Priscilla Fialho
OECD
Gulen Devren Sahin
OECD
Priscilla Fialho
OECD
Gulen Devren Sahin
OECD
Given its natural endowments, Argentina will be able to reap significant economic opportunities from the global energy transition. Argentina is home to 20% of the world’s identified lithium resources and has large untapped copper reserves. Argentina also has a strong potential for renewable energy production. Leveraging these resources would promote high value-added sectors, diversifying economic activity and strengthening economic resilience. To harness these opportunities, policy actions are needed to improve water management, modernise and decentralise electricity grids, and develop low-carbon transport infrastructure. Appropriate relative prices would create the right incentives to develop new opportunities and improve export competitiveness.
Argentina stands to reap sizeable opportunities from the global energy transition, both with respect to the production of renewable energy itself and with respect to key inputs into the transition towards renewables. Argentina has huge potential for renewable energy production (Figure 3.1). The country has the fourth largest offshore wind potential in the world, and the largest potential for onshore wind energy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, Patagonia is one of the world’s windiest places. Potential for solar energy generation is also significant in the Northwest region (IRENA, 2024[1]). Leveraging these resources and developing the renewable energy industry could provide economic opportunities and at the same time help reducing regional inequalities, promoting a competitive national industry in high value-added sectors, and creating high-quality jobs. The expansion of renewable energies represents an opportunity to strengthen economic resilience, by diversifying economic activity, reducing import dependence and improve quality of life, particularly in marginalized communities facing high energy costs or limited access to reliable energy sources (IEA, 2020[2]).
Note: LAC6 includes Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile, Brazil, and Peru.
Source: World Bank (2020), Global Solar Atlas; World Bank (2020), Global Wind Atlas.
Argentina’s comparative advantage in the generation of energy from renewable sources bodes well for both domestic use and exports. Hydrogen produced through electrolysis powered by renewable sources can be used to store energy for consumption at a different place and time, paving the way for energy trade through hydrogen, but also for decarbonising sectors where abatement costs are otherwise high, including transport and industry. To the extent that electricity production from renewables is more costly elsewhere, Argentina’s comparative advantage in wind and solar energy opens up significant export opportunities in low-emission hydrogen.
Demand for lithium, a critical mineral needed for energy storage in the context of intermittent renewable energy sources, has tripled since 2017 and could grow tenfold by 2050 (IEA, 2021[3]). Argentina is home to 13% of the world’s identified lithium reserves and has significant scope to expand lithium production and developing activity in midstream segments of the lithium value chain (Figure 3.2). Argentina already has six active lithium mines, with five more expected to become operational in the coming years. Additional mines are in various stages of planning and construction. As it takes about five to ten years to build and optimise a Lithium mine, efforts to attract further investment and develop additional lithium production and processing capacity will be required in the coming years. The economic and social benefits, in terms of GDP and employment, could be significant in the medium to long term (Obaya, Ramos and Romero, 2022[4]), provided labour market policies facilitate the reallocation of labour towards the most promising economic sectors. The oil and gas industries possess valuable expertise in resource extraction and management, which could be applied in the lithium industry.
Beyond its substantial lithium reserves, Argentina is rich in other critical minerals essential for battery production and renewable energy technologies, including large deposits of copper, a metal required for electrification including electric vehicle manufacturing and renewable energy infrastructure (IEA, 2021[3]). In addition to lithium and copper, Argentina also has abundant quantities of cobalt, chromium, rare earth elements, graphite, manganese, nickel, platinum-group elements and zinc. These critical minerals and strategic resources position the country as a key player in the global supply chain for clean technologies such as batteries, wind turbines, and solar panels.
