Aging in Türkiye highlights the need to better utilise existing human resources, particularly women, whose labour force participation is notably lower than in other OECD countries. Promoting equal opportunities for women and men not only enhances economic efficiency but also delivers significant economic benefits. In Türkiye, women spend disproportionately more time than men on unpaid care and housework and are less likely than women in other OECD countries to rejoin the labour market after childbirth. Expanding access to early childhood education and care is crucial, as limited availability prevents many mothers from re-entering the labour market. Additionally, labour market policies such as improved tax regulations and comprehensive parental leave that is aligned with early childhood education and care policies could play a pivotal role in ensuring that women’s earnings and employment outcomes do not diverge from men after the birth of a child.
OECD Economic Surveys: Türkiye 2025
Abstract
Türkiye’s economy has been benefiting from a young and dynamic population over the past decades relative to other OECD countries. Yet, this “demographic dividend” is set to gradually decline, slowing future potential growth, even if Türkiye has put in place several policies, such as the creation of the Department of Family and Population Policies to address demographic issues as well as the Council of Population Policies to monitor demographic changes and develop related policies, which could slow down the expected decline. Future demographic challenges underline the need to better leverage existing human resources, in particular women, whose labour force participation is particularly low compared to other OECD countries. Equal opportunities for women and men would also strengthen economic efficiency through better allocation of talent and bring major economic benefits (see below).
The previous OECD Economic Survey of Türkiye focused on general barriers that prevent higher labour market participation. Based on OECD indicators, employment legislation is relatively rigid with strict labour market rules for regular workers driven by the costly severance pay system (OECD, 2023[1]). Combined with one of the OECD’s highest minimum-to-median wage ratios, this results in comparatively high costs of formal job creation. In addition, strict employment rules for fixed-term and temporary work agency contracts lead to the widespread use of informal and semi-formal work practices. High labour tax wedges also discourage formal job creation as employee and employer social security contributions and net average tax rates are higher than in other OECD countries. More flexible labour markets should be part of a comprehensive reform programme that shifts job loss protection to a broader-based unemployment insurance scheme, supported by well-designed activation policies.
This chapter will discuss challenges specific to women's labour market participation. The first section describes progress made in female participation, but also the long-standing factors that hinder more rapid improvements. The second section discusses early childhood education and care (ECEC), as the availability of ECEC places is a major factor affecting women’s re-entry in the labour market after childbirth. The third section assesses labour market policies that can be more supportive of women’s employment. Finally, the last section concludes on using the practices and procedures of the budget cycle in a systematic way to promote equality between women and men, which can provide the government with insights into how tax and spending decisions affect equality between women and men.
Türkiye’s women’s labour force participation remains weak despite progress over the last decade. In the last 10 years, female participation in the workforce was supported by a number of measures such as awareness campaigns and labour law reforms. The labour force participation of women aged 15 to 64 years increased from 33.8% in 2013 to 40.9% in 2023. Nevertheless, women’s participation levels remain significantly below those in other OECD countries where the same participation rate increased from 62.5 to 66.7% (Figure 2.1). In addition, when women participate in the labour force, they face higher unemployment rates than men, which further discourages participation.
Source: OECD (2024), OECD Labour force statistics indicators (database).
While women in Türkiye earn less than men, the wage gap is smaller than in other OECD countries (Gonne and Trincao, [Upcoming][2]). This is likely due to a selection bias: many low-skilled women either stay out of the workforce or work informally, while those who do participate tend to be better educated and highly skilled. Most of the earnings gap in Türkiye is due to employment gaps, not wage disparities. In contrast, OECD countries like Lithuania, Sweden, Estonia, and Finland see wage gaps as the main driver of earnings gaps, since their employment and participation gaps are smaller (Ciminelli, Schwellnus and Stadler, 2021[3]). Therefore, policy efforts should in a first stage focus on removing structural barriers that prevent women from joining the formal labour market.
