This chapter reviews Slovenia’s progress towards climate change and air quality objectives. It reviews the key trends and progress towards targets. It assesses the governance, legal and strategic framework for climate change and air quality, as well as the key policy instruments. Finally, the chapter examines sectoral policy responses for the power sector, transport, buildings, agriculture and forestry.
OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Slovenia 2026
Abstract
2.1.1. Climate-related risks, impacts and assessments
Intensifying climate-related hazards lead to high exposure and vulnerability
Slovenia is experiencing increasingly severe climate impacts, with warming trends exceeding the OECD average, like many European countries. In 2024, Slovenia experienced its warmest year on record, with average annual temperatures 2°C above the reference period (1981‑2010) (Figure 2.1, panel A). In urban areas, heatwaves are becoming more frequent and severe. By the end of the century, the country could experience between 1‑21 additional hot days per year under various global emissions scenarios compared to a 1995‑2014 baseline (Figure 2.1, panel B). Shifting precipitation patterns result in more frequent and intense extreme events, including devastating floods in August 2023, droughts affecting agricultural regions such as the Vipava Valley and unprecedented wildfires in the Karst region in 2022.
Note: Panel A: land surface temperature change with reference to the baseline period 1981-2010; Panel B: population-weighted hot days refer to the annual average number of hot days where maximum temperatures surpass 35°C weighted by population density. The baseline period is 1995‑2014. Emissions scenarios refer to the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), specifically SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5 (Maes et al., 2025[1]).
Source: OECD (2026), Historical Exposure to Extreme Temperature (dataset); Projected Exposure to Extreme Temperature (dataset).
Slovenia’s mountainous topography and dense river network spanning nearly 27 000 km make it highly exposed and vulnerable to river flooding, landslides and soil erosion (OECD, 2012[2]). Nearly one- quarter of the population and 10% of the built-up area are exposed to flood risk, exceeding EU averages (Figure 2.2, panel B). Exposure varies at the subnational level, with particularly high population exposure in the Mura and Sava regions (Figure 2.2, panel A). Across moderate to pessimistic emissions scenarios,1 Slovenia is projected to experience a concerning increase in annual precipitation levels, a key indicator of flood risk. These projections suggest precipitation could increase by up to 20% compared to 1981‑2010 levels (MOPE, 2025[3]).
Note: Panel A: river flood risk is measured using a ten-year return period. A return period is the average or estimated time that a flood event is likely to recur. The figure indicates the share of total population (2020 data), built‑up area or cropland exposed to flood risk (2022).
Source: OECD (2025), River Flooding Exposure (dataset).
Between 3‑8 August 2023, Slovenia experienced the most devastating natural disaster in its history: widespread flooding that caused an estimated EUR 10 billion in economic damage. Torrential rainfall triggered major rivers to overflow, including the Sava, Drava and Mura, flooding 183 of 212 municipalities and causing landslides. Heavy July rains left rivers near capacity, with some areas receiving 200 mm of rain in just 12 hours (3‑4 August) (JBA Event Response, 2023[4]). The Slovenian Environment Agency issued a red alert, activating emergency protocols. The disaster claimed six lives, damaged nearly 2 000 km of roads, collapsed seven bridges and affected over 13 000 buildings, with 8 000 people evacuated. Damage to major road and freight corridors disrupted supply chains across Europe, especially in the automotive sector. Additional landslides followed months after renewed rainfall on saturated soils.
Slovenia is at an early stage in adaptation planning (Section 2.3.1), yet the human and economic costs of climate change are already significant. The August 2023 floods alone caused estimated damages of about 16% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (EEA, 2025[5]) (see Box 2.1). The 2022 wildfires triggered evacuations of nearly 4 000 people, while the number of deaths during heatwaves has increased, especially among vulnerable populations (URSZR, 2023[6]; ARSO, 2024[7]). Slovenia’s economic losses from weather- and climate-related extreme events from 1980‑2023 were by far the highest in Europe (Section 2.3.1).
2.1.2. GHG emissions trends and targets
Slovenia successfully reduced GHG emissions and met past targets
Slovenia’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) peaked in 2008 and fell by 32% between 2008 and 2023 (Figure 2.3). From 1995 to 2008, economic growth was the major driver behind rising emissions, surpassing gains in energy efficiency and carbon intensity (Figure 2.4). Between 2008 and 2023, emissions declined as improvements in energy efficiency and decarbonisation of energy use outweighed increased emissions associated with more moderate economic and population growth (Figure 2.4). These improvements were mostly concentrated in the power (Section 2.4.1) and residential sectors (Section 2.4.3), as well as in Slovenia’s large energy-intensive industrial sector. Despite this progress, the economy remains more emissions-intensive than the EU-27 average in terms of GDP. With around 7 tCO2e, per capita emissions are on par with the EU-27 average, reflecting slightly lower levels of economic development combined with higher emissions intensity.
Historical and projected GHG emissions and GHG emissions targets
Note: LULUCF: land use, land-use change and forestry. Dotted lines refer to national projections with existing measures. Dashed lines refer to projections with additional measures. ESR targets: 2020 target under the EU Effort Sharing legislation and 2030 target under the EU amended Effort Sharing Regulation (EU 2023/857). LULUCF 2030 target: under the LULUCF Regulation (EU 2023/839) and Updated NECP. The 2045 target was calculated to correspond to LULUCF projections (EEA 27 October 2025) taking into account provisions in the Climate Law. ETS: emissions under the EU Emissions Trading System. Projections with existing measures have not been plotted for ETS/ESR time series data. The kink of emissions in 2033 is related to the coal phase-out (Section 2.4.1).
Source: EEA (2024), Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emission Projections Data, 2021-50 (dataset); GoRS (2024), Up-to-date Comprehensive National Energy and Climate Plan of the Republic of Slovenia, December.
Most emissions are generated from energy-related activities. At around 80%, energy-related emissions accounted for the largest share of emissions in 2023 (Figure 2.5). This is close to the OECD average and slightly above the EU-27 average. Transport is the main source of emissions, accounting for 36% of total emissions, the second highest share among OECD and EU-27 countries (Section 2.4.2). Transport emissions more than doubled between 1990 and 2008 due to increased mobility, car dependency and road transit freight, but they stabilised thereafter.
Note: Energy intensity = final energy consumption/GDP; GHG emissions intensity = gross GHG emissions/final energy consumption. GDP at constant 2021 purchasing power parities. Emissions levels (1995, 2008, 2023) are totals for each year, while the four drivers show how those totals changed.
Source: Calculations of the authors based on: IEA (2025), IEA World Energy Balance (dataset); OECD (2025), OECD Economic Outlook (dataset); SEA (2025), Slovenian's Emission Inventory.
Note: Other energy includes emissions from commercial and institutional sectors, agriculture, forestry and fishing, and emissions from other mobile and stationary sources.
Source: SEA (2025), Slovenia's National Inventory Document 2025 – GHG Emissions Inventories 1986‑2023.
Other sectors also generate substantial emissions. Emissions from the residential sector grew strongly until 2000, but declined significantly thereafter thanks to improved energy efficiency and reduced coal use for heating (Section 2.4.3). Energy industries to produce electricity and heat contributed significantly to GHG emissions (Section 2.4.1). While hydropower (33%) and nuclear power from the Krško plant (35%) – jointly owned with Croatia – accounted for most electricity output, coal (lignite) still represented around 20%, despite substantial decreases in the past decade. Agriculture contributes 11% of total emissions, close to the EU-27 and OECD averages (Section 2.4.4).
Slovenia’s total energy supply is generated by a combination of fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. Overall, renewable energy sources accounted for around 43% of Slovenia’s electricity output and 20% of total energy supply in 2024, close to the EU-27 average and above the OECD average. Nuclear accounted for 23%. Fossil fuels make up 57% of energy supply. The country imports natural gas, oil and uranium for nuclear, making Slovenia vulnerable to geopolitical events such as the energy crisis. However, dependency on Russian fuels has been significantly reduced in recent years (EC, 2025[8]).
The LULUCF sector has been a carbon sink, but its sink capacity is increasingly uncertain. Between 2000 and 2012, LULUCF absorbed around 7 Mt CO2e per year thanks to Slovenia’s extensive forest cover (Section 2.4.5). The sink capacity fell massively in 2013 and turned the LULUCF sector into a small net emitter between 2014 and 2018 due to unprecedented natural disturbances such as ice damage and bark beetle outbreaks that caused higher natural mortality. Conservation and reforestation efforts helped return the sector to a carbon sink from 2019 onward. However, at around 4‑5 Mt CO2e per year, net removals did not reach previous levels. Moreover, they are not projected to reach previous levels in coming decades due to limited potential for afforestation, climate change impacts and the maturity of Slovenia’s forest, which limits absorption capacity.
Slovenia successfully met its emissions targets but did not meet its renewable energy target on time. The country met its international commitments under the Kyoto Protocol from 2008‑2012, as well as 2013‑2020 (UNFCCC, 2024[9]). It also met its legally binding 2020 EU target under the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) for sectors not covered under the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) such as transport, buildings, agriculture and small industry. However, the government only met its renewable energy target in 2023, three years later than required by the EU Directive (GoRS, 2024[10]).
GHG emissions targets are ambitious, requiring significant efforts to achieve
Slovenia advanced its net-zero target from 2050 to 2045, five years ahead of the EU collective commitment. The 2045 target was enshrined in the Climate Act, adopted in July 2025 (Section 2.2.1), superseding the 2050 target set in Slovenia’s Long-Term Low Emissions Development Strategy (LT-LEDS) from 2021. As an EU Member State, Slovenia is covered by the EU’s joint Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and does not submit its own NDC. EU regulation requires the country to cut ESR sector emissions by 27% by 2030 compared to 2005 (Table 2.1). Slovenia’s National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), submitted in 2025, aims to reduce ESR sector emissions by at least 28% by 2030 and total gross GHG emissions by at least 55% by 2033, each compared to 2005 levels.
The contribution of different sectors to the NECP target will vary. Transport and agriculture are making the smallest contribution to the NECP target at -1% and -2.8%. Other sectors, such as waste, are projected to have significantly larger reductions (Table 2.1).
The NECP also aims to increase the share of renewables in gross final energy consumption from around 20% in 2020 to 33% in 2030, and to reduce primary and final energy consumption to 5.98 and 4.32 megatons of oil equivalent (Mtoe), respectively. Slovenia is among the few European countries whose energy efficiency targets are consistent with the indicative targets implied by EU regulation. However, its renewable energy target (33%) falls short of the indicative EU target (46%).
Significant efforts are needed to reach Slovenia’s emission reduction targets.2 With existing measures, the country will miss both its NECP targets and its net-zero target by a wide margin (Figure 2.3). With additional measures, Slovenia is on track to achieve its 2030 targets, including the EU ESR, the gross emissions target in its NECP and its LULUCF target. However, the country is expected to miss both its 2033 and 2045 GHG reduction targets. Reaching its 2033 and 2045 targets will require annual emission cuts of 4.8% and 8.2%, respectively, as of 2024. This would be nearly two to three times higher than the 2.6% average annual reduction achieved between the 2008 peak and 2023.
Note: GHG emissions in the broad use sector include emissions from energy use in agriculture, households and service sectors, * 2023 values for primary energy consumption and final energy consumption are 5.92 and 4.48 Mtoe, respectively.
Reaching net-zero emissions is subject to uncertainty, particularly related to the LULUCF sector’s carbon sink potential. The net-zero target assumes a contribution of around -2.6 Mt CO2e in 2045. This appears to be a conservative estimate in view of the historic contribution of the LULUCF sector of around ‑7 Mt CO2e in the 2000s. However, there is growing uncertainty of this contribution due to the limitations mentioned above, as well as increasing climate-induced stress such as droughts and heatwaves. As such, Slovenia may need to accelerate planned emission reductions in other sectors to meet the net-zero target. Setting separate targets for gross economy-wide emission reductions and net carbon sequestration in the LULUCF sector would offer clearer policy guidance for emitting sectors. Updating the 2033 target to align with the 2045 target and implementing additional interim milestones – as Germany did with 2040 – would further clarify the emissions path to net zero.
2.1.3. Trends and targets of air quality and air pollution emissions
Despite some progress, air pollution impacts are severe
The impacts of air pollution are severe in Slovenia. In 2023, premature death attributed to exposure to air pollution amounted to 1 034, 93 and 297 related to PM2.5, NO2 and O3, respectively (EEA, 2025[11]). Slovenia ranks well above the OECD average for mortality related to PM2.5 with about 500 premature deaths per million inhabitants (Figure 2.6, panel A). Air pollution has significant economic and environmental costs, including direct health effects, effects on ecosystems and macroeconomic effects related to labour and crop productivity (OECD, 2016[12]). The European Commission estimates health damages caused by air pollution at EUR 290‑950 billion per year by 2030 in the EU (EC, 2025[13]). This translates into EUR 1.1-3.5 billion per year for Slovenia, assuming a breakdown based on GDP – a conservative estimate in view of its above-EU average exposure. The coal power plant in Šoštanj alone was estimated to cause external costs related to air pollution of EUR 156 million in 2021 (EEA, 2024[14]).
Note: Panel B: data in brackets refer to the 2022 population-weighted averages and percentage change in concentrations between 2022 and the five-year mean 2017-2021. Ozone: measured as 93.2 percentile of maximum daily eight-hour means.
Source: EEA (2024), Air Quality Maps of EEA Member and Cooperating Countries for 2022; IHME (2026) GBD Compare Data Visualization (dataset); OECD (2025), OECD Environment Statistics (dataset).
Despite some progress, Slovenia still encounters problems of meeting air quality targets for ozone and – to a lower extent – particulate matter (PM) according to its National Air Pollution Control Programmes (NAPCP) (GoRS, 2024[15]). Aside from a recent uptick in ozone, air quality has improved in recent years. Yet, it improved at a slower pace than the EU-27 and remains well below the EU-27 level for PM2.5 and ozone (Figure 2.6, panel B). Improvements can be attributed to favourable weather conditions, technological changes and policy measures. These measures include programmes or local plans to enhance air quality or other cross-sectoral and sectoral measures that reduced underlying air pollutant emissions.3 While air pollutant emissions contribute to a deterioration of air quality, the relationship between the two and their effects on human health are characterised by complex and non-linear processes (Thunis et al., 2019[16]). Air quality varies significantly by region: PM and NO2 concentrations are highest in densely populated cities like Ljubljana, Celje and Maribor due to road traffic. The southwest also has elevated NO2 levels due to freight traffic linked to the Port of Koper, as well as transboundary air pollution from northern Italy. Ozone concentrations are highest in northwest Slovenia.
Air pollutant emissions have declined, but further reductions are needed to reach targets
In terms of air pollutants, Slovenia significantly reduced its emissions in the last decade and met all related targets (Figure 2.7). Slovenia transposed the EU National Emission reduction Commitments (NEC) Directive into national law that committed the country to reduce sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrous oxide (NOX), non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs), particulate matter (PM2.5) and ammonia (NH3) emissions by 63%, 39%, 23%, 25% and 1%, respectively, in 2020 compared to 2005. Slovenia complied with these targets by a large margin for SO2 and NOX and by a smaller margin for the other three pollutants.
Emission reductions were slightly steeper than that of the EU average for most pollutants, but significantly steeper for SO2 (GoRS, 2024[15]; EC, 2025[13]). SO2 emissions decreased by more than 90% between 2005 and 2023. This decline was due to equipping coal power plants with advanced pollution abatement technologies, as well as a declining share of coal in Slovenia’s electricity generation mix.
Air pollutant emissions varied by source. Transport is the largest contributor to NOX emissions (Figure 2.7, panel B). The main sources of NMVOC emissions are the use of solvents and the combustion of woody biomass in small combustion plants. Rural biomass combustion is the most important source of PM2.5 emissions, while agriculture is the largest contributor to NH3 emissions.
Further efforts are needed to achieve air pollution and air quality targets
The 2024 EU Ambient Air Quality Directive imposes stricter PM2.5 limits on EU Member States, including Slovenia. In addition, the EU NEC Directive requires Slovenia to reduce emissions by 92%, 65%, 53%, 60% and 15% for SO2, NOX, NMVOC, PM2.5 and NH3 by 2030 relative to 2005 levels (Table 2.1). Slovenia’s NAPCP indicates that air quality is expected to improve for PM2.5, PM10 and NO2, but to further deteriorate for ozone even in projections with additional measures.4 The 2025 Air Pollution Inventory Report projects that Slovenia will meet its 2030 targets for SO2 and NOX, but fall short on NMVOCs and NH3, and narrowly miss on PM2.5 with additional measures (MECE, 2025[17]). High risk of non-compliance with NH3 and NMVOC emissions is also reported in the EU’s fourth Clean Air Outlook (EC, 2025[13]), as well as in the EU's NAPCP assessment (EC, 2024[18]).