Argentina is also well-positioned as a supplier of natural gas, which is expected to play an important role as a transition fuel in the global energy transition. This transition is likely to take time, given the substantial global investments required to ensure the reliability of power grids that will increasingly rely on intermittent renewables (IEA, 2019[5]). In Argentina, the large-scale exploitation of gas resources has already contributed to guarantee energy security at affordable prices, benefiting the industrial and residential sectors, and has helped to improve the current account balance. Further investments in new and upgraded pipelines, processing plants and export terminals would help to export liquified natural gas (LNG) and meet growing demand worldwide. While LNG exports hold significant potential in the short and medium term, including as a baseload energy supply to complement the development of renewable sources, demand for gas is likely to decline in the longer term as more countries commit to net-zero emissions targets and low carbon technologies become cost competitive (IEA, 2023[6]). This calls for a careful analysis of the economic opportunities and risks of such investments, including the risk of stranded assets.
Exposure to other countries’ climate trade-related policies could potentially affect exports and competitiveness if Argentina’s emission intensity remains substantially higher than that of trading partners and countries competing to export the same goods (Figure 3.3). New environmental standards and regulations on international trade aim to shape global value chains of products identified as drivers of greenhouse gas emissions. The European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, for example, could impact Argentinian exports of iron and steel. Stepping up efforts to reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions would bring additional benefits for export competitiveness and help build economic resilience. Against this background of global developments and given the need to harness new export opportunities, Argentina will have to evaluate carefully what is the best pace for its own decarbonisation strategy.
Total greenhouse gas emissions including land use, land-use change and forestry, 2022 or latest year available
Note: LAC7: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru. Latest year available is 2021 for Türkiye and Korea; 2020 for Chile; 2019 for Mexico and Peru, 2018 for Argentina and Colombia; 2017 for Costa Rica; and 2016 for Brazil.
Source: OECD Air emissions - Greenhouse gas emissions Inventories.
Wider global use of renewable energy sources will require batteries, for which lithium is a key ingredient. Expanding Argentina’s lithium industry will contribute to sustain the worldwide effort towards cleaner energy, while boosting Argentina’s growth, employment, and tax revenues. Five lithium production plants have already applied for inclusion into Argentina’s Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI) (Chapter 1). The “Rincón” lithium-brine plant in the Salta and Catamarca provinces is producing high-quality battery-grade lithium carbonate and will be expanded with an investment of USD 2.5 billion. Construction of the expanded plant is scheduled to begin in mid-2025 and could be operational by 2028. In the same region, the “Sal de Oro” production plant is expected to attract USD 1 billion in investments to expand its operations. Another USD 200 million investment is planned for the expansion of the “Hombre Muerto Oeste” lithium production plant in Catamarca. Other projects are expected to apply for RIGI benefits throughout 2025.
Northwestern Argentina's lithium brine deposits are known for their high quality, particularly due to the low levels of impurities like magnesium in the salt flats, which reduces processing costs (Sekerinska and Stokenberga, 2023[7]). The country's arid regions, including Salta, Jujuy, and Catamarca provinces, offer ideal conditions for extracting lithium from brine through solar evaporation. This method is more energy-efficient, carbon-friendly, and cost-effective compared to traditional hard rock mining (IEA, 2023[8]). However, the process demands large quantities of freshwater, which raises concerns about water scarcity and potential resource depletion (Krishnan and Gopan, 2024[9]). Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE) can reduce water consumption and Argentina is already home to some projects utilising DLE. This technology is, to date, the “greenest” way to mine lithium, which may be an additional selling point and further improve the competitiveness of lithium from Argentina (Farahbakhsh et al., 2024[10]).
Providing the necessary infrastructure and public services for the sustainable development of the lithium production chain and monitoring the environmental impact of lithium extraction would help to foster the competitiveness of Argentina’s lithium industry. Investments in strategic infrastructure that would support the integration of efficient water management solutions, renewable energy use and low-carbon modes of transport could position Argentina as a leader in responsible resource management, and add a competitive edge to its lithium exports. This has attracted funds from multilateral lenders, for example to develop a high-voltage transmission line supplying renewable energy to mining projects in the Puna region (IFC, 2024[11]). These initiatives contribute to Argentina’s economic development while establishing a model for sustainable mining that could turn into a strategic competitive edge on a global scale. Climate-smart mining practices promote innovation, public acceptance and support, contributing to attract investors and to improve the competitiveness of exports.
