This chapter reviews and analyses the Strategy for Development 2022-2024 of Bulgaria’s Commission for Anti-Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture (CACIAF). It examines the framework for implementing the Strategy at a legislative, organisational and operational level, makes suggestions to implement it more effectively through the remainder of its reporting period, and draws lessons learnt to inform the production of similar organisational strategies in the future.
Reforming Bulgaria’s Anti‑corruption Authorities
1. Review and analysis of the strategy for development 2022-2024 of Bulgaria’s CACIAF: Lessons learnt for the future
Copy link to 1. Review and analysis of the strategy for development 2022-2024 of Bulgaria’s CACIAF: Lessons learnt for the futureAbstract
1.1. Introduction: Strong corporate strategies for promoting integrity
Copy link to 1.1. Introduction: Strong corporate strategies for promoting integrity1.1.1. Setting strategic priorities for anti-corruption agencies to promote public integrity
Integrity is the cornerstone of a system of sound public governance. It is a vital safeguard to the public interest and the prosperity and well-being of society as a whole. It also reinforces other fundamental values such as the commitment to a pluralistic democracy based upon the rule of law and respect of human rights.
In this context, countries across the world are turning to national anti-corruption authorities (ACAs), i.e. public bodies with a specific mandate to combat and prevent corruption, as a subject of growing interest. International legal instruments often now require the creation of ACAs, or equivalent organisations, and regional instruments also recognise the usefulness of establishing ACAs to more successfully combat corruption and uphold integrity (AFA, 2020[1]).
However, like all public bodies, ACAs can only be effective where their responsibilities are clearly set out, where they have the appropriate mandate and capacity to fulfil their responsibilities, and where clear mechanisms for co-operation with other relevant authorities have been established (OECD, 2020[2]). Among the primary tools for introducing this level of clarity is a strong organisational strategy.
This chapter provides a review and analysis of the Strategy for Development 2022-2024 (the Strategic Plan) of Bulgaria’s Commission for Anti-Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture (CACIAF). The chapter examines the framework for implementing the Strategic Plan at a legislative, organisational and operational level. Throughout, the chapter makes suggestions for how the Strategic Plan can be implemented more effectively through the remainder of its reporting period, and draws lessons to inform the production of similar organisational strategies in the future.
This chapter also reflects on the impact of recent structural reforms to the CACIAF. The CACIAF (Комисия за противодействие на корупцията и за отнемане на назаконно придобитото имущество) was established in 2018 and adopted a series of strategic documents including the Strategic Plan and the accompanying annual operational plans. In September 2023, however, the Bulgarian National Assembly passed new legislation and split the CACIAF into two bodies: (1) the Anti-Corruption Commission (Комисия за противодействие на корупцията, ACC); and (2) the Commission for the Confiscation of Illegally Acquired Property (Комисията за отнемане на незаконно придобитото имущество, CCIAP). This structural reform has complicated the implementation of the current Strategy and the drawing of any lessons from its development and implementation. This report aims, where it can, to take these structural reforms into account in its recommendations and suggestions for the future.
1.2. Improving the framework for the 2022-2024 Strategic Plan’s implementation
Copy link to 1.2. Improving the framework for the 2022-2024 Strategic Plan’s implementation1.2.1. The legislative and regulatory basis for the ACC and its 2022-2024 Strategic Plan
Bulgaria’s specialised state bodies for countering corruption, and the legislative and regulatory basis for the Strategic Plan
Until September 2023 the CACIAF, Bulgaria’s core specialised state body for countering corruption, was responsible for both preventive and sanctioning actions for high-profile corruption. Throughout its operation, international bodies, including the European Commission, OECD and GRECO suggested that the CACIAF’s overall capacities should be strengthened to achieve lasting concrete results, especially by working to build public trust and gaining a reputation of independence and professionalism (European Commission, 2023[3]; OECD, 2022[4]; Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), 2023[5]).
In this context, the Bulgarian National Assembly adopted the Anti-Corruption Law of 2023, to divide the CACIAF into two new commissions, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and the Commission for the Confiscation of Illegally Acquired Property (CCIAP). The aim was to introduce effective countermeasures against corruption and create guarantees that persons occupying public positions perform their powers or duties honestly and honourably (Art. 2, Act No. 84 of 2023). The law designates the ACC as an independent specialised permanent state body, responsible for preventing and countering corruption and managing conflicts of interest (Art. 7. (1)-(2), Act No. 84 of 2023).
The ACC consists of three members of high professional and moral qualities, each elected for a six-year term by MPs on the basis of a two-thirds majority. The members chair the ACC on a rotating basis for two years (Art. 8(1)-(4), Act No. 84 of 2023). They carry out their activities until the new members are elected (Art. 8(5), Act No. 84 of 2023).
The ACC’s mandate includes the following tasks (Art. 13, Act No. 84 of 2023):
prevention of corruption
establishing a conflict of interest of persons holding public positions
control over declarations of property and interests of persons holding public positions
detecting and investigating corruption committed by persons holding public positions.
The Anti-Corruption Law of 2023 sets out 52 categories of public positions for the focus of the ACC’s operation, across the government, regional and municipal administration, business activities of public bodies, and academia and higher education. It also expands the scope of the previous legislation of 2018 by adding further subjects to the law, including representatives of the state or municipalities in the management or control bodies of commercial companies (Art. 6(1), Act No. 84 of 2023). The persons holding public positions are required to submit the following declarations to the ACC:
declaration of incompatibility
declaration of property and interests
declaration of change in declared circumstances (Art. 49. (1), Act No. 84 of 2023).
According to the Financial Management and Control Act, the ACC is required, like other public sector organisations, to establish an organisational strategic framework. The leaders of public sector organisations are responsible for determining the goals of their organisations, the development and implementation of strategic and annual action plans, and indicators for measuring the achievement of their goals (Art. 7(1), Act No. 21/10.03.2006). The Minister of Finance has issued detailed methodological guidelines about the preparation process (No. ЗМФ 184/06.03.2020), according to which strategic plans should cover at least 3 years and be based on the underlying principle of lawful, economic, effective and expedient management of public funds, and promoting the effectiveness of the internal control systems.
The Ministry of Finance’s guidelines set up a narrowly defined framework for organisational strategies. Strategic plans in the Bulgarian public sector must be prepared on the basis of already adopted strategic documents, on national, sectoral and/or regional level respectively. Public sector bodies may not formulate and adopt new strategic objectives. The organisational strategic plans must collect the strategic priorities and goals from the relevant regulations and documents and arrange them into a hierarchical order.