Further reducing air pollutant emissions to meet 2030 emissions and air quality targets requires concerted efforts in various sectors. In line with the NECP, the NAPCP lays out additional measures, focussing on household emissions from burning woody biomass, and emissions from transport and agriculture, with cumulative cost estimated at EUR 314 million from 2022 to 2030. Achieving Slovenia’s GHG and air pollution targets depends on fully implementing and further strengthening measures in the NECP and the NAPCP. These measures will be discussed in more detail in Sections 2.3. and 2.4.
Note: Panel A: emission trends and reduction targets under the EU National Emission Ceilings Directive (2016/2284/EC) on the reduction of national emissions of certain atmospheric pollutants (NEC). Dotted lines = with existing measures. Dashed lines = with additional measures.
Source: EIONET (2025), National Emission Inventory Under the NEC Directive; SEA (2025), Slovenian Informative Inventory Report 2025.
2.2.1. The 2025 Climate Act strengthens the institutional framework, but implementation is uncertain
Slovenia has significantly strengthened its governance framework related to climate change and air pollution in recent years. After over a decade in the making, the Climate Act was adopted in 2025, setting a formal pathway to achieve climate neutrality by 2045 and enhance climate resilience. The Act strengthens the institutional framework, but important gaps remain.
The Climate Act advances the country’s efforts to adapt to climate change with the objective to reduce societal vulnerability and strengthen resilience. The Act mandates the renewal of the NAS within 18 months of the law’s adoption. Slovenia adopted a Strategic Framework for Climate Change Adaptation in 2016 (NAS), which set out its vision to be a resilient society by 2050 (GoRS, 2016[19]). However, the strategy lacked measurable targets, and concrete measures did not follow, limiting accountability and implementation. The renewed NAS is to be updated every decade based on revised climate vulnerability and risk assessments across priority sectors that are under way. The priority sectors include water management, agriculture, forestry, energy, infrastructure and buildings, public health, economy (business and industry), urban areas, and preservation of nature and cultural heritage. However, Slovenia will need to address risks of fragmentation and barriers to mainstream adaptation across sectors effectively. In addition, the Act mandates regional Adaptation Action Plans (AAPs), which will also require enhanced implementation capacity (Section 2.2.3).
The Act also mandates different types of monitoring processes. The Act strengthens the country’s monitoring system, including through the Climate Mitigation Change Report published by the Ministry of Environment, Climate and Energy (MOPE) and the Climate Mirror of the Jožef Stefan Institute. It also requires additional action if targets are not met. A monitoring and evaluation framework for the renewed NAS includes development of indicators and preparation of a Climate Change Adaptation Report within 18 months of adoption. This is updated every two years with input from priority sectors. Similarly, the Act requires regional development councils to monitor AAP implementation every ten years and publish updated plans (Section 2.2.3).
Despite outlining major steps forward in mitigation, the Act lacks several key provisions. The Act does not commit to phasing out fossil fuel subsidies (Chapter 1). Rather, it introduces a new subsidy that allows offsetting CO2 price increases related to the EU ETS2 – which covers emissions from road transport, building and small industry – through reduced taxes and levies on energy products until 2030 (Climate Council, 2025[20]). Despite foreseeing comprehensive assessments of mitigation measures, the monitoring reports do not yet systematically assess the effectiveness of individual measures as also noted by the Climate Council (GoRS, 2025[21]). Finally, the Act does not include mandatory interim emissions targets, e.g. for 2035 and 2040, reducing accountability for staying on a credible path to the 2045 goal.
2.2.2. Mitigation and air pollution strategies are well developed, but adaptation measures are still nascent
While Slovenia is at an early stage in its adaptation efforts, efforts have accelerated in recent years. Disaster risk management systems are well developed, but measures to increase resilience to date have been limited. The Climate Act, together with the Life4Adapt project, seeks to address these gaps.
Launched in 2025, Life4Adapt is a seven-year project co-funded with the EU (EUR 26.6 million, EUR 14.2 million from the EU) (STAscience, 2025[22]). During the implementation of the 2016 NAS, sectoral and regional adaptation efforts remained fragmented, hindered by insufficient climate risk data and institutional capacity. Life4Adapt supports the renewed NAS by upgrading climate services at the Environment Agency (ARSO) through a dedicated climate centre, fostering inter-ministerial co‑operation, improving the online climate portal and establishing a climate office to support local authorities in partnership with the Association of Municipalities. Key work streams include 14 pilot measures, communication and education, innovative financing mechanisms and a post-project implementation plan complete with a monitoring and evaluation system. Life4Adapt promotes multi-level governance, engaging ministries, local governments, academia and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (University of Ljubljana, 2025[23]).
Slovenia has implemented several strategies to achieve its climate mitigation and air pollution goals. The 2021 LT-LEDS provides the strategic framework and sets sectoral targets for 2040 and 2050. The NECP is aligned with EU legislation and guides GHG emission reductions until 2030. The LT-LEDS is being updated to align with the Climate Act and the 2045 net-zero target.
The NECP and the NAPCP guide reductions in GHG and air pollution emissions by 2030 and indicate trajectories thereafter. Measures across both strategies are well co‑ordinated and closely aligned with EU regulations, including the EU ETS, the ESR, regulations related to air emissions and ambient air quality, and transport and land-use legislation. These cross-cutting strategies are complemented by several sector-specific strategies such as the Industrial Strategy 2021‑2030.5
2.2.3. Improved horizontal and vertical co‑ordination could strengthen resilience
Slovenia has improved horizontal co‑ordination, but gaps remain. In addition to preparing the updated NAS, MOPE is the main authority for climate policy, energy use and sustainable mobility, and air quality management. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Spatial Planning (MNVP) has key adaptation responsibilities, including spatial planning, land-use policy and water management. To strengthen horizontal co‑ordination, Slovenia created the Interdepartmental Working Group for International Climate Issues to develop positions in climate negotiations in 2022 and an inter-ministerial group to support the transition to a low-carbon economy in 2023.
While the Climate Act provides new momentum for adaptation, sectoral engagement beyond MOPE to date has been limited. The Inter-ministerial Working Group on Climate Change Adaptation, created in 2016, was discontinued. However, the Climate Act requires new or amended sectoral legislation to integrate climate considerations. For example, the Agriculture Law was amended in November 2025 to strengthen integration of adaptation and mitigation measures and improve data collection, although some barriers related to renewable energy deployment remain (Section 2.4.1).
Despite strengthened adaptation ambitions, follow‑through across sectors remains uncertain. Instructions for sectoral risk and vulnerability assessments were published in August 2025 to facilitate consistency and quality (Pogačar et al., 2025[24]). Nevertheless, the Climate Act does not commit the renewed NAS to preparing a roadmap with interim milestones; the Climate Council has called for such a roadmap (GoRS, 2025[21]). The Act also does not specify how to operationalise results of climate risk assessments through, for example, sectoral action plans. To date, adaptation planning has been driven largely by ministerial engagement, resulting in uneven progress across sectors. Prior to the Act, only the agriculture, forestry, water management and tourism sectors had developed adaptation plans. Embedding climate considerations throughout ministerial frameworks is particularly important because adaptation issues span multiple sectors – for example, integrated land‑use planning for nature‑based solutions (NbS). A clearer legal mandate is needed to ensure all sectors operationalise risk assessment findings, including costed measures, monitoring frameworks and enforcement mechanisms.
Disaster risk management – a critical area for horizontal co‑ordination – is led primarily by the Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief under the Ministry of Defence. Climate-related hazards such as floods and wildfires are included in disaster risk assessments. However, stronger collaboration with environmental authorities is needed to fully integrate climate data and adaptation considerations into national risk planning. Conducting disaster risk reduction and climate risk assessments in parallel risks siloed approaches (EEA, 2017[25]). The adoption of the Resolution on the National Programme of Protection against Natural and Other Disasters (2024‑2030) offers a key opportunity to embed climate considerations into national risk planning (GoRS, 2024[26]).
Vertical co‑ordination remains a significant barrier to adaptation (EC, 2023[27]). Slovenia’s highly centralised government has key administrative institutions and ministries concentrated in Ljubljana while its 12 statistical regions lack governance powers. This leaves 212 municipalities – mostly small and resource-constrained – responsible for environmental management at the subnational level. While some larger municipalities have shown leadership, proposing projects directly to the national level, this approach is not sustainable. Stronger technical support, improved accessibility of funding and capacity building are needed, particularly for less-resourced municipalities. Because climate impacts transcend municipal boundaries, stronger regional co‑ordination and coherence with other frameworks like regional development programmes and regional spatial plans are essential.
Regional development councils, which are often small and resource-constrained, may lack the capacity to complete the AAPs mandated by the Climate Act. AAPs must be prepared within 18 months following adaptation of the NAS. Strengthening implementation of the AAPs will require consistent technical support and dedicated funding. This could involve leveraging the forthcoming climate centre within ARSO, the climate office and EU programmes such as the Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change. Introducing a standardised AAP template, including key elements such as adaptation measures, implementation timelines, funding source mapping (see below) and monitoring requirements, would promote greater consistency and quality. For example, the Climate Change Adaptation Model Regions for Austria programme supports municipalities and defines necessary elements of their adaptation strategies (OECD, 2026[28]).
Regional development councils may also struggle to fulfil the Act’s monitoring requirements. To ensure consistency and avoid duplication of efforts, the government could define core national adaptation indicators and require regions to report against them. Common indicators could feed into a shared repository or dashboard, supporting peer learning and transparency. For example, Scotland’s National Adaptation Plan defines indicators and a monitoring framework for local authorities (Davies, Decherf and Smithers, 2024[29]).
Close co‑ordination between regional councils and municipalities is essential during AAP preparation. This would ensure that adaptation measures are locally grounded and avoid implementation barriers like delays in permitting or misalignment with local infrastructure priorities, as seen for renewable energy projects (Section 2.4.1). The Climate Act also requires regions with urban municipalities to address urban adaptation. Municipalities are not required to prepare their own adaptation plans; their involvement is often project-based through initiatives like EU LIFE or the Covenant of Mayors. However, municipalities hold many key levers for adaptation, including spatial planning, infrastructure maintenance and aspects of water management such as stormwater drainage. Therefore, co‑ordination should go beyond consultation and aim for active integration, helping municipalities embed regional AAP priorities into their municipal spatial plans and investment programmes.
Adaptation funding is fragmented across multiple sources, such as the Climate Fund, Water Fund and EU Cohesion Funds. This creates uncertainty about available resources and application processes. A planned overview of resilience funding under Life4Adapt is therefore a welcome step to support municipalities. Furthermore, upgrades to the national climate portal will help it better serve as a central platform for information sharing, best practices and knowledge exchange across all levels of governance (University of Ljubljana, 2025[23]).
2.2.4. Involvement of civil society has strengthened considerably, yet obstacles remain
Civil society is strongly involved in decision making related to climate change and air pollution. The Environmental Protection Act provides individuals and NGOs with legal standing to participate in, and challenge, environmental decisions. Restrictions on civil society participation in administrative and judicial proceedings introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic were repealed in 2022, restoring these rights (Krašovec, Deželan and Novak, 2024[30]).
Public consultations for key strategies are widespread. Under the NECP, Slovenia held three rounds of public consultations with local authorities and civil society from 2022 to 2024 (GoRS, 2024[31]). Extensive consultations were also held during development of the Climate Act. In contrast, the NAPCP did not include a public consultation process (EC, 2024[18]). Better co‑ordination, communication and early involvement of civil society will be needed to increase its support for energy infrastructure projects, which have faced public opposition (see Section 2.4.1).
In 2023, Slovenia established the Climate Council, an independent scientific advisory body on climate change mitigation and adaptation. Independent advisory bodies provide science-based guidance, enhance policy accountability and support collaboration for effective decision making. Less than half of OECD Member countries have a Climate Council (OECD, 2025[32]). Slovenia’s Council is composed of nine independent experts with expertise in climate change mitigation and adaptation, nominated by public universities, the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Art, and NGOs. The Council oversees implementation of the NECP, the LT-LEDS and the NAS, while advising the government on climate policies. It can propose adaptation and mitigation measures informed by the latest scientific research. Work outputs and activity reports are accessible on a dedicated web page. Strengthening the Council mandate and resourcing would enhance its ability to support ministries, provide timely advice and deepen public engagement. Key measures include creating a permanent secretariat, expanding analytical capacity and increasing resources. In addition to the Climate Council, MOPE and MNVP established the NGO Council as an expert advisory body to the respective ministers. It is selected by and composed of representatives from NGOs.
Building climate resilience and achieving Slovenia’s mitigation targets require a whole-of-government approach that is co‑ordinated effectively across all levels of government and sectors. This section discusses cross-sectoral policy responses to climate mitigation and adaptation. Section 2.4 provides a detailed analysis of sectoral policy options.
2.3.1. Climate adaptation
Priority sectors need more granular climate risk assessments
Slovenia has a solid foundation for assessing climate-related risks, including hazards such as floods, droughts, landslides and wildfires. Data on flood risk are the most comprehensive, incorporating both historical data and future climate scenarios, and are updated biannually. However, progress on hydrological studies remains limited as only 2 of 18 sub-basins have completed these assessments, undermining risk-based prioritisation for flood measures. Accelerating these studies would help better inform local flood management decisions (CoA, 2025[33]).
Forward‑looking, sector‑specific and more granular climate data are needed to better inform subnational adaptation planning. The lack of tailored data for sectors has been a barrier to implementation of the NAS, compounded by challenges in communicating and interpreting climate risk information (GoRS, 2025[21]). To address this, ARSO launched the Climate Projection Atlas web tool in 2022, enabling users to explore climate projections in a graphical format (ARSO, 2022[34]). The forthcoming national centre for climate analysis and forecast will further expand climate variables; update projections with the latest scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; and improve usability through interactive tools, guidance and training workshops (STAscience, 2025[22]).
Adaptation should be systematically integrated into planning and permitting
Significant hurdles persist at the implementation stage of Slovenia’s spatial planning system with consequences for resilience, as demonstrated by the August 2023 floods (MNVP, 2025[35]). The MNVP sets the National Spatial Order, while regional spatial plans – introduced in 2018 – guide regional development programmes. Municipal spatial plans form the basis for issuing construction and building permits, but many are outdated due to limited municipal capacity. As a result, national flood risk data are applied inconsistently. The Court of Audit deemed the system inefficient, noting that only 130 of 212 municipalities had adopted spatial plans that were due six years earlier. It also noted that adoption takes more than 3.5 years on average from submission of the first draft (CoA, 2017[36]). The update process remains lengthy and complex (Dražič, 2021[37]), pointing to a need for procedural simplification and streamlining.
These delays have consequences for resilience, as outdated plans can permit reconstruction or new development in flood‑prone areas. They also carry wider implications for mitigation, air‑quality management and biodiversity. Following the 2023 floods, the government committed to updating nationwide flood data to support spatial planning and the design of flood-resistant structures (MNVP, 2025[38]). However, these advances will only translate to reduced exposure if municipal spatial plans are systematically updated and enforced to reflect the best available hazard data; this has proven challenging.
One way to ensure the systematic use of up-to-date data could be to add a national constraint layer in the e-Spatial Planning Information System. This could automatically flag or trigger restrictions for proposed developments in high‑hazard zones during permitting, despite the lack of an up-to-date municipal plan. Such a measure would help prevent reconstruction or new development in high-risk areas. It could also ensure that any building is conditional on appropriate resilience investments, supporting a more efficient use of recovery funds. France’s Plans de Prévention des Risques d’Inondation include a constraint layer that restricts or conditions development in flood‑prone areas (Prefecture of Île-de-France, 2024[39]).
Climate risk assessment is not yet a standard requirement for public infrastructure. Large projects subject to environmental impact assessment (EIA) include some climate vulnerability analysis under EU rules. However, many smaller publicly funded projects, such as municipal roads and bridges, fall outside EIA requirements (Markun and Markun, 2025[40]). Slovenia has experience to build on, as climate risk assessment is already mandated for infrastructure co-funded by the EU (EC, 2023[41]). Extending climate proofing to all publicly funded projects above a modest threshold would reduce long-term vulnerability and costs. The Green Book guidance of the United Kingdom’s Treasury embeds climate risk as an appraisal criterion for national projects (Government of the United Kingdom, 2025[42]).
Although guidance for infrastructure developers on climate proofing has been developed, knowledge and capacity remain uneven among implementing bodies. Expertise tends to be concentrated in large-scale projects with knowledge lacking at the intermediate and local levels (Ministry of Cohesion and Regional Development, 2024[43]). Strengthening capacity, particularly at the municipal level, would help integrate climate proofing across infrastructure projects in an effective manner.
Climate resilience finance should be strengthened to reduce future costs and fiscal risks
Given its high rate of climate-related losses, Slovenia should strengthen investments in climate resilience. Slovenia has Europe’s highest climate‑related losses (Figure 2.8, panel A), reaching nearly 30% of 2024 GDP. Although the August 2023 floods – responsible for 16% of annual GDP in damages – strongly influence this figure, losses were already well above the EU average. Despite the high cost effectiveness of resilience investments generally – each Euro invested in resilience is estimated to save EUR 5‑7 in recovery costs – they remain under prioritised (EIB, 2024[44]). Public support for further action is high: 89% of Slovenian respondents believe immediate investment in climate adaptation is necessary to avoid higher future costs (EIB, 2024[45]).
