Corruption cases need to be detected before they can be investigated and eventually sanctioned. Therefore, this chapter focuses first on whistleblowing channels and whistleblower protection in Jordan, providing recommendations on how to strengthen the trust in and the coherence of the framework. Second, the chapter provides some concrete recommendations to further strengthen the chain of criminal investigations of corruption cases, starting from the preliminary investigation of a potential case by JIACC, the prosecution and the courts.
OECD Integrity Review of Jordan
Together for an Accountable and Transparent Public Administration
Abstract
A coherent and comprehensive public integrity system requires enforcement mechanisms to be credible and effective and avoid impunity that could undermine the rule of law, trust in institutions and could provide the breeding ground for more unethical practices, apathy, and cynicism. Therefore, if carried out in a fair, co-ordinated, transparent and timely manner, enforcement mechanisms can promote trust in the government’s public integrity system, strengthen its legitimacy over time and help to instill integrity values in individuals, organisations and society (OECD, 2017[1]). Therefore, the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity calls on adherents to ensure that enforcement mechanisms provide appropriate responses to all suspected violations of integrity standards by public officials and all others involved in the violations (OECD, 2017[2]).
In Jordan, Art. 97 Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary and the Law of Judicial Independence 29 of 2014, amongst others, stresses the independence of the judges and confirms the constitutional provision according to which there is no authority above the judges besides the law. In fact, Jordan performs relatively well in relevant international indicators related to rule of law and judicial independence. The World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI) “Rule of Law” indicator captures, amongst others, perceptions of the quality of contract enforcement and the quality of the courts. With a score of 57,08/100 in 2022, Jordan performs better than other countries in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) region (with an average of 41,24/100), but less than the OECD average of 80.44/100. However, between 1996 and 2022, Jordan’s performance in the WGI “Rule of Law” indicator decreased from 60,80 to 57,08. In the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 2023, Jordan scored 0,55/1 and the score remained relatively stable between 2015 (0.56) and 2023 (0.55). When looking at the relevant sub-indicators on “regulatory enforcement”, “civil justice” and “criminal justice”, Jordan score better than the regional and the global averages, but below OECD averages (Figure 6.1).
Source: World Justice Project Rule of Law Indicator 2023
Furthermore, with a score of 7.28/10 in 2023, the Index of Public Integrity rates Jordan positively the country’s sub-indicator on “judicial independence”. This score reflects the perception of executives from business and is taken from the Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Dataset, converting the original scale to a range from 1 (heavily influenced) to 10 (entirely independent). This sub-indicator asks the question “To what extent is the judiciary in your country independent from influences of members of government, citizens, or firms?” The perception of judicial independence in Jordan is thus above the world average (5.33/10), the regional average (6.21/10), the OECD average (7.08/10) and is the second-best performer amongst the 40 countries in the same income group with an average of 4.75/10. Finally, Jordanian’s trust in the judiciary among citizens is quite high. According to a poll conducted by the Center of Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan in 2023, 64% of the Jordanian population expressed trust in the judiciary (University of Jordan, 2023[3]).
To enable enforcement of integrity laws and regulations and to investigate and sanction cases of corruption through criminal proceedings or other integrity breaches through disciplinary measures (see Chapter 3), alleged cases first need to be detected and brought to the attention of enforcement actors. In addition to, for example, information from media or civil society reports (Chapter 4) or from audit reports (Chapter 5), an effective whistleblower framework is recognised as a core component of any public integrity system and key to unveil corrupt practices. In fact, according to the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), whistleblower reporting is the most important source for investigating corruption offences (JIACC, 2021[4]; JIACC, 2020[5]).
Jordan has been a pioneer in the MENA region when adopting the Whistleblower Protection Bylaw in 2014 (Regulation 62). Data from the Global Corruption Barometer 2019, collected by Transparency International in six MENA countries, evidence that citizens in Jordan have a relatively good perception concerning the consequences faced by corrupt officials which had been reported. When asked how likely it is that appropriate action would be taken against a government official that had been reported as corrupt, almost halve of the citizens in Jordan (49%) believe that such an official would face consequences (Figure 6.2). This is the highest score across the six countries and seems to reflect a certain perceived success in both the existing reporting channels and the prosecution of cases.
And thinking about if you were to report a case of corruption committed by a government official, how likely is it that appropriate action would be taken against them?
Note: average calculated with the data from Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Sudan and Tunisia.
Source: GCB, 2019
This chapter first analyses and provides recommendation on potential avenues to further strengthening the current whistleblowing framework in Jordan. It looks at the different channels for reporting misconduct and proposes avenues to improve their use by improving their coherence and the trust placed in them. Then, the chapter provides recommendations to further strengthen the chain of criminal investigations of corruption cases, starting from the preliminary investigation of a potential case by JIACC, the prosecution and ending with a brief look into the courts.
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity calls on adherents to ensure the implementation of whistleblower frameworks and calls countries to:
Provide alternative channels for reporting suspected violations of integrity standards, including the possibility of confidentially reporting to a body with the mandate and capacity to conduct an independent investigation (OECD, 2017[2]). A mixture of internal and external channels allowing disclosures to designated bodies and to the public or media is recommended (OECD, 2020[6]).
Ensure protection in law and practice against all types of unjustified treatments as a result of reporting in good faith and on reasonable grounds. It is key to establish a system that credibly protects whistleblowers from reprisals or harassment at the workplace, such as dismissal, suspension or demotion, transfer or reassignment, reduction of pay or even physical threats (OECD, 2016[7]). The system should provide clarity on the measures and remedies available, such as the return to employment after unfair termination. Protecting the confidentiality of whistleblowers and consider allowing for anonymous reporting is also a key element (OECD, 2020[6]).
In the end, there is a need to continuously work on strengthening trust in the existing channels and protection measures. Citizens and public officials can be aware of the existing channels and the available safeguards to protect whistleblowers, they can have clarity concerning which channel to use when, and there can be procedures for transferring reports in case they were filed to the wrong channel. However, if the channels and the protection measures are not trusted, people will not speak up and blow the whistle. Furthermore, as analysed in Chapter 3 and 4, whistleblowing is supported by the existence of general trust in the system and by openness so that public officials and citizens feel safe to raise questions, concerns or ideas (OECD, 2020[6]).
Trust in whistleblowing channels and, more broadly, for speaking up is difficult to achieve and to maintain. It requires several measures that reinforce one another. The following sections review the current whistleblowing framework in Jordan in view of providing recommendations to further improve its impact. They focus on three key dimensions: First, the clarity of the existing channels. Second, the credibility and effectiveness of protection measures. Third, raising awareness and communication.
