Growing geopolitical tensions and intense competition on emerging critical technologies are reshaping international co-operation in STI. Recent national STI policies and strategies reflect this shift with their increasing attention to security-related concerns. Focusing on public research systems, this chapter describes how governments are aiming to enhance national research and technological capabilities as they seek greater strategic autonomy that promotes both their economic and national security. This includes a growing policy emphasis on dual-use STI, as well as research security measures to protect against unauthorised knowledge leakage and foreign coercion. Governments have also become more strategic in their international STI linkages, including in their science diplomacy measures, with a view to projecting their national interests. The chapter highlights various risks and opportunities these policies pose and proposes that governments pursue balanced STI securitisation policies that are proportional, precise in their targeting, and based on committed partnerships with scientists and businesses, as well as across government.
OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2025
Abstract
Rising geopolitical tensions, accompanied by growing strategic competition on emerging critical technologies, are contributing to the growing securitisation of science, technology and innovation (STI). This includes the public research system, which is the chief focus of this chapter.
Governments are pursuing a mix of policies that contribute to this growing securitisation. First, they are increasingly implementing promotion policies that orient research and development (R&D) funding towards enhancing national and economic security, covering, among other things, dual-use initiatives to foster mutually beneficial links between civil and defence research.
Second, governments are using protection policies that introduce restrictions on sharing research findings with dual-use potential, as well as recent measures to strengthen research security more broadly to avoid exposing sensitive research to risks that ultimately erode safety and trust.
Finally, they are implementing projection policies that provide strategic direction to international STI relations, including science diplomacy initiatives that support research co‑operation with like-minded countries and strategic competitors.
These policies imply some reconfiguration of international research relations. For example, policies that aim to promote economic and national security could involve pooling research resources with like-minded countries, while research security measures could exclude or discourage collaboration with countries that are not considered safe partners for international co-operation.
Securitisation policies that restrict international research co-operation and mobility could have negative effects on research quality, innovation performance and economic competitiveness if applied overzealously. There are also risks that securitisation policies could fragment international STI linkages to such an extent that it undermines co‑operation on tackling global challenges.
STI securitisation measures involve different parts of government but are closely related and should be strategically oriented and co-ordinated. To improve their co-ordination and prevent over-securitisation, policymakers should adopt governing principles to design and implement balanced STI securitisation policy mixes that are proportional to the risks and opportunities at hand; formulated and implemented in partnership with scientists, businesses and across government; and precise and agile in their targeting.
Scientific discovery and technological innovation occur in an interconnected global ecosystem that draws upon collective knowledge, talent, resources and infrastructure. Countries individually benefit from this international connectedness, which contributes to their competitiveness and societal well-being. Such connectedness is also critical for tackling challenges and managing risks at the global level, such as pandemic preparedness, environmental stewardship and food security, which require multilateral co‑operation in STI.
Rising geopolitical tensions, accompanied by growing strategic competition on emerging critical technologies, are reshaping frameworks for international STI co-operation that have emerged over the last three decades. These tensions and competition undercut opportunities for cross-border knowledge exchange, collaborative STI projects and technology transfer, while national interests are routinely framed as trade-offs with global priorities. These developments impact everything from international research collaboration to international trade and investments in high-technology products and facilities.
The 2023 edition of the OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook introduced the concept of “STI securitisation”1 to discuss these trends (OECD, 2023[1]). This chapter continues along similar lines, focusing chiefly on the research aspects of STI systems and the impacts of growing securitisation on international research linkages. It consists of three main parts. The first part presents selected statistics on international scientific linkages, as measured by international research collaboration, researcher mobility and the scientific contributions of different countries to tackle global challenges, to highlight how these have evolved in recent years.
The second part of the chapter outlines the growing securitisation of STI policy, with a particular focus on newly intensive policy efforts towards achieving mastery and greater strategic autonomy in emerging science and technology in support of economic and national security objectives; the growing use of research security measures to protect against unauthorised knowledge leakage; and the increasing prominence of national interests in international science diplomacy.
These three sets of STI securitisation measures are closely related and imply an emerging reconfiguration of international research linkages. Accordingly, the third part of the chapter proposes a set of governing principles policymakers could adopt to design and implement balanced STI securitisation policy mixes that are proportional to the risks and opportunities at hand; formulated and implemented in partnership with scientists, businesses and across government; and precise and agile in their targeting.
International STI linkages have grown strongly since the 1990s to the benefit of research, innovation and economic development. Among these linkages is international research co-operation, which benefits the quality of research which, in turn, contributes to economic competitiveness through new knowledge generation and enhanced skills development. International research co-operation also broadens the dissemination of research results, helps tackle global challenges and can contribute to intercultural understanding.
In times of heightened geopolitical tensions, it is important to understand these implications for international research linkages. This section presents selected statistics on international research collaboration, researcher mobility and different countries’ scientific contributions to tackle global challenges to highlight how international research linkages have evolved in recent years.
Growth in international research collaboration has recently stalled
Collaborative research is at the core of an interconnected global research community. Data on co‑authorship of scientific publications involving authors with institutional affiliations in different countries provide an indication of international scientific collaboration.3 While only 2% of scientific papers had authors from more than one country in 1970 (Olechnicka, Ploszaj and Celinska-Janowicz, 2019[2]), the proportion was 27% of all publications in OECD countries in 2023, up from 22% in 2013 (Figure 2.1). The United Kingdom has the highest collaboration intensity within the top 15 science publishing economies, followed by Australia and France. The leading Asian economies exhibit lower than average international collaboration. Australia, Brazil, India and the United Kingdom experienced the largest proportional increase in collaboration intensity over the period 2013-2023.
As a percentage of domestically authored publications, based on fractional counts
Source: OECD calculations based on Scopus Custom Data, Elsevier, Version 1.2025, April 2025.
More recent data, however, suggest that the trend towards increasing international collaboration has lost momentum and might be partly breaking down (Figure 2.2). The external collaboration rate for the United States and the EU27 area has remained virtually unchanged since 2018, while the People’s Republic of China’s (hereafter “China”) international collaboration intensity declined significantly between 2020 and 2023, with India surpassing it in 2021. The growing scale and advancement of China’s research system mean there are more opportunities than ever to collaborate domestically with leading research groups, which could reduce incentives for international collaboration.4 However, as Figure 2.3 shows, this decline is largely driven by a sharp fall in collaboration with the United States. It applies across most research fields and is particularly pronounced in the natural sciences and engineering, as shown in Figure 2.4. Similar data covering China’s collaboration with other countries show some decline in a few fields with Japan and the United Kingdom, but continuing strengthened ties with the EU27. Despite these declines, the intensity of China’s research collaboration with the United States remained considerably higher in 2023 than with these other countries.
Percentage of scientific publications involving international collaboration, based on fractional counts
Source: OECD calculations based on Scopus Custom Data, Elsevier, Version 1.2025, April 2025.
Normalised collaboration based on whole counts
Notes: The bilateral collaboration intensity between two countries is calculated by dividing the number of scientific publications by authors with affiliations in both countries (whole counts) by the square root of the product of the publications for each of the two countries (whole counts). This indicator is, therefore, normalised for publication output. Publications refer to all citable publications, namely, articles, reviews and conference proceedings.
Source: Calculations based on Scopus Custom Data, Elsevier, Version 1.2025, April 2025.
Percentage change in year relative to 2019 baseline
Notes: Collaboration between China and the United States is defined by the number of co-authored publications between both countries (whole counts). Publications refer to all citable publications, that is articles, reviews and conference proceedings. The graph shows the changes in collaborations for each year versus the previous year, as a percentage of 2019 collaborations.
Source: Calculations based on Scopus Custom Data, Elsevier, Version 1.2025, April 2025.
OECD science systems depend on a ready supply of internationally mobile researchers
International scientific mobility has also grown in recent decades and the research workforce of several major research performers in OECD countries is heavily dependent on foreign-born doctoral and postdoctoral researchers. In the United States, for example, some 45% of workers in science and engineering occupations at the doctorate level in 2021 were foreign-born, with the highest shares among computer and mathematical scientists. More than half of foreign-born workers in the United States in 2021 whose highest degree is in a science and engineering field were from Asia. The leading birthplaces were India (29%) and China (13%) (US National Science Foundation, 2024[3]).
Early-career researchers conduct much of the research carried out in OECD Member countries’ laboratories. Although internationally comparative statistics are difficult to come by,5 many of these researchers are internationally mobile. They go abroad to enhance their qualifications, access world-class research facilities and improve their career prospects.6 The OECD’s education statistics show that Australia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have particularly high shares of international doctoral student graduates – at least 40% of their total number – as their universities attract global talent through scholarships, research opportunities and strong academic networks (Figure 2.5). Moreover, these proportions grew markedly between 2015 and 2022, with the exception of Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States, where they have remained the same. In some countries, the high proportion of international doctoral students also reflects declining interest in pursuing a PhD among domestic students (OECD, 2025[4]). In France, for instance, factors such as long periods of study, uncertain career prospects and more attractive opportunities in the private sector are reported to have made doctoral studies less appealing for national candidates.7
As a percentage of total PhD graduates
Note: Mobile doctoral students correspond to students in PhD programmes (ISCED level 8) enrolled in a country different from the one where they obtained their previous qualification, including homecoming nationals. Internationally harmonised data for the United States are unavailable.
Source: OECD Education Statistics Database Education access, participation, and progression | OECD (accessed on 18 July 2025).
As Figure 2.5 shows, significant proportions of these mobile doctoral graduates are from China, particularly in English-speaking countries (internationally harmonised data for the United States are unavailable), and in neighbouring Japan and Korea. Restrictions on international mobility as part of growing securitisation measures could weaken this important source of researchers and oblige countries to look elsewhere to attract global talent.
OECD countries need to tap into widely distributed knowledge to tackle global challenges
International scientific collaboration is particularly important in research relevant to energy security and environmental sustainability. Compared to all other areas of science, sustainability and energy-relevant research is more collaborative. Furthermore, this international collaboration has increased over time in virtually all countries (Figure 2.6). At the same time, there have been major changes in the contribution of the largest global economies to energy- and environment-relevant research output. The United States and the European Union have seen large declines in the share of relevant publications while China’s share has increased rapidly and India has also seen a steady increase (Figure 2.7). This implies a reduction in the overall relative contribution of OECD countries to scientific output in this area, over and above the general scientific publication shift that has been taking place (OECD, 2025[5]).8 It also highlights the importance of international openness and exchanges that allow OECD countries to tap into this more widely distributed knowledge.9.
As a percentage of domestically authored documents, fractional counts
Notes: SDG: Sustainable Development Goal. International collaboration refers to publications co-authored among institutions in different countries. Estimates are computed for each country by counting documents for which the set of listed affiliations includes at least one address within the country and one outside. Single-authored documents with multiple affiliations in different countries count as institutional international collaboration. A publication is tagged as relevant to environmental sustainability and energy if it has the highest aggregated probability for the SDGs under the “Planet” umbrella (6, 12, 13, 15 and 7).
Source: OECD calculations based on Scopus Custom Data, Elsevier, Version 1.2024.
As a percentage of world total energy and environmental SDG documents
Notes: SDG: Sustainable Development Goal. A publication is tagged as relevant to environmental sustainability and energy if it has the highest aggregated probability for the SDGs under the “Planet” umbrella (6, 12, 13, 15 and 7).
Source: OECD calculations based on OECD SDG classifier (OECD, 2025[6]) and Scopus Custom Data, Elsevier, Version 1.2024.
Concepts such as “strategic autonomy” and “technology sovereignty” have emerged as increasingly prominent frames for STI policy (Edler et al., 2023[7]; OECD, 2023[1]).10 This orientation extends beyond technology to cover research as well: for example, growing concerns over safeguarding national and economic security and protecting freedom of enquiry have led many OECD countries to develop guidelines and checklists to increase awareness of and provide guidance to the academic community on research security and integrity. Individual countries are also moving towards more selective international knowledge sharing, enhancing co-operation with countries that have similar values and political interests, particularly in STI areas with national security implications.