The budget for adaptation is insufficient considering that recovery generally costs more than prevention. Adaptation is financed through multiple channels, including the Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), Cohesion Funds and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). However, less than 10% of the Climate Fund Spending Programme for 2025‑2028 (EUR 49 million) is allocated to adaptation (MOPE, 2025[46]). This is disproportionate given that prevention is typically far less costly than recovery. Indeed, the August 2023 floods alone are expected to cost the government around EUR 3.5 billion by 2028 (GoRS, 2025[47]).
In light of the need for greater climate resilience finance, the Climate Act should be leveraged to align funding with systemic resilience. Mainstreaming adaptation finance would give local authorities and sectors more predictable, long‑term resources, enabling a shift from project-based to systematic approaches. This could involve introducing new funding mechanisms or directing existing revenues more explicitly towards resilience. For example, Dutch water boards link revenues to long‑term flood‑risk reduction, while applying the Beneficiary Pays Principle (Dutch Water Authorities, 2017[48]).
Note: Wweather- and climate-related extreme events include meteorological events (storms, including lightning and hail), hydrological events (floods) and climatological events (heatwaves, wildfires, droughts, cold spells, frost).
Source: EEA (2025), Economic Losses from Weather- and Climate-related Extremes in Europe (dataset).
Public budgets alone cannot meet adaptation needs, making it essential to incentivise resilience investments from private actors. Many assets and infrastructure, such as utilities and agricultural land, are owned or operated by private entities that, in principle, have a clear incentive to invest in risk reduction. However, these incentives can be weakened when the state provides post‑disaster assistance regardless of prior risk‑reduction efforts, creating moral hazard and discouraging proactive adaptation. This could be addressed through conditioning recovery support on resilience benchmarks, which is under way in the agricultural sector (Section 2.4.4). Beginning in April 2025, Canada’s federal Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements have included a Disaster Risk Reduction Incentive that rewards provinces and territories for investments made before disasters occur (Government of Canada, 2025[49]).
Innovative financing mechanisms could further mobilise private sector capital for adaptation as planned under Life4Adapt (University of Ljubljana, 2025[23]). Slovenia could look to peer countries and EU initiatives for inspiration on how to mobilise private capital. For example, the Netherlands issues Green Bonds, channelling proceeds to climate-related expenditures, including adaptation and sustainable water management (Dutch State Treasury Agency, 2025[50]). Public-private partnerships (PPPs) could also be leveraged. The EU project LIFE CITYAdaP3 uses PPP financing to enhance urban resilience in eight municipalities across Italy and Spain (EC, 2025[51]). Meanwhile, a PPP in Bilbao, Spain, re-developed the Zorrotzaurre district into a flood-proof residential area (EEA, 2023[52]).
Insurance coverage in Slovenia remains low, although it can help protect households and businesses from the financial impacts of climate-related disasters, build risk awareness and reduce the government’s contingent liability (OECD, 2023[53]). Only 3% of weather- and climate-related losses are insured, one of the lowest shares in the EU, leading to high uninsured losses (EEA, 2025[54]) (Figure 2.8, panel B). The August 2023 floods caused EUR 10 billion in economic losses, but only EUR 350 million was insured (Swiss Re, 2024[55]). A well-designed mandatory insurance system can increase coverage and accelerate recovery following disasters (Bock et al., 2024[56]). However, the system needs to maintain the risk signal and discourage maladaptive development (e.g. avoiding repeated payouts; incentivising elevation and flood protection). However, premiums may be unaffordable for the most exposed households, prompting governments to subsidise insurance premiums. This can create fiscal pressures, as demonstrated by recent strains on France’s CatNat programme (OECD, 2025[57]).
Slovenia faces significant contingent liabilities from climate‑related disasters but lacks a comprehensive climate‑fiscal strategy. Slovenia has relied on EU Solidarity Funds, but these are increasingly oversubscribed as climate-related disasters intensify and cover only part of total damages. This underscores the need for robust national measures (EEA, 2024[58]). Consequently, Slovenia needs a long-term strategy to reduce the exposure of public finances to climate risks. This could include exploring dedicated contingency reserves and risk‑transfer instruments such as parametric insurance to help protect the public budget from climate-related shocks.
Flood resilience planning is in place, but implementation must shift from reactive to proactive
While Slovenia invested heavily following the August 2023 floods, it did not apply build-back-better principles consistently, limiting the efficient use of these public funds. By September 2025, Slovenia had spent EUR 1.2 billion on reconstruction, with a further EUR 2.3 billion allocated by 2028 (GoRS, 2025[47]). To co‑ordinate recovery, Slovenia established a working group, a reconstruction office and technical offices alongside a fast‑tracked reconstruction law. Despite these efforts, resilience was not systematically integrated into rebuilding. For example, municipalities were required to spend rehabilitation funds within 12 months, while the Water Agency had not yet finalised the national intervention programme (Sodnik and Matjaž, 2024[59]). While removal orders for high-risk buildings helped prevent reconstruction in flood-prone areas, challenges such as outdated municipal spatial plans (see above), limited guidance for municipalities and a lack of preparedness on how to build-back-better hindered the full integration of adaptation (Sodnik and Matjaž, 2024[59]). Furthermore, failures and delays to enforce land-use compliance increased the potential for assets being rebuilt in high-risk areas and greater financial losses in the future (CoA, 2025[33]). Addressing these gaps would allow post‑disaster recovery to better support long‑term resilience, as demonstrated by the Netherlands’ use of build-back-better principles – such as spatial planning solutions and structural improvements – after major floods in 2021 (Pot, de Ridder and Dewulf, 2024[60]).
Despite national planning and prioritisation of flood risk management, implementation could be improved. The latest Flood Risk Management Plan (FRMP)6 (2023‑2027) outlines 20 structural and non-structural measures, incorporating climate considerations. However, the plan lacks detail on how climate and hazard data informed the selection of measures. In addition, prioritisation, monitoring and costing could be clarified (EC, 2025[61]). The FRMP also foresees an expansion of NbS, alongside traditional grey infrastructure, with measures like floodplain reconnection and wetland restoration. However, implementation of non-structural measures is hindered by incomplete inventories of floodplains and delays in land-use restrictions (CoA, 2025[33]). NbS also require strong horizontal co‑ordination to enable processes like acquiring or reserving land for periodic flooding, an area where improvements are needed (see above).
2.3.2. Climate mitigation and air pollution
Slovenia uses a diverse mix of policy instruments to reduce both GHG and air pollution emissions (Figure 2.9). Recent evidence suggests that a combination of diverse policy instruments is more effective than relying on few headline policies (D’Arcangelo, Kruse and Pisu, 2024[62]; Stechemesser et al., 2024[63]). The country substantially accelerated climate action in the last decades, in line with other OECD and EU-27 countries (Figure 2.10, panel A). Climate action is measured as a combination of adopting new policies and strengthening existing ones based on the OECD Climate Actions and Policies Measurement Framework (CAPMF) (Nachtigall et al., 2022[64]). Slovenia’s climate policy is significantly shaped by EU policies such as the EU ETS. However, the government still has significant scope to step up climate policies compared to other countries.
Climate action of market-based instruments (MBIs) could be stepped up. Both MBIs and non-MBIs can reduce emissions (Stechemesser et al., 2024[63]; OECD, 2025[65]). However, MBIs such as carbon pricing, phasing out of fossil fuel support (see Chapter 1 for details) and subsidies for renewables are usually more cost effective. Slovenia’s use of MBIs is slightly below that of OECD Member countries (Figure 2.10, panel B). While progress on MBIs has stagnated in the last years, Slovenia made significant progress on non-MBIs by transposing and implementing climate-related EU Directives related to buildings and electricity into national law. Yet, climate action in the buildings and electricity sectors remains below OECD and EU-27 averages (Figure 2.10, panel C). In addition, green innovation in Slovenia is below the OECD average (OECD, 2025[66]). The investment and research environment for Slovenian firms could be improved through better targeting of technologies in need of support; reducing overlaps in the country’s diverse support mechanisms; increasing predictability of funding; and shifting funding from energy-related projects to other green projects such as manufacturing (OECD, 2025[67]).
Note: Climate action is measured as a combination of policy adoption and policy stringency on a scale from 0 (no climate action) to 10 (strong action). Market-based instruments include carbon pricing and environmentally beneficial subsides. Non market-based instruments include standards and regulatory instruments.
Source: Based on Nachtigall et al. (2022[64]), The Climate Actions and Policies Measurement Framework: A Structured and Harmonised Climate Policy Database to Monitor Countries' Mitigation Action; OECD (2024[68]), Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2024: Gearing Up to Bring Emissions Down; OECD (2025[69]), Climate Actions and Policies Measurement Framework.
2.4.1. Towards a zero-carbon, climate-resilient power sector
Slovenia’s power sector is increasingly vulnerable to climate-related impacts
Rising temperatures, greater precipitation variability, more frequent and severe droughts, and declining snowpack are expected to increasingly compromise power production. Although the NECP did not assess climate risk (EC, 2023[70]), an assessment mandated under the Climate Act has since been completed for the energy sector (MOPE, 2025[71]). It identifies floods as the most severe risk, given their potential to damage transformer stations, distribution networks and other critical energy infrastructure. Declining water availability and river flows are also expected to reduce hydropower output during summer months, coinciding with rising cooling demand. In 2022, the Solkan hydropower plant was shut down due to the low flow of the Soča River (STA, 2022[72]). The diversification of renewable energy sources foreseen in the NECP is therefore welcome, as this can help offset seasonal reductions in hydropower output. Rising temperatures and reduced river flows similarly threaten the cooling capacity of thermal generation, including the Krško nuclear plant (STA, 2022[73]). The sector’s climate risk assessment provides a foundation for prioritising and guiding adaptation efforts; concrete measures with measurable and timebound goals should follow.
Renewable deployment has accelerated, but the pace remains insufficient for 2030 targets
Despite Slovenia’s efforts to lower the carbon intensity of electricity generation, coal remains a major source of emissions. The carbon intensity of electricity generation nearly halved between 2010 and 2024, dropping below the EU-27 average. This was mainly due to nuclear, hydro and recent growth in solar energy (EEA, 2024[74]). Despite this progress, coal still accounted for about 20% of electricity generation in 2024, remaining a major source of SOx and energy-related GHG emissions (Figure 2.11, panel A). In addition, progress in wind deployment is slowing. Only three turbines are operating, with no new installations in over a decade. New wind and hydropower projects have faced delays due to local opposition, permitting issues and frequent legislative changes, creating policy uncertainty.
Slovenia needs to further expand renewables generation to decarbonise power supply and support electrification of sectors such as transport and buildings (see Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3). In 2024, renewables made up 43% of electricity production but trail neighbouring countries and the EU-27 average (Figure 2.11, panel B). The country has strong solar potential, moderate onshore wind potential, limited options for new hydro plants and no offshore wind potential. Slovenia plans to achieve its 55% renewable electricity target by 2030, mostly by solar photovoltaic (PV) and – to a much lesser extent – by wind and biomass (biogas and woody biomass) (GoRS, 2024[31]). In 2023, electricity already accounted for 23.3% of final energy consumption, above the EU-27 average of 21.5%. The NECP expects electricity consumption to further increase by 2030 and beyond.
Note: Panel A: other renewables include negligible quantities of non-renewable energy.
Source: OECD (2025), IEA World Energy Balances and Statistics (dataset).
Slovenia aims to reconcile renewable energy expansion with protection of health, biodiversity and agricultural land, but these constraints limit deployment potential. In view of public opposition to renewable energy projects, Slovenia prioritises renewable deployment with the lowest adverse effects on other goals such as biodiversity and health. A recent analysis found that more than 99% of Slovenia’s renewable energy potential faces high or very high risk to be in conflict with broader biodiversity and health (in particular noise) objectives due to the country’s extensive protected areas and scattered settlements (GoRS, 2024[31]). In addition, the analysis identified no wind power potential without such risks.
To protect biodiversity and agricultural production, Slovenia largely restricts solar and wind installations on agricultural and forest land, which cover roughly 90% of the country. Restrictions were lifted for renewables on degraded agricultural land, mining pits, artificial lakes in mining regions and unprotected forests, enabling agrivoltaics and floating solar PV in these cases. However, restrictions on fertile or irrigated agricultural land are still in place in the 2025 draft amendment of the Agricultural Land Act. To mitigate negative impacts on biodiversity, Slovenia’s 2023 Act on the Introduction of Devices for the Production of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources prioritises PVs on large rooftops, car parks, energy infrastructure, roads, railways and closed landfills. In a welcome move, solar panel installation is now mandatory on reconstructed and new buildings, as well as car parks over 1 000 m² and existing buildings over 1 700 m². The law also simplifies permitting by reducing the majority approval requirement for rooftop solar PV in multi-family houses. As a result of these policies and the discontinuation of the net-metering programme in 2025, over 95% of new solar PV capacity in 2024 was installed on residential or commercial buildings, while less than 5% went to utility-scale facilities.
As lower risk options become exhausted, shifting to higher risk renewable options – while managing the trade-offs with biodiversity and health goals – is increasingly warranted to reach the 2030 renewables target and longer-term goals. Smaller-scale projects have fewer trade-offs with biodiversity, reduce network infrastructure needs and improve power system resilience but face higher costs and limited potential (OECD, 2020[75]). However, exploiting all renewable potential with no or limited risk as indicated in Slovenia’s NECP would increase renewable electricity generation by a maximum of around nine percentage points, falling short of Slovenia’s 2030 target (GoRS, 2024[31]).
Despite some progress, more could be done to remove other barriers to the deployment of renewable energy projects. Key barriers include grid bottlenecks, complex and lengthy permitting processes, and a lack of technical capacities and resources at the municipality level. In 2024, Slovenia encountered significant obstacles in integrating new renewable energy installations into the grid. More than 20% of connection requests – mostly small scale – were declined in that year, highlighting the need for grid reinforcements. The country plans to invest EUR 3.5 billion (7.5% of GDP) in electricity grids by 2032 to resolve such problems.
Slovenia has also introduced or updated legislation and policy to support renewable energy. In a welcome move, the 2023 Renewable Energy Sources Act recognises renewable plants and network infrastructure as assets of overriding public interest. This reduces the risk of legal challenges, enabling simpler permitting and faster approvals. In 2025, Slovenia transposed the EU Renewable Energy Directive III, which is expected to further speed up permitting. In 2019, the country launched 12 national spatial plans for wind farms to speed up approval and boost wind energy. As of 2024, only one had been adopted, four had been rejected and seven remained under development, illustrating the scale of implementation challenges.
Permitting processes are still complex and lengthy. Slovenia could consider expanding resources and capacity of permitting authorities or implementing silence-is-consent rules for permitting like in Italy. The application process for multiple permits generally requires each permit or approval to be obtained before proceeding to the next. Allowing permit seekers to submit applications for multiple permits at the same time would considerably reduce approval times.
Sharing the benefits from renewable projects with municipalities can ease local resistance. To address local opposition, the government offers municipalities EUR 200 000 for each megawatt of wind power installed for which they issue a construction permit. In addition, project developers are required to spend 3% of their profits in the local community. These are positive steps as recent evidence from Germany suggests that local opposition significantly decreases if municipalities financially benefit from wind power deployment (Germeshausen, Heim and Wagner, 2025[76]). However, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of these measures in Slovenia. Experience from Sosa City in Japan suggests that sharing profits from renewable energy production between developers and the local community can also significantly reduce local opposition to agrivoltaics (OECD, 2025[77]).
Community-led renewable energy projects, such as energy communities, can also reduce local opposition (Kirkegaard et al., 2023[78]), but these are limited in Slovenia. This is due to factors such as restrictions in the national legal framework (including scope of allowed activities), burdensome administrative procedures and unclear market rules. For example, energy communities are only allowed to engage in collective self-consumption, leaving other contributions of energy communities to the energy transition untapped. Simplifying administrative procedures and providing further guidance on the administrative steps (e.g. the help desk system developed in France), as well as transparent market rules for energy communities, would help encourage citizen-led renewables projects.
The country could redirect financial support for renewables. In 2018, Slovenia shifted from feed-in tariffs to competitive public tenders, which have proven effective in deploying larger renewable projects and reducing fiscal costs across the EU. However, in Slovenia, tenders have been less impactful due to the dominance of small-scale projects, which are less suited to competitive public calls (OECD, 2024[79]); many tenders are undersubscribed. In response, Slovenia plans to significantly increase the scale of public tenders. It aims to attract larger investors from EUR 20 million per year in 2024 to around EUR 100 million per year for 2025‑2029, financed through a combination of national and EU funds. The public calls cover a range of different technologies, such as solar PV and wind, as well as different sizes, including residential, commercial and utility-scale projects. Two public calls also offer grants to support construction of wind power plants. A EUR 31 million public call for 2025‑2027 focuses on energy communities. Expanding financial support for energy communities would speed up deployment and reduce local opposition. It would also bring the country closer to meeting the EU objective of having one energy community per municipality with a population of more than 10 000 by 2025.