Ensuring sufficient supply of water is crucial for households and industry alike, but Argentina faces critical water security gaps. The annual economic cost of Argentina’s water security deficits is estimated at about 2.2% of GDP, which could raise even further in coming years as the frequency of floods and droughts increases with climate change (World Bank, 2021[12]). To enhance water-related infrastructure investment, progressively close existing water security gaps, and prevent future water-related challenges, several regulatory and governance bottlenecks would need to be addressed in the water and sanitation sector.
Argentina needs to strengthen the implementation of the regulatory framework to promote integrated water resources management (World Bank, 2021[12]). Water and sanitation services are highly decentralised with multiple stakeholders at different levels of government involved in their governance. Some provinces have well-developed legislations, while others do not regulate important aspects, such as irrigation systems, water rights, users’ organisations, nor enforce the user-pays principle (OECD, 2019[13]). Some provinces lack institutional capacity to evaluate water resources, monitor and control water flows, identify users, and monitor water uses. As a result, excessive drinking water production is common, jeopardising water resilience. Infrastructure to reduce flow peaks and store flood water, is not always integrated into river basin planning processes. Moreover, imprecise definitions of responsibilities across jurisdictions make it difficult to monitor dam safety. The federal government issued National Guiding Principles of Water Policy, in agreement with provinces, opening the way for the integration of technical, social, economic, legal, institutional, and environmental aspects of water throughout the country. However, the implementation of these guidelines has been uneven across provinces.
Funding for the water and sanitation sector remains uncertain. Provinces are responsible for service provision, but the federal government is the main source of financing. User tariffs are not always based on volumetric water meters. Instead, users in several localities pay a fixed rate regardless of the water volume consumer, contributing to excessively high and irrational consumption. Revenues collected from user tariffs are not sufficient to cover operating and maintenance costs. Government subsidies complement user tariff revenues, which does not provide any incentive for improvements in operational efficiency. Some of these funds could have been destined to restoring and maintaining the network, expansion plans and service improvement. Adding to the issue, there are no clear rules for how the federal government should financially support the expansion of water and sanitation infrastructure across provinces. There are also no accountability mechanisms for the performance of provincial governments related to these nationally funded investments (World Bank, 2021[12]). The resulting lack of investment has resulted in high levels of network leakage and increasing operational costs (OECD, 2019[13]).
Several reforms could be considered to improve the efficiency of the water and sanitation sector and increase incentives for investment in the modernisation and expansion of infrastructure. Federal authorities should weave water resource management better into broader economic policy planning and provide clear guidance to provinces, with long-term visibility over sources of financing. A national overarching legal framework could be developed to set common water supply policy criteria across the country and support regulation consistency in different provinces, following the recent example of Brazil recently (Box 3.1). This framework could provide minimum requirements for the quality of the service. Conditional mechanisms for granting federal transfers could be considered based on compliance with performance and efficiency indicators. Inter-jurisdictional basin planning and increased cooperation between the provinces sharing rivers could be encouraged. Some countries, such as Australia, Brazil, or Canada, have created inter-governmental councils for better planning, governance, and regulation of water basins, as well as to seek opportunities to capture economies of scale when developing new water and sanitation infrastructure (OECD, 2019[13]). Finally, the fixed tariff system should be gradually replaced by a progressive scheme based on consumption volumes as metering technologies, including smart meters, are progressively rolled out across the country. To ensure that vulnerable households have access to high-quality water services, targeted subsidies could be implemented in coordination with other social policies.
Collaboration between government agencies, local communities and mining companies is also essential to ensure a fair and responsible use of water given its scarce availability in the arid regions where lithium is extracted. Detailed hydrogeological studies, continuous environmental monitoring, and information about low-water-consumption technologies would facilitate the adoption of more efficient and sustainable water management strategies by all stakeholders involved.
Brazil has made significant progress in the water and sanitation regulatory frameworks. Before 2020, regulation was under the responsibility of more than 100 local regulatory agencies, who barely met the necessary conditions for developing good regulatory governance. There was very little regulatory oversight, and it was often subject to local political interference. Since the reform, called “Novo Marco Legal do Saneamento”, the national water regulatory agency (“Agência Nacional de Águas”, ANA) has the responsibility to establish general guidelines that apply across all states and municipalities, harmonising the regulation and providing clarity and certainty. This will contribute to increase the sector’s attractiveness for private operators.