The CACIAF also adopted a roadmap and annual operational plans which considered the results of the implementation of the strategic objectives and its internal risk management activities (Figure 1.1). While the strategic plan and the operational plan laid out the strategic objectives and subsequent tasks for the CACIAF, the roadmap was a summary document of the annual plans for the whole period of time the strategy covered.
Figure 1.1. Organisational strategy framework in Bulgaria
Copy link to Figure 1.1. Organisational strategy framework in Bulgaria
The 2022-2024 Strategic Plan was drafted upon an order of the CACIAF’s Chair. The Strategic Plan and its objectives followed the pre-requisites defined by the Minister of Finance’s methodological guidelines (No. ЗМФ 184/06.03.2020). These objectives were aligned to the CACIAF’s five core strategic priorities, defined by the National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Corruption 2021-2027 and by the Anti-Corruption Law of 2018 (Box 1.1).
Box 1.1. Legal and regulatory foundations of the CACIAF’s strategic priorities
Copy link to Box 1.1. Legal and regulatory foundations of the CACIAF’s strategic prioritiesBulgaria’s National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Corruption 2021-2027 outlines Bulgaria’s priorities for the prevention and counteraction of corruption and indicates the measures and actions for their implementation. The main objective of the National Strategy is to continue efforts to improve the prevention and counteraction of corruption and to indicate the measures and actions for achieving these ends.
The NACS’ main priorities include:
strengthening capacity and increasing transparency of operation of anti-corruption bodies and units
countering corruption crimes
strengthening the capacity and improving the work of administration bodies charged with supervising and penalising powers
increasing the transparency and accountability of local government
freeing citizens from “petty” corruption
creating an environment for public intolerance of corruption.
The Anti-Corruption Law of 2018 prescribed the following tasks for the CACIAF:
preventing corruption, verifying property declarations of persons holding senior public positions, identifying conflicts of interest, and confiscating illegally acquired property
gathering, analysing and verifying information in cases when there is reason to believe that senior public office holders have committed acts of corruption
assessing corruption risks and conducting periodic assessments of the application of anticorruption measures
collecting good practices to maintain a database for implementation of the anti-corruption policies and measures
co-ordinating any draft law prepared by executive bodies regarding the existence of corruption risks, as well as carrying out an ex post analysis of the impact of the law.
Note: The subject of National Strategy for Preventing and Combatting Corruption in the Republic of Bulgaria (2021 – 2027) is to outline the priorities of the state policy for prevention and counteraction of corruption and to indicate the measures and actions for their implementation.
Source: National strategy for preventing and combatting corruption in the republic of Bulgaria (2021 – 2027); Anti-Corruption Law of 2018 (repealed).
In fact-finding interviews with the OECD, Bulgarian officials indicated that the 2022-2024 Strategic Plan was a direct extension of the previous 2019-2021 Strategic Plan. In practice, this meant that the content, provisions and wording of the two strategies remained consistent (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1. Priorities and objectives of the CACIAF’s 2019-2021 and 2022-2024 Strategic Plans
Copy link to Table 1.1. Priorities and objectives of the CACIAF’s 2019-2021 and 2022-2024 Strategic Plans|
Strategic priority |
Objectives |
|
|---|---|---|
|
1. |
Effective prevention and acting against corruption |
1.1. Tackling corruption effectively |
|
1.2. General and individual prevention aimed at senior public office holders by implementing the declaration system to ensure publicity and transparency of their assets and income |
||
|
1.3. Preventing the possibility and disposal of illicit acquisition of property |
||
|
2. |
Strengthening the administrative capacity of the employees |
2.1. Strengthening and developing the human resources management function |
|
2.2. Building competent administrative capacity by providing conditions for professional development and training |
||
|
2.3. Carrying out a quality check of the activity in accordance with the principles of professionalism and good faith |
||
|
3. |
Interaction and co-operation |
3.1. Exchange of information with other public authorities, competent authorities of other countries and international organisations |
|
4. |
Institutional development |
4.1. Strengthening the independence of the CACIAF |
|
4.2. Validation of the Commission for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as a model for good governance |
||
|
4.3. Strengthening institutional identity and belonging |
||
|
4.4. Improving the governance of the CACIAF through the deployment and application of modern information and communication technologies |
||
|
5. |
Publicity and transparency of the CACIAF’s activities |
5.1. Improving public awareness of the role of the CACIAF and increasing its confidence in it |
|
5.2. Making the CACIAF an equivalent and desirable partner to international organisations with a similar activity to exchange professional knowledge and experience |
||
Source: CACIAF’s 2019-2021 and 2022-2024 Strategic Plans.
The National Audit Office of Bulgaria approved the CACIAF’s strategic documents in 2021 during an audit of the CACIAF’s financial reporting and internal control system (Audit Report of the National Audit Office of Bulgaria, No. 0100216421/2021). Yet, the audit did not analyse the content of the Strategic Plan in order to assess, beyond the alignment with previous strategic documents and the CACIAF’s strategic priorities, whether the 2022-2024 Strategic Plan’s content and coverage was adequate to facilitate the CACIAF’s responsibilities. A fuller monitoring and evaluation process to make an assessment of the ongoing relevance of the Strategic Plan is suggested in Section 3 of this report. But as a first lesson learnt for future strategies, as well as ensuring alignment with the objectives of other relevant strategic documents, organisational strategies should be based on a full situation analysis to understand the current environment and set relevant, realistic objectives for the future.
The 2022-2024 Strategic Plan could have been stronger if it had incorporated a broader situation analysis and clearer connections to the CACIAF’s risk register
To be effective, organisational strategies should be based on an accurate assessment of potential problems and their causes, as well as the threats and opportunities facing an organisation (OECD, 2020[2]). During consultations with the OECD, CACIAF officials emphasised that, in order to avoid producing “an arbitrary document”, the Strategic Plan 2022-2024 had to reiterate the requirements and responsibilities set out in the Anti-Corruption Law of 2018 and to comply with the principles of the Ministry of Finance’s methodological guidelines. However, while the Ministry of Finance’s guidelines sets specific requirements both in terms of the strategic plan’s structure and content, it allows public bodies to tailor their plans to their specific needs through a situation analysis and risk assessment which can inform how they interpret and implement their legal mandate in everyday operation.
As international examples have shown, a comprehensive situation analysis enables anti-corruption organisations to identify their current position, the environment in which they are working, and the threats and opportunities they may meet in the future (Box 1.2).
Box 1.2. Problem analysis and risk assessment in the strategic framework of anti-corruption agencies
Copy link to Box 1.2. Problem analysis and risk assessment in the strategic framework of anti-corruption agenciesUnited States
The Strategic Plan of the United States Office of Government Ethics (OGE) for 2022-2026 examines the external factors which could cause OGE to incur costs, impede its mission, or necessitate reallocating staffing resources. These include nominee workload (doubling of workload for reviewing financial disclosure reports of nominees requiring Senate confirmation), potential security threats against IT systems, potential disruption and cost of moving office space and relocating staff, the security and operational stability of the electronic public financial disclosure system vital to the Presidential appointments process, senior leaders, and the executive branch-wide ethics programme, potential legislative reform, future of work, workload from changing inter-agency mandates and government wide initiatives.
