This chapter examines Ukraine’s mechanisms for promoting judicial integrity and enabling the effective enforcement of corruption offences. Judiciary reforms must continue to focus on merit and integrity. The disciplinary system for judges and mechanisms for whistleblowing and conflict of interest management have room for further improvement. The investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases also needs reform to ensure greater timeliness, fairness and impartiality.
OECD Integrity and Anti‑Corruption Review of Ukraine
Abstract
Rule of law and impartial enforcement of public integrity standards are key to preventing impunity or selective punishment for corruption. Principle 11 of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity calls on countries to ensure that enforcement mechanisms provide appropriate responses to all suspected violations of public integrity standards by public officials and all others involved in the violations. This includes applying fairness, objectivity and timeliness in the enforcement of public integrity standards; promoting mechanisms for co‑operation and exchange of information between relevant bodies; and encouraging transparency about the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms and outcomes of disciplinary, administrative, civil and criminal cases (OECD, 2017[1]).
The system of integrity in the judiciary requires a balance between independence and accountability. Judicial independence helps ensure that the judiciary can hold other branches of government accountable. In environments of low judicial independence, undue political influence can result in judges becoming instruments of political competition. On the other hand, independence must be accompanied by accountability for judges. Even in the absence of political influence, the power that judges wield may incentivise them to exploit their positions for personal gain (UNODC, 2011[2]; Gloppen, 2014[3]; Van Dijk and Vos, 2018[4]).
In addition, a culture of integrity supports judicial integrity by limiting the susceptibility of the judiciary to corruption and external influence (see Figure 4.1). Preventative measures to increase understanding of and adherence to ethical standards help ensure that even when opportunities for corruption exist, judges decline them. Such measures can include setting clear standards through a code of conduct and disseminating it through training on judicial ethics (including during general legal education), instituting mechanisms for resolving conflicts of interest and establishing whistleblowing channels.
Sources: OECD (2020[5]), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en; OECD (2023[6]), Istanbul Anti‑Corruption Action Plan, 5th Round of Monitoring: Guide, OECD, Paris; OECD (2023[7]), Istanbul Anti‑Corruption Action Plan, 5th Round of Monitoring: Assessment Framework, OECD, Paris; UNODC (2010[8]), Measures for the Effective Implementation of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, Austria; UNODC (2011[2]), Resource Guide on Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, Austria.
In Ukraine, the justice system’s ability to ensure accountability for corruption is hindered by three key issues:
Despite the ongoing reforms in the Ukrainian justice system that began in 2016, integrity safeguards in career progression continue to face implementation challenges. The high corruption risks associated with judicial positions necessitate systematically maintaining rigorous integrity assessments at all stages of judicial careers. Despite pressure to fill the high number of vacancies for judges in Ukraine, integrity should remain a priority to ensure judicial reform achieves lasting change. As a minimum, a rigorous merit- and integrity-based selection process should apply to high-level positions.
There are constantly low levels of trust in the judiciary in the Ukrainian society. Complementary to the external efforts to assess the integrity of judges, there is a need to entrench public integrity as a value in the culture of the Ukrainian judiciary (as well as in society at large). Fostering a culture of integrity is crucial to prevent corruption and to build public trust. An effective disciplinary system should also be in place.
While the definitions of corruption-related criminal offences in Ukraine follow international standards, and the system of specialised anti‑corruption bodies provides for effective detection, investigation and adjudication of grand corruption, obstacles to accountability for corruption remain. In particular, procedural elements that do not allow sufficient investigation time or enable obstruction result in the closure of many cases, and the overall case management system could better ensure integrity and foster public trust.
Since 2016, the incremental reform of the justice system has aimed to ensure the independence and accountability of the judiciary. On the one hand, the system of specialised anti‑corruption bodies and the High Anti‑Corruption Court (HACC) has been established to reduce impunity for high-level corruption not only among politicians but also among judges. The case against the President of the Supreme Court of Ukraine (SCU) (National Anti-Corruption Bureau, 2024[9]) is a strong example of the functioning of the system. On the other hand, reforms that instituted integrity checks at the stage of judicial appointments and procedures for merit-based career progression aim to increase integrity within the judiciary. These reforms resulted in the creation of institutions and procedures that involve actors outside the Ukrainian system of justice in the process of judicial selection and vetting. However, the ongoing reforms have also resulted in a large number of judicial vacancies and a backlog of court cases as decisions on career progression have become drawn out and many judges seek to avoid or undermine integrity checks.
The 2016 attempt at reform failed to meaningfully improve trust in the judiciary (see Figure 4.2). If citizens are not confident that judges are fair, independent and impartial, they will be unlikely engage with the justice system, thereby deterring citizens from reporting corruption and resulting in a lack of evidence in corruption cases and more impunity for corrupt officials. Parties to cases may even feel obligated to engage in corruption because they do not trust that the proceedings will be fair or objective otherwise. Trust in the judiciary is therefore both an important indicator of judicial integrity and an important prerequisite for effective adjudication of corruption cases. Over time low trust in the judiciary may even erode trust in the state as a whole. However, by 2021 the courts were the second least trusted institution in Ukraine, with the public rating their level of corruption on a five-point scale at 4.43. Businesses rated the level of corruption in the courts at 3.97 on average, and experts rated it at 3.98 on average (Jennett, 2021[10]). One explanation for this is that reforms focused too much on insulating the judiciary from influence from other branches of government without first addressing internal integrity concerns stemming from judicial corporatism (Dejure Foundation, 2019[11]). Therefore, another reform in 2021 established procedures for re-constituting judicial governance bodies such as the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and High Qualification Commission for Judges (HQCJ) with the involvement of international experts (European Commission, 2023[12]; Dejure Foundation, 2022[13]). Improving trust in the judiciary remains a key focus of theme 2.4 of the National Anti‑Corruption Strategy (NACS) for 2021–2025. This goal is also reflected in the draft Strategy for the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Justice for 2025–2029.
Source: Gallup (2023[14]), “Ukrainians continue to rally around president, military”, https://news.gallup.com/poll/512621/ukrainians-continue-rally-around-president-military.aspx (accessed on 31 October 2024).
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has also complicated judicial reform and the functioning of the justice system generally. Court staff shortages are acute, and the State Judicial Administration (SJA) reported that Russian shelling has resulted in the destruction of buildings and equipment, while power cuts complicate efforts to hold hearings, including those related to the selection and appointment of judges. While continued judicial reform is vital to ensure integrity and accountability, resource shortages make the need to take a risk-based approach to prioritising reforms all the more pressing.
Merit-based career progression helps protect independence in the judiciary. Clear and objective procedures for selecting, appointing and promoting judges with unified criteria for integrity assessment support both judicial independence and accountability (see Figure 4.3). Meritocratic systems reduce opportunities for favouritism and undue influence by ensuring that career progression depends on objective evaluations of one’s knowledge and skills (OECD, 2020[5]) At the same time, integrity safeguards are necessary to ensure accountability throughout judges’ careers. Integrity checks upon appointment can ensure trustworthy people assume the position of a judge, while integrity checks upon promotion can also ensure a judge maintains integrity throughout the career. To ensure integrity in judiciaries with a history of integrity shortcomings, lustration1 or another form of vetting of sitting judges may be also necessary, although it should be a one-time process to avoid unduly violating judicial independence. Once the judiciary has internalised integrity as a value, a clear, impartial and integrity-based judicial disciplinary system helps ensure accountability for judges committing integrity violations.
In Ukraine, the post-2014 reforms overhauled the judicial system and established safeguards to ensure its independence from the executive. For this purpose, the HCJ was established to handle judicial appointments and disciplinary proceedings. Law 1402-VIII on the Judiciary and Status of Judges (LJSJ) instituted a merit-based process for selecting and appointing judges, which the HQCJ conducts (summarised in Figure 4.4). The OECD’s Review of Anti‑Corruption Reforms in Ukraine under the fifth round of Istanbul Anti‑Corruption Action Plan monitoring concluded that the selection procedure is generally competitive and transparent but suffers from a lack of a clear methodology for assessing judicial integrity (OECD, 2024[15]).
Sources: OECD (2023[6]), Istanbul Anti‑Corruption Action Plan, 5th Round of Monitoring: Guide, OECD, Paris; OECD (2023[7]), Istanbul Anti‑Corruption Action Plan, 5th Round of Monitoring: Assessment Framework, OECD, Paris UNODC (2010[8]), Measures for the Effective Implementation of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, Austria; UNODC (2011[2]), Resource Guide on Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, Austria; Bulmer, E. (2017[16]), Judicial Appointments: International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 4, International IDEA, Stockholm, Sweden.
Other gaps in judicial reform remain, and until these gaps are filled there will continue to be integrity risks. The following three recommendations address major outstanding obstacles to comprehensive judicial reform that ensures judicial integrity:
Career progression and other judicial processes are inefficient and have created backlogs. In the long-term, the overall institutional and procedural setup should be streamlined to speed up the appointment process without compromising quality (OECD, 2024[15]). However, in the short term, it may be worth prioritising appointments, integrity checks and other reforms for institutions that are central to judicial governance and/or that carry high integrity risks such as judicial governance bodies and high-level courts.
Ensuring that newly adopted joint standards for the integrity checks of judges during the qualification assessment in the appointment process are applied consistently in practice. The lack of clear and transparent reasoning remains an issue to tackle as a next step.
The disciplinary system for judges in Ukraine is beginning to function again after a long hiatus. However, it requires several additional steps to refine definitions and rules of procedure such that the system ensures meaningful judicial accountability. These include clarifying offences and improving accountability in the HCJ appeal process. The large backlog of disciplinary cases means that a more effective risk-based strategy for case prioritisation may be needed.
4.2.1. Ukraine could consider streamlining judicial governance arrangements and taking a risk-based approach to judicial reform to maximise the impact of reform efforts on judicial integrity
Council of Europe standards maintain that good practice for judicial governance involves one independent self-governance body (judicial council) responsible for appointment (CoE, 2010[17]). In Ukraine, post-2021 attempts to increase independence and integrity in the judiciary strengthened two bodies of judicial governance – the HCJ and HQCJ – in particular by involving international experts in the selection of HCJ and HQCJ candidates as an additional (external) layer of assurance. The Council of Judges (COJ) is a judicial self-governance body, which remains unreformed. This setup has resulted in an institutionally convoluted judicial governance framework and backlogs in judicial career progression that the Venice Commission has recommended2 streamlining (Venice Commission, 2022[18]). Some improvements to the process were introduced in December 2023 via amendments to the LJSJ and the adoption of common HQCJ and Public Integrity Council (PIC) indicators for assessing judicial integrity.
Ukraine’s judiciary contains several independent governance institutions that contribute to upholding integrity within the judiciary. Their responsibilities are as follows:
Judicial governance bodies
Council of Judges (Рада суддів, COJ): The COJ is the main judicial self-governance body in Ukraine and acts on behalf of the Congress of Judges. Its role is outlined in Article 133 of the LJSJ. It develops and implements measures to protect judicial independence, which in practice has meant it is involved in developing documents like the Code of Judicial Ethics and providing input on the unified indicators of judicial integrity. It is also responsible for managing conflict of interest in the judiciary.
