This chapter examines Sweden’s framework of corruption offences, including both the legal framework and the performance of the enforcement system in practice. It provides recommendations on clarifying the wording of the trading in influence and official misconduct offences, improving liability and accountability for legal and natural persons, clarifying institutional responsibilities and developing institutional capacity.
OECD Integrity Review of Sweden
Abstract
Impartial and effective enforcement of corruption offences ensures accountability for those who engage in corruption. Even the most effective prevention framework will never be successful in all cases, so when corruption and other integrity violations occur, there must be a system in place that ensures there are consequences. This is especially true when combatting phenomena like the rise of serious organised crime that involve external actors for whom a preventative approach to fostering integrity alone may be less likely to be effective. Continuously reviewing the enforcement system is also necessary in such circumstances as external shocks may expose previously unexploited vulnerabilities.
Principle 11 of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity calls on adherents to ensure that enforcement mechanisms provide appropriate responses to all suspected violations of public integrity standards. This includes applying fairness, objectivity and timeliness in the enforcement of public integrity standards; promoting mechanisms for co-operation and exchange of information between relevant bodies; and encouraging transparency about the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms and outcomes of disciplinary, administrative, civil and criminal cases (OECD, 2017[1]).
In Sweden, the Brå publishes enforcement data, and as of May 2025 it showed that the number of corruption offences reported, investigated, prosecuted have remained fairly constant in the last five years, as has the number of convictions (Figure 3.1). However, this is not necessarily indicative of levels of corruption, which may go undetected. While perceived corruption tends to be low in Sweden, this data relies heavily on questions about bribery. Evidence from Iceland shows that when such questions are supplemented with questions about other types of corruption, perceptions of corruption are notably higher, and experts have posited that these findings would also apply in Sweden (Bergh, Erlingsson and Öhrvall, 2018[2]). For instance, OECD data shows that in Sweden, 43% of the population still thinks a public official would grant political favours in exchange for a job offer, which is not far below the OECD average of 49% (OECD, 2024[3]).
Note: Offence totals include the following offences (including minor and gross versions) outlined in Chapter 10 of the Swedish Criminal Code: embezzlement, bribery, breach of trust, negligent financing of bribery, trading in influence.
Source: Swedish Council for Crime Prevention (Brå)
At the same time, while not yet necessarily reflected in case statistics, the Swedish Government is concerned about the rise in serious organised crime, which may use corruption as a tactic to exert unlawful influence over public authorities as outlined in the APACUI and the National Strategy Against Organised Crime. Organised crime has also emerged as the issue that Swedes are most worried about, with 72% saying they were “very worried” about it in 2024 (SOM Institute, 2024[4]). It is therefore worth reviewing whether the enforcement system is sufficiently effective to counter this evolving threat.
Sweden has demonstrated a commitment to improving its enforcement framework. In February 2024 the Swedish Government organised a legislative inquiry to review “measures under criminal law against corruption and official misconduct” (hereinafter “the legislative inquiry”) with a specific focus on evaluating the impact of a 2012 reform package and considering the expansion of criminal liability for official misconduct (Government of Sweden, 2024[5]). The inquiry’s final report was presented in July 2025 (Government of Sweden, 2025[6]). This inquiry and its main focus areas are also reflected in the APACUI.
This chapter provides recommendations aimed at strengthening both the legal framework and enforcement in practice to ensure that the enforcement system is adequately equipped to ensure accountability for all forms of corruption, including corruption arising from the unlawful influence of serious organised crime. The recommendations cover:
improving the wording of certain offences in the legal framework, such as trading in influence and official misconduct
clarifying liability of legal persons and increasing the dissuasiveness of sanctions for both legal and natural persons
ensuring that the legal and institutional frameworks allow for effective investigation and prosecution of corruption
building capacity among law enforcement, prosecutors and judges responsible for corruption cases.
The recommendations in this chapter are not meant to constitute a comprehensive review of all corruption offences in Sweden but rather to focus on improving those that may be of greatest policy relevance to Sweden’s current priorities. A more overarching review of the legal framework can be found in GRECO’s third evaluation round report and subsequent compliance reports (GRECO, 2025[7]), as well as the UNODC’s review under the UNCAC (UNODC, 2014[8]).
Sweden also underwent a Phase 4 review by the OECD’s Working Group on Bribery in late 2024 (OECD, 2024[9]), and bribery of foreign public officials is therefore not covered in this report except insofar as the same enforcement challenges that apply to foreign bribery also apply to other offences. Foreign bribery was nonetheless within the scope of the legislative inquiry, and in this area the Working Group’s recommendations can serve as a guide.
A clear, comprehensive framework of corruption offences forms the cornerstone of an effective enforcement framework. Corruption is an increasingly complex phenomenon, and if prosecutors and judges are to hold those who engage in corruption accountable, they require the support of a robust legal framework. Clearly worded offences also support prevention efforts, as managing corruption and other integrity violations first requires people to understand what activities and behaviours are and are not permissible.
Several well-established international legal instruments require the criminalisation of certain corruption offences. The UNCAC requires all state parties to criminalise bribery of both national and foreign public officials, embezzlement, laundering the proceeds of crime, and obstruction of justice (UNODC, 2004[10]). The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption contains similar provisions but also calls for the criminalisation of trading in influence (Council of Europe, 1999[11]), and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions requires parties to criminalise bribery of foreign public officials (OECD, 1997[12]). In addition, the UNCAC advises adoption of additional criminal offences including trading in influence, abuse of function and illicit enrichment where compatible with the national legal framework (UNODC, 2004[10]). EU legislation requiring criminalisation of certain corruption offences is pending, with the European Commission having presented a proposal for an anti-corruption directive in 2023 (European Commission, 2023[13]).
Sweden is a party to the UNCAC and the Council of Europe and OECD Conventions, and as an EU member state it would also be bound by any future EU directive. As summarised in Box 3.1, Sweden has criminalised most offences envisioned in the UNCAC and OECD and Council of Europe Conventions, with the exception of illicit enrichment, and even this offence is effectively covered by new Swedish legislation on confiscation of unexplained wealth. The full provisions can be found in Annex B.
Chapter 10 of the Criminal Code
Most corruption offences, as well as the applicable range of sanctions, are outlined in Chapter 10 of Sweden’s Criminal Code. These include:
Section 1 – embezzlement
Section 2 – minor embezzlement
Section 3 – gross embezzlement
Section 4 – unlawful disposal
Section 5 – breach of trust
Section 5a – taking a bribe
Section 5b – giving a bribe
Section 5c – gross giving or taking of a bribe
Section 5d – trading in influence
Section 5e – negligent financing of bribery
Section 6 – abuse of authority
Section 7 – unlawful use
Section 8 – found property offence
Other chapters of the Criminal Code
Other chapters of the Criminal Code are also relevant to the framework of corruption offences. These include:
Chapter 20 Section 1 of the Criminal Code, which outlines the official misconduct offence. Reviewing this offence was within the scope of the legislative inquiry.
Chapter 25 of the Criminal Code, which outlines the applicable fines for all criminal offences, including corruption offences
Chapter 36 Section 23 of the Criminal Code, which outlines the possibility for imposing corporate fines.
Note: Swedish authorities explained that abuse of authority and the found property offence are generally not considered corruption offences in Sweden, but they are included here for the sake of completeness since they are also in Chapter 10 of the Criminal Code.
Source: Criminal Code of Sweden
However, Sweden’s framework contains several gaps that limit accountability for corruption. With regard to foreign bribery, the OECD Working Group on Bribery highlighted a number of areas for improvement in its December 2024 report (OECD, 2024[9]), including issues related to limited corporate criminal liability and non-dissuasive sanctions that apply to other corruption offences as well. While Sweden introduced offences for trading in influence and negligent financing of bribery in 2012, there have not been any legal proceedings related to these offences. Since 2020, these offences have been reported 41 times and investigated 22 times, but a prosecution decision has never been taken. With regard to negligent financing of bribery, this lack of prosecution could be connected to weaknesses in the provisions on liability of legal persons.