The 2023 OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook discussed at some length the growing securitisation of STI policy.11 It introduced a three-part framework – promotion, protection and projection policies – to map the policy responses of China, the European Union and the United States to growing geopolitical tensions and increasingly intense technological competition (OECD, 2023[1]). This framework has its origins in the policy analysis literature (see, for example Helwig, Sinkkonen and Sinkkonen (2021[8]); March and Schieferdecker (2021[9]); Goodman and Robert (2021[10])) and has recently been adopted by policymakers in the European Union, which used it to structure the European Union’s Economic Security Strategy (European Commission, 2023[11]), and by the Japanese government, which used it to articulate its economic security policies (METI, 2024[12]). Both policies are further described below. The framework’s advantage lies in the comprehensive picture it provides of the securitisation landscape that policymakers can use to design and deliver more joined-up and aligned policies across a range of areas.
This chapter uses this three-part framework to consider STI policy developments that focus predominantly on the research system (Figure2.8):12
1. Promotion policies, including directed R&D funding and broader industrial policies to enhance national and economic security, covering, among other things, dual-use initiatives to foster mutually beneficial links between civil and defence research.
2. Protection policies, including restrictions on sharing research findings with dual-use potential and recent measures to strengthen research security more broadly.
3. Projection policies, including international strategic research co-operation that further advances protection and promotion, as well as science diplomacy initiatives that support research co‑operation with a wider range of countries, including strategic competitors.
Each of these is discussed in more detail below.
Note: The chapter’s focus is mostly “upstream” on research
Leveraging the civil research system to enhance economic and national security
Technological leadership has long underpinned the economic prosperity and security of OECD countries, and with geopolitical tensions on the rise, governments are prioritising technological mastery and strategic autonomy as part of their broader national and economic security policies (OECD, 2023[1]). The first type of STI securitisation policy intervention therefore concerns the promotion of critical research and technology capabilities, for example through directed R&D funding that serves economic and national security needs.
Along these lines, recent years have seen a proliferation of national strategies targeting the development of a few critical technologies, where countries primarily aspire to capture their economic benefits. For example, quantum science and technology promises to reshape computing, communication and problem-solving in fundamentally new ways (OECD, 2025[13]), and around the world, governments, leading research institutes and some of the best-known technology companies are investing billions of dollars in quantum research (Box 2.1).
Quantum technologies have become a matter of geopolitical contention, echoing dynamics seen in other dual-use emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Their civilian and defence uses make quantum technologies dual-use. Over 30 countries have formulated substantial policies in support of developing quantum technologies, and among them, 14 OECD countries have adopted comprehensive strategies and committed substantial public investments to quantum research and development.
Defence establishments have been pivotal in developing quantum technology policy. The “quantum race”, therefore, is not merely a pursuit of technological supremacy but a crucial dimension on global security and power. At the same time, economic imperatives have complemented security concerns in driving quantum strategy development, particularly with reference to classical computing’s physical limitations.
Apprehensions about dependency on external actors for critical components have led to explicit mandates to develop domestic supply chains, protect intellectual property and cultivate in-house expertise. The aspiration to capture the transformational potential of quantum technologies underpins strategic efforts to foster diverse innovation ecosystems. These efforts blend top-down leadership (such as national-level funding initiatives and roadmaps) with bottom-up ecosystem-building (through incubators, consortia and test beds). Strategies are often accompanied by substantial investments in research institutes, infrastructure and interdisciplinary hubs.
Source: OECD (Forthcoming[14]).
Enhancing economic and national security is increasingly a main objective of science, technology and innovation policy
Governments are also embarking on more ambitious forms of holistic industrial policy (Dechezlepretre, Diaz and Lalanne, 2025[15])13 in which STI policy plays a prominent part. These policies increasingly target ecosystems that transcend traditional industrial sectors and knowledge domains (see Chapter 6).14 However, what clearly distinguishes the most recent initiatives from those of just a few years ago is their securitisation perspective and inclusion of strategic autonomy as a key consideration. While different aspects of security – including energy, health and food security – have received growing attention, enhancing national security is increasingly entwined with economic security as a main STI policy objective. Box 2.2 outlines the European Union’s recent related measures, which are largely framed by the 2023 European Economic Security Strategy.15
Published in 2023, the European Economic Security Strategy (European Commission, 2023[11]) aims to provide a framework for robust assessment and management of risks to economic security at the European Union (EU), national and business level at a time when these risks are both evolving rapidly and merging with national security concerns. It cites as a prime example of risk the speed with which critical new technologies are emerging and blurring the boundaries between civil and defence applications.
The European Economic Security Strategy uses the “3Ps” framework to propose a raft of policies that include promotion measures that foster the research and industrial base in strategic areas such as advanced semiconductors, quantum computing, biotechnology, net zero industries, clean energy or critical raw materials; protection measures to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies, as well as other dual-use items, to destinations of concern that operate civil-military fusion strategies; and projection measures (referred to as “partnering”) with countries who share common concerns on economic security and by investing in sustainable development and secure links throughout the world through the European Union’s Global Gateway initiative.
The risks related to technology security and technology leakage are being assessed based on a list of strategic technologies critical for economic security. At the same time – and reflecting the duality of perspectives on dual-use as an issue of concern for protection and promotion – a recent white paper outlined options to enhance targeted support for research and development (R&D) of dual-use technologies (European Commission, 2024[16]). This acknowledges that technologies used in the context of security and defence capabilities increasingly originate in the civilian domain, where private sector investments are higher, indirect costs lower and R&D cycles faster.
Taking up this theme, the Draghi Report on the future of European competitiveness asserts that dual‑use programmes are insufficiently developed in the European Union,1 despite their potential to enhance collaboration between civilian and defence sectors, drive deep technical innovation that also addresses military needs, and mitigate risk by leveraging common technologies across different end uses (European Commission, 2024[17]). The Niinistö Report on strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness, also published in 2024, highlights the need for Europe to better harness the much faster civil innovation cycles for technologies with dual-use potential to maintain its competitiveness and enhance military capabilities (European Commission, 2024[18]). Both reports compare EU expenditures on defence R&D unfavourably to similar investments by the United States.
In March 2025, the European Commission published a new white paper, European Defence Readiness 2030, which declares that technology will be the main feature of competition in the new geopolitical environment. It proposes new ecosystems and value chains for cutting-edge technologies, like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, to feed into both civilian and military applications. It highlights the blurred distinction between civil and defence research, particularly in the realm of “deep tech”, and affirms that relevant civil research results should play a crucial role in developing cutting-edge military capabilities (European Commission, 2025[19]).2
In July 2025, the European Commission published initial proposals for its tenth Multiannual Framework Programme (2028-2034), which for the first time embraces a “dual-use-by-design model” across much of its entirety (European Commission, 2025[20]).3 One of its priorities is the reduction of critical dependencies on non-EU technologies and a focus on dual-use technologies that can benefit both civil and defence applications. The European Commission proposes that large parts of the tenth Multiannual Framework Programme will be structured around the four policy “windows” of the European Competitiveness Fund, including one dedicated to “resilience and security, the defence industry and space”.
Notes: 1. This is not a new theme for the European Commission, which considers investment in innovation and better use of civilian technology in defence as key to enhancing Europe’s technological sovereignty and reducing its strategic dependencies. The European Commission published the “Action Plan on Synergies between Civil, Defence and Space Industries” in 2021, which aims to enhance complementarities between EU civil and defence programmes and instruments, promote “spin-offs” from defence and space R&D for civil applications, and facilitate “spin-ins” of civil-driven innovation into European defence co-operation projects. It followed this up in 2022 with its “Roadmap on Critical Technologies for Security and Defence”. Established in 2021 with a budget of EUR 8 billion over 7 years, the European Defence Fund promotes R&D co-operation between public research (typically research and technology organisations rather than universities) and firms. It supports competitive and collaborative projects throughout the entire R&D cycle, including design, prototyping and testing. 2. This white paper also integrates a series of actions to take immediately, such as activation of the National Escape Clause by member states, adoption of the Regulation on Security and Action for Europe, launch of the Strategic Dialogue with the defence industry, and a European Armament Technological Roadmap on investment into dual-use advanced technological capabilities in 2025. 3. The European Commission also published two independent expert reports on dual-use research and innovation (R&I) in June 2025 to inform decision making for the next generation of EU funding programmes. The first is a policy brief prepared by the Expert Group on Economic and Societal Impact of Research and Innovation that highlights the strategic role of dual-use R&I funding to foster security, strategic autonomy, competitiveness and sustainability, and recommends the adoption of a dual-use-by-design approach in future EU funding programmes (European Commission, 2025[21]). The second report, prepared by a small group of experts from both the civil and defence R&I communities, offers concrete examples and case studies on how dual-use R&I can work in practice (European Commission, 2025[22]).
In another example, the promotion of specific critical technologies in Japan’s Economic Security Promotion Act (2022) points in similar directions (Box 2.3).
Japan has been a pioneer in economic security policy with a view to minimising its vulnerability to economic coercion. Its main policy is the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act, which sets out to enhance Japan’s strategic autonomy and pursue “strategic indispensability” through superior, made-in-Japan technologies on which the rest of the world depends. The act defines four pillars of action: 1) supply chain resilience; 2) securing essential infrastructure; 3) developing cutting-edge critical technologies; and 4) non-disclosure of patents. The National Security Secretariat acts as a co‑ordinating body for these efforts and an Economic Security Promotion Office has been established in the Cabinet Office to help unify economic security policies and ensure coherency across all government ministries and agencies.
In addition to these government-wide initiatives, individual ministries are also undertaking their own efforts to enhance economic security. For example, in 2023, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published its Economic Security Action Plan, which is centred on the “3Ps”, defined in Japan (as in the European Union) as promote, protect and partner. METI has also established a Trade and Economic Security Bureau to formulate and promote policy related to economic security within its jurisdiction. The Action Plan was updated in 2024 and again in May 2025 (METI, 2025[25]), with the most recent version highlighting the need for Japan to adapt to changing conditions in the international system since the previous edition. The 2025 edition outlines four sets of measures:
1. Further integration and updating of the 3Ps to strengthen Japan’s industrial and technological bases. Among the announced measures are an expanded list of promoted critical technologies that cover various new materials and technologies critical for economic and national security; a new industrial value chain approach that further strengthens measures at each layer of the entire value chain, including research and development, procurement, production, and sales; and a more strategic approach to attracting and retaining highly skilled foreign talent to promote Japan’s strategic autonomy and indispensability and prevent the unintended leakage of technology.
2. Toward the reconstruction of a rules-based international economic order as a global public good. This includes promoting the “Run Faster Partnership” scheme, which integrates industrial promotion and industrial protection measures aimed at co-creating industrial and technological bases with like-minded countries (with an initial focus on the Indo-Pacific region); and a more proactive role in international strategic rule-making and standardisation.
3. Promotion of public-private dialogue. This includes establishing a multi-layered public-private dialogue mechanism; developing codes of conduct and guidelines as references for firms contributing to Japan’s economic security; and supporting firms in establishing information security systems.
4. Strengthening economic intelligence. In addition to existing scenario analysis, tabletop exercises, supply chain analysis and technology analysis, METI will recruit external experts with high expertise, e.g. in specific technology and industrial areas; establish a strategic dialogue platform between private sector think tanks and the government; and, together with the National Security Secretariat and Cabinet Office, establish an economic security centre to enhance the government’s economic intelligence capabilities.
Notes: The updated 2025 Action Plan highlights four “tectonic shifts”: 1) the erosion of the liberal international economic order; 2) the intensification of competition for technological hegemony (centred on artificial intelligence) between China and the United States; 3) the growing importance of energy security; and 4) intensifying competition in next-generation strategic fields (e.g. space, oceans and unmanned aerial systems) essential to national security among major but also emerging powers.
Sources: NSS (2022[23]); METI (2024[12]; 2025[25]); Suzuki (2023[24]).