6.2.1. JIACC, with other responsible entities, should continue promoting and improving the Bekhedmetkom platform and internal reporting channels as well as review existing channels to design a guide in plain language and to establish clear procedures for transferring cases
Currently, in Jordan, there are various channels to report criminal and disciplinary (administrative) violations against public integrity, based on several integrity standards and regulations. This includes all acts codified in Article 16 of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law (herein “AC Law”), public integrity standards codified in the Civil Service Bylaw, the Jordanian Code of Conduct and Ethics of the Public Service (CoC) and in specialised codes of conduct for certain areas and institutions (see Chapter 3).
Alleged cases can be reported to JIACC, the police or public prosecutors. JIACC receives reports in person, per WhatsApp, e-mail, letter, via the website grievance option, via JIACC liaison officers or transferred from other entities such as the police, the Audit Bureau (AB) or internal control units in national institutions. Regardless of whether an allegation is criminal or administrative in nature, an investigation is launched. The JIACC Board decides within fifteen days whether it accepts or rejects the report and authorises its Chairman or any of its members to take necessary measures to resolve the administrative issue (Art. 11 of AC Law). JIACC also sends a report to the respective public body, which has fifteen days to respond (or ask for an extension of this period). If the public body refuses to take the necessary measures or does not respond, the matter will be referred to the Council of Ministers (Art. 13). If the allegation qualifies as a criminal offence, JIACC Board refers the case to the competent public prosecutor or courts (Art. 12).
In turn, disciplinary/administrative violations, including violations against the CoC, can be reported through other channels. Line ministries are primarily responsible for ensuring that the CoC is implemented (Art. 11 of the CoC). Some ministries reportedly apply an open-door policy so that any employee can go into the office of the secretary general and complain. Reporting of violations of the CoC can also be done to the Service and Public Administration Commission (SPAC) and/or the joint SPAC/JIACC committee. As a rule, complaints should first be addressed internally within each public entity. If they are not addressed within one month, the SPAC can be approached. It is also possible to directly address the SPAC if an employee feels more comfortable in doing so. Complaints to the SPAC can be filed internally or externally via different channels including online, per mail or directly in person. JIACC, the Audit Bureau or other institutions can also transfer complaints to the SPAC. The SPAC has established focal points at JIACC and the Audit Bureau to ensure this co-operation. Reports concerning potential violations of the CoC may also fall under Art. 16 of AC Law. In this case, the offence should be transferred to JIACC or public prosecutors. However, whether an offence that has been filed internally is correctly identified as “criminal” or “disciplinary/administrative” depends on the capacities of the employee having received the report, which entails a risk of criminal cases not being transmitted to JIACC or prosecutors.
Particularly interesting is the “At your Service” (Bekhedmetkom) interactive platform launched in 2018, which enables direct communication between citizens and the government, offering various options such as asking questions, making suggestions, giving compliments, submitting complaints and reporting potential misuse of funds or misconduct by public officials (OECD ([8]) Public Governance Review of Jordan). Bekhedmetkom is hosted by the Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship (MoDEE) and the communications from citizens are then transmitted to the responsible public entity. There are also other channels for reporting administrative and criminal allegations including to the Audit Bureau, to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), to the National Centre of Human Rights, to the police and prosecution services or to the Judicial Council (JC). Table 6.1 provides an overview of the most relevant existing channels for reporting administrative and criminal allegations.
Source: Compiled by OECD based on information gathered through questionnaire and interviews.
Having a diversity of options to report misconduct, like in Jordan, is positive as it offers citizens and public officials a multitude of possibilities to file their reports. However, such alternative or complementary reporting channels need to be clear, consistent, coherent and visibly effective if they want to meaningfully contribute to improving public integrity. Above all, it should not be the burden of the public official or the citizen to know which channel is correct.
In Jordan, the exact roles and responsibilities of each of these channels are not always clear to people. There is reportedly a lack of knowledge amongst public officials on which mechanism exactly accepts and processes which offences or on what happens if the offense should have been filed elsewhere. This potentially can create confusion on which system to use, when and how. In fact, some of the bodies receive complaints falling under the jurisdiction of another body. The Audit Bureau, for instance, reported receiving complaints falling under the responsibility of JIACC. JIACC also stated to often receive reports for which they are not responsible (JIACC, 2021[4]). This certainly is also related to a lack of knowledge of many people about corruption more generally and which requires more awareness raising (JIACC, 2021[4]). Overlaps between channels appear to be unavoidable and can be addressed through an effective co-ordination and transfer of complaints. While the co-ordination between JIACC, the Audit Bureau or the former CSB has worked well, this co-ordination is less clear with other external channels and in particular with internal channels, i.e., reports submitted within or to a public entity (a line ministry, for example). Clearer procedures for such co-ordination and the transfer of cases would strengthen the overall system.
Furthermore, according to interviews and information received by the OECD, while internal channels are mandatory (Art. 11.G of the Civil Service Bylaw 2020), the level of implementation of such channels is relatively low. It is also unclear in how far direct supervisors, internal control units, or HR units are trained in handling complaints and in how far they are aware of available protection measures in law and practice. At the same time, promoting internal channels as the first option to public employees who wish to speak up and report violations is key. Only if whistleblowers do not trust internal channels, they should have the option to seek alternatives outside their public entity.
Therefore, JIACC could strengthen the coherence of the existing channels by the following measures.
First, JIACC could review all existing channels and, together with the responsible entities, establish clear procedures for transferring cases if required. For instance, it would make sense to clearly define in the AC Law for which administrative integrity violations JIACC is responsible and what issues other reporting channels should address. The current practice between JIACC and the Audit Bureau is a good example. In turn, Jordan could reflect whether the current reporting channel to the PMO is necessary. Furthermore, JIACC could publish a short guide in plain language to provide an overview of the different channels and their purposes. These measures could streamline the system and lead to more clarity and to a better use of the reporting channels.
As recommended in the (OECD[8]) Public Governance Review of Jordan could continue working on fine-tuning and increasing the visibility of the Bekhedmetkom platform and JIACC could promote the platform as the first option for external stakeholders who wish to report cases of suspected corruption.
Third, both JIACC and SPAC should aim at ensuring that all public institutions provide an internal channel for employees and that general directors, direct supervisors and relevant units are trained accordingly. The National Integrity Indicators (NII) promoted by JIACC have the potential to provide further incentives to implement such internal channels.
Finally, given the multiple reporting channels and complaints mechanisms, there is a risk that several entities deal with the same case. It is therefore important that bodies co-ordinate and exchange information on a regular level. For example, Brazil’s SISCOR System is a good practice to ensure a co-ordinated approach to disciplinary cases (Box 6.1).
The National Disciplinary Board (Corregedoria-Geral da União, CRG) in Brazil, established under the authority of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (CGU), is the central unit of the Federal Executive Branch Disciplinary System (Sistema de Correição do Poder Executivo Federal, SISCOR) and has the competence to supervise and monitor the disciplinary activity within the Federal Executive Branch. . The activities under the SISCOR include the investigation of irregularities committed by civil servants and the enforcement of applicable sanctions.