The new water and sanitation law also brought about several innovative developments. New concession contracts must now be attributed through a competitive public procurement process and include an objective of near-universal coverage. This aims to ensure that the most qualified operators, public or private, are selected, and that they have strong incentives to invest in expanding coverage. The new law also establishes that services should be auctioned grouping several cities or municipalities together. This will allow exploiting economies of scale, while ensuring that smaller and remote municipalities are covered.
Source: (OECD, 2023[14]), OECD Economic Survey Brazil 2023, OECD Publishing.
Harnessing the economic opportunities of the global energy transition could be complemented by fostering the deployment of renewable energy sources at home, and Argentina is well-placed to do this. Renewable energy sources are becoming increasingly competitive. Market prices alone, if properly calculated, will in some cases already be sufficient to steer resources into the right technologies. In 2023, after decades of falling costs and improving technology, 81% of the newly commissioned utility-scale renewable projects worldwide had lower costs than their fossil fuel-fired alternatives (IRENA, 2024[15]). The costs associated with generating electricity from onshore wind, in particular, have dropped to or below the weighted average fossil fuel-fired cost. Solar photovoltaic is also rapidly approaching this cost level. In 2014, Brazil became the first country where the levelised cost of electricity from new utility-scale solar photovoltaic fell below the cost of new fossil fuel capacity. Levelised cost measures the average net present cost of electricity generation for a generator over its lifetime. Australia followed in 2016, with its strong solar resources and high costs for new fossil fuel-fired power generation. Argentina reached that cross-over point in 2018. Even with lower fossil fuel prices in 2023, the competitiveness of utility-scale solar photovoltaic continued to improve (Nascimento et al., 2020[16]; IRENA, 2024[15]). Yet, the share of intermittent renewable energies in energy supply remains low (Figure 3.4).
Argentina has long had some of the lowest retail electricity prices in Latin America due to subsidies and a freeze on tariffs that lasted for around a decade, implying large fiscal costs (Chapter 1). End-user electricity tariffs have been below cost recovery, partly compensated by electricity subsidies mostly directed at electricity generators, transmitters, and distributors. Low electricity tariffs encourage overconsumption, while providing little prospects to potential investors and no incentives for incumbents to renew, expand, and modernise generation or the network. Moreover, the tariff structure is complex and public subsidies end up benefiting higher income groups (Giuliano et al., 2020[17]; Hooley et al, 2024[18]). Ongoing revisions to the regulatory framework and electricity tariffs will need to continue to promote cost recovery and deliver efficient price signals in the electricity sector, helping to secure further investments.
Public subsidies to the gas sector, initially established in an effort to exploit the availability of domestic gas resources and improve the energy trade balance, also distort price signals, potentially impairing the cost competitiveness of renewable energy technologies (Figure 3.5). Moreover, investments into gas production and the transportation infrastructure needed to complement those expansion plans carry a significant risk of stranded assets (World Bank, 2022[19]). Reducing public support for gas investment would help improve private-sector responsiveness to cost developments resulting from technological progress.
Argentina has taken some initial steps to reform the energy sector and improve price signals. The Decree of Necessity and Urgency (DNU) of December 2023 declared a state of emergency for the national energy sector until July 2025. Under this decree, the government launched a tariff review process for electric power and natural gas services subject to federal jurisdiction, with a plan to gradually raise regulated prices and phase out public subsidies. In nine months, the price of energy utilities compared to the general price level in the City of Buenos Aires increased from 42% to 92%, for example (Chapter 1).
Moreover, the “Bases Law”, approved in June 2024, empowered the executive branch to amend the regulatory framework for electric energy, with the objective of boosting competition in the vertically segmented generation, transmission, distribution, and retail sectors. Final users are now given the possibility to choose their electricity supplier freely. The law also introduces the possibility for electricity transportation infrastructure to be developed through open, transparent, and competitive mechanisms, and for electricity to be traded internationally. These regulatory reform efforts will continue to incentivise investments in the electricity sector and lay the grounds for the large-scale deployment of intermittent renewable energies, as observed in OECD countries who implemented similar measures (Box 3.2).
