Oil and gas is a critical input for virtually all other sectors of the global economy, accounting for nearly one third of the world’s total energy supply and underpinning global transportation, heating, industrial production and the manufacture of consumer goods. The sector’s complex, multi-tiered value chain spans exploration and production, transportation and storage, and refining and distribution. The sector’s operations are associated with significant environmental, social and governance risks, including greenhouse gas emissions, land degradation, water pollution, exposure to hazardous materials, occupational health and safety risks, risks of community displacement, corruption, illicit trade and links to conflict. This case study explores the most salient impacts related to the oil and gas sector, and challenges and opportunities in addressing them in line with international standards on responsible business conduct. It is targeted at companies in oil and gas value chains who are seeking to understand their exposure to related risks, and also for policymakers and stakeholders seeking to better understand opportunities for promoting effective due diligence in the sector.
Due diligence essentials for the oil and gas sector
Abstract
Oil and gas serves as a critical input for various industrial processes, from manufacturing to chemical production, underpinning many other sectors in the global economy. Oil accounts for nearly one‑third of the global energy supply, with approximately two‑thirds used to power global transportation through fuels like gasoline, diesel and kerosene (EIA, 2024[1]; 2016[2]). Petroleum-based products provide energy for heating and are essential for industrial processes and the production of consumer goods, including plastics. Similarly, natural gas has become increasingly important in electricity generation, heating and as an energy source for industrial applications. It is also used in the production of fertilisers, pharmaceuticals and plastics.
While virtually all countries are consumers of oil and gas-based products, only a few countries are major producers of oil and gas. OECD countries and non-OECD Middle Eastern countries each account for circa one‑third of global crude oil production, followed by a significant margin by non-OECD countries from Europe and Eurasia. OECD countries also currently lead global natural gas production, particularly driven by a recent surge in North American shale production. Middle Eastern countries, while rapidly increasing their global stake in natural gas production in recent decades, supply circa 16% of global natural gas; significantly below their influence in global crude oil production (IEA, 2021[3]).
The oil and gas sector is dominated by national oil companies (NOCs), some of which operate internationally (sometimes separately referred to as INOCs).1 NOCs collectively control over half of global oil and gas production and close to 60% of oil and gas reserves. They may operate independently or form joint ventures with private companies to access technology and capital. The structure of the industry varies regionally, with NOCs prevalent in various countries of the Middle East, a mix of large integrated oil companies thriving in North America and Europe and significant foreign investment in developing regions like Africa, although access to capital may be limited especially for SMEs.
Independent producers and international oil and gas majors make up the remaining share of the oil and gas industry, as well as various smaller service companies such as equipment providers and logistics firms, as well as trading entities. Vertical integration is a defining characteristic of many companies in the oil and gas industry. However, not all firms are vertically integrated; many SMEs specialise in specific value chain segments such as drilling, seismic surveys, equipment manufacturing or logistics. The presence of SME activity varies depending on the segment of the supply chain and the regulatory environment.
Home to the world’s major NOCs, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) plays a critical role in shaping the dynamics of the global oil and gas market. As a consortium of oil-producing nations,2 OPEC influences market stability, supply levels and pricing by controlling nearly 80% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 40% of global production (EIA, 2023[4]). OPEC adjusts output to respond to shifts in demand, economic conditions and geopolitical events. It expanded its geographic influence in 2016 by signing an agreement with ten other oil-producing countries to create what is known as OPEC+3 (EIA, 2023[4]; OPEC, 2024[5]).
Oil and gas products are typically sold either through direct contracts, including long-term supply agreements or the “spot market”, or on exchanges such as the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and the Dubai Mercantile Exchange (DME). Historically, the crude oil market has been dominated by long-term supply agreements, which account for approximately two‑thirds of the market and often span between 10 to 20 years (Dunn and Holloway, 2012[6]). Refineries typically procure their “base load” via long-term supply contracts for stability and price certainty while NOCs tend to sell their crude directly to refineries or other end users. For natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG), despite spot and short-term transactions gaining prominence in recent years, a substantial portion of trade still occurs under long-term agreements (Ason, 2022[7]). In LNG markets, capital-intensive infrastructure often necessitates stable, predictable revenue flows through long-term contracts. “Long-term” refers to contract durations of over four years, short-term to contract durations of under four years, and spot to delivery within three months from the transaction date. Certain geographical hubs in Europe and Asia occupy a dominant position in global commodities trade.