Among the main elements the act identified are Japan’s technological capabilities framed as economic measures related to ensuring national security. What marks a sharp departure from the past, though, is a new R&D initiative based on the act called the “K Program” (the Program for the Development of Key Technologies for Economic Security). This is a joint initiative of the Cabinet Office; the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) that focuses on technologies that contribute to securing national economic security in domains such as maritime, aerospace and cyberspace. The K Program currently has a budget of up to JPY 500 billion (EUR 3 billion) over ten years (NSS, 2022[23]; Suzuki, 2023[24]).16
There is renewed interest in promoting dual-use research as economic and national security agendas become increasingly entwined17
These short accounts of emerging European and Japanese economic security policies highlight governments’ expectations of the far-reaching consequences of emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing, including for national security. They also point to governments’ renewed interest in promoting dual-use R&I – involving both the civil and defence sectors – to foster economic and national security. As outlined in Chapter 1, governments are looking to actively exploit synergies between policy goals, including security and economic competitiveness, to ensure maximum return on and efficiency of STI investments. With defence budgets growing considerably in many OECD countries, including in R&D (see Chapter 1), governments are keen to leverage these new expenditures for civil purposes, too. It also seems likely that some civil R&D will be partly labelled as contributing to defence and security as countries aim to meet ambitious defence spending targets over the coming decade. Both phenomena contribute to the emergence of more explicit dual-use agendas.
While dual-use ambitions can be realised through multiple channels, two points of policy focus are emerging. The first focuses on ways to better anticipate both civil and defence needs when conducting low technology-readiness level (TRL) research related to general purpose technologies, such as AI and quantum computing, even when the field of application is not yet known. Many general-purpose technologies are inherently dual-use, and an approach that embodies a “dual-use-by-design model”, as discussed in the context of the European Union’s next framework programme (see Box 2.2), would aim to raise the awareness and reflection of researchers, administrators and funders on the potential end uses of their research. Such increased awareness and reflection would seek to promote early detection of the dual‑use potential of scientific output, with a view to enhancing understanding of both the risks and opportunities (European Commission, 2025[21]). It would also aim to promote a simultaneous alignment with civil and defence requirements, thereby minimising the modifications required to align a given technology with civil or defence standards when targeting respective markets (European Commission, 2025[22]).
The second point of policy focus concerns strengthening technology transfer between civil and defence applications at higher TRLs. While many governments have long supported two-way linkages between the civil and defence R&I systems, rapid and disruptive technological developments in the civil sector have seen governments pay growing attention to their dual-use potential in the defence sector. Accordingly, defence research funding programmes are increasingly opening and commissioning research from the civil research system.
Links between civil and defence research have been historically stronger in some countries than in others. For example, the United States has had a long-standing relationship between civil and defence research as a core feature of national security and science policy. The Department of Defense is an important funder of basic research in universities and support for doctoral programmes in a range of fields. Organisations such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency have sponsored path-breaking research and facilitated new scientific networks, drawing on leading university scientists as programme managers and researchers (see Chapter 1).18 By contrast, Germany and Japan have historically maintained strict separation between civil and defence research. For example, Germany’s “civil clause” excludes most public universities from defence-related research. This is currently under review, with the Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space discussing with other research funders the extent to which funding incentives can be used to increase co-operation between civilian and defence research in appropriate areas.19 In other countries, such as Australia, France and the United Kingdom, while some universities and civil public research institutes have a long history of working with the defence sector, linkages are less developed and systemic than in the United States.
Despite this history of linkages, the civil and defence research systems remain relatively distinct and somewhat independent of one another, having, for instance, their own lead ministries, funding bodies and programmes, research centres and infrastructures, and rules and regulations on what knowledge can and cannot be openly shared. Defence R&I ecosystems remain relatively closed compared to their civil counterparts and are still highly nationally organised. But as economic and national security agendas become more closely entwined, there is growing convergence in the design of funding and other public policy interventions that support civil and defence research and technology development. This could signal the emergence of a more integrated R&I system that sees civil research organisations and researchers further contribute to and exploit defence and security research.
Dual-use research raises several practical and more fundamental questions for civil research systems and policies
Dual-use R&I can be subject to extensive and complex export control compliance measures, including dual-use export control regulations, that introduce additional administrative overheads, significantly prolong development cycles and impose higher costs. Secure development environments with high‑security zones and restricted access may also need to be established, implying changes in the organisation of the campus, research teams, data management and IT systems, among other things. However, academic basic research has traditionally been exempt from many of these restrictions. For example, in the United States, the Department of Defense funds considerable research at universities that is inherently dual-use but also unclassified. It tends to be at the application level that distinctions are made between civil and defence uses, and separations are put in place to protect secrecy on the defence side. This distinction could become blurred if R&D funding programmes that are notionally civil become “dual-use-by-design” and target low TRL research that must already consider a range of uses, including for defence.
Talent constraints are another important challenge due to the scarcity in many OECD countries of professionals with both technical expertise and the required security clearances. Leading universities are international in their staffing, and in many systems, foreign doctoral students and postdocs play key roles. Obtaining security clearances can be a long and cumbersome process when hiring foreign researchers and doctoral students, and certain nationalities are likely to be excluded in some contexts. The classification of knowledge as sensitive or classified will also restrict its open dissemination, which could discourage early-career researchers who depend on open publication for their career progression (see Chapter 4). Finally, ethical considerations might also limit scientists’ availability and acceptance to engage in research with potential military applications (European Commission, 2025[22]).
At the same time, international competition for leading scientists has become more fierce
Despite possible future restrictions on hiring certain foreign researchers in certain fields, attracting international talent, including leading scientists, remains an important approach for countries to bolster research and technical capabilities that underpin their economic and national security. Those that do not join the global competition for highly skilled migrants risk falling behind (OECD, 2023[26]). OECD countries have for some time offered different types of incentives to attract leading scientists from abroad, including fellowships, grants, tax breaks, special visas and pension portability.20 Among these measures are talent programmes, which target leading overseas scientists with financial incentives and entry and settlement support. These programmes have become increasingly popular in recent years and often target specific areas of science and technology where countries are seeking to deepen their capabilities. Box 2.4 provides selected examples of recent initiatives.
The European Union and its member states offer a variety of funding opportunities open to researchers outside Europe. In May 2025, the European Commission announced a EUR 500 million package for 2025-2027 to attract and retain researchers based outside the European Union (EU). It includes the “Choose Europe for Science” initiative, which was launched in 2025 to attract and retain top research talent globally. It also includes the European Research Council Advanced Grant, which provides additional support to researchers moving from non‑EU countries, who can apply for an additional EUR 2 million to cover eligible start-up costs (European Commission, 2025[27]).
At the EU member state level, in 2023 the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación established the ATRAE programme, which awards grants to recruit established, internationally recognised research talent (among the top 10% of global researchers in their field) who have recently spent a significant period of their professional activity abroad. The 2025 call is worth EUR 40 million, with individual grants of up to EUR 1.2 million each. Their purpose is to promote progress toward a more competitive science, technology and innovation system at both the national and international levels.1
Germany’s Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space launched the “Global Minds Initiative” in 2025 directed at excellent international researchers. The initiative builds on programmes of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the German Research Foundation and aims to signal a culture of welcome in Germany and to offer a safe haven for scientific freedom. Funding is based on scientific excellence and is open to all themes.2
France launched the “Choose France for Science” platform in 2025 as part of its commitment to welcome international researchers who wish to work in an environment conducive to academic freedom. Operated by the French National Research Agency, it enables universities, schools and research organisations to apply for up to 50% co-funding from the government to host researchers.3
Also in 2025, the Swedish Research Council issued a call for grants of SEK 2 million to enable Swedish higher education institutions and other research organisations to recruit prominent researchers who are active outside Europe. The grant is to cover expenses for the recruitment and salary for employment in Sweden during a limited period.4
“Science Hub Denmark” is a nationally co-ordinated initiative aimed at enhancing the global visibility of Danish research and career opportunities in natural sciences, engineering and life sciences. It promotes Denmark as an attractive destination for top-tier international researchers, with a strong focus on excellence, societal impact and quality of life.5
Beyond Europe, Korea launched its “K-Tech Pass” in 2025 to attract global talent in advanced industries, including semiconductors, secondary batteries, displays, biotechnology, robotics and the defence sector. The scheme offers both entry and settlement support to foreigners with expertise in advanced technologies who have signed an employment contract with Korean firms in high-tech industries.6
China has scores of talent programmes operating at the national, regional and city levels. They mostly focus on attracting students and professionals from the Chinese diaspora to return to China. Perhaps the best known and one of the largest was the “Thousand Talents Programme”, which operated between 2008 and 2023 and is estimated to have attracted 7 000-8 000 participants. The part-time version of the programme attracted close scrutiny from several OECD Member countries, since programme participants moved back and forth and often set up a laboratory in China that mirrored their research lab in the OECD, thereby promoting knowledge and technology transfer on a regular basis (Barteau and Rovito, 2024[28]). The programme contributed to growing research security concerns in OECD countries,7 particularly around conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment among participating scientists.
Notes: 1. For further information, see: https://www.aei.gob.es/en/node/5066. 2. For further information, see: https://www.bmftr.bund.de/EN/Research/ScienceSystem/global-minds-initiative-germany/global-minds-initiative-germany.html?nn=1102680. 3. For further information, see: https://france2030.agencerecherche.fr/ChooseFranceForScience-2025/accueil.php?lang=EN. 4. For further information, see: https://www.vr.se/english/just-now/news/news-archive/2025-04-02-new-grant-for-recruiting-researchers-active-outside-europe.html. 5. For further information, see: https://research.state-of-denmark.com/about.
1. For further information, see: https://www.kotra.or.kr/gtc_eng/subList/41000060003. 7. For example, the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act prohibits US-based researchers with federal funding from participating in foreign talent recruitment programmes sponsored by China or the Russian Federation.
Protection through research security measures
There is a growing concern about hostile actors that exploit international research collaboration to acquire research and expertise to accelerate their technological capabilities in areas critical to national and economic security. Without attention and effective management, there is anxiety that such actions may have implications for national security, economic competitiveness and the integrity of research collaboration (James et al., 2025[29]). Many OECD countries now consider unauthorised information transfer and foreign interference in public research a serious national and economic security risk, and research security, including preventing undesirable foreign state or non-state interference in fundamental and applied scientific research, has become a high priority in STI policy (OECD, 2022[30]).
While countries have well-regulated export control systems for research on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive technologies, it is less easy to control the intangible transfer of data, information and know-how from scientific research carried out without a specific practical application in mind. This is the case for basic research, which has traditionally been exempt from export controls. At the same time, it is recognised that knowledge from many areas of basic research could be considered as potentially dual-use and, as highlighted above, policymakers are now considering ways to raise awareness among researchers and funding agencies to take this perspective into account in low TRL research. This has led to closer scrutiny of international scientific collaborations and publication practices that were previously liberal, with entire scientific fields, such as AI and quantum computing, increasingly classified as “critical”, “sensitive” or “security-relevant” to provide them with protection against espionage and foreign influence and to secure competitive advantages (German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina and German Research Foundation, 2024[31]).
Protecting data, information and know-how are not easy in the Internet era and restrictions on access may conflict with research integrity principles and open science (OECD, 2022[30]). Scientific research operates within a global research ecosystem that relies on autonomy, openness and free exchange to function effectively.21 A blanket application of strict research security measures would pose a direct or indirect risk to the quality, productivity, integrity and, therefore, the societal and economic value of the national research system (James et al., 2025[29]). Developing the capacity to identify and manage genuine security risks while preserving the integrity of the global research ecosystem has, therefore, become a priority for many governments.
Research security threats may result from the hostile activities of threat actors or the poor risk management practices of research-performing organisations or individual researchers. In 2022, the OECD released a policy paper entitled “Integrity and security in the global research system” which made recommendations on how various actors – including national governments, research-funding agencies, research institutions, universities, academic associations and intergovernmental organisations – should approach research security and outlined efforts already under way. Recommendations included integrating research security considerations into national and institutional frameworks for research integrity; promoting a proportionate and systematic approach to risk management in research; and working across sectors and institutions to develop more integrated and effective policy (OECD, 2022[30]).