Further changes could be envisaged regarding rules for the priority dispatch of electricity. In the current system, dispatch at the wholesale market is based on declared availability one-day ahead, not capturing marginal costs. Final users end up facing tariffs that do not reflect variable costs, nor hourly, daily, and seasonal variations in demand (Urbiztondo, Navajas and Barril, 2020[20]). Dispatch could prioritise highly efficient generation technologies. Electricity prices could then be set in real-time to fully reflect the marginal cost of the last needed electricity generation unit, including a component to compensate for the maintenance and amortisation of the existing transmission and distribution infrastructure (Navajas, Urbiztondo and Brichetti, 2023[21]). Granularity in electricity tariffs would help recognise that the value or cost of electricity services can vary significantly at different times and locations. The widespread use of information and communication technologies, such as advanced meters, could enable monitoring electricity demand and decentralised injections into the network, allowing prices to reflect the marginal cost of withdrawing energy from the distribution grid at the customer’s location during each hour of the day. Peak-capacity and scarcity charges could be introduced for users to internalise the network costs incurred to meet peak-demand. Following up on a proposal by the National Electricity Regulatory Entity (ENRE) to develop a Smart Metering Programme would lay the grounds for more effective demand management, including to balance supply and demand in the short term.
The expansion and deployment of renewable energies on a larger scale also depends on the existence of reliable grid networks and flexibility options, such as storage or power-to-gas technologies. In Argentina, the grid infrastructure has suffered years of lack of investment in maintenance and modernisation (Kurdziel, Nascimento and Hagemann, 2020[22]). The limited grid capacity to accommodate additional renewable energy generation discourages potential project developers. Large solar photovoltaic and onshore wind resources can be found in the North-West and far South of the country, but their development would require new electricity transmission corridors. Costs associated with grid expansion and modernisation are inevitable to accommodate increasing demand for electricity regardless of the energy source used for generation. These costs should not be attributed to the development of renewable energy power plants.
The transmission and distribution segments of Argentina’s electricity market include various regional monopolies, subject to complex regulatory pricing schemes and varying provincial and municipal taxes (Navajas and Puig, 2024[23]). Distortions from different taxes applied at the provincial and municipal level could be minimised by improving coordination across regions. A simplified pricing scheme based on a two-part tariff, one part variable and another fixed, could be envisaged to finance grid maintenance and expansion. Well-targeted lump-sum transfers to vulnerable households could mitigate the potential distributional impacts more effectively than complex regulated pricing schemes. The ongoing development of a comprehensive household-level registry will help improve the targeting of these social transfer (Chapter 2).
From 1996 to 2006, Portugal progressively opened the retail electricity market to competition, starting from consumers supplied at high voltages, and slowly moving to consumers supplied at low voltages. Efforts have also been taken to reduce administrative burdens in the electricity market to promote the entrance of multiple companies into the retailing business and to actively engage end-users in the market. To encourage competition and consumer switching, an on-line electricity price simulation tool is provided by the regulator to help end-users in selecting their retail company. Smart metering devices have been largely deployed, enabling more frequent information on consumption and billing, and providing an opportunity for retailers to exploit demand response programs.
Customers now benefit from more diverse services, being able to select offers that best meet their needs. The services are differentiated by, for example, offering dual fuel contracts, flexible billing, demand response programs, or energy efficiency services. The number of end-users who decided to change supplier was particularly high in the initial years of the reform and among the highest in Europe. The market share of the former state-owned monopoly has been continuously declining.
