France needs to accelerate efforts to meet its ambitious mitigation targets. To this end, it is essential to use the full range of economic instruments and increase the predictability and stability of climate policies. In particular, it is important to further align carbon prices across sectors and fuel sources, and tax polluting activities in line with their environmental impact. Such measures would raise government revenues for green investment, including targeted support for economic actors with limited financial capacity. Refocusing renovation grants on measures delivering the greatest energy efficiency gains and on low-income households, and further promoting support for low-interest loans, would also encourage investment. The national adaptation plan is welcome, but its financing arrangements are not fully specified. Even if global mitigation progresses, France faces several climate-related risks. Greater technical assistance from public operators and sharing of technical capacity would help local authorities implement adaptation strategies.
OECD Economic Surveys: France 2026
Abstract
Green policies need to be stepped up for France to stay on track with its ambitious decarbonisation goals. Emissions fell by around 3% on average each year between 2018 and 2024 but these reductions will need to accelerate to around 5% on average each year between 2025 and 2030 to meet the 2030 targets (Figure 3.1). Instead, emission reductions have slowed, with estimated declines of under 2% in 2024 and 2025.
Additional and effective mitigation efforts are needed rapidly if the country is to meet its 2030 targets. To achieve the required mitigation efforts within political and fiscal constraints and given long lead times for new policies, tightening existing policy measures is key. This includes making use of the full range of economic instruments by boosting policy effectiveness, in part through greater predictability of climate policies, and strengthening price incentives, such as carbon pricing. Revenues could also be used to provide targeted support to economic actors with limited financial capacity, in particular low-asset and low-income households. This support would help address budget constraints, support investments that would otherwise be unprofitable, and enhance political acceptability. An orderly transition with well-planned and targeted public policies could also help avoid a scenario of volatility in GDP and inflation in the short term and support productivity (Banque de France, 2023[1]).
Greenhouse gas emissions by sector, historical and targets
Note: The targets show those in the Third National Low-Carbon Strategy (Stratégie Nationale Bas-Carbone 3, SNBC3), which are provisional until passed by decree. The path between 2024 and 2030, and between 2030 and 2050 is assumed as linear. Technological carbon sinks are technologies designed to permanently store carbon removed from the atmosphere.
Source: Citepa (2025), Inventaire national d'émissions de gaz à effet de serre et de polluants atmosphériques (format Secten); Draft Stratégie Nationale Bas-Carbone 3; and OECD calculations.
France faces growing climate hazards, including heat stress, flooding, and forest fires. The third national adaptation plan was published in 2025. The plan consists of 200 wide-ranging actions that aim to improve information on risks and to foster adaptation, notably through private action and cost-effective measures. The plan is organised around a reference warming pathway for climate adaptation, which serves as a framework for the plan but, more broadly, informs all public policies aimed at a wider adaptation of people’s lifestyles. However, as adaptation policies partly depend on detailed climate risk maps that will be released in the coming years and future technological innovations, some policy details, notably the cost of measures, remain to be defined.
The first section of this chapter provides an update on OECD recommendations from the 2024 and 2021 Economic Surveys regarding mitigation objectives. It highlights key policies to trigger the green investment needed, with a particular focus on the transport and residential sectors. The second section discusses key challenges in adapting to climate change, notably on how to foster the sustainability of the Natural Catastrophe Compensation regime, and how to enhance some key sectoral policies for adaptation, such as housing and forestry.
3.2.1. Boosting the effectiveness and predictability of climate policies
France’s climate action and stringency have been increasing over the past decade and are above the OECD and EU averages, although increases have slowed (Figure 3.2). Climate policies include a greater share of market-based instruments to reduce emissions compared to the OECD average. France has also made some progress on previous OECD policy recommendations (Table 3.1).
Climate policy action
Stringency score from 0 (no action) to 10 (strong action)
Note: Policy stringency is defined as the degree to which policies incentivise emission reductions. High stringency values indicate that the policy in each year was more stringent compared to all other countries and years and not necessarily that the policy is sufficient to meet mitigation goals. OECD and EU are non-weighted averages. The OECD average excludes the United States, and the EU average excludes Cyprus. Climate policy action is measured as the average of policy stringency across all building blocks (sectoral, cross-sectoral, and international policies).
Source: OECD Climate actions and policies measurement framework database, https://oe.cd/dx/capmf.
Delays have stalled the approval of revised climate targets. France’s Energy and Climate Strategy is still not yet legally binding due to the delays in passing the Energy and Climate Budget Law. The three pillars of the Strategy – the third National Low-Carbon Strategy, the Multi-year Energy Plan, and the third National Adaptation Plan, have all faced delays, postponing the development of sectoral and regional implementation plans. All were first released for public consultation at the end of 2024, while only two of the three have been finalised and published: the National Adaptation Plan in March 2025 and the Multi-year Energy plan in February 2026. Delays have raised policy uncertainty, which can weaken incentives to invest in green assets (Berestycki et al., 2022[2]). Swift publication and adoption of the third National Low-Carbon Strategy is essential.
Rapid and worrying changes in the design of climate policies also risk heightening uncertainty and weakening France’s climate strategy. For example, support for building renovations was temporarily suspended, initially in mid-2025 for deep renovations only and subsequently in early 2026 for all renovation support pending the adoption of the 2026 Budget. This instability can also be observed in other environmental policies. For example, a legislative proposal could abolish the Low-Emission Zones (Zones à Faible Émissions) and modify the Zero Net Artificialisation (Zéro Artificialisation Nette) objective to exempt industrial projects and housing for a five-year period. Providing greater certainty in support measures while strengthening ambition will further incentivise private action.