These themes are addressed below, but since the report’s publication, research security measures have continued to expand globally, driven by heightened awareness and the evolving nature of security threats. There has been a sharp rise in the number of policy initiatives focused on research security and the number of countries deploying them. Only 27 national policy initiatives were reported in 2018 in the STIP Compass database.22 By 2025, that number had grown almost tenfold to more than 250. The interest in research security has expanded worldwide, with the number of countries with research security policies more than trebling over the same period, from 12 in 2018 to 41 in 2025.
Coupling of research security and integrity
While governments are putting measures in place to improve research security, they are at the same time emphasising research integrity, which refers specifically to certain values, norms and principles that constitute good scientific practice (freedom of scientific research, openness, honesty, ethics, integrity, accountability, etc.) and regulate international research collaboration (reciprocity, equity, non‑discrimination, etc.). Research integrity applies to the behaviour of individual scientists, but also to research ecosystems, with a particular focus on mitigating national and economic security threats and foreign interference. As international collaboration becomes more widespread and the geographic distribution of scientific production changes, mitigating unauthorised information transfer and foreign interference needs to be included in considerations of research integrity. Increasing transparency, disclosing potential conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment, and managing risks are aimed at strengthening both research integrity and security and are considered essential for promoting trust in science (OECD, 2022[30]).
Policy support is increasingly focused on research security implementation measures
While many earlier policy initiatives focused on raising awareness of research security as an issue and developing policy intelligence, such as evaluations of country-specific risks, the more recent focus has been on developing strategies, agendas and plans and providing support for their implementation. There has also been growing use of regulation, soft law and oversight since 2020. This shift indicates that countries are tightening up their research security efforts, transitioning from simply raising awareness and gathering intelligence to more concrete planning and implementation. These efforts primarily target research-performing organisations and funding agencies. The extent of initiatives focused on implementation reflects the extent to which these actors need support operating in a changing environment as well as the extent to which this environment is disrupting established practices. The most common categories of implementation support among recent policy initiatives are the development of guidance, self-service tools and advisory services (Box 2.5). Governments, funding agencies and research‑performing organisations are also establishing dedicated organisational structures to promote research security.23
Guidance development
Recent guidance documents provide frameworks for implementing newly issued strategies or directives or add detail to previously issued guidance. These are designed not only to help institutions navigate the evolving landscape of research security but also to help create a culture of accountability. For instance, the Norwegian Directorate for Higher Education and Skills, in collaboration with the Research Council of Norway, has issued Guidelines and Tools for Responsible International Knowledge Cooperation (Norwegian Directorate for Higher Education and Skills, 2023[32]). In the United States, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy has published Guidelines for Research Security Programs at Covered Institutions. These outline expectations for research security programmes in relation to cybersecurity, foreign travel security reporting, research security training and export control training (White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2024[33]). In Austria, the Ministry of Innovation, Mobility and Infrastructure (Bundesministerium für Innovation, Mobilität und Infrastruktur) is supporting research security in the applied research sector. Measures include guidance to help funding applicants self-assess the risks of possible joint projects and partners by asking the right questions, giving advice on how to identify red flags and general information on research security.
Self-service tools
With the increasing complexity of research security regulations and guidance, recent initiatives have included practical tools to help universities and research institutions apply this guidance in their day‑to‑day work. For example, the UK government’s National Protective Security Authority and National Cyber Security Centre have released a research security maturity self-assessment tool, the Trusted Research Evaluation Framework. Complementing existing Trusted Research guidance, the framework is aimed at helping academic institutions in different stages of their research security journey understand what “good” looks like across seven areas of activity. It defines what constitutes foundation, intermediate and developed capacity for multiple evaluation dimensions (National Protective Service Authority, United Kingdom, 2024[34]).
Advisory services
The establishment of advisory bodies has become a cornerstone of recent research security efforts, reflecting research institutions’ need for expertise navigating research security requirements, assessing risk in projects and evaluating potential collaborations. For example, Denmark established the Centre for Innovation and Knowledge Security within the Danish Security and Intelligence Service in 2023 to proactively advise its research institutions on how to handle threats from foreign states. The centre was created to address the growing risks of espionage, intellectual property theft and foreign interference in research.1 The United Kingdom’s partnership approach to research security engages universities through its Research Collaboration Advice Team and aims to support the research sector to take informed decisions on research collaborations.2
Notes: 1. For further information, see: https://pet.dk/en/our-tasks/security-advisory-services/the-objective. 2. For further information, see: https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/research-collaboration-advice-team-rcat.
Vetting international research collaborations through project- versus list-based approaches
Authorities are placing restrictions of varying degrees on collaboration with certain research organisations or countries. In some cases these are linked to identified fields of research that reflect geopolitical and economic security considerations. For example, the Government of Canada’s Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern entered into force in 2024 and stipulates that any research grant or funding application in listed sensitive technology research areas will not be funded if researchers involved in the application activities are in receipt of funding or in-kind support from listed research organisations connected to military, national defense or state security entities that could pose a risk to Canada’s national security (Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, 2024[35]).24
Other countries are establishing project-based approaches to identify sensitive research collaborations rather than relying on defined field- or affiliation-specific restrictions. The German federal government published its Strategy on China in 2023, setting a framework for secure co-operation with China amidst systemic rivalry (Federal Foreign Office, Germany, 2023[36]). The German Research Foundation, the German Science and Humanities Council, the German Academic Exchange Service, and the Max Plank Society subsequently published recommendations to support scientists, research institutes and universities in navigating this new context. They deliberately refrain from drawing red lines around specific countries, partner institutions or research topics and instead endorse case-by-case assessments.25
Similarly, a 2024 JASON study Safeguarding the Research Enterprise, contracted by the US National Science Foundation (NSF), recommended identifying sensitive research and risks to collaboration at the project level during research proposal evaluation research. It provides an alternative to sweeping restrictions on all collaborations in listed high-risk areas. This process-based approach has been newly adopted in the NSF’s Trusted Research Using Safeguards and Transparency (TRUST) framework.26 Inspired by this example, the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) has recently introduced a pilot scheme, JST-TRUST, that it applies to its calls for proposals on quantum science and semiconductor research. The scheme involves screening experts’ proposals, asking principal investigators how they do due diligence on their projects. Based on this, they consider risk-mitigation measures, to be set by the JST, if necessary. The JST-TRUST also assists with monitoring and guidance on research outcomes and publishing.27
Reframing science diplomacy to further both national and multilateral goals
The third type of STI securitisation policy intervention is rooted in the projection of national interests in international regulations, norms, standards and alliances. In this regard, science diplomacy, defined as the use of science for foreign policy purposes, has become an increasingly prominent instrument to pursue not only multilateral goals, but also national interests. While some supporters of science diplomacy still predominantly highlight its global public goods aspects,28 today it is widely recognised that science is increasingly used as a strategic tool to secure national interests and power, and for leverage in interstate rivalry. This duality is hardly new, but as strategic competition has become more prominent in the current geopolitical environment, perceptions of science diplomacy have shifted, and it has become more institutionalised as an external foreign policy tool.
Along these lines, the 2025 revised science diplomacy framework of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the United Kingdom’s Royal Society acknowledges the new era of disruption and is “darker, more realistic, and hard-edged, than its predecessor” from 2010 (The Royal Society and AAAS, 2025[37]). The European Commission’s European Framework for Science Diplomacy, also published in 2025, makes similar observations, acknowledging that “science and technology are pieces on the global geopolitical chessboard” (Gjedssø Bertelsen et al., 2025[38]). Box 2.6 briefly outlines both reports, which are expected to influence science diplomacy policies.
Science diplomacy in an era of disruption (American Association for the Advancement of Science and The Royal Society)
This report updates the 2010 framework for science diplomacy issued by the American Association for the Advancement of Science and The Royal Society. It argues that a more fragmented and dangerous world, impacted by global challenges and technological disruption, necessitates a revised approach to how science and diplomacy interact. The document proposes a simplified two-dimensional framework: science impacting diplomacy (the different ways that science interacts with diplomatic objectives) and diplomacy impacting science (the ways that diplomacy interacts and engages with the scientific enterprise).
The consultations that informed this report highlighted several key messages. For example, while science advisory mechanisms are increasingly integrated into national and multilateral institutions – reflecting the fact science is now ever more central to foreign policy – scientific and diplomatic interests may not always coincide. Treaties governing global commons sometimes conflict with sovereign national interests, prompting a re-examination of scientific values once thought universal and their implications for international scientific collaboration. The report also noted the increasingly influential roles of non-state actors, such as major companies and philanthropic organisations in the changing landscape of science diplomacy.
A European Framework for Science Diplomacy (European Commission)
With science and technology increasingly becoming a geopolitical currency, the European Union has concluded that science diplomacy can help it to project soft power and pursue its economic interests and fundamental values more effectively. Accordingly, the European Union launched the report, a European Framework for Science Diplomacy, in 2025, which is expected to be followed up with a science diplomacy strategy later in the year. The report recognises paradigm shifts in science diplomacy, driven by geopolitical and technological changes. It proposes a European-wide approach to science diplomacy that preserves spaces for exchange, fosters a shared responsibility for addressing common challenges and protecting global public goods, and defends Europe’s strategic interests. In particular, the framework highlights the need for a strategic use of science diplomacy in the current geopolitical context, involving enhanced strategic intelligence capacity (e.g. using foresight) and strengthened science diplomacy in delegations and embassies. The report provides concrete recommendations and actions on how European leadership in science diplomacy can be achieved through strategic, operational and enabling instruments.
Note: To elaborate: Strategic instruments for European science diplomacy focus on setting clear priorities and making science diplomacy visible, identifying the appropriate balance between openness and restrictedness in international science co-operation, and leveraging science diplomacy to address global challenges and sustainably manage global public goods and commons, including through partnerships with countries in the Global South. Operational instruments aim to establish the necessary structures for EU leadership in science diplomacy, foster science for policy and foresight ecosystems to enhance foreign and security policies, and strengthen the role of science and technology within diplomatic representations. Enabling instruments seek to create and connect science diplomacy communities, train and empower Europe’s current and future science diplomacy professionals, and advance the frontiers of science diplomacy through research and innovative approaches to strengthen the overall capacity and expertise in the field.
Sources: Gjedssø Bertelsen et al. (2025[38]); The Royal Society and AAAS (2025[37]).
Scholars and practitioners have debated ways to define, categorise and frame the different shapes and forms science diplomacy can take (Turekian, 2018[39]).29 This chapter does not seek to create an additional framework, but rather identifies three key aspects to consider:
1. The co-operative nature of science diplomacy: Science diplomacy for global public goods and development.
2. The competitive nature of science diplomacy: Science diplomacy in pursuit of national interests.
3. The hybrid nature of science diplomacy: Non-state actors and Track 2 diplomacy.
Each of these is further elaborated below.
Co-operative science diplomacy for global public goods and development
This form of science diplomacy strongly emerged in the 1990s and involves a mix of foreign policy and scientific personnel, often meeting in multilateral fora, to address global challenges like climate change, biodiversity loss, health security issues, etc. Examples include the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. In some fields, science diplomacy communities have emerged according to the nature of the scientific domain or natural resource in question, such as water diplomacy, health diplomacy, cyber diplomacy, etc. It is the sort of science diplomacy that some think is most at risk from rising geopolitical tensions and national security policies. By way of example, Box 2.7 describes ongoing ocean science diplomacy and its recent roles in the third United Nations Ocean Conference in Nice (France).
The ocean plays a vital role in the economies and livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people. If treated as a single country, the ocean economy would have ranked as the world’s fifth-largest economy in 2019, contributing 3-4% of global gross value added between 1995 and 2020 and supporting up to 133 million full-time jobs (OECD, 2025[40]). But the ocean is under many pressures, threatening not only ocean health but the future of the ocean economy as well.
