OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of State‑Owned Enterprises in Ukraine 2026

Annex B. Description of key Ukrainian SOEs and SOBs

As part of SOE sector reforms, in 2019 the Ukrainian government adopted a protocol decision to improve corporate governance practices in its top ten economically important SOEs with the stated intention of aligning practices with the SOE Guidelines.1 In July 2020, the list was further extended to include five additional SOEs. On 29 November 2024, the CMU approved the new SOP and adopted a list of 33 key SOEs and a sub-list of enterprises designated for corporatisation and for prioritising the establishment of supervisory boards with a majority of independent members (Ukraine Facility, 2025[1]).

Table A B.1. Reform plans in 33 key SOEs

Timeline	Plans
By Q2 2026	Appointment of supervisory boards: supervisory boards with a majority of independent members should be established in at least 15 SOEs.
By Q3 2026	Corporatisation of SOEs: at least 15 SOEs are to be corporatised as JSCs or LLCs.
By Q1 2025	Adoption of a roadmap for structural separation: the government should adopt and publish a roadmap detailing the mandatory structural separation of public service obligation and non-PSO activities in all SOEs engaged in PSOs. This roadmap should outline the process for separating accounts between PSO and non-PSO activities.
By Q3 2025	Legislative alignment for account separation: By Q3 2025, the government should assess and, if necessary, amend legislation identified in the roadmap to ensure that the mandatory structural separation of accounts between PSO and non-PSO activities is clearly defined and fully operational in all key SOEs engaged in PSOs.

Source: Questionnaire responses.

The following section provides an overview of a selection of ten economically important SOEs, whose corporate governance and disclosure practices are summarised in Annex Table 3.A.1. The selection of these from the list of 33 key SOEs was guided by the need to ensure a representative sample that captures the diversity of the Ukrainian SOE landscape. The chosen SOEs operate across multiple industries, including transport (Ukrzaliznytsia), electricity (Energoatom, Ukrenergo, Ukrhydroenergo), oil and gas (Naftogaz of Ukraine, Gas Transmission System Operator), postal services (Ukrposhta), forestry (Forests of Ukraine), manufacturing (Motor Sich), and energy market operations (Guaranteed Buyer). This selection balances market-oriented enterprises with natural monopolies, covering both regulated and competitive sectors. It also accounts for variations in corporate governance structures, including corporatised and non-corporatised entities, those with and without supervisory boards, and enterprises with different ownership backgrounds, including nationalised enterprises. The inclusion of SOEs with and without special obligations further ensures a comprehensive assessment of governance challenges and performance variations. Additionally, the selected SOEs illustrate the evolving roles of SOEs during wartime, as they have had to adapt to disruptions in supply chains, increased security risks and shifts in government priorities.

A separate section is also focused on the systemically important state-owned banks. These aspects are described in more detail in the SOE profiles organised in the following section as follows: energy, agriculture, manufacturing, transport and postal services, and state-owned banks.

Energy sector

Energoatom 

Energoatom is Ukraine’s state-owned national nuclear energy operator and one of the most strategically significant SOEs, both for the national economy and for energy security in the broader European region. The company operates four nuclear power plants, comprising 15 reactor units, and generates approximately 55% of the country’s electricity. Among these, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant – Europe’s largest and one of the top ten globally – has remained under Russian occupation since March 2022. This situation has resulted in a severe and ongoing nuclear safety crisis, marked by physical damage, restricted access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the loss of regulatory oversight. While Energoatom no longer controls the facility, it remains legally and operationally responsible under Ukrainian law, significantly increasing the company’s wartime risk exposure and crisis management obligations.

Despite the war, Energoatom has sustained electricity output across its remaining three nuclear power plants2 by accelerating preventive maintenance cycles, deploying mobile generation, and adapting safety protocols under military threat. The company has also played a systemically important role in maintaining grid stability, including compensating for lost hydroelectric and fossil fuel generation capacity resulting from the Russian invasion.