Trade finance provided by banks plays a critical role in facilitating the trading of oil and gas. Commodities trading is about buying and selling oil and gas, while trade finance provides the funding and risk management tools that enable those trades to happen. There exist various structures under which sellers and buyers of crude oil and gas products conduct trade finance, including letters of credit, pre‑payment, pre‑shipment and pre‑export financing, repurchase agreements and securitised finance. These structures may help manage risks for market participants while enabling substantially larger volumes of oil and gas deals. Providers of trade finance may thus represent critical control points4 in the oil and gas value chain, given that borrowers could be incentivised to comply with banks’ requests for information and as the total number of active lenders remains relatively small.
The oil and gas value chain involves a series of interconnected phases, which can be separated into three segments: upstream, midstream and downstream (see Figure 1).
The upstream segment, which accounts for nearly two in three industry jobs (IEA, 2023[8]), involves exploration and production of oil and gas. As a first step, companies acquire an exploration license from host governments. The exploration phase includes geological analyses and tests to locate potential drilling sites. If a viable location is found, the development phase begins, including drilling and well construction. Production constitutes the long-term extraction process that allows companies to bring oil and gas to the surface. This process is based on conventional methods such as vertical drilling, pumping and compression, as well as unconventional methods such as hydraulic fracturing (aka “fracking”), and horizontal drilling. The latter is used to access gas in more complex, less porous and deeper geological formations.
Source: Freely compiled after Inkpen and Moffett (2011[9]), The Global Oil & Gas Industry: Management, Strategy and Finance, https://www.academia.edu/42323981/The_Global_Oil_and_Gas_Industry_Management_Strategy_and_Finance.
The midstream segment typically refers to the transportation and storage of oil and gas. Oil transport by ship is the prevalent means of transporting, accounting for approximately two‑thirds of oil produced globally, and 17% of natural gas (Clarksons, 2022[10]). Pipelines are the dominant mode of transport for natural gas and also carry a significant share of crude oil and refined products, particularly over land and for shorter distances where fixed infrastructure is economically viable. Where pipelines are unfeasible, LNG may offer a flexible alternative. The more complex LNG value chain includes liquefaction, cooling, transport and storage on LNG tankers and terminals, and ultimately re‑gasification. Most natural gas and regasified LNG are transported to wholesalers and municipal companies, where they are stored and ultimately used for electricity and heat generation or consumption by end customers (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2023[11]). Storage facilities accordingly play a crucial role in managing supply and demand.
The downstream segment typically refers to the refining and distribution of oil and gas. Approximately 87% of the global oil supply is refined through distillation, fracking, and other chemical treatments in circa 825 active refineries across the world (Offshore Technology, 2024[12]). These range from “teapot” refineries built close to oil fields to produce small volumes of light blend-stocks for local demand, to the mega-refineries which process over 1 million barrels of oil per day (Offshore Technology, 2024[12]). Nearly half of global refining capacity is located in OECD countries (IEA, 2022[13]). Natural gas processing facilities are typically co-located with extraction operations.
Refining processes are tailored to the specific grades of crude oil that each refinery is designed to handle. Often, refineries process feedstocks composed of blends of different crudes, reflecting the diversity of available supplies. As a result, refineries may differ from one another in response to factors such as the geographic and logistical accessibility of crude oil supplies, the specific refining technologies and processes they employ, and the particular market for refined products they aim to serve. They do not typically produce end-user products directly, but rather “blend-stocks” that are further processed into consumer products such as gasoline and diesel. Once refined, the distribution phase begins, ensuring that oil and gas products are transported from refineries to storage terminals, retail outlets and industrial customers.
Blending may take place at various stages of the oil and gas supply chain: in storage facilities and terminals, at loading and unloading facilities and on barges and vessels.