Uncertainty in climate policies and its impact on electrification is also creating uncertainty for investment in low-carbon energy. Decarbonisation and greater energy security will partly rely on electrification. France currently has excess electricity supply, supporting electrification (RTE, 2025[3]), and presenting an opportunity to accelerate electrification policies. However, in the longer term, the uncertainty in future electricity demand complicates planning. Greater policy certainty would help guide investment in low-carbon energy needed for the transition and accelerate the electrification of the economy, supporting electricity demand and avoiding a structural surplus in electricity generation. Electrification will need to be coordinated with other European countries, in particular by facilitating cross-border interconnections.
Stronger evaluation of green policies could enhance policy continuity and effectiveness. France is yet to fully integrate systematic evaluation in its development and steering of climate policies (HCC, 2025[4]). Evaluation is often not feasible or underused as a monitoring tool (CESE, 2025[5]). France reinforced its evaluation of public policies in 2025, including by requiring ministries to integrate environmental and climate considerations more consistently into impact studies. However, systematically integrating evaluation into a policy’s development from the outset and providing sufficient resources will also help identify and guide the most effective policies at minimal cost (HCC, 2025[4]).
3.2.2. Efficiently meeting green investment needs
Climate investment needs are sizeable at the same time as the government faces fiscal consolidation pressures (see Chapter 1), reinforcing the need for efficient policies and private action. Annual low-carbon investments to meet greenhouse gas objectives needs to double between 2024 and 2030 in order to meet climate objectives. This translates to an increase in annual investments of EUR 82 billion per year compared to 2024, or around 2.5% of GDP of additional investment, as outlined in the Multi-year strategy for financing the ecological transition and national energy policy (SPAFTE). Direct public sector investment is projected to increase by EUR 13 billion or 0.4% of GDP, not including the state’s contribution to financing the transition of households or businesses.
Policies that create a greater role for the private sector, including through higher carbon prices (see below), could reduce the public share of additional spending from around 60% to 20% (I4CE, 2025[6]). This would help target public support for investments that are not profitable and limit public costs (France Stratégie, 2024[7]). Some green investments required to attain the 2030 emission objectives are economically profitable and ensuring that the government does not provide subsidies for these will reduce public expenses.
However, for many of these economically profitable actions, actors do not have the capacity to undertake them, including due to limited financial capacity, knowledge, or information (SGPE, 2024[8]). Helping households and firms overcome these barriers with low-cost support, such as guarantees, repayable advances, preferential-rate loans, information, or support would support green investment at low public cost (SGPE, 2024[8]). Although highly dependent on the price of carbon and current regulations, other actions, notably in transport and energy-efficient building renovations, are not always profitable without targeted public support (see Section 3.2.4).
3.2.3. Increasing price incentives to reduce emissions while raising revenues
Aligning the cost of polluting activities with their environmental impacts could help further reduce emissions in a cost-effective manner while raising revenues for the green transition (D’Arcangelo et al., 2022[9]; 2022[10]). Such revenues could play a key role in funding the 0.4% increase in public green investment needed by 2030 and make the transition more viable for public finances (Seghini and Dees, 2025[11]) (see Chapter 1). Using at least part of the revenues to extend investment and social policies that target support to low-income or vulnerable households can help offset the potential regressive impact of such mitigation policies and support political acceptability (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022[12]).
Fiscal spending on support measures for fossil fuels was estimated at 0.3% of GDP in 2024, below the OECD and EU averages of 0.7% of GDP, based on information in official documentation (OECD, 2025[13]). Support measures included 0.1% of GDP for each of the residential and transport sectors. Accelerating the phase-out of these fossil fuel subsidies, including reduced rates and tax exemptions, would increase financing for the transition, incentives for mitigation efforts, and the alignment of incentives across economic sectors. Congestion pricing can also raise revenues, which could help fund public transport infrastructure, while reducing car use and addressing externalities from road transport (see below).
France’s average net effective carbon prices are below rates in many peer economies and would need to increase significantly for France to achieve the 2030 and 2050 emission targets (Figure 3.3) (DG Trésor, 2025[14]). Carbon prices declined significantly in France in 2022 and 2023, reflecting emergency responses to the energy crisis rather than changes in carbon pricing policy (OECD, 2024[15]). In 2024, France’s average net effective carbon rate had returned to around its 2021 level. While cross-country data for 2024 are not yet available, data for 2021 show that France’s average net effective carbon rate was well above the OECD average, but lower than in several European countries. As a first step, increasing carbon prices to at least around EUR 85 (USD 100) in non-ETS1 sectors could reduce non-ETS1 emissions by nearly 10% and mobilise revenues of around 0.8% of GDP (Teodoru et al., 2024[16]).
Large disparities in the price of carbon emissions across sectors and users hinder decarbonisation, as discussed in previous Economic Surveys (OECD, 2024[17]; OECD, 2021[18]). Cross-country data excluding energy-crisis measures show that in 2021, carbon prices were above the EU average in road transport and electricity, but below the EU average across other sectors. From 2028, the EU’s ETS2 will cover emissions from fuels used in road transport, buildings, and certain industrial processes not yet covered, establishing a uniform carbon price in these sectors. The implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the gradual phasing out of free quotas for concerned sectors between 2026 and 2034 will also increase net effective carbon prices. Carbon prices were below the EU average for all energy sources except for fuel oil, diesel, and biofuels in 2021. Raising carbon prices in sectors and energy sources where they are low will provide clearer market signals.