The SISCOR is endowed with legal powers to supervise, correct any ongoing disciplinary procedures and impose sanctions. These core tasks are carried out by its approximately 150 employees at the central department and more than 250 sectional units located in federal agencies (corregedorias sectoriais).
One of the pillars of the co-ordination role of the CGU is the SISCOR System (Sistema SISCOR), a web-based platform that allows to store and make available, in a fast and secure way, information about the disciplinary procedures initiated within public entities. With the information available in the SISCOR System, public managers can monitor and control disciplinary processes, identify critical points, draw up risk maps and establish to for prevent and combat corruption and other administrative offences.
Source: (OECD, 2017[1]); the CGU website, www.cgu.gov.br/assuntos/atividade-disciplinar (accessed 5 October 2023)
6.2.2. Jordan could revise existing legislation to provide more clarity for whistleblowers on possibilities to be protected, ensure sufficient resources are allocated to provide protection and consider allowing anonymous reporting
A key ingredient for trust in whistleblowing channels is the protection granted to whistleblowers. With Regulation 62 of 2014, Jordan has adopted as one of the first countries in the MENA region a whistleblower protection bylaw. Regulation 62 grants protection to informers, witnesses, informants and experts as well as their relatives and closely related persons. Other relevant legislation is the AC Law and the Civil Service Bylaw. The decision to grant protection is taken by JIACC’s Board (Art. 6 of AC law). While some aspects and processes are the same, the following analysis focuses on the protection granted to whistleblowers, not witnesses.
Protection can take the forms of legal protection (Art. 9, Regulation 62) or personal protection (Art. 10, Regulation 62). Measures or actions to ensure their personal safety can include protection at their places of residence, at their places of work or also the provision of accommodation, if necessary. Financial aid for whistleblowers might be granted, if needed (Art. 24.d, AC Law). Furthermore, the AC Law allows for non-disclosure of the identity and whereabouts of whistleblowers. The protection terminates if protection conditions are violated (Art. 25 of AC Law), if the need for providing protection expires, if the protected person wishes to terminate protection, or if the JIACC Board decides to do so (Art. 11 of Regulation 62).
If retaliation against a protected person takes place, the JIACC Chairman and the General Prosecutor shall be immediately informed (Art. 3.B, par. 5 of Regulation 62). Penalties for such retaliation can reach imprisonment for not less than one year, and in the case of use of force or threat by weapons or other physical means, to no less than two years of imprisonment and a financial fine (Art. 27, AC Law).
JIACC has created a whistleblower protection unit to ensure the implementation of protection measures for all categories that can seek protection under Regulation 62. The unit currently consists of five persons and is reporting directly to the Secretary General of JIACC. According to information provided by JIACC, since the first protection request in 2015, the unit has received 607 requests of which 104 were accepted. In 2021, 63 protection applications were received, 11 granted, 52 remained under reservation. In 2020, out of 46 requests received, protection was granted 14 times and 32 cases were reserved. JIACC may consider whether the unit disposes of sufficient human and financial resources to ensure that effective physical protection can be granted. During interviews carried out by the OECD, a lack of resources was mentioned and JIACC could reflect on further strengthening the unit.
As such, Jordan has a strong framework for whistleblower protection, which could be further improved by considering the following measures:
Consider some changes in the legal framework to improve clarity, consider integrating a good faith clause and putting the burden of proof on those being suspected to retaliate against whistleblowers.
Consider establishing the possibility to report anonymously.
Consider some changes in the legal framework to improve clarity concerning definitions and protection measures, consider integrating a good faith clause and putting the burden of proof on those being suspected to retaliate against whistleblowers
Jordan’s whistleblowing framework could be further clarified and strengthened. First, the legal framework grants protection to informers, witnesses, informants and experts as defined in Article 2 of Regulation 62 (Box 6.2). Both “informers” and “informants” would correspond to a common definition of whistleblowers, defined by the OECD as “employees who disclose to the competent authorities in good faith and on reasonable grounds wrongdoing of whatever kind in the context of their workplace” (OECD, 2016[7]). The difference between “informers” and “informants” in Regulation 62 is related to who receives the information provided by the whistleblower: the “competent authorities” for the informers and “the commission” for the informants. This, in turn, entails different protection options since only the identity of informants reporting to the commission, i.e., to JIACC, can be concealed. Otherwise, Regulation 62 treats both equally, including that all other types of protection – legal protection in the workplace and personal /physical protection – are granted to all categories.
Informer: The person who informs the competent authorities of information related to corruption incident
Informant: The person who informs the commission of information related to a corruption incident.
Witness: The person who testifies in a crime of corruption before the Commission, General Prosecutor, Judiciary or any competent authority.
Expert: The person who is assigned to submit an expert’s report in respect of a corruption crime.
Source: Translated from Regulation 62 of 2014
However, the current formulations in Regulation 62 are somehow misleading in this respect. For instance, Art. 3.b.2 states that JIACC’s Protection Unit should “receive applications from the persons who do not wish to expose their identities, including, Informers and Informants, in order to study such applications and forward them to the Chairman for a decision in that respect” and Art. 3.b.4 states that it should “conceal the data provided in the protection applications which may lead to exposing the identity of the Informer, Witness, Informant or Expert and replace them with special codes”. These two formulations seem to indicate that both informants and informers could receive protection through concealment of their identities. Therefore, Jordan should consider revising the current legal text to avoid any scope for misinterpretation and clarify in Art 3.b.2 and 3.b.4 that only informants (those who report to JIACC) can be granted protection by concealing their identities, while informers, who report to other competent authorities, cannot. JIACC should also elaborate clear guidance materials on its website on which protection can be granted in which situation.
Second, the current text could be clearer with respect to what is meant with corruption. Citizens and employees often do not have always know what corruption offences are according to the law. JIACC emphasised during OECD interviews that clarifying what corruption is remains a significant challenge despite the efforts invested in raising awareness. Other stakeholders emphasised that recurring amendments of the laws have created some unclarities even for law enforcement agencies and experts (see also Chapter 1). This may imply, out of lack of understanding, that corrupt incidents sometimes simply do not reach JIACC and the courts. Jordan could therefore consider updating Regulation 62 to clearly define and codify all corruption incidents that can be reported and which qualify for whistle-blower protection mechanisms (Rasheed and USAID, 2019[9]).