Increasing shares of variable renewable energy such as solar PV and wind requires greater levels of system flexibility to balance electricity demand and supply. This can be achieved through interconnections, storage and demand-side response (DSR). Slovenia’s regulatory framework supports DSR, allowing it to participate in wholesale electricity and service markets. The country has excellent interconnection with neighbouring power systems, reaching an interconnection rate – measured as import capacity over production capacity – of 75% in 2021. This is well above the EU 10% target for 2020 and the 15% target for 2030 (GoRS, 2024[31]). Slovenia’s electricity storage mostly consists of pumped hydro plants. The government plans to further increase electricity storage through pumped hydro and, to a lesser extent, through batteries. A stronger focus on batteries may be warranted given local opposition to pumped hydro projects and rapidly declining costs of battery technologies.
Smart meter rollout is well developed, but uptake of dynamic electricity tariffs remains low. At 95%, Slovenia has one of the highest rollout rates of smart meters in the EU-27 (EC, 2025[8]). Smart meters enable participation in DSRs and take-up of dynamic electricity tariffs that encourage consumers to adapt their consumption to market conditions (e.g. by reducing consumption at peak times when prices are high). To shield consumers from high electricity prices during the energy crises, Slovenia regulated electricity prices from September 2022 through February 2025, implying that all households were subject to fixed price contracts (EU ACER, 2024[80]). Since March 2025, households and businesses can again opt for dynamic tariffs. In a welcome move, Slovenia also adjusted its network tariffs, moving towards charges depending on time of day and season to align electricity consumption with power production and network needs (EU ACER, 2025[81]). While uptake of dynamic retail tariffs is still to be assessed, further efforts may be needed to inform consumers about the financial benefits and risks associated with dynamic tariffs.
The coal phase-out can be accelerated
Slovenia’s National Strategy for the Exit from Coal and Restructuring of Coal Regions, adopted in 2022, aims to phase out coal by 2033. This exit is later than most other EU countries but earlier than countries with higher coal shares in the generation mix such as Germany (OECD, 2025[69]). Coal-related air pollutant and GHG emissions decreased significantly in the last decades. The decline was due to a shift from coal power to renewable electricity in response to industrial emissions legislation, such as the Large Combustion Plants Directive, as well as rising prices under the EU ETS. However, the state-owned energy company Holding Slovenske Elektrarne (HSE) brought the country’s largest coal plant in Šoštanj online as recently as 2014. The project cost EUR 1.2 billion, just under 2% of GDP (EBRD, 2019[82]). It burns lignite – an especially polluting fuel – supplied by the nearby Velenje coal mine.
The cost effectiveness of the coal phase-out must be improved. Plans to restructure the two coal regions in Slovenia are under development. Slovenia will tap EUR 259 million for the restructuring of its coal regions from the EU Just Transition Fund to support economic diversification and long-term restructuring of the region (OECD, 2026[83]). The Šoštanj power plant and the Velenje coal mine are located in the Šalek Valley, a relatively poor region. Jointly, they provide around 9 500 direct jobs. Both entities are expected to shut down much earlier than 2033 as the plant incurs significant losses due to elevated production costs. Production costs increased due to several factors, such as high EU ETS prices – a factor well known but not sufficiently considered in planning. In 2025, the government took over both entities from the HSE, providing EUR 403 million to avoid bankruptcy and ensure their operation from 2025 through April 2027, embedded in Slovenia’s Just Transition framework. This temporarily secured jobs and district heating for around 35 000 residents. Plans after April 2027 have not yet been communicated, creating uncertainty for workers and investors. Annual recurring fiscal cost is estimated at around EUR 200 million. This represents twice the amount of public funding for renewables, equivalent to a subsidy of more than EUR 21 000 per direct job per year.
Accelerating the coal phase-out would free up substantial public resources that could be invested in infrastructure, including renewables, and supporting alternative economic opportunities for the affected region. More robust and comprehensive cost-benefit analysis could have prevented construction of the Šoštanj plant and would have improved the overall cost effectiveness of the coal exit strategy. Countries such as the United Kingdom have used internal carbon pricing for their cost-benefit analysis, an approach recommended in the last OECD Economic Surveys for Slovenia (OECD, 2022[84]; OECD, 2024[79]). These offer important lessons for future large-scale energy investment decisions.
Nuclear expansion needs careful assessment
The planned expansion of nuclear power needs to be assessed carefully. In 2023, the lifetime of Slovenia’s nuclear power plant in Krško was extended to 2043. Croatia has signalled support for expanding the capacity of the jointly owned nuclear plant. Slovenia’s government also supports the capacity expansion under the Resolution on the Long-Term Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy for the Future of Slovenia, adopted in May 2024. However, a referendum on the proposed expansion, scheduled for November 2024, was cancelled by Parliament after environmental groups and experts challenged its legality before the Constitutional Court.
Slovenia’s updated NECP states that a final decision would take place by 2028 at the latest, for construction to start in 2032. As with all major energy projects, nuclear expansion should involve transparent public consultation and be guided by a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that considers full lifecycle costs, including plant construction, nuclear waste storage and decommissioning of retired facilities. In addition, robust energy scenarios should illustrate the extent to which the plant contributes to the 2045 net-zero goal, and addresses affordability concerns and grid flexibility. These scenarios should be communicated to foster public trust and investor confidence.
Risks related to cost overruns and delays need to be considered. The cost of the expansion is estimated at EUR 9.6‑15.4 billion (15‑23% of 2024 GDP), depending on the capacity installed. Recent European nuclear projects such as Hinkley point C in the United Kingdom, Flamanville in France, Olkiluoto 3 in Finland and Mochovce 3 in Slovakia suffered from significant delays and cost overruns (OECD, 2024[85]). Mochovce 3 – a nuclear reactor type similar to that envisioned in Slovenia – had an initial budget of EUR 2.8 billion, but the final cost rose to EUR 6.2 billion (Slovak Spectator, 2023[86]). The plant came online in 2023, 11 years after initially scheduled. Robust contingency planning is therefore essential to mitigate the impacts of such risks. While producing electricity domestically contributes to energy security, all uranium is currently imported from countries outside the EU-27, including from the Russian Federation.
2.4.2. Reducing transport emissions
Transport accounts for most emissions; stronger efforts are needed to meet targets
Slovenia’s transport sector is vulnerable to climate impacts and the largest contributor to GHG and NOx emissions. The transport infrastructure faces growing challenges from climate change, with floods and landslides causing severe disruptions. Transport accounts for 36% of the country’s GHG emissions – the second highest share in the EU-27. GHG emissions grew strongly until 2008, plateaued in the 2010s, dropped during COVID‑19 and then rebounded strongly. Increased travel demand was the major reason for this increase (Figure 2.12). This increase was driven by increased car dependency, more road transit freight and widespread commuting. These factors outweigh the savings related to improved fuel efficiency and the decarbonisation of the vehicle fleet.
Slovenia has one of the highest passenger mobility across transport modes among EU‑27 countries (Figure 2.13, panel A) and an above EU-27 average in the share of cars in the modal split. This share did not change much between 2010 and 2023 (Figure 2.13, panel B). In addition, Slovenia’s car fleet is growing and ageing with most cars failing to meet the most stringent air pollution and CO2 emission standards (Figure 2.13, panel C). Transport is the largest source of NOₓ and a significant source of PM emissions, which worsens air quality, especially in traffic-heavy urban areas. The ageing vehicle fleet, with 49% diesel cars in 2024, further increases pollution; diesel vehicles usually emit more NOₓ and PM than petrol cars.
Main drivers of CO2 emissions from transport, 2010-2023
Note: Other effects include behavioural effects and “negative savings” in freight transport due to low-capacity use.
Source: Odyssee-Mure (2026), CO2 Decomposition (dataset).
More efforts are needed to reach the transport-related emissions targets. Slovenia is obliged to reduce economy-wide NOx emissions by 65% by 2030. It also aims to reduce transport-related GHG emissions by 1% by 2030 compared to 2005 (19% reduction compared to 2023) (Table 2.1). The country expects to reach its GHG target with additional measures such as increased investments in sustainable transport infrastructure and multimodality. However, without additional measures, transport emissions are expected to rise by 41% by 2030 compared to 2005, highlighting the challenges ahead. Mitigating transport-related air pollution and GHG emissions requires adopting more low-emission vehicles and reducing car dependency. This can be achieved by discouraging private car use and advancing sustainable transportation options, such as public transit, walking and cycling, supported by strategic investments in high-quality infrastructure.
Source: Odyssee-Mure (2025), Key Indicators (dataset); Eurostat (2025), Transport Statistics (dataset); SURS (2025), “Transport”, SiStat (dataset).
Efforts to reduce car dependency need to be strengthened
Ljubljana has made notable progress in reducing car dependency from which other cities can learn. In response to a sharp rise in motorised traffic in the early 2000s, Ljubljana adopted its Vision 2025 and implemented a range of measures to reduce car dependency and promote sustainable mobility. With more than 0.5 million inhabitants, the metropole region of Ljubljana accounts for 25% of the country’s population. The city established an eco-friendly zone, closing the old city centre to traffic and establishing a pedestrian zone of more than 10 hectares (ha), one of the largest in the EU-27. Public acceptance of this measure has been high with 95% of people in support, and most in favour of a planned extension (EC, 2020[87]). To further encourage sustainable transport, Ljubljana introduced five new park-and-ride facilities, expanded its public bike hire programme, and upgraded its bus network with real-time arrival displays and a smart travel card. Despite these improvements, the city still lacks an interconnected network of dedicated bus lanes, which slows public transport. Still, the city manages more than 220 km of dedicated cycle lanes, dedicating almost 10% of its road network to cyclists – one of the highest shares among European cities (Virdo et al., 2022[88]). These efforts have curbed car use and led to a significant increase in walking, cycling and public transport use, contributing to lower emissions and improved urban air quality (EBRD, 2020[89]).
National policies, such as the tax-free commuting allowance, foster car dependency and need to be reformed. Slovenia’s tax-free commuting allowance covers 10% of petrol costs per kilometre and can account for up to one-third of the fuel and carbon taxes levied on transport emissions, diminishing its effectiveness in reducing emissions (OECD, 2024[79]). Accounting for a significant part of the income of some Slovens, this subsidy incentivises private car use, while discouraging the shift towards more sustainable modes of transport. The government has made several previous attempts to reform the allowance. However, it discontinued these efforts due to public resistance, particularly from trade unions. Gradually reforming the allowance would help reduce car dependency. This includes raising the eligibility distance above the current 2 km allowed between home and work. Slovenia could also lower income tax exemption thresholds, especially for urban residents who have alternatives to individual car trips.
Fiscal policies continue to encourage car use and transit traffic. Like most EU countries, Slovenia taxes diesel at a lower rate than petrol. This provides incentives for diesel cars, which are usually more polluting. Removing the tax differential between diesel and petrol would better align fuel prices with their environmental cost. The country’s carbon price (fuel excise tax and explicit carbon tax) in the transport sector is slightly below the EU-27 average (Chapter 1). The new EU ETS2, covering transport and buildings, will gradually increase the carbon price for transport fuels from 2028. However, a simultaneous decrease of the excise tax – a temporary provision of the Climate Act – risks restoring the old prices.
Like many neighbouring countries, Slovenia provides partial tax refunds for commercial diesel (CNR, 2025[90]). These refunds lower the price of road freight transport, reducing the competitiveness of more sustainable modes such as rail. They also encourage freight trucks travelling between Central and South-Eastern Europe to refuel in Slovenia, increasing recorded emissions. In 2022, tax reductions for commercial diesel and agriculture accounted for 0.1% of GDP (OECD, 2024[79]). The government intends to discontinue reimbursement of excise duties on commercial diesel, contingent upon approval of the revision of the EU Energy Tax Directive. The revised EU Directive seeks to remove exemptions and reduced rates that encourage use of fossil fuels. However, Member States have encountered difficulties to find consensus, indicating that final approval may require more time. Discontinuing the reimbursement in close co‑ordination with neighbouring countries is crucial to send the right price signal.
Other policies continue fostering car dependency. Free workplace parking is common in Slovenia and is currently not taxed. Transport-oriented development is mostly lacking in Slovenia. Most municipal spatial plans rarely address public transport links or mixed land use development, leading to greater car dependency. A tax on workplace parking, improved national guidance on spatial planning and better co‑ordination across municipalities would reduce car dependency.
Road pricing has strengthened for freight trucks. In accordance with EU regulation, trucks on motorways pay tolls based on the distance travelled, their Euro emissions standard, number of axles and – since November 2025 – CO2 emissions. This was implemented through a revenue-neutral differentiation of the infrastructure charge according to the vehicle’s CO2 emission class. Slovenia did not opt to price CO2 emissions from trucks using the external cost charge in addition to the infrastructure charge – as done in Austria and Germany. This additional charge would provide further incentives for cleaner trucks while generating revenues that could be used to invest in sustainable transport infrastructure (T&E, 2024[91]). However, Slovenia will apply an external cost charge on air pollution – as mandated by EU regulation – and opted to apply a charge on noise pollution from March 2026. Revenues from the external cost charge are earmarked to improve the transport system, reduce the environmental impact of transport and develop transport infrastructure. In line with EU guidance, the external cost charge will be higher in areas with higher air pollution and noise exposure.
Congestion charges and road pricing can be further strengthened. Differentiating rates by time, in addition to place, would help address congestion (van Dender, 2019[92]). Slovenia should consider extending distance-based charging to light vehicles, which pay a flat rate. This would help offset the loss of revenue from fuel taxes as electric vehicles (EVs) become more widespread. Such an approach is especially critical for Slovenia as tax revenues from road fuels accounted for around 10% of central government tax revenue in 2023 (Chapter 1). The NECP envisages introducing congestion charges in Ljubljana and Maribor by 2030, but this decision falls under jurisdiction of the respective city authorities.
Investment in public transport has increased. The country has long prioritised roads but has recently increased investments in rail significantly (Chapter 1). It does not have any high-speed railway lines. Around half of its network is electrified, slightly below the EU average. Slovenia’s RRP allocates nearly EUR 400 million, more than 17% of the total envelope to support sustainable mobility (MF, 2025[93]). This helps modernise and expand the public transport system, increasing the attractiveness of inter-city transport and work commutes. The creation of the Passenger Transport Management Company in 2022 helped enhance co‑ordination of regional bus and train services (OECD, 2024[79]). This, in combination with new concessions and lines, resulted in a nearly 20% increase of inter-city bus operations.
Despite these improvements, public transport remains underdeveloped. In 2023, it accounted for 15% of trips (3% by rail), below the EU-27 average of 17% (8% rail) (Figure 2.13, panel B). Although dispersed settlement patterns pose challenges, rail potential is further limited by service frequency, limited integration with bus networks and lack of seamless passenger information systems. All of these factors limit the competitiveness of rail versus private cars.
Making better use of infrastructure will require improved service integration, unified ticketing, enhanced convenience and reliability. Evidence from Chile suggests that improving service quality and electrifying urban public transport, such as buses, would significantly reduce air pollution (Tikoudis and Oueslati, 2022[94]). Investing in supporting infrastructure for multimodal transport, such as park-and-ride facilities or bicycle parking around train stations, as well as on-demand transport services would help unlock the full potential of the rail network. Moreover, the country’s National Integrated Transport Strategy from 2015 is outdated. A new comprehensive transport strategy is under development, planned for adoption in 2027. This transport strategy should be consistent with international commitments and other national strategic documents. It should also strengthen sustainable transport at the local level and support the implementation of Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans, which were adopted by nearly all municipalities.
Greater adoption of cleaner vehicles is needed
Motor vehicle taxes can be strengthened and better aligned to encourage the purchase of cleaner cars. Revenues from motor vehicle taxes (both registration and annual taxes but excluding fuel duty) are low (0.3% of GDP vs. 0.4% in the EU). Since 2021, the registration tax has been based on the vehicle’s CO2 emissions and Euro engine standards. Recent evidence suggests that EV adoption significantly increases when vehicle registration taxes are high and EVs are exempt (Eskeland and Yan, 2021[95]). However, Slovenia’s tax rates have been too low to encourage a shift towards hybrid and EVs. More importantly, preferential rates for older used cars have led to increased registrations of used combustion-engine vehicles. Also, the annual vehicle tax does not reflect emissions. Removing favourable registration tax treatment for older vehicles and introducing environmental criteria in the annual vehicle tax would help rejuvenate the fleet and steer the market towards cleaner vehicles.