High Council of Justice (Вища рада правосуддя, HCJ): The HCJ is responsible for recommending judges for appointment to the President of Ukraine, as outlined in Article 128 of the Constitution. Article 131 of the Constitution establishes the HCJ’s functions and composition. Under Article 79-6 of the LJSJ, the HCJ receives recommendations from the HQCJ and can only reject them in defined circumstances. The HCJ has a disciplinary chamber that processes disciplinary cases against judges as outlined in Chapter VI of the LJSJ and Chapter II Section 4 of the Law on the High Council of Justice. Its service of disciplinary inspectors commenced work in December 2024. The HCJ also houses a selection commission that evaluates candidates for positions in the HQCJ in line with Article 95 of LJSJ.
High Qualification Commission for Judges (Вища кваліфікаційна комісія суддів, HQCJ): The HQCJ is primarily responsible for the selection of judges, and its role and composition are outlined in Chapter V Section 3 of the LJSJ. It organises the selection process and is responsible for the qualification assessment that checks the competence, professional ethics and integrity of both new judicial candidates and sitting judges. Chapter V Section 1 of the LJSJ details the qualification assessment process.
External assurance bodies
Ethics Council (Етична рада): The Ethics Council is responsible for checking the integrity and professional competence of candidates for positions in the HCJ, as outlined in Article 9-1 of the Law on the High Council of Justice. It consists of six members, and while these will eventually all be Ukrainians, its first composition extraordinarily includes three international experts alongside three Ukrainian judges as established in Chapter III of the same law.
Public Council of International Experts (Громадська рада міжнародних експертів, PCIE): The PCIE is a temporary body consisting of six international experts who are in charge of selecting candidates for the HACC. As of April 2025 its mandate had been extended to May 2026.
Public Integrity Council (Громадська рада доброчесності, PIC): The PIC is a body composed of civil society representatives that assists the HQCJ in the qualification assessment process, as outlined in Article 87 of the LJSJ. The PIC issues opinions on judges’ compliance or non-compliance with criteria of professional ethics and integrity, and the HQCJ considers its recommendations when determining whether a prospective or sitting judge is suitable for to become a judge or to continue holding their position.
Relevant Courts
Constitutional Court of Ukraine (Конституційний Суд України, CCU): The CCU reviews the compatibility of law with the Constitution of Ukraine, as established in Chapter XII of the Constitution. If an applicant challenges the constitutionality of legal provisions on judicial integrity or the enforcement of corruption offences, the CCU can issue a ruling that may result in the amendment or repeal of the law or regulation, giving it significant power of the course of judicial reforms.
Supreme Court of Ukraine (Верховний Суд України, SCU): The SCU is the court of highest instance for all cases, including corruption cases, as specified in Article 125 of the Constitution. Its role and composition are outlined in more detail in Chapter II Section 5 of the LJSJ. The SCU also reviews appeals to the HQCJ (Article 88 of LJSJ and Article 22 of the Code of Administrative Procedure) and the HCJ (Article 79-6 of LJSJ) decisions on judicial career progression. This means that the SCU has significant power to influence implementation of judicial reforms. It also reviews the consistency of judicial decisions.
Sources: Constitution of Ukraine; Law of Ukraine on the Judiciary and Status of Judges; Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice; Law of Ukraine on the High Anti‑Corruption Court; Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine.
When it comes to judicial career progression there are three stages of integrity assurance – i) selection of the members of judicial governance bodies, ii) the selection, appointment and promotion of judges and iii) the disciplinary system for judges (see Figure 4.4). While it is a one-time occurrence, the qualification assessment of sitting judges is an additional process that aims to promote judicial integrity. Within each of these systems and processes, an array of judicial governance bodies is involved – including the HCJ, the HQCJ and “external” integrity assurance bodies such as the Ethics Council and the PIC. The COJ is also involved since it is responsible for judicial self-governance and the SCU and CCU adjudicate legal challenges.
In the long term, Ukraine could consider streamlining this institutional setup to make judicial career progression and the process of ensuring integrity therein more efficient. While judicial integrity has been a major objective of judicial reform since 2014, the increasingly complicated arrangements aimed at ensuring it and resistance to change from unreformed bodies have created bottlenecks in key judicial processes. For example, in 2019 the HQCJ was dissolved, and the HCJ’s members resigned rather than face 2021 reforms to the process of qualification assessment of sitting judges, necessitating the re-constitution of both bodies. However, a variety of factors including the need to form new selection bodies and select their members, the constitutional crisis triggered by a series of 2020 CCU decisions3 and the war in Ukraine has meant that the HQCJ and HCJ were not fully reconstituted until 2023. Thus, as of August 2024, more than 2000 judicial positions out of a total of around 7000 remained vacant (European Commission, 2024[19]). In the first half of 2024, the HCJ finalised recommendations for 400 candidates for first-instance courts based on the recommendations of the HQCJ. A similar selection process for 550 appellate court judges is underway but not complete as of December 2024 (HQCJ, 2024[20]). In light of the inefficiency a process that involves many institutions and steps, Ukraine could consider reducing the number of judicial governance bodies in the long term to ensure judicial career progression is not overly burdensome and does not deter qualified individuals from applying for judicial positions.
However, there is now increasing pressure to address such backlogs quickly. Filling 20% of overall judicial vacancies is a condition for unlocking a portion of the EUR 50 billion worth of grants and loans under the EU’s Ukraine Plan (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2024[21]). It is important that this urgency does not result in lax integrity standards, as filling positions quickly with judges of questionable integrity would result in many years of reform having little impact. Therefore, meaningful prioritisation is necessary.
Notes:
* Several different institutions appoint HCJ members according to their own rules and procedures.
** The qualification assessment only takes place to confirm the ability of a judicial candidate to administer justice in courts at the appellate level or higher, as well as for (qualification assessment of judges appointed prior to the 2016 constitutional amendments. This process can only result in dismissal for the latter category of judges, and this dismissal only occurs following a review and decision of the HCJ.
*** HCJ can also initiate a disciplinary investigation based on information received from HQCJ or on its own initiative.
**** Removal from office also happens automatically in defined circumstances, such as incapacitation or loss of Ukrainian citizenship.
Sources: Constitution of Ukraine; Law on the Judiciary and Status of Judges; Law on the High Council of Judges.
In the short term, prioritisation in judicial reform efforts may be more feasible and could still deliver impact. OECD standards promote a risk-based approach to integrity policy, as well as the key role of integrity leadership (OECD, 2020[5]). Nevertheless, the Venice Commission has noted4 in the past that judicial reform in Ukraine lacks a holistic approach and proper impact assessment. While the NACS includes a focus on the judiciary, not all measures in Ukraine’s 2021-2023 Strategy for the Development of the Justice System were implemented, and no formal assessment of implementation was carried out (European Commission, 2023[12]). A new strategy was under development as of December 2024 (Office of the President of Ukraine, 2024[22]), but while the draft version includes several objectives focused on improving judicial career progression, independence and integrity, it does not take a risk-based approach. Such an approach could help maximise the integrity benefits of limited resources. Ukraine could take a risk-based approach to justice system reform by focusing on improving integrity in positions that have substantial powers and therefore carry high integrity risks. This could include the following measures:
strengthening integrity safeguards applicable to institutions that can influence the course of reforms such as the CCU, SCU and the new Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC) and Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA)
reforming the COJ, which is the last major judicial self-governance body that has not been subject to any reforms
strengthening integrity safeguards applicable to positions responsible for the distribution of material and administrative resources, such as the leadership of the State Judicial Administration (SJA)
strengthening integrity safeguards among leadership in individual courts (court presidents).
A process to select new judges for the CCU is currently ongoing. A constitutional crisis in 2020 resulted in the retiring of most members of the court, thus leaving the court without enough judges to function (Freedom House, 2021[23]). The Verkhovna Rada adopted a law in 2023 agreeing on a process for re‑constituting the CCU in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission. The procedure is similar to those used for re-constituting the HACC, HCJ, and HQCJ, with the selection committee consisting of Ukrainian judges and international experts as part of the Advisory Group of Experts. There were seven vacancies in the CCU as of March 2025, and competitions were ongoing to fill the positions. Given the role of the CCU, Ukrainian authorities could prioritise completing the process of appointing new CCU judges in a timely, merit-based manner.
The SCU also stands out as a priority for reform, as evidenced by the corruption case against its former president (National Anti-Corruption Bureau, 2024[9]). It has also received criticism for obstructing judicial integrity checks through decisions5 that in the view of some stakeholders are legally inconsistent and unsound (Public Integrity Council, 2024[24]). The EU has reiterated the need to address corruption risks in this court (European Commission, 2024[19]) and in its 2024 enlargement report recommended temporarily involving international experts in verification of high court judges’ integrity declarations. Given 40 vacant positions in the SCU as of 2024 (Judiciary of Ukraine, 2024[25]), filling these positions with judges of high integrity could go a long way toward shifting the culture in the court. Ukrainian authorities could therefore prioritise organisation of an appointment process to fill these vacancies. An appointment process that involves international experts through the PCIE or another similar body would likely be the best model given the positive track record of this format in selecting judges for the HACC. Finally, the application of existing mechanisms for checking judicial integrity could help address corruption risks where they exist. These could include verification of judicial declarations of integrity and family ties that HQCJ can conduct under Article 62 of LJSJ, as well as disciplinary investigations, both of which are discussed later in this chapter.
In March 2025 the Verkhovna Rada adopted Law No. 4264-IX creating the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC) and Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA). These courts will have a unique position in the system of administrative courts, as they will be the courts of first and second instance for administrative cases – including disciplinary cases – involving central government officials. These courts will replace the District Administrative Court of Kyiv (DACK), which was liquidated because of corruption charges in December 2022 (European Commission, 2023[12]). An expert council consisting of three international experts and three judges proposed by the COJ will oversee the competition for positions in these new courts. Using the PCIE to select the SDAC and SACA’s judges, as was proposed in an earlier draft of the law and mirrors the good practice used for the selection of the HACC’s judges, may have better ensured appointees’ integrity and made more effective use of existing appointment bodies rather than creating more. Nonetheless, assuring that the expert council employs integrity-based selection for these courts remains paramount to avoid them falling prey to the same integrity concerns as the DACK.
The COJ is a judicial self-governance body that operates alongside the HCJ and HQCJ, and it plays a key role in several appointment processes, such as the one for the SDAC and SACA described above. However, the COJ is the only body that has not been the subject of judicial reform and attracts criticism from civil society for delaying the formation of key institutions like the Ethics Council and appointing candidates of questionable integrity to this and other institutions (Anti-Corruption Action Centre, 2024[26]). A draft law that would liquidate the COJ has been pending in the Verkhovna Rada since January 2023. Liquidation of the COJ would bring Ukraine’s judicial governance arrangements closer to European standards and Venice Commission recommendations of having a single judicial council, but it would also require reforms to several aspects of judicial governance and the transfer of the COJ’s functions to the HCJ and other bodies. In the short-term Ukrainian authorities could consider integrating more integrity safeguards into the appointment of COJ members, who as of now are elected by the Congress of Judges (which is in turn elected by judges in each court). This could help ensure that COJ members are well-equipped to carry out important integrity-related functions in the judiciary. It would also ensure that COJ members are held to the same integrity standard as members of other judicial governance bodies.
The SJA is the main body responsible for resource allocation in the judiciary. The SJA's high integrity risks have resulted in actual corruption cases. The NABU has charged the SJA’s last two chairmen with corruption (National Anti-Corruption Bureau, 2024[27]), which, as a minimum, demands ensuring integrity in future selections. The HCJ is responsible for appointing and dismissing the chairperson and must organise the selection process “in a competitive manner” (HCJ decision 141/0/15-19), but there are no further rules governing the process. The HCJ could therefore consider adopting a set of pre-defined objective criteria for the selection of candidates for the head of the SJA. The HCJ could also introduce additional mechanisms for transparency and consultation of other actors into current and future selection processes for the leadership of the SJA, as this could ensure more external scrutiny.