Third, the decision about whether protection will be granted depends currently on the existence of a “seriousness threat”. Whether such a “serious threat” exists, is decided by JIACC’s Board. According to experts in Jordan, however, despite the existence of criteria to reach a conclusion concerning the seriousness of a threat, a whistleblower, at the moment of deciding about whether to report a case, is de facto faced with uncertainty. The whistleblower can indeed not be entirely sure of whether he will be granted protection or not. This uncertainty could deter the whistleblower from coming forward. JIACC suggested during a workshop moderated by the OECD that protection should not depend on legal criteria, or the existence of a serious threat, but be full and complete (unconditional). Then, of course, different levels and types of protection measures can be granted depending on the needs and JIACC should have the sufficient financial independence to be able to assign resources as required. The option of anonymous reporting (see below) can be an additional safeguard for whistleblowers who fear reprisals or are particularly risk-averse concerning the protection that will be available.
Fourth, it was mentioned during a workshop moderated by the OECD that there is currently a lack of clarity of what happens if a whistleblower discloses confidential information. This indicates that either the law is not entirely clear about such a case or that the law is not clearly communicated, leading to uncertainty and potentially reluctance of whistleblowers to come forward if they are not sure about the nature of the information they use. Here, Jordan could follow the EU Directive 2019/1937, Article 21.7, which states:
“It should not be possible to rely on individuals' legal or contractual obligations, such as loyalty clauses in contracts or confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements, so as to preclude reporting, to deny protection or to penalise reporting persons for having reported information on breaches or made a public disclosure where providing the information falling within the scope of such clauses and agreements is necessary for revealing the breach. Where those conditions are met, reporting persons should not incur any kind of liability, be it civil, criminal, administrative or employment-related. It is appropriate that there be protection from liability for the reporting or public disclosure under this Directive of information in respect of which the reporting person had reasonable grounds to believe that reporting or public disclosure was necessary to reveal a breach pursuant to this Directive. Such protection should not extend to superfluous information that the person revealed without having such reasonable grounds.”
Fifth, the current legislation does not explicitly contain a good faith provision, i.e., specifying that persons reporting or disclosing suspected wrongdoing should have the right for protection if they had a reasonable belief that the information reported was true at the time of reporting (OECD, 2016[7]). Good faith clauses serve the purpose of preventing misuse of corruption provisions for other purposes, e.g., against political opposition or other political activists. While according to JIACC there has so far never been an incident of bad faith and that good faith is part of practice, an explicit clause would be important to prevent misuse of reporting provisions and to establish trust in the system. Jordan could therefore consider integrating a good faith clause in its current legal framework. In doing so, it could follow the approaches of other agencies in OECD countries such as the French Anti-Corruption Agency, which recommends protection for good faith reports from whistleblowers in its Anti-Corruption Agency Guidelines (AFA, 2020[10]). The threshold for good faith reporting could be based on Transparency International's approach, according to which all those who had a "reasonable belief in wrongdoing" should be awarded good faith (Transparency International, 2017[11]). The fact that such good faith can only be established during the proceedings should not stand in the way of the introduction of such a clause, but rather calls for intensifying adequate safeguards and fair trial guarantees throughout the proceedings.
Finally, Jordan could consider reflecting upon including a reversal of the burden of proof on those being suspected to actively retaliate whistleblowers. This would mean that whenever a whistleblower reports retaliatory measures or these have become known ex officio, the alleged perpetrator or employer must prove that this is not the case. This novel approach is followed, for example, by the new Directive of the European Union on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council).
Consider establishing the possibility to report anonymously
Currently, if whistleblowers want their identity and whereabouts to be protected, they must formulate a request (Art. 24.b of AC Law). A code system then allows to protect the names: when the report is received by JIACC, the name is replaced by a code. JIACC’s investigators only get the coded information. The identity of the person is coded throughout the process. Only one employee at JIACC can open the coded document, which allows for some protection of the identities. However, in the end, to use JIACC’s protection request tool on its website, one must indicate at least his/her name, national number, phone number, email address and the factual living address. This detailed level of information to be provided could be a deterrent to people who would wish to report but fear reprisals or do not trust the system. Indeed, whistleblowers may also not always trust the coding put in place. Because of this lack of a genuine anonymous reporting some people might reflect twice on whether to use the system.
Indeed, data for six MENA countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Sudan, Tunisia) from Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer 2019 show that respondents fear reprisals if they would report about corruption (Figure 6.3). On average 58% of people in all countries assessed think they will suffer retaliation if they report corruption. In Jordan, only 36% of respondents believe that ordinary people can report incidents of corruption without fear, risking retaliation or other negative consequences if they speak out in the fight against corruption. To compare, in the European Union, the Global Corruption Barometer 2021, showed that on average 47% of respondents perceived that citizens could report incidents in their countries without fear of reprisals. Germany and Austria, with 71% and 70% respectively, have the highest percentages in the EU, while Cyprus and Croatia have the lowest percentages, with 19% and 25% respectively.
In this country, can ordinary people report incidents of corruption without fear, or do they risk retaliation or other negative consequences if they speak out in the fight against corruption?
Note: average calculated with the data from Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Sudan and Tunisia.
Source: GCB, 2019
In Jordan, there is no similar data on perception from public officials with respect to reporting channels and the perceived fear of reprisals. However, interviews and a virtual focus group with JIACC liaison officers and one with Audit Bureau liaison officers carried out by the OECD for this Integrity Review allowed to get an idea of challenges at organisational levels. Overall, it seems that within public institutions in Jordan, there is still room for improvement with respect to creating open organisational cultures, in which everyone is allowed to speak freely and raise concerns, including about integrity issues. Liaison officers from both JIACC and the Audit Bureau, who arguably can get an “inside view” of the public entities to which they are sent, reported a widespread resistance to change and an acceptance of the status quo. Liaison officer from the Audit Bureau reported also a “failure to provide institutional protection to staff”. During a workshop moderated by the OECD, it was also mentioned that “whistleblowers are often excited in the beginning and then get afraid and retract” and that the fear of retaliation is common. Furthermore, the current uncertainty with respect to whether a threat will be considered serious and therefore protection granted or not (see above) could provide a further rationale for allowing anonymous reports.
Therefore, establishing an anonymous reporting mechanism should be considered by JIACC. This may require changes in the Law that can be discussed and proposed by key stakeholders in Jordan. Independently from such legal aspects that need to be sorted out, technical solutions are available to allow JIACC for anonymous whistleblowing. These solutions can even allow anonymous communication between the whistleblower and the investigator. Jordan could consider examples implemented in Austria (Box 6.3), by the police of Baden-Württemberg in Germany or by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya, for example, where such mechanisms were implemented with success. An experimental study carried out in Indonesia shows that anonymous reporting channels are effective to encourage whistleblowing intentions where there are high levels of fear of retaliation (Henrico, Wahyudi and Imam, 2022[12]). Statistical evidence from companies in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Switzerland with anonymous channels show that these do not lead to an abuse of anonymity (Hauser, Bretti-Reinalter and Blumer, 2021[13]):
“Overall, (…) the fear that whistleblowing systems are being abused on a large scale is not borne out by the statistical analysis. At the same time, it is clear that the proportion of abusive reports is no higher among companies that allow anonymous reporting than among those that do not accept anonymous reports.