EV adoption is low with the share of EVs in the vehicle stock at less than 2% in 2024 (European Alternative Fuels Observatory, 2025[96]). Registration of battery EVs decreased by 27% compared to 2023. Slovenia had one of the EU’s lowest EV market shares in new car sales at about 8% in 2024 (Figure 2.14, panel A). Slovenia aims to increase the share of EVs on all first registrations of passenger cars to 55% by 2030 (GoRS, 2024[31]).
Incentives for EVs need to be better targeted. Purchasing decisions for EVs often hinge on factors such as the retail price and operational costs, as well as practical considerations like the vehicle’s range and the availability of charging stations. In 2024 and 2025, Slovenia allocated EUR 26.25 million for the purchase of new or used EVs. Depending on the purchase price, buyers could receive a subsidy of up to EUR 7 200. Cars priced above EUR 65 000 were not subsidised. Subsidies were not targeted based on socio-economic characteristics such as transport poverty risk (Chapter 1). Redirecting financial support for EVs to households in rural areas – where alternatives to private vehicles are limited – would be a more effective use of public funds and avoid creating additional incentives for car ownership in urban areas (OECD, 2025[97]). In addition, more financial support for inter-city buses and trucks would accelerate fleet renewal. Mandating retailers to disclose the full lifecycle costs of all vehicles would enhance the information available to buyers and encourage greater adoption of EVs.
Slovenia needs to invest more in its charging infrastructure. Range anxiety is one of the major barriers to EV adoption. Despite significant progress in the last years, its charging infrastructure is well below the EU-27 average (Figure 2.14, panel B). The Act on Infrastructure for Alternative Fuels and Promotion of Transition to Alternative Fuels in Transport, adopted in 2023, aims to build a dense network of fast and ultra-fast electric charging stations. The Act allocates around EUR 40 million – co-financed by the RRF – to the private sector to support installation of public charging stations. However, private charging providers have fewer incentives to operate in remote, less densely populated areas. Directing greater support to these areas – like in France – would use public funds more efficiently and help ensure nationwide charging station coverage, reducing range anxiety. Rates of public charging stations are among the highest in the EU-27 (European Alternative Fuels Observatory, 2024[98]). Regulating charging rates could address this issue.
Source: OECD calculations based on: ACEA (2024), New EU Car Registrations by Power Source 2024 (dataset); European Alternative Fuels Observatory (2025), Recharging Infrastructure & Vehicles and Fleet (dataset).
2.4.3. Towards an energy-efficient, low-carbon and climate-resilient building sector
Resilient urban development, standards and renovations should be mainstreamed
Slovenia’s built environment faces increasing climate-related hazards, including flooding, storms and heatwaves. However, proactive measures can reduce the severity and economic impact of these hazards. The country has made progress in integrating resilience into urban development, with Ljubljana leading the way, co-funded by EU LIFE projects and Cohesion Funds. Building resilience hinges on adaptive site planning and climate risk assessment (Section 2.3.1). It can be further strengthened through regulatory reforms and integrating adaptive measures into renovations.
As the country’s most densely built and populated area, Ljubljana faces growing challenges from urban heat island (UHI) effects, as well as pluvial and fluvial flood risks (Gregorčič et al., 2025[99]). For example, annual flood damages along the Gradaščica River are estimated at EUR 5 million (Nature-Demo, 2025[100]). Since 2010, Ljubljana has planted over 40 000 trees and added 120 ha of green space, earning the European Green Capital Award in 2016 and ranking among European capitals with the highest share of green space (Fleck, 2022[101]). Prioritised under the Climate Act, these measures can help mitigate urban flooding, reduce the UHI effect and generate co-benefits for health, air quality and sustainable mobility.
Ljubljana’s transformation was driven by the integration of NbS into long-term planning frameworks. The city’s Municipal Spatial Plan integrates NbS and green infrastructure, introducing several tools and requirements. For example, the plan adopts the Green Space Factor, a scoring system based on infiltration potential – a proxy for flood risk. It also requires vegetation for trees, green roofs and cover planting in heat-generating land uses (e.g. parking lots). In addition, Ljubljana’s 2030 Climate Neutrality Action Plan, developed under the EU Mission for Climate Neutral and Smart Cities, sets out concrete measures to enhance resilience through NbS, such as sustainable drainage systems (NetZeroCities, 2024[102]). Other cities, such as Maribor, are following Ljubljana’s example, but uptake remains uneven (Climate-ADAPT, 2025[103]). To accelerate mainstreaming, municipalities may need technical support to update spatial plans and planning frameworks to integrate NbS (Section 2.3.1), complemented by structured capacity building and knowledge transfer among local authorities.
Building standards do not yet explicitly integrate climate change or resilience considerations. The Building Act (GZ-1) regulates high-level conditions like rules on earthquake risk assessment for construction of buildings and the MNVP issues more granular technical requirements (GoRS, 2023[104]; MNVP, 2025[35]). Introducing climate-resilient building codes could enforce higher resilience of buildings with requirements such as elevated foundations for flood-prone areas and reflective roofing to mitigate heatwaves. For example, Canada is updating its National Building Code to include climate data projections, such as future rainfall intensity (Government of Canada, 2025[105]).
Renovations can be an effective entry point for integrating climate resilience. While Eco Fund7 subsidies support measures with both mitigation and adaptation benefits, such as improved insulation, adaptation features are not yet standard in energy renovations. Incorporating resilience measures – such as water-resistant materials and structural reinforcements – during energy upgrades is cost effective, lowering labour and transaction costs. In so doing, these upgrades minimise disruptions and reduce future repair expenses (Haut Conseil pour le Climat, 2020[106]). Leveraging these synergies systematically within the Long-term Energy Renovation Strategy would be beneficial (see below).
Despite progress, emissions from buildings need to be reduced further
Alongside the energy sector, the buildings sector has played a significant role in Slovenia’s emissions reductions. Buildings accounted for 32% of final energy use in 2023, below the EU average of 40%. A recent positive measure was the 2023 ban on individual oil boilers in new construction. Slovenia is also among the few countries to have introduced a carbon tax in the building sector. However, reduced excise duties for heating fuels persist, weakening pricing signals (OECD, 2024[79]).
Efficiency improvements and a shift to cleaner heating sources in the building sector are needed. Slovenia needs to address rural air pollution from widespread wood combustion – the main source of national PM2.5 emissions, for which the country is off track to meet its 2030 target (Section 2.1.3). The government aims for a fully decarbonised building stock by 2050 in line with the EU Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD). It has interim targets to cut final energy use by 20% and GHG emissions by at least 70% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels (GoRS, 2025[107]). Progress to date is strong: by 2023, final energy consumption in buildings had already fallen by 23%, and GHG emissions were 58% below 2005 levels (ARSO, 2025[108]).
Biomass burning is a major source of rural air pollution, largely due to outdated stoves and poor combustion practices such as burning damp wood. Winter temperature inversions exacerbate the problem by trapping pollutants close to the ground in valleys. Wood fuels accounted for 30% of energy consumption in Slovenian households in 2023, driven by dispersed settlements and abundant privately owned forests. A study in the rural village of Retje found that 34 of 88 winter days exceeded PM pollution limits (Glojek et al., 2022[109]). Such emissions also affect indoor environments, particularly in poorly ventilated homes.
In 2023, proposed amendments to the Energy Act sought to ban biomass boilers in new buildings and allow municipalities to restrict wood heating, but they were dropped due to opposition (MOPE, 2024[110]). In a welcome move, Eco Fund subsidies encourage a shift towards modern boiler systems and wood pellets (National Council of the Republic of Slovenia, 2024[111]). These emit less PM thanks to improved combustion and filtration, although still more than alternatives like heat pumps. Furthermore, while sourced primarily from residues, wood pellets still carry lifecycle emissions from energy-intensive drying and cross-border transport (Topić Božič et al., 2024[112]). Still, heat pumps may not be suitable in all cases. Heat pumps perform best in efficient buildings, and the NECP highlights the need to address electricity grid constraints to enable wider adoption (GoRS, 2024[31]). The government should therefore support rural households in transitioning to both modern biomass systems and sustainable alternatives to conventional biomass burning.
Measures beyond subsidies may be needed to reduce rural air pollution. Regulations focussed on phasing out old stoves, rather than restricting wood burning, could improve public acceptance. Germany bans pre-1995 stoves, while Denmark requires replacement of pre-2003 stoves upon property sale (Government of Germany, n.d.[113]; Government of Denmark, 2021[114]). Further efforts may be needed to strengthen the national inventory of heating appliances for monitoring purposes. There is insufficient legal basis for enforcing rules against improper burning. Enhancing enforcement mechanisms, such as by introducing a visible smoke offence and providing enforcement resources, as implemented in the city of Bristol in the United Kingdom, could help address the negative externalities associated with improper burning (Bristol City Council, n.d.[115]).
To improve the acceptability of such regulations, raising awareness about biomass-related pollution is critical. In Retje, 70% of residents believed their air quality was good, and 89% did not think wood smoke harmed health (Glojek et al., 2022[109]). The NECP recognises the importance of educating users on proper fuel and burning methods. However, additional efforts are needed to close this knowledge gap and reframe air pollution as a rural issue, not just one affecting urban centres.
In densely populated areas, district heating powered by renewables represents a significant pathway for decarbonising the building sector. Around 6 000 buildings – mainly in Ljubljana and Maribor – are connected to district heating systems (DHS). However, DHS supply only 7.6% of energy use in buildings, well below countries such as the Slovak Republic (15%) (OECD, 2024[79]). Expansion efforts, supported by Cohesion Fund investments and Eco Fund subsidies for renewable‑based connections, focus on dense urban zones and upgrading ageing infrastructure. However, limited technical capacity among municipalities and weak alignment between local and national goals continue to hinder progress (OECD, 2024[79]). Recent collaboration with the Urban Agenda for the EU is helping improve co‑ordination, but further strengthening municipal capabilities is essential. EU projects such as ESCALATE, which provide standardised tools for local authorities, can support this effort (ESCALATE, 2025[116]). Support for smaller municipalities is also critical to ensure a consistent regulatory framework, which has been identified as a barrier to DHS expansion (Billerbeck et al., 2023[117]).
Beyond coverage, emission reductions from district heating depend heavily on feedstock composition. DHS rely on natural gas (50%), coal (30%) and biomass (15%), with renewables such as geothermal and waste heat contributing less than 5%. Slovenia aims to increase the share of renewable energy sources, and waste heat and cooling, in DHS by 2‑3% per year to achieve a 25‑40% share by 2030 (GoRS, 2025[107]). Promptly phasing out coal would help achieve this goal. For example, the Šaleška Valley’s transformation of its DHS from coal to renewables is commendable (EC, n.d.[118]).
In parallel to decreasing the carbon intensity of heating sources, heating demand must be reduced through energy efficiency renovations. Slovenia has an ageing housing stock, with nearly two-thirds of buildings constructed before 1980 (Figure 2.15, panel A), contributing to high residential energy consumption (Figure 2.15, panel B). To address this, Slovenia’s Long-term Energy Renovation Strategy for 2050 (DSEPS 2050) sets ambitious targets: by 2050, 74% of single-family homes and 91% of multi-apartment buildings should be renovated. This is supported by financial incentives mainly in the form of grants and low-interest loans for energy efficiency upgrades through the Eco Fund (GoRS, 2021[119]). However, the renovation rate was only 1.2% in 2023, far below the 3% target (IID, 2024[120]).
Note: Data for Slovenia refer to 2021 (Panel A) and 2019 (Panel B). OECD is an unweighted average of the countries shown in the figure.
Source: EC (2025), EU Building Stock Observatory (dataset); IEA (2025), IEA Energy End-uses and Efficiency Indicators (dataset).
Complex decision-making processes in multi-owner buildings with about 27% of residential floor area can hinder renovations (Ziemann, 2024[121]). Consent requirements vary by renovation type, ranging from majority approval to unanimity, often delaying or preventing projects. Recent amendments to the Building Construction Act have lowered thresholds for energy renovations in multi-family buildings and enabled co-ownership structures to access financial support. The development of one‑stop digital platforms for funding and permitting information is also another welcome step towards simplifying procedures. Further easing consent barriers – while offering targeted support to financially constrained owners who are overruled – could accelerate upgrades.
Eco Fund grants and loans could be better tailored to address age ownership barriers. Many homes are owned by older individuals with substantial housing equity but limited liquidity, restricting their ability to finance upgrades. To address this problem, France’s Prêt Avance Rénovation (PAR+) offers a renovation loan that is repaid only when the home is sold or inherited, helping ensure that liquidity constraints do not block energy efficiency upgrades (Government of France, 2024[122]). Awareness campaigns to inform older homeowners about renovation benefits are welcome, but further efforts are needed to reach rural areas and promote available financial support.
Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) can play a greater role in driving renovations. Slovenia has improved its EPC registry, making EPCs mandatory for new buildings, property transactions and public buildings over 250 m² in line with the EPBD recast (MOPE, n.d.[123]). Coverage reaches just more than a quarter of the building stock, mainly public and large non-residential buildings. Further expansion is needed – EPCs are only required for rental agreements longer than one year, leaving most short-term leases exempt. Closing this loophole and extending EPC requirements to all buildings would strengthen compliance, especially relevant as the EPBD introduces minimum energy performance standards for existing buildings, prioritising the elimination of class G, the worst performing category (EC, 2024[124]). Full EPC coverage would help guide investment decisions and target public funding effectively, ensuring support prioritises impactful renovations. It is welcome that the ministry has a pilot for building renovation passports to link EPC data with renovation roadmaps.
While grants have helped spur building renovation, they are not the most cost‑effective way to attract private capital at scale. DSEPS 2050 estimates an investment need of EUR 8.5 billion over 2021‑2030 for renovations, highlighting the importance of expanding loan‑based instruments and diversifying financing tools. Slovenia has taken steps in this direction. The Residential Buildings Guarantee Fund helps de-risk loans, encouraging banks to finance energy efficiency upgrades (GoRS, 2021[119]). On-bill financing programmes – which allow homeowners to repay renovation costs through utility savings – are being piloted with energy providers. Green mortgages and bonds are also being explored, but scaling these initiatives requires better data integration and greater awareness among financial institutions. The Netherlands offers a strong example through initiatives like the Energy Efficient Mortgage Hub (Achmea Bank, 2025[125]).
Like many European countries, Slovenia faces a shortage of skilled construction labour, marked by high turnover and a reliance on foreign workers whose skills may not align with energy upgrades. The BUILD UP Skills initiative established the National Qualification Platform. This created a roadmap to address skill gaps, while focussing on green construction techniques like heat pump installation, renewables integration and insulation (BUILD UP Skills Slovenia, 2013[126]). The SKILLCO Erasmus+ project (2017‑2020) continued addressing skill gaps (CEDEFOP, 2020[127]). Slovenia could further leverage EU programmes and funding – such as the Pact for Skills and Cohesion Funds – to strengthen these efforts, particularly in rural areas where demand for skilled workers far exceeds supply.
2.4.4. Fostering climate-smart agriculture and reducing agricultural emissions
Strengthening capacity and proactive risk management for climate-resilient agriculture
The agricultural sector faces growing climate risks, particularly from more frequent and severe droughts, compounded by pests and extreme weather such as hailstorms. In 2022, Slovenia experienced a severe drought causing over EUR 148 million in damage – over 30% of annual agricultural output – requiring the use of state aid (Interreg Alpine Space, 2024[128]). Although the sector has had an adaptation strategy since 2008 and accompanying action plans from 2010 and 2011, implementation has been fragmented. The Court of Audit found that the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food (MAFF) was only partially efficient in its adaptation efforts (2018‑2022). It noted the ministry did not systematically plan, implement or monitor adaptation measures in agriculture, nor did it identify research priorities for climate resilience (CoA, 2023[129]). To help address these gaps, the sector’s climate risk and vulnerability assessment mandated under the Climate Act was completed in November 2025. Slovenia also began producing annual climate reports for the agricultural sector in 2023, outlining mitigation and adaptation efforts.
The LIFE ViVaCCAdapt project (2016‑2021) in the Vipava Valley piloted resilient practices, but these require expanded technical support to be scaled up. The project developed a regional strategy; introduced a decision-support system for irrigation that cut water and energy use; and implemented green windbreaks to protect soil and biodiversity (Climate-ADAPT, 2023[130]). The Chamber of Agriculture and Forestry (CAFS), which advises farmers, operates 60 local units covering areas such as climate risk management (CAFS, 2025[131]). A systematic transition towards proactive practices such as optimised irrigation, NbS and data-driven approaches will require strengthened capacity building for farmers, supported by enhanced CAFS advisory services.
Slovenia’s farm structure, dominated by small, dispersed holdings, can pose challenges for resilience. Many small family farms face financial constraints and limited technical capacity, which restrict their ability to invest in adaptive practices. The EU CAP includes measures to support establishment of producer co‑operatives and groups, which can improve access to funding and reduce administrative burdens. However, structural limitations remain significant. Given Slovenia has about 70 000 farms with an average of less than 7 ha, overall productivity tends to be low, increasing pressure on land use (EC, 2025[132]). Slovenia accounts for 0.8% of EU farms but only 0.3% of agricultural output, one of the lowest ratios in the EU-27. However, small plots can support biodiversity and landscape diversity, contributing positively to resilience. In addition, Slovenia’s mountainous terrain limits the feasibility of large parcels.