Source: (Fotouhi Ghazvini et al., 2019[24]), Liberalization and customer behavior in the Portuguese residential retail electricity market
A first step to promote renewable electricity generation could be to ensure sufficient transmission capacity from the areas of high renewable potential to the areas where most electricity is consumed. This also entails expanding energy storage capacity to further enhance the efficiency of renewable energy production and utilisation, addressing the natural fluctuations in solar and wind power generation. Battery parks and other forms of short-term energy storage are effective in handling intra-day fluctuations, proving particularly advantageous for solar energy, but longer periods of intermittence from wind generation require long-duration energy storage (LDES). Argentina should ensure that its regulations for capacity transfer between energy producers cover and promote battery parks and energy storage systems. Several strategic plans aiming at strengthening the transmission infrastructure have been approved recently and should be followed through. Argentina has also recently opened a call for proposals for Storage Generation Contracts which is expected to help expanding energy storage capacity.
Renewable energy sources could also be used more widely in the transport sector, where most freight transport uses roads and trucks. Deploying sufficient charging infrastructure is key to boost the adoption of electric vehicles and greening transport. Regulations that restricted private businesses from setting up charging stations have recently been eliminated, which should help increase geographical coverage and lower costs for the use of electric vehicles (Chapter 4). Improving the condition of roads could help to reduce travel time and fuel consumption, as only 32% of road infrastructure is in good condition (Chapter 4). Improving freight railway infrastructure can also help to foster the electrification of transport and facilitate a wider use of renewable energy in the sector.
Getting carbon prices right will be an important instrument to reduce Argentina’s emission intensity more broadly, thereby improving exports competitiveness and economic resilience. From a perspective of reducing carbon-emissions in the most efficient way, carbon pricing should equalise marginal abatement costs across emission sources and sectors, and a single carbon price would generate the right incentives for this. Carbon prices are currently far from equal across sectors of activity. As of 2023, only 17.4% of greenhouse gas emissions in Argentina are covered by a positive net effective carbon price. This is among the lowest coverage among OECD countries, OECD accession countries, and OECD key partners. Emissions from the road transport sector are priced at a much higher rate than those from other sectors. By contrast, net effective carbon rates in the electricity sector, industry and buildings are zero or even negative (Figure 3.6).
Argentina introduced an explicit carbon tax in 2018, but its level remains too low to drive significant technological or behavioural changes. Moreover, several fossil fuels are exempted, including natural gas and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) used for heating purposes. Excise taxes are currently the main policy instrument for pricing carbon emissions. Dispersion of effective carbon rates across sectors are mostly explained by differences in the fuels used and the different tax treatment applied to different sources of energy, which does not reflect the order of fuels in terms of carbon content, nor does it reflect the fuels’ contributions to carbon emissions (Ahumada et al., 2023[25]). Eliminating existing exemptions from excise taxes could help to reduce differences in carbon pricing across sectors and fuels that are not explained by externalities or other economic considerations. This should be accompanied by progressively phasing out fossil fuel and electricity subsidies. The reduction or elimination of subsidies would lead to considerable increases in net effective carbon rates in non-road sectors and would save crucial fiscal resources.
Raising the level of the existing carbon tax could unlock further substantial fiscal revenues. An effective carbon rate floor of 120 EUR/tCO2e, for example, could raise an additional 2% of GDP in fiscal revenues (OECD, 2024[26]). Such an increase could be achieved by defining a gradual and predictable path, announced well in advance, to allow economic agents sufficient time to make the necessary investments and adjustments.
An alternative to increasing the explicit carbon tax would be to develop a carbon market or cap-and-trade system. These markets would allow companies and governments to buy and sell emission rights, thus incentivising emissions reduction, climate adaptation efforts, and environmental compensation. In such a system, the cost of achieving carbon emissions is determined by market forces and may vary, offering greater flexibility for economic players to choose the most effective and economical way of reducing their emissions, while creating incentives for innovation and the development of clean technologies where there is greater potential. This differs from carbon taxes, which provide certainty about the costs of compliance and create stable prices but cannot ensure a specific level of GHG reductions.
Higher carbon prices will create a financial burden on households and firms, therefore requiring a careful balance with social and economic concerns. Deploying additional fiscal revenues from carbon pricing towards well-targeted social protection policies or infrastructure development could help strengthen trust in government and favour public acceptability. Using revenues from carbon taxes to invest in climate adaptation infrastructure, for example, could be particularly beneficial for low-income segments of the population, who tend to live in flood-prone or water-scarce areas (World Bank, 2022[19]). Effective communication to explain the functioning of carbon taxes, potential distributional impacts and compensation mechanisms that will be put in place, could increase political support (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022[27]).