In 2013, the Federal Ministry of Justice in Austria launched a portal to enable individuals to report wrongdoing anonymously. The portal can be accessed via a link on the Ministry’s homepage, where individuals can find and download further information on the portal and is operated by the Central Public Prosecutor’s Office for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (CPPOCECC). It is an online anonymous reporting system, which is suited for investigations on economic crimes and corruption. To guarantee anonymity, when setting up a secured mailbox, the whistleblower is required to choose a username and a password. The whistleblower (or “discloser”) may then report anonymously; the investigation authority in turn may make inquiries with the whistleblower, while maintaining his or her anonymity to verify the value of the information. Any relevant reports outside the CPPOCECC remit are forwarded to the competent authority (mostly financial authorities). The anonymity of the information disclosed is maintained using encryption and other security procedures. Whistleblowers are asked not to enter any data that give clues as to their identity and to refrain from submitting a report using a device that was provided by their employer. After submission, the CPPOCECC provides the whistleblower with feedback and the status of the disclosure through a secure mailbox, which also allows for an anonymous dialogue between whistleblower and investigator.
The following description is available on the website in German:
“Particularly with regard to the prosecution of white-collar crime and corruption, new strategies and measures need to be developed in order to increase the effectiveness of prosecution and provide the authorities with the tools they need to fulfil their tasks.
White-collar crime and corruption are often characterised by the fact that the perpetrators are highly secretive and act in a conspiratorial manner. Criminal structures can often only be broken up if those involved who are willing to give evidence are given sufficient incentive to co-operate with the law enforcement authorities.
As a supplement to the leniency programme introduced as part of the criminal law competence package, an internet-based anonymous whistleblowing system was therefore set up at the Central Public Prosecutor's Office for the Prosecution of Economic Crime and Corruption (CPPOCECC) for a trial period of two years, which is particularly suitable for investigations into economic and corruption offences and was taken over into regular operation on 1 January 2016.
This whistleblower system gives the CPPOCECC the opportunity to communicate with an anonymous whistleblower via a mailbox. In contrast to the processing of anonymous reports received by post or other means, the system allows the public prosecutors involved to ask the whistleblower to objectify the value of the information while at the same time ensuring absolute anonymity. Reports objectified in this way can then be used as a starting point for investigations or as a prerequisite for concrete suspicion in order to conduct criminal proceedings.
The whistleblower system enables reports on the following key areas, which are based on the CPPOCECC’s catalogue of responsibilities: Corruption; Economic offences; Social fraud; Accounting and capital market offences; Money laundering.”
6.2.3. JIACC, Audit Bureau and SPACC could raise awareness about available reporting channels and protection measures, promote the use of internal channels as a first option and address cultural barriers to whistleblowing
Raising awareness and communicating about existing channels and protection measures is key to build trust. On the one hand, direct communication to whistleblowers is of course important, for instance, by sending a message that the report has been received and by providing updates on the follow-up status of the report. Such personal communication can even be achieved if reports are anonymous, as systems can allow for such bilateral anonymous communication, which can significantly increase the success of the investigation process as it allows to ask questions to the whistleblower (see Box 6.3 above). The EU Whistleblowing Directive, for instance, requires that authorities under obligation to follow-up on the reports received, have to, give feedback to the reporting persons about the follow-up (for instance, closure of the case based on a lack of sufficient evidence, launch of a full investigation and/or measures taken to address the issue raised) within 3 months (extendable to 6 months in case of complex cases).
On the other hand, from the perspective of enhancing trust in the system, it is particularly important to publish statistics on the number and nature of complaints received as well as on the results of investigations and sanctions (OECD, 2020[6]). Collecting data also can provide insights on risk areas and allow to assess the effectiveness of the system (OECD, 2020[6]). JIACC and the Audit Bureau provide date on their reporting channels in their annual reports, but for some other channels mentioned in Table 6.1 no information seems to be publicly available. In fact, many channels do not clearly communicate the way reports will be followed-up, neither in relevant legislation, nor on the websites, nor in other guidance documents. However, uncertainty about how a report will be processed and how the channel has performed in the past may deter a whistleblower from using it. In particular, interviews carried out by the OECD indicate that many internal reporting channels for violations of the CoC lack such transparency.
Therefore, JIACC, the Audit Bureau and the SPAC could jointly elaborate a strategic approach to promoting trust in existing channels, with particular emphasis on providing statistical data and on promoting the use of internal channels as first option. This could, for example, be an objective to include in the next National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategy of Jordan. Also, gathering data through regular staff surveys on how public officials perceive the whistleblowing channels and whether they fear reprisals could be an important input to inform integrity policies aimed at promoting trust and use of whistleblowing channels and also would allow to measure progress. Such survey questions could be part of JIACC’s National Integrity Indicators, for example (see Chapter 2).
Furthermore, JIACC should continue implementing awareness raising activities on whistleblowing and available protection measures, such as the campaign “Report and the Integrity Commission Protects You”. These additional efforts could focus on explaining in plain language the different existing channels and on providing a positive image of whistleblowers. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) Civil Service Commission includes a statement in staff manuals to reassure staff that it is safe to raise concerns (Box 6.4). In Canada, the Public Interest Commission of Alberta designed a series of posters and distributed them to public entities to be displayed in employee workspaces. The posters show messages such as ‘Make a change by making a call. Be a hero for Alberta’s public interest’.
In addition to current and future awareness raising activities, JIACC, Audit Bureau and SPAC could consider developing and implementing a training for civil servants on the different existing channels and protection measures. The training could also involve the Institute for Public Administration (IPA). Integrity Officers, as recommended in Chapter 1, or HR units in public entities could be trained to provide further ad hoc guidance on available channels and protection measures.
The UK Civil Service Commission uses the following statement to staff, reassuring them to raise concerns:
“We encourage everyone who works here to raise any concerns they have. We encourage ‘whistleblowing’ within the organisation to help us put things right if they are going wrong. If you think something is wrong please tell us and give us a chance to properly investigate and consider your concerns. We encourage you to raise concerns and will ensure that you do not suffer a detriment for doing so.”
Source: UK’s Civil Service Commission: http://civilservicecommission.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Whistleblowing-and-the-Civil-Service-Code.pdf
Finally, as in many other cultures, in Jordan there is a strong loyalty to the family, the community or the workplace which can conflict with reporting misconduct. Such social norms can undermine other measures aimed at promoting open organisational cultures, where speaking up is seen as a positive value. JIACC could therefore work on analysing and assessing the cultural connotations of blowing the whistle and of speaking up more generally. This could allow to explicitly address cultural aspects with the aim of realising the full potential of whistleblowing. Cultural connotations are not static, they can change over time and can be actively targeted (Box 6.5). Such an exercise should involve civil society organisations, trade unions as well as religious and tribal leaders, for example.