Slovenia could more actively encourage farm consolidation. The CAP replaced the previous system of direct payments with payments per hectare, which can favour expansion as the benefits of owning land scale directly with size. However, redistributive payments introduced under the CAP shift support towards smaller holdings. These and other policies favouring small farms should be carefully assessed to ensure they do not undermine consolidation objectives. Similarly, subsidised land rents below market rates reduce the cost of holding fragmented parcels and weaken incentives to release or consolidate fragmented parcels, keeping more land in use than would otherwise be the case. Other barriers relating to land transactions, including high costs and administrative burdens, should be addressed. Pre‑emption rights, intended to prioritise neighbouring farmers in land purchases, are designed to support consolidation, but lengthy and cumbersome approval procedures reduce their effectiveness (Roebeling et al., 2021[133]).
Slovenia is reforming its agricultural compensation framework to promote adaptation, but further efforts are needed. The 2023 amendment to the Natural Disaster Consequences Act includes measures to encourage private resilience efforts. These include differentiated compensation rates based on insurance coverage; support caps tied to percentage of lost income; reduced scope for repeat claims if the same hazard affects the same crop multiple times; and payouts for drought losses conditional on prior connection to irrigation systems for plots in irrigated areas (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 2023[134]). These are positive steps, but as climate-related hazards intensify, further efforts are needed to shift from reactive state aid to proactive resilience that incentivises prior risk reduction (OECD, 2025[135]). Extending conditionality to non‑irrigation resilience investments – such as crop diversification and drought-tolerant varieties – could strengthen incentives (OECD, 2025[136]).
Although MAFF subsidises up to 60% of agricultural insurance premiums, uptake remains low, leaving the state to cover a large share of disaster losses. Current coverage includes hail, floods, storms and fire (MAFF, 2025[137]). Limited participation suggests behavioural barriers and reliance on government bailouts. Slovenia could better use its post-disaster compensation system to encourage insurance uptake. For example, France changed its agricultural calamity regime in 2023 so that insurance participation is needed to reach high levels of aid (Government of France, 2023[138]). To improve coverage, Slovenia could also consider a default basic policy for all farmers with an opt-out option or integrate a simple opt-in mechanism into applications for agricultural financial support.
Droughts are Slovenia’s most damaging hazard, yet they are excluded from insurance subsidies and instead addressed through ad hoc compensation. The Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief co‑ordinates assessments and then MAFF provides payments. This process is costly and slow, as seen in 2022 when farmers did not receive state aid until a year after the drought (Pihlar, 2022[139]). Given that it already uses public funds for drought relief, Slovenia could consider adding drought to the list of subsidy-eligible perils. For example, Austria’s subsidised drought insurance allows the government to operate with a predictable budget and deliver faster payouts to farmers (Climate-ADAPT, 2024[140]). A tiered subsidy system could further encourage resilience measures such as drought‑tolerant crops, natural buffers and efficient irrigation.
Slovenia is not on track to meet its agricultural emissions targets
The agricultural sector accounts for virtually all NH3 emissions in Slovenia and for 11% of the country’s GHG emissions – slightly below the EU-27 average (12%). As other sectors decarbonise, agriculture’s share on total GHG emissions is expected to rise. The sector is more emissions intense in terms of both NH3 and GHG than the EU-27 average (Figure 2.16, panels A and C). This is because livestock make up a large portion of agriculture, leading to more emissions related to enteric fermentation (Figure 2.16, panel B). NH3 emissions mostly originate from livestock waste and fertiliser use, reacting with atmospheric acids like sulphuric and nitric acid to form PM2.5, which degrades air quality. NH3 emissions decreased between 2005 and 2023 as a result of measures aligned with the EU Directive (2016/2284) to reduce agricultural nitrogen losses and the number of livestock (GoRS, 2024[15]). Agricultural GHG emissions mostly consist of methane emissions (CH4) from enteric fermentation and manure management, as well as nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions from soil management and fertilisers. GHG emissions fell modestly between 2005 and 2023 but are projected to slightly increase by 2030 with existing measures.
Significant efforts are needed to reduce emissions in agriculture. In 2025, the government launched the development of a national strategic framework of the agricultural system by 2040. EU regulation requires Slovenia to reduce NH3 emissions by 15% by 2030 compared to 2005, but the country is expected to fall short of reaching that target (MECE, 2025[17]).8 It aims to reduce GHG emissions by 2.8% by 2030 compared with 2005. While this target is more ambitious than projections with existing measures, it is much lower than the reductions envisioned in other EU countries such as Denmark, Germany or Slovakia. Reducing agricultural air pollutant and GHG emissions requires a comprehensive policy mix, comprising less emissions-intensive agricultural production; demand-side measures such as shifting to more sustainable diets and reducing food waste; and improving carbon sequestration in agricultural soils. Most mitigation options are available, ready to deploy and cost efficient (IPCC, 2023[141]).
Note: Panel B: “Other” includes liming and urea applications. Panel C: emissions from agriculture as percentage of utilised agricultural area (UAA).
Source: Eurostat (2025), Ammonia Emissions from Agriculture (dataset); FAO (2025), FAOSTAT (dataset); OECD (2025), Air Emissions – Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventories (dataset).
Strengthening fiscal instruments is necessary to reduce emissions
Environmentally harmful subsidies need to be phased out. Slovenia provides subsidies to reduce input cost, which strengthens production and supports farmers. Like many EU countries, Slovenia applies a reduced value-added tax (VAT) rate for pesticides and fertilisers. While the standard VAT rate is 22%, pesticides and fertilisers enjoy a reduced rate of 9.5%. This measure encourages excessive input use, which can lead to soil degradation, water pollution (Chapter 1) and loss of biodiversity, while also contributing to NH₃ and N₂O emissions. The reduced VAT rate cost EUR 5.4 million in 2020 (EC, 2022[142]). Aligned with EU legislation, the reduced rate will be phased out by 2031. Removing the subsidy is estimated to raise pesticide and fertiliser costs by 11.5%. This will increase overall farming expenses by 1% but disproportionately affect smaller farms. In response to the subsidy phase-out, both fertiliser use and GHG emissions are expected to decrease by 3.5% each. As in most EU countries, Slovenian farmers also benefit from reduced fuel excise rates for diesel. Gradually phasing out environmentally harmful subsidies and channelling the savings to low-income farmers would improve the emissions intensity of the agricultural sector while enhancing acceptability by shielding vulnerable farmers from cost hikes.
Agricultural emissions, much like in other countries, are not subject to pricing. A price on agricultural emissions would incentivise producers to reduce emissions, while encouraging households to shift to more sustainable diets and reduce food waste. While accurately quantifying farm-level emissions presents technical difficulties, several estimation methodologies are available, such as proxies based on livestock numbers and feed types (OECD, 2024[79]). The Danish carbon tax, adopted in 2024, could serve as an example of how emissions pricing can be executed effectively. As the EU is considering an ETS for agriculture (EC, 2024[143]), Slovenia could start piloting potential measures related to monitoring while considering the impacts on farmers.
Although financial support for emission reductions has increased, funding could be further increased. Most financial support is provided via the EU CAP. The 2023‑2027 CAP cycle introduces national strategic plans as a new feature. Slovenia’s CAP Strategic Plan, approved by the European Commission in 2024, has a total budget of EUR 1.8 billion, including EUR 565 million of national funding. It allocates almost EUR 800 million or 43% of its CAP budget to environmental and climate objectives. This is slightly lower than the share of the EU (49%) and that of neighbouring countries such as Austria (54%), Hungary (45%), Croatia (45%) and Italy (44%) (EC, 2025[144]), indicating potential for further increases.
Demand-side measures hold significant potential but are currently underexplored
Strengthened demand-side measures are needed. Shifting towards more sustainable and healthy diets and less food waste are cost-effective measures to reduce GHG and NH3 emissions. They have particularly strong synergies with other Sustainable Development Goals, including good health, clean water and biodiversity (IPCC, 2023[141]). Slovenia had one of the lowest total food waste levels (71 kg per capita) among EU-27 Member States in 2022 (Eurostat, 2025[145]). Slovenian food waste is especially low for the “primary production, processing and manufacturing” and “households” subsectors. However, it is above EU‑27 average for the “retail, restaurants and other food services” subsector, which accounts for almost half of Slovenian food waste. Slovenia mainly uses voluntary and fiscal measures to reduce food waste in the retail and restaurant sector (OECD, 2025[146]). Mandatory measures would strengthen incentives to reduce food waste. For example, the French food waste law obliges large supermarkets to donate unsold food instead of discarding it. In the United Kingdom, retailers producing more than 5 kg food waste per week need to separate and track waste under the country’s food waste regulation.
Slovenia could promote more healthy diets. Shifting towards healthy diets could reduce global agricultural emissions by as much as 15%, while providing significant co-benefits in terms of health and biodiversity (Rockström et al., 2025[147]). Recent evidence covering ten EU countries suggests the carbon footprint of the average Slovenian diet to be 4.76 kg CO2e/day, slightly below the average of 5.45 among all ten countries (Alves et al., 2024[148]). However, Slovenian men have the largest carbon footprint of all men among the ten EU countries. Carbon footprint labelling – as piloted in Japan – would help consumers make more informed choices about the environmental impact of their purchases. Mandating a vegetarian day in public and school canteens – like in France – would encourage consumers to explore more sustainable diets. The free school lunch programme, which will begin in 2027, would be a good opportunity to implement this measure.
2.4.5. Strengthening carbon sinks and increasing resilience in the forestry sector
Despite a rebound in recent years, Slovenia’s forests remain vulnerable to climate change
Slovenia’s LULUCF sector is a net carbon sink but is increasingly vulnerable to climate change. Rising air temperatures, changing precipitation patterns and declining soil moisture are weakening forest resilience to storms, pests and fires. Between 2014 and 2018, major disturbances temporarily turned the sector into a net emitter. In 2014, most forests were damaged by a catastrophic ice storm, followed by windthrow and pest outbreaks. In 2022, the country experienced its largest forest fire, burning nearly 3 000 ha in the Karst region (SFS, n.d.[149]). These events underscore the urgency of strengthening forest resilience to preserve sink capacity, biodiversity and natural buffers against the impacts of climate change (OECD, 2023[150]). Although unmanaged forests may offer higher short-term carbon storage, they are less capable of maintaining carbon stocks and withstanding disturbances over the long term (Kun et al., 2020[151]). The Slovenian Forestry Service (SFS) has integrated adaptation into its National Forest Programme and Operational Programme (2022‑2026), carried out through regional forest management plans for 2021-2030, functional mapping and close-to-nature practices (SFS, n.d.[152]).
Fragmented forest ownership has consequences for resilience. Over 75% of forest land is privately owned by over 400 000 individuals, with an average holding of just 3.2 ha (SFS, n.d.[153]). These small parcels have benefits for biodiversity but limit economic incentives for proactive forest management and complicate co‑ordination due to limited expertise and resources (Stankevica et al., 2025[154]). The SFS offers subsidies and free services to enhance resilience, but uptake remains low. This is especially true among passive owners who do not rely on forest income and are unwilling or unable to handle administrative procedures. Under the current system, passive forest owners can create negative externalities by increasing climate risk for neighbouring forests and the wider landscape. The framework should therefore be reviewed to better align regulations and incentives for private actors with resilience objectives and the public interest.
The 2014‑2020 Rural Development Plan attempted to spur producer organisations by covering formation and administrative costs, but results were limited (MAFF, 2022[155]). The CAP Strategic Plan 2023‑2027 targets the creation of three forestry producer groups to promote collective management. Stronger incentives – such as higher co-funding rates for co‑operatives, as implemented in Austria – could further encourage participation (BMLUK, 2025[156]). However, while producer groups help organise owners to share services, they still require active involvement, which has proved challenging.
Collective management models and streamlined land consolidation mechanisms could improve sustainable forest management, including biodiversity protection and landscape-level climate adaptation. Evidence suggests that forest owners are generally willing to delegate management or pool land when it leads to better outcomes (Martins et al., 2021[157]). Professional management associations, such as those in Finland, allow owners to delegate operational tasks to regional managers. Finland also uses Jointly Owned Forests (JOF), a legal structure that enables multiple owners to pool parcels into a single, jointly held property (Finnish Forest Centre, n.d.[158]). Targeted incentives, such as Finland’s reduced tax rate on timber income from JOF, can further encourage participation (CONSOLE, 2022[159]).
Legal conditions on the management of jointly owned forests could be revised to better promote active management (SFS, 2021[160]). A 2010 amendment to the Forest Act prohibited subdividing forests smaller than 5 ha among heirs to curb fragmentation – a welcome measure, but it has resulted in widespread co-ownership of small plots. Co-owners must manage the property jointly, with decisions subject to consent thresholds ranging from majority shares to unanimous agreement. Creating a new legal framework to address this could reduce barriers to active management by lowering consent thresholds for implementing resilient practices set out in forest management plans.
Strengthening carbon sinks are key to meeting Slovenia’s net-zero target
Slovenia aims to restore its carbon sink capacity, although at much lower levels than observed in the past. EU legislation obliges the country to increase its LULUCF carbon sink by 0.21 Mt CO₂e compared to the 2016-2018 average by 2030 to 0.55 Mt CO₂e (Table 2.1). The country is expected to achieve this target both with and without additional measures. The carbon sink level is projected to further increase to around 2.5 Mt CO₂e by 2050 with additional measures (Figure 2.3). This is significantly lower than the sink levels observed in the 2000s, when the sector contributed around 7 Mt CO2e removals per year. Forests account for 61% of Slovenia’s land area, well above the EU-27 average of 39%. Slovenia’s high forest cover limits afforestation as a carbon sink strategy, requiring other measures like minimising settlement expansion, reducing deforestation, enhancing existing ecosystems and strengthening harvested wood products (HWPs), i.e. timber-based products that continue to store carbon.
The contribution of HWPs could be strengthened further. Slovenia’s key strategy includes promoting wood use in construction and investing in primary wood processing to strengthen HWPs. HWPs are one of the major LULUCF sink categories, contributing 5‑10% to the total LULUCF carbon sink in Slovenia. After 2030, this share is expected to rise above 60%, making HWPs the most significant removal category (GoRS, 2024[161]). The NECP aims to increase harvesting and the production of processed roundwood for non-energy use from 2 million m3 to 3 million m3 per year. It also aims to reach a 40% share of wood in the construction of all new public buildings by 2030. Annual harvesting levels below 6 million m3 are expected to be in line with stabilising the CO2 absorption under EU regulations9 based on recent simulations (Jevšenak, Klopčič and Mali, 2020[162]). This indicates there is room to expand timber production and HWPs, for which demand is expected to increase both in Slovenia and in neighbouring countries with fewer forest resources.10 Avoiding harvesting in protected or ecologically sensitive zones, minimising large-scale clearcuts and applying close-to-nature forestry practices, such as selective logging, would help preserve biodiversity and ecosystem integrity.
References
[125] Achmea Bank (2025), ESG Impact Report 2024, Achmea Bank, Zeist, The Netherlands, https://carbonaccountingfinancials.com/files/institutions_downloads/ESG-Impact-Report-2024-Achmea-Bank.pdf.
[148] Alves, R. et al. (2024), “Environmental impact of dietary patterns in 10 European countries; a cross-sectional analysis of nationally representative dietary surveys”, European Journal of Public Health, Vol. 34/5, pp. 992-1000, https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckae088.
[108] ARSO (2025), Final energy consumption, GHG emissions and the share of renewables in the buildings, (indicator), https://kazalci.arso.gov.si/en/content/final-energy-consumption-ghg-emissions-and-share-renewables-buildings-0 (accessed on 27 January 2026).
[7] ARSO (2024), Heat waves and daily number of deaths, (indicator), https://kazalci.arso.gov.si/en/content/heat-waves-and-daily-number-deaths-2 (accessed on 8 July 2025).
[34] ARSO (2022), Atlas of Climate Projections for Slovenia until 2100, (dataset), https://www.gov.si/novice/2022-01-20-atlas-podnebnih-projekcij-za-slovenijo-do-leta-2100 (accessed on 22 January 2026).
[117] Billerbeck, A. et al. (2023), “Policy frameworks for district heating: A comprehensive overview and analysis of regulations and support measures across Europe”, Energy Policy, Vol. 173, p. 113377, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.113377.
[156] BMLUK (2025), Shaping the Future of Rural Austria: The Austrian CAP Strategic Plan 2023-2027, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Climate Change and Environmental Protection, Regions and Water Management, Ljubljana, https://www.bmluk.gv.at/dam/jcr%3A071136ee-d4f0-4b42-adfc-f500826f0ecf/BML-0002_GAP-Strategieplan_%C3%96sterreich_2023-2027_EN_v6_BF.pdf.
