithuania.pdf (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[46] OECD (2021), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
[8] OECD (2021), OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PII).
[36] OECD (2021), “Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0379, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0379 (accessed on 27 April 2022).
[35] OECD (2020), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
[66] OECD (2019), Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Phase 2 Two-Year Follow-Up Report: Lithuania, https://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/Lithuania-phase-2-follow-up-report-ENG.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[18] OECD (2019), Lithuania: Follow-up to Phase 2 Report and Recommendations: Summary and Conclusions of the Working Group, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/WGB(2019)61/FINAL&docLanguage=En (accessed on 11 May 2022).
[108] OECD (2018), Behavioural Insights for Public Integrity: Harnessing the Human Factor to Counter, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264297067-en.
[98] OECD (2018), Education for Integrity: Teaching on Anti-Corruption, Values and the Rule of Law, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/integrity-education.htm#:~:text=Education%20for%20Integrity%20is%20the,system%20and%20in%20the%20classroom.
[81] OECD (2018), Greece-OECD Project: Technical Support on Anti-Corruption - Guidelines for Reporting Misconduct in the Public Sector in Greece, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/governance/ethics/guidelines-reporting-misconduct-public-sector-greece-en.pdf.
[80] OECD (2018), Greece-OECD Project: Technical Support on Anti-Corruption - Technical Report on Whistleblower Protection in the Public Sector in Greece, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/governance/ethics/technical-report-whistleblower-protection-public-sector-greece-en.pdf.
[106] OECD (2018), Integrity for Good Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean: From Commitments to Action, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264201866-.
[110] OECD (2018), Open Government Data Report: Enhancing Policy Maturity for Sustainable Impact, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264305847-en.
[107] OECD (2017), OECD Integrity Review of Coahuila, Mexico: Restoring Trust through an Integrity System, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264283091-en.
[72] OECD (2017), OECD Working Group on Bribery In International Business Transactions - Lithuania Phase 2 Report, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/WGB(2017)70/FINAL&docLanguage=En (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[109] OECD (2017), “Recommendation of the Council on Open Government”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0435, OECD, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/fr/gov/open-government.htm.
[2] OECD (2017), “Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0435, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/recommendation-public-integrity/.
[79] OECD (2016), Committing to Effective Whistleblower Protection, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264252639-en.
[116] OECD (2004), Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service: OECD Guidelines and Country Experiences, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264104938-en.
[112] OGP (2021), Lithuania Transitional Results Report 2018-2020, Open Government Partnership, https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/lithuania-transitional-results-report-2018-2020/ (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[29] OSCE (2021), Republic of Lithuania: Parliamentary Elections 11 and 25 October 2020. ODIHR Election Expert Team Report, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/a/477730_0.pdf (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[30] OSCE (2020), Republic of Lithuania: Parliamentary October 2020. ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/f/449398.pdf (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[123] Pakstaitis, L. (2019), “Private sector corruption: realities, difficulties of comprehension, causes and perspectives. The Lithuanian approach.”, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 72, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10611-019-09815-y (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[42] Peciukonė, Anastazija (2021), Lobbying Regulation: Endless discussion and questionable outcomes, https://metaadvisory.lt/lobbying-regulation-endless-discussion-and-questionable-outcomes/.
[90] PPO (2021), E-procurement, Lithuania’s Public Procurement Office.
[127] Registrų centras (2022), European Union funded projects, https://www.registrucentras.lt/p/546#VIRSIS (accessed on 7 April 2022).
[49] Schöberlein, J. (2019), Lessons learned from anti-corruption efforts at municipal and city level, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, https://www.u4.no/publications/lessons-learned-from-anti-corruption-efforts-at-municipal-and-city-level.pdf.
[75] Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (2021), Draft Law on the Amendment of The Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers No XIII-804, https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAP/ad4bf270487211eca8a1caec3ec4b244 (accessed on 11 May 2022).
[86] Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (2019), Amendment No. XIII-2161 of 2019 (Law No. I-1491 on Public Procurement), https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/ab5b6b93882a11e98a8298567570d639 (accessed on 11 May 2022).
[41] Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (2017), Law on Lobbying Activities, https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/9473b770a2a311e7a65c90dfe4655c64.