In the UK, a research project commissioned by Public Concern at Work from Cardiff University examined national newspaper reporting on whistleblowing and whistle-blowers covering the period from 1st January 1997 to 31 December 2009. This includes the period immediately before the introduction of the Public Interest Disclosure Act and tracks how the culture has changed since then. The study found that whistle-blowers were overwhelmingly represented in a positive light in the media. Over half (54%) of the newspaper stories represented whistle-blowers in a positive light, with only 5% of stories being negative. The remainder (41%) were neutral. Similarly, a study by YouGov found that 72% of workers view the term ‘whistle-blowers’ as neutral or positive.
Source: Public Concern at Work (2010), Where’s whistleblowing now? 10 years of legal protection for whistle-blowers, Public Concern at Work, London, p. 17, YouGov (2013), YouGov/PCAW Survey Results, YouGov, London, p.8
To improve the criminal justice system, Jordan launched reforms, in particular since 2016, aiming at making the judiciary more effective and efficient. These efforts are also reflected in a relatively good performance in the World Justice Project sub-factors rating the country’s criminal system (Figure 6.4).
Source: World Justice Project Rule of Law Indicator 2023
Nonetheless, during OECD interviews, several stakeholders stressed the good intentions of the judiciary, but mentioned some areas for improvement to further strengthen the effective enforcement of public integrity standards, which are presenting some particular challenges compared to other crimes. In Jordan, once an alleged case of corruption reaches JIACC, for example through whistleblowing channels, the process can be roughly divided into three steps:
1. Preliminary investigation carried out by JIACC. Since 2006, JIACC has been granted investigative powers allowing to investigate any kind of activity that qualifies as corruption offence based on Article 7 of the AC law at that time. Within JIACC, the Central Unit is currently responsible for the reception of complaints and for carrying out preliminary investigations, regardless of how they received the case. The Investigation Directorate currently has 24 investigators and is organised into a Public Investigation Division and a Private Investigation Division. The preliminary investigations consist of ensuring that the information received is correct and of collecting preliminary evidence. JIACC has developed its own investigation tools over time. If JIACC investigators conclude that there is substantial suspicion and further investigations are necessary, the case is sent with recommendations to the JIACC Board to be assessed. Cases that have no suspicion of corruption are documented and archived by JIACC. Whenever there is reasonable suspicion of corruption, cases are directed by JIACC Board to the Specialised Corruption Prosecution Department (Art. 17 of AC Law)
2. Investigation carried out by public prosecutors. The Specialised Corruption Prosecution Department is an independent institution affiliated to the Judiciary and is now located in the administrative court. It currently consists of 5 prosecutors, who are judges specialised in corruption. The Judicial Council decides, based on needs and an annual allocation procedure, the number of prosecutors allocated to this department (Art. 17 lit. b of AC Law). The prosecutors technically report to the Judicial Council on judicial issues and to the Ministry of Justice on administrative issues. Once the Specialised Corruption Prosecution Department receives cases from the JIACC Board, they are registered under a specific number and assigned to one of the prosecutors. The prosecutor assesses the investigations conducted so far and continues with the prosecution under Criminal Law supported by administrative governors, the police or heads of security centres (Art. 9 Criminal Procedure Principles of Law 9 of 1961). If needed, a corruption case could also be referred to additional general prosecutors. If prosecutors conclude that a case is substantiated, they issue a decision of suspicion, which is sent to the Attorney General (given its general oversight and control role). If either the responsible prosecutor or the Attorney General conclude that the case is not sufficiently substantiated, the case will be closed, archived and might be reopened in the future if new evidence comes up. Otherwise, the case reaches the courts for trial.
3. Alleged case reaches a court. Jordan has a comprehensive and relatively complex court system, which has the potential to effectively ensure public integrity (Box 6.6). Corruption crimes are dealt with by criminal Courts. While there is no special corruption court in Jordan, specialised judicial panels are dedicated to examining corruption cases. According to information provided by Jordan to the OECD, there are currently around 5 judges specialised in dealing with corruption cases. Specialised trainings on corruption and money laundering are offered by the Jordanian Judicial Institute. Cases are distributed among the courts based on the legal foundations and jurisdiction. Afterwards, a corruption case would go to a judge specialised for corruption cases. This distribution of cases among judges of the same specialty is done automatically through an electronic system. However, the Prime Minister could also refer crimes related to economic security to the State Security Court (Art. 6 of the Economic Crimes Law).
The Judiciary in Jordan is a separate and independent branch of the government. According to Article 27 of the Constitution, “the Judicial Power shall be exercised by the courts of law in their varying types and degrees. All judgments shall be given in accordance with the law and pronounced in the name of the King’’. Based on Art. 99 of the Constitution, there are three categories of courts:
Civil Courts: exercise their jurisdiction with respect to civil and penal matters in accordance with the law, and they have jurisdiction over all persons in all matters, civil and penal, including cases brought against the government (Art. 102 and 103 of the Constitution). The civil courts include Magistrate Courts, Courts of First Instance, Courts of Appeal, High Administrative Courts and the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court).
Religious courts: include shari’a (Islamic law) courts and the tribunals of other religious communities. Religious courts deal with matters involving personal status such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody, and blood money. Shari’a courts also have jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the Islamic waqfs (Art. 104-109 of the Constitution).
Special courts: Include courts of a civil nature, and courts of a military nature. Special Courts shall exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the laws (Art. 110 of the Constitution). Special courts include the Income Tax Appeal Court, the State Property Court of the State Security Court with different jurisdictions and competencies based on different legislative acts.
Since a constitutional amendment in 2011, there also exists the Jordanian Constitutional Court responsible for the oversight of the constitutionality of laws and regulations and for interpreting the provisions of the Constitution.
Figure 6.5 provides an overview of the criminal proceeding for corruption bases, from the moment a complaint is filed to the moment it reaches the Courts. Table 6.2 shows some key statistics related to this process between 2019 and 2022. It should be noted that this time period coincides with the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite of that, the data show an increase in recorded investigation, while the number of cases referred to prosecution roughly remains within a range of 200 to 300 cases per year. In percentage, the decrease of referrals to the Public Prosecution could be an indication that JIACC is taking measures other than referral, for example by correcting situations, settlements and recovering funds. From the cases referred to prosecution, a slight increase of cases reaching courts can be observed between 2019 and 2021, which could indicate the quality of the investigations carried out. Also, the ratio of convictions from those cases reaching the courts have been increasing steadily between 2019 and 2022. It was not possible to obtain data for 2023. The next sections provide some avenues to further strengthening the three steps: Preliminary investigation, prosecution and courts.