In a Eurobarometer survey, Swedes overwhelmingly cited the fact that it is “difficult to prove anything” as the top reason why people do not report corruption. In 2024, 59% of those surveyed selected this answer, and the percentage is both increasing and well above the EU average of 43% (European Commission, 2024[14]). While there could be many reasons for this perception, one possible explanation is that the legal framework does not enable effective enforcement of corruption and/or that law enforcement, prosecutors and judges do not apply the framework effectively.
The enforcement framework could also be improved to respond to the rising threat of organised crime. While the Government has highlighted how organised crime groups increasingly use corruption to exert unlawful influence, there have been few investigations or prosecutions of corruption related to infiltration of organised crime (European Commission, 2024[15]), suggesting that it may be going undetected. Sweden largely relies on reporting of corruption to initiate investigations, but for reasons ranging from weak reporting requirements in local government to the fact that public officials may be less inclined to report corruption when they or their families are suffering threats or intimidation from organised crime groups, this reliance on reporting may be ineffective.
An enforcement framework functions best when those subject to it understand what behaviours are and are not permitted and can pre-emptively adjust their behaviour accordingly. Otherwise, the system risks becoming flooded with cases or even being perceived as arbitrary and out of step with societal notions of permissible behaviour. In Sweden, the Statskontoret’s research has shown that there is a lack of knowledge and awareness about corruption risks among public officials (Statskontoret, 2023[16]). At the same time, a quickly growing percentage of the Swedish population perceives corruption as widespread and increasing (European Commission, 2024[14]). Efforts to engage in awareness-raising and capacity-building outlined elsewhere in this report are therefore also vital to ensure the enforcement system functions effectively.
The Swedish Government has acknowledged through the terms of reference (ToRs) for the legislative inquiry that recently delivered its report that there is room to improve the wording of certain offences (Government of Sweden, 2024[5]). For instance, the ToRs note a need to review whether the term “undue advantage” used in the bribery offences is sufficiently clear and whether the scope of individuals covered by several offences, such as the breach of trust offence, is sufficiently broad. Stakeholders consulted in preparation for this report also expressed the view that improving the wording of the trading in influence and negligent financing of bribery offences may improve enforcement of these offences.
Sweden has already implemented legislative changes to address some of the shortcomings in the legal framework. In February 2025 the Swedish Parliament approved the Government’s proposal for changes to statutes of limitations, which include an expansion of the statute of limitations for serious crimes (including serious corruption offences) from 10 to 15 years (Swedish Parliament, 2025[17]). These changes came into effect in April 2025. Similarly, the Swedish Parliament approved the introduction of a new provision on confiscation of unexplained wealth (independent confiscation). The new provision does not require that it can be shown that a person has committed a specific offence. Under the new provision, property must be confiscated if it is clearly more provable than not that the property derives from criminal conduct. The provision came into effect in November 2024 (Swedish Parliament, 2024[18]).
This section makes recommendations, beyond these recent reforms, for how Sweden can further improve the corruption offences framework to facilitate accountability, better address risks related to undue influence and remain responsive to challenges posed by serious organised crime. It recommends improving the legal framework in two main areas:
clarifying wording in existing corruption offences, in particular for the trading in influence and official misconduct offences
improving provisions on sanctions for corruption and liability of legal persons.
3.2.1. Swedish authorities could clarify and extend the scope of the trading in influence and official misconduct offences
The ToRs for the recently concluded legislative inquiry provide a useful baseline for identifying where gaps in Sweden’s framework of corruption offences may exist. However, upon further examination most challenges with enforcement of corruption offences in Sweden appear related to other aspects of the legal framework or application in practice rather than the wording of the offences themselves. While the ToRs highlight the use of the term “undue advantage” in the bribery offences as a potential source of confusion (Government of Sweden, 2024[5]), this term is in line with international standards, as well as provisions in the Criminal Codes of other countries such as Norway, Finland, Germany and the United Kingdom, which also use similar language (Box 3.2).
Norway
Section 387 of the Penal Code establishes that “A penalty of a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years shall be applied to any person who
a. for himself/herself or others demands, receives or accepts an offer of an improper advantage in connection with the conduct of a position, an office or performance of an assignment, or
b. gives or offers any person an improper advantage in connection with the conduct of a position, an office or performance of an assignment.
‘Position’, ‘office’ or ‘assignment’ in the first paragraph also means a position, office or assignment abroad.”
Finland
Chapter 16 Section 13 of the Criminal Code establishes that:
“(1) A person who promises, offers or gives to a public official in exchange for his or her actions in service a gift or other benefit intended for him or her or for another, that influences or is intended to influence or is conducive to influencing the actions in service of the public official, shall be sentenced for the giving of bribes to a fine or to imprisonment for at most two years.
(2) Also a person who, in exchange for the actions in service of a public official, promises, offers or gives the gift or benefit referred to in subsection 1 shall be sentenced for bribery.”
Other sections use similar language, including Chapter 40 Section 1 on acceptance of a bribe.”
Germany
Section 299 of the Criminal Code establishes that:
“(1) Whosoever as an employee or agent of a business, demands, allows himself to be promised or accepts a benefit for himself or another in a business transaction as consideration for according an unfair preference to another in the competitive purchase of goods or commercial services shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.
(2) Whosoever for competitive purposes offers, promises or grants an employee or agent of a business a benefit for himself or for a third person in a business transaction as consideration for such employee’s or agent’s according him or another an unfair preference in the purchase of goods or commercial services shall incur the same penalty.
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) above shall also apply to acts in competition abroad.”
United Kingdom
Section 2 of the Bribery Act 2010 establishes that:
“(1) A person (“R”) is guilty of an offence if any of the following cases applies.
(2) Case 3 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage intending that, in consequence, a relevant function or activity should be performed improperly (whether by R or another person).
(3) Case 4 is where— (a) R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage, and (b) the request, agreement or acceptance itself constitutes the improper performance by R of a relevant function or activity.
(4) Case 5 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage as a reward for the improper performance (whether by R or another person) of a relevant function or activity.
(5) Case 6 is where, in anticipation of or in consequence of R requesting, agreeing to receive or accepting a financial or other advantage, a relevant function or activity is performed improperly—(a) by R, or (b)by another person at R's request or with R's assent or acquiescence.
(…)”.
Section 1 similarly covers giving a bribe.
Source: Penal Code of Norway, Criminal Code of Finland, Criminal Code of Germany, UK Bribery Act 2010
The same is true for the breach of trust offence, which was another focus of the legislative inquiry. The ToRs call for a review of this offence (Chapter 10, Section 5 of the Criminal Code) on the basis of the decision in case 1675-22 of the Skåne and Blekinge Court of Appeal. In this case the Court ruled that members of an expert group in a public procurement procedure did not have direct decision-making authority and therefore could not be guilty of breach of trust. It is indeed difficult to argue that a person without definitive decision-making authority over an asset is in the position of trust necessary to commit an offence, and legislative reform to address integrity concerns related to advisory groups—which are legitimate and worth exploring—may therefore be more suitable with regard to other provisions.