Peer-reviewed science provides objective criteria that help reconcile economic ambitions with global environmental imperatives in ocean governance and management. Grounded in data, peer engagement and shared objectives, scientists from different countries can build co-operation and trust where traditional diplomacy sometimes falters, resulting in tangible policy outcomes and informed decision making. The importance of ocean science diplomacy was clearly apparent during the recent third United Nations Ocean Conference (9-13 June 2025), where the integration of up-to-date scientific findings on the state of the ocean shaped commitments anchored in shared evidence.
For instance, responding to the need for science-based marine protected areas – with the objective of conserving 30% of the ocean by 2030 – countries committed to joint ocean exploration missions and enhanced transparency in areas beyond national jurisdiction in the high seas. Notably, over 20 countries ratified the “High Seas Treaty”, a major diplomatic outcome of the conference. Once in effect, potentially as early as 2026, the agreement will establish a new legal framework for governing the high seas, contributing to the conservation and sustainable development of marine biological diversity. Science indicators and sustainable ocean data observations – spanning weather patterns, biodiversity, carbon cycles and fisheries – will provide a shared evidence base to guide policy and enable scientifically informed negotiations.
Source: OECD (2025[40]).
A related consideration is the participation of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in these international co-ordination efforts. For example, since LMICs are expected to account for much of the growth in global carbon emissions until 2050, it will be important for the global community to support multilateral and club-based STI collaborations that include or are driven by representatives of the Global South.30 International STI co-operation can help strengthen the national STI capabilities of LMICs, allowing them to better engage in global STI collaboration and decision making and contributing to their overall economic development.
Competitive science diplomacy in pursuit of national interests
The view of science as a purely collaborative, objective and unifying force capable of overcoming deep political divides is challenged by the reality that science can be a geopolitical asset, blurring the lines between its perceived non-political nature and its role in power dynamics (Runguis and Flink, 2020[41]). Governments are strategically harnessing scientific expertise and international collaboration to advance their country’s geopolitical influence, economic competitiveness and security objectives, often involving a deliberate balance between openness and restrictive measures to safeguard sovereign interests.
Along these lines, many countries are bolstering the science capacity of their foreign ministries and missions. For example, some countries have a large representation of science and technology diplomacy counsellors or attachés in missions abroad. The United Kingdom, for instance, has a well-established network of approximately 130 staff in over 65 locations across the world, building collaborations that aim to maintain the country’s scientific base, support the competitive advantage of the United Kingdom’s innovative businesses, and address shared opportunities and threats. These work with local science and innovation organisations to project UK STI excellence and leadership globally, build and facilitate STI of value to the United Kingdom, and provide insights and intelligence. While the thematic focus is different for each country, priorities include opportunities and risks from critical and emerging technologies, addressing climate change and biodiversity loss, and health security.31 Other G7 countries and China have similar operations, but some smaller countries are also active. For example, Hungary maintains an international network of science and technology attachés stationed at 15 key locations in major STI partner countries and centres of competitiveness and innovation (Asia-Europe Foundation, 2025[42]).
Hybrid science diplomacy involving non-state actors and Track 2 diplomacy
Science diplomacy involves an increasingly hybrid approach, combining and intertwining Track 1 (formal diplomacy primarily led by diplomats and other state actors) and Track 2 diplomacy (informal diplomacy, involving non-governmental participants and informal dialogue) (Ruffini, 2020[43]; Turekian and Gluckman, 2024[44]). While Track 1 diplomacy involves the direct pursuit of state interests through official channels and supports the negotiation of international treaties and formal agreements, Track 2 diplomacy is considered a means by which non-state actors, particularly academics and scientific organisations, can contribute new ideas and relationships to the official diplomatic process by incorporating leading thinkers from outside governmental structures. Through the soft power of science, they can establish personal scientific networks to foster trust where official diplomatic links are otherwise weak or non-existent. Box 2.8 outlines some widely cited examples.
While Track 2 diplomacy might be officially sanctioned by governments, it can also be driven by the professional interests of scientists. Various Cold War era links between the West and the Soviet Union are often cited as examples, such as the Pugwash conferences, which brought together scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain and played a significant, behind-the-scenes role in informing and laying the groundwork for major arms control.1 More recent examples of links include those between American and Cuban scientists over sharing weather data, leading to the development of a formal agreement to install shared GPS monitoring equipment in Cuba;2 the Iranian public health experts who worked together with US counterparts to replicate the Iranian primary healthcare system in the Mississippi Delta;3,4 and in the Middle East, collaboration between the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies and the Damour for Community Development, which have been organising since 2016 the Track II Forum for Environmental Diplomacy to enable key civil society organisations and individuals representing both state and non-state actors to discuss and develop cross-border strategies to facilitate formal and informal environmental agreements between Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan.5
Notes: 1. For further information, see: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1995/pugwash/speedread. 2. For further information, see American Meteorological Society (2015[45]). 3. For further information, see: https://era.ideasoneurope.eu/2022/07/13/learning-from-rivals-the-role-of-science-diplomacy. 4. For further information, see: https://www.stimson.org/2025/health-and-science-diplomacy-could-pave-the-way-to-new-us-iran-relations. 5. For further information, see: https://arava.org/initiatives-working-groups.
Among non-state actors, the private sector plays an increasingly crucial and complex role in science diplomacy, wielding significant scientific, economic and political influence that can, in some cases, rival that of individual countries. Many large firms, especially global technology businesses, are major R&D funders, with their annual expenditures often comparable to or exceeding national public research programmes. Some engage directly in diplomatic efforts, cultivating relationships with foreign governments and international bodies like the United Nations and the European Union,32 and engaging directly with them on topics like emerging technologies, often bypassing national diplomats from their countries of origin. They are also critical partners in public-private partnerships for developing large research infrastructures, such as SESAME and CERN Open Lab, and demonstrated their pivotal capacity during the COVID-19 pandemic in vaccine development and global distribution. Furthermore, the private sector is central to setting international technical standards for global trade and knowledge exchange.
Developments like these have led to the emergence of technology and innovation diplomacy (Leijten, 2017[46]), which involves combining expertise from the three traditionally separate fields of technology, business and foreign policy with a view to advancing national interests. Some countries have established a diplomatic presence near innovation hubs like Silicon Valley in recent years. Denmark led this trend in 2017 with its tech embassy in Palo Alto,33 a move since emulated by the EU Office in Silicon Valley.34 In another example, Switzerland has established its Swissnex global network to strengthen its profile as a world-leading hotspot of innovation. The network has offices in 6 regions renowned for innovation, backed by around 20 counsellors based in Swiss embassies worldwide. A notable feature is the engagement of public and private stakeholders from the Swiss and local education, R&I landscape, who cover at least two-thirds of the costs of Swissnex’s activities.35
These three strands of securitisation policy – critical technology promotion, research security and science diplomacy – are closely related and present policymakers with several governance challenges. Three aspects of STI policy governance particularly stand out, namely formulating the scope and focus of securitisation policies, mobilising key stakeholders to co-design and implement them, and building a knowledge and evidence base to inform policy choices and strategy:
First are the scope and focus of STI securitisation measures. A key consideration here is their proportionality with the level of expected risk and opportunities. Governments need to strike several balances along different axes and at different levels in their policies, in particular with regards to international openness.
Second, the R&I activities these policies seek to influence are performed by semi-autonomous researchers and private businesses. Governments must mobilise and partner with these groups for securitisation policies to succeed. They must also co-ordinate across different parts of government given the cross-cutting nature of securitisation policies.
Finally, security-related STI policy measures should be precise and agile when targeting research, technology and industrial areas for promotion, protection and projection. This points to the need for policy risk assessment and uncertainty analysis capabilities, underpinned by useable strategic intelligence. Securitisation policies should also be monitored and evaluated to enable course corrections and promote accountability.
Proportionality, partnerships and precision are, then, a further set of “3Ps” that overlay the original security 3Ps of promotion, protection and projection (Figure 2.9).36 They amount to principles for governing securitisation policies to mitigate risks and promote strategic co-ordination. The remainder of this section briefly discusses each in turn.
Proportionality: Scoping STI securitisation policies that balance different values, goals and interests
STI securitisation policies are inherently concerned with balancing different values, goals and interests along different axes and at different levels. The securitisation measures outlined in this chapter all pull in the direction of enhancing national interests, primarily economic competitiveness and national security, with each challenged by the need to retain some measure of international openness and research autonomy, both of which contribute to the value of R&I activities. The success of individual measures is tied to others, and they need to work together to ensure a balanced approach to securitisation. The formulation and implementation of STI securitisation policies should, therefore, be considered together as part of a broader and balanced STI securitisation strategy (also keeping in mind that this chapter has primarily explored the public research system, and that there are several other policies relevant to STI securitisation extending across the innovation chain that should also be considered).
The focus of this section is primarily on balancing research security and international openness, but there are also other important dilemmas that policymakers need to consider. For example, technology races should incorporate safeguards to manage downside risks and bridge global technology divides. In this regard, principles and guidelines can be an attractive modality for international, transnational and/or global actors to make moral and political commitments with some flexibility and accommodation for differences and changing circumstances (OECD, 2024[47]). Relatedly, clear ethical guidelines should be established for research and technologies with dual-use potential to ensure they do not undermine human rights or societal well-being (European Commission, 2025[21]).
Balancing research security and openness and the implications for international collaboration
Research security measures raise significant questions about international research collaboration, which is an important aspect of scientific openness. Countries are striving to strike the right balance between safeguarding their national and economic security while upholding academic freedom, promoting international research co-operation, and ensuring openness and non-discrimination. Implementing overly broad or extreme security practices can stifle academic freedom, hinder innovation and disrupt valuable global partnerships. On the other hand, too little security can expose sensitive research or academic collaborations to risks, ultimately eroding safety and trust.
There is wide recognition among policymakers that research security and open science need not be cast as oppositional and can, in fact, be complementary: for instance, research security measures can enable open research practices by protecting academic freedom from abuse by malicious state actors; they also often entail greater transparency on researchers’ affiliations and funding sources. In this way, they contribute to good scientific practice, but they can also be applied overzealously. The key is to find a middle ground that protects valuable work without undermining the very principles of academic freedom and the social and economic benefits of participating in open international scientific collaboration (OECD, 2022[30]; Shih, 2025[48]). The overarching principle guiding this complex equilibrium is to keep scientific engagement “as open as possible and as secure as necessary”.37 A related concept is the “small yard, high fence”, where strict, robust controls are put in place to protect narrow and specific areas of science and technology considered critical to national and economic security. However, the growing emphasis on research with a dual-use character could shift countries’ calculations and may introduce additional restrictions on international research collaboration (European Commission, 2025[21]).
STI securitisation measures also run the risk of creating a more fragmented global R&I landscape that is ill-equipped to tackle global challenges. Measures in one country can easily trigger unwelcome countermeasures in others and have a chilling effect on international collaboration to address shared global challenges. For instance, health-related research fields – such as pandemic preparedness and antimicrobial resistance – face an openness-versus-security dilemma. They address global challenges that depend on open scientific collaboration and data sharing to drive preparedness, recovery and resilience. At the same time, heightened openness in such sensitive health domains can increase the risk of misuse or misconduct, underscoring the need for vigilance. Acknowledging and managing this tension responsibly is essential to safeguard research integrity and ensure that international collaboration in health research can continue with confidence and maintain its positive impact.
The broader emphasis on research security has inadvertently led to a chilling effect on international research collaboration and academic mobility more broadly. Research-performing organisations are increasingly cautious about entering international research collaborations where security risks have been identified. This is in part a function of asymmetric knowledge, with research-performing organisations often complaining of being given insufficient information from security services to make informed judgements (James et al., 2025[29]). Research-performing organisations also complain of being faced with a range of ambiguities and sometimes contradictory signals. There are also risks that researchers feel pressured to self-censor or avoid high-risk but important research areas, adversely affecting R&I (Shih, 2025[48]). Furthermore, there are risks of prejudice, cultural bias and inadvertent discrimination against certain population groups in both list-based and process-based approaches to risk assessment. This is a major concern for the academic community and an area that needs to be carefully monitored as policies for restrictions on collaboration become more widespread.