The role of intermediary actors
Intermediary actors such as commodity traders, equipment suppliers, and logistics firms play critical roles in facilitating the flow of goods and services across the value chain, from extraction to refining, distribution, and delivery to end users. Commodity traders serve as intermediaries between producers and consumers, facilitating the flow of crude oil, refined products and natural gas across borders and into markets. They operate across all segments of the supply chain (see Figure 1). In the upstream phase, they are involved in procuring crude oil from NOCs and independent producers. At the refining stage, traders tend to work closely with refineries to ensure that the right grades of crude are processed to meet market demands. In the downstream phase, traders facilitate the distribution of refined products to global markets, handling transportation logistics and retail distribution.
Equipment suppliers play a role throughout the oil and gas value chain by providing the essential hardware and technological solutions needed for exploration, production, transportation, refining and processing. These suppliers often work closely with oil and gas companies to design, engineer and implement tailored solutions that meet the specific operational challenges of each project. Their contributions to the oil and gas value chain go hand-in-hand with services provided by logistics firms, aiding the physical movement of oil and gas products and managing pipelines, shipping routes and terminals.
Contribution to climate change
The production and consumption of oil and gas generate significant levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, therefore significantly contributing to global warming and the intensification of climate change.5 Emissions in the oil and gas sector, including particularly carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane and nitrous oxide, may occur at various stages of the supply chain: during production, processing, transportation and use. Scope 3 emissions, particularly the combustion of oil and gas by end-use consumers, account for 80% and 85% of the life cycle emissions of oil and gas, respectively (IEA, 2023[8]). Methane emissions from leaks, venting and flaring also significantly contribute to the sector’s footprint and may be especially associated with unconventional oil and gas extraction methods, including shale gas (IEA, 2024[14]). According to a 2023 report by the World Benchmarking Alliance (WBA, 2023[15]), the largest 81 oil and gas companies have made little progress in turning away from hydrocarbons and towards alignment with internationally agreed global temperature goals. Notably, the report finds that none of the assessed oil and gas companies with extraction activities show a “significant reduction” in production before 2030 (WBA, 2023[15]).
Land degradation, biodiversity loss and habitat disruption
Oil and gas production can negatively impact ecosystems and biodiversity, particularly during exploration, extraction, and transportation. Infrastructure development such as drilling sites, pipelines, and roads can lead to habitat loss and fragmentation, disrupting wildlife and reducing biodiversity (IPIECA, 2021[16]). This may be especially problematic in sensitive environments such as forests, wetlands and coastal areas, where land clearing can isolate populations, reduce genetic diversity and increase extinction risks for endangered species. Moreover, noise, vibration and light pollution from drilling operations can disturb wildlife behaviour, breeding and feeding (Rutherford et al., 2023[17]). Offshore oil and gas operations can damage marine ecosystems, including coral reefs and seafloor habitats, and noise pollution from drilling may affect marine mammals, interfering with their communication and navigation systems.
Water use and pollution
Oil and gas extraction and processing, particularly hydraulic fracturing, are highly water-intensive activities (Redmond, Watters and Grande, 2019[18]). Hydraulic fracturing generates vast quantities of wastewater that, if mismanaged, can contaminate local water sources and limit access to water resources for local communities, especially in high water stress areas. This contamination may occur through the injection of drilling fluids or from flowback, where pollutants, including chemicals and hydrocarbons, can seep into groundwater. Polluted water can severely harm aquatic ecosystems and human health. Additionally, accidental spills or leaks further exacerbate risks to nearby communities and wildlife.
PFAS or “forever chemicals”
Per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances, more commonly known as PFAS or “forever chemicals”, pose significant environmental and health risks when used in hydraulic fracturing processes. These synthetic chemicals are highly resistant to degradation, meaning they persist in the environment and can contaminate soil and water over long periods. PFAS can leach into groundwater or surface water, contaminating drinking supplies and posing a serious health hazard to nearby communities. Some jurisdictions are already considering new rules that would require oil and gas companies to disclose the chemicals used in operations and prohibit the use of PFAS after contamination concerns (Fisher, 2024[19]).
