This chapter provides recommendations for achieving a coherent and consistent integrity system in Jordan. First, it reviews the current legal and institutional arrangements on public integrity. Second, it analyses the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, as the lead entity responsible for anti-corruption and integrity in Jordan, and how the horizontal co-ordination and co-operation between the main public integrity actors could be strengthened to support coherence and to share and build on lessons learned from good practices. Finally, it looks at how integrity could be better integrated into the wider public management and governance framework to enable public-sector organisations, including the local level, to take responsibility for effectively managing integrity.
OECD Integrity Review of Jordan
Abstract
Corruption and the lack of integrity are affecting countries worldwide with corrosive effects. Corruption undermines democracy and trust in governments, widens economic and social inequalities, perpetuates inequality and poverty and reduces the quality of public services (OECD, 2017[1]). Corruption can serve as a breeding ground for organised crime and terrorism and weaken a state’s capacity to protect its citizens. Tackling corruption as well as promoting trust and integrity, therefore should be a priority for countries.
Corruption is a challenge to all countries and Jordan is not an exception. According to Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2023 (0 = high perceived level of corruption, to 100 = low perceived level of corruption), Jordan’s CPI score (46) is significantly higher than the average of 17 countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) included in the CPI (38),meaning that the corruption level perceived in Jordan is lower (Figure 1.1). In 2023, only three countries in MENA scored significantly better and seven countries scored significantly worse. The confidence interval of Jordan (41-51) overlaps with those of Saudi Arabia (43-61), Qatar (50-66), Kuwait (43-49), Oman (34-52), Bahrain (33-51), Tunisia (37-43), Morocco (35-41) and Egypt (29-41), making a comparison between these countries statistically difficult. In turn, Jordan’s CPI score (46) is significantly lower than the average of the OECD (66), the EU (64) or the G-20 (53), meaning that the perceived levels of corruption in Jordan are higher. Finally, the time series and the significance analysis carried out by Transparency International indicate that, between 2012 and 2023, Jordan’s CPI score did not change significantly.
Note: MENA average calculated with the scores from Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
Source: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2023, (Transparency International, 2023[2]).
These results from the CPI are mirrored in other international measurements. The World Bank Governance Indicators (WBI), for instance, report that Jordan’s performance with respect to the indicator “control of corruption” has only slightly improved (0 indicates the lowest and 100 the highest rank): from 1996 (55,38) to 2022 (58,02). However, while the best performing year was 2003 with a score of 67,72, the indicator is declined between 2015 and 2022. In turn, the Basel Institute on Governance Anti-Money-Laundering Index (AMLI) shows that Jordan slightly improved in recent years from 5.60 in 2021, to 5.07 in 2022 and 4.90 in 2023. The AMLI measures a country’s susceptibility to money laundering and terrorist financing (10 indicates the highest, while 0 the lowest susceptibility).
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer measures, amongst others, the experience with corruption of citizens who had contact with public services (Figure 1.2). With only 4% of Jordanians reporting in 2019 that they had to pay a bribe in such a situation, the country has the lowest bribery rate in the region (average 22%) and is even lower than the average of the European Union in 2021 (7%). However, when asking citizens in Jordan about their perception, the same Global Corruption Barometer 2019 evidenced that 86% of Jordanians perceive corruption to be a big problem in the country, while only 13% responded that corruption is not a problem or a small problem. Citizens only can experience corruption in direct contact with public officials, e.g., with police forces or public officials delivering public services. In turn, their perception of corruption can be influenced by many ways and is a complex phenomenon. Research has shown that personal characteristics such as “being a woman, being divorced, being unemployed, working at the private sector or being self-employed”, but also macro-variables such as “macroeconomic instability and income-inequality” are all positively correlated with the perception of corruption (Melgar, Rossi and Smith, 2010[3]). The authors of the study emphasise the relevance of corruption even if it is “only” perceived:
“Corruption and corruption perception can be considered as cultural phenomena because they depend on how a society understands the rules and what constitutes a deviation. (…) High levels of corruption perception could have more devastating effects than corruption itself; it generates a “culture of distrust” towards some institutions and may create a cultural tradition of gift giving and hence, raising corruption.” (Melgar, Rossi and Smith, 2010[3])
Note: The original question: “In the past 12 months have you had contact with any of the following services? How often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour in order to get the assistance or services you needed?”
MENA average calculated with the data from Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Sudan and Tunisia.
Source: For MENA: Global Corruption Barometer 2019, Transparency International, for European Union: Global Corruption Barometer 2021, Transparency International.
Jordan has recognised this challenge and has been taking measures to address corruption. Efforts to prevent and fight corruption have been ongoing for over 30 years and can be traced back at least to the mid-1990s (Al-Zu’bi, Al-Tal and Rubaiha, 2023[4]). Consequently, the country has established a remarkable and comprehensive national framework to tackle corruption and promote integrity. Jordan was the first Arab country that ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2005 and went through the UNCAC review mechanism in 2012. The country joined the Open Government Partnership Initiative in 2011, ratified the statute of the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) in Austria in 2011 as well as the Arab Convention against Corruption in 2012 (entry into force in 2013). Further milestones were, for example, the creation of the Jordan Anticorruption Commission in 2006, which later became the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct in the Civil Service in 2013 (see Chapter 3) or the adoption of the Whistleblower Protection Law in 2014 (see Chapter 6). Jordan had established a first anti-corruption strategy in 2008, followed by the National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategy (NIACS) 2017-2025, which was updated in 2020. These and other efforts seem to be reflected in the perception of citizens as well. In the Global Corruption Barometer 2019, 55% of citizens in Jordan seemed to have acknowledged that the government has been handling the problem rather well, which is significantly higher than the average of 28% of the six MENA countries included in this survey (Figure 1.3).
Note: Regional average calculated with the data from Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Sudan and Tunisia.
Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2019, Transparency International.
Jordan’s reform efforts to control corruption have been ongoing for over 30 years. Most recently, His Majesty King Abdullah ll and the government recognised corruption as an obstacle to modernise the public sector, promote economic progress and attract foreign investments. These ongoing economic and political reforms provide an opportunity to reinforce the efforts and to gradually shift from traditional anti-corruption policies to a more modern approach promoting a culture of integrity. To achieve this effectively, countries need to establish a proactive “culture of integrity”, which requires both adequate mechanisms to detect, investigate and sanction corruption and proactive and thorough preventive actions that address systemic and institutional weaknesses facilitating corruption and other unethical practices (OECD, 2017[1]). This, in turn requires coherent and co-ordinated public integrity systems as well as adapted institutional and legal frameworks.
The 2017 OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (“2017 OECD Recommendation”) provides policy makers with a vision and practical framework for such a coherent and comprehensive public integrity system. Public integrity is defined there as “the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector” (OECD, 2017[1]). As such, it looks at the legal, institutional and cultural frameworks that support integrity. By shifting the focus from fragmented and ad hoc integrity policies to a context dependent, behavioural and risk-based approach, emphasis is put on building a culture of integrity across government and the whole of society (Figure 1.4).
Source: (OECD, 2017[1])
This chapter follows the principles of “Commitment” and “Responsibilities” of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[1]) in view of providing concrete and realistic recommendations for improvement, building on what has been achieved in Jordan over the past years. The chapter is structured as follows:
The first section reviews briefly the current legal and institutional arrangements on public integrity, looking into the relevant legislation, responsibilities and appropriate mandate and capacities.
The second section analyses JIACC, as the lead entity responsible for anti-corruption and integrity in Jordan, and the horizontal co-ordination and co-operation between the main public integrity actors to support coherence and to share and build on lessons learned from good practices.
The third section looks how integrity is integrated into the wider public management and governance framework to enable public-sector organisations to take responsibility for effectively managing the integrity of their activities as well as that of the public officials who carry them out.
The remaining chapters of this Integrity Review analyse in further detail other specific areas of the 2017 OECD Recommendation: The evidence-based and strategic approach to public integrity (Chapter 2), the promotion of a culture of integrity throughout the public administration (Chapter 3) and in society as a whole (Chapter 4), the integrity risk management and audit framework (Chapter 5) as well as whistleblowing and the enforcement of integrity laws and regulation (Chapter 6).