[56] Bock, S. et al. (2024), Flood Insurance, Disaster Aid, and Economic Recovery in Europe, American Economic Association.
[115] Bristol City Council (n.d.), “Smoke control”, https://www.bristol.gov.uk/residents/pests-pollution-noise-and-food/air-quality-and-pollution/smoke-control (accessed on 15 December 2025).
[126] BUILD UP Skills Slovenia (2013), National Roadmap Permanent Education and Training of On-Site Workers in Construction, BUILD UP Skills Slovenia, Ljubljana, https://build-up.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/bus_projects/build_up_skills_slovenia_roadmap_eng_2013_1.pdf.
[131] CAFS (2025), “About CAFS”, https://www.kgzs.si/cafs (accessed on 9 July 2025).
[127] CEDEFOP (2020), “Slovenia: Construction sector SKILLCO project”, https://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/news/slovenia-construction-sector-skillco-project (accessed on 10 July 2026).
[20] Climate Council (2025), “Ending fossil fuel subsidies, setting intermediate targets and an aviation climate levy”, https://www.gov.si/novice/2025-07-14-ukinitev-subvencij-za-fosilna-goriva-dolocitev-vmesnih-ciljev-in-letalska-podnebna-dajatev/ (accessed on 10 October 2025).
[103] Climate-ADAPT (2025), “Restoring the Pekre stream in Maribor, Slovenia”, https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/mission/solutions/mission-stories/restoring-the-pekre-stream-slovenia-story89 (accessed on 27 November 2025).
[140] Climate-ADAPT (2024), “Subsidised drought insurance for farmers in Austria”, European Commission, https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/metadata/case-studies/Subsidised-drought-insurance-for-farmers-in-Austria (accessed on 11 July 2026).
[130] Climate-ADAPT (2023), “Adapting to climate change by improving irrigation practice in Vipava Valley, Slovenia”, Case Studies, Climate-ADAPT, https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/metadata/case-studies/adapting-to-climate-change-by-improving-irrigation-practice-in-vipava-valley-slovenia.
[90] CNR (2025), “Excise duties and mechanisms for RFT partial refunds on excise duties on diesel in Europe”, https://www.cnr.fr/en/excise-duties-and-mechanisms-rft-partial-refunds-diesel-europe-march-2025 (accessed on 14 July 2025).
[33] CoA (2025), Efficiency of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Spatial Planning and the Slovenian Water Agency in Reducing the Flood Risks, Court of Audit, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, https://wgea.org/media/d4olkumu/summary_of_the_audit__floods.pdf.
[129] CoA (2023), Efficiency of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food in Adapting Agriculture to Climate Change, Court of Audit, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, https://www.rs-rs.si/en/audits-auditing/audit-archive/audit/efficiency-of-the-ministry-of-agriculture-forestry-and-food-in-adapting-agriculture-to-climate-chan-1.
[36] CoA (2017), Efficiency of Spatial Planning Procedure of Municipalities, Court of Audit, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, https://www.rs-rs.si/en/audits-auditing/audit-archive/audit/efficiency-of-spatial-planning-procedure-of-municipalities-2319-1.
[159] CONSOLE (2022), “Green jointly owned forest – TUOHI”, CONSOLE, https://console-project.eu/Nuevos_deliverables/FI5_fin_2022.pdf.
[62] D’Arcangelo, F., T. Kruse and M. Pisu (2024), “Identifying and tracking climate change mitigation strategies with a cluster-based assessment”, npj Climate Action, Vol. 3/1, https://doi.org/10.1038/s44168-024-00158-6.
[29] Davies, W., C. Decherf and R. Smithers (2024), Monitoring Outcomes of the Third Scottish National Adaptation Plan, ClimateXChange, https://doi.org/10.7488/era/4836.
[37] Dražič, B. (2021), Spatial Planning Systems in Europe – Slovenian Example, Chamber of Architecture and Spatial Planning of Slovenia, https://www.arhitekti-hka.hr/files/file/vijesti/2020/02_SI.pdf.
[50] Dutch State Treasury Agency (2025), State of the Netherlands: Green Bond Report 2024, Ministry of Finance, Government of The Netherlands, https://english.dsta.nl/site/binaries/site-content/collections/documents/2025/05/28/green-bond-report-2024/green-bond-report-2024.pdf.
[48] Dutch Water Authorities (2017), Water Governance: The Dutch Water Authority Model, Dutch Water Authorities, The Hague, https://dutchwaterauthorities.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/The-Dutch-water-authority-model.pdf.
[89] EBRD (2020), “Pedestrianisation and car-free zones: Ljubljana, Slovenia”, https://www.ebrdgreencities.com/policy-tool/pedestrianisation-and-car-free-zones-ljubljana-slovenia-2/ (accessed on 8 January 2026).
[82] EBRD (2019), “Sostanj thermal power plant”, https://www.ebrd.com/home/work-with-us/projects/psd/40417.html (accessed on 6 August 2025).
[8] EC (2025), 2025 Country Report – Slovenia; SWD(2025) 224, European Commission, Brussels.
[132] EC (2025), At a Glance: Slovenia’s CAP Strategic Plan, European Commission, Brussels, https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e6089192-4d33-49ef-af25-b14a34bf2b46_en?filename=csp-at-a-glance-slovenia_en.pdf.
[144] EC (2025), Financial Allocation to CAP Specific Objectives, (dataset), https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DashboardCapPlan/financial_allocation.html# (accessed on 14 August 2025).
[51] EC (2025), “LIFE CITYAdaP3: Adapting cities to cope with climate change”, https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/life-cityadap3-adapting-cities-cope-climate-change-2025-02-12_en (accessed on 7 January 2026).
[13] EC (2025), The Fourth Clean Air Outlook, COM(2025) 64 final,, European Commission, Brussels, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0064.
[61] EC (2025), Third River Basin Management Plans Second Flood Hazard and Risk Maps and Second Flood Risk Management Plans Member State: Slovenia, European Commission, Brussels, https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVIII/EU/11278/imfname_11452071.pdf#:~:text=objectives%20and%20measures%3B%20x%20The,structural%20measures%2C%20beyond%20generic%20measures.
[124] EC (2024), “EPBD recast explained: Key updates, resources and stakeholder insights”, https://build-up.ec.europa.eu/en/news-and-events/news/epbd-recast-explained-key-updates-resources-and-stakeholder-insights (accessed on 15 September 2025).
[18] EC (2024), Review of the National Air Pollution Control Programme – Slovenia, European Commission, Brussels.
[143] EC (2024), “Strategic dialogue on the future of EU agriculture”, https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/overview-vision-agriculture-food/main-initiatives-strategic-dialogue-future-eu-agriculture_en (accessed on 15 August 2025).
[27] EC (2023), Assessment of Progress on Climate Adaptation in the Individual Member States according to the European Climate Law, European Commission, Brussels, https://climate.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/SWD_2023_932_1_EN.pdf.
[70] EC (2023), Assessment of the Draft Updated National Energy and Climate Plan of Slovenia, European Commission, Brussels, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/SWD_Assessment_draft_updated_NECP_Slovenia_2023.pdf.
[41] EC (2023), EU-level Technical Guidance on Adapting Buildings to Climate Change, European Commission, Brussels, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2834/558395.
[142] EC (2022), “Slovenia – EHS candidate for reform”, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/economy-and-finance/phasing-out-environmentally-harmful-subsidies/slovenia-ehs-candidate-reform_en (accessed on 15 December 2025).
[87] EC (2020), “Pedestrianisation of Ljubljana city centre”, https://urban-mobility-observatory.transport.ec.europa.eu/resources/case-studies/pedestrianisation-ljubljana-city-centre_en (accessed on 25 January 2026).
[118] EC (n.d.), “Transforming Šaleška Valley’s district heating for a sustainable future”, https://eu-mayors.ec.europa.eu/en/transforming-saleska-valleys-district-heating-for-a-sustainable-future (accessed on 5 September 2026).
[54] EEA (2025), Economic losses from weather- and climate-related extremes in Europe, (indicator), https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/economic-losses-from-climate-related (accessed on 16 September 2025).
[5] EEA (2025), Europe’s Environment and Climate: Knowledge for Resilience, Prosperity and Sustainability, European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/europe-environment-2025/main-report.
[11] EEA (2025), “Harm to human health from air pollution in Europe”, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/publications/harm-to-human-health-from-air-pollution-burden-of-disease-status-2025 (accessed on 29 January 2026).
[58] EEA (2024), European Climate Risk Assessment, European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/publications/european-climate-risk-assessment.
[74] EEA (2024), Greenhouse gas emission intensity of electricity generation in Europe, (indicator), https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/greenhouse-gas-emission-intensity-of-1 (accessed on 16 September 2025).
[14] EEA (2024), “The costs to health and the environment from industrial air pollution in Europe – 2024 update”, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/publications/the-costs-to-health-and-the-environment-from-industrial-air-pollution-in-europe-2024-update#:~:text=During%20the%20last%20ten%20years,year%20(see%20Table%201). (accessed on 16 May 2025).
[52] EEA (2023), “Public-private partnership for a new flood proof district in Bilbao, Spain”, Case Studies, European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/metadata/case-studies/public-private-partnership-for-a-new-flood-proof-district-in-bilbao.
[25] EEA (2017), Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction in Europe, European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/publications/climate-change-adaptation-and-disaster.
[45] EIB (2024), “89% of Slovenian respondents recognise that climate change adaptation requires investment now to avoid greater costs in the future, EIB survey finds”, https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2024-427-89-of-slovenian-respondents-recognise-that-climate-change-adaptation-requires-investment-now-to-avoid-greater-costs-in-the-future-eib-survey-finds (accessed on 17 September 2025).
[44] EIB (2024), “94% of Europeans support measures to adapt to climate change, according to EIB survey”, https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2024-406-94-of-europeans-support-measures-to-adapt-to-climate-change-according-to-eib-survey (accessed on 17 September 2025).
[116] ESCALATE (2025), “About ESCALATE”, https://escalate-project.eu/about/ (accessed on 26 November 2025).
[95] Eskeland, G. and S. Yan (2021), “The Norwegian CO2-differentiated motor vehicle registration tax: An extended Cost-Benefit Analysis”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 178, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ee108c96-en.
[81] EU ACER (2025), Getting the Signals Right: Electricity Network Tariff Methodologies in Europe, EU ACER, Ljubljana, https://www.acer.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Publications/2025-ACER-Electricity-Network-Tariff-Practices.pdf.
[80] EU ACER (2024), “Energy retail – Active consumer participation is key to driving the energy transition: How can it happen?”, 2024 Market Monitoring Report, EU ACER, Ljubljana, https://www.acer.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Publications/ACER-CEER_2024_MMR_Retail.pdf.
[96] European Alternative Fuels Observatory (2025), “Slovenia”, https://alternative-fuels-observatory.ec.europa.eu/transport-mode/road/slovenia (accessed on 18 September 2025).
[98] European Alternative Fuels Observatory (2024), “Electric vehicle recharging prices”, https://alternative-fuels-observatory.ec.europa.eu/consumer-portal/electric-vehicle-recharging-prices (accessed on 18 September 2025).
[145] Eurostat (2025), Food waste, (indicator), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/product/page/cei_pc035 (accessed on 12 January 2026).
[164] Eurostat (2025), Municipal Waste by Waste Management Operations [env_wasmun], (dataset), https://doi.org/10.2908/ENV_WASMUN (accessed on 17 October 2025).
[158] Finnish Forest Centre (n.d.), “Information about jointly owned forests”, https://www.metsakeskus.fi/en/forest-use-and-ownership/forms-of-forest-property-ownership/jointly-owned-forests/information-about-jointly-owned-forests (accessed on 2 December 2025).
[101] Fleck, A. (2022), “Which European capitals have the most green spaces?”, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2022/08/green-space-cities-climate-change/ (accessed on 23 September 2025).
[76] Germeshausen, R., S. Heim and U. Wagner (2025), “Support for renewable energy: The case of wind power”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 250, p. 105468, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105468.
[109] Glojek, K. et al. (2022), “The impact of temperature inversions on black carbon and particle mass concentrations in a mountainous area”, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 22/8, pp. 5577-5601, https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-22-5577-2022.
[107] GoRS (2025), National Energy and Climate Plan of the Republic of Slovenia, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, https://commission.europa.eu/publications/slovenia-final-updated-necp-2021-2030-submitted-2025_en.
[47] GoRS (2025), “State relief measures after the floods of August 2023”, https://www.gov.si/zbirke/projekti-in-programi/ukrepi-drzave-za-pomoc-po-poplavah-avgusta-2023/ (accessed on 30 September 2025).
[21] GoRS (2025), “Strengthening climate governance and accelerating implementation of measures is essential to achieve climate goals”, https://www.gov.si/novice/2025-10-13-krepitev-podnebnega-upravljanja-in-pospesitev-izvajanja-ukrepov-nujna-za-doseganje-podnebnih-ciljev/ (accessed on 15 October 2025).
[31] GoRS (2024), NECP of the Republic of Slovenia, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/19e1a8df-ca9a-4a37-9e3e-8d360b75d06c_en?filename=SI%20%E2%80%93%20FINAL%20UPDATED%20NECP%202021-2030%20%28English%29.pdf.
[15] GoRS (2024), Operational Air Pollution Control Programme (OAPCP), Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana.
[10] GoRS (2024), “Slovenia reaches major milestone in renewable energy use in 2023”, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2024-11-06-slovenia-reaches-major-milestone-in-renewable-energy-use-in-2023/ (accessed on 7 October 2025).
[26] GoRS (2024), “The National Assembly adopts a resolution on the national programme for protection against natural and other disasters”, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2024-11-04-the-national-assembly-adopts-a-resolution-on-the-national-programme-for-protection-against-natural-and-other-disasters/ (accessed on 9 January 2026).
[161] GoRS (2024), Updated National Energy and Climate Plan of the Republic of Slovenia, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubjana, https://commission.europa.eu/publications/slovenia-final-updated-necp-2021-2030-submitted-2025_en.
[104] GoRS (2023), “Building Act (GZ-1)”, https://pisrs.si/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO8244 (accessed on 2 December 2025).
[119] GoRS (2021), Long-term Energy Renovation Strategy for 2050, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-08/sl_ltrs_2020_en_0.pdf.
[19] GoRS (2016), Strategic Framework for Climate Change Adaptation, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, https://www.gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MOPE/Okolje/Podnebne-spremembe/SOzP_ang.pdf.
[105] Government of Canada (2025), “Codes, standards and guidance for climate resilience”, https://housing-infrastructure.canada.ca/climate-resilience-climatique/codes-standards-normes-guidances-eng.html (accessed on 6 January 2026).
[49] Government of Canada (2025), “How the DFAA program works (beginning April 1, 2025)”, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rcvr-dsstrs/dsstr-fnncl-ssstnc-rrngmnts/2025/hw-dfaa-prgrm-wrks-bgnnng-prl-1-2025-en.aspx (accessed on 17 December 2025).
[114] Government of Denmark (2021), “Executive order on the replacement or decommissioning of certain combustion plants for solid fuels below 1 MW in the event of a change of ownership of real property”, https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2021/1449 (accessed on 16 January 2026).
[122] Government of France (2024), “Financing energy renovation works with the interest-free advance transfer loan”, https://www.service-public.gouv.fr/particuliers/actualites/A17657?lang=en (accessed on 11 January 2026).
[138] Government of France (2023), “La réforme de l’assurance récolte”, https://agriculture.gouv.fr/la-reforme-de-lassurance-recolte (accessed on 3 December 2025).
[113] Government of Germany (n.d.), “Ordinance on small and medium-sized firing installations (1st BImSchV)”, https://www.bundesumweltministerium.de/en/residential-wood-heating/ordinance-on-small-and-medium-sized-firing-installations (accessed on 15 December 2025).
[42] Government of the United Kingdom (2025), “Executive summary: Accounting for the effects of climate change guidance”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/green-book-supplementary-guidance-environment/executive-summary-accounting-for-the-effects-of-climate-change-guidance (accessed on 4 December 2025).
[99] Gregorčič, T. et al. (2025), “A new approach to studying the urban heat island in Ljubljana”, EMS Annual Meeting [online], Scientific Conference Contribution Abstract, Berlin, http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/ems2025-335,%202025.
[106] Haut Conseil pour le Climat (2020), Renovating Better: Lessons from Europe, Haut Conseil pour le Climat, Paris, https://www.hautconseilclimat.fr/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/hcc_rapport_renover_mieux-english.pdf.
[120] IID (2024), “Highlights from the “green transition in construction” conference”, https://build-up.ec.europa.eu/en/news-and-events/news/highlights-green-transition-construction-conference (accessed on 14 October 2025).
[128] Interreg Alpine Space (2024), Drought and Heatwaves in Gorenjska – Sora Catchment, Interreg Alpine Space, Salzburg, https://cct.eurac.edu/x-risk-cc/data/ceph/webgis-diglib/pilot_reports/Gorenjska%20drought.pdf.