Latvia
The Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau of Latvia (KNAB) has used the “Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats” (SWOT) analysis to assess its situation and operational capacity for its Operational Strategy 2023-2026. Among the internal factors that influence its operation the KNAB identifies the capacity to directly influence the overall development of public administration in the field of anti-corruption, participation in international organisations, institutional independence, well-arranged division of responsibilities between departments, stability of the financial resources allocated and of the social guarantees for employees, staff turnover and staff competence and experience as strengths. Its weaknesses include insufficient digitisation, complex internal document circulation, poor integration between information technology systems, limited remote working opportunities and insufficient knowledge of the official languages of the European Union. Among the external factors, it identifies co-operation and exchange of experience with regional partners abroad, closer co-operation with national law enforcement authorities and non-governmental organisations, access to EU and foreign aid programmes, national corruption risk assessment that can contribute to risk-based national anticorruption policy planning, developments in information and communication technologies that can help optimise and automate procedures as opportunities for the KNAB. Geopolitical and political instability, security threats (including cyber threats), increase in the cost of resources and services, relatively low public trust in the Bureau and public administration in general, challenges in attracting highly skilled employees, especially in information technology are regarded as external threats.
Such a situation analysis relies on relevant, accessible data. The CACIAF collected and held a wealth of data on the performance of Bulgaria’s anti-corruption framework in the public sector. Much of the collected data would have supported the CACIAF in making an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats it might have faced in the discharge of its mandate, and which could have informed the content of its organisational strategy. The relevant data includes:
Data collected from the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Laws of 2018 and 2023: According to the Anti-Corruption Law of 2018 the CACIAF collected, analysed and verified information in relation to a wide range of national anti-corruption policies including corrupt acts of public employees, their asset and interest declarations, conflicts of interest and incompatibility, procedures to forfeit illegally acquired properties. This information provides good quantitative and qualitative evidence of corruption risk across public bodies and the effectiveness of the CACIAF’s (and in future the ACC and CCIAP’s) own procedures.
Results of integrity checks: According to the Anti-Corruption Law of 2018, all employees of the CACIAF were subject to initial and regular (periodic and occasional) ‘integrity checks’. Commission members had to undergo professional and moral quality screening and provide proof of how they meet the requirements for the position during the process of their election by the National Assembly (Anti-Corruption Law of 2018, Art. 9). Under CACIAF’s processes, ‘integrity checks’ involved reviews of asset and interest declarations, knowledge tests, disciplinary sanctions in force, performance appraisals and drug and alcohol tests. The results of integrity checks were summarised in the findings and conclusions of the inspecting committees’ detailed reports, and could provide important real-time data on the performance of integrity policies and procedures, which could support a strong situation analysis.
Data from whistleblowing procedures: Both the Whistleblower Protection Act of 2023 and Anti-Corruption Law of 2023 provides that any person having data concerning corruption, or conflict of interest about a person holding senior public position, may submit a report to the ACC. Previously, the CACIAF applied special rules for the receipt and consideration of reports for corruption or conflict of interest and for protection of whistle-blowers (CACIAF, 2021[8]). Moreover, the CACIAF’s Code of Ethics covered whistleblowing within the CACIAF. It stipulated that if an employee considers an order unlawful, they are required to report their views in writing to the superior manager. The data from whistleblowing cases and procedures could be used to identify specific corruption risks and elaborate adequate strategic objectives and activities to mitigate them.
In future iterations of their organisational plans, as Civil Society Organisations noted during consultations with the OECD, the ACC and CCIAP could consider drawing on this data to undertake a fuller situation analysis and ensure their strategies are enabling them to meet their responsibilities.
A strong situation analysis also incorporates an assessment of threats to the organisation and the environment in which it works. Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Financial Management and Control in the Public Sector Act required the CACIAF to develop corruption risk assessment methodologies, which it did accordingly (Box 1.3). This methodology also covered the risk register of each organisational unit within the CACIAF. The CACIAF’s risk assessment identified risks to the organisation's operation, an assessment of each risk’s impact, likelihood and the proposed actions in response, residual risks and additional actions to mitigate them, and also provided a timeframe for implementation of the additional actions and the staff responsible for their implementation. According to Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Financial Management and Control in the Public Sector Act, the managers of the organisations under Article 2 are responsible for overseeing this risk assessment process and for taking steps to mitigate identified risks, including establishing, maintaining and monitoring the internal control system, management structure, and alignment with central standards of accountability and effectiveness.
Box 1.3. Classified risks within the operation of the CACIAF
Copy link to Box 1.3. Classified risks within the operation of the CACIAFThe CACIAF’s Strategy on risk assessment identifies the following risks in its operation:
External risks: risks related to external circumstances, such as: political events, legislative changes, changes in the economy, natural phenomena, external organisations – partners, counterparties, media, etc.
Internal risks: risks related to the legal form, the specificity of the activity and the working process of the CACIAF, such as risks related to the data exchange system, human resource issues, changes in work tasks, etc.
Reputational risks: caused by weak public relations, failure to provide services or meet societal needs, working with citizens, colleagues, a media scandal involving employees of the organisation.
Technological risks: caused by the use of old technologies, by security problems or by the use of new information systems that have not been sufficiently tested or staff are not trained to the required level.
Security risks: caused by theft or misuse of material assets, cash or other financial assets or unauthorised access to information due to inadequate protection of the information system.
Legal/regulatory risks: arising from changes in national or EU legislation.
Financial risks: caused by insufficient funding or by unlawful, inefficient, ineffective or uneconomic use of funds.
Health risks: arising from the introduction of restrictions related to pandemics, various diseases, etc.
Contractual or partnership risks: arising from the failure of a partner or public service provider.
Source: Updated Strategy for Risk Management of the Commission for Combating Corruption for Forfeiture of Illegally Acquired Asset (provided by the CACIAF).