In November 2025, Energoatom was reported to be involved in a corruption investigation in which members of the company’s management allegedly conditioned payments for delivered goods and services on the receipt of illicit commissions amounting to 10–15% of contract values. While proceedings remain ongoing, the case has highlighted persistent weaknesses in internal controls and oversight arrangements and has raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of corporate governance safeguards in practice.

Special obligations

Since October 2021, Energoatom has operated under a targeted PSO framework. Under this model, the company sells a portion of its output at market prices, with proceeds channelled to the Guaranteed Buyer, a state intermediary tasked with ensuring the affordability of household tariffs. This system effectively transfers revenues from the nuclear generator to household subsidy mechanisms, subsidising the gap between regulated and market electricity prices. As a result, Energoatom functions not only as a commercial generator but also as a key instrument of energy-related fiscal policy. The company reports that these obligations, while stabilising consumer pricing, significantly constrain its ability to reinvest earnings into safety upgrades, capital renewal or nuclear fuel diversification. These constraints are compounded by continued under-compensation of PSO-related costs through the state budget.

Although these obligations are central to energy policy, they are not fully integrated into Energoatom’s non-financial targets or performance-based monitoring frameworks. This weakens transparency and accountability, particularly in light of international standards on state aid transparency and cost reflectivity. The wartime context has further intensified the company’s financial burden: in early 2024, Energoatom assumed additional load balancing responsibilities during critical grid disruptions caused by missile attacks on thermal generation assets.

Corporate governance

Energoatom’s corporate governance framework has undergone partial reform in recent years, marked by progress in supervisory board formation but hindered by significant implementation gaps. In June 2024, following a CMU protocol decision aligned with Ukraine’s broader SOE reform agenda, a new supervisory board was appointed comprising three independent directors and two state-nominated representatives from the Ministry of Energy. The appointment of internationally recognised experts was viewed as a milestone in strengthening strategic oversight for a systemically important SOE. However, the board’s activation was delayed due to contractual disputes, which cited inconsistencies between agreed remuneration terms and those presented in final drafts. As a result, the board only began operating effectively in early 2025, following the renegotiation of terms and the resignation of one member.

These developments drew attention from Ukraine’s international partners. In January 2025, G7 ambassadors publicly appealed to the Prime Minister to expedite the formation of Energoatom’s supervisory board. Later in 2025, the supervisory board was dismissed, reportedly without the full procedures ordinarily required for board termination, raising concerns among stakeholders about due process and governance safeguards. As of mid-2025, the company remains under interim leadership: on 21 August 2025, the supervisory board dismissed the CEO and appointed an acting CEO pending a competitive selection process. The pool of potential candidates has been relatively limited, as the CEO is required to hold a specialised nuclear licence – a requirement that appears more stringent than in many other jurisdictions and may constrain the breadth of the selection process. Subsequent amendments to the company’s charter expanded the supervisory board and modified decision-making arrangements, developments that have prompted further scrutiny regarding their implications for board autonomy and governance stability.

Ukrhydroenergo 

Overview

Ukrhydroenergo is the largest producer of hydropower in Ukraine, operating nine hydroelectric and pumped-storage power plants on the Dnipro and Dniester rivers. The company plays a crucial role in ensuring national energy security and maintaining a balanced power system. The war has had a severe impact on the company’s operations, particularly following the loss of the Kakhovka HPP in June 2023, which supplied a share of the company's capacity. As a result of massive missile strikes (more than 150 since the start of the full-scale invasion) and ongoing drone attacks, the company has suffered heavy losses, with about 45% of its generating capacity destroyed. Despite these challenges, Ukrhydroenergo reports profits and continues to meet all its obligations. The state retains its authority as the sole shareholder.

Special obligations

Ukrhydroenergo fulfils its PSOs, which require the company to compensate for the difference between market prices and the reduced tariffs applied to households. These obligations are reflected in the company’s financial indicators and are formally integrated into its broader strategic planning and performance objectives. Ukrhydroenergo covers these costs independently, without receiving any compensation from the state budget.

