Open Government Review of Australia

2. A thriving civic space to strengthen Australia’s culture of civic engagement

Abstract

This chapter examines civic space in Australia as a foundational condition for meaningful civic engagement, trust in public institutions and social cohesion. It analyses the legal, institutional and societal dimensions that enable individuals and civil society to engage in public life, while highlighting emerging challenges in a changing social and digital context. Building on Australia’s strong democratic foundations, the chapter identifies four priority areas for strengthening civic space: fostering an enabling environment for civil society organisations (CSOs), protecting freedom of peaceful assembly, countering hate offline and online and strengthening civic education. Together, these areas provide a framework for reinforcing the resilience and quality of civic engagement in Australia.

2.1. Civic space priorities in Australia

Australia benefits from strong civic space foundations, underpinned by well-established democratic institutions, robust legal protections, and a long-standing commitment to enabling active engagement in public life. Reflecting these strengths, Australia consistently ranks highly across a range of international indices assessing democratic governance, the rule of law, and civic space (Box 2.1). Sustaining these standards, even in countries like Australia with a high level of commitment to civic space requires continuous effort, as trends of democratic backsliding and pressures on civic freedoms are increasing in many contexts (OECD, 2024[1]). As outlined in Chapter 1, patterns of civic engagement are changing across the globe, with the digital transformation being one of the most significant drivers. Within this broader context, all OECD Members face challenges in protecting civic space, highlighting the need for ongoing attention to this area in law and in practice.

Box 2.1. Australia’s standing in the world: A snapshot of global rankings related to civic space

• World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (2025): Ranked 11^th out of 143 countries.

• V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (2025): Ranked 9^th out of 179 countries.

• EIU Democracy Index (2024): Ranked 11^th out of 167 countries (Status: Full Democracy).

• Freedom House Freedom in the World (2025): Score of 94/100 (Status: Free).

• Article 19 Global Expression Report (2024): Ranked 25^th out of 161 countries (Status: Open).

• United Nations E-Participation Index (2024): Ranked 8^th out of 193 Member States.

Source: (Article 19, 2024[2]; CIVICUS, 2025[3]; EIU, 2025[4]; Freedom House, 2025[5]; UN, 2024[6]; V-Dem Institute, 2025[7]; WJP, 2025[8]).

The scope of this review has been tailored to align with the Australian government’s priorities and extensive consultations with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. While not intended to fully capture the complexity Australia’s civic space today, this chapter seeks to support the country in prioritising efforts where they are most needed by considering current domestic trends and global developments already affecting Australia, as well as emerging risks and patterns observed in other similarly advanced democracies. This comparative and forward-looking approach seeks to help Australia identify opportunities to innovate and proactively address challenges that are shared across OECD countries. The following key issues emerged as central to making the protection of civic space more future-proof, stress-resilient and adaptive to rapidly evolving social, technological and policy environments:

• fostering the enabling environment for civil society organisations (CSOs), comprising a supportive legal, policy and financial context

• protecting freedom of peaceful assembly

• countering hate as a potential obstacle to equal participation in public life

• strengthening civic education.

Before turning to the assessment of the four focus areas, the chapter sets out the overall policy, legal and institutional framework for civic space in Australia.

2.2. An overview of Australia’s key policies, legal frameworks and institutional mechanisms governing civic space

Key findings and recommendations

Australia has a well-established policy and legal framework for protecting civic space through international commitments, constitutional principles, common law and specific federal and state legislation, underpinned by robust institutional settings. While fundamental rights and freedoms are generally well protected in practice, opportunities exist to streamline frameworks and enhance the effectiveness of public institutions’ work on protecting and promoting civic space.

Policy recommendations

To strengthen the coherence, visibility and practical application of civic freedoms, including through concrete legislative, policy or institutional measures, the Australian Government could consider to:

• Introduce a federal human rights act to further strengthen accountability in lawmaking and public decision making, and enhance public awareness of rights and access to remedies.

• Continuously ensure sustainable resourcing of oversight bodies in light of increasing demand.

• Improve data collection and sharing arrangements, to support evidence-based policymaking and more effective protection of civic space.

Australia’s commitment to and strategic vision for civic space is anchored in several interlinked policy agendas. The country’s civic space legal, policy and institutional framework is made up of a series of international commitments, legal instruments, and institutional actors which operate to protect civic freedoms and enable civic engagement across Australia’s jurisdictions. Unique among liberal democracies and the OECD Membership, including other common law countries, Australia does not have a national act or charter of rights that explicitly protects and defines individual rights (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2023[9]). Instead, human rights in Australia are currently recognised and protected through a range of laws at the federal, state and territory levels, the Australian Constitution and the common law.

2.2.1. The legal framework for the protection of civic freedoms

The Australian Government is bound by a series of legal instruments that protect civic freedoms which range from international human rights treaties to state and territory level legislation. At the international level, Australia is party to the seven key international human rights treaties, signing and ratifying agreements such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as signing a number of optional protocols on their treaties (Law Council of Australia, 2017[10]). Australia has also endorsed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2009.

In national law, rights and freedoms are generally protected by common law principles, such as the principle of legality which maintains that legislation should not infringe on fundamental rights and freedoms unless the legislation expresses a clear intention to do so and the infringement is reasonable (Australian Government, n.d.[11]). Some rights are implied in the Constitution, notably the freedom of political communication, which places a limit on the making of Commonwealth, state and territory laws, meaning they can be ruled invalid by a court if found to impermissibly burden political communication. However, it is not absolute and is not infringed by laws that are reasonably appropriate and adapted to advancing a legitimate purpose, such as protecting public health or safety. Other rights and freedoms are also explicitly protected by the Constitution and a series of laws that each have their own scope. These focus primarily on protecting people from discrimination and breaches of certain human rights, including various discrimination acts, the Privacy Act, the Commonwealth Electoral Act and others (Commonwealth of Australia, n.d.[12]). Different statutory provisions exist at the state and territory level as well (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024[13]). In addition to legislation that explicitly protects particular rights, the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 articulates the role and responsibilities of the Australian Human Rights Commission and gives effect to Australia’s obligations under a suite of international conventions (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2021[14]).

The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 further requires all new bills and disallowable legislative instruments to be accompanied by a statement that assesses the compatibility of the legislation with the rights and freedoms recognised in the seven core international human rights treaties that Australia has ratified (Australian Government, n.d.[11]). The act established the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJHCR), whose mandate it is to scrutinise proposed legislation for compatibility with Australia’s obligations under international human rights law.

At the state and territory level, three out of eight jurisdictions – the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), Victoria and Queensland – have enacted comprehensive human rights legislation.1 These laws protect various civil and political rights, including the right to freedom of expression, association and assembly, drawing from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Drawing from the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR), they also contain some economic and social rights, as well as cultural rights, including specific protections for the cultural rights of First Nations people. The Acts require their respective governments, including courts, the legislature, and public authorities, to act consistently with the human rights in the legislation. The acts also require statements of comparability for new legislation, establish a role of the courts, and describe the roles and responsibilities of relevant oversight bodies. Each of the acts also provide a ‘reasonable limits’ test which sets out when and to what extent the protected rights can be limited.

In the other Australian jurisdictions, there have been longstanding debates about the introduction of human rights acts, including at the federal level. Most recently, the New South Wales (NSW) Parliament launched a public inquiry into whether the state should also enact a NSW Human Rights Act, following the introduction of a bill on the matter in October 2025 (Human Rights Law Centre, 2026[15]). At the federal level, there have been previous attempts to introduce a federal human rights act, including following a 2009 national human rights consultation which ultimately led to the adoption of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.

Debate continues regarding the merit of adopting such an act. Some commentators consider that existing protection provided by common law principles already provide an effective framework for safeguarding rights and freedoms, while others continue to advocate for the introduction of federal human rights act (Rule of Law Education Centre, 2024[16]). In 2023, the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) formally recommended the adoption of a human rights act for the country. The recommendation, alongside seven others, issued from a multi-year policy project on identifying avenues to strengthen civic space (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2023[9]). In 2024, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR), answering a request from the Attorney-General to review the scope and effectiveness of Australia’s human rights framework, also recommended that the government introduce legislation to establish a human rights act (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2024[17]).

While fundamental rights and freedoms are well protected in practice, Australia could consider options to strengthen the coherence, visibility and practical application of civic freedoms, including through legislative, policy or institutional measures. One such option to further strengthen and future-proof the protection and promotion of human rights in Australia, could include the introduction of a human rights act at federal level, as previously recommended by the AHRC and PJCHR. If carried out in accordance with the recommendations issued by these expert bodies, this could lead to a number of benefits. It could increase the accountability of lawmakers and governments, ensuring the impact on human rights is adequately considered in decision making. The process of introducing such an act would provide Australia with an opportunity to develop comprehensive guidance on human rights-compliant decision making, by setting out criteria for the balancing of rights, so that laws, policies and programmes have the least restrictive impact on people’s human rights. This could be particularly beneficial in the context of considering laws which impact freedom of peaceful assembly (see further Section 0) and freedom of expression (see further Section 2.5). Additionally, a federal human rights act could increase the public’s understanding and awareness of human rights in Australia, including regarding access to remedy.

2.2.2. The institutional landscape of civic space protection

Australia’s institutional framework underpinning the protection of civic space is made up of a series of actors across all branches of government. Within the federal executive, the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) is one of the main institutions responsible for the legal and policy framework underpinning the protection of civic space in Australia. Its Human Rights Branch supports the domestic implementation of Australia’s international human rights obligations, including on the protection of civic freedoms. The department also administers anti-discrimination statutes, freedom of information, privacy law policies and other relevant laws. In its role the AGD also provides policy advice on human rights matters to the government and represents Australia in relevant international processes. The Standing Council of Attorneys-General (SCAG), comprising Attorneys-General from the federal government and all states and territories, supports co-ordination across jurisdictions, including on rights-related safeguards (Attorney-General's Department, n.d.[18]).

The Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) is the accredited national human rights institution (NHRI) for Australia. As an independent statutory authority, it has a wide range of responsibilities including to enforce anti-discrimination legislation, investigate and conciliate complaints of discrimination or breaches of human rights, and hold public inquiries into human rights issues of national importance (Australian Human Rights Commission, n.d.[19]). The AHRC also fulfils an important role of communicating, raising awareness and educating the public on human rights in Australia (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2025[20]; Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024[13]). It also offers trainings to public officials and the broader public on human rights and anti-racism and anti-discrimination.

The AHRC also advises the government on law and policy and regularly makes submissions to parliamentary inquiries, law reform processes, and government consultations. In practice, implementation of the AHRC’s advice and guidance varies. In some areas, for instance regarding sexual harassment, its recommendations have been widely adopted (Attorney-General's Department, n.d.[21]), while on other issues, such as the introduction of a federal human rights act and a national anti-racism framework (see further Section 2.5), definitive government responses have not yet been issued (de Kretser, 2026[22]).

In addition to the AHRC, there are a set of independent oversight bodies, regulators and other agencies that also work to promote civic space in specific areas, including the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), the Commonwealth Ombudsman, eSafety Commissioner, and independent regulators of various CSOs, some of which are discussed in more detail below. At the state and territory level, these roles and responsibilities are fulfilled by similarly designed actors.

These independent oversight mechanisms are vital to protecting civic space, and sufficient funding is essential to ensure their effective functioning. In Australia, as in most OECD Members, these institutions are primarily funded through government budget, typically with a dedicated budget line to safeguard a degree of financial independence (OECD, 2022[23]). However, several federal-level oversight bodies reported in OECD interviews that funding remains a key constraint in fulfilling their mandates, particularly against a backdrop of increased demand of their services. This finding is reinforced by survey responses collected for the purposes of this review, where limited resources and capacity were most frequently cited as challenges by entities with a civic space mandate, followed by insufficient data and monitoring.

The Australian Government has recognised these challenges and taken steps to provide additional funding where demand has increased. For instance, the AHRC recently received an additional AUD 49.8 million over four years, alongside annual appropriations from government to continue its ongoing work as Australia’s NHRI and further develop its work on anti-racism and prevention of workplace sexual harassment (UPR, 2021[24]). Additional resources have also been allocated to the OAIC, reflecting increased demand for information access and expanded responsibilities related to privacy and new regulatory areas (OAIC, 2024[25]). At the same time, consulted stakeholders have indicated that core annual appropriations may be under pressure, given the overall context of fiscal constraints. While public finances face increasing challenges across the OECD Membership, including Australia (OECD, 2026[26]), the increased demand on oversight bodies and their crucial role in ensuring accountability and strengthening trust, underscores the importance of providing them with sustainable resources.

Moving forward, Australia could also consider further strengthening data collection and sharing arrangements across government, including through adequate resourcing of data collection, while ensuring compliance with data protection and privacy frameworks as well as community ownership and stewardship of First Nations data, in alignment with Indigenous Data Sovereignty, Indigenous Data Governance and the CARE Principles for Indigenous Data Governance. Improved access to robust and disaggregated data, applying nationally consistent metrics and an intersectional and longitudinal approach, would be important for oversight and complaints bodies with a civic space mandate. It would also support these institutions in enhancing the accessibility and effectiveness of redress mechanisms, disaggregated data would help to shed light on clients availing of legal services and help to identify emerging needs and gaps in services and aid. Across the OECD, 53% of countries collect some form of disaggregated data, for example by type of complaint or responsible institution (OECD, 2022[23]). Such data can provide valuable insights into patterns of discrimination and structural inequalities, forming a basis for more evidence-based policymaking. When collected systematically, disaggregated data also allows governments to monitor trends over time and assess progress in advancing equality and the protection of rights.

2.3. Fostering an enabling environment for civil society

Key findings and recommendations

Australia has a robust and vibrant civil society and the enabling environment for CSOs is generally strong. The Government has taken important steps to reduce the administrative burden on CSOs. However, for certain aspects of the regulatory environment, coherence across jurisdictions and regulators could be further improved to reduce complexity and compliance costs for both the Government and CSOs.

Australian CSOs also benefit from substantial government support, but parts of the sector, particularly grassroots and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander CSOs, face challenges accessing funding due to complex processes and the predominance of short-term, project-based funding. Australia could consider policy measures to enhance direct and indirect support to the sector, with a view to enhancing the sustainability and organisational capacity of CSOs.

While Australia has also developed strong data infrastructure for the charity sector, distinct gaps remain in the availability, consistency and use of data on the broader CSO sector, limiting evidence-based policymaking and strategic support.

Policy recommendations

To further strengthen the enabling environment for Australian CSOs, the Australian Government could consider to:

• Further harmonise and modernise CSO regulatory frameworks across federal, state and territory levels, including through simplification measures, stronger regulator co-ordination and enhanced data-sharing systems.

• Expand access to flexible, core and multi-year funding, and undertake comprehensive reform of the deductible gift recipient (DGR) system to make indirect support more transparent and accessible, particularly for smaller and public-interest organisations.

• Further invest in the collection, integration and public reporting of disaggregated and longitudinal data on CSOs, public funding and outcomes through a more comprehensive national data system that supports monitoring, evaluation and strategic policymaking.

Civil society encompasses a broad range of actors, including activists, human rights defenders, grassroots or community-based organisations, advocacy groups, philanthropy and social movements. Civil society organisations (CSOs) are a crucial part of this ecosystem. They play an important role in strengthening democracies by representing the interests of various communities, offering specialised policy knowledge, monitoring government performance, engaging in public discourse, and delivering key services. Through these activities, they aim to enhance the accountability of public institutions vis-à-vis citizens and promote the representation of multiple viewpoints in policymaking. They can also play a key role in fostering social cohesion, as forming, participating in or volunteering with CSOs can strengthen a sense of belonging, build civic capital and reinforce community ties. By organising community events, protests or educational activities, CSOs can also bring together different parts of society and provide spaces for dialogue.

Given their expertise and ties to communities, CSOs can also be partners of government. In this function as intermediaries between governments and individual citizens, CSOs can contribute to building and maintaining trust in public institutions and strengthening the government-citizen interface. Creating tangible opportunities for co-operation with civil society can therefore help governments better align policies, laws and services with the needs and expectations of society, as further discussed in Chapter 3.

The environment in which CSOs operate impacts their ability to perform these roles freely and autonomously. Governments play a key role in fostering the enabling environment for CSOs, comprising a supportive legal, policy and financial context (OECD, 2024[27]). By recognising, enabling and supporting CSOs both as partners and as independent actors, governments can promote and facilitate freedom of association in practice (OECD, 2022[23]).

Australia has a vibrant and multifaceted civil society sector (Department of Social Services, 2025[28]; Strengthening Democracy Taskforce, 2024[29]) and the enabling environment for these organisations is generally strong. The Australian Government is committed to maintaining, protecting and enhancing public trust in the CSO sector, supporting it and promoting the reduction of unnecessary regulatory obligations (ACNC, 2020[30]), and Australian governments at different levels demonstrate a range of good practices in this context. However, even in an overall conducive environment, certain distinct challenges that can affect CSOs’ ability to participate in public life exist. Based on analysis of these select challenges, this section focuses on opportunities Australia could consider, including:

• Enhancing the legal and administrative frameworks governing the operating environment for CSOs,

• Effectively supporting a sustainable and innovative civil society sector, through direct and indirect government support and,

• Expanding the evidence base for more strategic support to the civil society sector

2.3.1. Enhancing the legal and administrative frameworks governing the operating environment for CSOs

An enabling legal and administrative environment is essential to adequately protect freedom of association and significantly influences CSOs’ capacity to realise their full potential and make meaningful societal contributions (OECD, 2022[23]). In Australia, there are several legal structures available for not-for-profit (NFP) CSOs, which are regulated by different laws and oversight entities operating at different levels of government. At the federal level, this includes the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC), the Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations (ORIC) and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The most common forms of CSOs include incorporated and unincorporated associations, registered Australian bodies, public companies limited by guarantee, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Community Controlled Organisations (ACCOs), charitable trusts and charities.

Many Australian CSOs, depending on their structure and geographical scope of their activities, have more than one regulator. For instance, some CSOs might be regulated by the ASIC, ORIC, or relevant state bodies for organisations in addition to the ACNC. Moreover, all registered CSOs must obtain their Australian Business Number (ABN) from the ATO. Recent government-commissioned expert reports have indicated that they consider the current regulatory frameworks are complex and fragmented, often resulting in inconsistent or conflicting laws, policies, and industry standards and exposing CSOs to different regulatory regimes. These reports point out that the system produces confusing compliance requirements, the navigation of which consumes scarce resources. This in turn can constrain civic engagement, erode public confidence in CSOs and produce sector-wide inefficiencies (Blueprint Expert Reference Group, 2024[31]; Productivity Commission, 2024[32]). This has been confirmed by CSOs consulted for the purposes of this review, especially small and community-based organisations, according to whom certain administrative procedures between different entities and levels of government could be further streamlined to ease the operational burden on them.