Energy saving certificates (certificats d’économie d'énergie) are a key energy saving policy, requiring energy suppliers to achieve set energy savings or pay a financial penalty. To cost-effectively meet their targets, energy suppliers can finance projects that reduce energy use, such as insulation, efficient heating, or electric vehicles, in exchange for certificates reflecting energy savings. They can also purchase certificates from organisations implementing eligible projects, including local authorities, the National Housing Agency (Anah), social landlords, and some semi-public companies. The scheme spans multiple sectors, including housing, transport, agriculture, and industry, and mobilised around EUR 6 billion annually in 2022-23.
Several factors have been reducing the effectiveness of the scheme. Some evaluations suggest that actual energy savings are only about one third of those reported (HCC, 2025[4]) and that the overall effectiveness of the scheme in reducing emissions is not superior to a public subsidy scheme (CAE, 2024[19]). Administrative management accounts for 20% of the scheme’s costs and around one third of operations audited on site revealed anomalies (Cour des comptes, 2024[20]). These factors need to be weighed against the merits of the scheme. The fact that it directly finances investments that support the energy transition enhances its political acceptability. The scheme is also well placed to support investment in sectors that are typically difficult to access using traditional public policy tools. Reforms enacted in 2025 aim to address the concerns noted above (i.e. Law 2025-594 strengthening sanctioning powers and human resources to investigate cases of fraud, and the PRODICEE programme to enable an objective assessment of actual energy savings). The impact of these reforms and the costs and benefits of the scheme should continue to be followed closely.
Average net effective carbon prices, 2021, current prices
Note: The net effective carbon rate is the net effect of fuel excise taxes, carbon taxes, permit prices and fuel subsidies.
Source: OECD (2026[21]).
3.2.4. Supporting climate change goals in the transport and residential sectors
The transport and buildings sectors generated almost half of emissions in 2024. Their decarbonisation is key in achieving mitigation targets but requires around EUR 66 billion of additional gross investment per year between 2024 and 2030 for these two sectors according to the 2025 Multi-year strategy for the ecological transition and national energy policy (SPAFTE). Given fiscal constraints, this section discusses how to target sector-specific support to increase green investment. Analysis on adapting forests to climate change and reinforcing their role as a climate sink is outlined in Section 3.3.7. Chapter 4 discusses greening industry.
Disincentivising thermal vehicle use
Greater use of pricing tools could increase incentives for green transport while generating government revenues to support investment. Passenger vehicles generated almost one-fifth of total emissions in 2024. Fuel excise tax rates are high compared to other OECD countries (DG Trésor, 2025[14]). However, carbon pricing still represented less than 90% of the negative externalities that cars imposed on society in 2020 (excluding congestion) (DG Trésor, 2025[14]). Gradually expanding the use of distance-based charges will also play a key role in maintaining coverage of negative externalities. Introducing congestion pricing in some urban settings could incentivise the use of public transport and address externalities from road transport more effectively than fuel taxes (van Dender, 2019[22]). Adjusting charges based on the time of day and traffic volumes can help optimise the policy (ITF, 2021[23]). For example, in Norway all major cities use environmentally differentiated rates to discourage urban traffic and reduce congestion. Reasonably priced parking fees can also help to internalise the costs to society associated with road traffic and thus play a similar role to congestion charges (Russo, van Ommeren and Dimitropoulos, 2019[24]). In San Francisco, for example, parking meters adjust their rates according to location, time of day and day of the week, with the aim of maintaining an average occupancy rate of between 60% and 80%. Investing revenues into improving public transport infrastructure can help improve public transport and political acceptability (ITF, 2023[25]). For example, London’s congestion charge funds public transport
There are insufficient price incentives for heavy vehicles to reduce transport emissions, as noted in the 2024 Economic Survey (OECD, 2024[17]). Heavy vehicles generated almost 8% of emissions in 2024. Similar to fuel tax rates, typically used in passenger vehicles, diesel, typically used in heavy vehicles, is taxed at a rate higher than in some OECD countries. However, there is a gap between average effective tax rates between diesel and gasoline due to a refund for diesel used by heavy vehicles. This is even though CO2 emissions per litre of diesel are higher than for fuel. Reducing this gap, estimated at a public cost of EUR 1.2 billion in 2026, could be a source of funding for green investment. The 2021 Climate and Resilience Law (loi climat et résilience) states that these tax exemptions will end by 2030. No increase is currently planned, although the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) 2 will price CO2 emissions in road transport from 2028 and increase prices.
Source: IEA (2026[26]); OECD Analytical database; and OECD calculations.
The uptake of passenger electric vehicles (EVs) was unchanged at 19.6% of new cars in 2025, far below the target of 66% by 2030. Uptake is around the OECD and EU averages (Figure 3.4, Panel A). Support measures for EVs were narrowed over 2024, then re-adjusted in mid-2025. While in 2025 low-income households received greater support, reallocating universal support to measures targeted to low-income households would boost policy efficiency. Increasing policy certainty in support for electric cars could also support uptake. In the second round of the government-funded social leasing measure, 50 000 EVs were leased to low-income households that drive at least 8 000 km per year for professional reasons at a reduced rate between September 2025 and January 2026. An evaluation will be key to determine the cost effectiveness of the policy. Subject to being assessed, the programme could be a viable option until the second-hand electric vehicle market reaches a sufficient size (France Stratégie, 2024[27]). Faster electrification of commercial fleets, which account for a large share of new vehicle registrations, would also help develop the second-hand market. While the fiscal and regulatory framework for greening corporate fleets was reinforced in 2025, further strengthening requirements could enhance its impact, for example, requiring a faster increase in the share of new vehicles that must be electric or extending obligations to fleets with fewer than 100 vehicles. The number of electric charging stations is now around the EU average (Panel B). Further expansions are planned. For example, "Charge France", the representative body for the electric charging operator sector, committed to investing EUR 4 billion to expand the national stock of ultra-fast charging points from over 17 000 today to 40 000 by 2028 (IEA, 2025[28]).