Increasing female labour force participation could bring significant economic benefits for Türkiye (Cuberes and Teignier, 2016[4]; IMF, 2024[5]). The underutilisation of women’s talents limits the country’s economic potential. An OECD study estimates that closing gaps between women and men in participation and working hours by 2060 could boost long-term GDP per capita growth by over 0.4 percentage points, increasing GDP by nearly 17% – one of the largest potential gains among OECD countries (see Fluchtmann, Keese and Adema (2024[6]) and Figure 2.2). Building a more inclusive labour market that fully utilises women’s skills can also enhance productivity (Hsieh et al., 2019[7]).
The weak participation of women in the labour market has long-standing causes. Women in Türkiye spend an average of four more hours per day than men on unpaid care and housework, significantly higher than the OECD average of two hours (Gonne and Trincao, [Upcoming][2]). This disproportionate involvement is a primary reason for women's low labour force participation. A recent TurkStat survey found that 30% of inactive women cite housework as their primary reason for not participating in the labour market, whereas no men gave this reason (TurkStat, 2023[8]). Childcare responsibilities highlight this disparity further: 96% of mothers are primary caregivers compared to only 2% of fathers, making childcare the most unequally divided household task (TurkStat, 2022[9]). In contrast, in the EU, 30% of men share childcare responsibilities equally or take on a larger role than their partners (Eurofound, 2017[10]).
Estimated difference relative to the baseline in the projected average annual rate of growth in GDP per capita over the period 2023-2060
Note: The simulation assumes that gaps in labour market participation and hours worked close by 2060. The figure shows the average yearly difference in potential per capita output growth by the end of the projection period, relative to the baseline projection from the OECD Economics Department Long-Term Model. Unweighted average of 38 countries for the OECD aggregate.
Source: Fluchtmann, Keese and Adema (2024), "Gender equality and economic growth: Past progress and future potential", OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 304.pers, No. 304.
Deeply rooted societal attitudes hinder efforts to improve female labour force participation and promote equality between women and men in Türkiye. Cultural norms continue to reinforce traditional roles, especially regarding women’s work-home balance. 64% of the population considers being a housewife as fulfilling as paid work – consistent with the OECD average. However, other beliefs are less in line with the OECD average (OECD, 2017[11]). For example, 52% of the population believes men deserve more job opportunities than women (OECD average: 18%), and 48% thinks men are better business executives (OECD average: 18%). These perceptions not only reflect traditional norms but also create barriers that limit women’s workforce participation. Additionally, 53% of the population believes children suffer when mothers work, compared to 33% in OECD countries overall.
Women are likely to reduce engagement in the workforce after childbirth. Motherhood significantly affects women’s workforce participation in Türkiye. Only 27% of mothers with children under age 3 were employed in 2023, compared to 58% of women without children (Turkstat, 2024[12]). Conversely, fathers are more likely to participate in the labour force than men without children (Figure 2.3). The child penalty – defined as the average reduction in women’s employment over the 10 years following the birth of their first child – is around 29% in Türkiye. While slightly lower than the OECD average, it tends to persist over time. In urban areas like Istanbul, the child penalty is even higher, reaching 61%, reflecting regional differences in job flexibility (Kleven, Landais and Leite-Mariante, 2023[13]). Motherhood also drives women toward more flexible, often precarious jobs, such as informal work, partly due to relatively low prevalence of supportive policies including childcare services (Akkan, Buğra and Knijn, 2023[14]) (Dedeoğlu and Şahankaya Adar, 2022[15]). These impacts are most pronounced immediately after childbirth but often extend into the long term (Berniell et al., 2021[16]). As discussed below, policies like improved childcare services, tax incentives, and comprehensive parental leave aligned with ECEC policies can help mitigate these challenges and support mothers’ workforce participation.
Employment rate of people aged 25-49 with and without children, 2023
Source: Eurostat (2024), EU Labour Force Survey.
Improving access to early childhood education and care is key for supporting mothers and ensuring their participation in the labour market. Research shows that affordable childcare significantly improves maternal employment outcomes (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017[17]; Halim, Perova and Reynolds, 2022[18]). When implemented effectively, expanded ECEC access can lead to multiple benefits by facilitating women’s labour force participation and improving broader equality outcomes; enhancing well-being and early development of Turkish children; and creating decent job and business opportunities in the paid care sector, particularly for women.