In practice, according to Order Number RD-07-2/15.02.2023, the Standing Working Group for Risk Management (SWGRM) is responsible for ensuring complementarity between the risk management process and the organisational strategy, through the preparation of the annual report on the state of the risk management system and the development and annual review of the Strategic Plan. However, while these processes are therefore overseen by a single body, the Commission’s Strategic and Operational Plans are independent documents that do not contain any consideration of the organisational risks set out in the Risk Management Strategy. This separation makes it unclear how the CACIAF’s strategic objectives relate to the organisational risks it faces. Unlike examples from other countries (Box 1.2), therefore, it is not clear how the CACIAF’s objectives and related actions were developed and prioritised according to the risks the organisation faced at the time the strategy was developed. The 2022-2024 Strategic Plan could therefore have been improved through the inclusion of an assessment of how the strategic objectives and the likelihood of their achievement were affected by the risks identified in the Risk Management Strategy. Inclusion of such an assessment would also have supported a strengthened monitoring and evaluation process, further explored below.
1.2.2. The ACC’s organisational set-up
The ACC could have implemented its strategic priorities around publicity and transparency through stronger and more transparent co-operation with stakeholders
Enforcing the right to know through transparency and access to information, and the inclusive and fair participation of stakeholders and participation of advocacy groups, media and “watchdog” organisations, are key instruments for levelling the playing field, reaching informed public decisions, and nurturing trust in public institutions and policymaking (OECD, 2020[2]). The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity states that adherents should “encourage transparency and stakeholders’ engagement at all stages of the political process and policy cycle to promote accountability, trust, and the public interest (OECD, 2017[9]).
The Anti-Corruption Law of 2023 introduced several measures to ensure more transparency and accountability for the ACC’s operation:
A special nomination committee of five members delegated by the Supreme Court of Cassation, the High Bar Council, the Ministry of Justice, the Ombudsman of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Audit Chamber is set up to select candidates for the ACC. The proposals for members are published on the website of the National Assembly, including written reasons for the professional and moral qualities of the candidates, documents proving that the candidates fulfil the requirements, and the written consent of the applicants. The name of the person who proposed the respective candidate and the result of the check to establish and declare affiliation to the State Security and Intelligence Services are also published. Each candidate prepares a concept on its plans and publishes it on the National Assembly’s website. The nomination committee’s report on its decision about final candidates it proposes to the National Assembly is also public (Art. 8(4) and 9, Act No. 84 of 2023).
The National Assembly exercises control over the activities of the ACC. Every six months, the ACC submits a report on its activities to the permanent committee of the National Assembly responsible for combating corruption, which may also hold a hearing involving the ACC’s chairman and members (Art. 31(1), Act No. 84 of 2023). In addition, each year by 31 March, the ACC submits a report on its activities to the National Assembly. The report is also submitted to the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers and is published on the ACC's website (Art. 32. (1)-(2), Act No. 84 of 2023).
The ACC publishes its decisions on its website, maintains public registers for the declarations of persons holding public positions, its decisions that establish a conflict of interest, and the documents establishing administrative penalties and criminal decrees that have entered into force (Art. 13(3), Art. 3(2) and Art. 56, Art. 112(1), Act No. 84 of 2023). Every person has the right to access the data from the registers (Art. 57(1), Act No. 84 of 2023).
The Anti-Corruption Law of 2023 lists the state bodies which need to co-operate and formulate joint instructions on their interactions: the ACC, and its investigating inspectors in particular, CCIAP, Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria, European Prosecutor's Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Finance, State Financial Inspection Agency, National Security State Agency, National Revenue Agency, Customs Agency, Chief Inspectorate of the Council of Ministers, Inspectorate of the Supreme Judicial Council (Art. 38(1)-(2)).
However, during consultations with the OECD, Civil Society Organisations noted that there remained a lack of public trust and transparency around the CACIAF which is liable to persist following the establishment of the ACC and CCIAP. In addition, the European Commission’s Rule of Law report noted that the perception among experts and business executives is that the level of corruption in the public sector remains high (RoL report). In the 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Bulgaria scored 43/100 and ranks 26th in the European Union and 72nd globally (CPI). The 2023 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 81% of Bulgarian respondents consider corruption widespread in their country (compared to an EU average of 70%), and 29% of respondents feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives (compared to an EU average 24%) (Eurobarometer). There is therefore work for the ACC still to do in meeting its strategic priorities relating to publicity and transparency, and the vision of the 2022-2024 Strategic Plan ‘to assert and be recognisable and perceived as an institution working in the interests of society’.
During consultations with the OECD, CSOs raised concerns about the extent to which their proposals and ideas have previously been considered by the CACIAF. In particular, CSOs suggested that participation in consultations sometimes felt like a formality and did not allow them a substantial input into the policymaking process. According to the Anti-Corruption Law of 2023, in order to carry out its activities related to the prevention of corruption, the ACC should co-operate with various stakeholders beyond the public sector, including CSOs, business representatives, and international organisations (Art. 48, Act No. 84 of 2023). More active engagement with these stakeholders could nurture trust and support for the ACC’s work and the achievement of its strategic priorities and objectives. For instance:
Involvement in policymaking: Like other OECD countries, the ACC could harness the technical expertise of civil society and the business sector during consultations on its policy development and refreshing its strategic framework (Box 1.4).
Box 1.4. The French Anti-Corruption Agency’s co-operation with external stakeholders in policymaking
Copy link to Box 1.4. The French Anti-Corruption Agency’s co-operation with external stakeholders in policymakingThe French Anti-Corruption Agency (AFA) is mandated to oversee the private sector in relation to promoting accountability and transparency standards and preventing corruption. One of the first major pieces of guidance produced by the AFA after its establishment in 2017 related to helping private and public sector entities prevent and detect corruption, influence peddling, extortion by public officials, unlawful taking of interest, misappropriation of public funds and favouritism. The AFA co-operated closely with both the private sector and the broader community to develop that guidance. It published its draft guidelines on its website and called for input and comments, and organised a conference to discuss the findings of the consultation. As a result of the consultation, the AFA received and considered 450 observations from international organisations, law firms, companies, CSOs and academics.
Source: (AFA, 2017[10])
Incorporating transparency into investigations: Other OECD countries have built trust and engagement in their anti-corruption work by creating opportunities for involvement and oversight of certain investigations. These formal mechanisms for participation have provided opportunities for e.g. CSOs to input into key processes such as planning, advocacy, and monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of anti-corruption work.
Communication and interaction: regular and open external communication is crucial to create a culture of information sharing within the ACC and with partners. Beyond maintaining the body’s website and publishing information required by law, the ACC could actively create partnerships and networks, communicate more effectively on its operations and results, and advocate for institutional or behavioural change through campaigns. Not least, through the development of a designated communication strategy the ACC could prioritise working upon elevated standards of transparency regarding its work and decisions.