Supporting targeted energy-efficiency housing renovations
Attaining emissions objectives for buildings is contingent on energy-efficiency renovations. Progress in reducing emissions generated from buildings in 2024 was limited: the sectors’ emissions increased when adjusted for weather conditions (HCC, 2025[4]). Public action is needed to overcome negative externalities: one estimate suggests that only 5% of housing is profitable for individuals to renovate while 55% is socially profitable when including environmental and health factors (CAE, 2024[19]). France, similar to three out of four countries in a 2024 OECD survey, provides a subsidy or grant to support energy efficiency in buildings (OECD, 2024[29]). The budget for the key energy-efficiency renovation policy, MaPrimeRénov’, was EUR 3.6 billion (0.1% of GDP) in 2026. However, regularly changing rules in 2024/25, alongside concerns around fraud, generated uncertainty and reduced the policy’s effectiveness. Maintaining public support for energy-efficiency renovations and increasing policy transparency through multi-annual budgets will support planning and policy effectiveness (CAE, 2024[19]; SGPE, 2024[8]).
Given fiscal constraints, further prioritising financial support to houses heated by fossil fuels and with the lowest energy performance and investments that would not be undertaken otherwise would maximise emission reductions. In December 2025, France adjusted its draft third National Low-Carbon Strategy to increase its ambitions for switching to low-carbon heating systems, notably heat pumps, which can be implemented faster and at lower upfront cost. Alongside this, France reduced its ambitions for deep renovations to 250 000 per year by 2030, although achieving the 2050 objectives will still require a large number of deep renovations. Continuing to increase data on the effectiveness of measures and the energy performance of buildings will be key to help guide this prioritisation (CAE, 2024[19]; HCC, 2025[4]). In 2025, 62% of support for single actions and 80% of support for deep measures went to very modest or modest households (Anah, 2026[30]). High-income households received no support for single actions but 9% of support for deep renovations. Increasingly targeting support to those with the largest financial constraints would support efficiency. Redirecting the reduced value-added tax rate of 5.5% on energy renovations towards targeted renovation measures would also help boost policy efficiency. The programme is estimated to cost public finances EUR 2.1 billion in 2026.
France could increase its use of low-interest loans to address some financial constraints that limit households from investing while lessening the financial strain on public investment. Removing investment barriers is estimated to increase the share of housing that is profitable for households to renovate from 5% to 26% (CAE, 2024[19]). France is one of around half of countries that offer low-interest loans to support energy-efficiency investments in buildings in a 2024 OECD survey (OECD, 2024[29]). France has recently simplified its interest-free eco-loan programme (éco-prêt à taux zéro) and increased the limit to EUR 50 000, which has an estimated fiscal cost of EUR 255 million in 2026. However, there remains scope to further use public funds to lower commercial interest rates or provide loan guarantees to mitigate some of the lender’s risks, particularly for low-income households. For example, Germany has a long tradition in supporting energy-efficient renovations through low-interest loans, with a current limit of up to EUR 150 000 (OECD, 2023[31]). In Japan, the elderly can benefit from monthly interest-only payments, with the principal repaid upon the borrower’s death (OECD, 2024[29]). The Netherlands’ National Heat Fund provides interest-free loans for households with gross income below EUR 60 000 (OECD, 2025[32]).
Greater controls would help boost policy effectiveness. The “Recognised as Environmentally Responsible” label (Reconnu Garant de l’Environnement), required by companies and craftsmen working on renovation projects that receive public support, is being simplified and should support the quality of projects. Stricter ex-post controls and their management through a public service could strengthen accountability and quality incentives (CAE, 2024[19]).
3.3.1. Climate-related risks are varied and increasing, raising public and private costs
Owing to its diverse geography, France is exposed to a wide range of climate hazards, which are likely to intensify as temperatures rise and exposure to drought, fires and flooding increases. The average surface temperature had increased by 1.2 degrees Celsius (°C) in 2020-24 since 1981-2010, above the OECD average (Figure 3.5, Panel A). Intense heat and drought are causing certain clay soils to shrink and swell, weakening housing foundations. Around 60% of existing detached houses are estimated to be located in areas of medium or high risk. Unplanned adaptation to rising temperatures risks leading to inefficient increases in air conditioning use at the expense of passive measures (i.e. sun protection) and low-energy solutions (i.e. fans). This would increase households’ and firms’ energy bills, increase pollution and emissions, and exacerbate urban “heat island” effects through the release of hot air. In addition, better coordination between energy-efficient renovation policies and heatwave adaptation strategies is needed to limit costs. Higher temperatures and drier environments are also increasing the risk of forest fires and wildfires. While some areas in the south already face elevated fire risks, increasing prevention and firefighting capacity will need to expand over the country. The share of built-up area is also more exposed to river flooding than the OECD average (Panel B).
Note: River flood risk is measured using a 10-year return period. A return period is the average or estimated time that a flood event is likely to recur.
Source: OECD-IEA Historical exposure to extreme temperature dataset; and OECD River flooding exposure dataset.