[74] Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (2017), Law on Protection of Whistleblowers, https://prokuraturos.lt/data/public/uploads/2020/02/1.9-225-praneseju-apsaugos-istatymas-eng.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[6] Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (2015), Resolution on the Approval of the National Anti-Corruption Programme of the Republic of Lithuania for 2015-2025, https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/e42b7360100211e5b0d3e1beb7dd5516?jfwid=-fxdp8swm (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[71] Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (2000), Law No. VIII-1968 of 26 September 2000 on the Approval and Entry into Force of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, https://www.e-tar.lt/portal/lt/legalAct/TAR.2B866DFF7D43/asr.
[73] Sentencing Council (2016), Fine Calculator, https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/fine-calculator/.
[96] State Medicines Control Authority, M. (2022), Annual Statement, https://www.vvkt.lt/index.php?1987515645 (accessed on 16 June 2022).
[47] Stokes, S. (2009), “Political Clientelism”, in Boix, C. and S. Stokes (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, Oxford University Press, https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199566020-e-25 (accessed on 27 April 2022).
[76] STT (2022), 2021 Map of Corruption in Lithuania: a more resolute involvement by the public sector in increasing resilience to corruption is required, Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania, https://www.stt.lt/en/news/7481/2021-map-of-corruption-in-lithuania-a-more-resolute-involvement-by-the-public-sector-in-increasing-resilience-to-corruption-is-required:3318 (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[78] STT (2022), Implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Programme 2015-2025: Review of the Implementation of the Interinstitutional Action Plan 2020-2022, Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania, https://www.stt.lt/data/public/uploads/2022/05/tvp-stebesenos-ataskaita.pdf.
[19] STT (2022), Lithuanian Map of Corruption 2021, Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania, https://www.stt.lt/analitine-antikorupcine-zvalgyba/lietuvos-korupcijos-zemelapis/7437 (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[51] STT (2021), Information and Statistics 2020, Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania, https://www.stt.lt/data/public/uploads/2021/08/stt_info_statistics_2020.pdf (accessed on 29 March 2022).
[10] STT (2021), Implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Programme 2015-2025: Review of the Implementation of the Interinstitutional Action Plan 2020-2022, Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania, https://www.stt.lt/data/public/uploads/2021/04/2020-m.-tvp-stebesenos-ataskaita.pdf (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[11] STT (2020), Implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Programme 2015-2025: Review of the Implementation of the Interinstitutional Action Plan 2015-2019, Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania, http://stt.lt/doclib/iwlpfjmqm2krucnq2u28zyguhkhv7ddy (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[16] STT (2020), The Lithuanian Map of Corruption 2020, Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania.
[60] STT (2019), Lithuanian Map of Corruption, Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania, https://www.stt.lt/data/public/uploads/2021/03/lietuvos-korupcijos-zemelapis-2019.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[128] STT (2017), On the Summary of the Implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Programme 2015-2025 and the Interinstitutional Action Plan 2015-2019, Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania.
[95] STT (2016), Lithuanian Map of Corruption, Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania, https://www.stt.lt/analitine-antikorupcine-zvalgyba/lietuvos-korupcijos-zemelapis/7437 (accessed on 7 April 2022).
[5] STT (2014), Lithuanian Map of Corruption, Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania, https://www.stt.lt/data/public/uploads/2019/11/d1_korupcijos_zemelapis_2014_pazyma.pdf (accessed on 26 April 2022).
[125] Supreme Court of Lithuania (2015), No. 2K-50-648/2015.
[124] Supreme Court of Lithuania (2014), 2K-P-89/2014.
[93] TPP Rating (2018), Lithuania, https://www.tpp-rating.org/page/eng/country/Lithuania/2018 (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[22] Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021, https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2021_Report_EN-web.pdf (accessed on 29 March 2022).
[114] Transparency International (2021), Every Third Municipality in Lithuania Implements Participatory Budgeting, https://www.transparency.lt/en/every-third-municipality-in-lithuania-implements-participatory-budgeting/ (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[57] Transparency International (2021), Global Corruption Barometer European Union 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb/eu/european-union-2021 (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[21] Transparency International (2021), Global Corruption Barometer Lithuania 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb/eu/european-union-2021/results/ltu (accessed on 6 April 2022).