There is currently no merit-based procedure governing the election of court presidents, who are elected by judges within their court without any defined criteria and in practice have often manipulated procedures to stay in office longer than the prescribed two terms (OECD, 2024[15]). In the absence of a merit-based procedure, the process of appointing court presidents may become a tool for rewarding loyalty to the judicial hierarchy. Court presidents selected in this way may use their positions of influence to encourage judges serving under them to behave unethically. The COJ and HCJ could therefore also consider creating a procedure that would apply objective criteria to the selection of court presidents.
4.2.2. Judicial authorities could improve the effectiveness of judicial integrity checks through a consistent methodology that is based on objective and clear criteria and substantiated and transparent reasoning
International standards recognise integrity checks of judicial candidates as legitimate although difficult to implement. The main challenge is to operationalise integrity and related concepts. The Council of Europe stresses that whatever criteria are used to test the integrity of a judge, they should be as objective as possible and ensure the independence, integrity and impartiality of judicial appointees. For sitting judges, asset and/or interest declarations can be useful in flagging when judges have used their position to illegally enrich or advantage themselves. In addition to ensuring the checks themselves are of high quality, GRECO urges judicial authorities to ensure integrity checks transparent and ensuring decisions are reasoned to encourage public trust in the process (CoE, 2021[28]).
Under Chapter V of the LJSJ, integrity checks are a key component of the qualification assessment process in Ukraine (Box 4.2 outlines how integrity checks are conducted in Ukraine). While this process forms a piece of the larger selection and appointment process, since 2016 the LJSJ has also required all sitting judges appointed prior to 2016 to undergo an ad hoc qualification assessment. If judges are found lacking in either competence or integrity, they can be dismissed. The Venice Commission has acknowledged the necessity of such a process for instigating cultural change in the judiciaries of Ukraine and other countries (Venice Commission, 2022[29]).
Several Ukrainian regulations govern the process of checking judicial integrity, namely:
The Constitution of Ukraine:
Chapter XV Art. 16-1 para. 4 establishes that a procedure will be established to assess the competence and integrity of judges appointed before 2016.
Law on the Judiciary and Status of Judges (LJSJ):
Chapter V establishes a procedure whereby the HQCJ conducts a qualification assessment to assess judges’ competence, professional ethics and integrity. The first step of this process is a qualification exam, and the second step consists of a review of a judge’s file (contents specified in Art. 85) and an interview. Under Art. 87 the PIC reviews judges’ compliance with criteria of professional ethics and integrity. Art. 88 establishes that the HQCJ cannot overturn a negative PIC opinion without the support of at least nine members.
Article 79-6 establishes that the HCJ appoints judges based on the HQCJ’s recommendations and can only overturn them in the event of reasonable doubt regarding the candidate's compliance with the criteria of integrity or professional ethics or other circumstances that may negatively affect public trust in the judiciary in connection with such an appointment or violation of the procedure for appointment to the position of a judge defined by law. It is noteworthy that the HCJ does not have the right to overturn negative decisions of the HQCJ. However, the vagueness of this provision also leaves the HCJ ample room to erroneously refuse appointing judges of high integrity.
Chapter XII Art. 20 also establishes that judges appointed prior to 2016 must undergo an equivalent HQCJ assessment of suitability for their position. However Supreme Court decision no. 9901/198/20 of 13 June 2024 asserted that this check is a different procedure from the qualification assessment procedure. Regardless of the legal reasoning, this has created a situation in which there is a risk of inconsistency between integrity checks of judicial candidates and integrity checks of sitting judges.
Unified indicators for assessing the integrity and professional ethics of a judge (HCJ decision no. 3659/0/15-24):
After consultations with the HQCJ, COJ and PIC, the HCJ adopted these indicators on 17 December 2024, thereby replacing the set of 14 indicators that the HQCJ and PIC had agreed upon in November 2023. Chapter III of this regulation establishes seven indicators that responsible authorities must use when assessing judicial integrity in the context of selection of candidates for judicial positions, namely independence, impartiality, adherence to ethical standards and impeccable behaviour in professional activities and personal life, honestly, conscientiousness, incorruptibility and legality of the sources of origin of property, compliance of the standard of living of the judge (candidate for the position of judge) or his family members with the declared income, compliance of the judge's (candidate for the position of judge) lifestyle with his status. These indicators are fleshed out in more detail in Art. 15-23, and the non‑compliance with any one indicator could be grounds for disqualification.
There are however notable gaps in the new set of indicators. Under Art. 10 of this regulation, facts and circumstances that were “properly assessed” by previous integrity checks which involved international experts during competitions for judicial positions cannot be assessed again by future integrity checks unless new information comes to light. Given acknowledged past shortcomings of integrity checks in the Ukrainian judiciary and the non-decisive influence of international experts in most appointment processes, barring certain actions from examination in the context of competitions for future positions risks absolving judges of integrity concerns forever, especially since there is no formal procedure for determining if a judge’s integrity was “properly assessed”.
Art. 8 also excludes anonymous reports from the evidence that can be considered as part of the process of assessing integrity (“anonymous reports are not considered”), which effectively excludes information provided by anonymous whistle-blowers. This is inconsistent with the LPC, which in Art. 53 establishes that whistle-blowers may submit anonymous reports as long as the information is verifiable. While the requirement for information to be verifiable should still apply, categorically excluding anonymous reports from judicial integrity checks could deprive the authorities conducting the checks of an important source of evidence.
Sources: Constitution of Ukraine; Law of Ukraine on the Judiciary and Status of Judges; Unified indicators for assessing the integrity and professional ethics of a judge (HCJ decision no. 3659/0/15-24).
Nevertheless, the many legal challenges to elements of the integrity screening process have created delays. In addition, nearly half of the judges that have already undergone qualification assessment did so under the old composition of the HQCJ and HCJ when integrity checks were not of high quality. Unclear methodologies and institutional disagreements have also stymied the effectiveness of the current process.
Since the HQCJ and HCJ resumed the qualification assessment process in 2023, the major challenge to the effectiveness of the process has been the repeated disagreement between these bodies and the PIC on how to assess judges’ integrity. The HQCJ can only overturn PIC decisions with a 2/3 majority, but the HCJ can overturn HQCJ decisions with a simple majority in defined circumstances. As of November 2024, the HQCJ had overturned 50 PIC negative opinions and only recommended dismissal of 36 judges6 (see Figure 4.5), and the HCJ had only removed six judges7 (High Council of Justice, 2024[30]). While in some instances there may be legitimate reasons for overruling the PIC, the frequency with which this happens is concerning, particularly since despite a requirement to include reasoning in its decisions as per Art. 101 of LJSJ, the HQCJ’s reasoning is often not clear in practice (Dejure Foundation, 2024[31]). Theme 2.4 of the NACS recognises the need to address problems inherent in this procedure (NACP, 2021[32]).
Note: Data as of November 2024.
Source: Data provided by High Qualification Commission for Judges.
Many stakeholders have attributed this institutional disagreement to the lack of agreed criteria for assessing judicial integrity. However, given that the PIC and HQCJ already agreed to a common set of criteria in 2023 (Dejure Foundation, 2024[33]), this cannot be the sole explanation. Some stakeholders and observers have pointed to inconsistent application of the criteria that results in arbitrary overturning of PIC decisions (OECD, 2024[15]), as well as integrity concerns with the HQCJ’s secretariat, as additional obstacles. The different compositions and viewpoints of the actors involved are also likely to play a role, which again speaks to the need to simplify the institutional framework.
To ameliorate the situation the HCJ adopted the Unified Indicators for Assessing Judicial Integrity and Professional Ethics of a Judge on 17 December 2024. Box 4.2 outlines some shortcomings of these indicators related to re-assessing judicial integrity and considering evidence from anonymous whistleblowers. To ensure the new procedure does not undermine accountability for integrity violations, the HCJ could consider amending it such that integrity checks can reconsider actions already considered in past checks for a proportionate period of time and anonymous reports from whistleblowers can be used as evidence if the information in them is verifiable.
There also already appear to be issues with the application of the new criteria. One example is the HCJ’s recent decision no. 21/0/15-25. While the case deals with a judge’s travel to Russia and occupied Crimea, which is not an integrity issue, and this report does not seek to comment on the merits of this particular case, the case demonstrates that the HCJ has broad leeway to interpret vague wording in the indicators. As the HCJ builds case law related to the indicators through its decisions, it could consider amending the wording in the indicators to make it more precise. It could also consider publishing consolidated summaries of case law in this area to clarify what is expected of judges, as the Council of Europe recommended when providing feedback on the initial draft of the indicators (CoE, 2024[34]).
The long-running focus on criteria has also obscured other issues with the assessment of judicial integrity. Civil society has noted that the HQCJ often provides little or unclear reasoning when overturning PIC decisions (Dejure Foundation, 2024[31]). This undermines the effectiveness of the progress as well as transparency and the degree to which civil society can provide an effective check on judicial integrity. The HQCJ could therefore consider producing internal guidance demonstrating how to draft high-quality reasoning for its decisions. Additional resources and capacity-building efforts for the HQCJ and PIC may also be necessary to ensure that integrity checks are of high quality.
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity highlights the key role of organisational leadership in displaying and communicating integrity standards (OECD, 2017[1]), and it is therefore a positive step that the HQCJ has decided to appoint new leadership for its secretariat (HQCJ, 2024[35]). Going forward the HQCJ could consider ensuring that the secretariat’s new leadership demonstrates a commitment to integrity by testing their knowledge and application of ethical standards as part of the appointment process. Other internal measures could also prove useful. The HQCJ could for example organise trainings for secretariat staff both on integrity generally and on analysing the competence and integrity of judicial candidates. This could improve both staff members’ own ethical behaviour and their ability to produce high-quality analysis that allows the HQCJ to make informed decisions. Such training may also benefit from the expertise of judicial councils and selection commissions in other countries.
The HQCJ could consider incorporating integrity-related questions into its interviews during the qualification assessment and including conclusions in its published decisions. In particular, the use of hypothetical questions on integrity could help elucidate how a candidate would behave on the job in a way that a review of documents cannot. Beyond a review of a prospective judge’s past activity, the interview that the HQCJ conducts also presents an opportunity to evaluate candidates’ integrity that past HQCJ decisions (see for instance HQCJ decision 323/ds-24 of 12 March 2024) suggest is currently under-utilised. The HQCJ’s decision no. 20/zp-25 of 22 January 2025 recently approved a regulation that fleshes out the qualification assessment process in more detail, but under this regulation (in particular paragraph 6.21), interviews still focus on confirmation of facts and checking compliance with the law rather than analysing ethical knowledge or hypothetical behaviour. Box 4.3 outlines methods that OECD countries use to test the integrity of candidates for civil service positions, and the HQCJ could apply several of these methods to its interviews with judges.