1.2.1. Jordan has adopted a comprehensive regulatory framework on anti-corruption and integrity that could benefit from further simplification and harmonisation
A practical translation of commitment into practice requires, among other things, clear, harmonised and up to date legislation and standards on a criminal, civil and administrative level (see also Chapter 3 and 6). This is important to ensure legal certainty for public officials and the general public and to know which behaviour is allowed and which prohibited. Clear standards also provide a common framework to ensure accountability (OECD, 2020[5]). In turn, an overly complex regulatory framework, lack of transparency in the preparation of regulations and ineffective or inappropriate application of laws are factors that could even favour corruption and dishonest behaviour.
On a regulatory level, Jordan has adopted and updated several laws and regulations that have been added to already existing relevant legislation. The Jordan’s Constitution of 1952, as amended, establishes a balance between the legislative and executive branch of the government. The Constitutional Court, established in 2011/12, is responsible for the oversight of the constitutionality of laws and regulations and for interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. Key integrity and anti-corruption legislation and regulations include, for example, the Jordan’s Penal Code 1960, as amended, the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law and its amendments, outlining amongst others the responsibilities of the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), the Civil Service Bylaw and the Public Human Resources Management Bylaw from 2024, the Audit Bureau Law and its amendments, the Internal Control Bylaw, the Government Procurement Bylaw (in particular Appendix 3), the Financial Disclosure Law, the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Law of 2007 and its amendments, the Illicit Enrichment Law of 2014 and its amendments, the Jordanian Economic Crimes Law of 1993, the Competition Law of 2004 or the Jordan Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct in Public Services (CoC), which includes integrity provisions to be followed by public servants.
Although Jordan has adopted this comprehensive set of laws and standards, the legal framework could be further strengthened. Such reforms would be in line with project number 4 of the NIACS 2020-2025, which aims at identifying loopholes in the applicable national legislation and working to harmonise them with international agreements, as well as the related projects number 2, 5,11 and 17 (JIACC, 2019[6]).
First, Jordan could further increase the clarity of anti-corruption and integrity regulations. Indeed, the relevant provisions are currently distributed in different acts of legislation. The Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law, for instance, refers to the Penal Code, Economic Crimes Law (Article 16.1 and 16.2) or the Illicit Enrichment Law to define what falls under its jurisdiction and qualifies as corruption. While dispersed laws are not per se a bad practice and quite common practice given the incremental reality of laws being created or amended over time, it makes it more difficult for non-experts to know and understand the relevant rules. JIACC noted in its annual report 2021 that a lack of knowledge may be the reason why they continue to receive complaints that fall outside of its jurisdiction and that more awareness raising is necessary (JIACC, 2021[7]). Furthermore, Laws are frequently amended in Jordan. While this also reflects the country’s will to reform, it increases legal complexity and could create confusion, especially amongst non-legally trained public officials and citizens. In fact, several stakeholders mentioned during interviews conducted by the OECD that frequent amendments and laws sometimes perceived as vague are a challenge for their practical application and could create legal uncertainty. Therefore, Jordan could discuss the possibility to codify into one single law all offences and relevant aspects, for instance following principles of the 2012 OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance (Box 1.1). As a minimum, since such a profound legal reform of relevant legislation could be difficult to achieve, JIACC could, together with the judiciary, elaborate guidance material in plain language to provide an overview of the current laws and explain the interpretation of some of the key provisions in further detail.
The OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance is the first international instrument to address regulatory policy, management and governance as a whole-of-government activity that can and should be addressed by sectoral ministries, regulatory and competition agencies.
In 12 Principles, it sets out the measures that governments can and should take to support the implementation and advancement of systemic regulatory reform to deliver regulations that meet public policy objectives having a positive impact on the economy and society. The measures are integrated in a comprehensive policy cycle in which regulations are designed, assessed and evaluated ex ante and ex post, revised and enforced at all levels of government, and supported by appropriate institutions.
Source: (OECD, 2012[8])
Finally, a revision of the current anti-corruption legislation could involve conducting a comprehensive gap analysis to identify corrupt practices that are currently not explicitly or adequately codified. For example, bribery in the private sector (Art. 21 UNCAC) is currently not explicitly codified as a standalone offense, while trading in influence (Art. 18 UNCAC) and the obstruction of justice (Art. 25 UNCAC) are codified only to a certain extend. For instance, while undue interference of witnesses and others in a position to provide authorities with relevant evidence is addressed in the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law, the Law does not explicitly address the second part of Art. 25 UNCAC which obliges member states to criminalise the use of physical force, threats or intimidation to unduly interfere with actions of judicial or law enforcement officials (Rasheed and USAID, 2019[9]). Finally, the concept “wasta” is arguably criminalised in Article 16 of the Anti-Corruption and Integrity Law and in Article 176 of the Penal Code, but nepotism and favouritism are concepts that are not further defined leaving room for interpretation and potential misunderstandings. Together with the difficulty to prove such an offense, another reason for this could be the ambiguity and vagueness of the law which fails to provide a clear definition of “wasta” (Merhej, 2022[10]). A clear definition of “wasta” and its relation to concepts such as nepotism and favouritism as well as including “wasta” into guidance on managing conflict of interest more broadly could therefore help to provide more clarity.
1.2.2. Jordan’s main integrity actors cover the key elements of a national integrity system
Complementing a clear legal framework, the promotion of public integrity also requires a clear institutional arrangement. A public integrity system typically involves many different official actors in the public sector that cover the various functions of an integrity system (Table 1.1). While civil society and private sector also play a role in an integrity system, these official integrity actors include the “core” integrity actors, such as the institutions, units or individuals responsible for implementing, promoting and enforcing integrity policies, but also “complementary” integrity actors with key support functions such as public finance, external audit, human resource management or public procurement.
The assignment of responsibilities for these integrity functions depends on the institutional and jurisdictional setup of a country and can vary significantly. In Jordan, the main integrity actors are:
The core responsibility for integrity and anti-corruption policies is assigned to the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), established in 2006 and merged with the Ombudsman Bureau in 2016. Its mandate and responsibilities will be analysed in more details below.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Council of Ministers play key roles for co-ordinating the implementation of Jordan’s broader reform agenda, including the modernisation roadmap and the integrity-related objectives (see also Chapter 2 of this Integrity Review).
The Service and Public Administration Commission (SPAC), that replaced the Civil Service Bureau as of January 2024, and the Institute for Public Administration (IPA) are key complementary integrity actors that promote a culture of integrity in the public administration through their mandates and within their spheres of influence. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice’s Financial Disclosure Department currently has a role in receiving asset declaration. Their roles are analysed in more detail in Chapter 3 of this Integrity Review.
The Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA) has a jurisdiction of municipal and governorate councils. Amongst others, MOLA has the role of inspection over the municipalities, governorate councils, committees and joint services councils and to ensure accountability of heads and members of municipal and municipal councils.
The co-responsibility of the whole of society, including the private sector, civil society organisations and the citizens but also actors of international cooperation, in upholding and promoting a culture of integrity in the country is analysed in Chapter 4.
The Audit Bureau (AB), as the Supreme Audit Institution of Jordan, and the Ministry of Finance, responsible for steering internal control and audit, are the main actors of the public control and audit framework in Jordan, which is analysed in Chapter 5.
Public prosecutors, the judiciary, including the Judicial Council and the Constitutional Court, are key integrity actors to ensure the investigation and sanctioning of integrity violations. They are analysed in Chapter 6.
Other relevant institutions, which are not further analysed in detail in this Integrity Review, are the Procurement Policy Committee, the Independent Election Committee (IEC), the Jordan Customs Department (e.g., related to customs smuggling) or the Income and Sales Tax Department (e.g., related to tax evasion). The Anti-Money Laundering Unit (FIU) within the Jordan Central Bank (CJB) and the Financial Disclosure Department (FDD) within the Ministry of Justice play an important role in relation to money laundering.