As their frequency and intensity increase, adaptation measures are essential to reduce economic losses linked to extreme weather events. These reached over EUR 2 000 per inhabitant over 1980-2023 and are relatively high compared to other European countries (Figure 3.6), although this partly reflects the high value of assets and insurance coverage. Average annual insured damages for all climate-related risks are expected to increase by 47-85% over 2023 to 2050 solely due to risk, costing on average over EUR 3 billion annually (CCR, 2023[33]). Another estimate incorporating sectoral analysis suggests that the costs of inaction against climate change in France could reach EUR 5 billion per year by 2050 (France Stratégie & OFCE, 2023[34]).
Some low-probability climate-related events could prove extremely costly. For example, the Seine Basin in the Île-de-France region continues to be highly vulnerable to flooding. Given the centralisation of economic activity in Paris, such an event could have significant knock-on impacts. In 2016, a flood that is estimated to occur every 20 years caused over EUR 1 billion in damages (OECD, 2018[35]). For example, flooding similar to that in 1910 is estimated to result in EUR 3-30 billion in direct damages and significant national repercussions (OECD, 2018[35]). The Paris metropolitan region is also increasingly exposed to episodes of drought, with the economic impacts from a major drought in the area estimated to range from EUR 1.4 billion to almost EUR 2.5 billion (OECD, 2025[36]). The consequences of climate change, notably heat stress or droughts on infrastructure, on the functioning of the rail network, nuclear plants, or the electricity network could also prove extremely costly for the country.
Economic losses per capita due to weather- and climate-related extreme events, 1980 to 2024
Note: EU is computed as a simple average. Weather and climate-related extreme events include meteorological events (storms including lightning and hail), hydrological events (floods), and climatological events (heatwaves, wildfires, droughts, cold spells, frost), and not all have a proven link with climate change.
Source: European Environment Agency (www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/economic-losses-from-climate-related).
Note: The increase in heat stress is proxied by the change in the distribution of days across the 25-30°C, 30-35°C, 35-40°C, and over 40°C temperature bins in the average location of each country. Higher temperatures are estimated to have a greater impact on productivity (provided in Table C.19 of Costa et al., (2024[37])). As such, a 2°C increase in temperature affects countries differently depending on the starting distribution of temperatures.
Source: Costa et al., (2024[37]).
Insufficient adaptation measures against climate-related risks could also lower productivity. Labour productivity is estimated to have been reduced by 0.13% due to the increase in heat stress between 2000-2004 and 2017-2021 at the mean location in France, compared to 0.08% on average in the other countries in the sample due to a greater increase in heat stress in France (Costa et al., 2024[37]) (Figure 3.7, Panel A). If existing economic conditions and adaptation remain constant, future labour productivity could fall by almost 0.4% in France from the increase in heat stress associated with a future 2°C increase in temperatures (Panel B). This drop is significant given limited productivity growth in recent years (see Chapter 1).
3.3.2. Defining public adaptation support and better incentivising private resilience
France has been an early adopter of an adaptation framework among OECD countries (OECD, 2024[38]). France was one of the first OECD countries to introduce a national adaptation strategy in 2006. It adopted its first national climate change adaptation plan (Plan national d’adaptation au changement climatique, PNACC) in 2011 and published the third version in 2025. Since 2021, an independent body, the Haut Conseil pour le Climat (High Council for Climate), has identified adaptation gaps and developed recommendations, which occurred in around half of 30 surveyed OECD countries in 2022 (OECD, 2022[39]).
Despite early action, many measures in the national adaptation plan remain to be defined and will depend on forthcoming data and technologies. Detailed climate risk maps to be released in the coming years will support the refinement of policy responses. Rapidly integrating new information into measures under the national adaptation plan, such as adapting transport infrastructure, strengthening the resilience of nuclear, hydroelectric, wind and solar power facilities and the electricity grid, and reinforcing forest fire prevention capacity would help better identify and prioritise investment needs. Working with the insurance sector to strengthen data sharing and awareness of risks could also contribute to further refining investment needs.
Supporting research will help advance adaptation solutions and prevention (OECD, 2024[40]). France is a global leader in climate science, although it ranks slightly lower in the fields of adaptation and mitigation (Cour des comptes, 2024[41]). Research in some adaptation fields appears to be particularly lagging, notably in health, urban planning, and cities. While significant, resources for adaptation research risk being insufficient (Cour des comptes, 2024[41]). Under the national adaptation plan, France will provide some support for research and assess the limitations of existing financing mechanisms, notably France 2030. Increasing resources for research in low-ranked fields and where cost-effective solutions are lacking (i.e. swelling and shrinking of clay soils and flood prevention, see below) could advance cost-effective policies. Better coordination between national and local initiatives, which are progressing in a fragmented manner, would reinforce the efficiency of research spending (Cour des comptes, 2024[41]).
France needs to clarify the scope and level of public support for adaptation and the risks it will cover. Discussions remain at an early stage (Haut-commissariat à la Stratégie et au Plan, 2025[42]). Given that climate-related risks vary widely across regions, clear choices are crucial to avoid deepening regional inequalities. Adaptation policies can better maintain risk signals and create stronger incentives for private actors to invest in resilience, including by addressing market failures, notably externalities, information gaps, and financial constraints, which can limit efficient and timely private-sector action (OECD, 2024[40]). Greater private resilience measures will be key to limit public spending and contingent liabilities. Investments in resilience are generally cost-effective yet under-prioritised, although the extent remains uncertain until there are sufficient information and clear objectives. Public intervention should focus on public goods and coordination, including information measures (i.e. risk mapping and education), regulations (i.e. building codes, zoning rules), disaster risk management (i.e. early-warning systems), and investment in climate resilient infrastructure, such as sea walls or drainage systems (OECD, 2024[40]). Targeted support for adaptation measures for low-income or vulnerable households can also help mitigate distributional disparities (OECD, 2024[40]). Other climate-related risks should be insured privately, supported by policies and regulation that ensure a well-functioning insurance market and broad coverage.