Nonetheless, trends in the corruption risks that Sweden faces – most notably unlawful influence exercised on behalf of both organised crime groups and other actors – suggest that it would be beneficial to review the wording of other offences. One such risk that Brå has highlighted is a growing threat of criminal organisations infiltrating small political parties and municipal government (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2023[19]). When individuals act of their own accord or receive benefits from a criminal organisation to influence their own duties, it could constitute either abuse of power or bribery, respectively. However, these individuals could also foreseeably embezzle public funds or leverage their position to influence colleagues in exchange for benefits, which would constitute trading in influence. The Swedish Police has already highlighted growing risks of organised crime groups engaging in widespread, systematic fraud, which is another group of closely related offences outlined in Chapter 9 of the Criminal Code (Swedish Police Authority, 2021[20]). Therefore, as the forms of corruption occurring or at risk of occurring in Swedish public institutions evolve, even if the number of incidents remains low in absolute terms, Swedish authorities would benefit from ensuring that all corruption offences are formulated in a manner that facilitates both effective enforcement and understanding in society at large.
This section focuses on improving the wording of two offences in particular: trading in influence and official misconduct. It does not focus on other corruption offences, which in most cases are already in line with international standards and/or have already been the focus of reviews by GRECO (GRECO, 2009[21]), UNODC (UNODC, 2014[8]) and the OECD Working Group on Bribery (OECD, 2024[9]). Indeed, since the 2011 compliance report for the third evaluation round, Sweden has not had any outstanding recommendations from GRECO on the framework of corruption offences (GRECO, 2011[22]), which demonstrates that baseline legal provisions required by international conventions are in place.
The section instead focuses on improving the wording of offences of particular policy relevance. From a policy perspective, improving the wording of the trading in influence and official misconduct offences could help Swedish authorities respond to the currently under-addressed integrity risks in the influence market (as could other non-criminal measures outlined in Chapter 4 of this report) and the unlawful influence phenomenon about which they have expressed concern. Even if Sweden complies with GRECO’s recommendations, changes to these offences could therefore be priorities in any planned legal reform because they could help better address high-risk areas. The fact that investigations into these offences less commonly result in prosecution or conviction vis a vis offences like bribery or embezzlement (see Figure 3.1, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4) also suggests that these offences could be particularly worth reviewing.
The trading in influence offence
Trading in influence has been a criminal offence in Sweden since 2012, and given that difficulties with the conceptualisation of this offence have meant that it is still not universally criminalised in EU member states (European Commission, 2023[13]), this is already a notable step. Chapter 10, Section 5d of the Criminal Code establishes a definition of trading in influence that is also contingent both upon the offer or receipt of an undue advantage and a goal of “influencing a decision or measure taken by someone else in the exercise of public authority or public procurement” (Box 3.3).
Sweden
Chapter 10 Section 5d of the Criminal Code defines trading in influence as follows: “In cases other than those referred to in Section 5a or 5b, a person is guilty of trading in influence and is sentenced to a fine or imprisonment for at most two years if they:
1. receive, accept a promise of or request an undue advantage to influence a decision or measure taken by someone else in the exercise of public authority or public procurement; or
2. give, promise or offer someone an undue advantage so that they will influence a decision or measure taken by someone else in the exercise of public authority or public procurement. Act 2012:301.”
UNCAC
Article 18 of the UNCAC establishes that “Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
(a) The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other person;
(b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage.”
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
Article 12 of the Convention establishes that “Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the promising, giving or offering, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to anyone who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert an improper influence over the decision-making of any person referred to in Articles 2, 4 to 6 and 9 to 11 in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that influence, whether or not the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result.”
Source: Criminal Code of Sweden, (UNODC, 2004[10]), (Council of Europe, 1999[11])
Unlike bribery, which involves a direct or indirect promise of an undue advantage to the person receiving the bribe in return for action related to their own official duties, trading in influence involves situations where the undue advantage is instead given in return for the target exerting influence or pressure on a third party without that party’s involvement (Figure 3.2). Trading in influence also covers any person claiming to have the power to influence, not just those who are an “employee or performing a commission” (to use the wording from the Swedish Criminal Code). It tends to be one of the most common forms of corruption in developed economies (Johnston, 2005[23]) (Gluck and Macaulay, 2017[24]), but it is also notoriously difficult to define and prove (Llamzon, 2019[25]). Since it is difficult to prove that an undue advantage was offered with the specific intent of influencing public-decision making, there are few examples globally of successful trading in influence prosecutions (Llamzon, 2019[25]).
Source: Adapted from (Llamzon, 2019[25])
Much of the international debate surrounding trading in influence also surrounds the difficulty distinguishing it from legitimate influence activities like lobbying (Llamzon, 2019[25]). Trading in influence is but one tool aimed at combatting undue influence over public decision-making, and it is the existence of an undue advantage that distinguishes it from lobbying and makes it a criminal offence. However a comprehensive approach to promoting integrity in the influence space involves a variety of tools, including mechanisms for conflict-of-interest management, lobbying transparency and post-public employment restrictions (OECD, 2024[26]), which largely rely on non-criminal provisions (see Chapter 4 of this report). Nonetheless a strong trading in influence offence is safeguard against the most egregious attempts to influence public decision-making in favour of private interests.
Despite Sweden’s trading in influence offence having existed for 13 years, there have not been any legal proceedings related to it (Figure 3.3). One possible explanation for this is that the offence is limited in scope. The current wording does not cover several forms of influence which could be obtained through undue advantages (even though successfully exerting influence is not required). One of the main areas where the wording of Sweden’s trading in influence offence differs from the offence as conceived in the UNCAC and Council of Europe Convention is its emphasis on influencing “a decision or measure”. Article 18 of the UNCAC uses the term “undue advantage” twice. It conceptualises trading in influence as one individual offering an “undue advantage” to a second individual to influence a third individual in order to secure an “undue advantage” for the first individual. The influence does not need to pertain to a specific decision or measure but could rather (for instance) pertain generally to changing the third individual’s opinion or perception such that it later affects their decision-making more systematically.
Note: Trading in influence and negligent financing of bribery are grouped together because Swedish authorities provided data in this format. Data on prosecution decisions refers to those decisions where bribery, trading of influence and negligent financing of bribery were the principal offences.
Source: Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention
Furthermore, as noted in Government Bill 2011/12:79 which originally introduced the trading in influence offence, the offence does not apply to elected officials. The stated reason for omitting elected officials was a fear that it could lead to the criminalisation of benign lobbying and opinion formulation. However, Article 18 of the UNCAC and Article 12 of the Council of Europe Convention both apply to all public officials, including elected officials. As noted above, trading in influence is not the same as lobbying, which is a key characteristic of the democratic process. Trading in influence requires that an undue advantage is given or promised and that the individual giving or promising it knew they were doing so in exchange for purported influence. In a legal sense these requirements serve as safeguards against the criminalisation of legitimate attempts to influence public decision making.
Although difficulties applying the trading in influence offence are not limited to Sweden and exist in most if not all countries worldwide, it also appears that trading in influence is generally perceived as a bribery offence in Sweden, which may hinder the offence’s application. The mandate of specialised institutions described later in this chapter, which covers bribery and trading in influence but not other forms of corruption, is evidence of this perception. Swedish stakeholders consulted during preparation for this report also noted that the conception of corruption in Swedish society is largely limited to monetary bribery, and civil society actors have publicly expressed this view too (Wahlberg, 2022[27]). This misconception could be attributed to the fact that perception surveys frequently measure corruption by asking about bribery and not other forms of corruption (Bergh, Erlingsson and Öhrvall, 2018[2]). However, there is comparatively less understanding of or focus on the risks of corruption related to nepotism or cronyism (Wahlberg, 2022[27]) (Wittberg, 2023[28]), despite evidence that it could be contributing to economic distortions, particularly at the local level (Wittberg and Fazekas, 2023[29]). While such influence activities are not necessarily unlawful, they can take the form of trading in influence in the most extreme cases.