In response to this, the Australian Government has put in place structures to streamline some reporting obligations, such as memoranda of understanding or data-sharing mechanisms among relevant regulators (ACNC, n.d.[33]; ASIC, n.d.[34]; Productivity Commission, 2024[32]). For instance, the ACNC has developed and administers a ‘Report once, use often’ framework using the ACNC Charity Passport. The framework enables government agencies to directly access ACNC charity data, comprising registration information, annual reporting and any changes to charities’ status, through a formal information sharing process via a file transfer protocol. This reduces the administrative burden on CSOs and government, by enabling streamlined data-sharing. The ACNC also works with state and territory governments to reduce unnecessary and duplicative administrative requirements and align regulatory and reporting obligations (ACNC, 2020[30]). Moreover, at federal level, several key services for CSOs are available online, including registration, reporting mechanisms, tax declaration, and application for grants. The Australian Government also regularly publishes a range of guidance materials to support CSOs in fulfilling their regulatory obligations (ACNC, n.d.[35]; ASIC, n.d.[34]).

Moreover, the Government has introduced differentiated accounting requirements for charities, in order to specifically support small and grassroots organisations. The system distinguishes between small (annual revenue of up to AUD 500 000), medium (annual revenue of up to AUD 3 000 000) and large charities (annual revenue above AUD 3 000 000). Small charities are only obliged to file an annual information statement with basic operational details, unlike medium and large charities which have additional reporting obligations. Small charities are also under no obligation to have an external audit for their annual information statements (CPA Australia, 2022[36]). This good practice, seen as emerging in a few other OECD countries, recognises that small CSOs frequently have fewer resources and less capacity and ensures that they are nonetheless able to compile and submit high quality reports without significant disruption to their operations (OECD, 2024[37]).

While these efforts showcase Australia’s commitment to streamlining and modernising processes, and reducing administrative burdens, especially for small CSOs, there are opportunities for the country to further enhance coherence and efficiency. The Government could for example further simplify and harmonise legislation and regulations governing CSOs’ registration and other administrative procedures. Such efforts could also help address unduly costs on the side of governments, and facilitate more effective oversight by responsible regulators. This could be implemented through a joint effort between federal and state and territory governments, as for instance seen in the milestone 2023 reform regulating fundraising by CSOs, where federal, state and territory treasurers agreed to nationally consistent fundraising principles aimed at reducing regulatory complexity and administrative burdens for charities and NFP organisations operating across jurisdictions (The Treasury, 2023[38]).

In addition, Australia could benefit from further modernising certain aspects of the institutional settings underpinning the legal and regulatory framework for CSOs in Australia. While some co-operation and data-sharing arrangements exist, consulted government officials report that these currently rely on archaic systems, such as manual file transfer protocols. There is an opportunity for Australia to introduce more efficient digital solutions for automated data exchange across regulators and other relevant government entities. Australia is already advancing efforts in this area through the Data and Digital Government Strategy, which seeks to deliver simple, secure and connected public services by strengthening partnerships, improving data sharing and streamlining service delivery (Commonwealth of Australia, 2023[39]). Further improving co-ordination and data-sharing arrangements between regulators, grant providing entities and other relevant government bodies regularly interacting with CSOs would further strengthen the enabling environment for CSOs while reducing administrative demands on governments.

Where governance settings allow for it, OECD guidance suggests that governments can consider reducing the number of agencies involved in administrative processes and in the long-term moving towards a single registration platform (OECD, 2024[37]; OECD, 2022[23]). Recognising the constraints inherent to the federal system, Australia could alternatively consider strengthening cross-government co-ordination, for instance through the establishment of a National Charity Regulators Forum to improve co-ordination and information sharing among regulators, as recommended by the Productivity Commission (Productivity Commission, 2024[32]). Consulted governmental stakeholders dealing with CSO registration and regulation have supported such an approach, highlighting that a consolidated public register for Australian CSOs could help foster greater trust in the sector and improve policy development, by making important data accessible for different agencies.

2.3.2. Effectively supporting a sustainable and innovative civil society sector

In addition to sound legal and regulatory frameworks, strategic and evidence-based support in practice is a key pillar of an enabling environment for CSOs and their engagement in public life. Governments can strengthen civil society through a range of measures, including direct public funding as well as indirect support through tax exemptions and benefits. Designing predictable, transparent and accessible financing mechanisms can allow governments to support the sector, while ensuring its independence from government.

Enhancing direct government support where it is needed

In Australia, CSOs can access government funding from a range of sources across all levels of government, reflecting a wide range of funding modalities. In 2021, the Australian, state, territory and local governments provided AUD 97 billion in direct funding to charities alone, through grants and contracts, making up around 50% of revenue for charities on average (Productivity Commission, 2024[32]). At the Commonwealth level, funding for CSOs typically includes short-term project grants for specific initiatives, ongoing programme grants to support service delivery, infrastructure grants for facilities and community assets, and operational or block funding for large-scale and long-term services such as aged care or disability support. Most federal grants are governed by the Commonwealth Grant Rules and Principles 2024, which establish requirements for transparent, competitive and accountable allocation processes. GrantConnect serves as the central platform through which funding opportunities and outcomes are published, providing CSOs with access to both one-off and recurring funding streams (Australian Government, n.d.[40]).

Australian civil society can therefore benefit from wide-ranging and generous government support. However, some CSOs in Australia report practical challenges in accessing this government support. Consulted stakeholders note that funding systems can be fragmented across and between levels of government, applying different procedures and eligibility criteria. This is particularly pertinent at the local level, which is highly decentralised. Despite the existence of standardised principles and frameworks at the federal level, application processes continue to vary across grant making agencies, requiring CSOs to familiarise themselves with multiple systems and administrative requirements. For smaller organisations with limited administrative capacity, navigating these varying requirements can be resource-intensive and burdensome. Smaller and grassroots organisations consulted for this review perceive federal funding as effectively inaccessible, due to this complexity.

Additional challenges relate to the type of government funding available and the process of allocating funds for CSO grants. Consulted stakeholders report limited access to core, flexible and long-term funding, with government support often concentrated on short-term project-based grants. At the federal level, many funding cycles operate on three-year terms, while local-level funding is often allocated annually through relatively small grants, limiting CSOs’ ability to plan strategically and invest in long-term organisational capacity. Grassroots and community CSOs reported that these arrangements constrain relationship-building, staff retention and institutional learning. This concern is reflected in feedback from consulted governmental stakeholders, who noted that CSOs at community level, face skills and capacity gaps limiting effective engagement with government processes. Survey responses further indicate that insufficient financial resources are the most commonly identified structural challenge for respondent CSOs, half of which operate primarily at the local level. Funding constraints were also identified as a key barrier to CSOs’ and their constituencies’ effective participation in decision-making processes.

Box 2.2. Specific challenges faced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander CSOs

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander CSOs report a number of specific challenges, which have distinct implications given their important role in advancing community outcomes.

Funding and sustainability

Consulted stakeholders highlighted that funding constraints can create competition for limited resources, both between service delivery and advocacy organisations, and between larger and smaller Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander CSOs. Advocacy-focused CSOs are often reliant on philanthropy rather than government support. However, some CSOs report low levels of trust in philanthropic actors and concerns that certain philanthropic priorities or funding conditions may not always align with community needs and priorities. The Productivity Commission has suggested that strengthening the capacity of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander CSOs to engage with philanthropic networks on their own terms could contribute to a more sustainable funding environment, thereby supporting broader commitments under the National Agreement on Closing the Gap (Productivity Commission, 2024[32]).

Representation and participation

ACCOs and peak organisations act as key democratic institutions and play an important role in representing First Nations interests, engaging with governments, and enabling community governance and self-determination. However, some stakeholders noted that these structures do not always reflect the full range of views and priorities across communities – especially as major representative structures are often closely linked to service delivery. Stakeholders therefore emphasised the importance of supporting independent advocacy organisations and community-led structures to contribute to policy development. Skills and capacity gaps, for instance related to navigating administrative requirements, accessing government funding and engaging with governments, currently lead to reliance on a small number of community leaders. In addition, in regional and remote areas infrastructure challenges, such as lack of access to the Internet and physical spaces such as offices and community centres further limits communities’ civic participation. Strengthening organisational capacity across Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander civil society could therefore enable broader representation in policymaking.

Source: (Blueprint Expert Reference Group, 2024[31]; Centre for Social Impact/Jumbunna Institute for Indigenous Education and Research, 2023[41]); (Centre for Social Impact/Jumbunna Institute for Indigenous Education and Research, 2023[41])

Many of these challenges reported by CSOs are not unique to Australia. Across the OECD, access to government funding remains a key challenge for CSOs, with pressures intensifying in the context of recent economic and geopolitical developments and broader fiscal constraints. In many countries, governments are increasingly prioritising competing spending areas, which can limit available resources for civil society (OECD, 2022[23]). At the same time, there are examples both from across the OECD Membership, as well as within Australia, of how governments are working towards further strengthening their support for the CSO sector (OECD, 2024[27]). Building on successful international and domestic examples, Australia could consider a range of measures to further strengthen its already substantial support for civil society.

First, the Australian Government could continue investing in harmonising regulations, industry standards and administrative procedures that affect CSOs’ access to public funding across different levels of government (Blueprint Expert Reference Group, 2024[31]). In this context, OECD guidance suggests that strengthening horizontal, vertical and cross-sectoral co-operation within the public administration can help improve coherence in funding standards and procedures, thereby reducing administrative burdens and uncertainty for applicants (OECD, 2024[27]). More consistent approaches across Australian Government entities could therefore also create greater predictability for CSOs seeking support from different government bodies or levels of government. Australia already has examples of co-ordination mechanisms in this area, including the IDC established in the context of the Community Sector Grants Engagement Framework (see Box 2.5). Similar approaches could be expanded or replicated across entities funding other parts of the CSO sector.

Regarding the types of government funding provided to civil society, Australia could also consider increasing the availability of core and longer-term funding to strengthen the institutional capacity, sustainability and independence of organisations. A balanced combination of targeted project funding, core support and capacity-building initiatives can enable flexibility, creativity and innovation and foster the overall sustainability and long-term development of the CSO sector. While short- and medium-term project funding remains important, long-term and core funding can help organisations build financial stability, retain and develop staff, invest in organisational capacity and respond more flexibly to evolving community needs and priorities. It can also reduce the administrative burden associated with repeatedly applying for short funding cycles (OSCE/ODIHR/Venice Commission, 2014[42]; OECD, 2022[23]; OECD, 2024[37]).

While short-term project-based funding continues to be the most common approach across the OECD Membership, some OECD countries, including Finland, Sweden, Spain and Estonia, have introduced multi-year funding models that provide greater flexibility and support organisational sustainability. Examples include government funding for operational and administrative costs, participation in policymaking and institutional capacity-building (OECD, 2022[23]). Australia also provides several examples of innovative approaches to supporting CSOs at both federal and state and territory level. For example, Community Hubs Australia – an initiative aimed at facilitating participation and community connections across the population – operates through a joint funding model where philanthropic actors support administrative and operational costs, while the Department of Home Affairs and certain state governments provide project-based funding for programme delivery. At the state level, Victoria established the Multicultural Communities Capacity Building Fund, designed to strengthen the organisational capacity and long-term sustainability of multicultural organisations (see Box 2.3).

Box 2.3. Victoria’s Multicultural Communities Capacity Building Fund

In July 2025, the Victorian Government released the final report of the Victoria Multicultural Review to assess and improve the state's multicultural policies, programmes and engagement structures. To implement the Review's recommendations and empower the community sector, the government announced strong, immediate actions, including a new capacity-building fund of AUD 5 Million. This targeted funding aims to strengthen the leadership, resilience and operational capacity of multicultural organisations, equipping them to be stable partners in driving social cohesion. To support organisations of different sizes and capacities, the Multicultural Capacity Building Program follows a tiered model and is structured into three distinct funding streams:

• The Small Stream provides up to AUD 10 000 for emerging and established organisations with an annual revenue below AUD 100 000 that reach fewer than 250 people,

• The Medium Stream offers up to AUD 100 000 for organisations reaching more than 250 people,

• the Large Stream provides between up to AUD 400 000 for established organisations reaching over 500 people.

Moreover, to ensure equitable support, the programme specifically prioritises applicant organisations that identify with a designated list of new and emerging communities. Developed in consultation with the Victorian Multicultural Commission, this priority list focuses on communities, categorised by country of origin or ethnicity, that have recently been, or are currently, part of Australia's humanitarian programmes.

Source: (Lekakis et al., 2025[43]; Premier of Victoria, 2025[44]; Victorian Government, 2025[45]; Victorian Government, 2026[46]).

By scaling and replicating the approach of such funding mechanisms and models, and by expanding access to flexible and core funding more broadly, the Australian Government could further enhance the resilience of the CSO sector. In addition, funding approaches can be explicitly designed to support a better connected CSO ecosystem, including stronger linkages between CSOs themselves and between CSOs and government. Relevant international practices provide useful examples in this regard. For instance, Lithuania’s Power of Lithuania programme (“Lietuvos galia”), implemented under the national presidency, provides structured opportunities for exchange, peer learning and capacity-building across civil society organisations (Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania, 2026[47]), while Finland’s Civil Society Academy strengthens dialogue and networking between the different levels of government and CSOs (OECD, 2021[48]; Open Government Finland, n.d.[49]). Introducing such initiatives could also respond to broader calls from Australian civil society for enhanced knowledge exchange and partnerships between the sector and the wider policy and research community (Blueprint Expert Reference Group, 2024[31]).

Australia could also invest further in meaningful consultation and co-creation in the design and implementation of funding programmes for civil society, helping ensure that government priorities are better aligned with the needs of CSOs, thereby improving the effectiveness of public support. Chapter 3 provides analysis and recommendations which inform how this can be achieved in practice. These efforts could for instance be supported through more institutionalised dialogue and co-operation mechanisms. Some OECD Members have established such mechanisms to inform civil society policy and funding approaches. In Finland, for example, the Advisory Board on Civil Society Policy provides a structured platform for dialogue between government and civil society and contributes to the development of policies affecting the sector (see Box 2.4). Australia already provides some examples of such approaches, including the CSAG established in the context of the Community Sector Grants Engagement Framework (see Box 2.5) and the National Multicultural Advisory Group (NMAG) which comprises peak organisations representing culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities as well as place-based service providers and supports Services Australia’s efforts towards co-creation of service design and delivery based on lived experiences (Australian Government, 2025[50]). Following the Productivity Commission’s 2024 Review of Closing the Gap, the Australian government has also significantly increased its efforts to strengthen co-design with First Nations communities (see Chapter 3). These examples could provide useful lessons for other parts of the CSO sector where stronger partnership approaches may also be beneficial.

Box 2.4. Finland’s Advisory Board on Civil Society Policy

The Advisory Board on Civil Society Policy (KANE) was established in 2007 and is attached to the Ministry of Justice. KANE is a multi-stakeholder body, made up mainly of ministry counterparts and well-established CSOs. It also includes a representative from informal civic activity, a representative from research on civil society and a representative from the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities. KANE serves as a forum for CSOs and public officials from across the administration to discuss solutions to challenges affecting Finnish civil society. Its aim is to improve civil society’s operating conditions, including by:

• Promoting co-operation and interaction between civil society and the authorities

• Monitoring changes in the operating environment of civil society, including internationally

• Providing proposals and opinions on the development of areas important for civil society policy

• Evaluating the non-governmental organisation (NGO) strategies of ministries and consultation practices with citizens

• Monitoring the coherence and predictability of the public administration’s decisions concerning NGOs

• Launching research and development projects and promoting the use of their results for decision making.

Source: (OECD, 2021[48])

Finally, there is an opportunity for Australia to invest in a more strategic approach to supporting certain parts of the CSO sector. A range of issue-specific and sectoral frameworks exist, designed to support different parts of civil society and/or address specific policy priorities, including the Community Sector Grants Engagement Framework and the Multicultural Framework Review (see Box 2.5). These efforts exemplify Australia’s commitment to systematically supporting CSOs, including more vulnerable and underrepresented parts of the sector. Drawing on these examples, there is an opportunity for Australia to replicate such a strategic approach, notably for those parts of the CSO sector which contribute highly to stated Government objectives related to social cohesion and democratic resilience. Currently, Australian governments already fund a wide range of initiatives related to social cohesion, civic participation and democratic resilience (Commonwealth of Australia, 2025[51]). However, consulted stakeholders from both government and civil society, lament the lack of a strategic approach underpinning these programmes.

Developing a strategic approach could clearly outline how the Australian Government intends to support CSOs both as partners in advancing social cohesion and civic participation, and as independent actors fulfilling important advocacy and watchdog functions needed to foster transparency and accountability in democratic societies. Importantly, this would provide the Australian government with an opportunity to review, assess and where needed reform the legal and regulatory frameworks underpinning charities’ rights to advocate, as previously suggested by legal experts and an alliance of CSOs working in the field (Blueprint Expert Reference Group, 2024[31]; Institute of Community Directors Australia, 2026[52]; Stronger Charities Alliance, 2024[53]). By reducing uncertainty around laws currently seen as fragmented and outdated (Gall and Howie, 2017[54]; Institute of Community Directors Australia, 2026[52]), Australia could ensure that charities, an integral part of Australia’s CSO sector, are able to advocate on behalf of the communities they represent, including while seeking public funding.

A strategic approach to supporting these CSOs could further lead to the establishment of designated grants and thereby more effectively support the work of CSOs crucial to strengthening social cohesion and democratic resilience, including ACCOs, grassroots, community-based and cultural CSOs, as well as those working on advocacy, research and development, democratic innovation and civic participation. Developed in collaboration with relevant CSOs, such a strategic approach could enable Australia to draw on varied expertise and perspectives while assessing the conditions under which these organisations operate and identifying areas for improvement. This could provide a framing to source innovative ways to advance social cohesion objectives and thereby enhance the impact that governments and CSOs have in this area.