Testing for integrity, moral reasoning or other values is a practice used in some countries, either across civil service or within specific organisations (as is the case in Australia, in the intelligence and national security agencies). This complex discipline requires support from qualified psychological experts. Line managers and/or human resources specialists are not likely to be equipped with the right skills, particularly for positions of higher ethical intensity. The following tools have been used by public organisations and provide examples of how this could be implemented:
use of uniform curriculum vitae formats, allowing to apply integrity filters to ease identification of suitable candidates
pre-screening integrity test (e.g. online), personality tests or similar examinations, as a first step to be considered for the position, and/or as input into the final decision
interview questions asking candidates to reflect on ethical role models they have had previously in the workplace, and/or to discuss ethical dilemmas they have faced and how they reacted to them
situational judgement tests and questions that present candidates with a morally ambiguous situation and have them explain their moral reasoning
role-play simulations and gamification to be conducted in an assessment centre
reference checks which include questions related to ethical decision making and assessment from peers in previous positions on the ethical nature of the person and their ability to manage others ethically
questions that enable the candidate to demonstrate awareness of and model moral management behaviour.
Source: OECD (2020[5]), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
4.2.3. Ukrainian authorities could improve accountability by strengthening the disciplinary systems for judges
The disciplinary system is one way of ensuring judicial accountability, although it is worth noting that judges can also be held accountable through criminal proceedings for corruption offences, which are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Ukraine has recognised the role of an effective judicial disciplinary system in ensuring accountability through recent reforms. The disciplinary chamber of the HCJ is competent for all judicial disciplinary cases and 2023 amendments to the LJSJ established a service of disciplinary inspectors that conducts preliminary investigations. Under the current procedure, the HCJ can initiate an investigation on its own initiative or based on a citizen complaint, and HQCJ can also prompt the HCJ to initiate an investigation. The disciplinary process then proceeds as outlined in Figure 4.4. However, challenges remain relating to the timeliness and effectiveness of the disciplinary system.
While HCJ’s service of disciplinary inspectors is up and running as of December 2024 (High Council of Justice, 2024[36]), this unit will only promote meaningful accountability in practice if it is staffed with competent inspectors who themselves promote integrity, so ensuring such that the recruitment process functions well is paramount. Furthermore, as of November 2024, there was a backlog of 13 081 judicial disciplinary cases (Judiciary of Ukraine, 2024[37]), many of which are nearing the end of the statute of limitations (European Commission, 2023[12]). Clearing 20% of the outstanding cases is a condition of the EU’s Ukraine Plan (as is having the service of disciplinary inspectors in place). The HCJ approved a risk-based approach to prioritising disciplinary cases in November 2023 via HCJ decision no. 1068/0/15-23. This regulation establishes that disciplinary proceedings against judges will be carried out in chronological order from the date of receipt with priority for cases involving:
more severe offences (those that may result in the judge’s dismissal)
judges undergoing qualification assessment
actions that created “significant public interest”.
It may be more effective to process cases according to when the statute of limitation expires, not when the complaint was received. To this end, the HCJ could consider amending decision no. 1068/0/15-23 to also make cases nearing the end of the statute of limitations a criterion for priority when determining the order in which to process cases. While the HCJ will process cases in chronological order from the date of receipt, not all complaints are submitted at the same time in relation to when the offence was committed.
Longer statutes of limitations and investigation times may also be warranted for more serious offences. Article 109 paragraph 11 of the LJSJ establishes a statute of limitations of three years for all disciplinary offences, and the HCJ’s disciplinary chamber has 18 months to process disciplinary cases according to Article 49 paragraph 15 of the Law on the High Council of Justice. Since some cases are more serious and complex than others, Ukrainian authorities could consider amending these laws such that the statutes of limitations and investigation times for disciplinary offences vary according to the severity of the offence.
Disciplinary offences should be defined clearly in the law to ensure the fairness of proceedings (OECD, 2020[5]). Ukrainian authorities could therefore consider amending Article 97 of the LJSJ to define disciplinary offences related to judicial conduct more precisely. To ensure legal clarity and consistency, such changes should mirror changes to the Code of Judicial Ethics. The vagueness of terms such as “conduct which disgraces the status of a judge or undermines the authority of justice” and “compliance with other norms of judicial ethics and standards of conduct which ensure public trust in courts” risks both opening the door for the weaponisation of the disciplinary process and preventing judges from ever be disciplined for ethical violations (GRECO, 2016[38]). GRECO’s recommendation on defining disciplinary offences for judges more precisely has stood for eight years but remains only partially implemented (GRECO, 2025[39]). The HCJ has set up two working groups on harmonising disciplinary practice, and this topic is addressed in the State Anti‑Corruption Programme (expected strategic results 2.1.3.2 and 2.1.3.3), but necessary legislative amendments have yet to be enacted.
If the disciplinary system is to function fairly and effectively, it is important that judges and complainants have equal rights to appeal the disciplinary chamber’s decisions to prevent impunity, and the same individuals should not be responsible for both deciding on a case and approving an appeal. Ukrainian authorities could therefore also consider amending Article 89 of the LJSJ to ensure appeal requests are decided by an independent party and grant complainants the same rights to appeal disciplinary chamber decisions as judges. It is a procedural issue if the disciplinary chamber of the HCJ rejects a disciplinary case in the first instance, the approval of the same disciplinary chamber members is necessary to appeal, which undermines the ability of the disciplinary system to effectively hold judges to account. While a case challenging this procedure reached the CCU, the Court ultimately refused to open proceedings. In practice, this loophole has resulted in disciplinary cases against judges being dropped without appeal (Dejure Foundation, 2024[40]).
Just as in other branches of government, relying solely on accountability mechanisms to address corruption in the judiciary is inefficient and ineffective because it only addresses corruption once the damage has already been done and assumes that sanctions are sufficient to deter future corruption. To build trust and ensure that the justice system handles corruption cases effectively, the judiciary also needs to prevent violations of public integrity. This requires ensuring that judges are well-equipped to understand, identify and respond to ethical challenges that they encounter in the context of their work.
Theme 2.4 of the NACS recognises a need to improve the implementation of integrity standards for judges in Ukraine. There are several ways to build and maintain a culture of integrity in the judiciary in day-to-day work. Such measures can help shift the responsibility for acting with integrity from control bodies like those responsible for the appointment and disciplinary process onto the judges themselves, thereby allowing the judiciary to take a more preventative approach to anti‑corruption. Preventative measures to strengthen judicial integrity are elaborated in the recommendations below and can include:
adopting and disseminating a code of conduct
training on judicial ethics (including during general legal education)
mechanisms for resolving conflicts of interest
a whistleblower protection framework.
4.3.1. The COJ and the National School of Judges could support the implementation of the newly adopted ethical standards by raising awareness and promoting good practice
Codes of conduct and ethics clarify expected behaviour for any category of public officials. These codes tend to be more effective when they are clear, simple, logically structured, and linked to all other related documents or legislation that form part of the wider integrity system (OECD, 2020[5]). Judicial conduct should also be guided by a code of conduct or ethics, which serves several purposes. When designed well, the code can guide judges’ behaviour, provide the judiciary with a framework for regulating judicial conduct and offer the public a standard by which to measure judicial conduct. The UN Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct recognise six core fundamental values, including integrity. The Bologna and Milan Global Code of Judicial Ethics provide more details about judicial integrity and covers topics like extrajudicial activities, judicial conflicts of interest and post-judicial activities (UNODC, 2018[41]; 2010[8]; International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace, 2015[42]).
Codes of conduct and ethics are effective if developed with input from judges themselves to increase ownership and, therefore, compliance. Such codes should also be reviewed and updated periodically to address emerging ethical challenges. In addition to ownership, judges should understand and apply the codes in practice. It is, therefore, important that institutional mechanisms to ensure that the code is understood and adhered to are in place. Judges should periodically receive training on ethics that not only educates them about ethical principles but also provides judges with a forum to discuss ethical dilemmas based on their own experiences (UNODC, 2015[43]). Figure 4.6 outlines ways of making ethical standards effective.
Ukraine adopted a revised Code of Judicial Ethics in September 2024, which addressed many gaps in the previous code, which dated to 2013 and did not reflect the many ways in which the Ukrainian judiciary has evolved since the 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution. The revised code draws on international standards for judicial conduct and introduces several important changes, including:
an increased focus on judges’ responsibilities including not only compliance with the law but also upholding ethical principles (Article 1)
a requirement to avoid perceived ethical violations in addition to actual ethical violations (Article 3)
more stringent provisions on public statements and handling of confidential information (Article 12)
stronger restrictions on relations and communication with court participants outside of court proceedings (Article 14)
rules on the use of AI by judges (Article 16)
a more explicit requirement to behave with integrity in the course of duties not related to court proceedings, such as activities related to judicial self-government (Article 17)
more explicit provisions on integrity in extrajudicial activities, including political activities and social media use (Articles 18-21).
The next step is to spread knowledge and awareness of these new standards given that awareness of ethical standards in the Ukrainian judiciary remains low. Analysis of selected court cases related to judicial integrity in 2021 revealed that such cases often suffer from the judges adjudicating them failing to hold their colleagues accountable for ethical violations because there is no legal definition of concepts like integrity (Dejure Foundation, 2021[44]). However, integrity is difficult to define legally, and if judges were to internalise the general principles that contribute to integrity instead of taking an overly legalistic approach it could contribute both to improved adherence to such principles and sanctioning of behaviours with unclear definitions.
With the support of international donors, the amount of training offered on integrity and ethics is increasing. The National School of Judges is responsible for co-ordinating this training, and the COJ has also created a code of conduct committee that is responsible for issuing advice to judges. An example of such co‑operation has been the Council of Europe’s trainings for judges organised under the “Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals (HELP) for Ukraine, including during wartime” programme. These trainings provided interactive ethics training to judges, prosecutors and lawyers that addressed both international standards and ECtHR case law as well as applications in the Ukrainian context. To ensure continued improvement in judges’ awareness and knowledge the National School of Judges and the COJ could continue engaging with international partners to hone good practices.
However, there is also a ceiling to how effective training from international experts can be. Due to the sheer quantity8 of judges in Ukraine and the opt-in nature of such training, it will never reach all judges and is perhaps unlikely to reach those who need it most. It is therefore also worth contemplating how the Ukrainian judiciary can build its own internal capacity when it comes to knowledge of ethical standards.
As a starting point, the COJ and the National School of Judges could identify judges in different levels of the court system and regions of the country who have been active participants in integrity trainings or otherwise possess a solid understanding of the principles set out in the new Code of Judicial Ethics. They could then work with these judges and their home courts to establish a network of integrity “ambassadors” who can offer training and support within these courts. Alternatively, court presidents could have this responsibility. This network of judges could also have periodic opportunities to network with each other and share experiences and challenges, thereby contributing to mainstreaming of judicial integrity efforts and more timely and effective diffusion of ethical knowledge throughout the judiciary.
4.3.2. The Ministry of Education and Science and Ministry of Internal Affairs could support judicial integrity by pursuing integrity reforms in legal education
Beyond ethics training for judges, a major component of cultivating judicial integrity is the legal education that lawyers receive before they become judges. To help ensure that judges behave with integrity and internalise important ethical principles early on, their legal education should not only teach the value of integrity issues but also be free from corruption. Thus, reducing both opportunities for and incentives toward corruption throughout all stages of legal education can contribute to judicial integrity in the long term. Depending on the stage in education, there are several ways to ensure integrity (see Figure 4.7).