The Norwegian trading in influence offence (Box 3.4) comes closer to the UNCAC wording in its scope of officials covered and focus on decision-making rather than a specific decision. At the same time the use of the term “undue advantage” in both the Swedish and Norwegian provisions helps distinguish trading in influence from lobbying such that there should not be a high risk of unintended consequences when extending the offence to elected officials. Swedish authorities could consider adding similar wording to the Criminal Code to ensure that integrity risks in all forms of public decision-making are mitigated and reduce the burden on prosecutors to prove a connection to a specific decision.
Norway criminalises both active and passive trading in influence for all public officials—including elected officials—in Section 389 of the Penal Code. These offences criminalise any improper advantage received in exchange for influencing the conduct of public duties generally:
“A penalty of a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years shall be applied to any person who:
a. for him/herself or others demands, receives or accepts an offer of an improper advantage in return for influencing the conduct of another person's position, office or performance of an assignment, or
b. gives or offers any person an improper advantage in return for influencing the conduct of another person's position, office or performance of an assignment.”
Source: Penal Code of Norway
Finally, the existing trading in influence offence is undermined by the fact that there is no regulation of lobbying in Sweden. A trading in influence offence is most effective as part of a larger toolbox for ensuring integrity in influence activities. Adopting lobbying legislation that defines legitimate influence activities, as outlined in Chapter 4 of this report, may also help clarify what is lobbying and what is trading in influence from a legal perspective. Rather than constraining public debate, clearer provisions on acceptable and unacceptable forms of influence could help level the playing field for smaller or less well established interest groups by ensuring their voices are given equal weight.
The official misconduct offence
Official misconduct is another offence that can be used to combat corruption perpetrated by public officials when they violate the trust that the public has place in them. It is similar to the abuse of function offence in Article 19 of the UNCAC. Sweden has an official misconduct offence in place (Box 3.5), but the ToRs for the legislative inquiry note a desire to review three aspects of the offence outlined in Chapter 20, Section 1 of the Criminal Code (Government of Sweden, 2024[5]), despite the fact that a 2020 legislative inquiry concluded no changes to the offence were needed. The offence currently applies to “a person who, intentionally or through negligence, when exercising public authority disregards their duties by action or omission”, and the three aspects under review are:
expanding the scope of the offence to cover certain actions outside the exercise of public authority, in particular actions that contravene constitutionally protected civil rights and freedoms, result in major financial consequences or consist of contempt of court
extending criminal liability to elected representatives, who are currently exempt under Paragraph 3 of this section
clarifying or amending the current limitation of criminal liability for minor offences (Government Bill 1988/89:113 established that actions considered minor based on an assessment of the circumstances—including inter alia the public official’s powers in exercise of authority—would not result in criminal liability).
Chapter 20 Section 1 of the Criminal Code defines official misconduct as follows: “A person who, intentionally or through negligence when exercising public authority disregards their duties by action or omission is guilty of official misconduct and is sentenced to a fine or imprisonment for at most two years. Responsibility is not assigned if, in view of the perpetrator’s powers, or some other connection between the duties and the exercise of public authority, or other circumstances, the act is considered minor.
If an offence referred to in the first paragraph was committed intentionally and is considered gross, the person is guilty of gross official misconduct and is sentenced to imprisonment for at least six months and at most six years. When assessing whether the offence is gross, particular consideration is given to whether the perpetrator seriously abused their position, or whether the act resulted in serious detriment or considerable undue advantage for an individual or the public.
A person who is a member of a central or local government decision-making assembly is not subject to responsibility under the first or second paragraph for any measure that they take in this capacity.
Nor are the provisions of the first and second paragraphs applied if the act is punishable under another provision. Act 1989:608.”
Source: Criminal Code of Sweden
Official misconduct is very frequently reported in Sweden, but less frequently prosecuted than bribery (Figure 3.4). This may also suggest that those reporting it do not understand what the offence covers or that elements of the offence make it difficult to prosecute. Either could be a reason to review the wording of the offence.
Note: “Bribery” includes offences outlined in Chapter 10 Sections 5a-5c of the Swedish Criminal Code. Official misconduct is outlined in Chapter 20 Section 1 of the Swedish Criminal Code. Data on prosecution decisions refers to those decisions where bribery and official misconduct were the principal offences.
Source: Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention
The wording of the official misconduct offence could be better adapted to existing risks of unlawful influence by expanding the scope of individuals and activities that it covers. Clarity and proportionality of public integrity standards, including on the sanctions faced for not complying with these standards, help public officials understand how they should behave (OECD, 2020[30]). The same is true for elected officials. Indeed, a proportionate, risk-based approach typically involves more stringent standards for elected officials in recognition of their power and influence over decision-making. Political leaders also set an example for other public officials by setting the “tone at the top” (OECD, 2023[31]).
Extending liability for official misconduct to elected officials would therefore not only send a strong message that no one is above the law but also contribute to prevention efforts by clarifying the standards to which these officials are held. Likewise, a more expansive view of official misconduct could better reflect the ways in which high-level public officials can abuse the influence they hold and may be worthwhile if sufficient legal safeguards are in place. Some Swedish stakeholders consulted in preparation for this report also saw the official misconduct offence as an effective tool in the fight against organised crime since it can more be applied to situations that do not involve a bribe.
Box 3.6 outlines the approach to official misconduct in the United Kingdom, where the offence also covers elected officials and where ongoing discussion about amending the law could be insightful. Similar offences in Ireland and New Zealand, for example, also cover elected officials (Law Commission, 2020[32]).
The common law offence of misconduct in public office
While the United Kingdom has a common law system, and misconduct in public office is a common law offence rather than a statutory offence, the elements of this offence as outlined by the Crown Prosecution Service could serve as a useful guide for how to construct such an offence. Misconduct in public office is committed when:
1. a public officer acting as such
2. wilfully neglects to perform their duty and/or wilfully misconducts themselves
3. to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder
4. without reasonable excuse or justification.
A public officer is defined in a broad sense and includes elected officials at both the central and local government levels. However the public officer must have been acting in the performance of their official duties (as in Sweden), and an attempted prosecution of an elected official on the grounds that he used the influence granted to him by virtue of his position in an irresponsible manner was not successful.
Proposals for a statutory offence
In 2020 in response to calls to review the scope of activities covered by the existing offence, the Law Commission, an advisory body tasked with reviewing and recommending legal reform in England and Wales, recommended splitting the misconduct in public office offence into two statutory offences to increase legal clarity. The two proposed offences were:
1. corruption in public office, whereby a public office holder knowingly uses or fails to use their public position or power for the purpose of achieving a benefit or detriment in a manner that would be considered “seriously improper” by a “reasonable person”
2. breach of duty in public office, whereby a public office holder has a duty to prevent death or serious injury, and they breach that duty, thereby resulting in a risk of death or serious injury.
In the Law Commission’s view splitting the offence in such a manner would better clarify the behaviour that it seeks to prevent. The first proposed offence is more relevant from an anti-corruption perspective, and it aims to combat behaviour such as misuse of public funds for personal gain and misuse of decision-making power. It is also a response to difficulties applying a threshold regarding the seriousness of the offence in practice.
By taking a more holistic view of the ways in which public officials—in particular high-level public officials—may abuse the mandate that has been entrusted to them and applying a clearer threshold for liability, the proposed offence could be an impactful innovation in the criminalisation of official misconduct.
The 2020 legislative inquiry concluded that the current wording of the official misconduct offence did not entail major difficulties in application and risks of implementing changes could outweigh the benefits. However, there are also benefits of being proactive in addressing emerging risks and risks of not acting. Both domestic and global developments as disparate as the rise of social media and suspected infiltration of organised crime have meant the line between the public and private spheres is increasingly blurred, which can create new risks and grey areas. In light of the risks faced by elected officials and their liability for official misconduct in other OECD countries, Swedish authorities could consider amending Chapter 20, Section 1 of the Criminal Code to remove the exemption from criminal liability for these officials. They could also consider incorporating elements of the proposed offence, inspired by the example from England and Wales, as outlined in Box 3.6 so as to establish liability for any seriously improper use of a public position and establish a clearer threshold of severity to incur liability, thereby also addressing the concerns outlined in the legislative inquiry.
