Müge Adalet McGowan, OECD
Patrizio Sicari, OECD
OECD Economic Surveys: Ireland 2025
Abstract
Despite GDP volatility, driven by some multinational-dominated sectors, domestic economic activity expands robustly, thanks to a strong labour market performance and easing inflationary pressures and financial conditions. The financial system appears resilient, but risks from the high share of non-bank lending to SMEs and the commercial real estate market should be monitored closely. The near-term fiscal situation remains resilient thanks to robust revenues. However, addressing spending pressures from ageing, climate change and housing and infrastructure investment needs will be key to ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability. This requires enhancing the fiscal framework, boosting spending efficiency and diversifying tax revenues. Reforms to improve the financial sustainability of the pension system should be transparent and fair across generations.
The strong labour market has been driving the domestic economy
Assessing the performance of the Irish economy is complicated by the presence of multinational firms whose large transactions can heavily impact national accounts (Box 1.1), For example, the sharp contraction in real GDP in 2023, due to reduced contract manufacturing and the spillovers from some large multinationals’ restructuring, contrasts with the 5% increase in GNI* (excluding large transactions of foreign corporations), which better reflects the true state of the domestic economy. Significant swings in investment and exports, driven by the multinational sector, also created volatility in the course of 2024 (Figure 1.1, Panel A). Public and private consumption, underpinned by a tight labour market, continue to support growth (Panel B).
To better capture the underlying dynamics of the Irish economy, the Central Statistics Office publishes some alternative metrics, such as Modified Domestic Demand (MDD) and Modified Gross National Income (GNI*). The former measures domestic demand, but excludes volatile components of investment spending by multinationals, namely on-shored intellectual property assets and investment in aircraft for leasing, which have very little impact on the domestic economy. GNI* goes further by taking into account the modified current account (CA*), which reflects the import content of domestic expenditure, and the contribution to growth from domestic trade and cross-border flows (excluding multinational-dominated trade), thereby allowing for a comprehensive assessment of productivity trends. In particular, relative to the standard GNI, GNI* excludes the factor income of firms that have re-domiciled their headquarters to Ireland, as well as the depreciation of trade in on-shored intellectual property assets, R&D service imports and aircraft owned by aircraft-leasing companies. As seen in the Basic Statistics Table at the beginning of this Survey, expressing different variables as a share of GNI* rather than GDP considerably alters the picture of the Irish economy. The Department of Finance uses fiscal variables, such as public debt as a share of GNI*, which enables a better assessment of the fiscal situation.
Source: Department of Finance (2021), Forecasting GNI* - Detailing the Department of Finance Approach, Dublin; Central Statistics Office, Modified GNI; Department of Finance (2024), The Balance of Payments in Ireland: An Update, Dublin.
1. Flash GDP estimate for Q4 2024. Modified domestic demand excludes large transactions of foreign corporations that do not have a big impact on the domestic economy.
2. Exports refer to both goods and services.
Source: OECD, National Accounts database.
Supported by the resilience of the service sector and net inward migration, employment reached a record high in the third quarter of 2024 (Figure 1.2, Panel A). The unemployment rate remains around historical lows, and well below the EU average of around 6% (Panel B). The female employment rate is also at a record high 71%, and the employment of older works has risen. While recent survey data still point to net job creation in manufacturing and services, job vacancy rates have declined since late 2022, except in public administration and administrative and support services (Chapter 2). Even so, they remain above their long-term averages and firms cite skills and labour shortages as a main concern.
Note: Panel A: Those aged 15-64. Panel B: Those aged 15-74.
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey (database).
Harmonised headline consumer price inflation has eased from its peak levels due to lower energy prices and was 1.5% in January (Figure 1.3). Harmonised core inflation was 1.5% in December, driven by a decline in in non-energy goods prices and an easing in service inflation, which nevertheless is around 3.3%, reflecting capacity constraints against the background of strong domestic demand. House price inflation remains high. Nominal house prices were up 9.7% in October on a year earlier, while rents (in the harmonised consumer price index) were up by 5.3% in December.
Note: Harmonised indices. Panel A: Core inflation excludes energy, food, alcohol, and tobacco. Flash estimate for January 2025.
Source: Eurostat, Monthly Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices.
Risks to growth are tilted to the downside
Real GDP growth is set to reach 3.7% in 2025 and 3.5% in 2026, as volatility from the multinational sector subsides, financial conditions improve, and goods exports recover (Table 1.1). Robust real income growth, combined with a relatively tight labour market, improving financial conditions, and the cost-of-living measures included in Budget 2025, will underpin household consumption. Further interest rate reductions will enhance domestic firms’ incentives to invest, while significant support to domestic investment, especially in the residential sector, will also come from robust growth in public capital spending, as set out in the National Development Plan. As a result, modified domestic demand growth is projected to stabilise around 3% in 2025-26, below its long-term average of around 3.5%. Headline consumer price inflation is set to be slightly below 2% in 2025-26.
Note: The historical data reflect the Central Statistics Office’s 28 January 2025 preliminary GDP estimate, but the projections are those from the December 2024 OECD Economic Outlook.
1. Contributions to changes in real GDP, actual amount in the first column.
2. Excludes those large transactions of foreign corporations that do not have a big impact on the domestic economy.
3. Excludes the factor income of firms that have re-domiciled their headquarters to Ireland, as well as the depreciation of trade in on-shored intellectual property assets, R&D service imports and aircraft owned by aircraft-leasing companies.
4. Modified current account balance removes a number of globalisation-related distortions, including trade and depreciation of intellectual property assets and aircraft related to leasing along with profits of redomiciled firms.
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 116 database and Central Statistics Office.