Corruption has historically been prevalent in Ukrainian higher education (Moraru, 2018[45]). Ukrainian authorities have taken several steps to address this problem. Standardised testing is now in place for entrance exams to both bachelor’s and master’s programmes in law, and the Unified State Qualification Exam for lawyers (an exit exam) was administered for the first time in 2023. The Ministry of Education and Science (Міністерство освіти і науки, MES) has capitalised on these reforms to adopt new standardised admission rules for higher education generally (Dejure Foundation, 2024[46]). Codes of honour and student-led ethics committees have also had a positive impact on instilling a culture of integrity early in one’s university career, although these may be ineffective as long as universities continue to face acute financial constraints that may incentivise corruption (Moraru, 2018[45]). See Box 4.4 for more information on how behavioural insights have helped combat corruption in Ukrainian legal education.
An experiment conduced on law students in Ukraine has already shown that integrity training can be effective in shifting attitudes towards corruption and even behaviours in certain circumstances. To study the effects of integrity education a group of researchers conducted an experiment whereby they randomly assigned one group of Ukrainian law students to participate in an interactive integrity training programme, in which the other group (control group) did not participate. The researchers then used surveys and an experimental game to gauge both the attitudes of students in the two groups to corruption and their likelihood to engage in corruption if the opportunity presented itself. The results of the experiment showed that integrity training had an impact in changing attitudes toward corruption. However, it only had a significant impact on corrupt behaviour in situations where non-integrity trained students knew they were playing the game alongside integrity trained students. This suggests that peer pressure and building around integrity champions could be useful in combatting corruption in higher education.
Source: Borcan, O. et al. (2023[47]), “Right in the middle: A field experiment on the role of integrity training and norms in combating corruption”, University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series, No. 2023-05, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.
Other integrity challenges in legal education go beyond the high corruption risks in examination. Around 20% of Ukrainian law students, who could in the future become judges, currently do not study in universities but instead in law enforcement academies that often do not abide by the same quality standards for legal education (Anti-Corruption Action Centre, 2024[26]). This practice is not followed in EU countries and despite only educating 20% of students, these institutions receive 60% of state funding for legal education. Law enforcement academies also enjoy certain exemptions from standardised examinations and contain unique integrity risks, as mentioned in stakeholder consultations. For example, the need for enrolling students to pass a physical examination is more subjective and therefore prone to attempted bribery instigated both by students and examiners.
To address these risks the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Міністерство внутрішніх справ, MIA), which oversees these academies, could also consider re-defining their focus so that they train law enforcement officers but do not accredit lawyers. Such a change could also contribute to a better understanding of the differences in roles and responsibilities between judges and law enforcement by ensuring that future judges do not receive their legal education in institutions that may be by nature biased in favour of the prosecution.
4.3.3. Ukrainian authorities could increase judicial integrity by improving conflict-of-interest management
One core tenet of judicial integrity is the need for judges to avoid conflicts of interest that may lead them to make biased decisions. For example, a judge may be called to hear a case involving a family member or business associate, which could result in real or perceived bias in that party’s favour. An effective conflict-of-interest system for judges involves both provisions on how to resolve conflicts of interest – either procedurally via recusals or otherwise – and provisions requiring the disclosure of financial and non-financial interests. While the former category of provisions helps judges to proactively avoid conflicts of interest, the latter category is useful to assist in the detection and enforcement of violations when they occur (UNODC, 2015[43]). As noted in Chapter 2 with regard to civil servants, judicial conflict of interest regulations should also address perceived conflicts of interest, as these can be just as damaging to public trust in the judicial system (UNODC, 2019[48]).
Ukrainian authorities could strengthen judicial conflict-of-interest management by clarifying institutional responsibilities
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity promotes clear and coherent standards and institutional responsibilities for integrity policy (OECD, 2017[1]). However, the various legal requirements for managing judicial conflict of interest have resulted in a system for managing judicial conflict of interest that is highly fragmented and contains gaps. Under Chapter VII of the LPC, the NACP uses asset and interest declarations to conduct lifestyle monitoring, but while the NACP has developed a procedure for verification of judicial declarations, the HCJ and CCU have yet to accept it (European Commission, 2024[19]). The system also allows detecting conflict-of-interest violations for enforcement purposes, but the disclosure system is currently not used for conflict-of-interest prevention purposes (see Section 2.3 on the disclosure system). The HQCJ can also check the accuracy of declarations of integrity and family ties (see Box 4.5 for more information), but there is no link between this process and the resolution of conflict of interest. Declarations of integrity also merely affirm that a judge is complying with ethical standards but only declarations of family ties contain supporting information about a judge’s relations and activities, which is not conducive to monitoring. On the other hand, the COJ is responsible for resolving judicial conflict of interest but has few means of detecting a judicial conflict of interest unless a judge complies with the notification requirement. This means that there is effectively no way of monitoring if a judge did not comply with the requirement to resolve a conflict-of-interest situation short of a civil society or media investigation (see Box 4.5).
There are several relevant regulations governing the prevention and management of judicial conflicts of interest in Ukraine, but the framework includes several gaps. These include:
Law on Prevention of Corruption (LPC): Judges are included in the requirement to prevent and resolve conflict of interest under Article 28 of this law. However, Article 35-1 establishes that the procedure for doing so for judges is that outlined in the LJSJ. Under Article 28 the NACP also retains an advisory function for all public officials who have doubts about whether they are in a conflict-of-interest situation, including judges. Article 45 obliges judges to submit asset declarations to the NACP, which has the power to verify these declarations and conduct lifestyle monitoring in accordance with general provisions in Article 51-4. Judges have administrative liability for not complying with asset declaration requirements under Chapter 13-A. Under Article 52-2, the HCJ and CCU must consent to any verification or monitoring procedure, and both bodies effectively retain the right to stop any verification or monitoring that constitutes “illegal influence, pressure or interference with the activity of a judge” as defined in Article 6.
Law on the Judiciary and Status of Judges (LJSJ): Article 133 paragraph 10 of this law establishes that when it is not possible to resolve an actual or potential conflict of interest via procedural law (i.e. via recusal), the judge must notify the COJ. In 2016 the COJ established a Committee for Ethics, Settlement of Conflict of Interest and Professional Development of Judges to carry out this function, and under Article 106 of the LJSJ, judges incur disciplinary liability for failing to notify this committee. Articles 61 and 62 also require that judges submit declarations of integrity and family ties to the HQCJ. However, as noted in the next item this system has a monitoring gap.
Council of Judges decision 02/04/2016 no. 2: Article 8 of this regulation establishes a voluntary interest disclosure scheme for judges. Article 11 empowers the COJ to conduct monitoring of judicial conflicts of interest, but while the COJ can carry out investigations and review the voluntarily submitted interest declarations, there are few practical means to detect conflicts of interest unless a judge complies with the requirement to notify the COJ.
Criminal Code of Ukraine: Article 366-2 establishes that declaring false information in an asset declaration is a criminal offence, thereby establishing criminal liability for judges in this area as well.
Sources: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2015[49]), Law on Corruption Prevention 1700-VII, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1700-18#top; Law of Ukraine on the Judiciary and Status of Judges; Decision 02/04/2016 no. 2 of the Council of Judges of Ukraine; Criminal Code of Ukraine.
Given that the NACP must already inform the HCJ or CCU about any ongoing verification of declarations or the lifestyle monitoring under Article 52-2 of the LPC, Ukrainian authorities could expand this provision to require that the NACP informs the COJ about potential judicial conflict of interest that are detected so that the COJ, which is responsible for resolving judicial conflict of interest, can then proceed with resolving them. Ukrainian authorities could similarly amend articles 61 and 62 of the LJSJ such that the declarations submitted to the HQCJ contribute to the resolution of judicial conflict of interest.
Streamlining the various declarations that judges must submit could also improve the clarity and cohesiveness of the process. While the declarations submitted to the HQCJ serve an important function in supporting its integrity checks, the COJ’s voluntary disclosure scheme serves little purpose so long as it remains voluntary, and the COJ could consider abolishing it. This would also free up resources currently expended on checking declarations that only judges with integrity are likely to submit with accurate information, thereby allowing the COJ to instead use them for overseeing the resolution of conflict of interest. As mentioned in the previous section, reducing the number of judicial self-governance institutions by merging the COJ into the HCJ could prove more efficient and combat fragmentation in the long term.
There is also a need to clarify institutional responsibilities surrounding integrity advice, including conflict-of-interest management. Conflicting advice on addressing integrity concerns or ethical dilemmas is a common challenge to ensuring to the effectiveness of this advice (OECD, 2020[5]). Several Ukrainian stakeholders nevertheless noted that in practice the COJ sometimes oversteps its legal mandate for resolving judicial conflict of interest and issues advice on interpretation of standards, which the NACP representatives explained sometimes contradicts the NACP’s advice. This runs the risk of making judges unsure of which advice they should follow and worsening rather than improving understanding of integrity issues in the judiciary. The COJ could therefore consider issuing internal guidance to its members and guidance to judges that any requests for advice should be directed to the NACP in line with its legal mandate. Figure 4.8 summarises the solutions that could help improve the clarity and effectiveness of the judicial conflict of interest system.
Ukrainian authorities could strengthen judicial conflict-of-interest management by improving procedures for judicial recusal
In addition to unclear roles and responsibilities, there are also procedural obstacles to effective conflict-of-interest management for judges. Article 133 of the LJSJ establishes that judges bear responsibility for resolving procedural conflict of interest themselves. However, while judges are expected to recuse themselves if they find themselves in a conflict-of-interest situation while hearing a case, procedural challenges remain when a judge does not do so and one of the parties subsequently motions for the judge’s recusal. In these situations, judges are still involved in deciding on their own recusal when presiding collegially under Article 81 of the CPC, increasing the risk that a conflict of interest will not be resolved.
Ukrainian authorities could therefore consider amendments to Article 81 of the CPC that would require an independent party – such as at the very least a panel of other judges – to decide on requests for a judge’s recusal and advise recusal in situations of perceived conflict of interest. Box 4.6 provides examples of impartial methods for deciding on judicial recusal that other European countries employ. Such a solution would ensure that there are still effective safeguards when a judge does not abide by the obligation to manage a conflict of interest, which is especially important in a judiciary with a history of corruption and low awareness of ethical standards.
Numerous European countries have developed solutions for deciding on a motion for a judge to recuse himself or herself without that judge’s involvement. While the solution is not always the same for criminal, civil, administrative and other types of cases, some examples from criminal law include:
Austria: The court president decides. If the request concerns the court president, a panel of three other judges in the same court decides (Article 44-45, Code of Criminal Procedure).
Belgium: The court immediately higher in rank than that to which the judge in question belongs decides (Article 838, Judicial Code).
France: The court immediately higher in rank than that to which the judge in question belongs decides (Article 669-672, Code of Criminal Procedure).
Germany: The same court decides without the judge in question’s participation (Article 27, Code of Criminal Procedure).
Italy: For judges in first-instance courts the court immediately higher in rank (Court of Appeals) decides. For higher courts, another chamber of the same court decides (Article 40, Code of Criminal Procedure).
The Netherlands: A multi-member panel of the same court decides without the judge in question’s participation (Article 518, Code of Criminal Procedure).
Poland: A multi-member panel of judges in the same court decides without the judge in question’s participation (Article 42, Code of Criminal Procedure).
Spain: There is a two-tiered system whereby one judge decides on the admissibility of the motion and another decides on recusal. While these arrangements vary from court to court, both judges generally come from the same court as the judge in question (Article 221-225, Organic Law on Judicial Power).