While research-performing organisations have a responsibility to act responsibly in their international activities, neither individual researchers nor individual universities should be left alone in making assessments of difficult goal conflicts, and governments and funding agencies have a responsibility to provide national guidelines (Swedish Council for Higher Education, 2024[49]). It is possible to define international co-operation as fully compatible with national security rather than as something external and threatening to it.38 To achieve this, an “intentionality” approach is crucial, requiring a deep understanding of collaborating partners’ motivations, networks and their ultimate intentions for research outputs. Similarly, emphasising reciprocity in collaborations is vital to ensure mutual benefits and prevent non-reciprocal exchanges that can intensify securitisation concerns (Dawes, Salt and Smith, 2024[50]).
At the same time, research-performing organisations need to develop their own internal security capacity, which includes creating institutional policies, establishing risk management and due diligence processes, and hiring dedicated research security officers. They also need to continue raising awareness about research security among researchers and administrative staff. Building this capacity is a challenge, as institutions must do so with limited funding and in a competitive job market where these specialised skills are scarce. Similarly, governments are also struggling with these capacity constraints as the growing demands of research security put a strain on ministries and security agencies (James et al., 2025[29]).
A strategic dual-track approach is emerging, focusing on intensive collaboration with “like-minded” countries for cutting-edge technologies while maintaining broader co-operation with diverse countries for shared global challenges (Asano and Arimoto, 2024[51]; Turekian and Gluckman, 2024[44]). Policy frameworks must clearly define “red lines” for collaborations that flagrantly violate established norms, such as serious ethics dumping, direct military use by military institutions, illicit technology transfer or grave human rights violations. At the same time, they need to actively manage “grey areas” where different national and institutional contexts create challenges, to prevent inappropriate transgressions through adherence to principles of research integrity, ethics and “responsible internationalisation” (Shih, 2024[52]). To take effective decisions, a wide range of issues must be considered, such as openness, scientific advancement, global challenges, national security, economic security, ethics, human rights and democracy. Combining these diverse concerns into a single, cohesive approach is difficult but essential for achieving proportionality in STI securitisation measures (Schwaag Serger and Shih, 2024[53]).
Partnerships: Co-operating with scientists and businesses and across government
A comprehensive STI securitisation policy mix must find ways to bring a broad range of stakeholders, including governments, business and academia, into the discussion while at the same time building robust governance mechanisms essential to integrating a range of priorities and values. This is in a context where businesses and public research-performing organisations enjoy considerable autonomy, which presents co-ordination and mobilisation challenges, particularly where values and interests may be misaligned. Promotion, protection and projection policies also call for cross-government co-ordination, but this is notoriously challenging, with different ministries and agencies having their own specific operating procedures, mental models and frameworks, and community interests to serve.
Co-operation with businesses
Most R&D in technology-intensive economies is conducted in firms, where trade and investment restrictions, as well as new industrial policy measures, are felt most keenly. Involving firms in formulating and implementing STI securitisation policies is, therefore, crucial. This is perhaps most obvious in promotion policies, where, for instance, the new wave of industrial policies builds largely on public-private partnerships. Priority-setting and policy formulation in these contexts typically involve firms, which are often engaged in strategic foresight and technology assessment processes, policy formulation and design, and collaborative R&D with public sector research-performing organisations. Firms also benefit from policy incentives that seek to attract international talent and are typically engaged in their design.
This chapter has focused on research security policies affecting public research-performing organisations, but firms are also subject to restrictions, for example in the form of export controls and investment screening as part of economic and national security measures. They are also targets of cyberattacks and industrial espionage, as well as vectors. Some governments provide guidelines on countermeasures against technology leakage in the context of overseas expansion of production facilities. Both the European Economic Security Strategy (see Box 2.2) and Japan’s Action Plan for Economic Security (see Box 2.3), for example, include provisions on the security risks from outbound investments.
This chapter has also highlighted the growing prominence of large leading technology firms in technology diplomacy as they seek to exert influence over international norms and political agendas. These firms wield significant control over critical technologies, raising key questions around accountability, equity and governance, particularly as development of these technologies resides largely outside the oversight of the state, and corporate interests may diverge from national interests (Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator, 2025[54]). Science and technology diplomacy frameworks, involving firms and state authorities, have been updated to explicitly recognise non-state actors as integral participants, shifting from a state‑only focus.
Co-operation with scientists and research-performing organisations
Directed research agendas that are oriented towards strategic goals like economic and national security must mobilise scientists and research-performing organisations if they are to succeed. Governments traditionally use managed funding programmes and other incentives for this purpose (see Chapter 1), but they must also incentivise the strengthening of linkages with other innovation system actors, notably firms, to promote innovation and national competitiveness. As already highlighted, a growing policy focus on dual‑use research and technology development could have implications for civil research, in terms of its physical environment, e.g. with high-security zones and restricted access, but also in the ways research is conducted and disseminated. Targeted education and support will be needed to help researchers better understand the complexities of dual-use research, including its risks and its opportunities (European Commission, 2025[21]). But there will also be a need for scientists and universities to be routinely involved in co-designing any new arrangements.
This is already happening around research security. The primary responsibility for implementing research security belongs to research-performing organisations and especially universities, given their autonomy is secured in many countries.39 At the time of the OECD-GSF report (OECD, 2022[30]), government research security measures were regularly criticised by the research community for being opaque or disconnected from the operational realities of research institutes. More recent initiatives show a marked improvement in how governments engage with research institutes in the development and implementation of such policies. For example, the 2024 JASON study’s recommendation to adopt a process-based, rather than a list-based, approach to identifying sensitive research was developed after discussions with a range of government agencies, university administrators and experts on issues of research security (JASON, 2024[55]). Across various levels of government, universities and research institutes appear to be routinely involved as active partners in the research security policymaking process, with nearly all new policy initiatives making efforts to collect input from research stakeholders.40
At the same time, a range of researcher-driven initiatives has emerged to promote interactions between the scientific and diplomatic communities, many working across national borders. For example, the American Association for the Advancement of Science established in 2008 the Center for Science Diplomacy, which aims to strengthen interactions and partnerships between the two communities, as well as to develop the intellectual framework and training to support the practice of science diplomacy.41 In Europe, the EU Science Diplomacy Alliance was launched in 2021 to facilitate interactions and dialogue, training, institutional capacity building and co-ordination of grant-seeking or use of joint funding.42 Similarly, DiploCientífica has developed a collaborative network that brings together scientists, policymakers and the diplomatic community in Latin America and the Caribbean to build capacity and produce constructive knowledge.43 Finally, South Africa hosts the Science Diplomacy Capital for Africa initiative that aims to facilitate cross-border collaboration between African science institutions and global partners, particularly diplomatic communities and regional bodies.44
Promoting cross-government policy coherence
Ministries with responsibilities for R&I, as well as funding agencies, are active in the growing securitisation of STI, although it has most often been led by ministries in other policy domains such as trade, foreign affairs, defence and industry. Existing links between STI policy and other policy domains remain weak in most countries and need strengthening to orchestrate government action on protection, promotion and projection policies (OECD, 2023[1]).
Strategically oriented research – for example, as part of new industrial policies – necessarily involves cross-government co-operation, particularly to help orchestrate supportive actions across the innovation chain, from basic research to technology commercialisation and diffusion. This is perhaps best illustrated by the recent popularity of mission-oriented innovation policy approaches, which typically bring together several ministries and agencies to co-ordinate actions to meet specified and time-limited shared goals (see Chapter 1). The promotion of dual-use research and technologies will also call for increased co-operation between STI ministries and agencies and their defence sector counterparts to accelerate innovation and support responsible and secure technology development (European Commission, 2025[21]).
An integrated approach to research security also calls for strengthening cross-government collaborations between science and security agencies. Such collaborations are necessary to build mutual understanding of the benefits and risks of international research collaborations and to help build risk-appropriate mitigation strategies. One purpose of such collaborations has been to build a shared understanding between the scientific and security agencies on the risks facing the research sector and thus increase buy-in for research security policy actions.45 More broadly, as research security policies proliferate, measures to streamline and harmonise overlapping guidelines, standards and organisational responsibilities are likely to be required. The establishment of new structures and new requirements for research security can come with a significant overhead in terms of costs and effort. Already, national governments and funding institutions face the need to clarify organisational roles and responsibilities within their own level of governance.46 A growing interest in information clearinghouses and learning and discussion forums may signal a demand for improved policy coherence. This would not only facilitate more consistent implementation of research security policies worldwide but also reduce burden on researchers. The Dutch National Contact Point for Knowledge Security is often held up as a good example and is a collaboration between different government ministries to support anyone connected to a knowledge institute who has questions about opportunities, risks or practical matters concerning international research co-operation.47
Cross-government collaborations also aim to support faster and more effective risk identification and mitigation of potential threats. For example, the Korean Ministry of Science and ICT is developing a new security classification for national research and development projects to enable better monitoring of these projects according to their level of risk. The new classification system defines a new category of “sensitive research” that lies between the traditional categories of “classified” and “unclassified” research. This initiative is part of a comprehensive national Plan for Strengthening the Research Security System for the Establishment of a Trusted Research Ecosystem, which is the collaborative work of nine ministries and agencies. The partnership is also conducting consultations on research asset leakage and developing a research security field guide to support research institutions.
Effective science diplomacy also needs enhanced cross-government co-ordination, and the interface between diplomatic services, science ministries and research communities is increasingly important. Policy concerns revolve around strengthening institutional capacities and personnel skills while fostering a more strategic outlook in pursuing a range of means and ends.
Precision: Building strategic intelligence and risk assessment capabilities
For securitisation measures to be proportionate, they should be based on sound risk and opportunity identification and assessments that draw on knowledge and evidence on current and future developments of new STI and their potential impacts on the economy and society. This strategic intelligence draws on a broad range of methods, such as statistical benchmarking, forecasting and modelling, foresight, technology assessment, systems and pathway mapping, and technology monitoring and evaluation. Chapter 7 outlines several types of strategic intelligence practices that would likely prove useful, including horizon scanning and technology monitoring; situation analysis; forward-looking technology assessment; adaptive foresight; multistakeholder participation; and formative (real-time) evaluation. Such efforts should also combine and integrate different disciplines, for example expertise on research, science and higher education systems and dynamics with expertise on relevant countries and national and economic security. Such a multi-disciplinary approach is important for avoiding over-securitisation (Schwaag Serger and Shih, 2024[53]).
Different technology supply chains have different vulnerability risks, and the same applies to international science collaboration: different critical technologies have varying dual-use potential, for example, and countries differ in their capacities to exploit them. This variation points to the need for a targeted policy approach, underpinned by risk management assessments that draw on the best available evidence, as well as forward-looking analysis where uncertainties preclude traditional risk-based analysis (OECD, 2023[1]). Several initiatives are now under way to develop this knowledge foundation, but more is needed. Earlier descriptions of EU and Japanese economic security policies highlighted these sorts of activities (see Box 2.2 and Box 2.3).48 Box 2.9 describes how Finland is similarly building capacity in cross‑government technology assessment to inform its economic and research and technology security policies.
As a small, technologically advanced economy, Finland has benefited from open international research and innovation co-operation, which has guided its science, technology and innovation (STI) policy thinking throughout the post-Cold War era. With growing awareness of research security, Finland needs to reconsider its technological and business strengths and purposefully develop growth opportunities and international high value-added businesses. Alongside strong EU STI collaboration, membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization also influences Finland’s STI collaboration with partners and opens export opportunities, including for the defence industry.
High-tech industries account for an important part of Finland’s exports, including products and services, and depend on significant amounts of raw materials and intermediate products sourced from abroad. In late 2024, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment established a Technology Policy Unit to enhance policy co-ordination, identify growth opportunities from technologies and deepen Finland’s analytical capacities in this area as a part of an overall technology roadmap activity. This includes developing capabilities to generate strategic intelligence that aims to provide a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities from research and new technologies.