While there is no consolidated assessment of adaptation needs in France, resources will likely need to increase further (I4CE, 2025[43]). Public resources dedicated to adaptation have increased in recent years, although they weakened in 2025 (I4CE, 2025[43]). In addition, current funding to implement the national adaptation plan remains insufficient compared to the estimated needs (HCC, 2025[4]). The national adaptation plan relies mainly on existing funds to finance public measures, notably the Barnier Fund and the Green Fund, which are relatively limited in size, and overall decreased in 2025 and 2026 (Assemblée nationale, 2025[44]) (Box 3.1). Incorporating OECD best practices, fiscal buffers, and budget flexibility into fiscal planning will help France ensure sufficient funding is available to implement the national adaptation plan as measures are defined (OECD, 2024[40]).
The Funds for preventing major natural risks (Fonds de prévention des risques naturels majeurs), or the Barnier Fund, enables local authorities and the state to buy back property at immediate risk or damaged by a major natural disaster. It also provides financing to local authorities and individuals and firms for some prevention measures. The fund’s resources were EUR 225 million in 2024 and EUR 300 million in 2025 and 2026.
The Green Fund (Fonds vert) provides financial support to local authorities for green projects. Its budget has declined from EUR 2.5 billion in 2024, to EUR 1.15 billion in 2025, and EUR 850 million in 2026. In 2025 around 23% prioritised adaptation measures.
Introducing earmarked taxation, user charges, or land value capture instruments could represent sources of financing for public goods (OECD, 2024[40]; 2024[45]; 2022[46]). For example, in Germany, designated areas face an urban renewal measures levy (Städtebauliche Sanierungsmaßnahmen) for measures such as green and open spaces for climate protection and adaptation or infrastructure to reduce pollution and noise (OECD, 2024[40]). Such taxes already exist in some sectors. For example, investments in water resilience are financed through taxes levied by regional water authorities on households and businesses.
3.3.3. Increasing the sustainability of the state-backed natural catastrophe regime, limiting state exposure and increasing incentives for private prevention efforts
Insurance coverage against natural hazards is above the OECD average, with about 55% of all economic losses from natural hazards since 2010 insured (Figure 3.8). Coverage against natural disasters, such as floods, earthquakes, and clay shrinkage and swelling, is automatically included in property insurance at a uniform national surcharge under France’s Natural Catastrophe regime (régime d’indemnisation des catastrophes naturelles, regime, “CatNat”). Insurers can reinsure up to 50% of their policies through a publicly owned and guaranteed reinsurer at a competitive price. The regime helps ensure insurance affordability and accessibility in high-risk areas and a high uptake of insurance coverage. However, the limited risk signals of the scheme and lack of incentives for prevention make it subject to moral hazard. As climate-related risks increase, the regime is facing challenges regarding its financial sustainability (Langreney, Le Cozannet and Merad, 2024[47]; Haut-commissariat à la Stratégie et au Plan, 2025[42]; Cour des comptes, 2026[48]).
Strengthening insufficient prevention efforts will play a key role in containing rising insurance claims and supporting the regime’s sustainability. Since 2021, the fund for the prevention of major natural risks, often known as the Barnier Fund (Box 3.1), has received an allocation from the government, instead of from a levy on the regime’s surcharge. Additionally, the allocation to the Barnier Fund as a share of the regime’s surcharge has declined. Increasing the amount of the Barnier Fund alongside increases in the regime’s surcharge could strengthen the acceptability of such increases and prevention financing (see below).
The Natural Catastrophe regime could provide incentives for adopting climate-proofing measures to lower the cost of coverage (OECD, 2021[49]). Currently, support provided through the Barnier Fund does not cover all natural disasters, notably the swelling and shrinking of clay soils, provides limited types of public support, and only 6% of the Fund supported individuals in 2023. Extending targeted prevention measures, such as giving greater weight to investments in prevention when establishing insurance surcharges or compensation payments for policyholders, could help build a risk-prevention culture and limit rising claim costs.
Insured losses from natural hazards, % of total economic losses, 2010-24
Note: OECD and EU are non-weighted averages.
Source: Swiss Re, sigma database, all rights reserved.
While the Natural Catastrophe regime shields the public from the financial impacts of climate-related shocks and reduces the risks of costly state intervention, the state’s unlimited guarantee of the publicly owned reinsurer leaves it exposed to increasing climate-related risks. A projected increase in claims of 27-62% on average by 2050 (CCR, 2023[33]) will need to be regularly reflected in rising insurance premia. In 2025, the government increased the regime’s surcharge on personal and commercial property from 12% to 20%. Some national estimates suggest that the surcharge rate should increase by 0.2 percentage points per year with a five-year review clause (Langreney, Le Cozannet and Merad, 2024[47]). Implementing regular increases will ensure the long-term financial sustainability of the scheme, and the Cour des comptes also recommends that this take place at least every five years (Cour des comptes, 2026[48]). Stress tests based on less favourable scenarios (slower premium growth, peaks in claims over several consecutive years, etc.) suggest that the state’s guarantee could be drawn on regularly in the medium term, to the tune of approximately EUR 1 billion per year.