Box 2.5. Examples of Australia’s strategic support to parts of civil society

Supporting multicultural organisations in line with the Multicultural Framework Review

The recent Multicultural Framework Review identified stronger partnerships with multicultural communities and organisations as a central policy objective, emphasising co-design, community participation in decision making and strengthening community capacity.

Informed by the review, the Modernised Multicultural Grant Program aims at providing more consistent and longer-term funding arrangements to multicultural organisations, fostering greater certainty and sustainability for the sector. Concretely, the programme provides funding through the following grants amounting to approximately AUD 500 Million:

• Multicultural Grassroots Initiatives

• Multicultural Peak Body Project Funding

• Infrastructure for Multicultural Communities.

Alongside broader funding initiatives, these grants support initiatives related to organisational leadership development, civic education and community safety, with funding directed towards initiatives promoting community participation in public life resilience against discrimination and extremism, and social cohesion.

The Community Sector Grants Engagement Framework

In response to rising demand for services, workforce shortages, declining volunteering rates and increasing administrative burdens, the Department of Social Services (DSS) developed the Community Sector Grants Engagement Framework in consultation with the Community Services Advisory Group (CSAG), comprising 27 organisations delivering services on behalf of government, and an interdepartmental committee (IDC) of agencies administering grants. The framework seeks to strengthen the relationship between government and the community sector by improving the sustainability, accessibility and effectiveness of grant arrangements. It promotes more predictable and sufficient funding, reduced administrative burdens, greater flexibility within the sector, stronger engagement with organisations and improved capacity-building.

Source: (Department of Social Services, 2025[55])

There are also several examples from OECD Members that Australia can draw on in this regard (OECD, 2022[23]; OECD, 2024[27]). In Germany, the programme Living Democracy ("Demokratie leben") established in 2015, has promoted civic engagement and civil society structures to foster democracy by providing financial support to numerous associations throughout the country that are committed to a pluralistic, non-violent and democratic society. The programme is now in its 3^rd funding cycle from 2025-2032 and focuses on fostering partnerships at the local level, offering counselling and public awareness-raising (Bundesministerium für Bildung, Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2026[56]). In the United Kingdom, the Civil Society Covenant outlines a vision centred on stronger communities, increased civic participation and a greater sense of shared identity (OECD, 2022[23]; Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2025[57]).

Strengthening indirect government support through comprehensive DGR reform

In many OECD countries, a distinction is made between CSOs more broadly and public benefit organisations or charities, which are often eligible for additional tax exemptions or other benefits. Tax exemptions and deductions constitute an important form of indirect government support for civil society, as specific tax regimes can encourage and reward activities that contribute to the public interest. In Australia, the deductible gift recipient (DGR) system provides a tax deduction for giving to certain entities. The DGR system benefits both donors and recipient organisations by providing a government subsidy through income tax deductions. It is the government’s primary policy mechanism for incentivising philanthropy and influencing where charitable donations are directed. Effective DGR policy settings are therefore important for ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of tax incentives as a means of increasing giving and supporting activities that generate broader social benefits (Productivity Commission, 2024[32]).

Under the current system, charities registered at the ACNC can seek endorsement from the ATO for DGR status if they fall within one of 52 categories listed in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. Entities that do not fall within one of the existing DGR categories may apply through a separate listing process, under which organisations must be individually named in legislation to obtain DGR status. This pathway is intended to be used only in exceptional circumstances, with only around 230 out of the 29 000 organisations with DGR status being specifically listed entities. The government may impose additional conditions on individually listed organisations and unlike the standard endorsement processes administered by the ATO, specific listing is not an administrative decision, but a policy decision taken by government. Once granted, the specific listing expires after five years. Consequently, the process can be lengthy and uncertain, with DGR status in some cases taking up to two years to come into effect after a proposal has been agreed by government. While organisations may resubmit unsuccessful proposals, there is not yet any formal appeals mechanism (The Treasury, n.d.[58]).

The complexity of the current DGR system has been identified as a key challenge impacting the enabling environment for CSOs in Australia. Among organisations surveyed for the purposes of this review, the laws and regulations governing charity and DGR status was selected as the most prominent legal and regulatory challenges faced by CSOs. Consulted stakeholders, particularly smaller and community-based organisations, reported that access to these benefits could be further facilitated. Organisations that already hold DGR status also noted that the complexity of the system can have wider impacts across the sector by limiting collaboration and interconnectedness between organisations. For example, larger CSOs seeking to partner with smaller grassroots organisations are unable to when those organisations do not hold DGR status themselves. This practical barrier is particularly relevant for organisations working on democratic resilience and social cohesion, where effective collaboration across networks of community-based organisations is important to reach different parts of society.

An assessment by the Productivity Commission indicated that many organisations do not align easily with the existing categories, and that the listing process lacks transparency and accessibility. While a wide range of organisations may face difficulties obtaining DGR status, some charities have multiple DGR endorsements, which can require complex organisational structures involving additional compliance costs. According to the report, DGR status is particularly inaccessible for smaller, volunteer-run and grassroots organisations, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander CSOs, as well as for those supporting women, young people and LGBTIQA+ individuals (Productivity Commission, 2024[32]). This concern was echoed by interviewed stakeholders, who additionally highlighted that DGR status is particularly difficult to attain for CSOs engaged in advocacy, watchdog functions and work related to democratic participation. They further noted that acquiring DGR status by being listed by name is factually only accessible to CSOs with significant resources and political capital.

Recent reforms indicate that the Australian Government has taken steps to improve its coherence and accessibility. Measures introduced since 2021 have aimed to strengthen oversight and streamline administrative processes, including requiring most DGRs to be registered charities with the ACNC, consolidating responsibility for several DGR categories under the ATO, and most recently creating new categories to better accommodate community-based charities (Australian Taxation Office, 2025[59]). These reforms reflect a clear commitment to reducing administrative burdens and modernising elements of the system. While these incremental changes are positive, stakeholder feedback and analysis suggest that further opportunities exist to more fully address the underlying complexity and structural limitations of the current framework, as for instance seen in New Zealand (see Box 2.6) (Productivity Commission, 2024[32]).

Box 2.6. New Zealand’s DGR system

New Zealand’s equivalent of the DGR is referred to as a donee organisation - a broad term which may include, but is not limited to, registered charities that request donee status and that apply their funds wholly or mainly to charitable purposes within New Zealand. The four types of donee organisation are:

• entities whose funds are applied wholly or mainly to charitable purposes within New Zealand, registered with the New Zealand charities regulator and recorded on the approved donee organisation list published by Inland Revenue

• entities whose funds are applied wholly or mainly to benevolent, philanthropic or cultural purposes within New Zealand recorded on the approved donee organisation list published by Inland Revenue

• entities that automatically qualify by satisfying specific definitions, namely, certain community housing entities, school board of trustees, and tertiary education institutions

• entities that apply funds for other than charitable, benevolent, philanthropic or cultural purposes within New Zealand, approved by Parliament and listed in the Income Tax Act

Most charities will automatically receive donee organisation status without needing to contact Inland Revenue, which draws on information provided to the charities regulator. So long as a charity has self-assessed itself as applying its funds “wholly or mainly” to charitable purposes within New Zealand, that charity will automatically be granted donee organisation status once registered as a charity. Those applying funds wholly or mainly to benevolent, philanthropic or cultural purposes within New Zealand, or those applying funds for charitable, benevolent, philanthropic or cultural purposes outside New Zealand need to go through an application process to gain donee organisation status.

Source: (Inland Revenue, 2022[60])

A more comprehensive and holistic reform could therefore be beneficial to ensure that Australia’s DGR system is more transparent, accessible and fit for purpose, particularly for smaller organisations and those engaged in advocacy and public interest activities. The reform could seize opportunities to both simplify the current category system and broaden access to DGR status to better reflect the variety of Australian civil society, while maintaining high standards of transparency and accountability. This would produce fairer and more consistent outcomes for CSOs, but also for donors and the broader community, as a wider range of causes and organisations could benefit from philanthropy and contributions from Australian taxpayers, providing donors with more choice. If implemented in line with the recommendations issued by the Productivity Commission, such reforms are expected to produce only modest fiscal costs, while contributing to a more vibrant and innovative CSO sector by supporting the establishment and scaling up of organisations addressing a broad range of social challenges (Productivity Commission, 2024[32]). This effort could benefit the broader Australian community, generating social capital and fostering greater social cohesion and democratic involvement.

2.3.3. Expanding the evidence base for more strategic support to the civil society sector

Governments’ efforts to foster an enabling environment for CSOs can be strengthened by a robust evidence base, including disaggregated and regularly updated data. This can help ensure that support measures are responsive to the varying needs of CSOs and contribute to their long-term sustainability. Concretely, this can include evaluations of the existing legal, policy and institutional frameworks and considering whether they are fit for purpose or could be updated and how the protection of freedom of association in law translates into tangible realities for civil society. For instance, collecting and analysing data on the number of denials or the average length of time and cost for CSO registration can help governments identify unintended barriers or constraints in the system. Similarly, monitoring the number of CSOs which receive public benefit status can allow governments to assess whether the status is sufficiently accessible, while tracking the number of organisations which lose such benefits due to activities they engage in indicates whether certain regulations are overly restrictive. Furthermore, collecting comprehensive, disaggregated data on government funding provided across different ministries and levels of government, can allow governments to monitor funding trends and make support to the sector more efficient, impactful and strategic (OECD, 2024[37]; OECD, 2022[23]).

In Australia, a range of relevant data on CSOs is already collected and published. For instance, ACNC and ASIC registration data are disclosed, as are most federal grants for the non-government sector. The ACNC’s data collection and visualisation tools have also been identified as contributing to improved transparency and increased trust in the charities and not-for-profits sector (see Box 2.7).

Box 2.7. ACNC data collection and visualisation

Prior to the establishment of the ACNC, there was no publicly available information regarding the size, scale and variety of the nation's charity sector. Over the past 11 years, the ACNC has systematically built a comprehensive database by collecting and analysing Annual Information Statements from over 52 000 registered charities to increase transparency, build public trust and form a robust evidence base for policymakers, researchers, grant makers and the sector itself. By publishing annual reports and maintaining open datasets, the ACNC ensures that the contributions of charities, including their revenues, activities, and the efforts of over 3.7 million volunteers, are understood and accessible to the Australian public.

Visualising data through the Charity Data Explorer

To make this vast amount of information accessible, the ACNC established the Charity Data Hub and the interactive Charity Data Explorer. These visualisation tools allow users to conduct custom searches and filter by criteria, such as charity size, location and charity subtype. By allowing stakeholders to visually map trends across areas or specific parts of the sector, the Explorer transforms static data into a dynamic resource.

Maximising data utility and reducing red tape

The ACNC’s data strategy is governed by a commitment to maximise data utility while minimising the administrative burden on charities, as through the Charity Passport initiative. Furthermore, the ACNC shares its data broadly by regularly publishing 12 datasets on data.gov.au. To ensure this information remains accurate and reliable for public use, the ACNC maintains a governance target of updating these public datasets on a weekly basis, achieving a 96% weekly update rate in the 2024-2025 reporting period.

Source: (ACNC, 2026[61]; ACNC, 2025[62]; ACNC, 2025[63]).

While ACNC data collection has improved transparency and previous ACNC reporting suggests greater visibility over charities’ activities and financial expenditure has contributed to trust in the sector, recent expert assessments identify ongoing opportunities for improvement. The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) noted that current reporting practices often remain inconsistent, difficult to compare and insufficiently aligned with stakeholder needs, particularly due to limited reporting on non-financial outcomes and longer-term impact. Similarly, experts note that current regulatory data focuses too heavily on inputs and operations, lacking the granularity required to support deeper analyses of long-term sector sustainability. To address these gaps, CSOs have therefore suggested expanding the remit and content of the ACNC Charity Register and improving routine data sharing between governments and the sector (Blueprint Expert Reference Group, 2024[31]).

More broadly, Australia could consider more comprehensive collection and proactive disclosure of disaggregated data on the overall CSO sector, including on the total number of CSOs active in the country, registrations and funding for CSOs. A number of datasets and analytical outputs produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) provide relevant insights, including biennial statistical reporting on NFPs (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2026[64]) and disaggregated and longitudinal data on volunteering drawing from the Census and other General Social Survey (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2026[65]; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2026[66]). Australia’s most comprehensive CSO-specific data collection efforts currently focus on charities registered with the ACNC, which represent only a small (though important) part of the broader civil society landscape.2 While on other parts of the sector some information is publicly available, online searchability, visualisation and interoperability of data could be improved. Consulted government stakeholders also highlighted important blind spots, particularly regarding unincorporated organisations (including size, activities and needs), meaning they may face barriers in accessing recognition or public support. In this context, experts point out that readily available data does not capture the full variety and scale of Australia’s CSO sector, limiting governments’ ability to develop evidence-based policies and targeted support measures (Blueprint Expert Reference Group, 2024[31]).

The usability of existing data could also be further improved. Consulted CSOs further noted that where organisations are asked to provide data to governments, the purpose and use of that information is not always clearly communicated, reducing the perceived value of reporting exercises. Moreover, monitoring and evaluation of grants and funding provided to CSOs is not yet systematically embedded across the public sector. While examples of monitoring and evaluation exist, they are often ad hoc or programme-specific, rather than part of a consistent and strategic approach focused on assessing longer-term outcomes and impacts.

Moreover, data collection on government funding provided to the sector, can help both governments and CSOs better achieve shared objectives and strengthen the effectiveness of public support. OECD guidance further suggests that strengthening the collection, dissemination and use of data on the CSO sector could help make the impact of civil society more visible (OECD, 2024[27]; Blueprint Expert Reference Group, 2024[31]). Concretely, data collection on government funding provided to the CSO sector, could cover funding delivered through different portfolios, departments, agencies and levels of government and be disaggregated by CSO recipient, funding modality, type of support and thematic area. Monitoring and evaluation approaches could also move beyond measuring outputs, such as beneficiary numbers or activities delivered, towards assessing broader outcomes and impacts. This would enable governments to evaluate the effectiveness of overall funding models. At the same time, it is important that efforts to improve reporting and evaluation avoid creating unnecessary administrative burdens for CSOs and rather build more systematically on existing administrative data already collected across public institutions, as for instance seen in Finland (see Box 2.8).

Existing data infrastructure in Australia presents opportunities to strengthen evidence generation and transparency in this regard. For example, data collected through GrantConnect could be used more systematically to improve public information on government support to the CSO sector. Ensuring that data on funding itself is disaggregated (e.g. by length and type of funding, sector or type of activity and funding source) can yield analysis on the flexibility, sustainability and reach of public funding, on any neglected sectors or activities, as well as the key actors supporting the sector, and any fragmentations, gaps and overlaps in the public funding system. Ensuring that this data is also place-based can reveal regional disparities, provided insights on CSOs and the people participating in them across the country. In turn, this data can empower the Australian Government to make more evidence-informed funding policy decisions. Experts have also identified opportunities to strengthen consistency and comparability in information collected through the ACNC Charity Register and to expand research drawing on existing datasets. For instance, the Community Council for Australia has recommended greater investment in charity sector research using ACNC data (Community Council for Australia, 2018[67]), while experts recommend improving the use of existing administrative information and re-establishing routine collection and dissemination of NFP sector data by the ABS. Proposed reforms include producing a regular national CSO report, supported by long-term investment and drawing on existing ACNC, ATO and government funding data (Blueprint Expert Reference Group, 2024[31]).

Ultimately, Australia could consider establishing a more centralised and comprehensive CSO register, ideally integrated through a single platform, to improve access to information for CSOs, governments and the public. Such a platform could bring together information on Australia’s multifaceted CSO landscape, including data on active organisations by location, size and thematic area, registration statistics and available government funding opportunities. Concretely, strengthening data collection and evaluation systems in Australia could support more strategic policy development, improve monitoring of funding trends and help ensure public support responds effectively to the evolving needs of the CSO sector. Greater visibility regarding the activities and contributions of CSOs can also support public understanding of the sector, strengthen trust and encourage civic participation, including through volunteering and engagement in CSOs.

Establishing such a system would require significant co-ordination across and between levels of government, alongside sufficient capacity and resources to maintain data quality and ensure information remains accurate and up to date. In the longer term, such an effort could however enhance the impact of CSOs’ and governments’ efforts.

Box 2.8. Finland: Gathering better data to support monitoring of civil society strategy

Finland’s “CSO Strategy 2023-2027: Government resolution on the development of civic space” emphasises the importance of evidence-based civil society policymaking, through building and updating a strong knowledge base. Complementing the strategy, in September 2024 Finland published its first report on “Basic information about the operating conditions of CSOs”, providing an overview of the CSO sector, including with a visualisation tool. This initiative gathers existing data from different public office sources, including:

• Number of registered associations and foundations, including registrations and deregistrations over time and breakdowns by activity area and region.

• Number of people employed by CSOs and share of Finns participating in volunteering, association activities, or board membership.

• Total public funding awarded to associations and foundations by year, with breakdowns by funding source (state entity, municipality, EU), grant type, and approval rates.

• Total revenue from fundraising, crowdfunding, lotteries, and membership fees.

• Procurement volumes for CSOs delivering public services.

• Number of organisations registered on the Transparency Register and reporting advocacy activities.

The compilation includes data from various entities, including registers, tax and statistics offices and law enforcement, and external data, such as the European Social Survey. Additional data on tax deductibility of donations and allocation of EU funding programmes will soon be added.

Source: (Finnish Ministry of Justice, n.d.[68]; Finnish Government, 2025[69]).

2.4. Protecting freedom of peaceful assembly as a pillar of democratic life

Key messages and recommendations

Australia has a long and steady tradition of peaceful protest. However recent legislative changes have prompted debate about the proportionality of some restrictions, as governments seek to balance freedom of assembly with public safety, security and protection from hate speech.

Policy recommendations

To ensure the adequate protection of freedom of peaceful assembly in law and in practice, the Australian Government could consider to:

• Adopt a more coherent legal framework for peaceful assembly that explicitly protects the right to peaceful assembly, clarifies notification procedures, recognises spontaneous assemblies and ensures restrictions are fully aligned with international standards.

• Further strengthen the evidence base and transparency around peaceful assemblies by systematically collecting and publishing disaggregated data on protests and their management, while also improving the public’s awareness of rights and responsibilities.