To improve cross-government co-ordination, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment has also convened a working group on technology policy for regular exchange of views and co-ordination with relevant ministries and agencies. Together, this group will identify and discuss policy questions that require national co-operation and co-ordination (including research and technology security issues), strengthen goal-oriented technology anticipation and analytical capacity, and produce knowledge that supports STI and industrial policy steering.
Source: Based on correspondence between the OECD Secretariat and the Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.
In the research security area, several countries and institutions have developed guidance for risk assessment and avoidance of risk,49 but there is less guidance on what proportionate risk mitigation and management means in different contexts. Not all risks can be identified and there are systemic vulnerabilities that need to be considered, such as in IT systems or peer review processes. Proportionality depends on priorities, resources and context. For example, some countries have developed blacklists of areas in which all scientific collaboration with specific countries or institutions is prohibited. Others are linking risk identification and management to TRLs. The advantages and disadvantages of different approaches in different contexts is an area where different countries and institutions could learn from each other.
As the field of research security continues to develop, there is recognition of the need for continuous learning to stay ahead of emerging risks and challenges. This includes understanding the latest mechanisms of foreign interference and effective strategies for mitigating risk. To address this need, various actors across the research landscape are moving to formalise continuous learning processes, in the form of evaluating policy and practice. This evaluative process is essential for refining existing policies and ensuring they remain aligned with broader R&I objectives.50 Furthermore, to facilitate the sharing of best practices in research security, organisations at multiple levels are increasingly focused on ways to foster peer learning, including through discussion-based forums and central clearinghouses of vetted, up‑to-date information and resources on threats and mitigation strategies.51
Science diplomacy measures would also benefit from greater use of strategic intelligence. Along these lines, the Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator has proposed a Framework on Anticipatory Science Diplomacy to proactively govern and deploy scientific advances before they cause disruption or inequality, ensuring science serves humanity while navigating geopolitical competition. It does this by providing relevant actors with early insights into frontier science – by identifying and scoping out the major scientific advances with the highest potential to reshape humanity and the planet – thereby allowing sufficient time to assess and debate their long-term global implications, and avoid missed opportunities by proactively shaping innovation trajectories before crises emerge (Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator, 2025[54]). The OECD’s 2024 Framework for Anticipatory Governance of Emerging Technologies also provides structured guidance on how governments can embed anticipation into policy cycles, stakeholder engagement and innovation strategies, including at the international level (OECD, 2024[47]).
Among a wide range of types of international STI linkages, this chapter has focused on international research linkages and, specifically, the emerging securitisation of STI policy that now shapes them. Post‑Cold War international STI co-operation arrangements are being reconfigured as they transition to a new era marked by growing geopolitical rivalry and intensified inter-state competition on emerging technologies. Signals of a less open international research system are already emerging: for instance, growing international co-authorship in scientific publications has been at the core of a more interconnected global research community over the last 30 years, but is now stagnating or even in decline.
While these developments present new challenges and considerable uncertainty, STI policymakers can influence the contours of an emerging landscape of international STI linkages. Using the “3Ps” framework of promotion, protection and projection introduced in the 2023 edition of the OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook, this chapter has reported on how governments increasingly target critical technologies to promote both economic and national security; implement research security measures to protect against unauthorised knowledge leakage and coercion; and use science diplomacy policies to further their national interests and accordingly more strategically manage the international openness of their research systems.
These policies carry various risks and opportunities, and policymakers should pursue balanced STI securitisation policies that are proportional to the risks at hand, precise in their targeting, and based on partnerships with scientists and businesses, as well as across government. For example, securitisation policies for STI should weigh any restrictions against the benefits of open science and innovation; they should be evidence-based, drawing on risk assessments, future-oriented analysis such as foresight and technology assessment (see Chapter 7), and evaluation insights; and they should mobilise a diverse set of stakeholders – including scientists and innovative firms which increasingly accept the necessity of securitisation measures – to increase their chances of success.
Many of the skills and organisational capabilities needed for governments to pursue balanced securitisation policies for STI remain underdeveloped. New institutions, policy frameworks and governance arrangements will also be required but will take time to develop, sometimes through trial and error. Policies that promote dual-use research, research security and science diplomacy are often managed by a range of ministries and agencies yet are closely entwined. Governments need to develop policy tools and assessment frameworks that offer a systemic view and understanding of their portfolio of securitisation policies in STI and beyond to appreciate their synergies and dissonance and promote joined-up interventions. Despite the sensitivities of the policy area, governments should also engage in international mutual learning and benchmarking of emerging good practices among like-minded countries to co-ordinate and accelerate their national development plans and implementation progress. There is still much to learn and continued sharing of policy and practice will be needed, as will policy refinement in a fast-moving space.
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[41] Runguis, C. and T. Flink (2020), “Romancing science for global solutions: On narratives and interpretative schemas of science diplomacy”, Humanities & Social Sciences Communications, Vol. 7/102, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00585-w.
[53] Schwaag Serger, S. and T. Shih (2024), Finding Effective and Acceptable Approaches to Managing International Collaborations in a Geopolitically Turbulent World, Vinnova, https://www.vinnova.se/globalassets/publikationer/2024/ru-rapport-dec-2024.pdf?cb=20250107110054.
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← 1. The 2023 edition of the OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook defined “securitisation” as the reframing of regular policy issues, such as climate change, migration and emerging technologies, into matters of “security”. The term has a more common but unrelated use in finance.
← 2. International STI linkages are wide-ranging. For example, academic researchers routinely co-operate and exchange across borders to advance shared scientific interests. Many researchers are also internationally mobile. In the private sector, innovative firms trade and invest internationally in the production of high-technology products and services. While international STI linkages can be led by states, they are more often built from the bottom-up, via individual researchers, research organisations and firms. The focus of this chapter is chiefly on research collaboration and international researcher mobility.
← 3. International collaboration intensity can be measured as the number of a reference territory’s publications where the set of listed affiliations includes at least one affiliation abroad, as a percentage of the total number of publications attributed to that territory.
← 4. China’s growing research capabilities have transformed the geography of international scientific collaboration over the last couple of decades. China’s spending on R&D was second only to the United States in 2023, it has the largest number of R&D personnel globally, and it is at the forefront in many areas of science and technology.
← 5. Early-career researchers – doctoral and postdoctoral – are often internationally mobile, but tracking their career paths can be difficult, particularly if they stop publishing and are no longer visible through bibliometric data. The absence of comprehensive data on career paths is not only a challenge for policymakers but also a problem for early-career researchers who want to make informed career choices. The Research and Innovation Careers Observatory (ReICO) is a joint initiative of the OECD and the European Commission. It aims to be the premier source for reliable data and information on careers in research and innovation (R&I). The project’s goal is to create a dynamic information hub that tracks and analyses trends in R&I talent, career paths, and mobility in OECD and EU countries, as well as other economies.
One of ReICO’s core pillars is talent circulation. This theme focuses on the movement of R&I talent across institutions, sectors and borders. It explores career transitions and how mobility contributes to dynamic and interconnected innovation systems. ReICO seeks to improve the international comparability of data on researcher mobility by working closely with national contact points through co-ordinated annual data collections. These draw on national administrative records and survey data, complemented by international sources such as the OECD Database on Immigrants. In addition, ReICO will launch the ReICO Survey of the R&I Workforce, targeting individuals, to generate new insights. It will thus shed light on the patterns and dynamics of talent circulation and provide evidence to distinguish between brain drain, brain gain and brain circulation. See https://www.oecd.org/en/networks/research-and-innovation-careers-observatory.html for more information.
← 6. Across OECD countries, the proportion of international students increases with the level of higher education. On average, they account for 5% of bachelor’s students, rising to 15% of master’s students and 25% of those in doctoral programmes (OECD, 2025[4]).
← 7. See Mérat (2022[57]).
← 8. Combined, the energy and environment SDGs account for approximately 28% of scientific production. The share of scientific publications that are deemed most likely to contribute to the energy and environment remained stable in the period 2008-2018. While the total number of indexed scientific publications grew steadily throughout the observed period, the share of publications relevant to the green transition stagnated through 2018 and moderately declined thereafter (OECD, 2025[6]).
← 9. This section is based largely on OECD (OECD, 2025[6]).
← 10. Citing the academic literature, the 2023 edition of the OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook (OECD, 2023[1]) provided the following definitions: “‘technology sovereignty’ refers to a polity’s capacity to act strategically and autonomously in an era of intensifying global technology-based competition. A related concept, ‘strategic autonomy’, is broader and refers to a polity’s capacity to act independently in strategically important policy areas. It does not imply isolation or decoupling from the rest of the world, but rather describes a polity’s capacity to develop and manage international relations independently. It is tied to technology sovereignty, insofar as the latter creates opportunities to compete at technological frontiers, with positive impacts on the polity’s ability to influence global affairs. Countries’ capacity to successfully develop, integrate and use emerging and disruptive technologies in military applications is a traditional measure of their strategic autonomy, but this capacity also applies to many commercial technologies, particularly those with dual-use potential.”
← 11. This chapter draws attention to four types of security and their implications for international STI linkages. The widest is global security, which includes food security, health security and environmental security, all areas where STI plays a central role. These cover many well-known global challenges, including pandemics, growing antimicrobial resistance, biodiversity loss, soil erosion and climate change. National security is traditionally associated with the military and other security forces, though broad definitions can also refer to various types of global security issues, such as pandemic preparedness. Defence-related national security strongly depends on advanced technologies, many of which are increasingly developed in the civil sector. Economic security refers to risks related to the resilience of supply chains, physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure, and the weaponisation of economic dependencies or economic coercion (European Commission, 2023[11]; OECD, 2025[66]). It is also concerned with technology leakage. Finally, the chapter also refers to research security, which is concerned with preventing undesirable foreign state or non-state interference with research (OECD, 2022[30]). These four types of security are often complementary, but they can also be in tension and involve trade-offs, particularly with respect to international STI linkages.
← 12. This chapter’s focus on the research system is in contrast to the broader perspective of the 2023 edition (OECD, 2023[1]), which also covered “downstream” policy concerns, such as industry subsidies (promotion), supply chain vulnerabilities (protection), and strategic alliances and technical standards (projection). The aim in 2023 was to provide a high-level and broad overview of the growing securitisation of STI, whereas in 2025 the aim is to more closely explore the links between different policies, primarily in one part of the innovation chain (the research system); their implications for international research linkages; and the measures governments might take to ensure policies are proportional to risks and opportunities, designed in partnership with the main stakeholders, and drawing on a mix of knowledge and evidence.
← 13. The OECD gathers publicly available data and measures industrial strategies across OECD countries through harmonised data on industrial policy expenditures, their composition, their mode of delivery and the characteristics of their beneficiaries. For further information, see: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/quantifying-industrial-strategies.html.
← 14. Mission-oriented innovation policies incorporate a similar ecosystem perspective, but with a narrower focus on fulfilling a specific mission, including technological missions (Larrue, Tõnurist and Jonason, 2024[56]).
← 15. Measures like these are not just confined to OECD countries. In China, for instance, the 14th Five-Year Plan for National and Economic Social Development (2021-2025) and its underpinning Dual Circulation Strategy aim to achieve self-sufficiency in core technologies and reduce the country’s reliance on foreign technologies, such as advanced semiconductors, where it has critical dependencies (OECD, 2023[1]).
← 16. Funds are dispersed through the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) and the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO). The act also has introduced a public-private co-operation council that actively supports R&D under the K Program by sharing valuable and sometimes sensitive information related to public and private needs and technological solutions. This includes information on security incidents involving private enterprises that are held by relevant administrative organisations, which had normally not been shared with researchers due to confidentiality obligations under the National Public Service Act.
← 17. This section draws widely on a keynote presentation given by Professor Andrew James (University of Manchester) to the Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy’s 125th meeting on 6 November 2024.