1.3.1. Jordan should strengthen JIACC by increasing its financial and administrative independence and by reinforcing its preventive mandate in the Law, while ensuring that public entities can get advice on integrity-related issues
A core question with respect to responsibilities relates to the dual functions of anti-corruption efforts: preventive and enforcement. The UNCAC requires member countries to address both and to establish “preventive anti-corruption bodies” (Art. 6) and “authorities” whose task is to combat corruption via law enforcement (Art. 36). Neither the UNCAC nor its interpretative documents recommend or require the existence of a single body responsible for both areas. While some countries have established one single authority responsible for both, most OECD countries have separated the two areas (OECD, 2013[11]; Recanatini, 2011[12]; Doig and Recanatini, 2020[13]; Hussmann, Hechler and Peñailillo, 2009[14]). Even across preventative institutions, mandates differ to a meaningful extent within OECD countries and, in many cases, responsibilities are shared between various institutions (OECD, 2017[15]).
The Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC) is mandated with prevention and has a role in enforcement. On the one hand, JIACC’s task is to ensure that the public administration acts fairly and impartially (Art. 4.b Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law), activates and applies the set of values and rules of conduct in the public administration (Art. 4.a) or to raise awareness of citizens on the negative impact of corruption (Art. 8). It also has the primary responsibility for implementing and co-ordinating the implementation of the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIACS) 2020-2025. On the other hand, JIACC is responsible for receiving complaints on corruption incidents as defined in Art. 16 of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law (Art 4.g), carrying out preliminary investigations (Art. 4.i), ensuring international co-operation and legal assistance (Art. 4.h) and providing whistleblower protection. Chapter 6 of this Integrity Review analyses in more detail this enforcement role of JIACC.
In recent years, JIACC, mainly through the Integrity and Prevention Directorate, has increased its efforts on prevention. Most importantly, the corruption risk assessment methodology (see Chapter 5) and the National Integrity Indicators (see Chapter 2) are significant steps towards strengthening the prevention of corruption. The Integrity and Prevention Directorate also has conducted several lectures and trainings for public administrations, developed training materials for the IPA on integrity and combating corruption for public officials (leadership and lower ranking levels), conducted awareness raising activities in schools (sometimes jointly with religious bodies) and universities (such as a master programme in integrity and anti-corruption with the University of Jordan), or analysed legislation in the health sector with respect to integrity issues (JIACC, 2021). In turn, JIACC’s legal division analyses legislation to identify corruption loopholes and proposes amendments to laws, regulations and instructions regulating the work of the Commission (JIACC 2022). JIACC also published studies, for instance on the extent and impact of wasta in Jordan (Queen Rania Center for Jordanian Studies Community Service, 2020[16]) and has developed tools to recover funds.
Building on these achievements and to further increase JIACC’s preventive profile, Jordan could consider revising the existing legislation in view of providing JIACC with a clearer prevention mandate. Some tasks already carried out by JIACC such as the elaboration of studies, the consultative role in drafting legislation relevant for integrity, or co-ordinating the implementation of the NIACS are currently not clearly anchored in the law and an authoritative mandate would be useful.
Furthermore, it is important to continue strengthening JIACC’s independence and capacities. Given its role in both prevention and enforcement, independence is key and adequate resourcing and well-trained staff are necessary for achieving results. Independence includes also being able to recruit the required professionals. The way in which the JIACC attracts, retains and motivates staff is ultimately a key determinant of its ability to continue acting independently and taking decisions that are objective and evidence-based. Strengthening a “culture of professionalism”, with professional staff being proud of belonging to JIACC, accompanied by “soft” incentives can compensate for remuneration gaps with the industry (OECD, 2016[17]).
However, while JIACC formally is an independent institution (Art 5 Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law), this independence seems to be de facto constrained from a financial and administrative perspective. For example, in terms of human resources, JIACC notes challenges related to hiring staff in more specialised fields such as engineering and finance. JIACC often must rely on personnel on secondments from other departments to fill key roles. These, however, require to be trained and are facing a learning curve. Reportedly, they often must go back to their entities precisely when they start getting acquainted to the work in JIACC. A further challenge mentioned during interviews is that JIACC falls under the Civil Service Bylaw. As such, in the past employees were chosen by the CSB (now the SPAC), which reportedly represented a challenge for JIACC in selecting adequate staff as they do not have the discretion to independently appoint their personnel. This, however, may improve with the SPAC and new regulations.
Jordan could therefore renew and reaffirm its strong political commitment to fighting corruption at the highest level by reviewing the law in view of granting JIACC stronger financial and administrative independence. This includes providing the necessary flexibility needed to appoint employees and determine their contracts and compensation, allowing JIACC to select its employees and revise the current selection and recruitment processes to ensure technical know-how and capacities. The current reforms in the context of the SPAC, could provide an opportunity to grant JIACC autonomy in hiring outside of the SPAC data base, while following SPAC procedures related, for example, to the advertisement, the exams, the interviews etc. A similar arrangement to the Audit Bureau could be envisaged. This autonomy should go along with measures aimed at strengthening a “culture of independence” within JIACC and promoting the pride and intrinsic motivation of its staff to belonging to the institution. This, amongst others, also requires increased capacity building measures and continued training and coaching, including, for example, in areas key for prevention such as the design of integrity strategies, corruption risk management or on data management and statistics.
Finally, experience has shown that combining prevention and enforcement roles is coming along with some challenges. On the one hand, the investigative mandate often dominates, providing the agencies with a certain power, which is more respected by other public institutions than the preventive mandate. On the other hand, a key preventive function is to provide not only generic guidance to public entities through trainings or awareness raising, but only concrete and specific advice and support to help entities strengthen their own organisational integrity policies and practices. This, however, may be tricky as this same public entity might be investigated by JIACC later and could try to argue that they just did exactly what JIACC recommended. During a workshop discussing a first draft of this Integrity Review, JIACC was very clear that they cannot and should not provide advice to public entities on integrity matters. The question is then, who in Jordan could provide such advice.
JIACC, together with other key integrity actors, could consider initiating an open dialogue on how to find a constructive way to overcome this challenge. Several alternative solutions could be envisaged and discussed.
First, JIACC could introduce a strict internal separation between prevention and enforcement areas and increase internal and external communication about this separation. While information from the enforcement area is beneficial for prevention and has, according to JIACC, already informed preventive actions in the past, such internal communication could be maintained but focusing on general dimensions, never mentioning specific cases. Also, security screening of staff and secrecy requirements could be significantly higher for staff in the enforcement area, while such restrictions would not be required for staff working on prevention.
Second, JIACC could reflect on whether the preliminary investigative powers could be passed entirely to the specialised prosecution services on corruption. JIACC could still receive complaints, for example, but would pass them directly to the relevant authority. This would not only allow JIACC to completely embrace its preventive mandate, but also prevent from any discussions regarding a potential undue influence in JIACC investigations, despite its independence pursuant to Art. 5.a of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law. Even a perceived undue influence or deliberately disseminated false rumours claiming such an influence could undermine JIACC’s legitimacy and the trust of citizens in this institution.
Third, JIACC could continue under the current setting, while passing the mandate to provide advice and guidance to public sector entities to another body. Just as JIACC, the Audit Bureau also needs to stay at arms-length with the public entities it is auditing. However, the mandate to provide advice and support in strengthening organisational culture of integrity could be given to Ministry of Finance, in the context of its function related to steering internal control systems, or to the SPAC, given its mandate related to public compliance and developing institutional cultures in the context of the Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap 2022.
1.3.2. Establish a permanent and sufficiently resourced and assertive co-ordination mechanism to ensure synergies and avoid overlaps between the main integrity actors
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity invites countries to promote mechanisms for horizontal and vertical co-operation between the different relevant public integrity actors, including, where possible, with and between subnational levels of government. The idea is that all core or non-core integrity actors work towards a common and shared objective to ensure impact of the integrity policies (OECD, 2020[5]; OECD, 2009[18]). Such co-ordinating mechanisms can have different formats, such as councils, commissions, committees or networks. They can be formal, i.e., through set structures and procedures created for the explicit purpose of co-operation, or more informal, i.e., voluntary through integrity networks, ad hoc working groups or similar. A key advantage of gathering the relevant actors and promoting a co-ordinated approach is that integrity policies can take advantage of the various kinds of expertise around the table and ensure broad implementation across the public sector by promoting ownership and commitment (OECD, 2019[19]). Such mechanisms are often established to jointly steer the development and monitor the implementation of a national anti-corruption strategy (see Chapter 2).