Source: OECD
Source: Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), Annual Report 2020, 2021 and 2022 and data provided by JIACC
6.3.1. To strengthen the preliminary investigations carried out by JIACC, Jordan should grant administrative and financial autonomy to JIACC and consider transferring all preliminary investigations to prosecution or making public the criteria for the transfer of cases
Adequate investigative resources and skilled staff are necessary to conduct investigations effectively and independently on corruption. The quality of the preliminary investigations carried out by JIACC investigators are key to continue with the prosecution and, later, launch court proceedings. However, skills, capacities and resources for managing complex investigations could be further improved. Technical know-how could be strengthened, for example, the areas of collecting evidence, in the investigation of complex corporate cases or in investigating organised and transnational crimes and establishing methodologies for international co-operation. JIACC is currently providing trainings for investigators through its Innovation and Training Unit. These trainings include procedural aspects based on the Criminal Procedures Law 9 of 1961 as well as trainings on the AC Law, including its corruption offences anchored in Art. 16. AS such, JIACC should continue its efforts to provide continuous training to its investigators, focusing on areas where challenges exist.
However, the availability of adequate skills and resources goes beyond training of investigators already working at JIACC. In addition, JIACC has to be able to attract and select new and skilled investigators. To enable this, as already recommended in Chapter 1, Jordan should strengthen JIACC by increasing its financial and administrative independence.
On an administrative level, staff recruitment is currently based on the Civil Service Bylaw. Given the very specific technical expertise required by investigators, it would be advisable to grant JIACC the right and competencies to hire their own personnel and grant JIACC with full administrative independence. JIACC should be able to directly manage and publish job advertisements. Indeed, this would help to overcome several challenges related to expertise. For example, it was reported that prosecutors sometimes need technical experts, but JIACC is often not able to hire such an expert. Also, hiring procedures through the procedures under the Civil Service Bylaw are typically long and might not enable to find the right profile in the databases of the Service and Public Administration Commission (SPAC), e.g., on money laundering. Sometimes, JIACC uses the help of experts or investigators from other public institutions, who come as secondments (for instance, from the public security department, forensic experts and engineers). However, these are often called back to their own institutions precisely when ending their learning curve at JIACC and, consequently, experience and knowledge are lost.
JIACC’s financial independence should also be strengthened. Currently, JIACC must comply with the general financial system of Jordan, which results in JIACC falling under general budgetary law. Since the general budgetary law does not or only in a limited manner allow for special financing, costs related to special investigations can be difficult to finance. As an example, JIACC reported of a case where several translation services were required but could not be financed; the case could thus not adequately followed up. Such autonomy is key for the enforcement of corruption cases and would clearly renew the country’s commitment to effectively fight corruption.
In turn, to ensure that not even the suspicion of influence could arise in the context of investigating corruption offences, JIACC could discuss the possibility to send all preliminary investigations to the prosecution services and focus on ensuring that they are followed up. This would also further align Jordan’s compliance with the UN Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, requiring in its principle 3 that the “judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law” (UN, 1985[15]). Indeed, as described above, the JIACC Board currently decides on whether preliminary investigations carried out by JIACC investigators are referred to the prosecution department. Until now, according to the interviews, there seems to never have been an issue with respect to a potential interference and the JIACC Board structure helps to mitigate that risk. However, to avoid any doubt and further strengthen confidence in the judiciary, Jordan should seek to revise current legal texts to include a default procedure that requires the forwarding of all preliminary investigations to prosecutors; and the establishment of a joint, co-ordinated investigation by the police, JIACC and criminal prosecutors, where the public prosecutor's office has the lead and decides on the continuation and or discontinuation of the investigation.
6.3.2. To strengthen the prosecution of corruption cases, Jordan could further strengthen national and international co-ordination and co-operation
The co-ordination and co-operation between investigating entities are a key to success. Poor co-ordination, co-operation and information sharing among enforcement actors undermine the ability to enforce the public integrity system, with the consequence of making deterrent measures ineffective and affecting the trust in the system (OECD, 2020[6]). In turn, oversight and co-operation among investigating entities at a national level help ensure uniform application of the integrity system and addressing common challenges (OECD, 2020[6]). In criminal proceedings, co-ordination is often managed by the corresponding prosecutor’s office or an attorney general. In addition, electronic case management systems help to further co-ordinate and co-operate among investigation actors and to avoid overlaps and double investigations. Electronic databases are not only useful to ensure consistency and a uniform application of the laws; they also provide helpful information for statistical or preventive purposes, and they also contribute to transparency (OECD, 2020[6]).
In Jordan, the Attorney General has oversight over the prosecution services and co-ordinates the work of the prosecution to ensure consistency. Jordan also has established an electronic case management system called “Mizan Computerised Case Management System”, which allows cases to be registered and managed electronically. According to the Judicial Council, this system includes all stages of case registration, consideration, issuance of various decisions and reflects the various procedures. It is a system linked electronically to the system of the Public Security Directorate and partner agencies can view the system’s data. It enables tracking cases referred to the public prosecutor or the court and extract accurate statistics. JIACC has a portal on the Mizan system allowing to follow-up on cases referred and relating them to other relevant cases.
However, it appears that co-ordination among preliminary investigation actors could be further improved. According to some interviews, the channels for co-ordination are not always entirely clear. Jordan could therefore establish regular channels for co-ordination and promoting co-operation between investigative entities. Such channels could build on existing memorandum of understanding, such as the one between JIACC and the General Security Department, and on successful exchanges of intelligence information with counterpart units such the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Unit to build the foundation for investigative files. As recommended in Chapter 1, this could be achieved by institutionalising a working group between investigating entities. The working group could discuss specific cases and develop standards and procedures for the exchange of information, for example. Also, there are reportedly challenges with the current electronic system. These include aligning the system with existing legal frameworks and regulations, infrastructure and connectivity, training and capacity building for judges and other users as well as overcoming resistance to change. To make full use of the potential of the system, Jordan should continue to invest in technical as well as human resources related to making use of the system. This requires joint collaborative efforts between government stakeholders and judicial actors, extending and further developing trainings for users, providing exchange and intelligence support for complex investigations and, if necessary, regularly updating the system.
Corruption sometimes transcends borders, constituting a transnational crime. Therefore, international co-ordination mechanisms and exchanges are equally important and are recognised by international instruments requiring countries to act proactively (whenever an authority detects a possible corruption offence) as well as upon request of investigating or prosecuting foreign entities (Council of Europe, 1999[16]). Establishing co-operation among foreign authorities and countries also helps promoting dialogue, mutual understanding and commitment (Collecting data also can provide insights on risk areas and allow to assess the effectiveness of the system (OECD, 2020[6]). Good practices involve transnational inter-agency agreements (such as Memoranda of Understanding), the establishment of networks and/or channels for continuing exchange or also regular meetings of investigative bodies and guidelines / manuals for those bodies Collecting data also can provide insights on risk areas and allow to assess the effectiveness of the system (OECD, 2020[6]).