The right to assemble peacefully, including through protests, meetings, sit-ins and strikes, is an international obligation of states and a prerequisite for any open and democratic society (UN Human Rights Committee, 2020[70]; OECD, 2022[23]). As a non-institutionalised form of civic engagement, peaceful protests offer a means for citizens and civil society to organise themselves, express views and collectively draw public attention to important issues and advocate for change. As such freedom of peaceful assembly can create avenues for more responsive policymaking and develop stronger democratic processes and institutions (Battaglini, 2017[71]). This is underlined by OECD data, which shows that while the group of people who lack trust in government are less likely to participate in national elections, many of them actively engage in protests, alongside other forms of non-institutionalised participation (Prats, Smid and Ferrin, 2024[72]; OECD, 2022[73]).

At the same time, the right to peaceful assembly is not absolute. It requires governments to balance different considerations, including the rights of vulnerable individuals and groups and the need to protect them from hate, as discussed in more detail below in Section 2.5. International guidance permits justified restrictions on freedom of assembly under the conditions of safeguarding the rights of others, preventing incitement to violence, ensuring public safety, protecting national security, maintaining public order, preserving public health and upholding public morals. Governments may therefore impose restrictions on assemblies based on considerations related to public safety, community security and the accessibility of public spaces. However, these restrictions and their implementation in practice must be grounded in law, narrowly framed, necessary in democratic societies, proportionate, impartial across all groups and free from discriminatory intent (UN Human Rights Committee, 2020[70]; OECD, 2022[23]).

Against a background of international crises, divisions on a wide range of issues, large-scale protests, and the use of digital tools to organise mobilisation at short notice and spread of images and messages of protests to a broad audience, the context in which the right to peaceful assembly is being facilitated across the OECD is increasingly complex (OECD, 2022[23]; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2026[74]). These evolutions raise new questions for policymakers on how to facilitate the exercise of this right and balance it with other legitimate considerations, with a view towards fostering democratic discourse and promoting people’s fundamental rights, while ensuring public safety.

Australia has a consolidated tradition of civic engagement through protests and performs well in international comparisons. According to V-Dem Institute’s Freedom of Peaceful Assembly Index for the year of 2024, Australia scored 3.88 compared to 3.36 for the population weighted OECD average. Besides a drop in 2021 during pandemic restrictions, the country has consistently scored above OECD averages. According to OECD data, 6% of Australians had taken part in a street protest or demonstration in 2025, slightly below the OECD average of 9% (OECD, 2026[75]). Australian data indicates that 11% of Australians attended a protest, march or demonstration in 2022, 2023 and 2024 and that participation in protests has been stable in Australia for the last decade (O’Donnell, Falkiner and Szacha, 2025[76]).

Overall, the data shows that the right to protest remains an important form of civic engagement for many Australians. While it is generally protected, there may be opportunities for further improvement. For example, the Australian Human Rights Commission, in its submission to Australia’s fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR), noted that “Australian governments have enacted laws that limit the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression with overly broad offences and disproportionately harsh penalties” (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2025[77]). This points to a potential opportunity for Australia to revisit how this long-standing democratic right is protected in law and facilitated in practice. While this chapter does not offer a comprehensive assessment of all protest-related laws in Australia, the below sections aim to support the Australian government in identifying opportunities to strengthen the enabling conditions for assembling and protesting.

In Australia, the right to peaceful assembly is protected by the country’s international obligations under the ICCPR as well as common law principles and the implied freedom of political communication discussed above. There is however no explicit mention to this right in the Constitution and the implied freedom of political communication is not considered an individual right, meaning that it cannot serve as a defence to protect individuals against actions by other individuals or organisations but is rather framed as a limit on legislative and executive power. In Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Queensland, state-level human rights charters explicitly protect the right to peaceful assembly (Victorian Government, 2022[78]; Queensland Government, 2023[79]; ACT Government, 2025[80]). In addition, Queensland is the only jurisdiction in Australia with a dedicated law governing freedom of peaceful assembly (Queensland Government, 2013[81]).i

Australia is among the few OECD Members where almost all aspects of the exercise of freedom of peaceful assemblies are regulated at subnational level, primarily through state and territory legislation (OECD, 2022[23]). Most states and territories operate notification systems whereby protest organisers can, but are not required to, notify the police, the courts or a local authority to hold a public assembly. In addition, various offences in the different states and territories have an impact on how protests may be conducted (O’Sullivan, 2024[82]; Justice Connect, 2025[83]). In most Australian jurisdictions with a notification scheme, the result of an assembly being notified and not denied, is that protestors are granted prosecution immunity, provided that the assembly is conducted in accordance with the details provided in the organiser. This protects participants from incurring civil or criminal liability on a range of specified offences, for instance obstruction of traffic, pedestrians or a public place (Justice Connect, 2025[83]).

Across the OECD Membership, 75% of countries have some kind of prior notification requirement in place, although consequences for failure of notification vary (OECD, 2022[23]). In accordance with international guidance, such notification regimes should not imply a need to seek permission but rather function as a tool to support authorities in facilitating assemblies. (OECD, 2024[37]). To ensure that notification requirements do not however amount to de facto authorisation regimes, international guidance suggests that a failure of notification should not in itself serve as a basis for denying or dissolving assemblies or imposing sanctions on organisers, such as charging them with criminal offences (UN Human Rights Committee, 2020[70]).

In most Australian states and territories, failure to notify does not per se render an assembly unlawful and there are no specific offences in case of failure to notify. Rather, protesters lose the immunity from prosecution on relevant offences, such as obstruction of public places (Parliamentary Research Service, Parliament of New South Wales, 2024[84]). However, there are examples of more restrictive procedures. For instance, in the Northern Territory and Victoria, local councils have the power to establish authorisation regimes with specific offences in place for failing to make the request prior to the gathering. In Tasmania there is a general permit requirement for the use of public streets (Tasmanian Government, 2025[85]), and failure to obtain such a permit may result in a fine. Such configurations may result in de facto authorisation regimes, where protestors must seek prior approval to exercise their right to peacefully assemble and may face sanctions, on the grounds of not having received explicit authorisation. The lack of explicit legal recognition of spontaneous public assemblies – as seen across Australian jurisdictions – can further increase this risk (OECD, 2024[27]).

In some cases, the fragmentation of the institutional framework governing notification requirements can create additional challenges. In many Australian jurisdictions, organisers need to notify several authorities, the police, road authorities and local councils (Parliamentary Research Service, Parliament of New South Wales, 2024[84]). This can be a burden on both the responsible authorities and the protestors. OECD guidance recommends that in order to streamline and simplify procedures, authorities can ensure that organisers only have to inform a single authority rather than having to navigate multiple entities (OECD, 2024[37]). In Australia, one option could be to establish online notification mechanisms on state and territory governments’ websites, which relevant authorities would have access to, in order to streamline and simplify the process.

More broadly, there have been several legislative developments impacting the right to protest in Australia in recent years. In this context, freedom of peaceful assembly in Australia has come under increasing scrutiny by civil society, as well as domestic and international experts, who raised concerns that some recent amendments in Australia may not fully comply with international human rights standards (Orellana, 2023[86]; Saul, Khan and Romero, 2025[87]; Voule et al., 2019[88]; Amnesty International, 2025[89]). The AHRC has raised concerns about increasingly restrictive laws impacting the right to protest, as well as broad discretionary powers granted to authorities governing assemblies on when to deny or dissolve an assembly (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2025[90]). In some instances, Australian courts have struck down provisions on the basis that they infringed constitutional protections, including the implied freedom of political communication (Lewis and Vinales, 2026[91]; Supreme Court NSW, 2025[92]). In this context, the absence of a federal human rights act is considered a structural limitation by many, as it reduces the availability of clearly defined and enforceable safeguards for freedom of peaceful assembly (Parliamentary Research Service, Parliament of New South Wales, 2024[84]; Grata Fund & Australian Democracy Network, 2024[93]; Human Rights Law Centre, 2024[94]; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2024[17]).

CSOs and experts consulted for the purposes of this review have equally expressed concerns that recent legislative developments may narrow the scope for peaceful assembly in some jurisdictions. Even where these more restrictive measures are not systematically enforced, governmental and non-governmental stakeholders interviewed by the OECD noted that they may have a chilling effect on the exercise of the right to protest. On the other hand, some consulted governmental stakeholders have emphasised the importance of ensuring public safety and security, including through restricting protest in specific public spaces. Moreover, the recent rise in antisemitic and other types of hateful conduct in Australia – both legal and illegal – has in many cases impacted the way protests are being governed, based on governments’ desire to protect vulnerable groups – including in response to the Bondi terrorist attack. As discussed in Section 2.5, this for instance included the introduction of laws specifically prohibiting the public display of Nazi and prohibited organisations’ symbols, as well as obstructions near places of worship. In early 2026, laws were passed in Queensland, explicitly prohibiting the public use of certain phrases related to the evolving conflicts in the Middle East, including in protests, when used to incite hatred, violence or discrimination (Hinchliffe and Messenger, 2026[95]). Similar measures were being discussed in NSW at the time of writing this report (Methven, 2026[96]).

Freedom of peaceful assembly generally excludes hate speech and gatherings where organisers or participants have violent intentions or otherwise reject the foundations of a democratic society from protection (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2025[90]; OECD, 2022[23]). However, even measures pursuing the legitimate aim of curbing hateful expression, must be proportionate and not unduly encroach on Australians’ freedoms of expression and assembly. Generally, restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly can be legitimate but must apply a balanced approach, i.e. be narrowly framed, necessary in democratic societies, proportionate and impartial. International guidance suggests governments avoid the imposition of blanket bans and content-based restrictions and as such, provisions banning specific slogans or symbols should face heightened scrutiny to ensure they are necessary in a democratic society, proportionate and pursue a legitimate aim (OSCE/ODIHR/Venice Commission, 2020[97]). Any time, place and manner restrictions governments should be justified on a case-by-case basis, to avoid disproportionate impacts. Grounds for restriction commonly include incitement to violence and other threats to public safety. 88% of OECD Members prohibit incitement to violence, both generally and specifically in the context of assemblies and 97% allow assemblies to be limited or banned if they constitute threats to public safety (OECD, 2022[23]). However, these are interpreted in different ways depending on the context. Interpretations of what constitutes a threat to public safety, for example, may vary considerably based on the historical and social context, and may also change over time in response to events, such as terrorist attacks (OECD, 2024[27]).

These considerations showcase the complexity and difficulty of protecting and facilitating the right to peaceful assembly, while balancing important considerations such as public safety and security. To address current challenges, Australia could consider introducing comprehensive legislation based on international standards and guidance that explicitly recognises the right to peaceful assemblies. Ensuring that such laws are clear and aligned with international standards can help avoid unintended constraints on legitimate forms of civic participation and support governments’ efforts to balance different considerations. Acknowledging the federated structure in Australia, the Government could consider pursuing this effort either at the federal level or through a co-ordinated effort at state and territory level, while ensuring a coherent approach across the country. This could be achieved through explicit human rights provisions and complemented by an additional stand-alone dedicated law on peaceful assembly. 44% of OECD Members currently have dedicated assembly laws in place and a review of these laws showcased several good practices which Australia could draw from. For instance, some laws explicitly stress the state's duty to facilitate peaceful assemblies and provide organisational support, as well as the responsibility of law enforcement to ensure safety and security. Several national laws also mention the importance of ensuring non-discriminatory handling of assemblies so that advance notifications are addressed fairly, transparently and on an equal basis (OECD, 2024[27]).

Such laws could delineate the respective responsibilities of law enforcement and assembly organisers in maintaining public order and security, thereby helping to establish clarity and accountability. Moreover, it could set standards for notification procedures to be applied across the country, including on notification periods and requiring states and territories to designate a single authority to notify. This would help ensure the right to protest is facilitated in an equal manner for all Australians. It could also emphasise that the content of an assembly cannot serve as grounds for refusal, in line with international standards. Such legislation could include an explicit legal recognition of spontaneous public assemblies, as seen in Germany and Brazil (see Box 2.9), and outline legally mandated exceptions and conditions to exercising the right in accordance with international standards. While the AHRC confirms in its educational explainer that protests in Australia can and do occur spontaneously (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2025[90]), this would decrease perceived uncertainties around the right to protest and ensure that notification requirements do not amount to de facto authorisation regimes in practice.

Box 2.9. International examples of legal recognitions of spontaneous assemblies

In Germany, spontaneous assemblies are protected in article 8 of the Constitution, which states that “All Germans shall have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without prior notification or permission” (Federal Republic of Germany, 2025[98]). Since 2006, the competence to regulate assemblies lies with states but federal legislation remains applicable to states that have not enacted dedicated assembly laws. It stipulates that for outdoors assemblies there is a 48-hour previous notification requirement, but German authorities recognise that “[t]he situation is different with regard to ad-hoc assemblies that address topical issues. In the case of such spontaneous assemblies, there is no notification requirement”.

Similarly, the Constitution in Brazil states that “all people may hold peaceful meetings in public places regardless of authorisation, as long as they bear no weapons, do not hinder another meeting previously convened for the same place, and issue prior notice to the competent authority.” In 2020 the Supreme Court clarified that the constitutional requirement for prior notice is met when protest organisers communicate information that enables public authorities to ensure the exercise of the right without interfering with another gathering in the same location. Additionally, the court ruled that the notification does not need to be personal or registered and, if prior notification is not possible, organisers should not face penalties, as peaceful spontaneous assemblies are presumed lawful.

Source: (Federal Ministry of Interior, n.d.[99]; Supreme Federal Court, 2020[100]).

In order for governments to ensure the protection of freedom of peaceful assembly translates into the right effectively being facilitated in practice, OECD guidance further suggests that the collection and disclosure of disaggregated, up to date, high-quality data is crucial. Relevant data could include the number of notifications received, denials or requests for changes in assembly notifications, the number of assemblies where police intervention happened, or number of people detained during assemblies. To enhance transparency and accountability, in turn strengthening trust, systematic collection and disclosure of data could also capture incidents of violence during assemblies (OECD, 2024[27]).

In Australia, as in most OECD Member countries, data on events related to the exercise of freedom of peaceful assembly is not currently systematically collected or published. Following the co-operative approach taken between federal and state and territory police on the National Hate Crimes Database (see Box 2.14), Australia could consider moving towards developing a centralised register containing relevant administrative data on protests in Australia. This type of data could support the government to detect trends, identify any disproportionate impacts on certain population groups and orient policy interventions to improve the effectiveness of the legal, institutional and implementation frameworks governing peaceful assembly, as for instance seen in New Zealand (see Box 2.10).

Box 2.10. New Zealand’s monitoring of incidents during protests

The Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA) in New Zealand, an oversight body, independent both from government and the police and headed by a judge, gathers and publishes data on complaints regarding police conduct. This includes information on the use of force and summaries of concluded investigations. It also issues thematic reviews on recurring topics to support prevention.

In recent years, the IPCA has increasingly focused on reviewing police conduct during protests, including injuries of police and protestors. A 2023 report on the policing of a protest and occupation of parliament in 2022, covered violence directed at and by the police based on over 1900 complaints received by the authority. In a 2025 report, the IPCA reviewed police responses to two marches conducted in 2023and includes recommendations related to improving the legal framework governing assemblies, reviewing the notification system for protests, better tailoring police powers for public assemblies and improving police policies, processes and training.

Source: (IPCA, 2023[101]; IPCA, 2025[102]).

In addition, improved data availability could support policy-oriented research on broader trends impacting Australian democracy and shaping civic engagement (see Chapter 1). The relevant data could feed directly into monitoring efforts by both governmental and non-governmental actors, including for instance any future iterations of the Civic Opportunity Index developed by the Scanlon Foundation Research Institute (Link, 2025[103]), as well as analytical work undertaken by the Australian Resilient Democracy Network (ARDN), thereby contributing to a more holistic understanding of civic space in Australia.

Such data can also support awareness-raising on freedom of peaceful assembly in Australia. Designated, evidence-informed public communication campaigns, educating the public about their rights and responsibilities, helping people understand how the right to protests is being facilitated in practice, and regularly updating the broader public about any recent trends and developments impacting right to protest. Such campaigns could also emphasise the right to peaceful assembly as a democratic right and protest means of participation in public life.

2.5. Countering hate as an obstacle to equal participation in public life

Key messages and recommendations

Australia has significantly strengthened federal and state hate speech protections in response to the rising number of hate incidents in recent years, but concerns remain about consistency across jurisdictions and ensuring that restrictions on expression remain necessary and proportionate. Australia has also made substantial investments in non-legislative measures to address hate and discrimination, including through numerous anti-racism and social cohesion initiatives and by bolstering data collection efforts. Australia has also long been a leader in addressing online harms, providing an effective framework to seek remedy.

These efforts provide a strong foundation. By strengthening co-ordination and coherence, impact across both legislative and non-legislative initiatives could be further enhanced.

Policy recommendations

To effectively tackle online and offline hate as a potential obstacle to equal participation in public life, the Australian Government could consider to:

• Systematically review and harmonise hate- and discrimination-related laws to improve legal clarity, coherence and effectiveness while safeguarding freedom of expression and open democratic debate.

• Invest in a more strategic and co-ordinated whole-of-government approach to addressing hate, bringing together governments, civil society and affected communities to improve public awareness and prevention efforts.

• Address systemic drivers of online hate through the upcoming Digital Duty of Care, while ensuring transparency, the right to privacy and data protection as well as clear safeguards for freedom of expression.

Democracy is reinforced when all members of society can exercise civic freedoms and participate in public life (OECD, 2024[27]). Discrimination and hate cause people to withdraw from public life for fear of vilification and attacks, therefore posing a significant obstacle to democratic governance and social cohesion. Particularly in the digital era, the misuse of digital technologies, including by malign actors, has contributed to undermining people’s willingness to engage in public debate and, at-times silencing their views through online abuse, harassment, and co-ordinated interference (OECD, 2024[37]). Discrimination can also affect citizens’ trust, in addition to their ability and willingness to engage with state institutions if they feel undervalued, excluded, unprotected or threatened. As such, discrimination can affect individuals’ ability or willingness to freely express themselves or influence public decision making (OECD, 2022[23]), shaping who participates in public life, how they participate, and whether they feel able to engage at all. The OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions has consistently shown that discrimination reinforces political vulnerability (OECD, 2024[104]; OECD, 2022[73]).