In Jordan, co-operation between JIACC and other relevant integrity actors is currently based on bilateral memoranda of understanding (MoUs). JIACC has such bilateral agreements with the Audit Bureau, the IPA, the University of Jordan or the Public Security Directorate/Preventive Security to grant physical protection for whistleblowers, for example. While such bilateral agreements provide JIACC an effective basis to address key issues of concern and help to implement its mandate, they are not suitable to allow for broader, multi-actor co-ordination and discussions on advancing key integrity reforms. Beyond the bilateral MoUs, there is no regular formal or informal co-ordination and co-operation mechanism on public integrity. In fact, the UNCAC peer review in 2012 already recommended to improve co-ordination among key actors (UN, 2012[20]).
At the same time, there is scope for increased synergies and co-ordination in several areas. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5 in more detail, there are multiple actors receiving integrity complaints. While each channel has its purpose and corresponds to the mandate of the respective entity, this may not always be clear to citizens and public officials. A space for co-ordination could facilitate the exchange of information or allow to jointly identify scope for improving the overall system of reporting channels. Another area which would benefit from such a co-ordination space, is related to promoting the implementation of the NACS 2020-2025 and future strategies. According to JIACC, the implementation currently often depends on the goodwill of other responsible entities. Indeed, implementation of such a multi-stakeholder strategy cannot be enforced, it must be promoted by creating and sustaining ownership of the different entities responsible for the implementation of the projects (see also Chapter 2). Finally, all participants could benefit from the specialised knowledge of the participating entities, which could share insights and lessons learnt, allowing for joint learning, while respecting the different mandates and functions.
Therefore, to benefit from such synergies and co-ordination, Jordan could consider creating a formal mechanism that meets regularly (at least every three or four months) and that is complementary to the current arrangements that rely on bilateral agreements between JIACC and other entities. As a pilot for a more permanent and formal co-ordination mechanism, Jordan could implement a working group to steer the development and implementation of the next NIACS in 2024 (see Chapter 2). Building on this experience, the mandate and working procedures of the co-ordination mechanism could be reviewed and formalised. The mandate could include, for example, the regular update of the strategies, steering and monitoring the implementation of the NIACS, regular exchanges on integrity challenges in the country including a clear mandate to make proposals for integrity reforms to address existing challenges.
As the main responsible for anti-corruption and integrity, JIACC should co-ordinate, steer and manage such a mechanism. This may require clarifying JIACC’s mandate as well as granting sufficient resources for JIACC to be capable of taking up this role. The SPAC could be considered as a co-chair to strengthen the connection to the executive and considering their key mandate related to integrity in human resource management and the development of institutional cultures. The mechanism could also involve the Prime Minister’s Project Management Implementation Office (PMIO) to ensure the link to the Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap 2022 and to increase the political leverage of the mechanism. A legislative framework would need to provide power and authorities to the mechanism. Finally, regular meetings with the Council of Ministers could be envisaged to promote the implementation of integrity policies across ministries.
With JIACC and the SPAC, actors that should participate in such a mechanism are the Audit Bureau, the IPA, the relevant units of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice, as well as the Ministry of Local Administration, to include the local dimension. Furthermore, the Procurement Policy Committee, the King Abdullah II Centre for Excellence, selected national and local integrity officers (see section below) could be regularly involved if relevant for the sessions. Selected CSOs, academics, journalists, tribal representatives and religious leaders also could be sometimes invited to share their “external” views and contribute to specific discussions.
In addition, a more informal or ad-hoc co-operation mechanism could be established between investigation actors for the primary purpose of exchanging information, avoiding overlaps while at the same time keeping confidentiality when necessary. JIACC should lead this platform for exchange on investigation, where selected prosecutors and judges as well as complaints receiving entities within other public bodies such as AB, ministries, customs department could participate. Those meetings could address implementation and enforcement challenges and eventually also discuss legal loopholes that need to be addressed or how mutual legal assistance and international co-operation could be improved. In terms of frequency, such meetings could take place biannually.
Several countries have established similar co-ordination mechanisms. For example, Korea has an anti-corruption policy co-ordination body composed of representatives from ten government agencies (ministries and supervisory bodies) to ensure communication among their institutions (OECD, 2020[5]). Colombia, Peru and Portugal have established national commissions/mechanisms that bring together relevant integrity actors (Box 1.2).
Colombia’s National Moralisation Commission (CNM)
The National Moralisation Commission (CNM) in Colombia is a high-level mechanism to co-ordinate strategies to prevent and fight corruption. The CNM has 13 members: the President of the Republic; the Inspector General; the Prosecutor General; the Comptroller General (Colombia’s Supreme Audit Institution); the Auditor General; the National Ombudsman; the Secretary of Transparency; the President of the House of Representatives; the President of the Senate; the President of the Supreme Court; the President of the Council of the State; the Minister of Justice; and the Minister of the Interior. The CNM must ensure information and data exchange among the aforementioned bodies, establish indicators to assess transparency in the public administration, and adopt an annual strategy to promote ethical conduct in the public administration. In addition, the CNM provides guidelines to be implemented by the Regional Moralisation Commissions (CRM) at sub-national level (Departments). The CNM issues reports and publishes the minutes of the meetings. The Secretariat for Transparency, in the Presidency of Colombia, is the technical secretariat responsible for the agenda and steering the CNM.
Peru’s High-level Commission against Corruption (CAN)
Since 2010, Peru has been promoting inter-institutional co-ordination through the High-level Commission against Corruption (CAN) and, since 2013, through the Regional Anti-corruption Commissions (CRAs) at sub-national level. The CAN is a round table of institutions from the public sector, including autonomous entities, the legislative and the judiciary. Institutions from the private sectors and civil society are not full members; they can participate with voice but without vote. Bringing these actors around the table at regular intervals aims at promoting horizontal co-ordination and guaranteeing the coherence of the anti-corruption policy framework. The institutional presidency of the CAN rotates every two years. The candidate has to be elected from a full member of the CAN. The presidency is not ad personam, so if there is a change at the head of the institution having the presidency of the CAN, the presidency stays with this same institution. Amongst other functions, the Secretariat for Public Integrity (Secretaría de Integridad Pública, SIP), in the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM) is the technical secretariate of the CAN, steering the discussions, preparing the agenda and following up with concrete proposals, for example.
Portugal’s National Anti-Corruption Mechanism (MENAC)
The National Anti-Corruption Mechanism (MENAC) in Portugal was created by Decree-Law 109-E/2021 with the aim of promoting transparency and integrity in public action and guaranteeing the effectiveness of policies to prevent corruption and related offences. The MENAC has several bodies, including the Advisory Council (Conselho Consultivo), the Accompanying Committee (Comissão de Acompanhamento) and the Sanctions Committee (Comissão de Sanções).
Advisory Council: responsible for giving its opinion on the proposal for the three-year strategic plan, the annual activity plan and the annual report of the MENAC and on other matters submitted to it by the MENAC President. It meets ordinarily twice a year and may also meet extraordinarily at the call of the MENAC President, if exceptional circumstances justify it. The Advisory Council has the following members: Inspector General of Finance; Inspector General of Justice Services; Inspector General for Agriculture, the Sea, the Environment and Spatial Planning; Inspector General of the Food and Economic Safety Authority; Inspector General for Education and Science; Inspector General for Health Activities; Secretary-General for the Economy; Director of Legal Services, Audit and Inspection of the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers; one regional inspector for each Autonomous Region, appointed by the competent regional body; a magistrate from the Public Prosecutor's Office representing the Attorney General of the Republic; a representative of the Portuguese Bar Association; a person of recognised merit, who has distinguished himself/herself in the investigation and study of corruption and related crime; and a representative appointed jointly by the business organisations with a seat on the Standing Committee on Social Dialogue.
Accompanying Committee: responsible for developing MENAC's activities. It has the following members: the Vice-President of MENAC, who chairs it, and six general inspectors (four are appointed on a rotating basis by the general inspectorates represented on the Advisory Council, and the remaining two are appointed by the regional inspectorates represented on the Advisory Council).