Implementation of the ACC’s publicity and transparency commitments could also have been improved through a stronger system of internal integrity checks
The 2022-2024 Strategic Plan’s priorities relating to publicity and transparency and the aim to be recognisable and perceived as an institution working in the interests of society could also be better achieved through implementing a more rigorous process of internal integrity checks. The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity recommends that adherents promote a merit-based, professional, public sector dedicated to public service values and good governance, in particular through ensuring human resource management that consistently applies basic principles, such as merit and transparency, to support the professionalism of the public service, prevent favouritism and nepotism, protect against undue political interference and mitigate risks for abuse of position and misconduct (OECD, 2017[9]).
Bulgaria has taken steps to observe this principle through the Anti-Corruption Law of 2023, which establishes criteria for the appointment of the ACC’s members and the director of the Anti-Corruption Directorate, including conditions of appointment and incompatibility standards (Table 1.2).
Table 1.2. Appointment of the ACC’s members, the director and deputy directors of the Anti-corruption Directorate
Copy link to Table 1.2. Appointment of the ACC’s members, the director and deputy directors of the Anti-corruption Directorate|
Appointing body |
Education |
Experience |
Conditions of appointment and incompatibility standards |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Chairman of the ACC |
National Assembly (2/3 majority) |
Higher education (law/economics) |
At least 7 years of law enforcement practice |
|
|
Members of the ACC |
National Assembly (2/3 majority) |
Higher education (law/economics) |
At least 7 years of law enforcement practice |
|
|
Director of the Anti-corruption Directorate |
Members of the ACC (with unanimous decision) |
Higher education (law) |
At least 10 years of law enforcement practice or public service |
|
|
Deputy directors of the Anti-corruption Directorate |
Members of the ACC |
Higher education (law) |
At least 10 years of law enforcement practice or public service |
Source: Anti-corruption Law of 2023.
The Anti-Corruption Law of 2023 also requires the ACC to perform integrity checks of its employees (Art. 13(1), Point 10, Act No. 84 of 2023). Investigating inspectors and other employees in leadership positions may be subject to periodic and occasional integrity checks during their tenure of office, but not more than twice a year. Failure to pass an integrity check may be grounds for dismissal from the position held (Art. 19 (8)-(10), Act No. 84 of 2023).
Previously, the CACIAF conducted three types of integrity check:
Initial integrity checks took place before the appointment of all employees. When the CACIAF was established in 2018, all reassigned employees underwent the initial integrity check within six months of their reassignment. Regardless of their legal status and the type of employment, each employee had to pass an integrity check as a part of the recruitment process. Through data-driven screening the CACIAF checked the identity, criminal background and wealth upon official records. Integrity checks also included knowledge tests about legal and organisational measures on integrity.
Periodic integrity checks were carried out over a fixed period of time, annually at most, on the basis of an order of the President of the CACIAF.
Occasional integrity checks were unannounced tests based on the order of the President of the CACIAF. They were not subject to time limit requirements. Inspectors and directors of the CACIAF had to agree to become subjects of both periodic and occasional integrity checks during their employment.
The CACIAF reported that it carried out 485 initial integrity checks between 2018 and 2021. In 2022 and 2023, initial integrity checks were applied to 34 and 16 newly appointed employees respectively. In 2023 they were applied to 9 newly appointed employees at the ACC. However, neither periodic nor occasional checks were carried out since the CACIAF was set up in 2018. Similarly, no specific plan or strategy had been laid out to carry out these integrity checks. The integrity check system in its previous form therefore did not track or provide new information about, for example, any new personal interests or ethical values which officials acquired following the initial check upon taking office (OECD, 2023[11]).
According to the new provision of the ACC, within 12 months of reassignment the persons under paragraphs 4 and 5 must pass an integrity check, with failure to do so being grounds for dismissal. The ACC could also consider how to implement periodic and occasional integrity checks which ensure a better, more publicly visible, adherence to public integrity and public service values. Other OECD countries have adopted a plan and tailored internal rules for the implementation of periodic integrity checks to promote integrity on an ongoing basis (Box 1.5). The ACC could consider how to implement similar ongoing integrity checks.
Box 1.5. Security vetting and integrity checks in the United Kingdom
Copy link to Box 1.5. Security vetting and integrity checks in the United KingdomVetting in the United Kingdom is delivered by United Kingdom Security Vetting (UKSV). The process helps public sector employers and employees identify, manage and mitigate risks for roles where national security concerns are a consideration. Vetting establishes trust between employers and employees, sometimes through confidential conversations. It is the start of an ongoing dialogue about managing risks, which lasts for as long as a person holds a security clearance. Several different levels of vetting are applied to public office holders, the main ones being:
BPSS: Applied to all individuals with any access to government assets, including all civil servants, members of the armed forces, temporary staff in departments, and government contractors. Checks include identity, recent employment history, national and immigration status, unspent criminal record, and significant time spent abroad in the last 3 years.
CTC: Applied to those employed in posts which involve proximity to public figures assessed to be at particular risk from terrorist attack; give access to information or material assessed to be of value to terrorists; involve unescorted access to certain military, civil, industrial or commercial establishments assessed to be at particular risk from terrorist attack. Checks include completion of a Security Questionnaire; a departmental/company records check including personal files, staff reports, sick leave returns and security records; a criminal record check; a check of Security Service records, including an interview where there are any unresolved security concerns about the individual.
SC: Applied to those employed in posts which require frequent and uncontrolled access to Secret assets and/or occasional, supervised access to Top Secret assets, and for those who could bring about the same degree of damage; will have sufficient knowledge to obtain a comprehensive picture of Secret information; are being considered for employment where it would be impossible to make career progress without access to Secret assets; require access to certain levels of classified material originating from another country or international organisation. Checks include all those for CTC and a credit and financial history check, including a financial questionnaire where there are unresolved concerns. Checks may also extend to third parties included on the security questionnaire.
DV: Applied to those in posts which require frequent and uncontrolled access to Top Secret assets or above, and those in a position to bring about the same degree of damage; require frequent and uncontrolled access to certain nuclear material; require access to certain levels of classified material originating from another country or international organisation. Checks include all those for SC and a full review of personal finances including an assessment of an individual’s personal and household assets, liabilities, income and expenditure; a detailed interview conducted by a trained Investigating Officer; further enquiries, including interviews with referees conducted by a trained Investigating Officer.
In addition, government departments must establish a process to ensure the declaration of all relevant outside interests on commencing employment, moving between roles, and on an ongoing basis, either to the management chain or relevant independent person. Departments should nominate a senior responsible officer to oversee and ensure compliance with the proper application of internal policy and procedures, ensure consistency of judgement and provide expert advice. Senior Civil Servants must confirm on an annual basis that their declarations of interest are up to date (including a nil return).