[141] IPCC (ed.) (2023), Climate Change 2022 – Mitigation of Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.
[4] JBA Event Response (2023), “Slovenia floods: August 2023”, https://www.jbarisk.com/knowledge-hub/event-response/slovenia-floods-august-2023/ (accessed on 14 January 2026).
[162] Jevšenak, J., M. Klopčič and B. Mali (2020), “The effect of harvesting on national forest carbon sinks up to 2050 simulated by the CBM-CFS3 model: A case study from Slovenia”, Forests, Vol. 11/10, p. 1090, https://doi.org/10.3390/f11101090.
[78] Kirkegaard, J. et al. (2023), “Towards failed renewable energy communities? Activist attempts to change market conditions in the Danish wind energy market”, Energy Research & Social Science, Vol. 102, p. 103152, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103152.
[30] Krašovec, A., T. Deželan and M. Novak (2024), Sustainable Governance Indicators 2024 – Slovenia Report, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, https://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2024/country/SGI2024_Slovenia.pdf.
[151] Kun, Z. et al. (2020), “Recognizing the importance of unmanaged forests to mitigate climate change”, GCB Bioenergy, Vol. 12/12, pp. 1034-1035, https://doi.org/10.1111/gcbb.12714.
[1] Maes, M. et al. (2025), “Monitoring exposure to future climate-related hazards: Forward-looking indicator results and methods using climate scenarios”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 264, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b9ba6ee0-en.
[137] MAFF (2025), “Insurance of primary agricultural production”, https://www.gov.si/teme/zavarovanje-primarne-kmetijske-proizvodnje (accessed on 3 December 2025).
[155] MAFF (2022), Operational Programme for the Implementation of the National Forest Programme in the 2022–2026 Period, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food, Ljubljana, https://www.gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MKGP/PODROCJA/GOZDARSTVO/NGP/OPNGP-2022_2026_EN.pdf.
[40] Markun, E. and A. Markun (2025), Guidelines for Designing Objects Adapted to Climate Change, Chamber of Engineers, Ljubljana, https://www.izs.si/assets/media/izsnovo/2025/IZS_Smernica%20za%20prilagajanje%20na%20podnebne%20spremembe.pdf.
[157] Martins, A. et al. (2021), “Promoting landscape-level forest management in fire-prone areas: Delegate management to a multi-owner collaborative, rent the land, or just sell it?”, Forests, Vol. 13/1, p. 22, https://doi.org/10.3390/f13010022.
[17] MECE (2025), Informative Inventory Report: Slovenia 2025, Ministry of the Environment, Climate and Energy, Ljubljana, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SVN%20NID%202025%20April.pdf.
[93] MF (2025), Third Amendment to the Recovery and Resilience Plan, Summary, Government of the Republic of Slovania, Ljubjana, https://www.gov.si/assets/organi-v-sestavi/URSOO/Dokumenti/Nacrt-za-okrevanje-in-odpornost/Povzetek_tretje_spremembe_NOO_junij_2025_FINAL_20062025.pdf.
[43] Ministry of Cohesion and Regional Development (2024), Slovenian National Guidance on the Climate Proofing of Infrastructure in the Period 2021-2027, Ministry of Cohesion and Regional Development, Ljubljana, https://jaspers.eib.org/files/activities/2024/climate_proofing_of_infrastructure_projects/5-slovenia-presentation.pdf.
[35] MNVP (2025), Spatial Development Report 2024, Ministry of Natural Resources and Spatial Planning, Ljubljana.
[38] MNVP (2025), “Two years after the floods: Strengthening resilience to climate change”, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2025-07-25-two-years-after-the-floods-strengthening-resilience-to-climate-change/ (accessed on 15 October 2025).
[46] MOPE (2025), “Climate fund spending programme for 2025-2028 adopted”, https://www.energetika-portal.si/nc/novica/n/sprejet-program-porabe-sredstev-podnebnega-sklada-za-leta-2025-2028/ (accessed on 8 January 2026).
[3] MOPE (2025), First Biennial Transparency Report of the Republic of Slovenia under the Paris Agreement, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana.
[71] MOPE (2025), National-level Climate Vulnerability and Risk Assessment for the Energy Sector, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, https://www.energetika-portal.si/fileadmin/dokumenti/publikacije/nepn/dokumenti/podn_ran_rep_nov2025.pdf.
[110] MOPE (2024), “The Energy Act does not prohibit heating with wood and natural gas”, https://www.gov.si/novice/2024-01-11-energetski-zakon-ne-prepoveduje-ogrevanja-na-les-in-zemeljski-plin/ (accessed on 15 December 2025).
[123] MOPE (n.d.), “Energy performance certificate of a building – information for citizens”, https://www.energetika-portal.si/podrocja/energetika/energetske-izkaznice-stavb/za-drzavljane (accessed on 27 November 2025).
[64] Nachtigall, D. et al. (2022), “The climate actions and policies measurement framework: A structured and harmonised climate policy database to monitor countries’ mitigation action”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 203, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2caa60ce-en.
[111] National Council of the Republic of Slovenia (2024), Opinion on the Amended Draft Energy Act (EZ-2) – Second Reading, National Council of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, https://www.ds-rs.si/sites/default/files/dogodek/3._tocka_8ds-16_predlog_mnenja_ds_ez-2_epa_1223-ix_lektn.pdf.
[100] Nature-Demo (2025), “Demo 3: Ljubljana, Slovenia”, https://nature-demo.eu/demo-3-ljubljana-slovenia/ (accessed on 1 December 2025).
[102] NetZeroCities (2024), 2030 Climate Neutrality Action Plan of the City of Ljubljana, NetZeroCities, Frankfurt am Main, https://netzerocities.app/_content/files/knowledge/4444/city_of_ljubljana_ccc.pdf.
[83] OECD (2026), Mining Regions and Cities in SAŠA and Zasavska, Slovenia: A Regional Approach for a Just Transition Away from Coal, OECD Rural Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/257451da-en.
[28] OECD (2026), OECD Environmental Performance Review: Austria 2026, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/520533a1-en.
[67] OECD (2025), “A review of Slovenia’s industrial strategy: Policies for a green, innovative, and smart economy”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 177, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f10e4ef9-en.
[57] OECD (2025), Adapting the Paris Metropolitan Area to a Water-Scarce Future, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/00a103f8-en.
[146] OECD (2025), “Beyond food loss and waste reduction targets: Translating reduction ambitions into policy outcomes”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 214, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/59cf6c95-en.
[69] OECD (2025), Climate Actions and Policies Measurement Framework, (dataset), https://oe.cd/dx/capmf (accessed on 1 September 2025).
[66] OECD (2025), Development of Environment-related Technologies, (dataset), http://oe.cd/ipstats (accessed on 11 December 2025).
[135] OECD (2025), Global Drought Outlook: Trends, Impacts and Policies to Adapt to a Drier World, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d492583a-en.
[32] OECD (2025), Government at a Glance 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en.
[136] OECD (2025), Measuring progress in adapting the agricultural sector to more variable and extreme weather conditions: Framework, indicator methodology and results, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/388e1d3c-en.
[77] OECD (2025), OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Japan 2025, OECD Environmental Performance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/583cab4c-en.
[65] OECD (2025), “The effects of climate policies on emissions: Evidence from a comprehensive and systematic review of the ex-post empirical literature”, Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches Papers, No. 7, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ec1f7f0d-en.
[97] OECD (2025), Transforming Catalonia’s Mobility System for Net Zero, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1cac3681-en.
[85] OECD (2024), OECD Economic Surveys: Hungary 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/795451e5-en.
[79] OECD (2024), OECD Economic Surveys: Slovenia 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/bc4a107b-en.
[68] OECD (2024), Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2024: Gearing Up to Bring Emissions Down, OECD Series on Carbon Pricing and Energy Taxation, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b44c74e6-en.
[53] OECD (2023), “Enhancing the insurance sector’s contribution to climate adaptation”, OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, No. 26, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0951dfcd-en.
[150] OECD (2023), Taming Wildfires in the Context of Climate Change, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dd00c367-en.
[84] OECD (2022), OECD Economic Surveys: Slovenia 2022, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d63f5a2f-en.
[75] OECD (2020), Accelerating Climate Action in Israel: Refocusing Mitigation Policies for the Electricity, Residential and Transport Sectors, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fb32aabd-en.
[12] OECD (2016), The Economic Consequences of Outdoor Air Pollution, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264257474-en.
[2] OECD (2012), OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Slovenia 2012, OECD Environmental Performance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264169265-en.
[134] Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia (2023), “Act to amend the Natural Disaster Consequences Act (ZOPNN-F)”, https://www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradni-list-rs/vsebina/2023-01-2599# (accessed on 10 October 2025).
[139] Pihlar, T. (2022), “Drought 2022: State aid comes only after a year”, Dnevnik, https://www.dnevnik.si/novice/slovenija/susa-2022-drzavna-pomoc-prihaja-sele-po-enem-letu-2081470/ (accessed on 3 December 2025).
[24] Pogačar, T. et al. (2025), Sectoral Assessment of Climate Vulnerability and Risks at the National Level: Guidelines for Preparation, University of Ljubljana, Tjaša, https://www.gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MOPE/Podnebje/Prilagajanje/Navodila-za-pripravo-sektorskih-ocen-podnebne-ranljivosti-in-tveganj.pdf.
[60] Pot, W., Y. de Ridder and A. Dewulf (2024), “Avoiding future surprises after acute shocks: Long-term flood risk lessons catalysed by the 2021 summer flood in the Netherlands”, Environmental Sciences Europe, Vol. 36/1, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12302-024-00960-3.
[39] Prefecture of Île-de-France (2024), “Les Plans de Prévention des Risques d’Inondation (PPRI) en Île-de-France”, https://www.eure.gouv.fr/Actions-de-l-Etat/Risques-majeurs/Risques-naturels/Inondations/Les-plans-de-prevention-du-risque-d-inondation-PPRI (accessed on 4 December 2025).
[147] Rockström, J. et al. (2025), “The EAT–Lancet Commission on healthy, sustainable, and just food systems”, The Lancet, Vol. 406/10512, pp. 1625-1700, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(25)01201-2.
[133] Roebeling, P. et al. (2021), Agricultural Land Market Regulations in the EU Member States, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC126310 (accessed on 23 January 2026).
[160] SFS (2021), Forests and Forestry in Slovenia, Slovenia Forest Service, Ljubljana, https://www.zgs.si/assets/uploads/files/vsebine/3/3/1/forests-and-forestry-in-slovenia-2021-compressed.pdf.
[149] SFS (n.d.), “Climate change”, https://www.zgs.si/en/slovenian-forests/climate-change (accessed on 1 December 2025).
[152] SFS (n.d.), “Forest management”, https://www.zgs.si/en/forest-management/ (accessed on 1 December 2025).
[153] SFS (n.d.), “Forest ownership”, https://www.zgs.si/en/slovenian-forests/forest-ownership (accessed on 2 December 2025).
[86] Slovak Spectator (2023), “Nuclear power plant in Mochovce hits one of its last milestones”, https://spectator.sme.sk/business/c/nuclear-power-plant-mochovce-milestone-slovakia (accessed on 18 May 2025).
[59] Sodnik, J. and M. Matjaž (2024), “Extreme August 2024 floods in Slovenia – The lessons learned for public water infrastructure”, Conference: Interpraevent 2024, Vienna, Conference Proceedings, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/381435449.
[73] STA (2022), “N-plant operating at full power despite low water levels, high temps”, https://english.sta.si/3063394/n-plant-operating-at-full-power-despite-low-water-levels-high-temps (accessed on 6 November 2025).
[72] STA (2022), “Solkan hydro plant shuts down due to drought”, https://english.sta.si/3065321/solkan-hydro-plant-shuts-down-due-to-drought (accessed on 5 November 2025).
[154] Stankevica, K. et al. (2025), “Drivers of forest land, management, and policy changes in Latvia: Over a century of transitions”, Trees, Forests and People, Vol. 22, p. 101015, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tfp.2025.101015.
[22] STAscience (2025), “Slovenia launches seven-year project to boost climate change resilience”, STA, https://znanost.sta.si/3389279/slovenia-launches-seven-year-project-to-boost-climate-change-resilience (accessed on 7 January 2026).
[63] Stechemesser, A. et al. (2024), “Climate policies that achieved major emission reductions: Global evidence from two decades”, Science, Vol. 385/6711, pp. 884-892, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adl6547.
[163] SURS (2022), Production and Consumption of Wood, Republic of Slovenia, Statistical Office, https://www.stat.si/StatWeb/File/DocSysFile/12064/ang-teden-gozdov-2022.pdf.
[55] Swiss Re (2024), “Europe in the spotlight as global economic losses from natural catastrophes reach USD 280 billion in 2023”, https://www.swissre.com/reinsurance/insights/europe-global-natcat-losses-2023.html (accessed on 10 November 2025).
[91] T&E (2024), “Tolling: The highway to green trucking”, Briefing, Transport & Environment, Brussels, https://www.transportenvironment.org/uploads/files/202403_TE_Eurovignette_briefing_update.pdf.
[16] Thunis, P. et al. (2019), “Source apportionment to support air quality planning: Strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches”, Environment International, Vol. 130, p. 104825, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2019.05.019.
[94] Tikoudis, I. and W. Oueslati (2022), “The future of transport-related emissions in dense urban areas: An analysis of various policy scenarios with MOLES”, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Vol. 25/2, pp. 205-268, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-022-00357-7.
[112] Topić Božič, J. et al. (2024), “Life cycle assessment of using firewood and wood pellets in Slovenia as two primary wood-based heating systems and their environmental impact”, Sustainability, Vol. 16/4, p. 1687, https://doi.org/10.3390/su16041687.
[9] UNFCCC (2024), Final Compilation and Accounting Report for Slovenia for the Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn.
[23] University of Ljubljana (2025), “Slovenia’s strategic integrated LIFE project for adaptation”, https://www.bf.uni-lj.si/en/research/research-projects/2025031910420897/slovenia%E2%80%99s-strategic-integrated-life-project-for-adaptation (accessed on 20 January 2026).
[6] URSZR (2023), Assessment of the Risk of Fires to the Republic of Slovenia in the Natural Environment and Outdoors, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, https://www.gov.si/assets/organi-v-sestavi/URSZR/Datoteke/Ocene-ogrozenosti/ocena_ogrozenosti_pozari.pdf.
[92] van Dender, K. (2019), “Taxing vehicles, fuels, and road use: Opportunities for improving transport tax practice”, OECD Taxation Working Papers, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e7f1d771-en.
[88] Virdo, J. et al. (2022), Pan-European City Rating and Ranking on Urban Mobility for Liveable Cities, Ricardo, https://cleancitiescampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Technical-report-Clean-Cities-City-Rating-and-Ranking.pdf.
[121] Ziemann, V. (2024), “Housing market challenges and policy options in Slovenia”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1810, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fab74d9f-en.
← 1. These refer to Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP4.5 and RCP8.5).
← 2. Under the EU framework, WEM projections are based on policies in force at the time of submission, while WAM projections operationalise the policy package contained in the NECP, translating stated targets and planned measures into quantified emissions pathways.
← 3. Key national programmes comprise the “Operational programme for maintaining ambient air quality” or the “National Environmental Protection Programme”. In 2014, Slovenia worked with municipalities like Celje, Ljubljana and Maribor to reduce building and road transport emissions, aiming to meet PM10 limits. These local plans significantly improved air quality. In 2020, Slovenia did not exceed PM10 emissions.
← 4. The concentration of ground-level ozone has grown because the concentration of NOx is expected to decrease faster than that of NMVOC. As the concentration of ground-level ozone is basically determined by the NMVOC/NOx ratio, a faster decrease of the NOx concentration leads to increased ozone formation, even though emissions of the underlying pollutants decrease. The deterioration is expected to be highest in urban areas, as well as in Primorska close to the border with Italy.
← 5. Other strategies include the transport development programme (adopted in 2016), the strategy for market development for the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure in the transport sector (adopted in 2017), the strategy for energy renovation of buildings up to 2050, the programme on strategic guidelines for the development of agriculture and the food industry (all adopted in 2021), and the national strategy for coal exit (adopted in 2022).
← 6. Slovenia has two FRMP under the EU Floods Directive, corresponding to its two river basin districts/units of management (Danube and Adriatic). However, measures are presented in a single national FRMP document.
← 7. The Eco Fund provides loans and grants for environmental and climate‑related investments, financed primarily through energy end‑user fees and emissions allowance revenues.
← 8. However, methodological changes included in more recent projections, which have not yet been published, indicate that Slovenia will achieve the 2030 target.
← 9. The EU Forest Reference Level (FRL) is a benchmark under the LULUCF Regulation for tracking greenhouse gas emissions and removals from managed forests. It projects expected carbon sinks based on forest management from 2000‑2009, serving as a baseline to assess future performance against EU climate targets.
← 10. Current output of fuel wood amounts to 1.1 million m3 (SURS, 2022[163]), leaving room to expand timber production for HWPs.