In light of its highly diverse population,3 the Australian government has placed significant importance on protecting the rights and uplifting the voices of underheard groups and individuals (Strengthening Democracy Taskforce, 2024[29]). The Australian Government has made significant investments through numerous projects implemented at all levels of government and in close partnership with civil society and communities. These efforts are underpinned by several recent important political commitments and high-level strategies, including but not limited to: the Closing the Gap Agreement adopted in 2020 aimed at enabling First Nations people and all levels of government to work together to overcome inequality and achieve equal outcomes; the Office for Social Cohesion established in 2024, with a strategy-setting and co-ordinating role across levels of government to strengthen social cohesion and democratic resilience (see Chapter 1); the Multicultural Framework Review and appointment of the first ever Minister for Multicultural Affairs in 2025.

Nonetheless, racism, hate, intolerance and discrimination remain obstacles to participation in public life in Australia (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024[105]; O’Donnell, Falkiner and Szacha, 2025[76]; OECD, 2025[106]) – as is the case in other OECD Members. Societal tensions and incidents of antisemitism and islamophobia have increased significantly in Australia, as they have globally, including since the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks and the subsequent evolving conflicts in the Middle East (Vergani, Goodhart and Carlan, 2024[107]; O’Donnell, Falkiner and Szacha, 2025[76]). For First Nations communities, the history and lasting impacts of colonialism, forced dispossession, structural violence and racial exclusion continue to impact their relationship with public institutions and their access to public life and decision making. Concerns around cultural safety, institutional racism and a lack of trust between governments and First Nations communities impact their willingness to participate in civic life (Commonwealth of Australia, 2024[108]; OECD, 2025[106]). Immigrants, as well as cultural and religious minorities continue to experience racism and other forms of discrimination (O’Donnell, Falkiner and Szacha, 2025[76]; Islamophobia Register Australia, 2025[109]).

Against this backdrop, this section focuses on Australia’s current efforts and opportunities to strengthen its approach to fostering a civic space that enables the equal participation of all Australians in democratic life. It assesses specific aspects of the overall enabling environment for marginalised and vulnerable communities to participate in public life. It does so by analysing Australia’s efforts to adequately protect individuals and groups from hate and discrimination through legislative and non-legislative measures, online and offline, ensuring all Australians can be heard and engage in open and safe democratic debate.

2.5.1. Tackling hate while safeguarding civic freedoms and open public discourse

Countering occurrences of hate in public life is as a priority among OECD Members, given its increasing prevalence and complexity. While it is not a new phenomenon, many OECD countries have experienced a rise in hateful expression, with an increased number of hate speech and hate crimes being recorded (Article 19, 2018[110]; ECRI, 2025[111]). 94% of OECD Members, including Australia, prohibit hate speech, defined by the OECD for the purposes of comparative analysis broadly as any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour – both online and offline – that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are and aims to incite discrimination or violence towards that person or group (e.g. based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent or other identity factors). As such, hate speech is considered a lawful restriction to freedom of expression in the vast majority of OECD Members. In recent years, many OECD Members have increased their efforts to combat hate speech, especially online (OECD, 2022[23]).

However, effectively addressing challenges related to the spread of hate speech remains a challenge across the OECD Membership reflecting the difficulty of reconciling two fundamental democratic objectives: protecting vulnerable groups from harmful attacks and ensuring their full participation in public life, while preserving freedom of expression and preventing responses that could lead to undue censorship or chill legitimate public discourse. According to the ICCPR, restrictions on the right to free speech must be provided by law, be narrowly defined to serve a legitimate interest, and be necessary in a democratic society to protect that interest. International guidance suggest that hateful expression may only be prohibited where it clearly amounts to incitement to hatred or discrimination (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 2013[112]; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2015[113]). Clear distinctions should be made between the types of expression that are sanctioned by criminal law, by civil law or do not meet any legal threshold (OHCHR, 2013[114]). Furthermore, international guidance suggests hateful expression should only be criminalised in serious cases and that less serious cases should be addressed by means other than criminal law (UN, 2019[115]).

The complexity of the issue requires governments to develop varied and holistic approaches to addressing challenges related to the spread of hate, in collaboration with citizens, civil society and expert groups (OECD, 2024[27]). As part of its commitment to strengthening social cohesion, the Australian Government promotes a zero-tolerance approach to hate (Department of Home Affairs, n.d.[116]; Australian Federal Police, n.d.[117]; Attorney-General's Department, n.d.[118]). In recent years, it has strengthened existing frameworks and has put in place several additional legal protections and non-legislative measures to tackle hate as a recognised obstacle to a free and equal democratic society.

Legal protections as the baseline to ensure safe and equal participation in public life

In Australia, a range of federal and state and territory anti-discrimination laws offer protection from hate and discrimination. At the federal level, this includes the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, Age Discrimination Act 2004, Disability Discrimination Act 1992, the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 and other laws (Commonwealth of Australia, n.d.[12]). At the state and territory level, anti-discrimination and equal opportunity acts set out the prohibited grounds of discrimination and the contexts or areas of activity in which discrimination is prohibited. In addition, the three human rights statutes in the ACT, Queensland, and Victoria protect the right to equality before the law, including the right to enjoy a person’s human rights without distinction or discrimination of any kind, the right to the equal protection of the law without discrimination and the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground (ACT Government, 2025[80]; Queensland Government, 2023[79]; Victorian Government, 2022[78]).

As is the case in most OECD Members, “hate speech” per se is not defined in Australian law. Rather, Australian anti-discrimination laws at federal and state and territory level prohibit public acts that incite hatred or violence against others due to their particular characteristics through provisions commonly referred to as anti-vilification laws. At federal level, section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, makes it unlawful to publicly commit an act that is reasonably likely to offend, insult, humiliate, or intimidate another person or group based on their race, colour, or national or ethnic origin. Exemptions exist for acts done for artistic, academic, scientific or other public interest purposes made in good faith. These provisions are generally enforceable through complaints to Australian federal and state and territory human rights bodies, which can investigate and attempt to the resolve the matter or refer it to a court for further action.

Moreover, criminal law provisions at federal and state and territory level prohibit certain speech. Concretely, Division 80 of the federal Criminal Code contains several offences related to advocating or threatening violence against people due to their membership in particular groups. Protected characteristics include race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, nationality, national or ethnic origin, political opinion, and other bases. The codified offences criminalise advocating or threatening violence against these protected groups, members of the groups and their close associates.4 The law further prohibits advocating or threatening damage to property of protected groups and places of worship, as well as the public display or trading of prohibited symbols (Attorney-General's Department, 2025[119]).

In recent years a significant number of amendments were introduced at federal level and in several states and territories, expanding the scope of civil protections, criminalised hate speech and other hate crimes. These amendments were introduced primarily in response to a surge in antisemitic occurrences in Australia (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2025[20]; Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2026[120]). At the federal level, this notably included the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Act 2023 and the Criminal Code Amendment (Hate Crimes) Act 2025.

In January 2026, in the wake of the Bondi terrorist attack, federal criminal laws were further strengthened via the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism (Criminal and Migration Laws) Act 2026. The amendments significantly widen the scope of criminal laws, including by lowering the threshold to capture additional behaviours and levels of intent and by increasing penalties. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the most significant developments at federal level since 2023.

Table 2.1. Overview of the recent key amendments to Australian Commonwealth hate crime laws

Legislative reform	Key amendments
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Act 2023	Creation of new offences related to displaying or trading in prohibited Nazi and prohibited organisation symbols.
Criminal Code Amendment (Hate Crimes) Act 2025	Introduction of mandatory minimum sentences of 1 year for display of prohibited symbols. Expansion of offences to criminalise ‘advocating’ force or violence against specific groups, members of those groups and their close associates, capturing conduct that is ‘reckless’ as to whether force or violence occurs, and no longer requiring an intention that the force or violence actually occurs. Creation of new offences, including advocating or threatening damage to, or destruction of, places of worship or property owned or occupied by members of a protected group or their close associates. and, particular to groups distinguished by race, religion or ethnic origin, offence of advocating force or violence against a group through causing damage to property (which includes minor damage such as painting a slogan on a building).
Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism (Criminal and Migration Laws) Act 2026	Increase of maximum penalties for most codified hate offences by 2-3 years. Creation of a listing framework for prohibited hate groups, which directly engaged in, prepared, planned, assisted or advocated for conduct constituting a hate crime. Creation of new offences for directing the activities or membership of a prohibited hate group, as well as recruiting, training, providing support to or getting funds for such a group. Creation of aggravated offences, including for offences committed in the capacity as a religious, spiritual leader or secular leader and for offences for adults who radicalise children. Strengthening provisions related to prohibition of certain symbols, including e.g. by expanding the list of symbols to capture symbols of prohibited hate groups (in addition to terrorist organisations) and reversing burden of proof.

Note: This list is not exhaustive, it provides an overview of the main legislative changes relevant to this review.

Source: (Parliament of Australia, 2023[121]; Australian Human Rights Commission, 2025[20]; Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2026[120]).

With the exception of the Northern Territory and the ACT, state and territory criminal codes criminalise certain types of hateful expression, while hate motivation is also commonly considered an aggravating factor for other crimes. In recent years all subnational jurisdictions with hate-related criminal offences introduced offences related to the display of Nazi symbols. Many have also recently expanded the list of protected characteristics in relevant civil anti-vilification as well as criminal laws, filling previous gaps in protection.

Following several years of consideration and debate, including a public inquiry and consultation processes, Victoria introduced a comprehensive reform of both its civil and criminal hate speech laws through the Justice Legislation Amendment (Anti-vilification and Social Cohesion) Bill 2024 (Vic) (see Box 2.12). The law expanded the list of protected characteristics for both civil and criminal provisions, introduced criminal offences related to inciting or threatening physical harm or property damage based on a protected characteristic, increased penalties for criminal conduct and enabled the refusal of bail for the offence of publicly performing a Nazi gesture (Victorian Government, 2026[122]).

In NSW, several legislative reforms since 2022 have tightened restrictions on hateful expression.5 Amendments passed in 2025 introduced a new offence for displaying Nazi symbols near places of worship, intentionally blocking, harassing, intimidating or threatening people leaving places of worship. Reforms also included the introduction of a new criminal offence for inciting racial hatred (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2025[20]). Reforms passed in response to the Bondi terrorist attack in NSW’s capital Sydney just a few days following the incident, increased the maximum penalty for the display of prohibited symbols and introduced restrictions pertaining to public assemblies (see Section 0) (Parliament of New South Wales, 2025[123]).

These examples showcase a clear trend in Australia towards strengthening hate speech legislation, in response to the abovementioned recent increase in hateful expression and conduct. Most OECD Members tend to criminalise certain types of hate speech and provide prison sentences for serious cases involving incitement to hatred or violence (OECD, 2022[23]; European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024[124]; NSW Law Reform Commission, 2024[125]). However, research indicates that there is significant variation between OECD Members on how hate-related conduct, including hate speech and hate crimes, is defined in legislation and how relevant provisions are applied (Article 19, 2018[110]; OECD, 2022[23]). According to the latest available OECD data, 84% of OECD Members criminalise incitement to violence and 78% criminalise hate speech in accordance with their national definition (OECD, 2022[23]). 28% of OECD Members that had hate speech legislation in place, provided for punishment through fines and imprisonment of up to 2 years. In 50% of OECD Members, the punishment is more severe and amounts to a minimum of between 3 months and 4 years, and a maximum of between 3 and 8 years of imprisonment. As in Australia, high penalties are usually applied to cases of a serious nature, including where an organised group commits the act, incitement is carried out via the media or otherwise published, or where incitement leads to or involves violence or clearly endangers public order and safety (OECD, 2022[23]).

As mentioned above, international expert bodies and non-governmental actors have regularly stressed that strict hate speech laws can constitute potential threats to civic space and particularly freedom of expression (Article 19, 2020[126]; UN, 2019[115]; Article 19, 2018[110]). When definitions of hate speech are overly broad, this risks arbitrary application of the laws which can restrict speech too widely. This is particularly pertinent for criminal offences, which according to international guidance should be seen as a last resort measure and only capture behaviours that include the elements of incitement to hatred, violence or discrimination (OHCHR, 2013[114]). When ill-designed, prohibitions and sanctions on hate speech may therefore fail to meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality in upholding freedom of expression with the rights to equality and non-discrimination. Even when not widely applied in practice, these laws can then have a range of unintended consequences, including a chilling effect on the legitimate exercise of civic freedoms, thereby stifling democratic engagement and open public discourse.

In Australia, there is broad agreement among the public and consulted stakeholders that there is a need to respond to the rise in discriminatory language and attacks. Many therefore support the objective and purpose of the new hate speech laws. However, the design and potential implications of certain provisions introduced in recent years have garnered criticism from some CSOs, rights bodies and experts. These stakeholders have raised concerns both about the proportionality and effectiveness of these measures in curbing hate. Concretely, the use of broad and vague wording in some cases, combined with the imposition of minimum penalties for certain offences, as well as the increase of maximum penalties for others, is seen as creating risks for unintended consequences, including the potential chilling effects on legitimate forms of expression such as journalistic reporting, academic research and broader civic engagement (Human Rights Law Centre, 2025[127]; Methven, 2026[96]; NSW Law Reform Commission, 2024[125]; Commonwealth of Australia, 2024[128]).

Moreover, some of the new federal criminal provisions rely on definitions of offences set out in state and territory laws. Given variations across jurisdictions, this may create legal uncertainty and could lead to uneven application of hate-related criminal laws across Australia (Twomey, 2026[129]). In this context, the AHRC and certain experts reiterated the need for harmonisation between relevant federal and state and territory laws (de Kretser, 2026[22]; Twomey, 2026[129]). Governmental stakeholders consulted for the purposes of this review have also pointed out that improving coherence among relevant laws could also help improve their application, both on the side of government and amongst the public.

Against this background, there have been calls for increased legal certainty, clarity and harmonisation across and between federal and state and territory laws governing protections against hate and discrimination. As outlined in Section 2.2, Australia has dedicated safeguards in place to ensure that limitations on protected freedoms, are necessary, appropriate and proportionate. Most notably, parliamentary scrutiny frameworks require that all new legislative instruments be accompanied by a statement of compatibility, which assesses the compatibility of the legislation with protected rights and freedoms. This mechanism enables governments to assess whether draft laws on hate speech might unduly restrict civic freedoms, including the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. There are also select examples of ex post evaluation, for instance in relation to some of the recent amendments at the federal level and in NSW made in 2026 (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2026[120]; Penry, 2026[130]).

Australian governments and lawmakers also generally recognise the importance of greater legal coherence across jurisdictions. Several reform texts, including at the Commonwealth level, have explicitly cited alignment with laws in other jurisdictions as a key objective (Parliament of Australia, 2023[121]). Moreover, the Australian Government has made targeted investments to improve relevant legal frameworks based on in-depth reviews in recent years, including the review and modernisation of the Sex Discrimination Act and the Disability Discrimination Act (Attorney-General's Department, n.d.[21]; Department of Health, Disability and Ageing, 2024[131]).

These institutional safeguards and reform efforts underline Australia’s commitment to creating and maintaining effective protections against hate and discrimination. However, there is an opportunity for Australia to further institutionalise systematic legislative review processes for hate- and discrimination related laws. In this context it is particularly important to consider the entire patchwork of legal protections, including both the civil anti-vilification and criminal hate speech provisions, the roles different provisions play and how they interact (Commonwealth of Australia, 2024[128]; NSW Law Reform Commission, 2024[125]; OHCHR, 2013[114]; OECD, 2024[27]). OECD guidance emphasises the importance of continuous review of key laws impacting civic space, to ensure they remain fit for purpose, restrictions on civic freedoms align with international guidance and norms, and unintended or indirect consequences are identified and addressed (OECD, 2024[27]). This is particularly relevant in a rapidly changing context characterised by technological advancements and shifting patterns of civic engagement (see Chapter 1), where governments require adaptive tools and mechanisms to respond effectively. Especially complex policy areas such as hate speech regulation, where restrictions must meet strict requirements of necessity and proportionality in reconciling other fundamental rights, underscore the need for ongoing review.

While recognising the constraints posed by Australia’s federated structure, a more systematic, comprehensive and holistic approach to regularly reviewing and reforming hate- and discrimination-related laws in line with international standards and guidance could therefore be beneficial. Such an approach can help ensure the overall legal framework governing hate speech, and how it is applied in practice adequately safeguards freedom of expression and does not unintentionally restrict open public discourse. Consistent harmonisation of laws can also help reduce complexity and inconsistency, consequently reducing the administrative burden for governments and producing a clearer legal framework for the general public.

In Australia, this effort could be supported and co-ordinated by the SCAG, as seen in regard to the revision and harmonisation of defamation laws in an effort to better protect free speech and freedom of the press (see Box 2.11). Following the Bondi terrorist attack, in an extraordinary joint meeting with the Police Ministers Council, the SCAG agreed to convene federal and state and territory public officials, as well as the eSafety Commissioner and Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism to discuss measures to address antisemitism (SCAG, 2026[132]). The SCAG also mapped jurisdictions’ different responses to antisemitism and islamophobia in civil and criminal law (SCAG, 2026[133]). Building on these important steps, the work of the SCAG could be further expanded to map, review and propose opportunities to better address all types of hate in Australia in manner that reconciles different fundamental rights. The PJCHR and equivalent or similar bodies in states and territories with a legislative scrutiny mandate could be involved in this effort, to ensure the review and revision of relevant legislation is compatible with human rights obligations. Any reform efforts should also take into account the results of the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, expected in December 2026.

Box 2.11. Development and modernisation of model defamation provisions across Australian states and territories

Recognising the need to balance the protection of personal reputations with the fundamental right to freedom of expression and seeking to adapt legal frameworks to the realities of modern digital communication, Australian states and territories engaged in a co-ordinated effort to modernise their Model Defamation Provisions. While responsibility for defamation law falls to individual states and territories, the federal government prompted this effort towards a national approach. To this end, the former Council of Attorneys-General (CAG) convened a dedicated Defamation Working Group in 2018 to review the provisions. Political agreement across the jurisdictions was reached through a structured, collaborative process driven by the CAG and the SCAG. This involved releasing discussion papers and exposure drafts for public feedback, alongside wide-ranging consultations with media companies, legal experts, peak bodies, academics and digital platforms. A first reform led to the introduction of a serious harm threshold, as well as a statutory public interest defence to safeguard journalism, while a second set of reforms focused on ensuring a balanced approach for digital intermediaries and additionally introduced absolute privilege when reporting misconduct to the police or complaints-handling bodies.

Source: (Department of Communities and Justice, 2024[134]; Rule of Law Education Centre, 2023[135]; Wotton Kearney, 2024[136]).