The ACC could better implement its strategic priorities around prevention and education by improving networking between integrity inspectorates
Upon its creation, the ACC inherited the CACIAF’s strategic responsibilities relating to effective prevention and capability building (through commitments in the 2022-2024 Strategic Plan’s strategic priorities 1, 2 and 3). Accordingly, the ACC is responsible for collecting, summarising and analysing information and good practices on national anti-corruption policies and measures, maintaining databases, performing monitoring and periodic assessment of the application of anti-corruption measures, and providing information to national, European and international anti-corruption institutions and organisations (Art. 45, Act No. 84 of 2023). It is also responsible for developing and proposing anti-corruption measures and legal amendments for the prevention and counteraction of corruption, co-ordinating their implementation, and carrying out a subsequent analysis of their impact. And it is responsible for developing methodologies for assessing corruption risks, ethical standards of conduct, systems for checking integrity, providing assistance in their implementation, and approving related legislative proposals (Art. 46(1), Act No. 84 of 2023).
An important structure for the ACC to implement these responsibilities relating to the mainstreaming of integrity policies and procedures through the Bulgarian public service are the internal inspectorates within public entities. In Bulgaria, internal inspectorates have the main anti-corruption responsibilities within entities. Heads of the inspectorates report directly to the Minister or the authority to which it is attached, without the intermediation of the members or the Head of the Political Cabinet or the Chief Secretary. According to Article 46 of the Administration Act (Act No. 130 of 1998) heads of inspectorates are responsible for:
prevention and elimination of irregularities in the functioning of the administration
independent and objective evaluation of the operation of the administration
improvement of the performance of the administration.
The inspectorates’ specific activities include the exercise of checks and controls regarding conflicts of interest and the content of the mandatory asset declarations, submitted by public officials, advisors and experts and the alerting of the prosecution authorities in the cases where evidence is found for a committed offence. Inspectorates also assess corruption risks and propose measures to limit them. Each internal inspectorate participates in the development of an anti-corruption plan in line with the national anticorruption strategy (with responsibility for approving the plan resting with the minister or head of the relevant institution). The NCAP provides templates and guidance on content in public entities’ anti-corruption plans. According to Bulgaria’s National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Corruption 2021-2027 (National Anti-Corruption Strategy) in previous years each anti-corruption plan was then analysed by the CACIAF for compliance with the requirements of the Guidelines to Conduct Anti-Corruption Plans, including their form, content, communication and mitigation measures. According to information provided to the OECD by the CACIAF, for the 2020 anti-corruption plans a total of 724 measures were planned in the 35 departments analysed (OECD, 2022[4]).
The 2023 Anti-Corruption Law gave the ACC responsibility for activities relating to the mainstreaming of integrity through Bulgaria’s public sector. The ACC is responsible for organising training, seminars and anti-corruption information campaigns, providing opinions on the implementation of law, organising surveys, participating in assemblies and other local and international forums, and analysing public opinion on anti-corruption matters (Art. 47, Act No. 84 of 2023). While Bulgaria currently has no network of integrity advisers akin to other OECD countries (Box 1.6), the ACC, through its membership of the NCAP, could formalise a network of internal inspectorates to better raise awareness, co-ordination, and implementation of integrity policies and processes throughout Bulgaria’s public sector.
Box 1.6. Examples of integrity networks in Germany and Sweden
Copy link to Box 1.6. Examples of integrity networks in Germany and SwedenThe German network of contact persons for corruption prevention
In Germany, the lead federal ministry for corruption prevention and integrity is the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community. Since preventing corruption does not involve having a supervisory role over other ministries, co-operation is essential in order to reach a common understanding of integrity policies and comprehensive standards for their implementation.
For the German federal administration, the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries regulates (among other issues) co-operation within the federal government. Article 19 stipulates that “in matters affecting the remits of more than one Federal Ministry, those Ministries will work together to ensure that the Federal Government speaks and acts consistently”.
In practical terms, co-operation happens through a network of contact persons for corruption prevention that meets frequently. The network also develops guidelines, handbooks and recommendations for implementing the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration.
The Network against Corruption for Swedish State Agencies
The Swedish Agency for Public Management hosts the Network against Corruption for Swedish State Agencies. Delegates participating in the network include heads of administrative departments and heads of legal departments. The network meets four times a year, and each meeting usually gathers close to 100 agencies.
The purpose of the network is to share experiences, learn about good examples and take part in the production of handbooks, reports, and other publications of the Swedish Agency for Public Management on anti-corruption measures, internal control, and efficiency.
Source: (OECD, 2020[2]).
Germany: information provided by the Ministry of the Interior; Sweden: information provided by the Swedish Agency for Public Management.
The ACC could introduce a more comprehensive monitoring process to ensure the effectiveness of the strategic and operational plan
Monitoring and evaluation are key to ensure the effective implementation of the CACIAF, and now the ACC’s, strategic plans. The core objective of monitoring is to identify challenges and opportunities in a timely manner to inform decisions and enable adjustments during implementation. As such, monitoring should always be understood as contributing to an effective public management. This needs to be institutionalised by linking the process of monitoring with the process of decision making and implementation (OECD, 2019[14]). To achieve this, clear mechanisms and procedures to monitor progress should be established.
The CACIAF’s 2022-2024 Strategic Plan set out several methods for monitoring the implementation of its objectives and activities (Table 1.3).
Table 1.3. 2022-2024 Strategic Plan arrangements for monitoring and reporting on performance
Copy link to Table 1.3. 2022-2024 Strategic Plan arrangements for monitoring and reporting on performance|
Type of monitoring |
Responsible unit |
Description |
Regularity / Timeframe |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Ongoing monitoring |
Working group for risk management |
The head of the working group co-ordinates the monitoring and compiles the information sent by the directorates into the report on the implementation of the operational plan. |
Annually |
|
Self-assessment |
Units responsible for strategic activities |
Heads of units are responsible for a periodic review and assessment of the extent of the objectives achieved. |
Ongoing |
|
Internal audit |
Internal audit department |
The internal audit covers strategic planning, annual reports, and risk registers. Audits report of irregularities and recommendations are adopted and fulfilled by management. |
Annually |
Source: (CACIAF, 2021[15]); Information received from the CACIAF; 2022-2024 Strategic Plan.
While managers of units and departments are responsible for ongoing monitoring, the permanent working group for risk management holds an oversight role to assess annually whether the Strategic Plan’s objectives have been achieved (Order No РД-07-2/15.02.2023, rep. Order No РД-07-5/04.05.2022, rep. Order No РД-07-9/28.09.2021). The working group comprises representatives of all directorates of the CACIAF’s general and specialised administration. The working group collects summary reports about the implementation of the strategy and the operational plans from responsible directorates and reviews the accomplished objectives. It also considers the results of the internal audit and risk assessment procedures, holding annual meetings for risk management, with additional meetings as needed. The working group is responsible for preparing, by 31 March each year, a report on the implementation of the annual operational plan, which informs the drafting of the operational plan for the next year. The monitoring report compiled summaries of information about what measures and activities have been implemented under the specific objectives. If necessary, the Strategic Plan may be updated, amended or supplemented if significant changes have taken place to the legal framework and the internal acts governing the activities of the CACIAF.