Rising geopolitical tensions, trade protectionism and weaker global demand could weigh on exports. Tighter capacity constraints or renewed pressures on energy and food prices may keep inflation higher than foreseen, weighing on consumption. Delayed progress in addressing capacity constraints in housing and other infrastructure could generate higher and more persistent price and wage inflation and damage competitiveness. On the upside, a faster drop in services prices would ease SME operational costs and boost consumer confidence. Greater than assumed use of the ‘excess’ household savings built up during the pandemic, which have remained high, would boost spending or investment and increase domestic demand. Higher-than-expected inward migration could boost labour supply, employment and output. In addition, other lower-probability threats to the outlook could derail the economy (Table 1.2).
Financial sector assets grew to EUR 8.3 trillion in 2023 (Figure 1.4), which is among the highest in the European Union. There are two separate segments, with internationally-oriented investment banks, funds and insurance firms, and retail banks serving the domestic market. The rising prominence of non-banks could create risks stemming from liquidity mismatches, leverage and interconnectedness (CBI, 2024a). The overall linkages of investment funds and money market funds to the domestic economy and banks remain limited, but some highly leveraged property funds can be a potential source of financial stability risk through their exposure to the commercial real estate market (IMF, 2023a). Hence, the ongoing improvements in their supervision, discussed below, is welcome.
Financial sector assets
Note: Investment funds refer to collective investment vehicles that provide asset management services to ultimate investors, such as bond and equity funds, whose portfolio assets and investor base are predominantly international.
Source: Central Bank of Ireland.
Household deposits have supported domestic retail banks, and capital and liquidity positions of Irish banks are well above regulatory requirements and European averages (EBA, 2024). Stress tests show that banks are resilient against large adverse shocks (EBA, 2023). Increasing net interest incomes have raised bank profitability, which could nevertheless be adversely impacted if bank funding costs or loan impairments were to rise (CBI, 2023). High costs remain a structural challenge, which should be addressed via investment in increased digitalisation and operational resilience.
The European Central Bank’s monetary tightening impacted credit conditions mostly via non-bank lending in Ireland. The pass-through of higher policy rates to bank lending rates on mortgage loans was lower than in the euro area, given Ireland’s starting point of structurally higher retail interest rates following the global financial crisis (Figure 1.5, Panel A). Combined with structural housing demand-supply mismatches and the relative strength of household incomes, this led to a smaller house price correction than elsewhere (Panel B), with a limited impact on lending and sales volumes.
Source: European Central Bank, Financial Markets and Interest Rates (database); OECD, Analytical House Price Indicators (database).
Credit risks seem to be contained, but vigilance remains warranted. While the overall non-performing loan (NPL) ratio at 1.5% was below the EU average of 1.9% in June 2024, the NPL ratio for real estate activities at 7.1% was higher than the 4.4% EU average (EBA, 2024). Households holding mortgages with a history of performance problems or mortgages originating before 2009 and tracker mortgages are more likely to miss payments (Shaikh et al., 2023; Figure 1.6, Panel A). However, the high share of fixed mortgages and mortgage switching by households have lowered risks (Bryne, McCann and Gaffney, 2023; Scott and Singh, 2024). One potential sign of deteriorating credit risk is that the share of Stage 2 loans, which reflect banks’ judgments around the risk profile of performing loans, has increased for non-financial corporations (Panel B), and is above the EU average and pre-pandemic levels.
The high share of SME lending by non-banks, especially in the real estate sector, also creates risks (Figure 1.6, Panel C; Moloney et al., 2023). SMEs that borrow from non-banks tend to be younger, less liquid and more leveraged than those financed by banks (Gaffney and McGeever, 2022). The higher sensitivity of non-banks to market conditions and interest rates increases the risks of abrupt changes to credit supply. In addition, some SME lending comes from institutions not regulated by the Central Bank, which can create an uneven level playing field. Bringing them under the supervision of the Central Bank, as recommended by the 2022 Retail Banking Review, would improve the identification and assessment of risks.
Non-banks also have high exposure to the commercial real estate (CRE) sector (Panel D). Capital values in the sector have decreased by 27% since 2019 and the Dublin office market is experiencing one of the largest increases in vacancy rates in Europe (CBI, 2024a). While resilient overall, the leverage of some property funds has increased. This creates a risk that further declines in CRE prices could create an adverse feedback loop between non-bank financing, the CRE market, and the real economy. In addition, addressing data gaps in direct cross-border exposures to CRE would improve understanding of risks (IMF, 2023a).
Note: Panel A: The share of primary dwelling house mortgage loans moving from zero days past due to 31-180 days past due and zero days past due to 91-180 days past due in the following six months. SVR refers to standard variable rate mortgages. Panel B: NFC and HH refer to non-financial corporates and households, respectively. Stage 2 refers to higher risk balances according to IFRS9. Panel C: Real estate lending refers to real estate activities and construction.
Source: Central Bank of Ireland.
The Central Bank of Ireland increased the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) to 1.5% in June 2024, as recommended in the 2022 Economic Survey. This is appropriate given the current macro-financial conditions and will increase resilience against the potential materialisation of risks. The Central Bank has a macroprudential stress testing framework to inform policy decisions on cyclical buffers (Morell, Rice and Shaw, 2022). In case of a shock, the CCyB should be released to enable banks to absorb losses and sustain credit supply.
Ireland continues to improve its macroprudential policy framework for non-banks. Macroprudential rules for property funds (a leverage limit and liquidity management guidance) and Irish-authorised GBP-denominated Liability Driven Investment funds (maintaining a buffer against a minimum of 300 basis points increase in UK yields) were introduced in November 2022 and April 2024, respectively (CBI, 2024b). The recent central bank feedback statement as part of the consultation process for macroprudential rules for investment funds and the Funds Sector Review are welcome. Close monitoring of non-banks should be continued with a view to recalibrate macroprudential measures, as needed.