OECD research also underlines that in order to increase broad acceptability, legitimacy and effectiveness and to avoid overall unintended consequences, legislative reform governing hate speech should include adequate and meaningful participation opportunities (see Chapter 3). In relation to the most recent amendments at the federal level, rights bodies, experts and relevant stakeholders from civil society contended a lack of meaningful participation opportunities (Finlay, 2026[137]; de Kretser, 2026[22]; The Guardian, 2026[138]; Queensland Council for Civil Liberties, 2026[139]; Liberty Victoria; NSW Council for Civil Liberties, 2026[140]). The latter are especially important for controversial or complex issues with implications for individual freedoms and rights. Meaningfully involving a broad range of stakeholders, including citizens, affected communities, CSOs and subject-matter experts can play a crucial role. When conducted well, such participation opportunities can also offer the space for a broader conversation on tackling hate in society, touching on the respective roles of criminal law, civil provisions and non-legal measures, as seen for instance in Victoria and Finland (see Box 2.12).

Box 2.12. Australian and international examples of developing community-based solutions to tackling hate

Multi-year consultation process on Victoria’s 2024 hate speech reform

The legislative reform of Victoria’s anti-vilification framework was preceded by a multi-stage, participatory consultation process combining formal parliamentary inquiry, public consultation, and targeted engagement.

• Inquiry into Anti-Vilification Protections (2021): The inquiry gathered extensive evidence through submissions and public hearings with key stakeholders including police, legal experts and advocacy organisations. It was further informed by parallel consultations conducted by the Victorian Multicultural Commission, which involved regional advisory meetings with hundreds of community representatives, ensuring geographically and socially varied input into the reform process. The inquiry documented widespread experiences of vilification and issued 36 recommendations for reform.

• Public consultation on reform options: The inquiry was followed by a government commitment to further consultation. Written submissions were invited and survey responses on key reform options summarised in three distinct consultation papers on the coverage of protections, criminal provisions and civil protections. This broad public consultation, which over the course of four months drew 619 survey responses and 122 written submissions, was complemented by targeted discussions.

• A second public consultation then took place on the proposed provisions of the Justice Legislation Amendment (Anti-vilification and Social Cohesion) Act 2024.

The consultation findings informed the subsequent legislative reforms, which expanded protected attributes, introduced new criminal offences, and strengthened civil protections, while maintaining safeguards for freedom of expression.

Finland’s Citizen’s Panel on Freedom of Expression

Commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice as part of the OECD Civic Space Scan of Finland, the Citizens’ Panel on the Freedom of Expression gathered 29 selected volunteer citizens for three days in 2021 to discuss how to protect people in public professions from hate speech and to safeguard free expression of opinion, resulting in a collective public statement and 25 recommendations.

Participants heard from victims of online shaming and experts and had access to supporting materials. Finnish ministries supported the process by situating the discussion in the context of related legislative work and recent administrative activities. Since the Panel, Finland has enacted specific reforms around their hate offences frameworks, especially aimed at countering threats and online harassment affecting public officials, journalists, researchers and others.

Source: (Legislative Assembly Legal and Social Issues Committee, 2021[141]; Victorian Multicultural Commission, 2021[142]; Victorian Government, 2021[143]; Engage Victoria, 2023[144]; Engage Victoria, 2024[145]; Victorian Government, 2026[122]; Jäske et al., 2021[146]).

Going beyond legislative measures to holistically address hate

The policy debate in Australia has also focused on the need to go beyond legislative measures to effectively tackle hate and discrimination. According to relevant stakeholders, this should include a focus on prevention and addressing the root causes, as well as improving the application of existing protections to achieve the intended policy aim of strengthening social cohesion (de Kretser, 2026[22]; NSW Law Reform Commission, 2024[125]). International guidance states multi-stakeholder initiatives and focus on education, nurturing tolerance and constructive public debate are essential tools to address the challenges of hate speech while reducing the risks of chilling effect on freedom of expression (OHCHR, 2013[114]; UN, 2019[115]). Furthermore, research shows that while legal frameworks on hate speech are relatively well established in OECD Member countries, underreporting remains a common challenge. Less serious cases of hateful expression which do not meet the threshold of civil or criminal illegality are extremely prevalent and damaging, therefore requiring governments to respond to hate through a wide range of measures (OECD, 2022[23]; OECD, 2024[37]). This can include developing strategies to counter discrimination and hate, supporting dedicated equality bodies and improving data collection and monitoring (OECD, 2024[27]).

In Australia, in addition to handling or referring individual complaints related to discrimination and hate, the AHRC has functions related to addressing systemic discrimination. As part of this broader mandate, the AHRC was commissioned by the Australian government in October 2022 to undertake work to tackle racism and promote racial equality in Australia, providing AUD 7.5 Million over four years (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2022[147]). With this funding, the AHRC developed the National Anti-Racism Framework, which was published in 2024 and provides a roadmap for the government, as well as businesses and the broader population, on addressing all forms of racism in Australia. It was developed in consultation with 1200 people with experience of racism across Australia, as well as with the inputs of First Nations people based on their experience of systemic and structural racism (Muralidharan, Hosseini and Arashiro, 2024[148]; First Nations Co., n.d.[149]).

The framework calls for the establishment of a National Anti-Racism Taskforce, to be made up of civil society and cross-jurisdictional government leaders and to oversee the implementation of the framework (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024[105]). This recommendation by the AHRC responds to its previous assessment that current anti-racism work done by the Australian government at different levels tends to be undertaken in ad hoc and disjointed manner, lacking a whole of government approach (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024[150]). Although broader in scope, a mapping of the government’s social cohesion initiatives – some but not all of which aim to address hate – conducted by the Department of Home Affairs Office for Social Cohesion equally found that stronger national co-ordination and leadership is required for a more coherent approach to strengthening social cohesion (Commonwealth of Australia, 2025[51]).

Some cross-government co-ordination mechanisms, multi-stakeholder forums and other strategic initiatives relevant to countering hate exist, such as the First Secretaries Group, the Social Cohesion Working Group and the Australian Multicultural Council. In response to the uptick in antisemitic and Islamophobic incidents, in 2024, the Australian Government also appointed a Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism and shortly afterwards a Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia (The Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia, 2025[151]; Australia's Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism, 2025[152]). In response to the Bondi terrorist attack, the Australian Government established a Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion. The Royal Commission will make recommendations to tackle antisemitism, examine the circumstances surrounding the Bondi attack and make recommendations to strengthen social cohesion and counter ideologically and religiously motivated extremism in Australia. It will deliver its final report by December 2026 (Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, 2026[153]). In the context of these recent efforts, stakeholders are increasingly promoting a strengths-based approach to tackling hate and fostering social cohesion, emphasising the value of multiculturalism and the importance of building on existing cultural, community, and relational strengths (Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, 2026[154]).

Building on existing structures, there is an opportunity for the Australian Government to further invest in a coherent and strategic approach to tackling hate and fostering social cohesion. A strategic approach can take various forms depending on the concrete context, needs and priorities in Australia. Across the OECD Membership, governments are taking various approaches to tackling hate and discrimination in a holistic and strategic manner. For instance, several OECD Member countries have introduced national policies, strategies, agendas or action plans to promote equality and inclusion, some of which are embedding in broader government plans on democratic resilience, social cohesion or human rights, while others are stand-alone documents with a concrete focus on countering racism or other forms of discrimination and hate (OECD, 2025[155]).

In several OECD countries, efforts are supported by methods of co-ordinating across ministries, though horizontal co-ordination across national government policy departments is more common than co-ordination between national and subnational levels (OECD, 2025[155]). Some OECD Members have further pursued initiatives to foster a whole-of-society approach to tackling hate, as for instance seen in the example of New Zealand’s Harmony Accords. Box 2.13 provides further details on select examples of strategic approaches and related governance mechanisms from OECD countries.

Box 2.13. International examples of strategic and co-ordinated approaches to tackling hate

Canada’s anti-racism strategy and anti-hate action plan

Canada's response to the rising threat of hate crimes and incidents is guided by two complementary, whole-of-government frameworks. “Changing Systems, Transforming Lives: Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy 2024-2028” provides the overarching framework for addressing systemic racism and advancing equity across sectors. Complementing this approach, “Canada's Action Plan on Combatting Hate” focuses on preventing and responding to the specific threat of hate affecting at-risk communities.

The Action Plan addresses both criminal hate offences and non-criminal hate incidents offline and online. Its objective is to prevent hate and social fragmentation, protect targeted populations, and foster community resilience and trust through three strategic pillars:

• Empowering communities to identify and prevent hate (e.g. through funding for community-based anti-hate projects and Special Envoys on Combatting Islamophobia and Antisemitism)

• Supporting victims and survivors and protecting communities (e.g. through providing financial assistance to victims of hate-motivated crimes and enhancing security for Pride festivals)

• Building community trust, partnerships, and institutional readiness (e.g. through task forces and information resource hubs and enhancing police training)

Canadian Heritage monitors and reports on the implementation of the Action Plan across the government. Participating federal institutions are required to develop their own performance measurement frameworks, prioritising the collection of disaggregated data. A Ministerial Advisory Council on Combatting Hate provides an ongoing mechanism to gather direct feedback from experts and community leaders regarding the plan's implementation.

New Zealand’s Harmony Accords

In response to global conflicts and the impact it was having on local communities, New Zealand’s Ministry for Ethnic Communities played a convening and facilitative role in the in the development of New Zealand’s Harmony Accord. The Accord is a voluntary agreement between Muslim and Jewish community organisations in New Zealand, setting out a shared commitment to promote understanding, reject all forms of hate and extremism, and strengthen social cohesion through ongoing dialogue and co-operation. The Ministry’s role has been to create the conditions for enduring dialogue and collaboration between community organisations, while ensuring that both the initiatives under the Accord, and the pace at which they progress, are led by the community organisations themselves.

As a voluntary, values-based agreement, the Accord is designed to enable dialogue and mutual understanding, not to prescribe views or outcomes. By centring leadership within the communities themselves, the role of government is positioned as enabling rather than directing. This helps avoid perceptions of top-down “social engineering”, and instead supports an approach where initiatives are authentic, durable, and grounded in lived experience, even when that means progress is incremental rather than rapid.

Looking ahead, the Accord is intended to evolve over time, with community leaders continuing to shape its next steps and expand participation, ensuring that progress remains grounded in shared ownership. Through its involvement, the Ministry has positioned the Accord as an evolving and inclusive platform, reinforcing New Zealand’s broader commitment to diversity, respect, and belonging as core elements of a stable and cohesive society.

Source: (Canadian Heritage, 2024[156]; Government of Canada, 2024[157]; Ministry for Ethnic Communities, 2025[158]).

To inform the effectiveness of such a strategic approach, regularly published data and analysis are crucial to adequately assess ongoing trends and raise awareness, including related to root causes, perpetrators, victims. Different data sources can complement each other, to give a full picture of the prevalence of hateful incidents – both illegal and those that do not meet the threshold – as well as online and offline. This can include reports and analysis from social media platforms, independent regulators, CSOs, academia, research institutes and governmental actors, such as independent complaints mechanisms and law enforcement authorities (OECD, 2024[37]).

The Australian Government has increasingly focused on improving data collection on hateful conduct through a range of investments, and in collaboration with academia, research institutions and civil society. These efforts respond to experts, as well as civil society and community-led advocacy campaigns, which have pointed to the need for better hate-related data in recent years (Tackling Hate, n.d.[159]; Islamophobia Register Australia, 2025[109]; NSW Law Reform Commission, 2024[125]). Notably, the Australian Government recently established a National Hate Crimes Database, the first phase of which was launched in December 2025 (see Box 2.14). The Australian government also funds data collection and research initiatives on hate and discrimination conducted by civil society and researchers, such as the Tackling Hate Lab (Tackling Hate, 2026[160]).

Box 2.14. Data, research and analysis on hate in Australia and other OECD Members

Australia’s National Hate Crimes Database

In 2025, the Australian federal and state and territory governments agreed to work together to establish a national hate crimes and incidents database, to allow the government to better understand the prevalence and impact of hate crimes and develop better-targeted responses. Developed by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), the initiative's first phase was launched in December 2025. It features a dashboard that reports on hate-related offences recorded by federal, state and territory police agencies in cases where an offender has been formally charged.

Currently, in the absence of uniform hate crime legislation, the database captures offences identified as hate-related under differing jurisdictional frameworks, limiting comparability across states and territories. Moreover, offences are not currently disaggregated by specific hate motivations. Moving forward, the AIC will continue to work with data-providing police agencies to expand the scope of the data available on the dashboard. Further advancements of the database could be informed by the German example centralising across a federated system.

Germany’s Centralised registration and monitoring of politically motived crime

In 2001, the German police created a dedicated Criminal Police Registration Service for Cases of Politically Motivated Crime (KPMD-PMK), covering crimes associated with the far-right, far-left, religious ideologies, hate crimes and any other politically motivated crimes. Case numbers are collected by the police at state level and sent to the Federal Criminal Police Office for monitoring and publishing once a year.

Source: (Australian Institute of Criminology, n.d.[161]; Federal Ministry of Interior, n.d.[162]).

Access to quality data can also help governments develop more effective prevention and response methods. By illustrating the pathways between reporting, police recording and prosecutions of cases of hate speech, authorities and legislators can better understand the extent of the problem and better respond to the needs of victims, including by facilitating access to justice (OECD, 2024[37]). This is particularly relevant, as underreporting remains a key challenge, both in Australia and globally due to factors such as fear of retaliation, a lack of trust in reporting mechanisms and the normalisation of such behaviour (NSW Law Reform Commission, 2024[125]; Pezzella, Fetzer and Keller, 2019[163]; EU Fundamental Rights Agency, 2021[164]).

Beyond supporting the reporting and prosecution of hate crimes, data on the type, prevalence, frequency and sources of hateful incidents can help to shed light on the problem and raise awareness across the broader public. Australian federal and state and territory governments already provide a wealth of online resources on hate speech and crimes, including for instance multi-language explanatory videos (NSW Police Force, n.d.[165]), aimed at educating the public about what constitutes illegal hateful conduct and access to remedies, facilitating reporting (Attorney-General's Department, 2025[119]; Australian Federal Police, n.d.[117]; Department of Home Affairs, n.d.[116]). Several federal and state-level public communication initiatives further promote a whole-of-society approach to tackling hate by reinforcing narratives of social unity (Department of Home Affairs, 2020[166]; Premier of Victoria, 2024[167]; NSW Government, n.d.[168]; Multicultural NSW, 2025[169]). Building on these important initiatives, and in line with forthcoming OECD work on using public communication to build common ground, the Australian Government could further enhance its efforts in this regard (OECD, forthcoming[170]).

2.5.2. Addressing the specificities of online hate

Online hate speech has become increasingly prevalent across OECD countries, including in Australia, facilitated by the spread of content across social media platforms (OECD, 2024[171]) (eSafety Commissioner, 2024[172]). These types of hateful discourse undermine both the public’s ability and willingness to engage constructively in democratic debate. Systematically addressing online hate speech and fostering a healthy information environment based on the protection of freedom of expression and open democratic discourse is therefore a precondition of democratic engagement and social cohesion, yet it remains a complex task that poses challenges across the OECD Membership.

Australia has long been proactive in trying to promote online safety and protect online civic space (Box 2.15). The Australian government recognises online hate speech as a threat to Australian democracy, on the ground that it silences targeted populations and restricts their participation in democratic processes. As in most OECD Members, online hate speech is not mentioned explicitly. Rather, the described civil and criminal offences codified in federal and state and territory laws apply to the dissemination of hateful expression regardless of the medium and in a technology-neutral manner. Additionally, the Online Safety Act 2021 establishes regulatory pathways for different categories of online harm which cover online hate speech (Australian Government, 2021[173]). Recognising the disproportionate impact of online hate on certain groups, the act prioritises protecting vulnerable communities (Commonwealth of Australia Explanatory Memoranda, 2021[174]).

Box 2.15. Australia’s leading role on online safety and protecting online civic space

eSafety Commissioner as one of the world’s first dedicated online safety government organisations

With the establishment of the eSafety Commissioner in 2015, Australia was one of the first countries to establish a dedicated government organisation for online safety. The eSafety Commissioner is a single statutory office that concentrates regulatory authority and provides specialised expertise in digital platform governance and online harm mitigation. It works in close collaboration with the Department of Communications, which leads the policy development for online safety (Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts, 2021[175]). The eSafety Commissioner operates as an independent regulator with powers to investigate complaints, issue legally binding removal notices, and impose financial penalties on non-compliant platforms (Australian Government, 2021[173]).

Australia’s social media ban for children

Australia also provides for specific protections for children from online harm which are continuously being improved. Currently, the OAIC is developing a Children’s Online Privacy Code, as set out in the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (OAIC, 2026[176]). The Online Safety Act's protective framework for children includes a “cyberbullying scheme” and has recently been further expanded through age-based access measures. The Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Act 2024 establishes a minimum age of 16 years for access to social media, requiring platforms to take reasonable steps to prevent access by younger users. This measure is the first of its kind globally and went into effect in December 2025, with potential fines up to AUD 49.5 million for platforms that fail to comply (Australian Government, 2025[177]).

The reform has sparked nuanced debate in Australia around the need to protect children from online harm, while upholding their right to freedom of expression. Research commissioned by the government found support for age assurance methods to control access of children to online services, with nine in ten adults being at least somewhat supportive (Social Research Centre, 2024[178]). On the other hand, civil rights bodies and groups have warned that a blanket minimum age could curtail young people’s ability to communicate and participate in public life on an equal basis compared to adults, particularly in remote and marginalised communities (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024[179]). In addition, and as acknowledged in the act as one of the key implementation challenges, age verification technologies raise privacy concerns, as they may require collection of sensitive personal information (Australian Government, 2024[180]).

Initial monitoring and reporting by the eSafety Commissioner indicates that while millions of accounts have been removed or restricted since December 2025, children under 16 continue to find ways around the restrictions and compliance concerns persist, with more research needed to better understand the implementation of the measure in practice (eSafety Commissioner, 2026[181]; eSafety Commissioner, 2026[182]).

Note: The office was initially established as the Children’s eSafety Commissioner under the Enhancing Online Safety Act 2015 and since operates under an expanded mandate defined by the Online Safety Act 2021. The Online Safety Act 2021, which governs the eSafety Commissioner’s mandate, was introduced in response to the Briggs Review, a government-commissioned evaluation, which found that the previous reliance on platform self-regulation meant that platforms operated reactively rather than proactively, content moderation standards varied significantly across digital platforms, and digital platforms provided minimal public information about their content moderation decisions (Briggs, 2019[183]).