While the existing monitoring procedure provides a useful mechanism for assessing how far commitments in the current strategic plan have been implemented, information gathered through this process focuses on how far commitments have been delivered and whether they have been delivered on time. These are important types of information to receive through a monitoring process, but there is scope for the ACC to develop the monitoring process to gain a more comprehensive picture about the factors contributing to or impeding implementation and any adjustments which may have needed to be made as a result. Such supporting types of information, which enable those monitoring implementation to assess not only how far a commitment has been delivered but the reasons for this level of implementation, are set out in Box 1.7.
Box 1.7. Ensuring a comprehensive monitoring process
Copy link to Box 1.7. Ensuring a comprehensive monitoring processThere are several types of monitoring, each with specific purposes:
1. Compliance monitoring: Focuses on compliance with established standards and procedures.
2. Activity monitoring: Focuses on quantity, quality, and timeliness of inputs and activities.
3. Financial monitoring: Tracks cost of implementation according to budget and time frame.
4. Organisational monitoring: Tracks sustainability, institutional development, and capacity building in the project and potentially directs attention to problem areas.
5. Context monitoring: Focuses on the project context and environment, especially critical elements that can affect the implementation and progress of the project.
6. Beneficiary monitoring: Focuses on the perceptions of beneficiaries of the intervention.
7. Results monitoring: Focuses on achievement of planned results, especially outcomes and impacts.
Source: (Johnsøn et al., 2011[16]).
The ACC could more effectively implement its Strategic Plan through establishing a strong evaluation methodology
Policy evaluation is a critical element of sound public governance. It can help ensure public sector effectiveness and improve the quality, responsiveness and efficiency of public policies and services. Evaluation is essential to draw lessons and to provide an understanding of what works, why, for whom, and under what circumstances. Done well, it can connect policies, policymakers and citizens, helping ensure that decisions are rooted in trustworthy evidence and delivering desired outcomes (OECD, 2020[2]).
Both the CACIAF’s 2019-2021 and 2022-2024 Strategic Plans set out a monitoring process, led by the working group on risk assessment, and suggest that if necessary the Plan could be changed and updated. However, they give no detail about what evaluation will be made in order to inform these judgements about what should be changed, how, and why. The ACC should establish such an evaluation process.
To do so, evaluation questions could be asked of information gathered through the monitoring process for the strategic plan. These questions should go beyond assessing the implementation status of a given activity, and look instead at issues such as the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, or sustainability of actions and strategic priorities. The evaluation of strategic plans should use a broad spectrum of sources of both quantitative and qualitative information to answer these questions, to draw informative lessons learnt, and to provide concrete recommendations to the ACC and implementing authorities. The ACC could consider the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, which set out a methodology for effective evaluation (OECD, 2022[17]) (Box 1.8).
Box 1.8. The OECD-DAC evaluation criteria
Copy link to Box 1.8. The OECD-DAC evaluation criteriaThe OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluation (EvalNet) has defined six evaluation criteria – relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability – and two principles for their use. These criteria provide a normative framework used to determine the merit or worth of an intervention (policy, strategy, programme, project or activity). They serve as the basis upon which evaluative judgements are made.
Two principles for using evaluation criteria
It is important that the definitions of the criteria are understood within a broader context, and read in conjunction with other principles and guidance on how to conduct evaluations in ways that will be useful and of high quality:
1. The criteria should be applied thoughtfully to support high quality, useful evaluation. They should be contextualised – understood in the context of the individual evaluation, the intervention being evaluated, and the stakeholders involved. The evaluation questions (what you are trying to find out) and what you intend to do with the answers, should inform how the criteria are specifically interpreted and analysed.
2. The use of the criteria depends on the purpose of the evaluation. The criteria should not be applied mechanistically. Instead, they should be covered according to the needs of the relevant stakeholders and the context of the evaluation. More or less time and resources may be devoted to the evaluative analysis for each criterion depending on the evaluation purpose. Data availability, resource constraints, timing, and methodological considerations may also influence how (and whether) a particular criterion is covered.
The six evaluation criteria
1. Relevance: Were the strategic plans designed to respond to country needs and priorities? To what extend are the objectives still valid? Do the stakeholders feel a sense of ownership?
2. Coherence: Was the strategic plan coherent with other organisational reforms and policies in relevant key areas? Were the different objectives of the strategic plans designed in a way to reinforce one another and create synergies and were the activities relevant to contribute to the achievement of the results and the objectives?
3. Effectiveness: To what degree have the strategic plans achieved the envisaged goals and implemented the activities (level of implementation)? What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
4. Efficiency: How well were the available resources used to achieve the objectives of the strategic plans? Were the objectives achieved on time?
5. Impact: What differences did the strategic plans make? What were the positive changes and could some unintended consequences be observed?
6. Sustainability: How did the strategic plans build on earlier efforts to prevent and combat corruption and how likely are the implemented changes to last over time?
Source: (OECD, 2021[18])
The ACC could improve implementation of its Strategic Plan by setting clearer indicators in its operational plans
Even a strong monitoring process and thoughtful execution of the evaluation is unlikely to produce useful findings if it does not incorporate indicators which are finely attuned to reality. Indicator development requires a deep understanding of corruption and how individuals and institutions set out to fight it. An indicator can be defined as a measure tracked systematically over time that indicates positive, negative, or no change with respect to progress towards a stated target (Johnson, 2011).
The implementation of the 2022-2024 Strategic Plan was supported by an annual operational plan. These operational plans reiterated the priorities and activities listed in the 2022-2024 Strategic Plan, along with indicators of success and expected results, the calendar year to fulfil the objective, the source of funding, and the units or persons responsible for carrying out each task. However, the indicators of success frequently simply reiterate the specified activity or measure. For example, activity 1.1.2. in the 2022 Operational Plan was ‘identifying and analysing corruption risk areas’. The corresponding indicator of success was the ‘identification of corruption risk zones in the Republic of Bulgaria’. Likewise, one of the activities under commitment 1.1.3. was to ‘develop and propose measures to prevent and counter corruption’, while the corresponding indicator of success was ‘developing concrete anti-corruption measures’. These indicators give little sense of what a good identification of corruption risks zones might look like and what steps might be taken to achieve it, or what a concrete anti-corruption measure would be or how it might be developed.