The evolution of new lending has been broadly in line with the Central Bank’s ex-ante assessment of the new mortgage framework, which came into effect in January 2023 (CBI, 2024a). The measures increased the loan-to-income ratio limit for first-time buyers from 3.5 to 4 and the loan-to-value limit of second and subsequent buyers from 80% to 90%. The impact should continue to be monitored to ensure that the new measures do not have the unintended consequence of increasing housing demand and prices in a manner that would undermine the objectives of the measures.
The domestic banking system remains highly concentrated, with three retail banks operating fully in Ireland as two banks are completing the process of withdrawing (KBC and Ulster Bank). Exposures concentrated in Ireland and in real estate, in particular residential mortgages, increases risks (CBI, 2023). The growing importance of non-bank financial institutions, credit unions and digital banks may potentially mitigate any reduction in competition, but greater dependency on wholesale funding by non-banks can create volatility. The recent Retail Banking Review, ongoing work to develop a national financial literacy strategy, and the ongoing review of the consumer protection code will improve the framework. The recommendations of the Retail Banking Review should continue to be implemented in a prompt manner.
The Retail Banking Review recommended easing mortgage switching to a lender offering a cheaper interest rate (Department of Finance, 2022a), which can improve household financial resilience. Higher interest rates have recently increased mortgage switching, which has traditionally been relatively low. This reflects the difficulty in comparing offers, uncertainty about the process, the costs and benefits of switching, fear of making a mistake and the time and paperwork required to switch (Papadopoulos et al., 2023). The recent exit of KBC could also lower switching (CCPC, 2023 and 2022). Addressing impediments and gaps in the process and enhancing requirements to provide information on alternative mortgage products to customers can boost the take-up of cheaper alternatives.
The short-term fiscal position remains strong
The budget balance recorded a surplus of 1.5% of GDP (2.6% of GNI*) in 2023, supported by strong revenue growth. Public debt at around 43% of GDP in 2023 is low, but it is 76% of GNI* and gross debt per capita remains relatively elevated (Figure 1.7). The budget surplus is projected at 4.5% of GDP (7.5% of GNI*) in 2024, partly supported by a one-off increase in revenues due to the September 2024 tax ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (EUR 14.1 billion). Corporate taxes make up close to 20% of total government revenues (27% of tax revenues) and are highly concentrated (Figure 1.8). The share of “windfall” corporate tax receipts, i.e., those that cannot be explained by underlying drivers, is estimated to be 47% in 2023 (Department of Finance, 2022b and 2024a). The government estimates that the fiscal balance was -1.3% of GNI* in 2023 and projects it at -1.9% by 2027, without these windfall revenues (Department of Finance, 2024b).
Note: Panel A: Projections for GNI* are from Budget 2025. The 2024 budget balance projections include the one-off transfers from the Court of Justice of the European Union ruling in September.
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 116 database; OECD, National Accounts database; Central Statistical Office.
Source: Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, Fiscal Assessment Report June 2024 and OECD, National Accounts database.
Budget 2025 features a EUR 10.5 billion (2.1% of 2023 GDP; 3.6% of GNI*) package. This will comprise permanent spending measures of EUR 6.9 billion (of which EUR 1.6 billion is capital), largely aimed at preserving the existing level of public services, against the backdrop of a larger-than-assumed population, and sustaining infrastructure spending, and cost-of-living measures of EUR 2.2 billion. The latter includes one-off lump sums paid to welfare recipients and universal additional child benefit payments and EUR 250 energy credits. Permanent tax measures worth EUR 1.4 billion will serve to offset income tax threshold effects (see below), while EUR 0.2 billion is allocated to the extension of reduced VAT rates on electricity and gas until April 2025, the extension of mortgage interest relief and an additional payment of the rental tax credit. The government also announced an additional EUR 3 billion for investment for housing, water and electricity, not included in the Budget, which will be funded from the recent sale of some of the state’s shareholding in Allied Irish Bank.
With the economy at – or close to – full employment, such emphasis on pro-cyclical spending, albeit partly focussed on productivity-enhancing capital investment, risks running against capacity constraints, adding to underlying inflationary pressures – besides resulting in breaches of the existing spending rule (see below). Around half of the cost-of-living measures in Budget 2025 are untargeted (IFAC, 2024a). A more prudent approach to fiscal policy is needed. This should entail avoiding further untargeted one-off income support measures, which are not justified by the current context. Better controlling increases in permanent current spending and effectively sequencing capital investment projects to help ease capacity constraints (see below) are also key.
Fiscal pressures loom on the horizon
Several underlying pressures (demographic change, digitalisation, deglobalisation and decarbonisation) will increase long-term fiscal sustainability challenges. The current demographic profile is favourable, but the share of the population older than 64 relative to that of working-age (20-64) is projected to more than double between 2022 and 2070 to 55.6%. The associated increase in government spending on health, long-term care and pensions of 5.7% of GDP by 2070 will be much higher than the EU average of 1.6% (Table 1.4; EC, 2024a). Hence, pension and health-care reforms, as discussed below, are needed. Ireland is currently experiencing strong population growth, which can offset some of these costs. For example, net migration higher by a third would reduce pension expenditures by 0.2% of GDP (0.4% of GNI*) compared to the baseline scenario (Department of Finance, 2024c).
Note: The demographic assumptions on fertility, mortality and net migration are based on Eurostat’s EUROPOP2023.
Source: EC (2024a), Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States, 2022-2070.
There is room to improve the updating and incorporating of the costs of major planned medium-term reforms, such as climate and health care, in fiscal projections. As decarbonisation costs set out in climate legislation are likely to reach a peak in 2026-30 (Fitzgerald, 2021), they should be incorporated in fiscal projections promptly. Estimates suggest that gross costs from higher expenditures and lower revenues (Figure 1.9) could be EUR 5.5 billion a year or 2% of GNI* in 2026-30 (Casey and Carroll, 2023). In addition, the initial costing of the government’s ten-year policy roadmap to reform the health system (Sláintecare) has not been revised since 2017 (IFAC, 2024b). Updated projections, reflecting rising costs and population, would improve the assessment of future fiscal needs.