Induced seismicity
The injection of wastewater into deep geological formations, a common practice in hydraulic fracturing has been shown to be able to trigger seismic events (Folger and Tiemann, 2016[20]; U.S. Geological Survey, n.d.[21]). High-pressure injection may alter subsurface pressure and stress conditions, potentially leading to fault slippage. The resulting increase in seismic activity may pose safety risks to nearby communities, as even minor earthquakes can damage infrastructure. For example, some reports already posit significant surges in local earthquake activity over the last decade associated with nearby hydraulic fracturing wells (Ries et al., 2020[22]).
Community displacement and loss of livelihoods
Community displacement and the loss of livelihoods may be significant risks in regions where extraction, infrastructure development and processing activities occur, particularly in areas with weak governance, high population density and economies dependent on subsistence activities (ACCORD, 2024[23]). Large‑scale land acquisitions for extraction sites, pipelines, refineries, storage facilities and export terminals may result in physical and economic displacement. In regions with unclear land tenure systems or inadequate legal protections, forced evictions frequently might occur, leaving affected families without fair compensation or adequate relocation support. Environmental degradation may further exacerbate these challenges.
Impacts of the oil and gas industry may disproportionally affect Indigenous Peoples (ACCORD, 2021[24]). This may include the encroachment on ancestral lands and loss of land access, the disruption of traditional practices, the loss of sacred sites, forced relocation, and unequal benefit sharing (UCLA IoES, 2020[25]). Many Indigenous communities reside in regions rich in natural resources, yet their involvement in decisions related to the development of those resources may be frequently overlooked, highlighting the importance of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC).
Exposure to Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) and heavy metals
Oil and gas extraction can lead to significant concentrations of Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) within produced water, sludge, and scale that forms on equipment. posing potential hazards to the environment and human health. The risk of NORM exposure may be elevated in unconventional production such as hydraulic fracturing. These unconventional methods typically involve extensive fracturing of rock formations, which increases the likelihood of bringing radioactive isotopes (e.g. radium, thorium, and uranium) to the surface. High exposure risks to NORM are particularly prevalent in areas with high levels of shale gas extraction, like the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and parts of Texas in the United States (Cowie et al., 2012[26]). Extraction and refining processes can also release heavy metals which occur naturally in crude oil and associated geological formations (e.g. lead, arsenic, mercury, cadmium, and chromium). These metals may be released into soil and waterways through produced water discharge, drilling muds, and refinery effluents, with potentially serious consequences for surrounding ecosystems and communities, including adverse health impacts such as elevated risk of cancer and some diseases (UNEP, 2011[27]) (Singha and Deka, 2024[28]).
Links to armed conflict
The oil and gas sector may be associated with particular challenges when operating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas (CAHRAs). In certain conflict-affected regions, non-state armed groups have seized control of oil production and distribution infrastructure, using revenues to finance their operations. In such contexts, companies operating in or near conflict zones or sourcing from intermediaries active in these markets, may face heightened risks of contributing to the financing of armed groups, with significant implications under international humanitarian law and applicable sanctions regimes. Oil and gas companies may also contribute to, or be associated with, conflicts within or between communities and human rights abuses, including by exacerbating disputes over natural resource access (UNICEF, 2015[29]; OECD, 2016[30]). For instance, oilfield discoveries have been associated with a heightened incidence of internal armed conflict, especially for countries previously experiencing armed conflict (Lei and Michaels, 2014[31]). Conflict can also be related to the use of private security companies hired by oil and gas companies to guard their perimeter and facilities (UNEP Finance Initiative, 2014[32]).
Job losses related to the transition to a low-carbon economy
The oil and gas industry employs an estimated 12 million people globally, with employment heavily concentrated geographically and primarily located in the sector’s upstream segment (IEA, 2023[33]). If oil and gas production phases down in the coming decades, low- and middle‑income countries reliant on these industries may face substantial job and revenue losses, potentially affecting public spending on social services and infrastructure. Key considerations for a just energy transition include the relatively older (and ageing) workforce compared to renewable energy, diverse collective bargaining structures and the high incidence of contract-based employment (OECD, 2026[34]; World Resources Institute, 2023[35]). In a well-below 2°C scenario, global fossil fuel employment is projected to fall by 75% by 2050, with job losses predominantly in oil, gas and coal, though regional and national impacts may vary significantly (Pai et al., 2021[36]).