It should however be noted that judiciaries in several European countries have observed increases in abuse of motions for a judge’s recusal, thereby requiring clear and specific provisions governing the admissibility of such motions.
Sources: Sonnemans, J. et al. (2018[50]), “An economic approach on countering the misuse of the right to challenge judges: An experiment”, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-016-9539-y; Giesen, I. et al. (2012[51]), “De wrakingsprocedure: Een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden tot herziening van de Nederlandse wrakingsprocedure [The recusal procedure: A comparative legal study into the possibilities for revision of the Dutch recusal procedure]”, Raad voor de Rechtspraak, The Hague, the Netherlands; listed laws.
Finally, increased transparency regarding the recusal of judges could also help increase accountability for conflict of interest, and with it, public trust in the judiciary. Jurisdictions such as Scotland have established user-friendly transparency portals summarising all judicial recusals and the reasons therefor (Judiciary of Scotland, 2024[52]). The Ukrainian judiciary could consider employing a similar solution.
4.3.4. Judicial authorities could cultivate a culture of openness by connecting all courts and judicial governance bodies to the Unified Whistleblower Notification Portal without delay
Ensuring that it is safe to report a suspected integrity violation is a key component of a culture of openness (OECD, 2017[1]). International standards make the stress the need for whistleblowing channels for the judiciary to promote judicial integrity. Indeed, Article 4 of EU Directive 2019/1937, which sets common standards on whistleblower protection for all EU member states, establishes that it applies to “reporting persons working in the private or public sector who acquired information on breaches in a work-related context.” Although Article 3(3) of the Directive specifies that its implementation shall not affect the application of EU or national law on the secrecy of judicial deliberations, the Directive is also clear that judges should have their own internal and external9 reporting channels. In addition, in the UK, the Supreme Court case of Gilham v. Ministry of Justice affirmed that judges have whistleblower protections stemming from the ECHR.
As Chapter 6 sets out, Ukraine has taken steps to improve its whistleblowing framework, and many of these advances apply to whistleblowing in the judiciary. Indeed, the judiciary is now subject to the overall public sector whistleblower protection framework overseen by the NACP established in Chapter VIII of the LPC, which establishes the Unified Whistleblower Notification Portal (UWNP) as both an internal reporting channel and a regular reporting channel for all state bodies. The UWNP is a unified IT solution, allowing whistleblowers to make a disclosure either through an internal channel to the authorised person in the institution where they work or to bodies authorised to act as regular reporting channels (NACP, NABU, national police or SBI). The SJA is connected to the portal as of May 2024, and NACP order 93/24 of 11 April 2024 established a new procedure for connecting judicial bodies to the portal. The SJA is responsible for connecting district and appellate courts to the portal, while the heads of the CCU, SCU, HACC, other specialised courts, HCJ and HQCJ are responsible for connecting their courts. The HCJ has been connected to the UNWP since September 2023. These are positive steps, not least because in the context of its EU accession Ukraine will need to bring its whistleblower protection framework in line with EU Directive 2019/1937 by implementing, among other things, viable internal and external reporting channels for all public bodies.
In addition, while Article 53-1 of the LPC establishes an obligation for state bodies – including courts – to establish channels for internal whistleblowing and NACP order 93/24 of 11 April 2024 establishes a procedure whereby judicial bodies can connect to the UWNP, there is no clear accountability mechanism for judicial bodies that do not do so, which means that the majority of them remain disconnected. In addition, while some judicial bodies have set up their own internal reporting procedures, as long as they remain detached from the UWNP there are risks of confusion about channels available to judges and risks that handling of judges’ internal whistleblowing complaints is not held to the same quality standard.
Ukraine should therefore ensure that all judicial bodies connect to the UWNP as quickly as possible, to guarantee that judicial whistleblowers have access to an internal reporting channel (UWNP guarantees a regular/external channel for all public officials). The SJA is proceeding with connecting district and appellate courts to the portal (State Judicial Administration, 2024[53]). As of March 2025, in addition to its own territorial departments, the SJA had connected 23 courts of appeal, 7 administrative courts of appeal and 6 commercial courts of appeal to the UNWP. In order to strengthen accountability in the judiciary it should proceed with connecting the rest of the courts without delay. To aid this implementation, it could prioritise connecting judicial bodies according to the risk-profile of the work they carry out, meaning it could connect bodies at the top of the judicial hierarchy first. The heads of the CCU, SCU, HACC, HCJ and HQCJ could also consider promptly connecting their institutions to the UWNP. Given the lack of clear accountability mechanisms, if they fail to do so, Ukrainian authorities could consider specifying legal responsibility for the heads of these courts to incentivise compliance.
The Verkhovna Rada could also consider ordering an audit of these bodies’ systems for internal reporting to ensure that they meet the same quality standards as the UWNP (while taking necessary precautions to protect personal data and confidentiality). In some countries, there is an institution with an explicit mandate to conduct external audits of the whistleblowing system such as the Ombudsman in Bulgaria (Ombudsman of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2024[54]). An external audit of judicial whistleblowing channels in Ukraine – whether conducted by the Accounting Chamber or another competent authority – could help ensure that viable internal reporting channels are in place, even if a disjointed framework whereby some courts use the UWNP and some do not may continue to engender confusion about how to report.
The judicial system is the main avenue for ensuring there is accountability for corruption offences when they occur (OECD, 2020[5]; 1997[55]; UNODC, 2004[56]). When systems for enforcement and adjudication are inefficient, corruption remains unpunished.
Corruption offences in Ukraine are defined in line with international standards. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) requires UN member states to criminalise several corruption offences under Chapter III (UNODC, 2004[56]). These include active and passive domestic and foreign bribery in the public and private sectors, embezzlement or misappropriation of funds, trading in influence, abuse of functions, illicit enrichment, laundering the proceeds of crime and obstruction of justice, as well as attempts to commit these offences, incitement to commit them or aiding and abetting in them. The European Commission’s draft anti‑corruption directive envisions similar requirements for EU member states (European Commission, 2023[57]). Ukraine has criminalised all required offences in its criminal code.
Ukraine’s specialised anti‑corruption enforcement and adjudication institutions – the NABU, SAPO, and HACC – remain some of the most well-functioning institutions in Ukraine (European Commission, 2024[19]). A systemic monitoring by Transparency International Ukraine indicates that all three institutions are generally capable, effective, and independent (TI Ukraine, 2023[58]). Their performance has also improved over time (see Figure 4.9). The overall score for the performance of the anti‑corruption law enforcement institutions in Ukraine under the peer review in the fifth round of monitoring under the Istanbul Anti‑Corruption Action Plan reached the “outstanding” level with a score of almost 80% on the scale (OECD, 2024[15]).
Note: Scores assess agencies’ capacity, governance, and interaction on a five-point scale with five being the best score.
Source: TI Ukraine (2023[58]), “Capable, effective and independent: Analysis of anti‑corruption agencies”, https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/capable-effective-and-independent-analysis-of-anti‑corruption-agencies/.
However, in addition to the specialised anti‑corruption institutions, regular enforcement bodies (see Chapter 1) investigate and adjudicate all cases besides those above a certain monetary threshold or committed by a person in a high-risk political position, as defined by the Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine (CPC). Thus, considering the obstacles of the overall enforcement system and building upon good practices of the specialised anti‑corruption system, the following sections elaborate on systemic issues and provide recommendations in the following areas:
A high rate of case closure undermines the enforcement of corruption-related violations. Case closures often result from failure to meet legally required deadlines at various stages of criminal procedure. This can be addressed by revising statutes of limitations and combatting abuse of procedural rights that lead to delays.
Improving processes and tools for case allocation and management could increase judicial integrity and internal independence by limiting opportunities for forum shopping or tampering with case files. Improving case transparency could also help foster public trust.
4.4.1. Ukrainian authorities could decrease the number of closed corruption cases by introducing more flexibility in investigation times and combatting abuse of procedural rights
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity calls on adherents to ensure fairness in the enforcement of corruption offences (OECD, 2017[1]), which requires a delicate balance. On the one hand, enforcement procedures should respect human rights and due process but on the other hand, the procedures must be effective to avoid impunity for integrity breaches. Increasingly complex organisational structures for facilitating corruption have made investigating corruption and ensuring accountability more difficult (OECD, 2020[5]). Article 29 of the UNCAC therefore requires that state parties have sufficiently long statutes of limitations for initiating prosecution of corruption offences (UNODC, 2004[56]).
In Ukraine, despite the effective work of the specialised anti‑corruption investigation bodies, the proportion of closed criminal and administrative cases associated with corruption is relatively high. The expiration of the statute of limitations is often the main reason (OECD, 2024[15]). When it comes to high-level corruption cases (those under HACC jurisdiction), almost every third case (22 cases out of 76 in total) was closed in 2023 due to the expiration of the pre-trial investigation period (12 cases) or expiration of the statute of limitations (10 cases) (see Figure 4.10). The lack of centralised criminal statistics from other courts (OECD, 2024[15]) makes the trend there difficult to assess.
To address the issue of closed cases due to the expired deadlines, Ukraine would benefit from:
aligning statutes of limitation for corruption offences in Ukraine with the EU average
tackling the defence’s abuse of procedural rights by the defence since it has proved to be a common mechanism for delaying adjudication of corruption cases.
Ukraine has continuously worked to improve the efficiency of criminal procedures for corruption cases. Amendments to the CPC were adopted on 16 May 2024 and will allow certain HACC cases to be heard by one judge, which will help alleviate the high caseload in the court and speed up case processing. Similar draft legislation is pending for civil and administrative cases. However, several elements of the criminal code (CC) and CPC continue to make it more difficult for the NABU, SAPO and other investigative bodies to build high-quality cases and for the HACC and other courts to process cases efficiently. The State Anti‑Corruption Program 2023-2025 (theme 3.3) recognises the need to improve both the procedure itself and the consistency of procedural application in corruption cases. Short time limits for investigation and prosecution of these cases often stymy the work of the NABU and SAPO, particularly in complex cases where international legal assistance is required. Statutes of limitations for many corruption offences are also relatively short.
Source: NACP (2024[59]), Statistical Information on the Results of the Work of Specially Authorized Entities in the Field of Anti‑corruption and Other State Bodies, https://dap.nazk.gov.ua/kpi/info/1/?lang=en (accessed on 15 November 2024).
While corruption offences are not identical across all OECD or EU countries, statutes of limitations for several corruption offences in Ukraine fall behind the EU average (see Table 4.1). Ukraine’s statutes of limitations are also shorter than those outlined in Article 21 of the European Commission’s proposed Anti‑Corruption Directive (European Commission, 2023[57]), which are eight years for illicit enrichment and aiding or abetting in a corruption offence and either 10 or 15 years for all other offences covered.
Note: The proposed EU anti-corruption directive is still under negotiation and therefore its provisions are subject to change.
Source: European Commission (2023[57]), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating Corruption, Replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on the Fight against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and Amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council, EUR-LEX, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium.
Ukrainian authorities could therefore consider reviewing statutes of limitations for corruption offences and ensuring that they align with the EU average. The fact that abuse of power and trading in influence cases in the HACC are among those for which the statute of limitations most commonly expires (TI Ukraine, 2024[60]) suggests that investigations into these two offences at a minimum would benefit from more time. Abuse of power is also the most commonly investigated criminal corruption offence in Ukraine by far, with 11 069 pre-investigations occurring in 2023 (NACP, 2024[59]), which means that a review of the statute of limitations could have a substantial impact.