While public investment has increased in recent years, Ireland faces large investment needs, which could rise further due to strong population growth. The population in Ireland increased by 13.5% from 2016 to 2024, to 5.4 million people. The share of population growth due to net immigration has been rising (Figure 1.10, Panel A), with the share of people born overseas now at around 20%. The widening of the occupations for which employment permits can be granted boosted immigration (Murphy and Sheridan, 2023), while arrivals from Ukraine was 109 566 by September 2024, of which 74% are estimated to be still in Ireland. Around 50% of the population resides in the Eastern and Midland region, of which more than half is in Dublin city and county. The population increased in nearly all counties, with 51.6% of the total from the Eastern and Midland region (Panel B).
Note: Panel A: Refers to a high-cost scenario. Panel B: Shifting away from fossil fuels without tax policy changes.
Source: Casey, E. and K. Carroll (2023), “What climate change means for Ireland’s public finances”, Long-term Sustainability Report: Supporting Research Series, No.1.
The National Development Plan (NDP) 2021-30 has a total allocation of EUR 165 billion to support housing, digital and green transformations, infrastructure and healthcare, with an aim to keep public investment around 5% of GNI* (Government of Ireland, 2021). These investments are critical for future competitiveness and long-term growth but it will be important to ensure that they do not worsen the overall fiscal stance. Effective prioritisation and sequencing across sectors and type of projects can help balance potential short-run inflationary impacts and the long-run benefits of enhanced public investment. To ensure spending efficiency, existing cost-benefit analyses of projects should be re-assessed with new parameters capturing the more severe capacity constraints and the more demanding climate targets which have arisen since the original NDP was drafted (Barrett and Curtis, 2024). Addressing capacity constraints and expediting the planning permission process will also be key (Chapters 2 and 4).
Note: In Panel B, the data labels indicate the contribution to the overall population increase.
Source: Central Statistics Office.
The impact of the two-pillar international tax agreement on public finances remains uncertain. Government projections assume that the implementation of Pillar 2, which introduces a minimum effective tax rate of 15% for large enterprises (annual turnover exceeding EUR 750 million) from 2024, would increase tax revenues from 2026 (Department of Finance, 2024a), though it may negatively impact Ireland’s competitiveness. While the impact of Pillar 1, which will reallocate some taxable income of multinationals across jurisdictions to where consumers and users are located, remains uncertain; the government assumes a net revenue loss of EUR 2 billion from the two-pillar solution for Ireland (Department of Finance, 2024a).
Pension and health-care reforms can help address ageing costs
Pensions
Ireland's pension system consists of a pay-as-you-go financed public pension pillar supplemented by a voluntary second pillar scheme and private pension plans. The statutory retirement age is 66, while the effective age of labour market exit is 66.3 for men and 64.9 for women, suggesting that early retirement is not a major challenge to the pension system. The public pension pillar comprises both a contributory and a non-contributory element. The latter is a means-tested pension, which is paid to individuals without adequate means at the age of 66. The old-age contributory pension system provides flat-rate benefits depending on the contribution period, and a person may continue to work full-time after reaching the state pension age and collect their pension at the same time.
The government has launched several reforms, after a reversal of plans to increase the state pension age from 66 to 68 by 2028. The option to defer the uptake of the basic pension from 66 to 70, with an increase in the basic pension for each year of deferral in an actuarially neutral way, was introduced in January 2024. The annual minimum contribution payment for the self-employed contributors and the voluntary contribution for former self-employed contributors were raised by EUR 150 to EUR 650 from October 2024. An automatic enrolment in retirement savings schemes will be introduced in September 2025 and the Future of Ireland Fund (see below) will help address some ageing-costs. Most notably, the contribution rates for employees and employers both increased by 0.1 percentage points in October 2024, and are expected to increase further by 0.7 percentage points between 2024 and 2028. However, this approach creates some concerns of fairness across generations (Doorley and Duna, 2024).
The 2021 Pension Commission had recommended a mix of policies, including to incrementally increase the pension age by three months each year, commencing in 2028 to reach 67 in 2031, followed by further increases of three months every second year thereafter, reaching 68 by 2039 (The Pensions Commission, 2021), to prevent the need for large increases in contributions. The government’s planned increases in contributions (based on a 2020 actuarial review) until 2028 are lower than those proposed by the Pensions Commission (based on a 2015 actuarial review) in scenarios without an increase in the pension age. While the new projections have lowered the shortfall by around EUR 4 billion, further reforms will be needed to ensure the continued viability of the social insurance fund beyond 2028, when a new actuarial review is planned. Given Ireland’s high life expectancy at birth (82) and healthy life expectancy (the average number of years in good health a person has at age 60) (Figure 1.11, Panel A), linking the retirement age to life expectancy could yield large benefits (Panel B). For example, Ireland could increase the pension age by 2/3 of the increase in life expectancy.
Note: Panel A: Healthy life expectancy refers to the average number of years that a person at the age of 60 can expect to live in "full health". Panel B: The estimates are for fully linking the pension age to life expectancy.
Source: WHO and EC (2024a), Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States, 2022-2070.
Healthcare spending
Ireland’s relatively young population enjoys a long life expectancy and a good self-reported health status, among the OECD’s best. However, at 11.3% of GNI*, total current health spending in 2022 was above the OECD average of 9.2% of GDP, suggesting room for efficiency gains, although against the background of targeted investment needs to increase the system’s resilience to future health shocks (OECD, 2023a). Moreover, since 2015, healthcare spending has grown at an average annual rate of 4.2% in real terms, versus 2.5% OECD-wide, resulting in spending overruns (see below). Health spending absorbs around one fifth of total public spending, the OECD’s second-highest share, although this partly reflects Ireland’s peculiarity of including some of the social care components of long-term care expenditure in health spending. At the same time, voluntary private healthcare payment schemes fund 12% of the system’s costs, one of the highest shares in the European Union. Covering about 46% of the population, private health insurance is used to bypass long waiting lists in public hospitals, resulting in a two-tier system in which poorer households’ access to care is restricted, even when fully subsidised. Household out-of-pocket payments account for only 10% of health financing, well below the OECD’s 18%, due to free or subsidised approved prescribed drugs.