[129] Transparency International (2018), State-Owned Enterprises: Beacons of Integrity?, https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/state-owned-enterprises-beacons-of-integrity (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[130] Transparency International (2017), 10 Anti-Corruption Principles for State-Owned Enterprises: a Multi-Stakeholder Initiative of Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/10-anti-corruption-principles-for-state-owned-enterprises (accessed on 7 April 2022).
[84] Transparency International (2017), Clean contracting at work: an example from Vilnius, https://www.transparency.org/en/news/clean-contracting-at-work-an-example-from-vilnius (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[50] Transparency International (2014), Local Integrity System Assessment Toolkit, https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2014_LISToolkit_EN.pdf.
[39] Transparency International Lithuania (2020), Backstage politics? Deconstructing lobbying in Lithuania, https://www.riigikogu.ee/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Backstage-politics-Deconstructing-lobbying-in-Lithuania.pdf (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[38] Transparency International Lithuania (2020), Lobbying transparency in Lithuania or publish whom you meet: an overview of meetings with interest groups held by Lithuania MPs in 2017-2020, https://www.transparency.lt/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Lithuania_Final_Report_2020-1.pdf (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[77] Transparency International Lithuania (2020), Pranešėjų Apsauga Lietuvoje 2019-2020 [Protection of Whistleblowers 2019-2020], https://www.transparency.lt/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Prane%C5%A1%C4%97j%C5%B3-apsauga_studija.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[94] Transparency International Lithuania (2019), Every 5th Euro from municipalities’ publicity budgets goes to politician- affiliated companies, https://www.transparency.lt/en/ti-lithuania-every-5th-euro-from-municipalities-publicity-budgets-goes-to-politician-affiliated-companies/ (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[44] Transparency International Lithuania (2017), “Kaip lr seimo nariai viešina savo susitikimus? 2017 m. Lr seimo pavasario sesijos apžvalga [How do members of the Seimas make their meetings public? 2017 Review of the spring session of the Seimas]”, https://www.transparency.lt/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Seimo-nariu-susitikimai_2017.pdf (accessed on 29 March 2022).
[117] UNODC (2018), Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on the Prevention of Corruption Thematic Compilation of Relevant Information Submitted by Lithuania. Article 8, Paragraph 5 Asset and Interest Disclosure Systems, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/WG-Prevention/Art_8_Financial_disclosure_declaration_of_assets/Lithuania.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[23] UNODC (2013), Country Review Report of Lithuania of implementation by Lithuania of articles 15 – 42 of Chapter III. “Criminalization and law enforcement” and articles 44 – 50 of Chapter IV. “International cooperation” of the United Nations Convention against Corruption for the review cycle 2010 - 2015, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/2013_10_29_Lithuania_Final_Country_Report/2013_10_29_Lithuania_Final_Country_Review_Report.pdf (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[83] US Department of State (2017), 2017 Investment Climate Statements: Lithuania, https://www.state.gov/reports/2017-investment-climate-statements/lithuania/ (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[28] V-Dem (2021), Variable Graph, https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/ (accessed on 24 March 2022).
[69] Vilnius District Court (2022), Case No 1-10-873/2020 of 19 April 2022.
[15] World Bank Group (2020), Doing Business 2020: Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/32436/9781464814402.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[101] World Bank Group (2018), Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs, https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2018-Full-Report.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[100] World Bank Group (2015), Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency, https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB15-Full-Report.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[62] World Economic Forum (2019), The Global Competitiveness Report 2019, https://www.weforum.org/reports/how-to-end-a-decade-of-lost-productivity-growth/in-full/economy-profiles-8215e8beb6#economy-profiles-8215e8beb6 (accessed on 4 April 2022).
[120] Zimmermann, S. et al. (2020), Preventing and Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector: Good practices guide, Prepared at the request of the G20 Anticorruption Working Group by the World Bank, OECD and UNODC, https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2020/Preventing-and-Managing-Conflicts-of-Interest-in-the-Public-Sector-Good-Practices-Guide.pdf (accessed on 6 June 2022).