Sanctions Committee: responsible for exercising MENAC's powers with regard to sanctions. It has the following members: the Vice-President of MENAC, who chairs it, and four general inspectors (two are appointed on a rotating basis by the general inspectorates represented on the Advisory Council, and the remaining two are appointed by the regional inspectorates represented on the Advisory Council).
1.4.1. While maintaining the role of JIACC liaison officers, Jordan could establish permanent integrity officers in all public entities in the central administration
Integrity is the responsibility of all public officials. Nonetheless, countries around the world are facing the challenge of ensuring a coherent and effective implementation of integrity policies throughout their public administration. Some OECD countries use legislation as primary vehicle to ensure that public entities assume integrity responsibilities (Box 1.3). Typically, however, gaps exist between the normative requirements and actual effective implementation. In particular, the challenge involves translating and anchoring standards into a wide variety of organisational and local realities. Public entities, particularly at the local level, often do not have sufficient human, financial and technical resources to identify and address the specific integrity risks involved in their work. Furthermore, in line with the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity, implementation goes beyond a formal compliance with the existing regulations and should achieve real change in organisational cultures and behaviours at all levels of government (Rangone, 2021[26]; OECD, 2018[27]).
France
In France, Law 2016-1691 from 2016 on Transparency, Fighting Corruption and Modernisation of the Economy (Sapin II), provides for the implementation of procedures to prevent integrity breaches in public sector organisations, including state administrations, local authorities and related entities.
Germany
In Germany, the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption lists specific measures that all federal administrative agencies must take to prevent corruption, including establishing responsibility for identifying and analysing corruption risk areas and for designating an officer in charge of corruption prevention. The Directive also assigns additional rules to the respective offices for carrying out responsibility in their specific areas.
Korea
In Korea, Article 3 of the Act on the Prevention of Corruption and Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (Act No. 14831) requires all public organisations to take active efforts to prevent corruption and establish a culture of social ethics.
Sweden
The Swedish Administrative Procedure Act details basic principles of good governance, notably rule of law, objectivity and proportionality. These principles are applicable to all public offices at state, regional and municipal levels. In addition, an ordinance on internal control was drafted for all government agencies with an internal audit function (about 70 agencies). It requires these agencies to have an internal control and a “good internal environment” to foster good governance.
Source: (G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, 2018[28]; Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, 2014[29]); contributions from the governments of France and Sweden.
In Jordan, to promote integrity and compliance of public entities with integrity regulations, JIACC has been sending liaison officers to public entities (Art. 14 Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law). The decision of whether to send a JIACC liaison officer is taken by JIACC’s board chairman and public bodies are obliged to accept. By law, the liaison officers have the right to attend procurement and tenders’ committee meetings without having the right to vote (Art 14.b).
Their specific tasks are described in separate guidelines and include, for example, to support and co-ordinate with investigators at JIACC or to help activating the Internal Control Units that undertake internal control and internal auditing of the financial, administrative, and technical transaction in accordance with the provisions of the Internal Control Bylaw (see Chapter 5).
Liaison officers are assigned for one year, open to renewal. Currently there are liaison officers in 23 public bodies (departments with larger budgets). A specific liaison officer department has been created within JIACC that also follows up on complaints of those entities, ensures that they provide services with high quality, transparency and fairness, and monitors any abuse of public funds (JIACC, 2021[7]). Enhancing the role of these liaison officers is part of the NIACS (project 3). Some of the positive effects of these liaison officers include, for example, taking preventive and corrective measures, such as amending procedures and gaps; receiving intelligence information and complaints; improving procurement processes; enabling faster access of JIACC to databases and other information of the entity; or contributing to awareness raising (JIACC, 2021[7]).
Although their role has been perceived positively by others outside of JIACC, within the institutions themselves they often are perceived as “unwanted guests’’. During a virtual focus group organised by the OECD with JIACC liaison officers, they mentioned the institutional culture of resistance to change and preferring the status quo as a primary challenge within the public administration. Other challenges include excessive bureaucracy and the uneven electronic transformation (corruption risks being higher in those departments in which transformation is delayed). To overcome these challenges, it was mentioned during interviews and the virtual focus group that it would be important that the Internal Control Units, who are responsible for the internal audits, become stronger. However, internal audit should not be involved in management and not provide direct support in operational activities on public entities. At the same time, public managers require advice, support and guidance on public integrity which could be provided by a dedicated person or unit within the public entity.
Of course, JIACC cannot (and should not) be sending JIACC liaison officers to every public entity of the public administration. This would require prohibitively high resources and would not resolve the issue that these liaison officers are considered as outsiders. In addition, there is the already mentioned challenge inherent to JIACC as a body combining prevention and enforcement: public officials in the entities could never be entirely sure if the JIACC liaison officer is there to help or to control.
At the same time, international experience shows that dedicated “integrity officers” in public entities can contribute to ensure implementation of integrity policies and to promote organisational cultures of integrity (OECD, 2009[18]; G20, 2017[30]; OECD, 2019[19]). Box 1.4 provides further reasons for having such a dedicated function within the organisation. The idea is close to the compliance officers or ethics advisors in private sector companies and are increasingly implemented in the public sector.
There are several reasons why it is important to have a dedicated integrity function (a person or a unit) in an organisation:
It allows to steer and co-ordinate different integrity measures, such as ensuring the implementation of an ethics code, providing advice on managing conflict of interest or ethical dilemmas, providing guidance on how to file a complaint or on how to identify, assess and manage integrity risks.
It allows to create a “safe haven” in the organization, where employees can go with questions, dilemmas and issues without fear of reprisal.
It allows for a true accumulation of expertise, as recommendations, insights and good practices are compiled in a single area within the organisation.
It can facilitate the continuity of integrity policies. In practice, it is common that, even when integrity management draws attention and enthusiasm when launched for the first time, this tends to decrease after some time. Having dedicated persons with the responsibility to manage integrity and asking them to report on their progress will significantly reduce this risk.
It has a symbolic element. It sends the signal that integrity is deemed important within the organisation. A typical rule in the theory of organisational design is that “the structure follows the strategy”: the structure reflects the areas of strategic importance for the organisation. If an organisation seeks to attribute importance to integrity, this shall be reflected and visible in its organisational chart.
It allows to co-ordinate and achieve synergies for promoting integrity with other relevant areas such as human resource management, the procurement unit, leadership or financial management.
Source: Based on (OECD, 2009[18]; OECD, 2019[31]; OECD, 2021[32]).
Therefore, given the good practice of the JIACC liaison officers, while acknowledging the benefits of internal dedicated integrity officers, Jordan could consider a two-pronged approach:
Maintaining the current practice of JIACC liaison officers that are temporarily placed within public entities for specific support tasks or for data collection.
Creating as a new, internal function a permanent and dedicated integrity officer in every public entity. These integrity officers should be selected from the permanent staff of the entity, have an institutionalised direct access to the highest authority and receive specialised training to allow them to fulfil their role.
While a dedicated, full-time position would be ideal, Jordan could consider assigning this function to an already existing position or unit. To be able to create a “safe haven”, to provide credible advice and to build a trusted relationship with employees of the entity, it is key that these integrity officers do not play any role at all related to control, oversight, audit or enforcement. Rather, these integrity officers should have the following three core responsibilities:
Providing ad hoc advice to staff as well as guidance and training on areas on public integrity, including for example guidance and trainings on values, dealing with ethical dilemmas, developing skills for ethical leadership and management of conflict of interests.
Provide guidance on and support to public managers on integrity risk management (identification, assessment and management).
Planning (involving all relevant internal units), co-ordinating and monitoring an organisational sub-strategy or an executive plan on integrity (to be implemented by different units of the public entity, for instance, integrity measures to be implemented by the HR units or the procurement units, following national regulations).
Support the entity in collecting the data required for the National Integrity Index.
While responding only to the head of the public entity they are working in, the integrity officers could receive training, guidance and support from JIACC and from the JIACC liaison officers, but also from the Audit Bureau, the SPAC (in particular, from the recently established Compliance Department) and the IPA, or the Ministry of Finance, for example. The following table provides an overview the rationale and respective functions of the existing JIACC liaison officer and the recommended integrity officials clearly laying out the complementarity of both roles (Table 1.2).
Source: Elaborated by the OECD.