As highlighted in the 2022 OECD Economic Survey, high healthcare spending results mainly from the system being largely based on costly hospital care, due to its centralised structure and the lack of universal coverage of primary care, its legacy of past under-investment resulting in relatively out-of-date clinical infrastructure, weak service integration at a decentralised level, and poor digitalisation and data frameworks. The government’s Sláintecare reforms aim at enhancing fairness and efficiency by gradually introducing universal access to primary care and greater separation between public and private service providers and integrating the provision of high-quality primary health and social care services at the community-level to ease pressure on more costly acute care settings (OECD, 2022a).
In 2023, Sláintecare reforms advanced along the equity dimension by abolishing all in-patient hospital charges and extending eligibility for the General Practitioner (GP) Card. Entitling holders to most GP visits for free, the GP Card now also covers individuals with earnings at or below the median income and children aged six or seven, benefiting an additional 500 000 individuals. The GP Card is currently held by around 12% of the population (DOH, 2024), but only less than 10% of the newly eligible adults applied for it, with anecdotal evidence pointing to difficult application processes and stigma as main barriers. Similarly, the share of the population with a Medical Card, which provides means-tested access to largely free care, fell from 37% in 2015 to 30% in 2022. A review of eligibility requirements is exploring policy options to enable broader access to care (Government of Ireland, 2024a). These should include measures to streamline and harmonise eligibility criteria across all publicly-funded health schemes, as recommended in the 2022 OECD Economic Survey. The new public-only consultant contracts and increased resources to reduce long waiting lists are also crucial steps towards a more equitable health system.
Implementation of the Health Regions, which will enable a move away from hospital-centred care, is ongoing. The Health Service Executive (HSE) has completed the restructuring of its highly centralised governance to establish six new regional administrative units, which, overseen by the HSE’s centre, are set to be operational by March 2025. Each local unit, headed by an executive officer accountable to the HSE Board, will manage its own budget to plan and deliver more efficient care services through cost-effective, patient-centred, and integrated primary, community and long-term care services, and a stronger gatekeeping role for GPs. However, key corporate functions, such as finance control, human resources, and information technology support, will remain centralised, and regional units will have to adhere to national priorities set by HSE’s annual National Service Plans. By promoting greater hospital specialisation in acute services and facilitating care closer to patients’ homes, enhanced community care is expected to yield significant efficiency and welfare gains.
The adoption of a population-based resourcing allocation (PBRA) approach will be essential for enhancing healthcare spending efficiency. PBRA allocate healthcare resources based on national priorities and the specific needs of varying population profiles, rather than on requests from different categories of providers (OECD, 2022a). This approach paves the way for better governance frameworks via improved service planning, transparency and accountability. Therefore, developing a specific PBRA framework should be prioritised, to enable a quick mapping of regional service needs. Given their crucial role in community-level service integration, addressing the relative shortage of general practitioners is critical, particularly in rural areas, since about one third are older than 55 (Medical Council, 2024).
Moving towards more efficient and equitable healthcare service delivery hinges on an advanced digital and data infrastructure. Ireland’s level of digital health readiness is relatively poor (OECD, 2023b), lacking both the analytical capacity to link and use health data across critical domains and effective dataset governance (Figure 1.12). Key national healthcare datasets are in the custody of different institutions with uncoordinated patient identification systems (Oderkirk, 2021). Over the years, progress in linking health data nationally using an individual healthcare identifier has been modest. Integrating datasets within adequately securitised frameworks is essential to protect patients’ privacy, match health service utilisation and costs to specific population characteristics, and enable effective use of PBRA for better service planning. Furthermore, greater data granularity would enhance budget oversight and strengthen the government’s Health System Performance Assessment framework, allowing for flexible, evidence-based decision making without locking health regions into rigid, common performance patterns.
The recent Digital Health Framework for Ireland could boost health sector productivity. With a roadmap to 2030, it aims to harness data and digital technology to enable better access to quality health and social care while generating efficiency gains (Government of Ireland, 2024b). A new patient application, to be launched in 2025, will give users easier access to and control over their own health data, and digital solutions, including e-consultations, remote monitoring, and preventive care services. This will give patients a more central role in managing their healthcare and reduce associated costs, particularly for mobility-constrained patients or those living in rural hinterlands. Tailored support programmes are needed to ensure that patients with limited digital skills, frequently seniors, can access the same care options.
Note: Panel A: ability to access and link datasets in healthcare. Panel B: score calculated as a sum of proportions of national healthcare datasets with recommended governance elements. Higher score corresponds to a better outcome.
Source: OECD, Health at a Glance 2023.
The framework also aims for the full digitalisation of health care records by 2026 and the deployment of Electronic Health Records systems across the new regions by 2029-30 (HSE, 2024). Once operational, these tools will enable more affordable care provision, thanks to reduced administrative costs and improved service planning, and better patient safety. Similarly, the planned integration of financial management, staff and payroll records, and estate management systems at a national level will foster real-time insight into the functioning of the health system, reducing the potential for budgetary overruns (see below). Substantial funding will be necessary to fulfil the ambitious roadmap, including the implementation of robust data privacy and security measures. The costing of these investments, which has not yet been properly quantified, should be prioritised to ensure adequate multi-year funding allocations for investment certainty. The Health Information Bill, published in July 2024, will establish the legal framework for implementation. The system will build on the Personal Public Service Number, in use by individuals in their interactions with public service and welfare agencies since 1979, as the primary health identifier linking personal medical information to patients every time they access healthcare in a public or private setting. Speeding up its implementation will be key to deliver efficiency gains.