The Online Safety Act addresses online hate speech through the “adult cyber abuse pathway”, which covers content targeting individual Australian adults that is both intended to cause serious physical or psychological harm that goes beyond ordinary emotional reactions and is menacing, harassing or offensive. Whether the material – which can include posts, comments, emails, messages, memes, images and videos – meets the threshold of being seriously harmful is based on the content's nature, the target's vulnerability, as well as the context. This is decided on a case-by-case basis and in its regulatory guidance, the Commissioner provides a non-exhaustive list of behaviours which may constitute seriously harmful abuse, including inciting, urging, encouraging, threatening, or inciting violence. This approach reflects the Act’s policy objective of protecting individuals from substantial harm and providing an effective redress mechanism without unduly restricting freedom of expression (eSafetyCommissioner, 2025[184]). To ensure standards related to data protection and the right to privacy, notably as set out in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), are upheld while addressing online hate, the eSafety Commissioner works closely with the OAIC (eSafety Commissioner, 2026[185]; OAIC, 2026[186])

The current Australian model provides individuals with an effective pathway to seek remedies for harms they have experienced. The Commissioner receives more than 3 600 complaints from adults regarding cyber abuse annually, and in 78% of cases in which the Commissioner made a request to service providers, the material was removed (Commonwealth of Australia, 2025[187]). However, the complaints-based approach does not require platforms to identify or mitigate systemic conditions that may impact participation in public discourse online (Electronic Frontiers Australia, 2026[188]).

In order to implement a more systematic approach, in November 2023, the government announced a statutory review of the Online Safety Act 2021, with the terms of reference specifically covering consideration of the introduction of a duty of care requirements towards users and ensuring the industry acts in the best interests of children on their services. The Australian government is still considering its responses to many of the review’s 67 recommendations issued in the final report but in November 2024, the government formally committed to introducing legislation to establish a Digital Duty of Care, aligned with approaches in the United Kingdom and European Union. Work on the relevant bill is ongoing, with a public consultation having been undertaken in November and December 2025.

Several OECD Members have put in place such frameworks in recent years, notably through the EU Digital Services Act and national regulation (OECD, 2024[27]). At the same time, the extent to which online platforms should be responsible for monitoring, removing or blocking illegal online content has been the subject of ongoing debate. Some strict or overly vague approaches by governments have garnered criticism for their potential to limit freedom of speech and OECD data further indicates that citizens expect platforms to clarify their content moderation policies and terms of service, provide clear guidance for users, ensure greater transparency regarding content removal and issue regular reports to mitigate such risks (OECD, 2022[189]; OECD, 2022[23]). In this context, identifying the scope of regulatory solutions and measures against online hate remains a challenge for OECD governments and platforms alike. By introducing graduated enforcement tools and equipping regulators with clear and detailed guidance on their application, the Australian Government can ensure the effective implementation of the systematic approach to addressing online harms under the envisaged Digital Duty of Care, while safeguarding freedom of expression in line with international guidance and avoiding disproportionate or undue restrictions on online public discourse.

2.6. Civic education – preparing all citizens for their role in public life

Key messages and recommendations

Australia has a strong civic education ecosystem recognising the importance of civic education for an informed and active citizenry. In the classroom, civics and citizenship education is a well-established part of the curriculum at a federal level. Outside the classroom, the federal government has put in place a number of initiatives to strengthen experiential civic education, and several innovative programmes are already established at the local level. These efforts are recognised by Australian citizens with almost two thirds of respondents to the Survey of Trust in Australian public services (TAPS) saying that the government is “good” or “very good” at helping people of all ages learn how democracy works. However, Australia is not immune to challenges, with studies showing a decrease in civics knowledge particularly for Year 10 students, while students’ perceptions of the importance of citizenship behaviours has slightly declined.

Continued efforts to broaden access to hands-on civic education opportunities and civics training for educators across jurisdictions and schools could further strengthen civic education outcomes.

Policy recommendations

To further promote civic education to prepare all citizens for their role in public life, the Australian Government could consider to:

• Expand and scale key civic education opportunities, including youth parliaments, youth councils, participatory budgeting, volunteering programmes and visits to democratic institutions, with a focus on ensuring participation by underheard groups.

• Further strengthen teacher capacity in civics and citizenship education by expanding the role of the Civics and Citizenship Education Hub, enhancing professional learning opportunities, further collaborating with state and territory governments to promote more consistent pre-service and in-service training for educators and supporting national communities of practice.

A well-functioning democracy relies on the knowledge, skills and engagement of its citizens (OECD, 2018[190]). The OECD defines civic education as education which aims to develop the skills, knowledge and attitudes required to be an active, democratic, responsible and critical citizen. The goal is to educate the population on democratic citizenship and make them aware of their rights and responsibilities (Borhan, 2025[191]). As such, all OECD countries include civic education as part of their curriculum, covering topics such as students’ knowledge of basic rights and duties as well key features of political institutions and the voting process (OECD, 2018[190]).

As covered in Chapter 1, recent trends across OECD countries show that the government-citizen interface is rapidly changing. Citizens are interacting with the government in new ways, while more conventional ways of participation are declining, including diminishing electoral engagement, lower volunteering rates and participation in organised civic activities. Furthermore, there are rising socio-economic and generational disparities when it comes to political involvement (Borhan, 2025[191]). In this context, many countries are promoting civic education as a means to foster a more active citizenry across the population.

The link between political knowledge - which civic education can help promote - on the one hand, and improvement of both the quality and quantity of participation in democratic processes on the other is well established (Luskin, 1987[192]; Luskin, 1990[193]; Zaller, 1992[194]; Desjardins, Schuller and Feinstein, 2006[195]). More specifically, civic education can also contribute to social cohesion efforts. The report of the T20 Task Force on Social Cohesion produced for the G20 Argentinian Presidency for example refers to the importance of offering “educational programmes providing students with the opportunity to engage in community work and association membership” (Grimalda and Tänzer, 2018[196]). The report further underlines how civic education can positively impact future volunteerism, political activity and attitudes towards civic participation.

Civic education is multifaceted and can be analysed in a variety of ways. From civic education curricula in schools, to lifelong “civic journeys”, instilling civic values from a young age can have positive effects in shaping citizens that remain active throughout their lives. Civic education is equally important for adults and recognised as an important prerequisite for a more skilled and adaptable society for all (Borhan, 2025[191]).

In Australia, significant efforts have taken place to ensure continuous civic education across the life journey, with Australian experts focusing on designing civic engagement around key transition points in particular with regards to young people, while also mobilising digital tools, creating purpose-built opportunities for mid-life and later-life stages and meeting people where they are regarding opportunities for civic learning (Ross et al., 2026[197]).

This section focuses on two specific aspects of civic education that could have a significant impact on civic engagement and by extension building trust and social cohesion in Australia, namely: (1) civic education for students beyond the classroom, or experiential civic education (understood as civic education which steers away from knowledge-transfer-based learning and towards learning practices which place children in the centre of the learning process); and (2) the continuous training of teachers of civic education, to increase their confidence and ability to both promote the civics knowledge of their students, and create an environment for more meaningful, open and respectful dialogue in the classroom, noting that certain decisions on training of educators lie with the states, territories and non-government education authorities and are therefore outside of the scope of this Review. Creating such an environment has been proven to be particularly meaningful in fostering political and civic engagement (Desjardins, Schuller and Feinstein, 2006[195]).

2.6.1. Civic education for students beyond the classroom

“Civics and citizenship” is a well-established part of the Australian curriculum at the federal level, further developed and implemented at the level of states and territories. The Australian Government has put in place several initiatives that promote civic education outside the classroom (see Box 2.16). Based on the most recent available OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) data on these categories from 2018, Australian students were above average on global competence matters which relate to civic education outcomes, including “respect people from other cultures”, “awareness of global issues” and “perspective-taking” (i.e. taking into account the position of their interlocutor in a discussion) (OECD, 2020[198]).

Table 2.2. Students’ attitudes and performance on the global competence cognitive

ISO code	Students' awareness of global issues	Students' self-efficacy regarding global issues	Students' perspective-taking	Students' interest in learning about other cultures	Students' respect for people from other cultures
	Mean Index	Mean Index	Mean Index	Mean Index	Mean Index
OECD average	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00
AUS	0.10	0.05	0.05	-0.03	0.19
AUT	-0.02	0.04	0.03	-0.15	-0.04
CAN	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.04	0.30
CHL	-0.10	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.08
COL	-0.14	0.15	-0.21	0.11	-0.34
EST	-0.01	-0.11	0.07	0.02	-0.06
FRA	0.05	0.07	-0.25	0.06	0.14
DEU	0.06	0.21	0.06	-0.18	0.16
GRC	0.28	0.11	-0.10	-0.04	-0.21
HUN	-0.05	-0.03	-0.17	-0.21	-0.54
ISL	-0.13	-0.11	0.08	-0.05	0.00
IRL	0.12	-0.03	0.14	-0.10	0.21
ISR¹	-0.15	0.05	-0.08	-0.09	m
ITA	-0.03	-0.16	-0.34	-0.25	-0.41
KOR	-0.26	0.16	0.22	-0.14	0.20
LVA	-0.14	-0.04	-0.19	0.02	-0.25
LTU	0.28	0.08	-0.23	0.09	-0.07
MEX	-0.04	0.09	0.17	0.29	0.20
NZL	-0.06	-0.08	0.00	0.03	0.17
POL	0.10	0.10	0.05	0.05	-0.13
PRT	0.20	0.01	0.17	0.14	0.16
GBR	0.09	-0.19	-0.07	-0.16	0.25
SVK	-0.16	-0.42	-0.24	-0.27	-0.46
SVN	-0.01	-0.10	0.05	-0.07	-0.03
ESP	0.03	-0.04	0.19	0.18	0.38
CHE	-0.12	0.02	-0.05	-0.10	0.08
TUR	0.13	0.03	0.25	0.65	0.08

1: The global competence sample from Israel does not include students in ultra-Orthodox schools and, thus, is not nationally representative.

Source: OECD (2020[198]), PISA 2018 Results (Volume VI): Are Students Ready to Thrive in an Interconnected World?, https://doi.org/10.1787/d5f68679-en.

However, based on the most recent Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) data from 2024, at the national level, Australian students’ knowledge, understanding of and skills in civics and citizenship have fallen since the last assessment undertaken in 2019. While average scores for Year 6 students were not significantly lower than the 2007 or 2004 cycles, the performance of Year 10 students has fallen to the lowest levels since the assessment began in 2004. At the same time, students’ perceptions of the importance of citizenship behaviours (understood as e.g. learning about what happens in other countries, discussing politics, taking part in protests, etc.) have also significantly decreased for almost all categories for both Year 6 and Year 10 students, compared to 2019 (ACARA, 2025[199]).

Looking at the latest Democracy Pulse Report from March 2026 (APSC, 2026[200]), two lessons emerge regarding citizens’ assessments of civic education as a democratic element. Firstly, the perceived performance of civic education is high, with 64.7% of respondents to the Survey of Trust in Australian public services (TAPS) saying that the government is “good” or “very good” at helping people of all ages learn how democracy works. The best-ranked democratic element is election fairness, with a satisfaction rate of 67.3%. The assessment of civic education has remained stable since 2023 and recent efforts on this field likely contributed to the improvement of public perceptions of democracy over the past few years: according to the Trust and Satisfaction in Australian Democracy National Survey, the proportion of people who declared themselves “very satisfied” with democracy went from 12% to 21% between June 2023 and March 2026, while the proportion of those neither satisfied nor dissatisfied fell over the same period (from 25% to 20%) and of those dissatisfied or very dissatisfied increased but by less than 2%.

Civic education is well established in Australia overall and several good practices exist, established by public institutions, civil society, as well as cultural institutions, such as museums and libraries (see Box 2.16). A prime example is the programmes offered by the Museum of Australian Democracy (MoAD) for students. The MoAD provides several learning programmes designed to empower students as “informed, active and engaged citizens,” with several in-person and online initiatives. It also provides toolkits and activities for schools, focusing on civic participation and media literacy. However, discrepancies can be observed between states and territories, with regards to both formal and informal civic engagement opportunities for students, as well as the presence of mandated instructional hours for Civics and Citizenship Education. Teachers, students and other stakeholders report that civics is often given little time or focus, and that content can be dry, lack relevance to students’ lives, and does not teach practical skills like how to vote. Furthermore, socio-economic status, age, geography and other factors influence the ability of students to engage with civic education materials (Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Parliament of Australia, 2025[201]). Regarding experiential civic education, recognised to contribute to an increase of confidence in understanding democratic practices and support long-term engagement, access also appears to be uneven across Australia (Fischer and Biddle, 2026[202]). In addition, ACARA reports that the share of students from Year 10 who reported participating in civic activities is lower than those in Year 6, suggesting that as schooling intensifies in other areas, civic and citizenship might be de-prioritised. The same source also reports a decrease in school-based civics activities between 2019 and 2024, with the largest decreases being reported in visits to parliaments or law courts (ACARA, 2025[199]). It should, however, be noted that this decrease in visits to physical locations coincided with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, and that several institutions provided online alternatives during this period.

The importance of civic education in self-reported understanding of Australian democracy, but also the increasing satisfaction with democracy in Australia (Australian Public Service Commission, 2023[203]) serve as proof of the value of these efforts. A prime example is the programmes offered by the Museum of Australian Democracy (MoAD) for students. The MoAD provides several learning programmes designed to empower students as “informed, active and engaged citizens,” with several in-person and online initiatives. It also provides toolkits and activities for schools, focusing on civic participation and media literacy.

Box 2.16. Selected good practices on civic education in Australia

Young Mayors Programme

Established by the Foundation for Young Australians (FYA), the Young Mayors programme allows people aged 11-17 to run for elections by their peers and work with local government to deliver projects and influence decisions affecting their communities. Partnering with local councils and the state Electoral Commission offices, they are encouraged to get involved in political decision making from an early age.

Youth Parliament programmes

At the national level, the Y Australia, a large social enterprise, and the Department of the House of representatives collaborate to host the “Young Parliament national programme”, held annually in every state and territory across Australia. It provides young people with a structured “mock parliament” experience with opportunities for youth representation in policymaking, bill drafting and debate. The programme also takes place at the local level.

Parliament of Victoria Youth Associates

The Victorian Parliament offers paid employment opportunities for young people to work at parliament, including on using digital tools for engagement, a young women’s forum, projects to connect with the deaf community, videos on youth leadership and graphic design.

Parliament tours and educational programmes

Each year, more than 100 000 school students visit Australia’s Parliament House to get first-hand knowledge of democracy and lawmaking. Visits include guided tours, an education programme and meet-ups with parliamentarians. The Parliamentary Education Office (PEO) also delivers digital and outreach programmes to students who are unable to visit parliament, particularly those in rural and remote areas, and provides support for teachers, including professional training and classroom resources.

Australian Electoral Commission’s (AEC) National Electoral Education Centre (NEEC)

Based at Old Parliament House in Canberra, the AEC’s National Electoral Education Centre (NEEC) delivers three cornerstone electoral education programmes – House of Representatives, Referendum, and Eligible Elector. Through 90-minute interactive educational sessions, the centre helps students and visitors gain a deeper understanding of the history of democracy and voting in Australia. Each visit includes an interactive activity, where students participate in a mock voting process. Each year, around 80 000 students participate in these curriculum-aligned programmes, which blend civic education with experiential learning opportunities that bring democratic processes to life.

AEC’s Teach the Vote and DemocraCity initiatives

Teach the Vote is an educational resource suite developed by the AEC to support students’ understanding of democracy and voting. The suite, which is available to schools and communities across Australia, includes four key components: ‘Get Voting’, ‘Democracy Rules’, ‘DemocraCity’, and teacher professional learning. These resources combine curriculum-aligned content, interactive learning activities, and professional development opportunities to strengthen civic and electoral education.

Central to the suite is DemocraCity, an interactive 3D game that enables students to participate in a virtual election, from the issuing of ballot papers through to voting and counting. Its use of digital technologies and gamification provides an engaging and innovative approach to teaching democratic processes and civic participation.

Initiatives from the National Archives of Australia

The National Archives of Australia supports civic, political and media literacy, empowering people to think critically and build a core understanding of democracy. This focus fosters deeper civics engagement and represents a prominent contribution to civic space to support citizen participation. Examples include curriculum-linked onsite and digital civics programmes, teacher professional development materials, research centres across all states and territories, online access to over 54 million archival records, touring exhibitions, webinars, guided tours and social media campaigns marking democratic milestones

Source: (Foundation for Young Australians, 2026[204]; The Y Australia, 2026[205]; Parliament of Victoria, 2026[206]; Parliamentary Education Office, 2026[207]; Australian Electoral Commission, 2026[208]; Australian Electoral Commission, 2026[209]; National Archives of Australia, 2026[210]).

Australia could build on and scale existing good practices to increase their impact. The Commonwealth could provide national (co-)funding to, and increase collaboration with, local councils and electoral commissions to expand youth participation initiatives across Australia, such as the youth mayors and youth parliaments programmes. To promote civic education for all, the federal government could further put in place a requirement to include traditionally underheard groups (e.g. students from rural areas) in such initiatives to benefit from this funding. Furthermore, the Australian Government could aim to expand participation in digital, outreach and onsite programmes delivered by the NEEC, MoAD and the PEO. This could be done by increasing travel support to enable students from all States and Territories to participate in-person, through the existing Parliament and Civic Education Rebate (PACER) mechanism that supports Years 4-12 student visits to Canberra’s national civic institutions, as well as by increasing the human capacity working in the relevant institutions.

The Australian Government could also consider piloting a national youth participatory budgeting initiative involving young people in deciding how funding is allocated. Such efforts often take place at the local level (see Box 2.17) but the federal government can have an important role to play, either through allocating earmarked funding for participatory budgeting, or in providing capacity- building and guidance to public officials at the local level. Encouraging participation from different segments of the youth population would be an essential criterion for success, as participation in such activities in OECD Member countries tends to be uneven based on characteristics such as socio-economic status and levels of education.