Türkiye has made notable strides in improving ECEC services, with enrolment rates rising significantly in recent years. Between 2005 and 2022, the share of children aged 3-5 enrolled in ECEC or primary education has increased sharply from 28% to 48% (OECD, 2024[19]). Enrolment for 5-year-olds showed the most progress and has become almost universal like in other OECD countries: in particular, Türkiye had by far the largest increase, over the last 10 years, in enrolment rates of young children one year before the typical primary entry age (OECD, 2024[19]). Despite these improvements, Türkiye’s ECEC enrolment rates still lag significantly behind other OECD countries where the enrolment rate of 3-5 years old is 35 percentage points higher (Figure 2.4). This highlights significant gaps in early childcare services, particularly for the youngest age group, where such services are virtually non-existent.
Enrolment rates in early childhood education and care services and primary education programmes
Note: The OECD average includes all OECD member countries with data available for both age groups (data for Canada and the USA are missing for 0-2 year olds and data for Canada are missing for 3-5 year olds). Data for 0-2-year-olds generally include children enrolled in early childhood education services (ISCED 2011 level 0) and other registered ECEC services (outside the scope of ISCED 0, because they are not in adherence with all ISCED-2011 criteria). Data for 3-5-year-olds include early childhood education services (ISCED 2011 level 0) and other registered ECEC services, as well as primary education (ISCED 2011 level 1).
Source: OECD (2024), Education at a Glance 2024: OECD Indicators (data for 3-5 year olds); and OECD Family Database, Chart PF3.2.A (data for 0-2 year olds).
2.3.1. Improving the labour market access of women through lower supply-side barriers
In Türkiye, approximately 80% of ECEC services are publicly provided, with capacity heavily skewed towards children in pre-primary school age. ECEC is not mandatory in Türkiye, but it is highly encouraged for 5-year-olds. ECEC prioritises enrolment of 5-year-olds, as regulation mandates that younger children who are four or three years old can only be offered places after accommodating all the older children who express demand. Most of the ECEC facilities for five-year-olds operate at or close to full capacity and sometimes not all the 5-year-olds have been able to be enrolled in the past (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2019[20]). This means places are rarely offered to younger children. To address the demand for children aged 3–5, some publicly-owned childcare centres are available but have limited capacity. Private centres also offer childcare, but their limited number and high costs make them difficult to access for many families. Unlike many OECD countries, Türkiye does not have a legal entitlement guaranteeing every child an access to ECEC services. This lack of a "place guarantee" exacerbates the supply-demand imbalance. As a consequence, the quality of ECEC services tends to also be lower than the OECD average even in the highest levels of ECEC: in 2018, there were 18 children by teaching staff in pre-primary education (ISCED 02) compared to 14 in the OECD on average, while the ratio has not improved between 2013 and 2022 as opposed to most OECD countries (OECD, 2020[21]; OECD, 2024[19]). Addressing this issue would require significant investments to expand infrastructure, increase public and private capacity, and ensure equitable access for all families in need of childcare services (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2019[20])
Broadening access to childcare for children under 3 years old could have a significant impact on women’s labour market participation. This age group shows the strongest link between childcare availability and mothers' ability to engage in paid work, more than the ECEC enrolment rates of 3-5 years-old (OECD, 2018[22]). In Türkiye, however, childcare options for children under 3 are limited. Crèches and day-care centres are almost entirely dependent on private providers, which fail to meet growing demand. This has left many families without access to these essential services in the past (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2019[20]). By contrast, countries like Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Germany have implemented robust ECEC systems that ensure high enrolment rates for children under 3. In Denmark, for example, every child is guaranteed a place in a day-care facility from the age of 26 weeks until school age. If public provision is unavailable, parents receive financial support for private childcare. Germany introduced a legal right to childcare for children under 3 in 2013, significantly increasing capacity and enrolment rates (OECD, 2018[22]).