3.2.2. Swedish authorities could consider introducing stronger corporate criminal liability for corruption and increasing sanctions for both natural and legal persons
Other elements of the legal framework—notably liability for legal persons and sanctions applicable to both legal and natural persons—also affect the ability of the enforcement system to respond to emerging risks like the rise of organised crime. As corruption has grown more complex as a global phenomenon, corporate entities are increasingly used as tools to obscure corruption and enable individuals to avoid accountability. An enforcement framework that only sanctions natural persons can lead to public perceptions of impunity, and it can be difficult to attribute responsibility for corruption to a specific person or people when legal entities that have diffuse decision-making structures are involved. This necessitates enforcement mechanisms for legal persons, as well as natural persons. Effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for both categories help incentivise compliance and ensure accountability (OECD, 2020[30]).
While Sweden’s expansion of the statute of limitations for serious corruption offences is a step toward enabling more effective investigation and prosecution of corruption, unclear liability for legal persons and non-dissuasive sanctions remain legal barriers to an effective enforcement system and may have negative consequences for the public sector. Corporate entities may also pose a threat to public integrity if they are used as vehicles for exerting unlawful influence over public officials or embezzling public funds. Brå has noted that organised crime groups increasingly use legal entities to facilitate corruption and other economic crime (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2023[19]), and the Swedish Government has given Brå an “Assignment to study how companies are used as criminal tools by criminals”, on which it must report by October 2025 (Government of Sweden, 2024[34]). The OECD Working Group on Bribery has similarly raised concerns about Sweden’s limited liability framework and low corporate sanctions, identifying these as high-priority issues in its 2024 Phase 4 evaluation of Sweden. The increasing use of legal entities to commit crimes further heightens the urgency of ensuring these entities face real accountability for corruption so as to prevent organised crime groups from exploiting legal loopholes to their advantage.
Liability of legal persons
Swedish legal persons can face fines for corruption under Chapter 36 Section 23 of the Criminal Code if the company acted negligently or the offence was committed by a person in a leading position. However, in practice it is difficult to impose a fine on a legal person without a conviction against a natural person because proving that an offence occurred requires proving intent, which is difficult to do for a legal person. Some stakeholders interviewed in the preparation of this report noted that legal persons are not actually liable for corruption at all but rather can be fined as the result of liability of a natural person. Even in cases where a natural person is found to have committed an offence, a legal person’s liability can be difficult to establish if the natural person is found not to hold a leadership position. While a fine can be imposed when “the company did not do what could reasonably be required to prevent the offence”, it is unclear what is “reasonable” and this can be difficult to prove (OECD, 2024[9]). Corporate liability for subordinates acting on behalf of management including, as occurred in one case, the close relatives of senior executives (OECD, 2024[9]), also remains unclear. The fact that Swedish companies have been sanctioned for corruption in other jurisdictions such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France but not in Sweden is further evidence of a system of liability for legal persons that is not working and may not be aligned with Sweden’s peers (OECD, 2024[9]). This lack of liability for corporations may help explain why certain offences, particularly negligent financing of bribery, have not been prosecuted.
To ensure that Swedish companies are not used as vehicles to facilitate corruption and that there is a level playing field for multi-national companies that are already required to meet more stringent anti-corruption requirements in other jurisdictions, Swedish authorities could consider strengthening the provision on liability of legal persons in Chapter 36 Section 23 of the Criminal Code. Specifically, they could consider amendments such that this provision explicitly states corporations’ liability rather than only allowing them to be fined based on the liability of a natural person. This change could help clarify the expectation to take measures to prevent corruption clearer to company leadership. It could also make prosecuting legal persons less dependent on a conviction for a specific natural person since it would be easier to prove intent for a legal person on its own due to e.g. documentary evidence of systemic tolerance of wrongdoing. In other countries such as Finland (Box 3.7), such situations can more clearly incur corporate criminal liability. Similar amendments to Chapter 36 Section 23 of the Criminal Code could help address the risk of organised crime groups using legal entities to get away with corruption and exert unlawful influence.
Chapter 9 of Finland’s Criminal Code outlines corporate criminal liability in detail. Specifically, Section 2 of this Chapter establishes the prerequisites for liability:
“(1) A corporation may be sentenced to a corporate fine if a person who is part of its statutory organ or other management or who exercises actual decision-making authority therein has been an accomplice in an offence or allowed the commission of the offence or if the care and diligence necessary for the prevention of the offence have not been observed in the operations of the corporation.
(2) A corporate fine may be imposed even if the offender cannot be identified or otherwise is not punished. However, no corporate fine shall be imposed for a complainant offence which is not reported by the injured party so as to have charges brought, unless there is a very important public interest for the bringing of charges.”
Source: Criminal Code of Finland
Issues with corporate criminal liability were also highlighted by the OECD Working Group on Bribery in its 2024 Phase 4 evaluation of Sweden (OECD, 2024[9]), which recommended strengthening, as a matter of priority, both the legal framework and enforcement practices regarding corporate liability. In particular, Sweden could ensure that liability is not dependent on prosecution or conviction of a natural person, that companies can be held liable for acts committed through third parties, and that companies with substantial links to Sweden can be held accountable under Swedish law, even if they are legally registered elsewhere.
Sanctions for legal persons
Even if corporations were to face fines, under the current framework they may be unlikely to be dissuasive against further corrupt activity. In its 2024 Phase 4 evaluation, the OECD Working Group on Bribery expressed concern that these statutory maximum fines are not sufficiently effective proportionate or dissuasive, particularly in light of the size and revenue of many Swedish companies. The maximum corporate fine under Chapter 36 of the Criminal Code for any company not considered “large” is SEK 10 million (approximately EUR 917 000 as of April 2025). This fine can be increased up to SEK 500 million (approximately EUR 46 million as of April 2025) for “large” companies.
To be considered “large”, a company must meet two of the three following criteria (see Chapter 1 Section 3 of the Annual Accounts Act 1995:1554):
at least 50 employees
a balance sheet over SEK 40 million
net turnover of at least SEK 80 million.
A company whose securities are traded in a market outside the European Economic Area is also considered a large company. While the sanctions faced by large companies are more substantial, the thresholds in place are relatively high and mean that only around 7 000 out of over 1 million registered companies in Sweden (less than 0.07%) can face these sanctions (OECD, 2024[9]). Nearly 99% of limited liability companies with employees registered in Sweden are small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (OECD, 2024[9]), so the difference in these numbers would suggest a gap of at least 1% (approximately 10 000 companies) that are large enough not to be SMEs but cannot be sanctioned as “large companies”.
As outlined in the next section, many of the shortcomings of this system pertain to the non-pursuit or non-issuance of corporate fines in practice. However, introducing a more graduated range of possible corporate fines in the legal framework could help increase accountability for corporations by not artificially sorting them into two groups with drastically different maximum fines. Box 3.8 outlines the conditions for determining whether to impose a corporate fine and the amount of the fine in Norway. Such conditions could allow for a more variable sanctioning regime and enable the abolition of the SEK 10 million fine threshold that effectively separates large companies from other companies. If the introduction of such provisions is not preferred, Swedish authorities could also consider reviewing the threshold for determining what is a “large company” and whether amendments to the Annual Accounts Act are needed.
Chapter 4 Section 28 of Norway’s Penal Code outlines considerations for determining whether to impose a corporate fine and how large the fine should be. While some of these considerations exist in Chapter 36 Sections 7-10a in Sweden’s Criminal Code, namely the severity of the offence, the culpability of a natural person in the company, the degree to which the company obtained an advantage and preventive actions taken or not taken by the company, others do not. Furthermore, the consideration of the financial capacity of the company is currently only applicable to large companies in Sweden.