Corporate governance

Corporate governance developments are somewhat misaligned. A 2024 government protocol called for Ukrhydroenergo’s corporatisation and the establishment of a majority-independent supervisory board by the end-2026. However, the company had already undergone corporatisation, operates as a JSC and has had a supervisory board with a majority of independent members since 2019. The Charter of Ukrhydroenergo also contains qualified-majority vote rules for certain strategic decisions of the board, such as CEO appointment. Its long-serving CEO, who held office since 2011, resigned in May 2025, and the position has since been held by an acting CEO. As of October 2025, there was no public information on the launch of a selection procedure for a permanent CEO.

Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine (GTSOU)

GTSOU operates Ukraine’s gas transmission network and is responsible for delivering gas to regional distribution systems and supporting cross-border transit to EU markets. The company was unbundled from Naftogaz in 2020 to meet EU and Energy Community requirements and is held through Main Gas Pipelines of Ukraine (MGU), a holding company owned by the Ministry of Energy.

GTSOU’s financial model was heavily reliant on transit revenues from Gazprom under a multi-year agreement, which expired at the end of 2024. Before 2022, over three-quarters of the company’s income came from international transit fees. With the cessation of transit flows, revenues have declined sharply, and international donor support has become critical for operational continuity. Wartime damage has also been severe: multiple transmission pipelines and gas distribution stations were destroyed or seized, significantly disrupting operations.

Corporate governance

Governance challenges have persisted since unbundling. Early concerns included changes in MGU’s supervisory board leadership, which raised questions about the stability of the governance framework and the company’s Energy Community Secretariat certification process. More recently, GTSOU has faced delays in finalising its corporate charter and in implementing governance reforms. In 2024, a collegiate executive management model was introduced, but its application has remained partial. Further amendments to GTSOU’s charter were made in 2025, including new provisions on qualified-majority voting for key supervisory board decisions, such as CEO appointment.

Ukrenergo

Ukrenergo is a private joint-stock company with 100% state ownership, with the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine acting as its ownership entity.3 The company is certified under the Independent System Operator (ISO) model and operates in compliance with the EU’s Third Energy Package. As Ukraine’s transmission system operator (TSO), Ukrenergo is responsible for: 

• operational and technological control of the Integrated Power System (IPS) of Ukraine;

• transmission of electricity via high-voltage power grids from generation to distribution networks; and

• acting as commercial metering administrator and settlement administrator in Ukraine’s electricity market. 

According to the triage results, Ukrenergo will remain in state ownership. In March 2022, Ukraine’s electricity grid was successfully synchronised with the Continental European Grid, opening new business opportunities for Ukrenergo. Ukrenergo's facilities are frequent targets of Russian missile and drone attacks, often leading to outages. Despite this, the pace of restoration of the high-voltage grid has enabled Ukrenergo to fully perform its function as the power system operator. Since the full-scale invasion, Ukrenergo has attracted more than USD 1.57 billion in international support for restoring the power system, maintaining liquidity and building engineering protections. 

Special obligations 

Ukrenergo acts as the state resource through which the special obligation to stimulate production from alternative energy sources (green energy) is financed. These special obligation costs are incorporated into Ukrenergo’s transmission tariff, which is approved and monitored by the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission. 

Corporate governance   

Ukrenergo had operated under the Ministry of Finance until it was transferred to the ownership of the Ministry of Energy in July 2021. Since its corporatisation as a joint-stock Company in 2019, Ukrenergo has operated under CMU protocols requiring the establishment of a majority independent supervisory board. By late 2024, a seven-member board with four independent directors was in place. In September 2024, the board dismissed the CEO and appointed an acting CEO. The decision, reportedly taken without sufficient transparency, raised concerns over board independence and triggered the resignation of two independent members (Ukrenergo, 2025[2]). A new board was appointed in late 2024, and in February 2025, a competitive CEO selection process was launched. In mid-2025, the Ministry of Energy amended Ukrenergo’s charter to require a qualified majority for key supervisory board decisions, including CEO appointment. Similar to other energy SOE examples cited above, these changes came under international scrutiny and were viewed by key international partners as a potential rollback of corporate governance reforms with potential implications for compliance with IFI loan conditionalities.