Note: In panel A, some countries local governments play a key role in financing and providing childcare services. Such spending is comprehensively recorded in Nordic countries, but in some other (often federal) countries it may not be fully captured by the OECD social expenditure data. In panel B, expenditure per child is based on headcounts rather than full-time equivalent students and is converted in current PPPs. Unweighted average for the OECD aggregates with available data (35 countries for Panel A and 27 countries for Panel B).
Source: OECD Family Database Indicator PF3.1; and OECD (2024), Education at a Glance 2024: OECD Indicators.
Türkiye has room to increase public funding for ECEC to expand capacity and supply. Türkiye allocates just 0.3% of its GDP to ECEC, compared to the OECD average of 0.8% ( Figure 2.5). Increasing public investment in ECEC would not only help meet rising demand but also provide substantial economic and social returns (Heckman et al., 2010[23]). An OECD study estimated that achieving best-practice levels in pre-primary attendance could boost per capita income in Türkiye by almost 6% (Égert, Botev and Turner, 2019[24]). Upfront fiscal costs could be offset by long-term benefits, such as increased tax revenues from higher earnings and reduced spending on social programmes or healthcare. Early childhood education programmes can yield high social returns, with some studies finding returns up to 44 times the initial investment (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020[25]). Expanding ECEC capacity also has immediate benefits, such as creating jobs in the education sector.
Strengthening the legal and regulatory framework for various childcare providers – including private businesses, employers, local governments, and home-based care – could significantly enhance Türkiye’s childcare delivery capacity. Municipalities already play a supportive role in addressing gaps in national programmes by offering early education services tailored to local needs.
Employer-provided childcare in Türkiye remains rare. Turkish labour law mandates that workplaces with at least 150 female employees provide childcare facilities and those with 100 or more female employees offer breastfeeding rooms. However, these legal requirements apply only to a small fraction of workplaces, as a large share of employment in Türkiye is in micro and small enterprises with fewer than 50 employees (Turkstat, 2023[26]). More generally, as this can provide large employers with strong financial incentives not to hire women, the authorities could consider reviewing this mandate.
Türkiye should create incentives for smaller businesses to offer childcare options. Examples from other countries can provide guidance. In Chile, small firms can pool resources to establish shared childcare centres near workplaces, making this a cost-effective solution. In Japan, starting in 2025, employers will be required to support work-life balance and childcare needs regardless of company size, including through measures such as teleworking or reduced working hours. Another way forward can be to pursue the introduction of childcare centres in organised industrial zones. Many countries, including Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Switzerland, have improved their ECEC systems by increasing subsidies for local governments and private providers, including employer-sponsored childcare (Alajääskö and Fluchtmann, 2023[25]).
Regulation requirements for childcare service providers could be eased. In Türkiye, private childcare providers benefit from tax breaks, but inadequate accreditation standards and licensing costs can create barriers for establishing new facilities (World Bank, 2015[28]; Batyra, 2017[29]). Accreditation requirements primarily focus on building and infrastructure specifications, which can pose challenges in densely populated urban areas. International best practices, instead, emphasise standards based on child development outcomes, staff qualifications, and service quality rather than physical infrastructure (OECD, 2015[30]; Slot, 2018[31]).
Türkiye could address the lack of childcare availability, particularly for children under 3, by introducing a formal, regulated home-based ECEC model. A well-regulated home-based system could help expand childcare access while maintaining quality and reliability and expand the formal employment base (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2019[20]). In this system, childminders care for a small group of children (typically 4–5) in their homes, providing families with flexible care options. For example, Korea features licensed childcare centres in a home setting for a small number of children in houses or apartment units, and those centres contributed significantly to the enrolment rate of very young children (Ahn and Shin, 2013[32]). Currently, such system is at the pilot stage in Türkiye. Home-based ECEC is especially beneficial for children under 3 and is widely used in countries like France, where more children are cared for by childminders than in crèches. Other countries, such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom, also rely on home-based care, though centre-based care still dominates. Implementing a home-based childcare system in Türkiye would require (i) Developing clear regulatory frameworks to ensure quality and safety standards, (ii) establishing training and certification programmes for childminders, and (iii) monitoring services to guarantee reliable care. In that context, Türkiye is currently implementing a joint small project with the European Union in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir providing grants to 3 500 mothers of young children on the condition that they employ a certified caregiver, with the goal to both support mothers’ employment and the professionalisation of childcare.