Box 2.17. Youth participatory budgeting initiatives

France: Ardèche

The Departement of l'Ardèche implemented a youth participatory budget in 2020 to integrate young people into the formulation of public policy. Funded in part by the national government and supported by the Ardèche, Youth, Innovation, Rurality (AJIR) project, the initiative allowed young residents aged 11 to 30 to submit ideas and shape project proposals across fields such as ecological transition, social ties, and the local economy for up to EUR 30 000 per project. Experiential civic education was embedded in the methodology, with more than 200 young people participating in the initial drafting of the budget's regulations. While the wider public could submit specific projects and vote, the voting power of individuals aged 11 to 30 was weighted with a 10% increase. Furthermore, a dedicated youth jury was responsible for shortlisting projects for the final public vote.

Portugal: Cascais

The municipality of Cascais initiated its Youth Participatory Budget (YPB) in 2016 as a pedagogical process to foster participatory democracy and practical civic education among students. Designed in collaboration with external non-formal education entities, the programme engages students aged 12 to 18 across 15 schools. The YPB process relies on three structural cycles: decision, implementation, and monitoring. During the decision cycle, elected "YPB classes" receive specialised classroom training on leadership, collaborative democracy, and financial literacy, followed by the organisation of public sessions where students present ideas for both their schools and the broader community. In the implementation cycle, each participating school is allocated EUR 10 000 to execute winning internal projects, while community-oriented student projects are integrated into the main Cascais participatory budget for potential funding of up to EUR 350 000. The initiative has resulted in students directly allocating EUR 492 500 for school projects and EUR 3 902 950 for community projects, demonstrating the tangible impact of experiential civic education.

Source: (Europe Goes Local, n.d.[211]; OIDP, n.d.[212]).

Young Australians volunteer at comparatively high rates compared to the OECD average. Building on this momentum, the Australian Government could also consider establishing a national youth volunteering service that mobilises volunteers to work towards community goals. Such a programme could unlock underutilised civic capacity, provide practical skills and pathways for participation, and build shared relationships and purpose across generations, in particular for young people. In a period of rising social and environmental pressure, a structured, well-supported national youth service offers a scalable way to invest in communities while reinforcing the civic fabric that sustains them.

Box 2.18. National volunteering programmes

National Volunteer Service programme, Luxembourg

The National Volunteer Service (SVN) programme in Luxembourg is co-ordinated by the National Youth Service and allows young people aged 16 to 30 to engage in public-interest projects on a full-time basis for up to 12 months. To participate, individuals must have completed their compulsory education, be legally resident in the country, and speak at least one of the three official languages (Luxembourgish, French, or German). Volunteers are placed in a host organisation to provide administrative, cultural, organisational, or mobilisation support. The programme provides participants with professional and personalised support, pocket money, a subsistence allowance, social security registration, and free training. Volunteers over the age of 18 who reside continuously in Luxembourg also receive monthly financial aid from the State.

Maatschappelijke diensttijd, the Netherlands

Following a two-year experimental phase, the Netherlands officially launched the Maatschappelijke Diensttijd (MDT) programme in 2020. The initiative engages youth aged 12 to 30 in voluntary community service for a maximum of six months. MDT is structured around three core pillars: doing something for another person or society, talent development, and engaging in meaningful encounters with individuals outside of a participant's usual environment. The programme aims to foster resilient and mentally healthy young people while enhancing social cohesion. Practical examples of participant activities include teaching languages or co-organising social events. In 2026, the programme is being supported by EUR 148.6 million in financial resources.

Canada Service Corps

The Canada Service Corps (CSC) provides funding to national and regional organisations to promote civic engagement among youth aged 12 to 30. The initiative offers volunteer service placements focused on themes such as reconciliation, environmental preservation, and civic and democratic engagement. Placements can be undertaken on a full-time basis, requiring 30 hours per week for a minimum of three consecutive months, or on a flexible basis requiring a minimum of 120 hours within a twelve-month period. In addition to service placements, the CSC provides micro-grants that allow youth to access up to CAD 5 000 in funding. These micro-grants empower young people to propose solutions, budget, and implement small-scale, innovative community service projects at the local level.

Source: (Government of Canada, 2024[213]; Government of Luxembourg, 2019[214]; Government of the Netherlands, n.d.[215]; Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, n.d.[216]).

Finally, the federal government could provide additional funding opportunities for local CSOs to deliver civic learning opportunities beyond the classroom. Grassroot CSOs and community organisations are uniquely placed to promote civic education and civic skills in an experiential way. Providing small grants for student-led civic projects through a collaboration with local councils or community organisations to promote experiential civic education is another measure that the federal government could consider. At the state and territory level in Australia, several of these initiatives exist including in Western Australia (Youth Engagement Grants Program (Government of Western Australia, 2026[217])), Victoria (Engage! 2025-27 (Government of Victoria, 2024[218])) and New South Wales (Youth Opportunities Programme (Government of New South Wales, 2026[219])). At the national level, the United Kingdom’s #iwill Fund provides funding to a network of UK Community Foundations, each of which runs its own youth social action fund making local grants (e.g. 16 community foundations in one round awarded grants of up to GBP 10 000 to groups for projects lasting up to a year) (UK Community Foundations, 2026[220]). This model keeps decision making close to communities while letting the funder set the aggregate priorities. In Germany, the Federal Agency for Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung) supports a diverse ecosystem of civic education providers through institutional funding, project grants and small-scale seed funding for local democracy initiatives (Federal Agency for Civic Education, 2026[221]). Such approaches demonstrate the important role that CSOs can play as partners in the design and delivery of civic education and engagement programmes.

2.6.2. Continuing to build teachers’ civic education skills

The OECD Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS) 2024 data reveals that Australia's teachers interact with more linguistically varied classrooms than the OECD average. In Australia, 34% of lower secondary teachers work in schools where more than 10% of students’ first language is not the language of instruction versus 25% in average across OECD Members (OECD, 2025[222]). However, Australian teachers reporting they can adapt their teaching to cultural variety “quite a bit” or “a lot” is at 58%, lower than the OECD average of 63% (OECD, 2025[222]). These findings highlight that being able to teach civic education to different audiences is particularly essential in the Australian context and that this could represent an opportunity Australia can seize.

At the same time, teachers’ skills also considerably depend on state‑based curricula and school resources, resulting in uneven access across Australia, with teachers’ level of confidence in teaching civics and citizenship varying considerably. More than half of participating teachers in a 2025 survey stated that they feel “very” or “extremely” confident in teaching a wide range of civic and legal concepts (Rule of Law Education Centre, 2025[223]). Those reporting lower levels of confidence cited “not receiving any formal training in the areas they have been teaching” or “having limited exposure to the civics concepts they are now teaching” as the most prominent reasons for their lack of confidence. The difficulty of fostering discussion around contemporary, complex topics in a way that facilitates respectful debate was also cited as an important reason leading to lower self-reported confidence (Rule of Law Education Centre, 2025[223]).

Acknowledging the importance of strengthening teachers’ skills, Australia has already implemented a number of initiatives in this area. A key example is the Civic and Citizenship Education (CCE) Hub. Launched in February 2025, it is an online platform linking teachers, parents and learners to resources, events and programmes that support civics and citizenship education in schools. The Hub was developed by Education Services Australia for the Australian Government Department of Education and is intended to be a dynamic space, with resources and events added and updated over time. The live site currently lists 272 resources, which teachers can browse and filter by year level and theme. The Hub is designed to support teaching across Years 3-10 and organises content under four main themes: democratic history; government and democracy; laws and citizenship; and identity. The platform also includes a calendar of civics and citizenship events for schools, covering activities such as visits to Australian Parliament House, conferences, webinars and professional learning opportunities. The CCE Hub further aims to support the implementation of the Australian Curriculum, including Humanities and Social Sciences (HASS), History (where relevant to civics and citizenship), and Civics and Citizenship, and the site notes that resources included on the Hub are non-commercial, free to schools, and reviewed before publication.

An “open classroom culture”, meaning an approach which adopts a strong focus on learning-by-doing, greater students’ initiative and autonomy and open discussion, can be particularly important for civic education outcomes and can help with the development of critical thinking, empathy and the ability to consider multiple perspectives (Borhan, 2025[191]). Acknowledging the importance of creating an open classroom climate, the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement created guidelines for teachers on how to encourage students to express their opinions, allow them to make up their own minds and encourage students to discuss issues with people who have different opinions (IEA, 2022[224]). At the state and territory level, the Government of New South Wales has already put in place the Controversial Issues in Schools Policy, underscoring that teaching approaches to such subjects need to be sensitive, objective and balanced and ensure that a range of opinions are taken into account. Moving forward, at the federal level, the government could consider expanding the CCE Hub’s function, by further increasing the already rich availability of useful materials and more importantly, by strengthening the already existing focus on the skills required to spark meaningful and respectful debate amongst students. Such skills should include the ability to create trust, frame issues carefully, facilitate evidence-based discussion, manage disagreement respectfully, and reflect on their own role in order to make political discussion in the classroom genuinely educational. In order to achieve it, the Hub could encourage more teachers to pursue specific professional learning opportunities in this space (including self‑paced learning and workshops), so teachers can be upskilled in this area, in addition to the focus on their civics knowledge.

In addition, and while some training on civic education for Humanities and Social Sciences teachers is already required, it is often uneven and fragmented. To help tackle discrepancies across states, the federal government could further standardise pre-service training for civics educations teachers, while working with state and territory governments to promote greater consistency of in-service training, which remains the responsibility of the state and territories. Box 2.19 presents Finland’s efforts in this area.

Box 2.19. Building teacher’s skills in Finland

In Finland, targeted initiatives are being implemented to improve the capacity of teachers to deliver democratic citizenship and human rights education. To address gaps in civics substance and pedagogical confidence, the University of Helsinki launched a web-based pilot course in 2019 targeted at qualified educational professionals. The curriculum reviews national legislation and international human rights treaties, equipping teachers with the substantive knowledge required to navigate challenging classroom dynamics, such as hate crimes and the limits of freedom of speech. Furthermore, the course addresses the tendency of educators to avoid political commentary, providing them with the pedagogical courage to facilitate meaningful discussions on complex societal topics and to actively prevent inequality.

To support practical application in the classroom, the Finnish National Agency for Education, in collaboration with the Human Rights, Democracy, Values and Dialogue in Education project, launched a material repository titled "Democracy, human rights and participation". This resource provides teachers with over 170 web pages of practical tips and materials for democratic citizenship and human rights education. Additionally, the Council of Europe's professional development programme, Teaching controversial issues, has been made available in Finnish. This training pack assists teachers in creating safe spaces in the classroom where students can freely explore concerning topics, and it provides teaching strategies that promote open and respectful dialogue.

Source: (Council of Europe, 2017[225]; University of Helsinki, 2019[226]).

Lastly, the federal government could consider establishing or supporting existing national networks or communities of practice for teachers of civics and citizenship from across the country to provide a support mechanism for improving coherence across civics initiatives and their impact (see Box 2.20). This could be done, for example, by supporting the Social and Citizenship Education Association of Australia (SCEAA), which represents teachers, educators and academics with an interest in social and citizenship education. Alternatively, the Australian government could consider further increasing the role of the CCE Hub to create a community of practice including professional associations such as the SCEAA as members.

Box 2.20. The importance of networks for civic education teachers

CIVIX, Canada

CIVIX is a registered charitable organisation in Canada that focuses its educational programming on themes such as elections, government budgets, elected representatives, digital media literacy, and civic discourse. To support educators, CIVIX provides the Democracy Bootcamp programme, which enhances teachers' capacity and commitment to civic education by exploring current trends and introducing new tools. Furthermore, CIVIX offers several experiential learning programmes to assist teachers in bringing democracy into the classroom. These include Student Vote, which allows students to cast ballots for official candidates during an election cycle; Rep Day, which connects students with elected representatives to build trust in democratic institutions; and PoliTalks, which cultivates skills for constructive political discussion and respectful self-expression. The organisation also co-ordinates the Youth Parliament of Canada, a multi-day national bilingual model parliament simulation for youth aged 16 to 20.

Source: (CIVIX, 2026[227]; CIVIX, 2026[228]).

2.7. Conclusions and recommendations

Australia benefits from strong civic space foundations, underpinned by robust democratic institutions, legal protections and an active civil society. These elements provide a solid basis for citizen participation and contribute to enabling Australians to engage in public life across a wide range of channels. At the same time, the chapter highlights that sustaining and strengthening these foundations requires continuous attention in the face of evolving and interlinked global as well as domestic societal dynamics.

Key challenges identified relate on the one hand to the laws, policies and institutions governing the enabling conditions for democratic life, as well as to the practical realities defining citizens’, communities, and CSOs’ civic engagement. Issues such as the persistence of hate, pressures on the information environment, and uneven access to opportunities for engagement across parts of civil society can act as barriers to meaningful participation, affect trust in public institutions and impede social cohesion.

Taken together, the findings underline that civic space is not a static condition but an evolving ecosystem that directly shapes citizens’ ability and willingness to participate. Strengthening civic space therefore requires a balanced and forward-looking approach that protects freedoms, enables constructive public discourse and democratic engagement across both offline and online environments and fosters the conditions for all parts of civil society to thrive.

Building on this, the next chapter examines how participation is organised and governed across the public sector, focusing on the institutional, policy and capacity dimensions needed to translate these enabling conditions into meaningful, coherent and impactful participation practices.

Box 2.21. Recommendations to foster a thriving civic space in Australia

Review and where needed, reform the legislative environment as the baseline of protecting civic space and addressing the identified select gaps, while ensuring the adequate participation of key stakeholders in reform efforts, especially public entities with a human rights mandate, rights experts and groups, civil society, and impacted communities, including by:

• Considering to introduce a human rights act at the federal level.

• Harmonising and systematically reviewing laws governing protection from discrimination and hate speech by using clear and consistent terminology, expanding protected groups, and aligning thresholds for criminalisation.

• Introducing dedicated legislation which explicitly recognises and universally protects the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, including spontaneous assemblies, clearly outlines protestors’ rights and responsibilities, and exempts mere failure of notification as a ground for prohibition and/or dissolution of a peaceful assembly.

• Ensuring that any restrictions on civic freedoms apply a balanced approach in line with international standards and guidance (i.e. are grounded in law, narrowly framed, necessary in democratic societies, proportionate and impartial across all groups), and in particular do not result in or risk undue censorship or chilling effects on legitimate political discourse and civic engagement.

• Continuing to improve the legal and regulatory frameworks governing the enabling environment for CSOs, notably by comprehensively reforming the DGR system, removing barriers for CSOs crucial to democracy and further streamlining administrative processes thereby reducing the burden on CSOs and government entities.

Strengthen parts of the institutional framework protecting civic space and ensure independent oversight institutions, complaints mechanisms, independent regulators, law enforcement, the judiciary and other relevant authorities are adequately equipped to fulfil their mandates, including by:

• Ensuring adequate and consistent funding for independent oversight institutions, acknowledging the increase in demand.

• Equipping independent regulators with adequate and graduated enforcement tools, coupled with detailed guidance on their application, to allow for more systematic approach to addressing online harms and protecting online civic space.

• Further institutionalise collaboration with relevant CSOs, especially place-based and community organisations, which can help improve outreach to predominantly affected communities and foster trust.

Further strengthen strategic government support for CSOs with a focus on continuing to support the needs of small, place-based and community, as well as First Nations organisations and those working in advocacy, watchdog roles, R&D or other areas which contribute to social cohesion and democratic resilience, including by:

• Increasing the availability of flexible and core funding for CSOs and exploring other innovative funding approaches tailored to CSOs’ needs.

• Providing capacity-building and trainings for CSOs covering the range of skills needed throughout the CSO lifecycle, including participation in public decision making.

Improve data-collection and -sharing arrangements across government, while upholding data protection standards, the right to privacy, and principles related to community ownership of data regarding First Nations people, to anticipate and analyse trends, inform evidence-based decision making and policy interventions and systematic monitoring and evaluation of these interventions’ impacts in practice to protect and promote civic space, including by:

• Allowing for the collection of robust data on rights violations, helping improve the practical accessibility of complaints and redress mechanisms.

• Continuing to strengthen the conditions for robust data collection on incidents of hate and discrimination, including online.

• Systematically collecting data on freedom of peaceful assembly.

• Further strengthening data collection and user-friendly visualisation to encompass all parts of the CSO sector.

Continue to strengthen efforts to counter hate, including by combining legislative and non-legislative measures and better linking different programmes and initiatives on anti-discrimination, racism, and tackling hate, with a view to developing a long-term, strengths-based, holistic whole-of-government approach.

Promote opportunities for experiential civic education for students beyond the classroom, and continue to build on teachers’ skills to create an even more informed and active citizenry into adulthood and beyond, including by:

• Scaling existing successful initiatives, such as the programmes by the Museum of Australian Democracy, the Australian Electoral Commission and the Parliamentary Education Office.

• Supporting experiential civic education through participatory budgeting programmes and a national youth volunteering programme.

• Expanding the role of the CCE Hub to further build the skills of civic education teachers and create a community of practice of educators.

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Notes

← 1.  The ACT Human Rights Act 2004 was the first-of-its kind legislation in Australia, and includes specific additional rights protection for education, the right to work, and the right to a healthy environment. While the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 identifies fewer specific additional rights than the other acts, it has more robust mechanisms for parliamentary scrutiny, with statements of compatibility required for all bills. Under both the Victorian Act, and the Queensland Human Rights Act 2019 a person cannot directly approach the courts when they believe their rights to have been breached but must indirectly ‘piggy-back’ off another action against a public entity for unlawful conduct (Parliament of New South Wales, 2025[229]; Parliament of South Australia, 2025[230]).

← 2.  As of July 2026, the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) data has been integrated into the Business Longitudinal Analysis Data Environment (BLADE), enabling deeper analysis of Australian charities by their spatial characteristics over time (ABS, n.d.[234]).

← 3.  Official data indicates that approximately 30% of the population was born overseas and 48% of Australians have a parent born overseas (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2024[232]; Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024[231]). Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, the First People of Australia whose history and culture reaches back several tens of thousands of years, represent 3.2% of the population. Moreover, over 5.5 million Australians speak a language other than English at home (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022[233]).

← 4.  In accordance with Australian legislation, close associates are close family members of all groups, and for people with disability, their carers or assistants.

← 5.  These included the Crimes Amendment (Prohibition on Display of Nazi Symbols) Act 2022 (NSW), the Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Religious Vilification) Act 2023 (NSW), the Crimes Legislation (Racial and Religious Hatred) Act 2025 (NSW), the Crimes Amendment (Inciting Racial Hatred) Act 2025 (NSW), the Terrorism and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2025 (NSW).