The supervisory board appointed a permanent CEO on 23 June 2025, after the charter was amended again to allow appointment by simple majority on a third vote. As of July 2025, the supervisory board had been reconstituted with five members, and a full management board is expected soon (Ukrenergo, 2025[2]; Ukrainian SOE weekly, 2024[3]). As of September 2025, the supervisory board dismissed the CEO, but the related decision was blocked by the Ministry of Justice, while the Ministry of Energy and NEURC issued negative opinions, actions that ultimately led to the reinstatement of the CEO.

Guaranteed Buyer

Overview

Guaranteed Buyer was established in 2019 to ensure the purchase of all electricity generated from renewable energy sources at the established "green" tariff. Later, it also became part of the affordability special obligation framework, as described in the next section. The CMU fulfils the ownership function. According to the triage results, the company will remain in state ownership.

Special obligations

Guaranteed Buyer has special obligations related to green energy and affordable electricity. The green energy special obligation has undergone continuous evolution. Initially, a fixed green tariff was introduced. Under this, green energy producers sell electricity at special tariffs, which is then purchased by Guaranteed Buyer and resold at market prices to consumers. Ukrenergo is responsible for compensating Guaranteed Buyer for the difference between these special tariffs and market prices. However, recent policy shifts aim to enhance competition among green energy producers rather than maintaining fixed tariff guarantees. For instance, under the “feed-in premium mechanism”, green energy producers sell electricity directly to consumers at market prices, while Guaranteed Buyer compensates them for the difference between special tariffs and market prices. Ukrenergo, in turn, reimburses Guaranteed Buyer for these payments.

Additionally, under the affordability special obligation, Universal Service Providers (USPs) are required to sell electricity to household consumers at fixed prices to ensure affordability. Guaranteed Buyer compensates USPs for the gap between fixed and market prices. To fund this system, Energoatom and Ukrhydroenergo are responsible for funding Guaranteed Buyer’s payments to USPs, effectively ensuring the availability of affordable electricity for households.

Corporate governance

Guaranteed Buyer is among the 33 key SOEs slated for corporatisation. The same CMU protocol decision set a target for its corporatisation and the establishment of a SB with a majority of independent members by end-2026. However, in April 2024, the CMU accelerated this timeline by adopting a corporatisation plan that aimed for completion by September 2024, with the supervisory board to be in place by October 2024. As of October 2025, corporatisation has yet to be completed.

Naftogaz Group

Overview

Naftogaz remains Ukraine’s largest SOE and a cornerstone of the country’s energy system. Operating under the ownership of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Naftogaz oversees a wide array of operations across the oil and gas value chain, including gas production, storage, distribution and retail, as well as oil extraction, transport, refining, and petrol station operations. It also plays a key role in the fulfilment of special obligations, supplying gas at regulated prices to protected consumer categories. Since the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Naftogaz’s strategic importance has only deepened, driven by the state’s seizure of energy assets previously controlled by Russian-affiliated or oligarchic interests. As of mid-2024, Naftogaz had assumed operational control over 27 regional gas distribution companies and now supplies an estimated 97% of all household natural gas demand in Ukraine (Naftogaz, 2021[4]).

The group continues to dominate the national gas market. In 2023, its subsidiaries produced approximately 15 billion cubic metres of natural gas, accounting for 80% of Ukraine’s domestic output. Its key subsidiary, the Gas Supply Company Naftogaz of Ukraine (GSC Naftogaz), remains the designated supplier of last resort (SoLR) until at least six months following the termination of martial law, ensuring continuity of gas supply to customers in cases of supplier default. These roles reinforce Naftogaz’s quasi-sovereign status in a critical sector that is both strategically sensitive and fiscally impactful.