2.3.2. Demand-side barriers also hinder women’s labour market participation
In addition to limited supply, families in Türkiye face demand-side barriers when seeking suitable childcare options. While childcare costs are relatively low compared to the average wage (Gromada and Richardson, 2021[33]; UNICEF, 2024[34]), high out-of-pocket costs can remain a significant challenge for some families and prevent them from accessing ECEC services. Studies indicate that preschool care and education expenses are often beyond the financial reach of low-income households (Dedeoğlu and Şahankaya Adar, 2022[15]; Pınarcıoğlu and Soyseçkin, 2018[35]). This disparity was evident in enrolment rates in Türkiye in the past: among children aged 3–5 from the poorest income decile households, only 16.4% attend preschool in 2012, and a mere 0.4% used daycare services. In contrast, children from households in the wealthiest income decile have much higher participation rates – 28.4% for preschool and 31.6% for daycare services (World Bank, 2015[28]). Today, disadvantaged children, who stand to benefit the most from ECEC, are more likely to miss out on early educational experiences, potentially impacting their future opportunities (Alajääskö and Fluchtmann, 2023[27]). To address this inequality, some countries have introduced targeted measures. For instance, Lithuania mandates preschool education for children from families at social risk, ensuring access to critical early education services (Alajääskö and Fluchtmann, 2023[27]). In Türkiye, 3% of the capacity of certified day care centres is reserved for disadvantaged children who can then benefit from care services free of charge, which has benefited around 3 000 children per year since 2017.
High ECEC costs in Türkiye are further exacerbated by the absence of supportive financial mechanisms, such as tax incentives or subsidies for families. Currently, financial assistance to help families afford private childcare services is sparse, although employer-provided nursery and daycare centres are exempt from income taxation. Ensuring adequate financial support, such as fee discounts or subsidies, is essential to reducing barriers and enabling more families to access childcare. Across OECD countries, various financial support programmes aim to lower the cost of childcare, including childcare allowances, tax concessions, fee rebates, and increased entitlement to other benefits. For example, Estonia caps childcare fees at 20% of the monthly minimum wage, Germany exempts low-income and vulnerable households from ECEC fees. Norway limits childcare fees to a fraction of gross household income and offers 20 hours of free childcare weekly for lower-income parents. In Quebec, Canada, capping childcare fees has significantly increased maternal labour force participation (Alajääskö and Fluchtmann, 2023[27]). These strategies ensure more equitable access to ECEC and promote broader participation, especially among low-income families. Similarly, countries like Sweden and Germany provide generous subsidies and family benefits to reduce the financial burden on parents, making childcare more accessible across all income levels. Adopting such measures in Türkiye could significantly enhance affordability and access to ECEC services.
Operational challenges and hidden additional costs in public childcare services can reduce demand and accessibility for parents. Public kindergartens and nurseries often face logistical limitations, such as not being open during the summer and relying on a double-shift, half-day system, which does not meet the needs of parents working full-time jobs. Additionally, the lack of transportation and meal services in public ECEC programmes adds extra costs for families, making childcare less affordable and harder to access. Quality concerns also emerge when children of different ages are grouped together in the same classroom due to capacity constraints, which can discourage families from enrolling their children. Although private centres generally offer more flexibility and better services to mitigate these issues, they are often more expensive, posing a significant challenge for low-income mothers who might otherwise seek these services. All these factors create practical barriers that complicate access to affordable and quality childcare.