EU member states have also adopted a variety of other solutions to accounting for the late discovery of a corruption case beyond increasing the statute of limitations outright (Transparency International, 2010[61]). These include:
calculating the statute of limitations from the date on which the last offence took place in the event of repeated offences
calculating the statute of limitations from the date on which the offence ceased in the event of continuous offences
calculating the statute of limitations from the date on which the last attempted crime took place in the event of repeated offences/attempts
calculating the statute of limitations from the date on which the consequences arose
introducing special statutes of limitations for specific offences or offences in specific economic sectors
suspending the statute of limitations while requests for mutual legal assistance (MLA) from other jurisdictions are pending.
While Article 49 of the CC already establishes that the statute of limitations is calculated from the date on which the last offence took place, the other four solutions could be worth exploring in Ukraine if analysis of past corruption cases indicates they could prove useful. Time limits on pre-trial investigations also complicate the work of the NABU and SAPO. Under Article 219 of the CPC pre-trial investigations for serious or very serious crimes (such as many corruption offences) cannot exceed 12 months. The 2018 “Lozovyi amendments” to the CPC compounded issues with investigation duration, particularly through a provision requiring automatic case closure upon the expiration of pre-trial investigation time limits (European Commission, 2024[19]). While these amendments had the positive effect of reducing the ability of law enforcement to intimidate suspects without bringing charges, their strictness in requiring the termination of all investigations for which no extension is requested has also resulted in important corruption cases not going to trial (TI Ukraine, 2023[62]). Case closures in practice have also resulted from law enforcement, prosecutors and courts having differing interpretations of the CPC and the applicability of the Lozovyi amendments to investigations that began prior to 2018 and those that were merged or divided. Furthermore, while judges respect deadlines in a legal sense, they often do not issue decisions far enough in advance for the NABU and SAPO to react to them and meet their own deadlines.
Ukrainian authorities could therefore consider amending Article 219 of the CPC to allow the SAPO to grant the NABU more time to investigate in pre-defined circumstances related to high case complexity – such as when the investigation has been delayed by pending MLA requests. This would follow examples from countries such as Estonia and Latvia, where there is more flexibility in limits to time limits for pre-trial investigation (see Box 4.7). Notably, these countries’ provisions consider the complexity of the individual case and obstructive actions from the suspect when setting time limits, not just the severity of the offence committed. Thus, even if there is a preference for specific time limits in Ukraine, relevant amendments could introduce more axes of variation into the investigation time limits.
Abuse of procedural rights by parties also frequently slows down criminal proceedings, as noted by problem 3.3.4 of the NACS (NACP, 2021[32]) and the EU (European Commission, 2024[19]) and reaffirmed by stakeholders in discussions with the OECD. The CPC strongly favours the defence, which while positive for due process slows down court proceedings tremendously. One particularly problematic provision in Article 46 entitles all defendants to have up to five counsellors present at court proceedings, and the inability to proceed even if four out of five are present causes cases to drag out. Defendants sometimes invoke this right as a deliberate strategy for delaying progress on the case. Due to the limitation periods in place, the defence can pursue these delay tactics until the period has elapsed and the case must be closed. Draft law no. 5661 aims to amend the CPC to stop this practice, and while it was on the agenda of the Verkhovna Rada adopted in September 2024, it had also already been pending for three years by this point.
Several other countries sharing a common legal and institutional history with Ukraine allow more flexibility in time limits for pre-trial investigation:
Estonia: Article 205-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “If it becomes evident in pre-trial procedure that a criminal matter cannot be adjudicated within a reasonable time of proceedings, the Public Prosecutor's Office may terminate the criminal proceedings by an order with the consent of the suspect taking into account the gravity of the criminal offence, complexity and extent of the criminal matter, current course of the criminal proceeding and other circumstances.”
Latvia: Article 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “(1) A prosecutor has the following duties as the person directing the proceedings: 1) to not permit unjustified delay and to initiate criminal prosecution in the term specified in the Law; 1-1) to select the most simple form for the completion of pre-trial criminal proceedings corresponding to the specific circumstances, and also to select and carry out such procedural actions that would ensure the achievement of the objective of criminal proceedings as quickly and economically as possible; (…)”.
Source: OECD (2024[63]), Combatting High-level Corruption in Eastern Europe: Insights and Solutions, https://doi.org/10.1787/3c82f87d-en.
The Verkhovna Rada could consider amending the CPC without delay such that the limitation period is paused when the SAPO passes the case to the court, thereby reducing the feasibility of delay tactics. It could also consider amendments that would allow the case to proceed when a given counsellor misses a court hearing multiple times in a row without a justified excuse. This could be accompanied by measures used in other countries to prevent procedural abuse (see Box 4.8) such as assigning substitute counsel, “stop-the-clock” mechanisms that pause limitation periods in the event of procedural abuse and allowing courts to impose disciplinary measures on lawyers engaging in obstruction. Amendments to the CPC could also potentially reduce the number of counsellors that must be present to at least one. To supplement amendments to the CPC, there are also measures that judges and courts themselves can take to promote accountability for parties and their counsel (see Box 4.8). Finally, Ukraine should ensure to the extent possible that courts retain capacity to conduct electronic hearings to prevent limitations on physical presence being used as a tool for procedural stalling. Combining legal amendments with guidance and training to improve court practice could help reduce the ability of defendants to unduly abuse procedural rights.
Germany
Under Section 145 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO), if a lawyer repeatedly fails to appear without valid justification, the court can appoint a substitute counsel to prevent stalling. Adjournments should be limited (Section 228 StPO). Additionally, Germany employs a “stop-the-clock” mechanism (Section 78b of the Criminal Code) to pause limitation periods when procedural abuse is evident, thereby preventing cases from being dismissed due to deliberate delays. Courts also impose disciplinary measures on lawyers engaging in obstruction, ensuring that justice is not hindered by procedural manipulation.
Canada
Canada has also taken measures that go beyond the legal framework itself. As part of its strategy for reducing case backlogs in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Canadian judiciary outlined a number of measures that could be effective in ensuring parties to a case and/or their counsel do not slow down proceedings either intentionally or unintentionally. These include:
consulting with local bar associations before implementing new or revised rules, policies or practice directives that regulate counsel’s obligations in order to promote acceptance
requiring parties to abide by timelines and commitments made in writing or on the record
setting realistic hearing durations and enforcing them subject to exceptional circumstances
placing the onus on parties to inform the court in advance – within a specified timeframe and process – of any circumstance that may lead to a cancellation, postponement, or change in the duration of a hearing, and to substantiate any requests for adjournments or other applications
subject to procedural fairness, refusing adjournment requests that are unsubstantiated, untimely, repetitive or result from a lack of preparedness
clearly outlining processes and expectations for self-represented litigants, and directing them to the appropriate resources or services.
Source: Government of Canada (2022[64]), Action Committee on Modernizing Court Operations - Roadmap to Recovery: Orienting Principles for Reducing Court Backlog and Delays, https://www.fja.gc.ca/COVID-19/Orienting-Principles-Reducing-Backlog-and-Delays-Principes-d-orientation-reduire-les-engorgements-et-delais-eng.html (accessed on 23 October 2024).
4.4.2. Judicial authorities could increase impartiality and timeliness in enforcement through improved processes and tools for case allocation, management and transparency
Transparent mechanisms for case management contribute to internal independence in courts and foster integrity in the adjudication of corruption. There are at least four mechanisms contributing to an effective case management system in the judiciary:
In all European and OECD countries case allocation occurs through random assignment, which is increasingly automated (World Bank, 2016[65]). This random assignment is also increasingly weighted to account for case complexity, judge specialisation, and other factors.
Once cases have been allocated, digital tools can also help ensure integrity and increase efficiency in case management. Digital case management tools help promote transparency, limit opportunities for unethically tampering with case files and procedures and introduce accountability by logging judicial case management actions. To facilitate effective corruption investigation and prosecution relevant authorities should have tools that at a minimum allow for the exchange of information between law enforcement, prosecutors, tax authorities and securities authorities (OECD, 2020[5]).
Judges also benefit from having case management systems as they allow for more efficient case processing (UNODC, 2011[2]) and therefore increase accountability for corruption offences. Such case management systems tend to succeed when there is user buy-in, development is user-guided, there is a focus on change management and eliminating manual procedures, there is secure funding, there is phased system development that reflects the needs of different types of cases and courts, there is continuous user training and support, and the system is part of a broader strategy for justice system digitalisation (World Bank, 2016[65]).
The publication of data on case outcomes helps ensure transparency and improve public trust in the judiciary’s ability to address corruption. High-quality statistics on offences, case processing, and case outcomes can help identify trends in corrupt behaviour that in turn increase the effectiveness of anti‑corruption policy. They can also help inform efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the judiciary itself (OECD, 2020[5]).
In Ukraine COJ decision 25 of 2 April 2015 established a system whereby cases are randomly allocated to judges through an automated system that also considers a judge’s caseload and specialisation. It also foresees similar procedures for assigning cases to substitute judges. However, while a system of automatic allocation of cases to judges exists, financial, technical and personnel constraints have meant that this system does not work properly in practice (European Commission, 2024[19]). Under Section 9 of HCJ decision no. 1845/0/15-21 of 17.08.2021 when the automated system determines the automated distribution of cases is impossible, the court must issue a protocol regarding the impossibility of random allocation, but this regulation does not provide any further details. Furthermore, while most courts publish these protocols, few courts publish their reports on how they have actually distributed cases in practice. This undermines the ability of random allocation to promote judicial integrity and in turn, the ability of courts to hold corrupt actors accountable.
To address integrity risks in case allocation the COJ and HCJ could therefore consider developing a revised procedure for the allocation and transfer of cases in wartime based on objective criteria, as well as a plan for transitioning from such an ad hoc solution to a viable and sustainable case allocation system once the war ends. The SJA also could incentivise courts to publish information on case allocation in practice by for example making it a condition of receiving certain resources. Alternatively, it could consider developing a centralised portal like the one that exists in Poland (see Box 4.9) to reduce the burden on individual courts. These measures could help ensure that the positive effects of random case allocation on judicial integrity are still realised even in wartime and risks of non-randomness that enable judge shopping or forum shopping are mitigated to the greatest extent possible.
Poland has developed a search engine for all reports on randomised case allocation as part of its Information Portal for Common Courts. The search engine contains reports for all cases allocated since October 2021 and requires users to input the court, department, repertory, number and year. It also contains an explanation for users on interpreting the reports. The reports themselves contain information on the judges included in the allocation pool, the date on which the allocation took place, the result of the allocation and the procedure and calculations used to determine the allocation. This system facilitates transparency by making it convenient for users to find case allocation reports and limiting the discretion of individual courts in how to publish them.
Source: Ministry of Justice of Poland (2025[66]), Wyszukiwarka raportów z Systemu Losowego Przydziału Spraw [Random Case Allocation System Report Search Engine], https://portal.wroclaw.sa.gov.pl/#/slps (accessed on 17 March 2025).
Mechanisms for sharing cases between courts such as those used in the Netherlands and Canada (see Box 4.10) could also be effective in areas of major disruption to court activities, such as in courts relocated from territories occupied by Russia or close to the front line. However, integrity risks remain if courts do not communicate about their use of such measures in a transparent manner and have formalised procedures in place for their implementation that are still based on the principle of randomness. Otherwise, these measures could easily become a further tool for circumventing random case allocation.