← 18. Inspired in part by the United States’ success in developing productive linkages between its civil and defence technology ecosystems, China has been pursuing a Military-Civil Fusion initiative for several years. It aims to create and exploit synergies between economic development and military modernisation, and encourages defence and commercial firms to collaborate and synchronise their efforts by sharing talent, resources and innovations (OECD, 2023[1]).
← 19. While the German federal government is in favour of leveraging synergies between military and civilian research, it recognises the need for a holistic approach to security that sees both promoted in a more complementary way.
← 20. The EC-OECD STIP Compass database has outlined information on almost 400 policy initiatives from 60 countries related to the international mobility of human resources. See: https://stip.oecd.org/stip/interactive-dashboards/themes/TH55.
← 21. Furthermore, several countries have constitutional or other legal provisions regarding academic freedom and the institutional autonomy of universities.
← 22. The thematic portal on research security in the EC-OECD STIP Compass provides a unique window into research security policy initiatives worldwide. The portal enables mutual learning across countries, focusing on the types of policy instruments countries are deploying and the specific policy concerns they seek to address. As of 2025, the portal contains information on 261 research security policy initiatives from 41 countries. Following the STIP Compass policy taxonomy, the top three policy instruments reportedly used are public awareness campaigns and other outreach activities; strategies, agendas and plans; and science and technology regulation and soft law.
← 23. These initiatives often involve the creation of dedicated offices or units with mandates to oversee research security policy. They centralise responsibility and expertise for research security, potentially allowing more consistent policy development and enforcement. For example, the Office of the Director of the National Science Foundation (NSF) established in 2023 the new Office of the Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy, which is responsible for co-ordinating all research security policies across the NSF. Its responsibilities include: identifying and addressing potential risks to the research enterprise; developing policy and best practices; conducting outreach and education; communicating reporting and disclosure requirements; establishing policies to ensure compliance; and, importantly, conducting due diligence on applications for NSF awards (US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 2022[58]). Organisations with similar remits are also being created at universities and research institutions, in the United States and elsewhere. For example, in a research security survey conducted in 2023 by the Korean Ministry of Science and ICT, nearly half of the more than 90 Korean research institutes that responded had a dedicated body for research security (Presidential Advisory Council on Science and Technology, Korea, 2023[62]).
← 24. This list-based approach is complemented by a broader risk assessment approach requiring general due diligence on research projects (including beyond the scope of the list), as per the complementary policy entitled the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships. It is also notable that the Canadian policy does not identify specific countries, but rather focuses on the risk profile of individual research organisations, only prohibiting affiliations with those that are assessed to pose the highest risk to Canada's national security (Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, 2024[35]).
← 25. The German Research Foundation underlines that individual and institutional applicants wishing to co‑operate with international partners need to explain the potential risks and benefits of the collaboration, with more detailed justifications typically required for projects with greater risks or appearance of risks (German Research Foundation, 2023[59]). The German Science and Humanities Council published a position paper on “Science and security in times of global political upheaval” (German Science and Humanities Council, 2025[65]), which gives recommendations for dealing with knowledge risks in order to protect and build a resilient society. While the recommendations by the German Science and Humanities Council and the German Research Foundation are country agnostic, the Max Plank Society and the German Academic Exchange Service have published specific papers regarding interaction with China. The Max Plank Society emphasises the need for mutual understanding and a culturally sensitive approach for sound decisions and balanced co-operation with China (Max Planck Society, 2023[60]). According to the German Academic Exchange Service’s recommendations, interaction with Chinese partners should be interest-oriented, risk-aware and competence-based (German Academic Exchange Service, 2024[61]).
← 26. TRUST applies a decision tree for assessing research proposals and ongoing projects regarding personnel appointments and research support, non-compliance with disclosure and other requirements, and potential risks to national security. See National Science Foundation (National Science Foundation, 2024[63]).
← 27. For further details, see: https://www.jst.go.jp/osirase/research_security/index_e.html. More broadly, the policy discussion on research security in Japan surged in 2024 during economic security policy discussions (e.g. the National Security Secretariat’s expert panel on countermeasures against leakage of critical technologies). Following this, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology issued its Report on Approach for Ensuring Research Security at Universities in December 2024 https://www.mext.go.jp/content/20250423-mxt_kagkoku-000019002_2.pdf). The CSTI Secretariat Expert Panel launched discussions to develop research security guidelines in April 2025.
← 28. For instance, examples featured on UNESCO’s webpage on science diplomacy [https://www.unesco.org/en/scientific-research-cooperation-why-collaborate-science-benefits-and-examples] include CERN in Switzerland, the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Italy and SESAME in Jordan. UNESCO has also published in 2025 its report, Science diplomacy in a rapidly changing world: Building peace in the minds of men and women (UNESCO, 2025[69]).
← 29. The growing popularity of the science diplomacy concept has led to some dilution of its meaning. As noted by the Geneva Science Diplomacy Anticipator (2025[54]), its transdisciplinary nature has made science diplomacy attractive across academic, policy and diplomatic communities, but also prone to being used as a catch-all label for any initiative involving international science collaborations, even when these lack strategic intent or demonstrable impact on foreign policy or international governance. The proliferation of the concept risks obscuring this important distinction, underscoring the need for clearer frameworks to ensure science diplomacy remains purpose-driven, coherent and impactful.
← 30. The uneven distribution of research infrastructure capacities at the global level prevented equitable access to resources and data in many parts of the world during the COVID-19 pandemic, contributing to a disconnect between needs and resources. OECD country research funders recognised the problem, allocating around USD 200 million globally for COVID-19 projects that aimed to strengthen research capacity in LMICs, most of which focused on reinforcing laboratory capacity. Such a strengthening of research capacity can be an important contribution to health-crisis preparedness, but needs to be extended to provide effective global action for other ongoing and future challenges (OECD, 2023[1]).
← 31. For further information, see: https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/uk-science-and-innovation-network.
← 32. For example, more information on Microsoft’s work with the United Nations and international organisations can be found at: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/united-nations.
← 33. For further information, see the Office of Denmark’s Tech Ambassador at: https://techamb.um.dk/the-techplomacy-approach.
← 34. For further information, see: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-states-america/san-francisco_en?s=253.
← 35. For further information, see: https://swissnex.org/about-us/mission-and-organization.
← 36. The European Economic Security Strategy (see Box 2.2) also identifies proportionality and precision as fundamental principles for any measures on economic security (European Commission, 2023[11]).
← 37. Open science is a policy priority for all OECD countries. The EC-OECD STIP Compass database provides a window into how different countries are responding at the national policy level to promote open science. Its STI policies for Open Science portal provides information on close to 700 policy initiatives from more than 60 countries and the European Union and is regularly updated. While the information is certainly not fully comprehensive for all countries, it does provide a meta-view of where countries are focusing their efforts and, at the level of individual initiatives, provides access to summary information and links that are a valuable starting point for those who want to delve further. The portal also provides ready access to published reports and articles relating to open science policy from the OECD, other international organisations and relevant public repositories.
← 38. Emerging frameworks suggest potential paths forward to promote complementarities between research security and open science. For example, in its 2023 Research Security System Improvement Plan, Korea notes that it must continue to promote international co-operation to drive innovation, even while adopting research security management strategies. A 2024 JASON report formalises this intuition by suggesting that technology maturity – as measured through the TRL framework – can guide institutions’ decisions on when imposing additional controls, versus maintaining openness, might best support national security (broadly defined to include economic security). The authors suggest that while potential national security issues may be apparent as early as fundamental research stages (TRLs 1 and 2), it is not until technologies reach the pilot and demonstration phase (move from TRLs 5 to 6) that their actual significance to national security can be demonstrated and warrant substantive mitigation efforts (JASON, 2024[55]).
← 39. For example, Finland’s Constitution secures university autonomy. When ensuring research security, a researcher’s right to choose their research topic and methods cannot be restricted. This means that the applicants for Research Council of Finland funding need to take research security into account as part of the application for research funding. For this reason, the Act on Research Council of Finland was amended in May 2025 to include a paragraph on research security. The aim is to encourage research-performing organisations to identify potential risks and threats related to security in advance. The Research Council’s task is to ensure that due consideration be given to research security and to the risks associated with it in research projects, research co-operation and the use of research results.
← 40. For instance, at the multilateral level, the European Union’s Council Recommendation on Enhancing Research Security, adopted in May 2024, was developed with significant input from R&I stakeholders. The result has been a strongly positive reception from key associations such as the League of European Research Universities, an association of 24 leading research-intensive universities in Europe (see: https://www.leru.org/news/leru-welcomes-proposals-for-more-secure-research-in-the-future). At the national government level, Korea’s recent efforts to develop its comprehensive Plan for Strengthening the Research Security System for the Establishment of a Trusted Research Ecosystem not only engaged 14 universities with industry-academia co-operations (OECD, 2023[68]) but it also linked to the Research Security Advisory Committee, composed of research experts and security experts (see: https://www.msit.go.kr/bbs/view.do?sCode=user&mId=113&mPid=238&bbsSeqNo=94&nttSeqNo=3183414).
← 41. For further information, see: https://www.aaas.org/programs/center-science-diplomacy/about.
← 42. For further information, see: https://www.science-diplomacy.eu.
← 43. For further information, see: https://diplomaciacientifica.org.
← 44. For further information, see: https://www.africasciencediplomacy.org.
← 45. For example, Germany is currently working on developing a strategic approach that connects the constitutionally protected freedom of science with German security and economic interests while maintaining a culture of enabling reciprocal international research co-operation with reliable partners. The German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (known since May 2025 as the Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space) has initiated a national process bringing together stakeholders from the scientific community, the federal ministries and governments of the Länder, industry, and intelligence services. The aim of the ongoing process is to develop a common understanding on research security and essential measures to improve the status quo.
← 46. For example, the Australian Research Council’s Foreign Interference and Security Risk Internal Audit identified one of the highest priority gaps as being the absence of an overarching framework clarifying different actors’ roles and responsibilities (https://www.arc.gov.au/funding-research/research-security).
← 47. For further information, see the National Contact Point for Knowledge Security, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, at: https://english.loketkennisveiligheid.nl.
← 48. For example, in 2023 the European Commission published a recommendation on critical technology areas for the European Union’s economic security (European Commission, 2023[64]). It has also set up a Critical Technologies Observatory which identifies, monitors and assesses critical technologies for the space, defence and related civil sectors and their potential application and related value and supply chains. It also monitors and analyses existing and predictable technology gaps, the root causes of strategic dependencies, and vulnerabilities. Based on these data, the European Commission prepares a classified report for member states on critical technologies and risks associated with strategic dependencies affecting security, space and defence every two years. It also prepares technology roadmaps based on these reports, which include mitigating measures to boost research and innovation and reduce strategic dependencies affecting security and defence (European Commission, 2025[67]).
← 49. For example, the NSF Office of the Chief of Research Security and Policy released its Guidelines for Research Security Analytics in 2023 to support the implementation of its congressionally mandated role. This includes performing risk assessments of NSF proposals and awards using analytical tools to assess non-disclosures of required information. These guidelines include a breakdown of which agency personnel may conduct research security-related activities, what monitoring activities are allowed and with what resources they are conducted, how information will be validated to ensure accuracy, and how information may be shared within the NSF and externally. This level of specificity not only clarifies roles within the NSF but also sets a standard for accountability in research security.
← 50. For example, in the United States, the NSF has launched the Research on Research Security Program to assess the methods for identifying research security risks and strategies for preventing and mitigating them. The programme seeks to better understand the nature, scope, challenges and potential of this field – including the critical areas of cybersecurity, foreign travel, research security training and export control training – with the aim of informing best practices and guidance for the research community. For further information, see: https://new.nsf.gov/news/nsf-announces-research-research-security-program.
← 51. The NSF has also announced a 5-year USD 67 million investment to establish the Safeguarding the Entire Community of the US Research Ecosystem (SECURE) Center, an information clearinghouse. The SECURE Center will disseminate information and reports on risks of foreign interference, provide research security training to relevant communities, and serve as a bridge between the research community and government funding agencies on security concerns. For further information, see: https://new.nsf.gov/news/nsf-backed-secure-center-will-support-research.