Considering moving from the universal national surcharge towards the government gradually introducing some set differentiated surcharges could increase contributions to the regime and better encourage private prevention. France’s regime is based on the pooling of climate risks and solidarity, ensuring protection for all policyholders. However, this also creates a system of cross-subsidisation, where those in lower-risk areas help cover the costs for those in higher-risk areas. More differentiated surcharges based on policyholders’ risks can help lower and target these subsidies. For example, the United Kingdom’s (UK) reinsurance scheme Flood Re, which provides flood insurance to high-risk properties, introduced transparency around cross-subsidisation by funding it through an annual levy of GBP 180 million on insurers offering residential property coverage, allocated on market share. This cross-subsidisation will be phased out through a gradual transition to risk-based pricing by 2039 (OECD, 2021[49]). In the United States (US), National Flood Insurance Program premiums are generally risk-based, although with provisions limiting the cost of insurance for high-risk properties. It will be key that any gradual introduction of some differentiated surcharges also takes into account the solidarity objectives of the scheme. Pricing should continue to ensure that insurance premiums remain affordable, particularly in low-income, higher-risk areas and overseas territories, supporting the high take-up of insurance. Supporting low-income higher-risk households to invest in prevention will also play a key role.
Establishing additional eligibility criteria for coverage could also support the scheme’s sustainability. For example, in the US, National Flood Insurance Program coverage is only available in communities that implement specific floodplain management measures, which provides a means for the federal government to influence local government’s risk management decisions (OECD, 2021[49]). In the United Kingdom, Flood Re’s reinsurance coverage is not available for properties that have been built after 2009, which should encourage new developments to consider the level of flood risk in decisions on location and construction standards.
Limiting coverage can also help reduce the government’s exposure. A number of catastrophe risk insurance programmes across OECD countries apply indemnity limits, either as a limit on the amount of coverage that can be provided to each policyholder (such as EQC in New Zealand, or NFIP in the US) or as a limit on the total payments that can be made to all policyholders in aggregate (NTI in Iceland, Flood Re in the UK), or both in some cases (OECD, 2021[49]). Even where losses exceed policy limits, limited programme coverage may be sufficient to support the financial well-being of affected policyholders while keeping premiums affordable. For example, the main objective of Japan’s basic earthquake insurance policy is to stabilise the livelihoods of those affected by earthquakes, not indemnify against all the losses incurred. While coverage is limited by the amounts defined in the private insurance contract, defining separate limits for the scheme could also help ensure that the scheme is aligned with its objectives. Considering applying a limit on coverage could provide an opportunity for private sector insurers or reinsurers to provide supplemental insurance.
3.3.4. Adapting supervisory toolkits to climate and environmental risks
The financial sector faces growing exposure to climate-related risks (Ruxandra Teodoru, 2024[50]). Financial institutions, through their investments in companies, are exposed to physical risks (the impact of natural disasters) and transition risks (e.g. losses due to the declining value of investments in carbon-intensive companies). Delays in reducing global emissions will expose the financial sector to increasing physical climate-related risks (Banque de France, 2025[51]).
France is among the leading OECD countries in integrating climate-related risks into financial supervision. The Banque de France is deploying a toolkit that includes macroeconomic modelling and detailed risk mapping to more precisely identify physical and financial vulnerabilities (Banque de France, 2025[52]). The authorities conducted pilot climate stress tests in 2020 and a second exercise for insurers took place between 2022 and 2024. The authorities are working to standardise and improve the reliability of these tests to make them a core supervisory tool (Banque de France, 2025[53]). Based on these tests, the authorities could then consider introducing further macroprudential tools linked to exposure to climate vulnerabilities, such as systemic risk buffers (Bartsch et al., 2024[54]). The efforts of the authorities to strengthen their modelling capacity and develop more complex and comprehensive scenarios are welcome (Banque de France, 2025[51]).
The authorities are deepening their understanding of banks’ and insurers’ exposures to climate and environmental risks. In 2023-24 they undertook thematic reviews on how supervised institutions integrate these risks into their strategy, governance, and risk management (Banque de France, 2025[53]). A self-assessment survey of 90 entities helped continue to raise awareness of these issues. However, it also revealed that smaller institutions lag behind, and many are yet to explicitly include climate and environmental risks in their risk appetite frameworks or credit risk exposure assessments (Banque de France, 2025[53]). The authorities should ensure that supervised institutions implement the European Banking Authority (EBA) guidelines on environmental, social and governance (ESG) risk management from 2026, which set out how institutions should identify, measure, manage, and monitor ESG risks.
3.3.5. Supporting local authorities to develop adaptation plans
Local authorities are struggling to develop and implement adaptation strategies due to limited in-house technical and financial capacity. Adaptation strategies are required in territorial climate-air-energy plans (Plans climat-air-énergie territoriaux, PCAET) in inter-municipal cooperation bodies (établissements publics de coopération intercommunale, EPCI) with more than 20 000 inhabitants since 2018. However, for many of these plans, the required human resources and budgets still remain to be specified (Cour des comptes, 2024[41]). In most cases, the assessment of climate-related risks has been superficial and the adaptation strategy component represented a list of measures taken without a breakdown of future steps (Cour des comptes, 2024[41]). In response to these weaknesses, adaptation strategies within territorial climate-air-energy plans are currently being strengthened.