The Netherlands
In the judiciary, there is a long tradition of using “flying brigades” to address case backlogs. These flying brigades are effectively specialised units of judges and staff that the judiciary convenes when the system is struggling to process cases in a particular area. The Judicial Council set up the initial flying brigade of six judges from multiple courts in 2000 to address a backlog of civil cases across the country.
However, the practice of using flying brigades has continued to be effective. For example, in 2019 amidst an increase in complex organised crime cases, three courts in the provinces of Brabant, Limburg and Zeeland formed a flying brigade of judges, investigating magistrates and court staff. The goal of this flying brigade was to shorten investigation and case processing time while leveraging specialised expertise across multiple courts.
Canada
In Canada, the experience of having to administer justice during the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the usefulness of several measures in mitigating the effects of judicial vacancies. During the pandemic, some court jurisdictions created virtual service hubs or justice centres serving multiple courts to make up for shortages in judicial availability. Pooling of resources was particularly useful in northern and remote communities where courts are not permanently established or it is more difficult to fill judicial vacancies.
To ensure these solutions are effective the Canadian judiciary has highlighted the importance of formalising procedures and building a sense of ownership in individual courts. The judiciary has called on courts to develop strategies for reducing backlogs, which places some onus on them to implement solutions adapted to the needs of their court. Resource-sharing agreements should be formalised through terms of reference or joint protocols.
Sources: De Rechtspraak (2019[67]), “Judiciary joins forces to tackle undermining [Rechtspraak bundelt krachten in aanpak ondermijning]”, https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Raad-voor-de-rechtspraak/Nieuws/Paginas/Rechtspraak-bundelt-krachten-in-aanpak-ondermijning.aspx (accessed on 22 October 2024); CEPEJ (2006[68]), Compendium of Best Practices on Time Management of Judicial Proceedings, European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Strasbourg, France; Rechtennieuws.nl (2004[69]), “Mijlpaal voor Vliegende Brigade: 7500ste civiele vonnis [Milestone for Flying Brigade: 7,500th civil verdict]”, https://rechtennieuws.nl/1846/mijlpaal-voor-vliegende-brigade-7500ste-civiele-vonnis/ (accessed on 22 October 2024); Government of Canada (2022[64]), Action Committee on Modernizing Court Operations - Roadmap to Recovery: Orienting Principles for Reducing Court Backlog and Delays, https://www.fja.gc.ca/COVID-19/Orienting-Principles-Reducing-Backlog-and-Delays-Principes-d-orientation-reduire-les-engorgements-et-delais-eng.html (accessed on 23 October 2024).
The Unified Judicial Information and Telecommunication System (UJITS) is the primary tool used for case management in courts, and a planned future module will also facilitate automatic case allocation. However, the UJITS is old and outdated, which aligns with the EU Ukraine Plan’s recognition of an overarching need to improve the digitalisation of the judiciary. The UJITS does not integrate systems of individual courts or provide a sufficient overview of the auto-distribution of cases and there is no underlying database. It also is not user-friendly and lacks features like templates and tips for users. An EU project with the SJA will focus on creating a new modern system, although it continues to face resource constraints.
Once the replacement for the UJITS is in place, the SJA could consider organising training and establishing responsive helplines to ensure a smooth transition and improve digital literacy in the judiciary. This could help ensure full realisation of the potential gains of a digital case management system. See Box 4.11 for more information about efforts to develop the e-case management system in the Republic of Korea. Safeguards and testing will also be necessary to ensure that new digital tools do not contain vulnerabilities that can be used to the undermine the integrity of processes like automatic case allocation.
Korea has had an electronic case management system in place since 1986 with the goal of making the justice system more transparent, efficient, and accessible. Parties can file all court documents, documentary evidence, and digital evidence via the system and can also receive notifications when other parties submit documents. Judges can view all case records electronically, allowing them to conduct entirely paperless hearings. The case management system covers all case types and is noteworthy for its high degree of interoperability. It allows the exchange of information between courts, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Public Administration and Safety, the National Statistics Office, financial institutions and registration offices, among others.
To serve those without internet access, there are also self-service machines in local government offices throughout the country that allow court users to access the system, which could be a useful solution in Ukraine as its internet infrastructure increasingly comes under attack. Using innovative solutions such as these could help prevent a temporary return to non-electronic case management and its associated increased integrity risks.
One major factor in the success of electronic case management in Korea has been the involvement of judges themselves. Judges first initiated the feasibility study for such a case management system in 1979 and since then have played an active role in fleshing out a system that serves their needs and addresses problems that they see in their courtrooms. The Supreme Court also played a key leadership role in driving the digitalisation process and setting strategic goals. This speaks to the importance of the development of a case management system being a collaborative process rather than simply being imposed by the judicial administration or external actors.
Sources: World Bank (2016[65]), Good Practices for Courts: Helpful Elements for Good Court Performance and the World Bank’s Quality of Judicial Process Indicators, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/e4d9dd40-c207-5d24-b663-260f23a4624a/content; Gramckow, H. and O. Ebeid (2016[70]), “Leveraging technology to improve service delivery in the justice sector in South Korea”, Just Development, No. 10, World Bank, Washington, DC; Supreme Court of Korea (2024[71]), e-Trials, https://eng.scourt.go.kr/eng/judiciary/eCourt/eTrials.jsp (accessed on 23 September 2024).
Short-term improvements could focus on improving existing systems. In the specialised anti‑corruption enforcement system the NABU, SAPO and HACC share their own case management system called eCase MS, which while a good practice example still lacks many features and integration with other relevant IT systems (European Commission, 2024[19]). Since the NABU, SAPO and HACC are at a more advanced stage regarding case management, they could consider the following additions to eCase MS that could increase its effectiveness and the ability of these institutions to efficiently investigate and prosecute corruption offences:
increasing the number of motions fileable through eCase to maximise its benefits
improving access for defence lawyers to ensure respect for due process.
While it is a positive step that the NABU, SAPO and HACC have developed eCase, to strengthen accountability in corruption cases outside the jurisdiction of these bodies the new case management system for regular courts should meet the same quality standard, and in the long term, information exchange between these systems should be possible. Judicial proceedings are often interconnected, and it may initially be unclear which investigative body and/or court has jurisdiction over a given case. Cases related to the same incident may also proceed concurrently in specialised and regular courts. In both situations, quick and efficient information exchange is necessary to ensure accountability for corruption. Although resources are currently limited and building a web of high-quality interoperable case management tools will take time, in the long term the SJA could ensure that the new case management tool described above can exchange information with eCase.
Finally, concerning transparency of case outcomes, the judiciary is subject to open data obligations under the Law on Access to Public Information and Cabinet Regulation 835, but most courts do not comply with these regulations in practice, and the ambition of applying these regulations to the entire public sector means they are not well-attuned to the work of the judiciary. The centralisation and standardisation of criminal statistics even beyond corruption offences also remain an issue (Fabra-Mata and Asselin de Williencourt, 2024[72]).
The Cabinet of Ministers and Ministry of Digital Transformation could consider working with the HCJ and SJA to explore the adoption of a separate regulation on open data in the judiciary that is better adapted to its work and functions. The SJA could then support courts in improving the publication of case data in practice, such as by helping courts recruit more IT personnel and creating a unified data portal once more resources are available. This could help improve transparency and ensure the public is better able to hold the judiciary accountable by scrutinising judges’ activities. A unified portal of court decisions and statistics has been created as part of judicial digitalisation initiatives in many OECD countries, including those pursued by the Republic of Korea outlined in Box 4.11.
In 2024 the Verkhovna Rada also approved at first reading a draft law10 restricting access to court decisions pertaining to national security and the military during martial law. The NACP (2025[73]) and other actors have highlighted that such a move carries corruption risks, as it would effectively be possible to bribe a judge in such a case without anyone ever discovering it. The Verkhovna Rada could consider amending this draft law such that the scope of decisions covered is sufficiently precise and narrow. It could also consider alternative measures for keeping certain information confidential without completely restricting access. Box 4.12 outlines how the United Kingdom balances the principles of national security and open justice through court procedures that provide intermediate steps for handling confidential information before taking the extreme measure of closing access to the judgement.
The Justice and Security Act of 2013 created a closed material procedure (CMP) whereby the government can disclose material related to national security to a judge and a special advocate representing the interests of the other party and in a closed procedure. Specifically, CMP may entail changes to the procedure for introducing evidence, allowing proceedings to take place without a formal court hearing, limiting information about decisions during proceedings given to a party and summarising evidence accepted in a party’s absence to that party. The court is also required to continuously review the use of CMP and revoke it if it concludes that it is undermining the fair and effective administration of justice.
While court judgements can be closed under CMP they do not need to be since it also provides several procedural steps safeguarding confidential information. Each year the Ministry of Justice must also prepare a report to the parliament on the use of CMP in that year as a safeguard against abuse of this procedure. This report is also made public. In May 2024 the UK Government reviewed the relevant provisions of the Justice and Security Act to ensure the procedure remains fit for purpose.
Sources: Justice and Security Act of 2013; UK Ministry of Justice (2024[74]), “Closed material procedure: Government response”, Ministry of Justice of the United Kingdom, London, UK.
Completing integrity and merit-based reform of the judiciary
Ukraine could consider streamlining judicial governance arrangements and taking a risk-based approach to judicial reform to maximise the impact of reform efforts on judicial integrity.
Judicial authorities could improve the effectiveness of judicial integrity checks through a consistent methodology and transparent reasoning.
Ukrainian authorities could improve accountability by strengthening the disciplinary systems for judges.
Cultivating a culture of integrity in the judiciary
The COJ and the National School of Judges could support the implementation of the newly adopted ethical standards by raising awareness and promoting good practices.
The Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Internal Affairs could support judicial integrity by pursuing integrity reforms in legal education.
Ukrainian authorities could increase judicial integrity by improving the framework for conflict-of-interest management.
Judicial authorities could cultivate a culture of openness by connecting all courts and judicial governance bodies to the Unified Whistleblower Notification Portal without delay.
Improving fairness, impartiality and timeliness in the enforcement corruption offences
Ukrainian authorities could decrease the number of closed corruption cases by introducing more flexibility in investigation times and combatting abuse of procedural rights.
Judicial authorities could increase impartiality and timeliness in enforcement through improved processes and tools for case allocation, management and transparency.
References
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← 1. Lustration is a transitional justice concept that refers to vetting aimed at removing public officials or judges associated with a past regime and/or preventing them from taking office in the future. Most Central and Eastern European countries employed a form of lustration after the fall of communist regimes in the 1980s and 1990s (Horne, 2009[76]).
← 2. See opinion CDL-AD(2013)014.
← 3. These include decisions no. 13-r/2020 and no. 12-4/2020 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.
← 4. See for instance opinions CDL-AD(2020)022 and CDL-PI(2021)004.
← 5. See for instance decision no. 9901/198/20 of June 13, 2024.
← 6. HQCJ also recommended dismissal of an additional two judges who refused to take part in the qualification assessment process (European Commission, 2024[19]).
← 7. From January-October 2024, 203 judges also resigned and 23 were dismissed for significant disciplinary violations.
← 8. As of January 2025, there were 6 589 judicial positions in Ukraine (4 943 in district courts, 1 357 in appellate courts, 93 in higher specialised courts and 196 in the Supreme Court) (HQCJ, 2025[75]).
← 9. In LPC and other Ukrainian regulations external reporting channels are referred to as “regular” reporting channels.
← 10. Draft law no. 7033-d.