Beyond costs and operational challenges, social norms regarding caretaking of young children could be reducing the response of labour supply to better childcare access. Indeed, recent evidence suggest that cultural norms have a significant impact on gaps between women and men in labour market outcomes in some OECD countries (Olivetti, Pan and Petrongolo, 2024[36]). As discussed above, cultural norms in Türkiye continue to reinforce traditional roles of women and men, including for childcare. In recent years, many OECD governments have tried to change stereotypes through public awareness campaigns, which could help counter social norms (OECD, 2017[11]; Gonne and Trincao, [Upcoming][2]). Several policies including mentorship, capacity-building programmes, and active recruitment of women for leadership positions can help alter these expectations through creating role models (André et al., 2023[37]). Recent evidence suggests that indeed, those policies can contribute to reduce gaps between women and men as norms are transmitted not only by parents, but also via peer effects, teachers, and hierarchical superiors for example (Olivetti, Pan and Petrongolo, 2024[36]). Finally, designing family and labour market policies carefully, as discussed below, can help alter social norms. For example, they can incentivise the take-up of parental leave by fathers. They can also take into account, via budgeting practices sensitive to equality between men and women for instance, the indirect impact of nominally-neutral policy measures because of their interaction with social norms, e.g. in the context of household taxation.
2.4.1. Parental leave policies could foster a more equitable sharing of leave between parents
Incentivising a more equitable sharing of parental leave between parents would help to balance the share of unpaid work and home care, enhancing women's engagement in the workforce. Maternity leave is more generous in Türkiye than the median OECD country, as mothers are entitled to 16 weeks of paid maternity leave with a full replacement rate (Figure 2.6). However, the absence of paid parental leave implies that total paid leave available to mothers is relatively low compared to other OECD countries even in full-rate equivalent terms. Additionally, mothers can take up to 6 months of unpaid parental leave following maternity leave, along with the option to work half-time for 60 days (for the first child) up to 180 days (for the third and subsequent children), with a half-time working allowance covering the non-worked hours. The difference between women and men in available parental leave is wider than in the OECD. Fathers receive only 5 days of paid paternity leave (and no paid parental and home care leave), also at full replacement rate, which is less than most OECD countries. Civil servants are eligible for up to two years of unpaid parental leave, available to either parent, on top of paid maternity and paternity leave entitlements.
Inequalities between women and men in the take-up of parental leave can lead to women spending disproportionately more time than men on unpaid care and housework, which negatively impacts their employability and wages. Recent evidence suggests a correlation between fathers’ leave taking and higher involvement in care and other unpaid work later on, which might be beneficial for mothers’ labour market outcomes during and beyond the leave period (Fluchtmann, Keese and Adema, 2024[6]). Policies that encourage fathers’ uptake of paternity and parental leave could weaken the persistent bias between women and men regarding paid and unpaid work eventually and improve family well-being by strengthening father-child relationships (OECD, 2023[38]). For example, evidence from Norway suggests that coworkers and brothers are significantly more likely to take paternity leave if their peers are (exogenously) induced to take leave (Dahl, Løken and Mogstad, 2014[39]).
In recent years, policy reforms in many OECD countries have aimed to encourage fathers to take up parental leave through earmarked months or bonus systems, while Türkiye does not currently offer non-transferable parental leave that is exclusively reserved for fathers. Evidence indicates that introducing such measures can, in addition to supporting women’s work, significantly boost their leave uptake and increase their involvement in childcare (OECD, 2023[38]). For instance, in Iceland, men accounted for only 3% of all parental leave taken before mother and father quotas were introduced in the early 2000s. Today, men take approximately 45% of all parental leave. The number of OECD countries offering some parental leave reserved for fathers rose from seven in 1995 to 34 in 2020 (OECD, 2022[40]; André et al., 2023[37]).
Paid leave duration, in full-rate equivalent, 2023
Note: Paid leaves include maternity or paternity leaves, and parental and home care leaves. Entitlements are reported in full-rate equivalent, i.e., paid at 100% of previous earnings. Unweighted average of 38 countries for the OECD aggregate.
Source: OECD Family Database, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/oecd-family-database.html.