Special obligations

The scope of special obligations imposed on Naftogaz continues to raise major concerns regarding financial sustainability and market distortion. Under current regulations, Naftogaz Trading – a subsidiary within the group – is tasked with delivering gas to designated consumer groups at government-set prices. In 2022, Naftogaz estimated that these implicit subsidies amounted to UAH 842 billion (USD 20.2 billion), equivalent to nearly 19% of that year’s nominal GDP. These figures do not capture the full opportunity cost, as compensation is calculated using import parity prices, omitting the gap between actual market value and the fixed tariffs applied to Naftogaz’s domestic production. The shortfall is covered through cross-subsidisation from commercially profitable lines of business, reducing fiscal transparency and crowding out reinvestment in infrastructure and exploration. Despite calls for reform, special obligations are expected to remain in place for the duration of martial law (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2023[5]), and their eventual phasing out will require both political will and the introduction of targeted social protection mechanisms to cushion vulnerable consumers (Expro, 2023[6]).

Corporate governance

In terms of corporate governance, Naftogaz has undergone significant evolution in recent years. As a joint-stock company fully owned by the state, it is subject to governance oversight by a seven-member supervisory board composed of four independent directors and three state representatives. This structure was tested in 2022 when the CMU amended the company charter to bypass the one-year cooling-off period for political appointees, enabling the appointment of a former minister as CEO in the absence of a functioning board. While the board was subsequently reconstituted, the incident drew criticism from international partners. Since April 2025, following a competitive recruitment process concluded by the board, a new CEO was appointed. This was followed by strategic appointments to the management board, including a new Chief Commercial Officer and two additional senior executives.

As a group company, Naftogaz exercises ownership rights over more than 50 legal entities (subsidiaries), which can be categorised into three groups:

• fully-owned subsidiaries

• controlled subsidiaries, where Naftogaz owns 50% or more of the authorised capital

• subsidiaries in which Naftogaz owns less than 50%

Due to shortcomings in Ukrainian corporate law, there is no efficient legal framework for the effective management and oversight of holding companies like Naftogaz. As a result, the group faces significant governance and accountability challenges. Naftogaz lacks the legal tools necessary to streamline governance across its subsidiaries, leading to potential inefficiencies. For example, while Ukrainian law does not explicitly require subsidiaries of SOEs to establish independent supervisory boards, other legislation may impose such requirements if certain criteria are met. This could affect the parent company's ability to influence its subsidiaries, especially when the parent remains responsible for the effective management of the entire group, and may limit the parent’s influence. In some cases, subsidiaries have audit committees in place despite lacking a full supervisory board, further complicating oversight.

Another example is that the CEO of Naftogaz does not have the legal authority to direct the CEOs of its subsidiaries. Instructions or directives from the parent company can only be issued during general shareholders’ meetings, which may be infrequent in certain cases. This situation encourages informal, non-binding instructions that can dilute decision-making responsibility and weaken accountability within the group, especially with such a large group of subsidiaries. Addressing this complexity potentially requires reforms to introduce an appropriate legal framework for holding companies and the development of a new targeted group governance model for Naftogaz.

Agriculture

Forests of Ukraine

Overview

Forests of Ukraine is a state unitary enterprise operating under the ownership oversight of the State Forest Resources Agency. It is included in the list of 33 key SOEs of strategic importance and, according to Ukraine’s triage framework, is expected to remain in state ownership. In line with broader state property management reforms, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has instructed that the enterprise undergo corporatisation by the end of 2026. This transition includes the establishment of a supervisory board composed of a majority of independent members, in accordance with best corporate governance practices for large SOEs.

Special obligations

The enterprise currently does not carry any formally designated special obligations tied to state policies, according to its latest letter of expectations. Its mandate is commercial in nature, although its activities naturally intersect with broader public policy objectives related to environmental protection, biodiversity and sustainable resource use.

Corporate governance

Significant steps have been taken in recent years to strengthen the company’s governance. In January 2025, the CMU appointed three independent directors and one state representative to the supervisory board, allowing the board to become operational for the first time. However, one board seat remains unfilled as of mid-2025, with the company charter requiring a total of five members. The enterprise’s current CEO was appointed in 2023 and remains in post. While the board is still in its early stages of activity, its establishment marks a milestone in professionalising oversight and aligns with ongoing efforts to corporatise state forestry assets.