Greater technical capacity and cooperation across local authorities could help address resource constraints. Expanding the role and human resources of inter-municipal cooperation bodies and decreasing those of municipalities could also better group technical resources and support the efficiency of local authorities (see Chapter 1) and their ability to implement adaptation policies. More coordinated local authorities could also help implement adaptation measures, which can transcend local boundaries (see Chapter 1). Pooling expertise across inter-municipal cooperation bodies or through generalising departmental or interdepartmental technical engineering agencies (Woerth, 2024[55]) could support smaller or more remote inter-municipal bodies access skilled resources. The “Mission Adaptation” or “Adaptation Mission” programme, launched in 2025, provides a single point of entry for local authorities to seek assistance, offering project management support, training, assistance in developing adaptation strategies and coordination with other operators. While an important step forward, it has not been matched with increased resources for public operators (I4CE, 2025[43]). Reallocating resources towards the Adaptation Mission will be key to its success.
3.3.6. Adapting housing to heatwaves, weakening foundations and floods
Housing faces risks from heatwaves, floods, and weakening housing foundations. Intense heat and drought cause soil shrinkage and swelling in certain clay soils, with the damage in 2022 estimated to cost 0.1% of GDP (EUR 2.4-2.9 billion). Revised urban planning and building regulations, including the need to consider summer comfort, have raised the resilience of new construction. However, the costs of adapting existing houses cannot yet be estimated due to insufficient data on the houses to be treated. In addition, implementing appropriate preventive measures faces several difficulties. Quantifying and prioritising needs is an important step (OECD, 2024[40]) and many efforts are underway. Swiftly using this information to target housing renovation support and improve local government’s adaptation strategies, which are often superficial (see above), will support policy efficiency.
Accelerating research and development on technical solutions could support cost-effective prevention and reduce insured losses (see above). Currently some prevention measures against clay soil shrinkage and swelling and flooding can be more costly than post-disaster intervention (Cour des comptes, 2024[41]). Several efforts are underway. For example, under the national adaptation plan one project is evaluating technologies promoting summer thermal comfort in buildings. Another experimental fund in pilot départments aims to boost prevention against clay soil shrinkage and swelling and improve knowledge of effective measures through diagnosing vulnerable households and subsidising preventive measures, subject to income conditions. Another project under France 2030 is identifying and supporting innovation practices to combat clay soil shrinkage and swelling. Research could also help clarify the cost effectiveness of “multi-benefit solutions”, i.e. measures that are cost effective when combined with other work, which could be used to adjust targeted renovation support. For example, some analysis already recommends increasing renovation subsidies when flood risk is taken into account (CGEDD, 2017[56]), although there remains debate around concrete and sustainable solutions (Cour des comptes, 2024[41]; 2022[57]). Additional funds could be linked to the surcharge of the Natural Catastrophe regime (see above).
Current housing renovation policies are unlikely to sufficiently improve resilience. While some adaptation measures (i.e. shutters or awnings) have been eligible for support in deep renovations since 2024, uptake remains limited, despite the goal of integrating summer thermal comfort in all deep renovations by 2030. Strengthening incentives for deep renovations (see above) will support both mitigation and adaptation and could help reduce total costs in the case of future renovations. Regularly updating measures eligible for support as research advances would further enhance resilience (OECD, 2024[40]).
3.3.7. Increasing the resilience of forests and reinforcing carbon sinks
Forestry measures hold a large potential to pursue the twin goals of climate policy, increasing carbon storage capacity, while simultaneously reducing exposure and vulnerability to weather-related risks (OECD, 2021[58]). In France, climate change has slowed forests’ growth and increased tree mortality through more droughts, heat waves, and fires, and indirectly impacted forests through parasites and diseases (HCC, 2025[4]). Forests, which represent most of the carbon sink, are estimated to have absorbed 51 MtCO2e (13.6% of France’s total emissions) in 2023, a decline of around one third compared to its maximum level of 75.4 MtCO2e in 2008. However, in 2023 temporary carbon storage in dead wood was estimated to represent around one third of the forest carbon sink. Some of this carbon will be mineralised in the soil and the remainder will be released into the atmosphere as CO2, which could affect the achievement of future absorption targets.
Strengthening the carbon sink requires immediate action. Swiftly establishing the national strategy for adapting forests to climate change is crucial to implement climate-resilient measures, strengthen environmental requirements, such as the diversification and selection of tree species that are more resistant to climate change, and ensure the long-term continuity of the forest renewal fund. Renewing around 10% of the forest over the next 10 years could cost around EUR 10 billion (or around 0.3% of GDP). Currently around 2% of French metropolitan forests benefit from ‘strong’ regulatory protection status and are managed with a focus on conserving biodiversity. Around 18.5% of the metropolitan forest area, or 3.3 million hectares, is included in the Natura 2000 network compared to around 23% in the EU. While timber harvesting increased between 2015 to 2023 compared with the 2005-2013 period, notably as part of efforts to manage the bark beetle crisis, forest production decreased significantly (IGN, 2025[59]).
Fragmented private ownership of forest land creates complexity in implementing policies, with around three-quarters of forests being privately owned. Around two-thirds of owners own less than one hectare, even though properties of less than one hectare account for only 7% of the total area of private woodland, according to the IGN. This situation complicates efforts to identify and reach small landowners and implement policies (Cour des comptes, 2024[60]). Around two-thirds of private forests, half of the total forest area, do not have sustainable management documents. Further developing professional management associations can allow owners to take a less active role, instead delegating operational responsibilities to forestry professionals. Work is underway to propose measures that would streamline the procedure for taking back vacant and ownerless properties. For example, in Portugal, where the owner is unknown or where owners fail to carry out the requested efforts, the state can legally carry out certain measures, such as fuel management activities in forest land, a practice known as “forced tenancy” (OECD, 2023[61]).
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