The government will appoint two new bodies, the Digital Health Authority (DHA) and the Health Data Access Body (HDAB), to oversee the primary and secondary use of individualised health data, respectively. DHA will monitor that strong identification processes are in place to preserve patient safety, while HDAB will implement stringent and transparent protocols enabling researchers and policy-makers access to properly de-identified datasets for analysis and service oversight purposes. Provided these bodies are independent and adequately resourced to maintain high levels of privacy and data security, the new governance framework could generate efficiency gains and enhance innovation diffusion supporting greater productivity or new ways to deliver healthcare services in the long term.
There is room to improve the medium-term resilience of the tax revenue structure
Tax pressures measured by the tax-to-GDP ratio is 20.9%, below the OECD average of 34%, but the tax-to-GNI* ratio stands at 38%. Several tax measures were introduced in recent years, including changes to the local property tax, the introduction of vacant home and residential zoned land taxes (Chapter 4) and a sugar tax. The schedule of multi-annual increases in carbon tax rates out to 2030 as legislated in Finance Act 2020 (Chapter 3) is also on track.
A relatively narrow tax base (IMF, 2024a; Commission on Taxation and Welfare, 2022; EC, 2024b) and a high reliance on corporate and personal income tax revenues from multinationals implies a vulnerability to economic shocks (Department of Finance, 2023). Hence, building a more resilient revenue structure is needed to ensure diverse and stable revenue sources to finance spending priorities in the medium term. Broadening the tax base could include personal income and value-added tax reforms (discussed below), higher property taxes (Chapter 4) and other taxes, as recommended by the Commission of Taxation and Welfare’s 2022 report (Box 1.2). The Irish Fiscal Advisory Council has estimated that, based on the proposals of the Commission they are able to quantify, tax revenues as a share of GNI* could increase by 5.3 percentage points (Casey, 2022; IFAC, 2022). The report has led to a personal tax reform review (Department of Finance, 2023) and an ongoing review of the taxation of investment funds.
The Commission on Taxation and Welfare published its report on taxation and welfare reforms to meet Ireland’s long-term needs in September 2022. One of the key messages is that although the existing systems perform well, substantial reforms will be needed to meet future fiscal sustainability challenges, which could be addressed via the broadening of the tax base through reforms to value-added, property and environmental taxes and to the pay-related social insurance system. The Commission’s recommendations include a reform of the pay-related social insurance base to bring more people into the system and basing income taxes and universal social charges on incomes; increases in capital gains, excise and land and property taxes; taxing of fossil fuels in relation to their carbon emissions; the introduction of road user charges; modernisation of the VAT administration and increasing its yield; and reforms to incentivise savings for retirement and decrease the use of tax expenditures.
Source: Commission on Taxation and Welfare (2022), Foundations for the Future.
Although the personal tax system is highly progressive, the exclusion of a large number of individuals should be reconsidered to broaden the tax base. With the top 20% of taxpayers accounting for about 80% of the 2024 projected personal income tax yield, the tax system is among the OECD’s most progressive (Department of Finance, 2024d). Due to a complex, and relatively generous system of tax credits and reliefs, around one-third of income earners do not pay personal income tax (PIT) or the universal social charge (USC). In 2023, 37% of taxpayers were exempt from USC (Revenue, 2023), reflecting the reduction of USC rates and increases in the entry threshold over the past few years, despite the tax’s original purpose to broaden the income tax base.
For any given revenue target, the flipside of the narrow tax base is the need to apply higher marginal rates relatively low in the income distribution (Figure 1.13, Panel A). Among the more vulnerable groups of taxpayers, this may result in “cliff edges” already at 60-80% of the average wage (OECD, 2024), where tax liabilities jump or benefit entitlements fall when income exceeds a certain level, creating strong disincentives to work more. Such adverse participation threshold effects, which, for instance, arise when earnings surpass the liability threshold for pay-related sociaI insurance (at EUR 352 per week) and the USC (at EUR 13 000 per year), should be removed (Doolan and Keane, 2023; Commission on Taxation and Welfare, 2022). Broadening the tax base would also contribute to making the tax system less vulnerable to sector- or firm-specific risks, with 40% of personal income tax receipts linked to salaries paid by multinationals (Panel B).
Note: Panel B: The ‘Other’ includes taxes paid by public sector employees and the self-employed. USC is the universal social charge.
Source: OECD Taxing Wages (database); Department of Finance.
If designed well, reforms to PIT and USC can yield significant revenues while maintaining the high progressivity of the Irish tax and transfer system (Kakoulidou and Roantree, 2021). One option to consider is to introduce intermediate PIT bands and rates and calibrating the tax rates to preserve progressiveness (when combined with means-tested cash transfers for low-income households), while reducing disincentives to work more, as recommended in the 2022 OECD Economic Survey. Another option is to reform the pay-related social insurance system or tax exemptions, as recommended by the Commission on Taxation and Welfare. Recent official simulations suggest that increasing the standard rate band by EUR 10 000 would be less administratively costly than introducing a 30% intermediate rate of income tax between the current 20% and 40% standard and top ones (Department of Finance, 2023). Over 2021-24, on the back of sustained inflationary pressures, the government gradually lifted the standard rate income tax bands by a maximum of 19%, against a 13.6% increase in the value of main personal tax credits (Department of Finance, 2024d). Whatever option is considered for a reform, advance identification and communication of the target threshold, as well as of the steps to implement it (in case of a gradual adjustment path), rather than annually reconsidering the tax bands during the budget process, would help enhance the system’s transparency.