Manufacturing

Motor Sich

Overview

Motor Sich is one of Ukraine’s most strategically sensitive state-owned enterprises, specialising in the production and maintenance of aviation engines and gas turbine units. Historically one of the country’s most prominent industrial manufacturers, the company was nationalised in a high-profile decision reflecting growing geopolitical concerns over foreign ownership and the security of defence-related technologies. In March 2021, the President enacted a decision of the National Security and Defence Council to nationalise Motor Sich, citing national security interests and announcing that affected investors would be compensated. In November 2022, amid full-scale war, the company’s corporate rights were formally seized under martial law and transferred to the Ministry of Defence, which now performs the ownership function and holds 100% of the company’s shares.

Motor Sich is designated among the 33 key SOEs and is expected to remain in state ownership for the duration of martial law. However, future privatisation remains a possibility once martial law is lifted, pending a security review and broader economic recovery conditions. Its role in maintaining Ukraine’s aerospace and defence production capacity gives it strategic prominence within the manufacturing sector.

Corporate governance

Following the seizure of corporate rights, the Ministry of Defence took swift action to reconstitute the company’s governance structure. A new five-member supervisory board was appointed in late 2022, with a majority of independent directors. A new CEO was also appointed to lead the company’s operational restructuring. The reconfiguration of Motor Sich’s governance framework underlines the state’s efforts to professionalise oversight while retaining strategic control.

Transport and postal services

Ukrzaliznytsia 

Ukrzaliznytsia, the national railway operator of Ukraine, remains one of the most strategically vital and operationally complex SOEs. It is fully state-owned, with the CMU performing the ownership function. As confirmed by the triage assessment, Ukrzaliznytsia will remain in state ownership. The company operates as a legal monopoly in key segments of the railway sector, including infrastructure management, locomotive traction and passenger transport. Freight wagon operation is the only segment where private participation is currently permitted. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrzaliznytsia’s infrastructure has been repeatedly targeted by missile and drone strikes. The company has also played a central role in the humanitarian response, evacuating civilians from conflict zones and ensuring mobility during wartime.

In recent years, Ukrzaliznytsia has identified key strategic priorities, including the unbundling of its operations into independent business lines covering passenger and cargo transport, infrastructure management, and production. A parallel strategic objective is the gradual integration of Ukraine’s rail system with the European Union. This long-term goal will require a significant technical transition from Ukraine’s 1 520 mm railway gauge to the 1 435 mm European standard gauge, necessitating substantial infrastructure investment and coordination (Ukrainian SOE Weekly, 2024[7]).

Special obligations

While Ukrzaliznytsia is not formally assigned special obligations under state policy, it provides subsidised or free tickets to various social categories, including war veterans and pensioners. Although the law requires that these services be compensated from relevant public budgets, the company has consistently faced underpayment for these obligations, placing a fiscal burden on its balance sheet.

Corporate governance

Ukrzaliznytsia is corporatised (operating as a JSC) with a majority independent supervisory board. In December 2024, the CMU reinstated the competitive selection process for board members at Ukrzaliznytsia, as the process had previously been suspended for the duration of martial law (Ukrainian SOE Weekly, 2024[7]).

To ensure continuity in corporate governance, the CMU reappointed the existing supervisory board members for a six-month term on 29 December 2024, allowing the company to maintain an operational board while the selection process is completed. Notably, the term of office of the supervisory board was set to expire on the same date. In October 2024, the CMU terminated the powers of the entire executive board of Ukrzaliznytsia. By the same ordinance, the CMU appointed a new CEO for a three-year term and reappointed the former CEO as an executive board member (Ukrainian SOE Weekly, 2024[7]).

Ukrposhta 

Ukrposhta, the national postal operator of Ukraine, holds a legal monopoly on the provision of universal postal services. The company is state-owned, with the Ministry for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development exercising the ownership function. With over 4 900 fixed locations and nearly 2 000 mobile branches, Ukrposhta maintains one of the country’s most expansive logistical footprints, ensuring near-complete national coverage apart from temporarily occupied territories. In addition to postal services, the company provides a wide array of financial services, including cash pensions, money transfers and utility payments, often serving as a financial lifeline for rural and elderly populations. Ukrposhta is confirmed to remain in state ownership (Ukrposhta, 2023[8]).