In Peru, the Offices of Institutional Integrity have to be established throughout the national public administration and in local governments, with the Secretariat for Public Integrity as governing body (OECD, 2019[31]; OECD, 2021[23]). In Brazil, Integrity Sectorial Units have been established in all entities of the federal executive branch. Box 1.5 provides an overview of these two experiences. Other examples of countries that have implemented such dedicated units or persons are Germany and Austria (Box 1.6).
Institutional Integrity Offices in Peru
To mainstream integrity throughout its public administration, Peru has developed and implemented the so-called “Integrity Model”. This model establishes a framework of public compliance for integrity and anti-corruption measures at organisational levels. The Integrity Model has nine components that all public entities must implement: (1) Commitment by senior management; (2) risk management; (3) integrity policies; (4) transparency, open data and accountability; (5) internal control; (6) communication and training; (7) Whistleblower Channel; (8) supervision and monitoring of the Integrity Model; (9) integrity model manager. Public entities must implement the Integrity Model progressively to strengthen their prevention capacity against corruption. The Secretariat for Public Integrity (Secretaría de Integridad Pública, SIP) developed and is implementing Institutional Integrity Offices (IIO) to fulfil the role of the Integrity Model Manager and has developed the Index of the Preventive Capacity against Corruption which tracks progress in the implementation of the Integrity Model. The IIO are responsible for the implementation of the Integrity Model within their entities, they provide trainings to employees, implement awareness raising activities and can receive complaints to carry out preliminary investigation before sending the cases to the relevant authorities.
Integrity Management Units in Brazil
The Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, or CGU) of Brazil is leading integrity policies. Bodies and entities of the Federal Government (ministries, autarchies and public foundations) have to implement integrity programmes. The first phase of integrity programmes involves the creation of Integrity Sectorial Units. The creation of these units is a necessary condition for public entities to developing and applying an internal Integrity Plan. Integrity Sectorial Units are bodies vested with functional autonomy, which may also be created on the basis of another unit. Specifically, Integrity Management Units have, among others, the following attributes:
Co-ordination of the design, implementation and monitoring of the integrity programme.
Advice to, and training of, public servants regarding subjects related to the integrity programme.
Promotion of other actions related to the implementation of integrity plans together with other relevant units of the entity.
Source: (OECD, 2019[31]; OECD, 2021[32]), updated based on Decree 11.529/2023 of the Government of Brazil.
Germany's Contact Persons for Corruption Prevention
Germany, at federal level, has institutionalised contact persons for anti-corruption. The “Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration” defines these contact persons and their tasks as follows:
1. A contact person for corruption prevention shall be appointed based on the tasks and size of the agency. One contact person may be responsible for more than one agency. Contact persons may be charged with the following tasks: serving as a contact person for agency staff and management, if necessary without having to go through official channels, along with private persons; advising agency management; keeping staff members informed (e.g. by means of regularly scheduled seminars and presentations); assisting with training; monitoring and assessing any indications of corruption; helping keep the public informed about penalties under public service law and criminal law (preventive effect) while respecting the privacy rights of those concerned.
2. If the contact person becomes aware of facts leading to reasonable suspicion that a corruption offence has been committed, he or she shall inform the agency management and make recommendations on conducting an internal investigation, on taking measures to prevent concealment and on informing the law enforcement authorities. The agency management shall take the necessary steps to deal with the matter.
3. Contact persons shall not be delegated any authority to carry out disciplinary measures; they shall not lead investigations in disciplinary proceedings for corruption cases.
4. Agencies shall provide contact persons promptly and comprehensively with the information needed to perform their duties, particularly with regard to incidents of suspected corruption.
5. In carrying out their duties of corruption prevention, contact persons shall be independent of instructions. They shall have the right to report directly to the head of the agency and may not be subject to discrimination as a result of performing their duties.
6. Even after completing their term of office, contact persons shall not disclose any information they have gained about staff members’ personal circumstances; they may however provide such information to agency management or personnel management if they have a reasonable suspicion that a corruption offence has been committed. Personal data shall be treated in accordance with the principles of personnel records management.
The Austrian Integrity Network (Integritätsbeauftragten-Netzwerk)
In Austria, the Federal Bureau to prevent and fight corruption (Bundesamt zur Korruptionspraevention und Korruptionsbekaempfung, BAK) created the Austrian Integrity Network (Integritaetsbeauftragten-Netzwerk) to strengthen integrity by firmly anchoring integrity as a fundamental element in public sector. The BAK trains civil servants to become experts in the field of integrity and corruption prevention within the Integrity Network. These integrity officers provide advice and guidance in their entities to strengthen integrity. The integrity officers can access further information on compliance, corruption, ethics, integrity and organisational culture. The BAK also offers regular follow-up meetings for integrity officers on specific topics such as risk management, ethics and values.
Source: For Germany: German Federal Ministry of the Interior “Rules on Integrity”, www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Broschueren/2014/rules-on-integrity.pdf?__blob=publicationFile; For Austria: https://integritaet.info/
1.4.2. Jordan should consider establishing integrity officers in municipalities and promote local integrity strategies, aligned with the national strategy
To have an impact on building a culture of integrity in a country, it is key to reach out to the local level, especially to municipalities. While the autonomies and mandates of municipalities vary across countries, they typically have responsibilities in the provision of public services and their proximity and recurrence of the interactions between local authorities and citizens and the private sector makes them vulnerable to integrity risks. At the same time, integrity policies at municipal levels can achieve highly visible results for citizens.
In Jordan, the subnational level is predominantly governed by the Local Administration Law 25 of 2021. According to this law, there are three categories of municipalities:
Category A municipalities of governorate centres with a population of more than 200,000 people (in total 12 with Amman, Irbid, Zarqa as the three biggest ones).
Category B municipalities of priority centres with a population of more than 50,000 people.
The rest of the municipalities (category C).
The management of those municipalities largely falls under the responsibility of mayors (chairing the municipal councils), the executive manager of the municipality and municipal councils. The latter two do not have legislative powers but are responsible for setting the local development vision and adopting strategic plans and annual budgets. Mayors, members of the municipal councils and 85% of members of the governorate councils are directly elected all four years, 15% are appointed by the central government and 25% in Amman (Freedom House, 2023[33]). Governors are appointed by the King through the Ministry of the Interior (and are supervised by the Ministry of Interior). They enjoy wide administrative authority and in specific cases, they exercise the powers of ministers through the executive councils in the governorates. Despite some reforms in recent years, municipalities and governors are perceived as an extension of the central government (SmartGov, 2021[34]).
Budgets for the municipalities are elaborated by the municipal councils and approved by the Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA). 50% of the municipal budget should (de facto it is reportedly only 25%) be allocated to the municipalities by the central government, the remaining parts come from local revenues and fees (e.g., fees, construction). At municipal level, there is no obligation to publish the budgets, there are no participatory mechanisms for their preparation and Parliament has no participation and/or oversight role in their elaboration. There reportedly is a challenge in data driven elaboration of priorities for those budgets, translating into “wish lists” and allocating most of the budget (reportedly about 85%) to operational costs and salaries. The practices of municipalities are subject to oversight by the Audit Bureau and JIACC, Government Procurement Bylaw 8 of 2022 applies to procurement processes and hiring processes follow the Municipal Employees Bylaw of 2007 and the following 2020 amendments. However, according to interviews conducted by the OECD, both the oversight for procurement and hiring processes could be more efficient and policies applied more consistently to prevent abuses such as nepotism/favouritism in hiring or vote buying practices.
Consequently, there are several challenges with respect to public integrity at the local level. For example, there is a reported overstaffing within municipalities as a direct result of regular elections and close tribal or family (or other) ties of the candidates with the constituents. Vote buying through recruitments in local administrations has also been mentioned as an issue. This reportedly leads to hiring of staff lacking adequate qualifications and consequently inadequate application of regulations and procedures on, for instance, recruitment or procurement. This can again lead to errors and corruption. Services are reportedly sometimes delivered based on tribal or familial (or other) proximity rather than on law and merit. In general, there is also a lack of awareness of integrity regulations and their application, which is, according to interviews, more often the cause for integrity misbehaviours than deliberate deception.