The Norwegian provision outlines the following considerations:
1. the preventive effect of the penalty
2. the severity of the offence, and whether a person acting on behalf of the enterprise has acted culpably
3. whether the enterprise could have prevented the offence by use of guidelines, instructions, training, checks or other measures
4. whether the offence has been committed in order to promote the interests of the enterprise
5. whether the enterprise has had or could have obtained any advantage by the offence
6. the financial capacity of the enterprise
7. whether other sanctions arising from the offence are imposed on the enterprise or a person who has acted on its behalf, including whether a penalty is imposed on any individual person
8. whether agreements with foreign states prescribe the use of enterprise penalties.
Considerations like the preventive effect of the penalty, the financial capacity of the company and relevant provisions in international agreements could all help increase accountability for legal entities in Sweden. Considering the preventive effect of the penalty may encourage the imposition of higher fines, while considering the financial capacity of the company (for all companies not just large companies) without an arbitrarily low maximum fine threshold for non-large companies could introduce more flexibility in determining the size of the fine. Finally, considering international agreements, which would include the UNCAC and OECD and Council of Europe Conventions, could incentivise courts toward imposing fines in corruption cases more regularly.
Source: Penal Code of Norway, Criminal Code of Sweden
Fines are also not the only sanctions that can be used to ensure accountability for legal persons. The draft EU anti-corruption directive envisions a variety of different sanctions for legal persons, including fines as well as excluding the legal person from public benefits or participation in public procurement and the temporary or permanent disqualification of the legal person from exercising commercial activities (European Commission, 2023[13]). Under Section 4 of the Act on Business Prohibitions (2014:836), legal persons in Sweden can face a ban from doing business if convicted of a non-minor crime. Under Chapter 13 of the Public Procurement Act (2016:1145), legal persons can also be excluded from public procurement for bribery or fraud committed in the past five years, although this provision refers to international definitions rather than the Swedish Criminal Code. This latter sanction can be a useful tool to ensure accountability for corruption for legal persons, particularly if organised crime groups use them to perpetrate corruption in public procurement. However, to ensure legal clarity and the viability of this sanction in practice, Swedish authorities could consider ensuring that the grounds for excluding legal persons from public procurement are fully aligned with the suite of corruption offences in the Criminal Code.
Sanctions for natural persons
There may also be cause for Sweden to review the dissuasiveness of sanctions for natural persons. The three main sanctions applicable to natural persons in Sweden are fines, prison sentences and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. There is not set amount or range of fines prescribed for corruption offences, and Chapter 25 of the Criminal Code outlines the system of fines applicable to all crimes. There is a maximum fine of SEK 150 000. On the other hand, each corruption offence has its own maximum prison sentence, which tends to be lower than the EU average (Table 3.1). While maximum prison sentences for bribery and embezzlement are just below average, those for trading in influence and abuse of functions are far below the EU average due to a lack of aggravated versions of these offences. The 2024 Phase 4 evaluation of Sweden further noted that, in practice, sanctions imposed on natural persons in corruption cases have been extremely low, raising concerns about their overall dissuasiveness.
Note: While not called abuse of function, the official misconduct offence in Sweden’s Criminal Code is similar to the definition of abuse of function in the UNCAC.
Source: (European Commission, 2023[13])
There are legitimate reasons for prescribing shorter maximum prison sentences, and comparing to the EU average only provides a loose suggestion of the appropriate length of a prison sentence. However, it is not clear why sanctions for trading in influence are less severe in Sweden than, for instance, bribery or embezzlement, as it can be just as harmful to the public interest. Applicable sanctions should therefore be proportionate to the severity of these offences. Swedish authorities may wish to consider introducing an aggravated version of the trading in influence offence to ensure a proportionate response in circumstances where the offence has been made more serious by deliberate acts or where organised crime groups were involved. Such a change would also ensure more consistency in the legal framework of corruption offences. It would also enable investigators to use a broader range of investigative techniques as discussed in the next section.
A strong legal framework can only be effective in ensuring accountability for corruption if it can be applied in practice. Fair and effective enforcement mechanisms depend on adequate resources and skilled staff at all stages of the process. Without sufficient capacity, corruption may never be detected and prosecuted in the first place or cases may suffer from procedural mistakes and low technical quality (OECD, 2020[30]). The complex and hidden nature of organised crime groups may also make investigating and prosecuting unlawful influence and corruption originating from these groups particularly difficult.
In Sweden the National Anti-Corruption Police Unit (Nationella Anti-korruptionsgruppen, NACPU) has been responsible for bribery investigations since 2012 and was created in responses to domestic and international criticism over lack of investigative capacity. The unit also carries out preventive work and supports public authorities in combatting corruption. Similarly, the National Anti-Corruption Unit (Riksenheten mot korruption, NACU) within the Swedish Prosecution Authority is responsible for overseeing these investigations and prosecuting them in court. Since 2012 the NACPU has handled approximately 100-150 cases per year and collected SEK 262 138 567 (around EUR 24 million as of April 2025) in damages and fines. It has a staff of 27 police officers, civilian investigators and experts (Swedish Police, 2025[35]). The NACU consists of ten prosecutors and one forensic accountant (OECD, 2024[9]). There are no specialised anti-corruption courts or court units in Sweden, and NACU cases are adjudicated in the normal criminal court system.
The NACPU and NACU have developed into hubs of anti-corruption expertise and have succeeded in investigating and prosecuting a steady stream of bribery cases since their creation, although the OECD Working Group on Bribery has noted challenges related to the enforcement of foreign bribery specifically (OECD, 2024[9]). However, these units remain relatively siloed, and stakeholders consulted during the OECD’s fact-finding mission noted that lack of anti-corruption expertise in other units, law enforcement agencies, public authorities, courts and the general public hinders the fight against corruption. This lack of expertise means that reported cases may not be referred to the correct authority, investigators and prosecutors may overlook red flags of corruption or build weak cases and judges may misunderstand key case details. A narrow mandate, capacity challenges and spillover effects from weaknesses of the legal framework also limit NACPU and NACU from realising their full potential.
3.3.1. Sweden could improve co-operation and capability among prosecution and police authorities, and in the longer term could consider expanding the mandate of the NACU and NACPU
Corruption offences are difficult to investigate and are becoming increasingly complex. Conducting an effective investigation therefore requires a variety of specialised knowledge and skills ranging from an understanding of the offences themselves to digital forensics and analysis of financial records (UNODC, 2024[36]). This makes capacity-building efforts in this area key to the success of the enforcement system in practice.
One potential limit on the NACPU and NACU’s ability to prosecute corruption stems not from their own capacity but from their mandate and by extension other units’ and authorities’ capacity. As per the Rules of Procedure of the Swedish Prosecution Office, the NACU’s mandate, which also determines the NACPU’s mandate, covers “cases of offences under Chapter 10 sections 5 a-e and Chapter 17 section 8 of the Criminal Code, cases of crimes of a complex or extensive nature committed by senior executives in the public or private sector who have abused or exploited the influence that comes with the position and the case is not to be handled by the Special Prosecution Office, and cases of crimes related to such criminality.” Beyond the reference to specific offences, there is no further clarity surrounding who is a “senior executive in the public or private sector”.