Corruption and bribery
The oil and gas sector’s lucrative nature may make it susceptible to corruption, including bribery, embezzlement and undue political influence. Companies seeking access to oil and gas reserves may engage in bribery during the licensing process to secure favourable terms or expedite bureaucratic processes, undermining fair competition. Similarly, companies may bypass environmental regulations through bribery. Key drivers of corruption can include weak governance frameworks, discretionary power in decision making, revolving doors, campaign contributions and a lack of transparency regarding beneficial ownership (OECD, 2016[37]).
The sector is also particularly vulnerable to abuse because of the high value of resources, the central role of the state, and the involvement of political elites, creating corruption risks across the entire extractive value chain, including licensing, revenue management and state‑owned enterprises (EITI, n.d.[38]). Similarly, analysis of the “resource curse” emphasises that oil wealth is associated with rent-seeking, authoritarian tendencies and weak accountability, as governments become less dependent on citizens and more prone to using resource revenues to maintain power (NRGI, 2015[39]).
Illicit trade and smuggling
Illicit trade and smuggling pose significant risks to the oil and gas sector, potentially impacting economic, social and security dimensions. Fuel theft and smuggling may be particularly prevalent in regions with subsidised fuel prices or cross-border price disparities, leading to substantial revenue losses for governments and companies. Pipeline theft and vandalism, often orchestrated by criminal networks, not only result in financial losses but also create severe environmental and safety hazards, such as spills and explosions. Illegally obtained oil and gas may enter black markets and fund criminal organisations and armed groups, particularly in CAHRAs.
State‑backed sanctions evasion in the oil and gas sector increasingly operates through co‑ordinated, sovereign-supported networks (The Maritime Hub, 2025[40]). In many cases, these systems are actively enabled or tolerated by states themselves through state‑linked shipping, alternative payment channels, and co‑operation with third countries. This allows sanctioned producers to sustain export revenues and embed evasion practices into the structure of the global energy trade.
Varying levels of supplier visibility and traceability along the value chain
Supplier visibility along the oil and gas supply chain may strongly depend on the segment of and position in the supply chain as well as the chosen procurement method. For instance, the sector’s prevalence of medium- and long-term contracts between mutually known parties may aid supplier visibility and enable proactive due diligence efforts, including environmental, social and governance supplier assessments and continuous engagement. However, the industry’s increasing reliance on spot markets may undermine such visibility, highlighting the need for enhanced industry-wide supply chain transparency and traceability mechanisms.
The extent of supply chain traceability in the oil and gas supply chain is generally constrained by established practices of blending and commingling. Buyers of a cargo of crude oil (as opposed to refined oil products) are typically able to trace the oil back to its origin since the source country or even field is usually an element of the contracted grade. Customary testing of the cargo by the buyer, moreover, can ensure that the oil does in fact match the specified quality and associated provenance. More challenging for a buyer of a cargo of crude, instead, may be to establish a reliable chain of custody, charting the hands through which the cargo has passed.
Establishing origin in the case of refined oil-based products can be even more challenging. Refineries typically maintain comprehensive oversight of their diverse supplier networks and may possess direct insights into the geographic origins of specific crude oil grades they procure, which may position them as critical control points in the oil and gas supply chain. However, from a buyer perspective, industrial and particularly retail consumers typically have little visibility on the provenance of the crude oil used to produce their products. While it may be possible to identify refineries which take cargoes of crude from specific destinations, it could be challenging to assess what proportion of a specific cargo of refined product came from a specific oil field.
Unique due diligence challenges associated with SOEs
The dominance of SOEs in the oil and gas industry may be associated with unique due diligence challenges (OECD, 2024[41]). NOCs are uniquely tied to strategic national interests such as energy security and state revenue, which may not always align with the objectives of international standards on RBC. For instance, NOCs may be subject to weaker non-financial disclosure and reporting regimes compared to those applicable to listed companies (OECD, 2020[42]). As such, they may not extensively disclose due diligence practices and sustainability impacts, complicating buyers’ efforts to identify and monitor actual and potential impacts. These challenges can be amplified by a lack of leverage vis-à-vis large NOCs and heightened corruption-related risks that may undermine the effective enforcement of RBC standards and reduce trust in the accuracy and reliability of related impact assessments and mitigation measures (OECD, 2018[43]).