Notwithstanding a potential opportunity to review the Local Administration Law, which is outside the scope of this Integrity Review, Jordan could establish integrity officers as recommended above at least in the larger municipalities of category A and B to promote integrity in municipalities. Again, it is important to emphasise that these integrity officers are not JIACC liaison officers and are not related to nor employed by JIACC but should belong to the municipality and respond to the mayor. In total, this would correspond to around twenty-five integrity officers, some of them (for instance those responsible for the twelve category A municipalities) could also have some regional responsibility and/or responsibility for specific smaller municipalities. According to information provided by Jordan, a first integrity unit has been implemented in Greater Amman Municipality.
Like the integrity officers recommended for the national level, the roles and responsibilities of those officers could include:
Advocate and contribute to elaborating local integrity strategies and action plans including the identification of clear responsibilities as well as co-ordination and monitoring of their implementation. Such local integrity strategies, aligned to the NIACS, would be particularly desirable because of the specific challenges local levels face. Elaborated in municipalities, such strategies would also contribute to raising awareness and promoting ownership.
Provide guidance and, in close co-ordination and collaboration with JIACC, the AB, the Ministry of Finance, the IPA, the Procurement Policy Committee and MOLA, provide training on areas on public integrity, including for example guidance and trainings on values, dealing with ethical dilemmas, developing skills for ethical leadership and management of conflict of interests, corruption risk management, internal control and audit. This could also include trainings and guidance on key processes such as recruitment and procurement. In those areas close collaboration with the SPAC and the Procurement Policy Committee would be recommended.
The placement of integrity officers in category A and B municipalities could be helpful to contribute to building trust in the political system. This appears to be particularly relevant given the low numbers of voters having participated and the large distrust expressed during the last local elections in 2022 (Ersan, 2022[35]). Several countries have implemented integrity functions at the local level. Box 1.7 provides examples from France and the Netherlands, which could provide Jordan with additional and alternative ideas on how to reach municipalities.
The following are examples of how local governments assign integrity functions in line with their capacity and resource levels.
The Netherlands
Most cities and communities in the Netherlands develop and implement their own local integrity strategy. In the City of Amsterdam, the Integrity Office (Bureau Integriteit, BI) is responsible for promoting integrity with the local political leaders and managers, the whole city administration, and service providers and businesses. The mandate of the BI covers ethics and legal advice, training, risk assessments, disciplinary procedures and integrity investigation. This office is also the contact point for whistleblowers to report misconduct and breaches of integrity rules. The staff is specially trained to provide integrity advice, and usually has had extensive experience working for the administration of the City of Amsterdam.
France
In France, some major cities and regions have designed and implemented an integrity policy and specific functions. Since 2014, the City of Paris has an ethics commission responsible for conflict of interest and asset disclosure, gifts and gratuities, interpretation and application of the code of conduct, and counselling and advice. In 2014, the City of Strasbourg assigned a similar role to an independent ethics officer for promoting the integrity of political leaders and managers, as well as administration of the municipality. Regions that have adopted a comparable approach include Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur. The 2016 revision of civil service status introduced a right to access ethics counselling in public organisations for all civil servants regardless of their status. The organisations must assign this responsibility, internally or externally. However, there are close to 35 000 municipalities, among which more than 90% have less than 5 000 inhabitants and have more limited financial and human resources. Consequently, some of the integrity functions are either the responsibility of a local management centre, general director or other designated person(s) of the administration, or they are not assigned locally and rely upon other actors in the integrity system.
Source: For the Netherlands, (City of Amsterdam, 2019[36]). For France, (City of Strasbourg, 2019[37]; Government of France, 2016[38]; Mairie de Paris, 2018[39]).
1.4.3. Networks between JIACC liaison officers and potential future integrity officers could promote mutual learning and support
The exchange of good practices as well as discussions about common challenges and how to find solutions are important reasons to promote an exchange between JIACC liaison officers. The virtual focus group organised by the OECD is a good example of the value added of bringing these officers together to talk about their work. While they already share informally, a more formal and regular get-together could be promoted by JIACC. Such exchanges also could include discussing, for instance, training modules or guidance materials elaborated jointly with other relevant entities such as the IPA. These meetings could take place every three or four months or at least, twice a year.
If implemented, the establishment of regular exchange fora among the proposed integrity officers may also be useful. For example, at subnational level, regional networks could be organised. The chairmanship of the network could rotate annually among the Category A integrity officers. The network could allow a better information flow and awareness raising for public officials to act correctly. JIACC and MOLA could participate to identify the issues that could be addressed at a policy level. Those meetings of local integrity officers could be organised once or twice a year, outside of Amman. Again, there are helpful examples from OECD countries that could serve as an inspiration for Jordan (Box 1.8).
The Austrian Network of Integrity Officers
To mainstream integrity into the public sector, Austria has established the Network of Integrity Officers, which aims to place integrity officers in various federal institutions (e.g., ministries). Tasks performed by the officers include: performing advisory services for employees and senior officials; circulating information on integrity and awareness raising; providing training; analysing the risk of corruption; collaboration and experience sharing; serving as the focal point for compliance-related issues. The Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption is responsible for managing the network, generating and collecting expertise on the topic of integrity, and providing basic training and training materials to the officers.
Formal and informal co-operation mechanisms in Canada
In Canada the central agency, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS), hosts two communities of practice: the Interdepartmental Values and Ethics Network and the Senior Officers for Internal Disclosure Group (whistleblowing). These communities of practice meet regularly, and mutually benefit from sharing good practices and lessons learned. The communities and their regular exchanges provide the TBS with an informal means of keeping up with emerging issues and evolving challenges. Their input can also help shape integrity policies as well as the Secretariat’s awareness-raising and communications activities.
The German network of contact persons for corruption prevention
In Germany, the lead federal ministry for corruption prevention and integrity is the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community. Since preventing corruption does not involve having a supervisory role over other ministries, co-operation is essential to reach a common understanding of integrity policies and comprehensive standards for their implementation. For the German federal administration, the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries regulates (among other issues) co-operation within the federal government. Article 19 stipulates that “in matters affecting the remits of more than one Federal Ministry, those Ministries will work together to ensure that the Federal Government speaks and acts consistently”. In practical terms, co-operation happens through a network of contact persons for corruption prevention that meets frequently. The network also develops guidelines, handbooks and recommendations for implementing the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration.
The Network against Corruption for Swedish State Agencies
The Swedish Agency for Public Management hosts the Network against Corruption for Swedish State Agencies. Delegates participating in the network include heads of administrative departments and heads of legal departments. The network meets four times a year, and each meeting usually gathers close to 100 agencies. The purpose of the network is to share experiences, learn about good examples and take part in the production of handbooks, reports, and other publications of the Swedish Agency for Public Management on anti-corruption measures, internal control, and efficiency.
Source: (IBN, 2020[40]); Germany: information provided by the Ministry of the Interior; Sweden: information provided by the Swedish Agency for Public Management. Canada: Adapted from inputs shared by the Treasury Board Secretariat.
The legal and institutional integrity framework in Jordan
Jordan could further increase the clarity of anti-corruption and integrity regulations and discuss the possibility to codify into one single law all offences and relevant aspects.
JIACC could, together with the judiciary, elaborate guidance material in plain language to provide an overview of the current laws and explain the interpretation of some of the key provisions in further detail.
A revision of the current anti-corruption legislation could involve conducting a comprehensive gap analysis to identify corrupt practices that are currently not explicitly or adequately codified.
Strengthen JIACC and promote co-ordination amongst key actors in Jordan
To further increase JIACC’s preventive profile, Jordan could revise the existing legislation in view of providing JIACC with a clearer prevention mandate, for instance, by explicitly including tasks already carried out by JIACC such as the elaboration of studies, the consultative role in drafting legislation relevant for integrity, or co-ordinating the implementation of the National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategies (NIACS).
Jordan could review the law in view of granting JIACC stronger financial and administrative independence. In particular, the current reforms in the context of the SPAC, could provide an opportunity to grant JIACC autonomy in hiring outside of the SPAC data base, while following SPAC procedures.
JIACC should continue promoting measures aimed at strengthening a “culture of independence” within JIACC and promoting the pride and intrinsic motivation of its staff to belonging to the institution.