Stakeholders consulted during the OECD’s fact-finding mission noted that this risks creating confusion both on the part of investigative and prosecutorial authorities who may doubt whether they have the mandate to pursue a case. There is also a risk that cases become bogged down in debates over jurisdiction in court. To mitigate these risks, Swedish authorities could consider clarifying the definition of a “senior executive” or otherwise amending the Rules of Procedure of the Swedish Prosecution Office to ensure that at a minimum all high-risk positions are covered. While senior managers in the public sector are most clearly covered by this provision, it could be worth specifying how many levels of management are covered. It is less clear whether other categories of high-risk officials, such as those at the political level, ministerial advisers and officials with decision-making authority in public procurement and regulatory enforcement, are covered under the existing provision. Since these categories of officials all carry heightened integrity risks (OECD, 2020[30]), it could be beneficial to ensure they fall within the scope of the NACU’s mandate in light of its expertise.
As noted elsewhere in this report, Sweden is taking steps to expand understanding of corruption beyond historic perceptions that it relates only to bribery, but the NACU and NACPU’s mandate is currently limited to investigations of bribery offences (as well as trading in influence which is considered a bribery offence). While this arrangement is not inherently negative, it can limit the effectiveness of the enforcement system if non-specialised units responsible for investigations into other corruption offences do not have the necessary expertise or there is not sufficient co-ordination (OECD, 2020[30]). As an example, the OECD Working Group on Bribery has noted resource constraints and a lack of knowledge of foreign bribery as a predicate offence of money laundering in the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) within the Swedish Police (OECD, 2024[9]).
In the short term, Sweden could invest in building capacity for anti-corruption investigation in other police units such as the FIU, other prosecution units and authorities investigating crimes closely related to corruption like the Swedish Economic Crime Authority (SECA). The NACPU is already organising training for other police units, as well as training for employees in the SECA. The NACPU and NACU are also currently discussing how to better co-ordinate their training efforts and potentially organise joint awareness training for other units in the Swedish Prosecution Authority. If responsibilities for corruption investigations continue to be spread across several units and bodies, Sweden should also ensure that mechanisms for co-ordination and information sharing are in place to ensure that the dispersal of responsibility does not result in duplicated work or corruption going undetected.
In the longer-term, as part of the overall review of corruption offences, Swedish authorities may wish to consider reviewing whether changes to the offences within the NACU and NACPU’s mandate are needed. Expanding their mandates would naturally require a corresponding increase in resources but may be more impactful and better leverage existing anti-corruption expertise and technical skills in specialised units that may be lacking elsewhere. Expanding the NACU and NACPU’s mandate could also involve them integrating with other specialised police and prosecution units (such as the Swedish Economic Crime Authority) to better respond to complex economic and financial crime. Box 3.9 outlines how the prosecution in France takes a more holistic approach to combatting corruption and financial crime, and Sweden may wish to consider a similar more consolidated approach even if not to the same degree.
In France the National Financial Prosecutor’s Office (Le parquet national financier, PNF) has been responsible for the investigation and prosecution of complex economic and financial crime since 2013. Its mandate covers:
1. attacks on public finances (complex tax fraud, highly complex VAT fraud, etc.)
2. breaches of integrity (corruption, influence peddling, favouritism, etc.)
3. attacks on the proper functioning of markets (insider trading, dissemination of false or misleading information, etc.)
4. attacks on free competition (illegal agreement, abuse of dominant position).
The PNF’s staff consists of 20 magistrates specialising in economic and financial crime supported by specialised professionals in taxation, stock market law, accounting, public procurement, civil service law, seizures and confiscations and IT. Magistrates work on cases in pairs to allow them to cross-reference their analysis of complex processes.
Bringing expertise on economic and financial crime in the prosecution service under one roof could have several benefits. It could better leverage highly specialised investigative expertise which would otherwise be spread across several authorities and contribute to a better understanding of the interlinkages between different types of economic and financial crime. The fact that just 40% of the PNF’s current cases originated from reports from public authorities also speaks to a strong capacity to detect potential offences through other means.
3.3.2. Swedish authorities could strengthen the ability of law enforcement to detect and investigate corruption
Sweden has taken positive steps to improve the detection and investigation of corruption, in particular by increasing the statute of limitations for serious crimes including corruption. However, the NACPU and the Swedish Police generally face a number of challenges to detecting and investigating corruption, which could prove especially acute as they are increasingly called on to respond to the threat of organised crime. These include:
a reliance on reporting to detect corruption coupled with limited intelligence capabilities and reporting requirements for municipalities
limits to the investigative techniques it can use as a result of low sanctions for corruption.
Detection and reporting requirements
Detection of corruption in local government in Sweden is a particular challenge. There are many more local government authorities than central government authorities, local government is a high-risk area for corruption due to small, close-knit networks (OECD, 2020[30]), and there is a general perception that corruption is higher in local authorities. However, law enforcement receives the same number of reports from the subnational level as it does from central government agencies (Statskontoret, 2023[16]). This has led both the Swedish Police and the State Treasury to conclude that corruption in these authorities is underreported (Swedish Police Authority, 2024[38]).
Central government authorities are required to report corruption to the Swedish Prosecution Authority under Section 22 of the Public Employment Act (1994:260). This provision explicitly requires reporting of bribery and official misconduct offences, but paragraph 2 also requires reporting of any other crime that could carry a sanction beyond just a fine. However, there is no equivalent reporting requirement for regional or municipal authorities, and the Swedish Police has publicly called for a legal requirement to address this problem (Swedish Police Authority, 2025[39]).
To improve detection of corruption in this high-risk area of public administration, Swedish authorities could consider introducing an equivalent requirement for local authorities to report corruption. While this would entail resource investments from local authorities, and such authorities often face resource constraints (OECD, 2020[30]), the risks of not introducing such a requirement are high, especially in light of the growing threat of organised crime and the fact that local authorities already tend to have less developed preventative measures in place (Statskontoret, 2023[16]). The State Treasury, the Swedish Police and other national authorities could also offer support to local government in setting up reporting channels and integrating them into existing channels where possible (see Chapter 6 of this report).
In addition, the NACPU appears not to have adequate resources for effective proactive detection. At the current levels of corruption reporting, stakeholders consulted during the OECD’s fact-finding mission agreed that the NACPU is adequately resourced. However, the NACPU only has one specialist currently working on intelligence for all corruption-related offences, whether domestic or foreign, which limits its ability to detect corruption. As the influence of organised crime increases, especially given the current lack of reporting requirements in local authorities, the NACPU would be more effective if it could increase its capacity to proactively detect corruption through other means. It could therefore consider requesting funds to recruit more intelligence specialists in the next budgeting cycle, and Swedish authorities could ensure that the NACPU has sufficient budget to adequately remunerate these specialists.
Investigative techniques
Investigations of corruption could also be improved through amendments to judicial procedure that would allow the police to make more effective use of special investigative techniques. To illustrate just one example, Chapter 27 Section 18a of the Code of Judicial Procedure establishes that wiretapping can only be used in preliminary investigations for “offences in respect of which a less severe penalty than imprisonment for two years is not prescribed for the offence”. It is also possible to employ wiretapping if a perpetrator committed multiple offences in a systematic manner which collectively carry penalties of at least two years imprisonment. All corruption offences in Sweden have a minimum sanction of less than two years imprisonment, and for several offences including trading in influence, abuse of power and official misconduct, this is the maximum sanction. Therefore, in practice it is not possible to investigate corruption using wiretapping under this article unless the suspected offence is sufficiently aggravated that it could be expected to be sanctioned with more than two years imprisonment (aggravated bribery or embezzlement carry maximum sanctions of six years imprisonment). For offences where two years imprisonment is the maximum sanction, it would effectively not be possible to use wiretapping at all. The same is true for other investigative techniques subject to similar restrictions in the Code of Judicial Procedure.
In addition, under Section 2a of Act 2012:278, investigations into several offences, including aggravated embezzlement as well as crimes that can be closely related to corruption such as aggravated money laundering and aggravated tax crime, can use wiretapping irrespective of the sanction threshold outlined in the Code of Judicial Procedure. However, this provision does not apply to bribery or other corruption offences besides embezzlement.