In Jordan, according to the Judicial Council, the International Cooperation Office of the Public Prosecutor’s Department dealt with 74 requests for judicial assistance in 2023, all of which were implemented in the same year in which they were received and with a maximum working period not exceeding three months. The requests varied in terms of their scope and topic and concerned areas such as, for example, requests for evidence, examination of objects and locations, implementation of seizure, confiscation or search operations. These are very positive developments. However, there reportedly are also challenges related to international co-operation on corruption cases: currently there have not been any notification of Jordanian authorities to the UN on whether the UNCAC is accepted as legal basis for extradition, for instance. Furthermore, Jordan could extend its mutual legal assistance under certain well-established criteria even if the dual criminality requirement is not met.
6.3.3. To strengthen the judiciary, the Judicial Council should continue building competencies of the judges and continue attracting youth to work for the judiciary
The fair and timely enforcement of public integrity regulations requires skilled judges and judicial staff as well as adequate investigative resources. This includes specialised trainings, for example, on complex corporate cases or organised crime involving money laundering or transnational elements. This includes technical expertise on issues such as administrative law, IT, economics, accounting or similar (OECD, 2020[6]).
In Jordan, Judges are appointed by committees consisting of no less than five judges appointed by the Judicial Council. This decision is based on a recommendation of the chair of the Judicial Council (appointed by the King) and must be accompanied by Royal Decree. Also, more than one person must be nominated for the vacant position (Art. 13 Judicial Independence Law, as amended Number 29 of 2014). Only candidates with competence, good moral character and fitness for the judicial position can be appointed (Art. 10). The Judicial Council is also responsible for examining the performance, promotion, discipline, transfer and assignment of judges, evaluating the work of judges, developing technical, behavioural, ethical and professional competences and other administrative and disciplinary tasks that aim at making the judiciary more effective. In turn, the Ministry of Justice determines salaries and promotions based on merit and competences, as evaluated by the Judicial Council and the reports of the inspectors, also considering any disciplinary measures that may have been imposed (Art. 18 Judicial Independence Law). Judges, including prosecutors, are governed by the Code of Conduct for the Judiciary (CoC-J).
Over the past years, there have been substantive improvements in building the competencies and capacities of judges and prosecution services on corruption issues in Jordan. This includes specialised trainings in corruption and on “new” crimes delivered by the Jordanian Judicial Institute. From 2021-2023, for instance, a total of 48 such specialised trainings were held in addition to 82 specialised training programmes in criminal procedures, fair trial guarantees or investigative skills. However, technical knowledge in important areas such as, for example, litigation procedures and complex investigations on corruption, organised crime or money laundering could still be improved. In fact, while Jordan’s performance with respect to timeliness of criminal proceedings overall is comparatively good (Figure 6.4 above), interviews conducted by the OECD mentioned some delays in processing corruption cases specifically, due to case complexities, caseload, the conduct of the accused, frequent legal reforms and procedures complicating firmly anchored processes or also inefficiencies in conducting investigations.
Therefore, Jordan should continue the efforts invested in building special capacities for judges needed to deal with corruption cases. Jordan should therefore continue to increase its efforts to offer specialised trainings on corruption, money laundering and litigation of, for instance, complex corporate corruption cases. Jordan could also reflect on making such regular trainings mandatory for judges specialised in corruption cases and should also include trainings for the administrative personnel supporting the judges. Indeed, qualified civil administrative staff supporting the work of judges and prosecutors is key. In addition to training, it is important that the country continues to invest in technical and infrastructure facilities allowing the judiciary to fulfil their tasks more efficiently and effectively.
Furthermore, in Jordan young people are typically underrepresented in state institutions, including the judiciary (OECD, 2021[17]) and (OECD[8]) Public Governance Review of Jordan). At the same time, there is enormous potential in increasingly motivating and bringing young people to work for the judiciary. They can bring innovation and fresh perspectives, technological proficiency, connectivity with the youth, allow for early construction of future leaders or more diversity. Jordan could therefore consider to strategically promoting and providing incentives for younger generations to take up the role of a judge building on effort such as the “Future Judges Programme” implemented by the judiciary. Jordan could, for instance, integrate in its National Youth Strategy 2019-25 explicit measures that aim at promoting youth interest and opportunities to engage in the judiciary, such as inclusion of teaching modules in schools on the role and functioning of the judiciary, addressing structural barriers (for example financial through the provision of financial support to go to university) or eventually also quota for underrepresented (young) people. Bringing younger generations and currently underrepresented other groups to the judiciary would not only contribute to more trust in those parts of the society but also increase the human capacities within the judiciary.
Strengthening whistleblowing in Jordan
JIACC, together with other responsible entities, could lead an in-depth review of existing channels to clarify which reporting channel addresses which issue, establish clear procedures for transferring cases if required.
Based on this review, JIACC could publish a short guide in plain language to provide an overview of the different channels and their purposes.
JIACC and SPAC should aim at ensuring that all public institutions provide an internal channel for employees as foreseen in Art 11.G of the Civil Service Bylaw and that general directors, direct supervisors and relevant units are trained accordingly. The National Integrity Indicators (NII) promoted by JIACC have the potential to provide further incentives to implement such internal channels.
Jordan could continue working on fine-tuning and increasing the visibility of the Bekhedmetkom platform and JIACC could promote the platform as the first option for external stakeholders who wish to report cases of suspected corruption.
Jordan's strong framework for whistleblower protection, could be further improved by considering some changes in the legal framework to improve clarity, integrating an explicit good faith clause and putting the burden of proof on those being suspected to retaliate against whistleblowers. Jordan should also consider establishing the possibility to report anonymously.
Jordan should revise Regulation 62 (Art 3.b.2 and 3.b.4) to avoid any scope for misinterpretation between informer and informants, clarifying that only informants (those who report to JIACC) can be granted protection by concealing their identities, while informers cannot. JIACC should also elaborate clear guidance materials on its website on which protection can be granted in which situation.
JIACC, Audit Bureau and SPAC could raise awareness about available reporting channels and protection measures, promote the use of internal channels as a first option and address cultural barriers to whistleblowing.
Strengthening the criminal enforcement of corruption cases
To strengthen the preliminary investigations carried out by JIACC, Jordan should grant administrative and financial autonomy to JIACC.
Jordan should consider revising current legal texts to include a default procedure that requires the forwarding of all preliminary investigations to prosecutors and the establishment of a joint, co-ordinated investigation procedure by the police, JIACC and prosecutors, where the public prosecutor's office has the lead and decides on the continuation and or discontinuation of the investigation.
To strengthen the prosecution of corruption cases, Jordan could further strengthen national and international co-ordination and co-operation.
To strengthen the judiciary, the Judicial Council should continue building competencies of the judges and consider attracting youth to work for the judiciary.
References
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