JIACC, together with other key integrity actors, could consider initiating an open dialogue on how to find a constructive way to overcome the challenges related to combining prevention and enforcement roles.
To benefit from synergies, allow for exchange of information and to promote an inter-institutional dialogue on anti-corruption and integrity, Jordan could consider creating a formal co-ordination mechanism steered by JIACC, which could be co-chaired by the SPAC and should involve key integrity actors.
A more informal or ad-hoc co-operation mechanism could be established between investigation actors for the primary purpose of exchanging information, avoiding overlaps while at the same time keeping confidentiality when necessary.
Enable public sector entities to manage public integrity
While maintaining the current practice of JIACC liaison officers, Jordan could create permanent and dedicated integrity officers in every public entity. These integrity officers should be selected from the permanent staff of the entity, have an institutionalised direct access to the highest authority and receive specialised training to allow them to fulfil their role. It is key that these integrity officers do not play any role at all related to control, oversight, audit or enforcement.
In addition, Jordan could establish such integrity officers at least in the larger municipalities of category A and B to promote integrity in municipalities.
JIACC could consider establishing networks between JIACC liaison officers and potential future integrity officers to promote mutual learning and support.
References
[4] Al-Zu’bi, H., R. Al-Tal and R. Rubaiha (2023), “An Appraisal of the Legal Framework and the Impact of Administrative Corruption on the Jordanian Economy: An Empirical Evidence”, Asian Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 14/2, pp. 163-188, https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2022-0082.
[36] City of Amsterdam (2019), Bureau Integriteit - Gemeente Amsterdam.
[37] City of Strasbourg (2019), Charte de déontologie | Strasbourg.eu, https://www.strasbourg.eu/charte-deontologie (accessed on 11 September 2019).
[13] Doig, A. and F. Recanatini (2020), “Anti-Corruption Agencies: Can Anti-Corruption Agencies Be Successful in Combatting Corruption?”, Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency: The Fight Against Corruption, pp. 290-303.
[35] Ersan, M. (2022), “Jordan local elections: Low turnout as tribal dealings and cynicism leave voters cold”, Middle East Eye, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordan-local-elections-low-turnout-tribal-dealings-dominate-discourage (accessed on 29 February 2024).
[29] Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (2014), Rules on Integrity.
[33] Freedom House (2023), Jordan – Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report, https://freedomhouse.org/country/jordan/freedom-world/2023 (accessed on 29 February 2024).
[30] G20 (2017), G20 High Level Principles on Organizing Against Corruption, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-g20-acwg-anti-corruption.html.
[28] G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group (2018), Compendium on Measures to Encourage Public Organisations to Implement Anti-Corruption Policy.
[38] Government of France (2016), LOI n° 2016-483 du 20 avril 2016 relative à la déontologie et aux droits et obligations des fonctionnaires | Legifrance, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000032433852&categorieLien=id (accessed on 11 Spetember 2019).
[25] Government of Portugal (2021), Decreto-Lei n.º 109-E/2021, de 9 de dezembro, https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/109-e-2021-175659840 (accessed on 4 June 2024).
[14] Hussmann, K., H. Hechler and M. Peñailillo (2009), Institutional arrangements for corruption prevention: Considerations for the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption Article 6, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Issue 2009:4), Bergen, http://www.u4.no/publications/institutional-arrangements-for-corruption-prevention-considerations-for-the-implementation-of-the-united-nations-convention-against-corruption-article-6/ (accessed on 11 January 2018).
[40] IBN (2020), Integritätsbeauftragten-Netzwerk, https://integritaet.info/ (accessed on 18 September 2019).
[7] JIACC (2021), Annual Report: 2021, Jordanian Integrity and Anticorruption Commission, Amman, Jordan, https://www.jiacc.gov.jo/ebv4.0/root_storage/en/eb_list_page/english_report_2021.pdf (accessed on 16 February 2024).
[6] JIACC (2019), National Strategy of Integrity and Anti-Corruption 2020-2025, https://jiacc.gov.jo/EBV4.0/Root_Storage/AR/EB_Blog/JIACC_Strategy_2020-2025_English.pdf (accessed on 16 February 2024).
[39] Mairie de Paris (2018), La commission de déontologie des élu·e·s du Conseil - Ville de Paris, https://www.paris.fr/pages/la-commission-de-deontologie-des-elu-e-s-du-conseil-de-paris-3167/#autres-cas-de-saisine (accessed on 11 September 2019).
[3] Melgar, N., M. Rossi and T. Smith (2010), The perception of corruption, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edp058.
[10] Merhej, K. (2022), Promises and Pitfalls of Jordan’s Anti-Corruption Legal Framework, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), https://timep.org/2022/07/20/promises-and-pitfalls-of-jordans-anti-corruption-legal-framework/ (accessed on 29 February 2024).
[23] OECD (2021), Integrity in the Peruvian Regions: Implementing the Integrity System, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ceba1186-en.
[24] OECD (2021), Public Integrity at the Regional Level in Colombia: Empowering the Regional Moralisation Commissions, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/corruption/ethics/public-integrity-regional-level-colombia.pdf (accessed on 6 August 2021).
[32] OECD (2021), Strengthening Public Integrity in Brazil: Mainstreaming Integrity Policies in the Federal Executive Branch, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a8cbb8fa-en.
[5] OECD (2020), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
[19] OECD (2019), La Integridad Pública en América Latina y el Caribe 2018-2019: De Gobiernos reactivos a Estados proactivos, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/integridad-publica-en-america-latina-caribe-2018-2019.htm.
[31] OECD (2019), Offices of Institutional Integrity in Peru: Implementing the Integrity System, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/offices-of-institutional-integrity-peru.pdf (accessed on 19 August 2021).
[27] OECD (2018), Behavioural Insights for Public Integrity: Harnessing the Human Factor to Counter Corruption, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264297067-en.
[15] OECD (2017), Government at a Glance 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2017-en.
[21] OECD (2017), OECD Integrity Review of Colombia: Investing in Integrity for Peace and Prosperity, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264278325-en.
[22] OECD (2017), OECD Integrity Review of Peru: Enhancing Public Sector Integrity for Inclusive Growth, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264271029-en.
[1] OECD (2017), “Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0435, OECD, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/Recommendation-Public-Integrity.pdf.
[17] OECD (2016), Being an Independent Regulator, The Governance of Regulators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264255401-en.
[11] OECD (2013), Specialised Anti-Corruption Institutions: Review of Models: Second Edition, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264187207-en.
[8] OECD (2012), “Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0390, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0390.
[18] OECD (2009), Towards a Sound Integrity Framework: Instruments, Processes, Structures and Conditions for Implementation (GOV/PGC/GF(2009)1), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
[16] Queen Rania Center for Jordanian Studies Community Service (2020), The Extent of the Phenomenon of Wasta and Favoritism in the Jordanian Public Sector, Yarmouk University , Irbid, Jordan, https://www.jiacc.gov.jo/ebv4.0/root_storage/en/eb_list_page/final_wasta_english.pdf (accessed on 29 February 2024).
[26] Rangone, N. (2021), “Making Law Effective: Behavioural Insights into Compliance”, European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 9, pp. 483-501, https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2018.51.
[9] Rasheed and USAID (2019), Summary – Shadow Report: Reviewing Progress made in Jordan for targets 4, 5, 6 and 10 under goal number 16 from Sustainable Development Goals, Rasheed - Transparency International Jordan, Amman, Jordan, https://rasheedti.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Summary-SDGs-Eng-2019.pdf (accessed on 29 February 2024).
[12] Recanatini, F. (2011), “Anti-Corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to Curb Corruption?”, in Rose-Ackerman, S. and T. Søreide (eds.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham and Northampton, https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781849802512.00030.xml (accessed on 11 January 2018).
[34] SmartGov (2021), Jordan Local Government Policy and Reform Context, SmartGov, Tripoli, Lebanon, https://www.smartgov.tech/jordan-local-government-policy-and-reform-context/ (accessed on 29 February 2024).
[2] Transparency International (2023), The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023.
[20] UN (2012), Executive Summary of the Review of the Implementation of the Implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption – Jordan, Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, New York, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/18-22June2012/V1187238e.pdf (accessed on 29 February 2024).