Ireland has a relatively low standard value-added tax (VAT) revenue ratio, the ratio between the actual VAT revenue collected and the revenue that would theoretically be raised if VAT was applied at the standard rate to all final consumption under full VAT compliance (OECD, 2022b; Figure 1.14). Indeed, while the standard VAT rate is the fourth highest in the EU at 23%, reduced rates of 0% (e.g., on food, water, books, and children’s clothes), and 13.5% and 9% (e.g., on heating oil and solid fuels, construction, many hospitality and tourism-related services) are widespread. Increasing the reduced rates of 9% and 13.5% by one percentage point could yield additional revenues of EUR 64 million and EUR 519 million per year, respectively (Department of Finance, 2024e).
Source: OECD, Global Revenue Statistics; OECD, National Accounts.
As highlighted in the 2020 OECD Economic Survey and recommended by the Commission on Taxation and Welfare, the VAT base should be broadened to increase its yield by merging the existing special reduced rates and increasing them incrementally over time. As a starting point, those that disproportionately benefit higher income deciles (such as those applicable to hospitality and tourism) could be gradually aligned to the standard rate. Increased rates on necessities, however, would have adverse consequences for low-income households (Kakoulidou and Roantree, 2021). Hence, part of the revenues from the reform should be used for targeted transfers to low-income households.
Fiscal and structural reforms can help improve debt sustainability
Public debt is projected to rise to 85% of GNI* by 2050 under current policies (Figure 1.15), taking into account some of the quantifiable costs discussed above, which would decrease to 79% under a higher immigration scenario. As a small open economy subject to shocks, Ireland can face abrupt changes in its debt position, calling for fiscal prudence. To wit, the public-debt-to-GDP ratio soared from 24% in 2007 to 119% in 2012. Some of the fiscal reforms discussed above would imply a debt-to-GNI* ratio of around 55% by 2050, although any estimates of spending efficiency gains are subject to uncertainty. A more optimistic scenario, which also assumes the implementation of some growth-enhancing structural reforms outlined in Box 1.3, would bring down the debt-to-GNI* ratio to slightly above 40%.
General gross government debt
Note: The “current policies” scenario assumes existing tax and spending policies and takes into account ageing-costs from EU (2024a), Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States, 2022-2070. In line with Department of Finance (2024), Annual Report on Public Debt in Ireland 2023, it is assumed that the windfall tax revenues fully unwind by 2030 and transfers to the new funds are made as planned. The “fiscal reform” scenario assumes the implementation of fiscal recommendations of the Survey to gradually broaden the tax base, link the pension age to life expectancy and improving health and long-term care spending efficiency. The “fiscal and structural reforms” scenario assumes higher real GDP growth of 0.1 percentage point each year compared to the baseline due to structural reforms.
Source: OECD calculations based on OECD, Economic Outlook 115 and long-term model databases.
Table 1.5 broadly illustrates the growth impact of some key structural reforms proposed in this Survey. The fiscal impacts presented in Table 1.6 do not take into account indirect effects, such as those induced by the positive impact of the reforms on growth and public revenues, and the impact of some recommendations is not quantifiable.
Note: These estimates are illustrative. The impact on the level of GDP per capita is estimated using historical relationships between reforms and growth in OECD countries. The long-term effect refers to 2050.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD Long-term Model.
Note: The estimated impact of improved spending efficiency is subject to particularly large uncertainty.
Source: OECD calculations.
The fiscal framework should be further enhanced
The Irish fiscal framework includes EU rules, a 2013 medium-term expenditure framework, with three-year government and ministerial expenditure ceilings, and a domestic expenditure rule introduced in 2021. The Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, established in 2012, plays an important role in bringing visibility and transparency of both short and long-run fiscal issues, and performs well by international standards (Nicol et al., 2021). With a budget surplus and public debt below 60% of GDP, the new EU rules are not currently a binding constraint for Ireland. Hence, a more binding and credible domestic framework with stronger political anchoring is essential to complement the new EU fiscal rules and to ensure medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability.
The domestic spending rule, limiting permanent spending increases to 5% per annum (broadly the sum of trend growth of an underlying measure of economic activity assumed to be 3% and the 2% inflation target) net of tax policy changes over the medium term, is welcome. However, it has been systematically breached since its introduction. According to the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, Budget 2025 implies a net spending increase of 9.2% in 2024 and 5.8% for 2025 (IFAC, 2024a). Repeated breaches undermine its aim to lower the procyclicality of fiscal policy. Simulations suggest that higher expenditure growth above the rule since 2022 added 2.1% and 0.5 percentage points per annum on average to domestic demand and inflation, respectively (CBI, 2024c). Especially in a context of rising capital investment needs to address high population growth and infrastructure gaps, controlling current expenditure will be key not to breach the expenditure rule. As per EU rules, Ireland set a medium-term net expenditure path in October, but it does not yet include revenues from the Court of Justice of the European Union decision and sales of Allied Irish bank shares (around EUR 17 billion), which are likely be used for infrastructure investment spending (Government of Ireland, 2024c).
The Fiscal Council recommends that the domestic rule be reinforced, for example by reviewing the level every five years, giving it legislative status, extending its coverage to a general government basis (as it is currently based on exchequer spending, excluding around one-fifth of spending) and linking it to the debt ratio (Casey and Cronin, 2023; IFAC, 2024b). For example, giving it legislative status, as recommended in the 2022 OECD Economic Survey, accompanied by well-defined escape clauses, could improve its credibility. The Swiss spending rule is in the constitution and includes exemption clauses for natural disasters or severe recessions. In Ireland, clear escape clauses linked to periods of an exceptional deterioration in economic prospects impacting the public finances, to be monitored by the Fiscal Council, could provide flexibility, if the rule is legislated.