Wiretapping and other special investigative techniques should be used sparingly to avoid unduly infringing on privacy (UNODC, 2024[36]). However given that Swedish authorities are concerned about the rise of organised crime groups, which are notoriously difficult to disentangle using other methods like informants due to strong internal loyalty (Albanese, 2014[40]), (McCarthy, 2011[41]), such techniques are useful tools which are not currently available in many cases of suspected corruption. In other OECD countries such as Denmark, the fight against organised crime has recently been an impetus for expanding the police’s ability to use certain special investigative techniques (Ministry of Justice of Denmark, 2023[42]).
As a result, and as mentioned above, Sweden could introduce aggravated versions of the trading in influence and abuse of power offences to allow wiretapping and other special investigative techniques that are currently off limits to be used in the event of investigations into particularly serious instances of these offences. It could also codify the possibility to use wiretapping in investigations into aggravated versions of all corruption offences in Act 2012:278. These offences are similar to those already listed in this law, and more explicitly including them here could better enable law enforcement to combat corruption and the influence of organised crime.
3.3.3. Swedish authorities could invest in building the capacity of prosecutors and judges to prosecute and adjudicate corruption cases
Building capacity among judges
Unlike in the police and prosecution service, there is no judicial specialisation in corruption in Sweden. However, there appear to be cases where the courts may be misinterpreting elements of corruption offences. For example, the Supreme Court decision in case no. B 5301-18 (issued March 2020) examined whether invitations for public officials to attend holiday parties could be considered bribes. While the Court ruled that the monetary value of these parties could be sufficient to be considered a bribe, it ultimately acquitted the accused because there was no “concrete risk” that they would influence public officials’ decision-making. Similar reasoning has since appeared in several lower court decisions which have taken this case as precedent, such as the decision in case 1675-22 of the Skåne and Blekinge Court of Appeal. However, this reasoning appears out of line with the preparatory material for past legislation on corruption offences (e.g. SOU 2010:38), which stipulates that criminal provisions should cover all situations where advantages could result in influence (an “abstract risk”).
There are relatively few corruption cases prosecuted in Sweden, which is reflected in the case statistics in Figure 3.1 that show that the number tends to be between 750 and 1500 each year. Stakeholders interviewed in preparation for this report noted that there is therefore not much precedent for judges to look to, and they may lack experience due to simply not hearing many corruption cases. Nonetheless, addressing the risks of judicial misinterpretation in corruption cases when they do occur could help the enforcement system more effectively ensure accountability. It may therefore be worth investing in building judicial capacity.
One route for responding to a lack of expertise would be specialisation. Court specialisation has become more common around the world in recent decades (Gramckow and Walsh, 2013[43]), including in the area of anti-corruption (Stephenson and Schütte, 2022[44]). It can range from a rapporteur system in which judges with specialised expertise sit on ad hoc court panels to a separate division or bench within a court to a separate court or even separate court system (Damle, 2005[45]). However it tends to be most beneficial when a given subject area is distinct, has a high case volume, is particularly technical and in need of specialist expertise and is uniformly administered in the executive branch (Gramckow and Walsh, 2013[43]).
In Sweden the case volume is currently relatively low, and the administration is fairly decentralised. It may therefore not be proportionate to establish a separate anti-corruption court, especially since there is not a tradition of specialisation in the criminal court system in Sweden (Courts of Sweden, 2025[46]). However, a limited degree of specialisation may be beneficial to overcome the existing expertise deficit by, for instance, ensuring that existing courts have at least one judge with specialist knowledge on adjudication of corruption cases.
To ensure that judges have the necessary knowledge, the Swedish Judicial Training Academy (Domstolsakademin) could organise more regular training for judges on corruption. Box 3.10 outlines how in France, such training occurs regularly in co-operation with the anti-corruption agency. Similar involvement for Swedish public authorities responsible for preventing and combatting corruption could strengthen its quality by lending more of an inter-disciplinary perspective.
The French National School of the Judiciary (Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature) offers trainings on corruption and incorporates them into broader more regular training programmes. The 2025-2026 training offerings include a training cycle of 17-24 days over two years on financial and economic crime, which includes an option for a five-day course on corruption in criminal law. There is also targeted training on corruption in public procurement, and the possibility to do a two-day immersive course in the French Anti-Corruption Agency to better understand its work. By offering such trainings regularly, judges can develop their expertise in this area independently of any formal institutional specialisation.
The Swedish Judicial Training Academy could also promote participation in European trainings to exchange anti-corruption expertise with colleagues from other countries. In 2025 (exact date to be determined) the European Judicial Training Network is organising a joint training on investigating and preventing corruption for judges, prosecutors and law enforcement. It also organises ongoing specialised exchanges between courts in EU member states on a variety of topics, including anti-corruption (European Judicial Training Network, 2025[48]).
Building capacity among prosecutors
Challenges with adjudication of corruption cases in practice also go beyond a lack of judicial expertise. In many cases, even though a corporate fine is obligatory upon conviction of a natural person under Chapter 36 Section 23 of the Criminal Code as confirmed during past evaluations of the OECD Working Group on Bribery (OECD, 2024[9]), the prosecution does not pursue one. The Working Group has noted this as a challenge with regard to enforcement of foreign bribery (OECD, 2024[9]), but it also applies to enforcement of domestic offences. For example, in the aforementioned decision in case 1675-22 of the Skåne and Blekinge Court of Appeal, the convicted bribe-givers worked for a security firm, and the prosecution could have pursued a corporate fine against the firm because the CEO was convicted of aggravated bribery but did not. While the possibility to impose a fine in situations where a company “did not do what could reasonably be required to prevent the offence” exists in the Criminal Code, stakeholders consulted during the OECD’s fact-finding mission highlighted that this provision is almost never used in practice, and there is therefore an absence of case law on what failure to prevent means concretely.
Clarifying corporate criminal liability from a legal perspective, as outlined in the previous section, could go a long way toward addressing prosecutors’ non-pursuit of corporate fines. However, more training for prosecutors on the preventive side of anti-corruption—in addition to existing training on the enforcement side—could also be beneficial. Such training could give prosecutors a better sense of what companies would be expected to do to prevent corruption and therefore enable them to identify whether a given company has done so or not. To this end the NACU and the Swedish Prosecution Authority generally could consider organising trainings in partnership with the Statskontoret, corporate compliance officers and/or international peers to gain a better understanding of corruption prevention efforts and requirements, as well as when it would be appropriate to seek a corporate fine.
In some other countries, the prosecution service actively offers publicly available guidance on interpretation of certain legal provisions (Box 3.11), which can be useful both for companies in understanding liability and for the prosecution service itself in crystalising understanding and strategy. However, stakeholders consulted during the OECD’s fact-finding mission explained that it is not common practice for the prosecution service to issue such guidance in Sweden. Therefore, while such an approach could be worthwhile, implementing it may require more systemic changes in how the Swedish Prosecution Authority operates.
The Bribery Act of 2010 is the primary piece of bribery legislation in the United Kingdom. To support enforcement of the bribery offences outlined in the Act, the UK Crown Prosecution Service issued the Joint Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions on the Bribery Act 2010. The Guidance outlines in detail how prosecutors should approach bribery prosecutions, and it contains inter alia a section covering failure to prevent provisions under Section 7 of the Act.
This section of the Guidance outlines relevant case law, what defence companies might employ and how to evaluate whether the company had sufficient prevention protocols in place. The Guidance also references the Ministry of Justice’s Guidance about commercial organisations preventing bribery, which it was required to produce under Section 9 of the Act. These and other guidance documents can be useful in clarifying legislative ambiguity and making sure individuals and businesses understand what is expected of them.
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