Regulatory and policy gaps in unconventional oil and gas extraction
Unconventional oil and gas extraction, such as fracking, oil sands extraction and deepwater drilling may be subject to regulatory gaps or outdated legal frameworks, particularly in emerging producer countries (Yadav, Bhardwaj and Sarangi, 2024[44]; Snow, 2018[45]; Hawkins, 2015[46]). Legal frameworks designed for conventional extraction may fail to address the distinct challenges and impacts associated with unconventional extraction technologies, including increased water usage and the technology’s connection to seismic activity. Weak regulatory oversight limits access to environmental and social impact assessments, while inconsistent liability frameworks and enforcement make it difficult to ensure mitigation and remedy. As a result, buyers may face greater uncertainty and rely on voluntary commitments.
Identified control points in the value chain
While leverage in the oil and gas sector may generally depend on factors such as company size, contractual modality and position in the supply chain, the sector may exhibit at least two promising control points (or “choke points”) where effective due diligence practices can be established. Firstly, refineries have comprehensive oversight and significant leverage vis-à-vis supplier networks. Secondly, providers of trade finance represent a relatively small number of financial institutions with pre‑existing due diligence processes and potential leverage over borrower behaviour. In contrast, SMEs, industrial and retail consumers of refined oil products and utility companies typically enjoy limited leverage and ability to enforce due diligence expectations.
Advancements in technological solutions
Recent technological advancements may support due diligence efforts in the oil and gas industry. For instance, DNA markers could be used to “identify the source rocks, whether the oil has originated from one or multiple sources, and might provide information about its migration history” (Alibrandi et al., 2023[47]). Moreover, satellite monitoring may further enable companies and regulators to track spills and even methane emissions (OGCI, n.d.[48]). Blockchain technology could offer another promising solution, enabling the creation of immutable records of product movements across both oil and gas supply chains, though implementation would hinge on the disclosure of various supply chain actors. Market mechanisms such as “book and claim” have also been implemented to “claim” attributes from certified sustainable sources, even when products are blended (RMI, 2023[49]).
Increased leverage and visibility through partnerships and stakeholder engagement
Partnerships and multi-stakeholder initiatives may be powerful tools to share best practices and increase collective leverage in the oil and gas sector. For instance, existing industry associations such as the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) and the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) foster co‑operation and alignment of industry-wide standards among oil and gas companies. Industry initiatives, such as the Global Methane Initiative, the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership (OGMP), the Responsible Commodities Sourcing Initiative (RECOSI) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) provide platforms for companies to collectively address key challenges, such as reducing methane emissions and enabling responsible sourcing.
Climate related initiatives also provide standards and guidance relevant to the sector. For example, The Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) sets and validates corporate emissions reduction targets and has developed sector-specific guidance for oil and gas companies (SBTi, 2020[50]). The Task Force on Climate‑related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) has prompted greater disclosure of climate‑related risks and transition plans among listed oil and gas companies through integration into International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which can improve the quality of information available to investors and other companies conducting due diligence on oil and gas related climate risks in their supply chains.
These initiatives can help pooling resources, sharing best practices and promoting the adoption of sustainability standards across the industry. The integration of sustainability standards and certification schemes into business operations can improve transparency, environmental stewardship and responsible conduct in the oil and gas sector. Various schemes promote accountability, particularly in areas such emissions management and social impacts.
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← 1. For simplicity, in the following, both NOCs and INOCs are collectively referred to as “NOCs”.
← 2. As of 2026, the list member countries of OPEC are: Algeria, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.
← 3. As of 2026, OPEC+ includes Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Russian Federation, South Sudan and Sudan.
← 4. Control points (sometimes referred to as “choke points”) are “key points of transformation in the supply chain where traceability or chain of custody information may be aggregated or lost” (OECD, 2018[51]).
← 5. During interviews, stakeholders were asked which issues under the scope of the MNE Guidelines that they encountered as part of their due diligence processes. In the case of non-industry stakeholders (i.e. government, worker and civil society representatives), they were asked to identify what risks they believed to be most significant and to share desk research.
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