Special obligations

Although Ukrposhta’s legal designation includes universal service obligations – such as the delivery of simple letters and postcards at regulated tariffs and the nationwide distribution of pensions in cash – its formal letter of expectations does not currently record any special obligations. Nonetheless, these public service functions remain central to the enterprise’s mandate and contribute to its strategic importance within the state sector (Ukrposhta, 2024[9]).

Corporate governance

Ukrposhta has implemented several corporate governance reforms in recent years. The company’s supervisory board is composed of six members – four independent directors and two state representatives – with one additional independent member yet to be appointed to meet statutory requirements. The CEO has led the company since 2016, providing leadership continuity and helping to steer Ukrposhta through digitalisation, decentralisation and wartime logistical disruptions. Though included in the list of SOEs requiring corporatisation by 2026, Ukrposhta is already corporatised and maintains a functioning supervisory board with a majority of independent members.

Ukrposhta is also among the few Ukrainian SOEs that continue to demonstrate a high level of transparency amid wartime conditions, regularly publishing financial reports, audit documentation, and performance data (Ukrposhta, 2024[9]).

State-owned banks

Ukraine’s state-owned banking sector plays a systemically important role, accounting for a significant share of total banking assets.4 The top five state-owned banks are subject to state ownership for differing reasons, including systemic stability, crisis response and national security. Collectively, they illustrate varying degrees of reform progress and readiness for eventual privatisation.

PrivatBank

PrivatBank, the largest financial institution in the country, has remained state-owned since its nationalisation in 2016. The CMU performs the ownership function, and the bank is a critical fiscal contributor, having provided 75%5 of all SOE and state bank dividends to the national budget in 2023 (PrivatBank, 2025[10]). The bank’s governance architecture is relatively robust, featuring a nine-member supervisory board with six independent members. A new CEO was appointed in October 2024 through a competitive selection process. PrivatBank has published a corporate governance code and continues to serve as a pillar of financial inclusion and digital banking innovation (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, 2025[11]) (SMIDA, 2025[12]).

Oschadbank

Oschadbank, historically rooted in the Soviet-era savings system, remains a major retail banking institution. The CMU oversees ownership, and in 2023 the bank posted a record profit of UAH 6 billion (USD 1.4 billion). Its management board currently comprises eight members. While Oschadbank’s supervisory board formally began operations in 2023 with seven appointed members, this is still below the nine members required by its charter. Efforts to fill the open board seats are ongoing (Oschad Bank, 2025[13]).

Ukreximbank

Ukreximbank, focused on foreign trade finance and government credit lines, also operates under the CMU’s oversight. It has historically served as the financial interface for international development loans and export-import transactions. The bank's governance framework includes a management board of six members and a supervisory board of eight, with five independent directors. Although one additional board member awaits approval from the National Bank of Ukraine, the bank has continued to function with an incomplete board since January 2024, as permitted by government ordinance (Exim Bank, 2025[14]).

Ukrgasbank

Ukrgasbank, nationalised during the 2009 financial crisis, has since repositioned itself as a leader in “green” banking. Unlike PrivatBank, Oschadbank, Ukreximbank and Sense Bank, the Ministry of Finance is responsible for Ukrgasbank. With a 94.94% state ownership stake, the Ministry of Finance is preparing the bank for eventual privatisation. The bank’s supervisory board comprises six members, four of whom are independent, and it continues to promote environmental finance as a core business line (UkrGasBank, 2025[15]).

Sense Bank

Sense Bank, formerly Alfa Bank Ukraine, was nationalised in July 2023 under emergency legislation, and the Deposit Guarantee Fund installed new supervisory and executive leadership with Ministry of Finance and National Bank approval. A new CEO was selected in December 2023 (Ukrainian SOE Weekly, 2023[16]). Sense Bank’s supervisory board currently comprises five members – two state representatives and three independent directors – which is fewer than the nine-member composition required under Ukraine’s banking law. The bank is publicly identified as a candidate for future privatisation alongside other state-owned banks, and the government has committed to engaging external advisors for the privatisation process, though specific timelines may be subject to delay (IMF, 2023[17]).