2.4.2. Changes in other family and labour market policies could enhance female labour participation
The lack of flexible employment contracts in Türkiye significantly hinders women's ability to participate in the workforce. Rigid employment structures – such as strict full-time requirements, fixed hours, and limited opportunities for remote or part-time work – fail to accommodate the needs of women who require adaptable working conditions due to caregiving roles. These inflexible arrangements often force women to either leave the workforce entirely or turn to informal, less secure jobs that provide flexibility but lack stability, social security, and career advancement opportunities. The previous OECD Economic Survey of Türkiye recommended expanding the use of fixed-term and temporary work agency contracts, which are currently confined to seasonal and agricultural sectors. Extending these contracts to other industries, such as business services, could facilitate women's transition into formal employment (OECD, 2023[1]). Although reforms in 2016 introduced flexible work models like part-time work, part-time employment remains underutilised in Türkiye, accounting for only 9.5% of the workforce compared to the EU average of 16.5%. Increasing the availability of part-time roles and easing regulatory restrictions could help more women participate in and remain in formal employment. Türkiye has also supported female entrepreneurship: for example, it provides discounted social security premium payments for female workers in trades and crafts activities performed outside a workplace, or capacity support programs and corporate income tax exemption for Women-led Cooperatives. As a result, women entrepreneurship in Türkiye is in line with OECD average, although the gap between men and women is relatively larger given the high rate of entrepreneurship in the country (OECD/European Commission, 2023[41]).
Certain labour laws in Türkiye unintentionally discourage women from joining the workforce. For instance, Turkish labour law grants severance pay to women who resign within one year from the date of marriage, potentially increasing not only the long-term cost for employers, but also women’s incentives to resign and quit the labour force. While the law prohibits discrimination between women and men in the labour market, this regulation – specific to female employees – can indirectly contribute to employment disparities. Such regulations, while well-intentioned, highlight the need to balance protective measures with policies that actively promote women’s workforce participation.
Türkiye’s tax and benefits policies do not favour the labour force participation of households with children. Türkiye does not provide significant fiscal benefits to such households’ members through advantageous tax treatments or cash benefits, relative to OECD countries. For example, expenditure on family and children benefits in 2022 represented 550 purchasing power standards (PPS, an artificial currency unit which theoretically buys the same amount of goods and services in each country) per population aged 18 or younger against between PPS 1500 and PPS 12500 in EU countries. As a consequence, the average tax wedge on households with children is among the highest in the OECD (Figure 2.7). For example, the tax wedge for a single person at 67% of the average wage is at the OECD average for childless households, but twice the OECD average for a household with two children. Importantly, those households tend to be headed by women: in 2023, three quarters of single parents with resident children were women. Providing targeted tax credits or cash benefits for children, such as deductions or credits for childcare expenses, would promote greater labour force participation especially among women. Indeed, evidence also suggests that the elasticity of women’s labour supply is particularly high among women earning low incomes and in countries where female labour participation is lower (OECD, 2024[42]). Since childcare costs are, today, entirely out-of-pocket, the financial benefit of entering the labour force, particularly for low-income families, is often outweighed by the costs associated with the induced childcare and transportation expenses, and the loss of unpaid domestic labour. Direct benefits, in particular child benefits, targeted toward lower income households, can increase the marginal tax wedge as the level of benefits is phased out with income. However, the average tax wedge is the more relevant measure to consider when aiming to improve participation in the labour market, and a marginal tax rate increasing with income would also enhance the progressivity of the tax system (see Chapter 1) (Paturot, Mellbye and Brys, 2013[43]).
Appropriate budgetary practices and procedures can provide governments with insights into how tax and spending decisions affect equality between women and men. By analysing how resource allocation impacts men and women differently, governments can make informed decisions that reduce disparities and prevent policies from unintentionally disadvantaging women’s economic participation or reinforcing societal perceptions that discourage women from working. Such budgeting practices are increasingly applied in OECD countries. To date, 23 OECD member countries have integrated budgeting tools into their budgetary frameworks to promote equality between women and men in a systematic way, with four more countries planning or actively considering its implementation in the near future (OECD, 2023[44]).