Note: Panel B: Based on the OECD's Effective Carbon Rates 2023. Fossil fuel subsidy estimates are based on the OECD's Inventory of Fossil Fuel Support, where available, and original research for the other countries (Garsous et al., 2023). Due to data limitations, fossil fuel subsidy estimates for 2023 are based on data for 2022. GHG emissions are the sum of fossil-fuel related CO2 emissions, calculated based on energy use data for 2021 from the IEA (2023) and other GHGs from Climate Watch (2024).
Source: Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2024, OECD Net effective carbon rates database.
|
Recommendations in the previous Survey |
Actions taken since previous Survey (March 2019) |
|---|---|
|
Phase-out energy subsidies. |
Subsidies for electricity and gas are now being faded out. |
|
Continue developing an automatic early warning system to halt deforestation. |
A monitoring system based on Google Earth satellite images to check changes in the forest cover every two weeks has been implemented. |
|
Strengthen proper enforcement of the forest law, especially at the provincial level. |
Provinces are required to build land use maps that identify areas with different conservation levels, but implementation is slow and unequal across provinces. |
|
Undertake an in-depth evaluation of the negative externalities associated with different types of pesticides, with a view to implementing targeted measures to manage pesticide use. |
The National Directorate for Agriculture and the Agrochemical and Fertilizer Chamber have organised joint training programmes to promote the responsible use of pesticides. |
|
Implement measures to reduce air pollution, including taxing vehicles according to emissions. |
The explicit carbon price, which could tax vehicles based on their emission intensity, is low. |
|
MAIN FINDINGS |
RECOMMENDATIONS (Key recommendations in bold) |
|---|---|
|
Promoting renewable energy sources and developing the lithium industry |
|
|
Argentina is home to 20% of global lithium resources, but lithium production requires a careful use of water and energy resources. |
Ensure the provision of the necessary infrastructure and effective water management for the development of a sustainable lithium production chain. |
|
Inefficient water management is common in some provinces, jeopardizing water resilience. Infrastructure to reduce flow peaks and store flood water is not well integrated in planning processes. Water network leakage is frequent. |
Implement the regulatory framework to promote integrated water resources management. Provide technical assistance to provinces to implement the National Guiding Principles of Water Policy. |
|
Prudent water management is becoming increasingly important, especially in the context of a federal system with delegated responsibilities. |
Ensure that river basin planning systemically consider the development of infrastructure to reduce flow peaks and store flood water. |
|
Water consumption tariffs are not always based on volumetric water meters. Often, users pay a fixed rate regardless of the water volume consumed, contributing to overconsumption and waste. |
Progressively expand water metering technologies and replace the fixed user tariff scheme with consumption-based pricing. |
|
End-user electricity tariffs have been below cost recovery, encouraging overconsumption and providing little incentives for prospective investors in generation, transmission and distribution. |
Align electricity prices with full costs, including the costs of investments in transmission and distribution infrastructure. |
|
Dispatch in the wholesale electricity market is based on declared availability one-day ahead, not capturing marginal costs. |
Prioritise dispatch from highly efficient generation technologies. |
|
Reducing the emission intensity of Argentina’s exports |
|
|
Only 17.4% of GHG emissions are covered by a positive net effective carbon price. Net effective carbon prices in the industry, buildings, and the electricity sectors are null or even negative. Fossil fuel subsidies have helped bring down energy prices and contain inflation but failed to steer resources into investments with the largest economic potential in the medium to long-term. |
Continue to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and remove the carbon tax exemption for natural gas and Liquefied Petroleum Gas used for heating purposes, in industry, and in the electricity sector, while supporting low-income households through targeted transfers. |
|
Carbon markets offer greater flexibility for economic players to choose the most effective and economical way of reducing emissions, while creating incentives for the development of clean technologies where there is greater potential. |
Consider developing a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions. |
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