References

[14] Exim Bank (2025), Правління, https://www.eximb.com/ua/bank/corp-management/pravlinnya/.

[6] Expro (2023), Ukraine increased gas production by 0.9% - up to 18.7 bcm in 2023, https://expro.com.ua/en/tidings/ukraine-increased-gas-production-by-09-up-to-187-bcm-in-2023.

[17] IMF (2023), “Ukraine: Sixth Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, Requests for Modification of a Performance Criterion, and Financing Assurances Review-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Ukraine”, Country Reports 366, p. 163, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400297397.002.

[11] Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (2025), Reports, https://mof.gov.ua/uk/zvity.

[4] Naftogaz (2021), about-naftogaz, https://www.naftogaz.com/about-naftogaz.

[13] Oschad Bank (2025), Правління та наглядова рада банку, https://www.oschadbank.ua/pravlinna-ta-nagladova-rada-banku.

[10] PrivatBank (2025), Corporate Governance, https://privatbank.ua/en/about/management/corp.

[12] SMIDA (2025), 14360570 - АКЦІОНЕРНЕ ТОВАРИСТВО КОМЕРЦІЙНИЙ БАНК “ПРИВАТБАНК”, https://smida.gov.ua/db/prof/14360570.

[1] Ukraine Facility (2025), Plan for the implementation, https://www.ukrainefacility.me.gov.ua/en/.

[7] Ukrainian SOE Weekly (2024), Issue 153 (special issue on Ukrzaliznytsia), https://mailchi.mp/cfc/ukrainian-soe-weekly-issue-153?e=407cd4f6a2.

[16] Ukrainian SOE Weekly (2023), Issue 98, https://us20.campaign-archive.com/?u=3fbeb741afc64dbe2ff6cbbb8&id=1a13955450#Confiscation.

[3] Ukrainian SOE weekly (2024), Issue 145, https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-state-owned-enterprises-weekly-issue-145/.

[2] Ukrenergo (2025), Announcement of competitive selection for Chairman of the Management Board of Private Joint Stock Company National Power Company UKRENERGO (NPC UKRENERGO), https://ua.energy/general-news/announcement-of-competitive-selection-for-chairman-of-the-management-board-of-private-joint-stock-company-national-power-company-ukrenergo-npc-ukrenergo/.

[15] UkrGasBank (2025), UkrGasBank, https://en.thepage.ua/dossier/ukrgasbank.

[9] Ukrposhta (2024), Поштові послуги, https://www.ukrposhta.ua/ua.

[8] Ukrposhta (2023), MANAGEMENT REPORT OF JOINT STOCK COMPANY “UKRPOSHTA”, https://expro.com.ua/en/tidings/ukraine-increased-gas-production-by-09-up-to-187-bcm-in-2023.

[5] Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2023), On the designation of the Limited Liability Company “Gas Supply Company “Naftogaz of Ukraine” as the supplier of “last resort”, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/793-2023-%D1%80#Text.

Notes

← 1.  Naftogaz, Ukrzaliznytsia, State Food and Grain Corporation, Ukrhydroenergo, Ukrenergo, Ukroboronprom, Ukrposhta, Energoatom, Sea Ports Authority, and Boryspil Airport. In July 2020, the government issued a Protocol Decision No. 62 and added five SOEs to the list, including the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine (GTSO), the Agrarian Fund, the Automobile Roads of Ukraine, the Air Traffic Control and Polygraph Combine “Ukraina”.

← 2.  Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine

← 3.  Ukrenergo was previously assigned to the Ministry of Finance as its ownership entity.

← 4.  This section does not refer to all SOBs, Motor Bank (100% state-owned by the SPFU) and PIN Bank (88.9% state-owned by the SPFU) are not further outlined (more detail in 1.3).

← 5.  In 2024 (latest available data), total revenues to the state budget from dividends amounted to UAH 71.1 billion. Compared to total budget revenues of UAH 3,123.5 billion, dividends represented only 2.3%. PrivatBank provided the majority of dividend inflows among SOEs and state banks, but when placed in the context of the overall budget, the fiscal importance of dividends remains limited.