Türkiye has been applying budgeting practices sensitive to equality between women and men since 2019 and has progressively incorporated this approach into key fiscal reforms. The 2003 Public Financial Management and Control Law laid the foundation for fiscal policies sensitive to equality women and men. In 2011, a formal commitment to budgeting practices that consider these sensitivities was established. This commitment has since been reflected in strategic planning documents, such as development plans. By 2019, those budgeting practices became more visible through performance indicators in Türkiye’s 11th Development Plan (Curristine et al., 2021[45]; OECD, 2023[44]). Additionally, public investment projects are now required to address their differential impact on women and men and contribute to women’s empowerment (Strategy and Budget Office, 2024[46]).
Such budgeting practices in Türkiye can be improved to better serve equality outcomes. Current efforts focus largely on integrating new dimensions into performance budgeting but lack critical tools such as ex-ante and ex-post impact assessments, and distributional analyses of budget measures according to their differential consequences on women and men. Approximately 40% of OECD countries that implement budget practices promoting equality between women and men use at least one of these tools to evaluate the impact of fiscal policies on equality between women and men (OECD, 2023[44]). Adopting such practices in Türkiye would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the impacts of fiscal decisions on equality between women and men, ensuring that resource allocation effectively reduces inequalities. Additionally, while Türkiye’s legal framework allows for such budgeting practices, it does not mandate it. In contrast, 65% of OECD countries have institutionalised those budgeting practices through legal mandates, with some countries even embedding it in their constitutions (OECD, 2023[44]). Establishing legal requirements would strengthen integration of those practices across all sectors and ensure consistent application. Moreover, budget allocations sensitive to equality between women and men in Türkiye are currently limited to certain agencies, such as the Ministry of Family and Social Services. Supporting the expansion of this approach across all line ministries would promote policy coherence and adopt a more comprehensive strategy for enhancing women’s workforce participation and advancing equality between women and men. The launch of the Planning and Budgeting Strategy and Action Plan for Equality Between Women and Men for 2024-2028 is thus promising. The plan provides actions to be taken for the systematic integration of an equality perspective into national and local policymaking and budgeting processes. It sets four main objectives: developing statistics and analyses responsive to equality between women and men, mainstreaming this responsiveness in planning and budgeting processes, building institutional capacity to conduct budgeting practices as discussed above, and strengthening monitoring and auditing mechanisms.
Average tax wedge, by household type and wage level, 2023
Note: Data are based on personal income tax plus employee and employer contributions (SSCs) less cash benefits to which each household type are entitled. Married (100-60%) corresponds to the two-earner couple at the combined wage level of 100% and 60% of average wage. Married (100-0%) corresponds to the one-earner couple at the wage level of 100% of average wage.
Source: OECD (2024), Taxing Wages 2024: Tax and Gender through the Lens of the Second Earner.
Additional considerations in transport infrastructure investment can significantly influence inequalities in economic outcomes between women and men. An International Transport Workers’ Federation survey revealed that 80% of women feel unsafe on public transportation in both developed and developing countries (OECD, 2023[38]). Safety concerns can discourage women from pursuing economic opportunities that require commuting in Türkiye (Beyazit et al., 2023[47]; Özgür Keysan, Kaygan and Kaygan, 2022[48]). Challenges such as long travel times, poorly-lit streets, and unreliable public transport schedules usually disproportionately affect women. They often face greater difficulties using public transportation due to concerns over safety and accessibility, which restricts their ability to travel to work, access social services, or engage in education and training opportunities. Incorporating sensitivities to inequality between women and men into transport infrastructure investment can enhance the safety, accessibility, and reliability of public transport, ultimately boosting women’s labour force participation, and good practices could be pursued in Türkiye. For instance, Chile has implemented responsive transportation policies by adapting routes, designing safer night services, and incorporating universal accessibility features for pregnant women and mothers with children. Canada and Iceland have introduced programmes to improve public transport safety, frequency, and accessibility, enabling women, particularly from low-income backgrounds, to participate more actively in the workforce (OECD, 2021[49]).
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