Indicators which support monitoring and evaluation, and ultimately implementation, are normally derived from the outputs, outcomes and impact of a given activity or priority area, defined in advance as desired results. It is therefore important to establish those clearly and to ensure that a clear logic or theory of change is established. A basic distinction can be made between indicators that measure aspects of the successful implementation of integrity policies, and indicators that measure the extent to which the desired outcome, or the expected change, is ultimately realised.
There are no universal principles to follow when defining indicators, as they depend on the purpose they serve and the nature of the policy or programme they seek to monitor. However, one method which can support effective implementation, and which the ACC could consider using, is the CREAM approach (Box 1.9).
Box 1.9. The CREAM approach for developing indicators
Copy link to Box 1.9. The CREAM approach for developing indicatorsThe “CREAM” of selecting good performance indicators is essentially a set of criteria to aid in developing indicators for a specific project, programme, or policy (Schiavo-Campo 1999, p. 85). Performance indicators should be clear, relevant, economic, adequate, and monitorable. CREAM amounts to an insurance policy, because the more precise and coherent the indicators, the better focused the measurement strategies will be.
Clear: Precise and unambiguous
Relevant: Appropriate to the subject at hand
Economic: Available at a reasonable cost
Adequate: Provide a sufficient basis to assess performance
Monitorable: Amenable to independent validation
If any one of these five criteria are not met, formal performance indicators will suffer and be less useful. Performance indicators should be as clear, direct, and unambiguous as possible. Indicators may be qualitative or quantitative.
Source: (Zall Kusek and Rist, 2004[19]).
Indicators can be quantitative or qualitative, but they should always be specific, measurable, and realistic. No outcome or impact should be measured by only one indicator. Instead, managers or policymakers should examine the combined evidence from a group of indicators to evaluate whether the intervention is having positive effects. Several data sources should be used to measure impact and keep track of progress on selected indicators. Commonly used methods include public opinion surveys, public sector diagnostics, private sector surveys, combined surveys, cross-country surveys, pro-poor and gender-sensitive surveys, and sectoral surveys (Table 1.4). Wherever possible, indicators should enable comparability over time. This allows for benchmarking that can assess the effectiveness of different interventions in the strategy and in other parts of the integrity system. In an organisational context, such benchmarks can be established using a before-and-after approach, if indicators are established and data collected well in advance of implementing the strategy.
Table 1.4. Examples of sources applied by anti-corruption authorities to verify the implementation of strategic indicators
Copy link to Table 1.4. Examples of sources applied by anti-corruption authorities to verify the implementation of strategic indicators|
Function |
Desired outcome |
Possible indicators |
Sources of verification |
Sources of verification applied by anti-corruption authorities |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Prevention |
Promoting a strong public service ethos |
Percentage of public servants who are aware of ethical dilemmas and guidelines regarding corruption |
|
Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania:
United States Office of Government Ethics:
|
|
Percentage / number of full investigations of significant breaches of procedures or ethics of senior civil servants being pursued fully and fairly and leading to transparent outcomes, and if necessary, to enforcement / punishment in institutions targeted by the anti-corruption authority |
|
|||
|
Promoting trust in public service |
Percentage of public service users who have trust in the institutions |
|
Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau of Latvia:
|
|
|
General management |
Communicating successes and interact with society |
Number of visits / downloads / length of stay / interactions on the authority’s website |
|
United States Office of Government Ethics:
|
|
Number of information meetings and events held by the authority |
|
|||
|
The organisation is service-minded and responsive |
Percentage of responses to a corruption report within predefined number of hours |
|
Serious Fraud Office of New Zealand:
|
|
|
Percentage of responses to requests for corruption prevention advice within predefined number of working days |
|
Moving forward, the ACC could build upon its previous operational plans to establish a more detailed roadmap, incorporating stronger indicators, to achieve the priorities in the Strategic Plan. To identify measurable and relevant indicators, and improve the perceived credibility of the evaluation process, the ACC could conduct stakeholder consultation with its staff, government agencies, internal and external experts, and civil society. The ACC could then apply the principles set out above to develop more detailed output, outcome and impact indicators. An example of more detailed indicators which the ACC could introduce is at (Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2. The implementation process of strategic activities
Copy link to Figure 1.2. The implementation process of strategic activitiesActivity 2.1.3. Improving recruitment and selection systems
1.3. The ACC’s operational set-up
Copy link to 1.3. The ACC’s operational set-up1.3.1. Following the division of the CACIAF’s responsibilities, the ACC must retain adequate funding to enable effective implementation of its strategic objectives
Within the CACIAF’s strategic framework, financial resources were allocated to the corresponding tasks and responsibilities, which relied on two types of sources: a) the CACIAF’s “programme budget”,;and b) external project funding. The CACIAF set out in consultations that the mid-term budget estimates were drawn up for three-year-long periods based on the “Internal rules on the organisation of the budget process at Commission for Anti-Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture”. The budget estimates were developed in accordance with instructions from the Ministry of Finance and the decision of the Council of Ministers. With the budget estimates the CACIAF’s chair established indicative values for a maximum amount of the new obligations for costs. For each fiscal year capital and operational costs were approved within the framework of the approved expenditure ceilings. The target values of the indicators for implementation of the planned goals corresponded to the planned resources for the respective period, including the account of the different sources of financing.
The Anti-Corruption Law of 2023 declares that the ACC is a legal entity supported by the state budget. Its budget is drawn up, executed, and reported in accordance with the Law on Public Finance (Art. 7(3), Act No. 84 of 2023). The Chairman of the ACC is the primary budget administrator (Art. 8(6), Act No. 84 of 2023). The ACC has operational flexibility and space to make decisions concerning daily spending and administrative issues. However, while the budgetary autonomy provided by the law establishes safeguards for the ACC from restrictions on its activities, most of the CACIAF’s financial resources were designated to its asset recovery activities, which have now become the mandate of the CCIAP. The ACC should therefore be mindful of retaining adequate funding to be able to discharge its responsibilities and implement its strategic priorities.
Not retaining adequate funding carries several risks. Firstly, taking a systems perspective implies that reducing the resources of one part of the system below a sufficient level for effective operations will not only hamper that particular function’s ability to achieve its mandate, but will also likely have spillover effects across the entire system, affecting the overall achievement of the desired goals. For example, reducing funding for the ACC’s preventative functions could lead to an increase in petty corruption, which in turn could reduce the effectiveness and reliability of front-line public services. And secondly, all actors in integrity systems need adequate resources to ensure effective co-operation, including partnering with others, attending committee meetings and contributing to common databases. When resources are constrained, there tends to be a bias towards concentrating them on achieving vertical operational delivery rather than horizontal collaborative working. This can reinforce silos and lead to fragmentation or gaps in the integrity system, the risks of which have been discussed earlier in this report (OECD, 2020[2]).