Improved spending efficiency, budgeting and management is a priority. Current expenditure overruns, calculated as the difference between the outturn and budgeted gross current expenditures, have risen in some areas, such as health (IFAC, 2024b; Figure 1.16). EUR 3.7 billion of the increase in spending in Budget 2025 was due to overruns compared to Budget 2024 (IFAC, 2024a). Repeated, sizeable spending overruns can negate the efforts to enhance the credibility of the spending rule and ensure the sustainability of public finances. In addition, financing of regular health spending overruns in the past has reduced incentives to adhere to formally tight ceilings. Unrealistic budget allocations that do not fully account for actual expenditure needs, partly due to poor planning and a lack of adequate modelling, contribute to overruns. In the health sector, for example, higher reliance on more costly agency staff, amidst ongoing challenges in the recruitment and retention of permanent staff, has contributed to larger than planned spending. Recent reforms, such as the establishment of the Health Budget Oversight Group and an improved use of performance budgeting, are welcome. Such efforts to move towards more credible ceilings should be prioritised to increase spending efficiency.
Cumulative monthly health spending overruns
Note: Data for 2020-22 are not shown due to the pandemic. Data for July to December 2023 reflect the transfer of the “Disability” function from the Department of Health to the Department of Children.
Source: Irish Fiscal Advisory Council.
Spending reviews, including ex-ante evaluations of proposed policies, are an important tool to prioritise and control government expenditure, boost public sector productivity and better align public inputs with outputs. Initial spending reviews in Ireland (2009-17) were comprehensive, focusing on deficit reduction. They were subsequently replaced by annual ones on specific areas to improve the allocation of public expenditure and broader policy evaluation (Reidy and Oyewole, 2020). The Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service, established in 2012 as the main responsible body, has increased its collaboration with line ministries over time. While annual reviews are useful, Ireland should also undertake a comprehensive spending review. Comprehensive spending reviews are used in the preparation of a new medium-term expenditure framework in the United Kingdom and before a parliamentary election in the Netherlands (Box 1.4). Spending reviews should also be systematically integrated into budgetary cycles. Currently, the Irish spending reviews are linked to the budget cycle in terms of scheduling, as publication in July can feed into the Autumn Budget. The Budget sometimes includes a discussion of some of the findings of spending reviews, but the exact link between findings and budget decisions is not clear. Strengthening these links would improve the transparency of the process and the overall budget framework.
The Future Ireland Fund (FIF) and the Infrastructure, Climate and Nature Fund (ICNF), established in July 2024 to save part of the estimated windfall corporate tax revenues, have strengthened the fiscal framework (Oireachtas, 2024). The FIF and ICNF received initial endowments of EUR 4.3 billion and EUR 2 billion, respectively, from the dissolution of the National Reserve Fund. The FIF, a long-term savings vehicle to help meet future spending on ageing, climate and digitalisation, was allocated an additional EUR 4.1 billion in 2024, which will be followed by annual allocations of 0.8% of GDP until 2035. The ICNF, which aims to ensure continued funding of climate change investment, with a potential to use the funds in a downturn, will have a fixed EUR 2 billion annual allocation to reach EUR 14 billion by 2030. Taking into account annual contributions, growth in GDP and potential return in investment, which are assumed to be around 5% per year, the FIF is projected to reach EUR 100 billion by 2040.
Spending reviews can help prioritise and control government expenditure. Despite their growing popularity, spending review outcomes are not always clear, highlighting the importance of better tracking of implementation and effectiveness. Drawing on the experience of OECD countries, Tryggvadottir (2022) identifies the following features as best practices: setting out clear objectives, scope and clear governance arrangements, ensuring integration with the budget process, implementing the recommendations in an accountable and transparent manner, full transparency and regular updates of the review framework.
There are two models of spending reviews: targeted annual reviews focusing on specific topics, and periodic comprehensive reviews, which are not constrained by an ex-ante list of topics. In the Netherlands, spending reviews are conducted both annually and periodically. The Ministry of Finance selects topics for the annual reviews, ranging from ministry-specific (e.g., healthcare innovation) to interdepartmental (e.g., social housing) or government-wide (e.g., subsidies). Prior to each electoral term, the Netherlands also conducts comprehensive reviews, which examine a broader share of the budget and cover substantial policy topics across major areas of spending. In the United Kingdom, spending reviews normally take place every two to four years, as part of the budget process and are linked to the mid-term fiscal strategy.
Source: Tryggvadottir (2022) and UK National Audit Office (2021).
The set-up details of the funds are broadly in line with international standards. The funds will be operated by the National Treasury Management Agency to maximise financial returns and can invest in both domestic and foreign assets. Withdrawals from the FIF are not permitted until 2041, while the ICNF can potentially be drawn down from 2026. There are provisions to lower or suspend payments in case of a deterioration in the economic or fiscal situation. Around half of the estimated windfall corporate tax receipts have been put in the funds, but it would have been more prudent to put all (IFAC, 2024b). Payments above those legislated are possible on the advice of the Minister of Finance and approval of Parliament, but linking them more directly to the size of windfall corporate tax receipts, which are nevertheless difficult to calculate, could be considered.
It will be important to ensure that the operational rules of the funds are consistent with Ireland’s fiscal framework. International evidence suggests that a lack of coordination could have unintended consequences, such as fragmentation of public spending (e.g., appearance of parallel budgets), or poorly timed saving-investment decisions (IMF, 2023b). Transparency and clear accountability procedures are also key. Some countries have similar funds fully integrated in the budget. For example, the net allocation of one of Norway’s funds is integrated to the budgetary process, with income to and from the fund flowing directly though the central government budget. In addition, some features of the funds, especially the ICNF, are similar to the existing Ireland Strategic Investment Fund, which has the mandate to invest in climate and housing, so overlaps should be avoided. The links between the ICNF, the current and forthcoming spending rules and the National Development Plan (the framework to plan long-term capital needs) have to be carefully outlined to ensure a coherent fiscal framework, with a binding anchor.
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