This report presents the findings of the 2025 development co‑operation peer review of Switzerland and includes the relevant recommendations approved by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In accordance with the peer review methodology, it does not cover all components identified in the peer review analytical framework. Rather, the report focuses on four areas of Switzerland’s development co‑operation that were selected in consultation with Switzerland’s partners and representatives of the Swiss government. As such, it examines the extent to which the Swiss co-operation system as a whole is living up to its objectives in terms of its strategic, institutional and operational aspects; how Switzerland sets and uses results systems for development impact; its ability to respond to an unstable world; and its efforts to partner with the private sector. For each of these areas, the report takes stock of Switzerland’s strengths, the challenges and risks it faces, and its prospects for the future.
OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Switzerland 2025
Abstract
The political context places pressure on international co-operation
Global crises and shifting geopolitics place increasing demands on Switzerland’s international co-operation. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, other violent conflicts, climate change, and the lingering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are exacerbating poverty, inequality, and food insecurity, and undermining governance in many partner countries (OECD, 2024[1]). These dynamics point to a greater need for international co-operation, and also strengthen calls to invest more in security. For Switzerland, these global dynamics significantly influence its international co-operation, necessitating flexible and adaptive approaches to partnerships and global engagement.
Switzerland’s foreign policy highlights its ambition to address global challenges. Switzerland has actively positioned itself as an influential and constructive actor through its roles in multilateral forums. Its non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (2023-2024) underscores its commitment to peacebuilding, climate action and UN reform (OECD, 2024[1]). Switzerland’s 2024-27 foreign policy describes an “arc of crisis”, including unresolved conflicts – around Europe, in Ukraine and the south Caucasus – as well as in the Middle East, the Sahel region and Sudan (FDFA, 2024[2]). In particular, the reconstruction of Ukraine is identified as a strategic priority for Europe and for Switzerland. Switzerland is playing an active role in reconstruction in Ukraine, notably by hosting the Ukraine Recovery Conference in 2022 and the Ukraine Peace Summit in June 2024, as well as its substantial ODA increase for the country.
Domestic political shifts include growing scrutiny of international co-operation. The 2023 federal elections resulted in a shift towards greater centre-right representation, increasing political pressure on international co-operation reflecting public concerns about migration, security and fiscal discipline, while environment-friendly factions lost influence. Despite solid public support for international co-operation (ETH Zürich, 2024[3]), taking effect from 2025, parliament decided to cut the budget – apart from humanitarian aid – to create more fiscal space for defence expenditures. High-profile debates, such as whether to continue funding the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) amid escalating tensions in the Middle East (Swissinfo, 2024[4]; Switzerland Today, 2024[5]), and about the interpretation of “Swiss neutrality” (ETH Zürich Centre for Security Studies, 2024[6]; ECFR, 2024[7]), highlight the complexity of international co-operation within Switzerland’s political landscape.
Switzerland’s budgetary discipline drives policy choices, affecting funding for international co-operation
While Switzerland’s public finances compare well internationally, budgetary constraints challenge the scope of Swiss international co-operation. Switzerland’s gross government debt-to-GDP ratio amounted to 38.3% in 2024, compared to 81.6% for EU countries (OECD, 2025[8]; CEIC, 2025[9]). However, Switzerland is currently facing fiscal constraints due to the “debt brake”1 mechanism: the government is required to balance its expenditure and receipts over the longer term and is using a debt brake to avoid structural imbalances (Federal Department of Finance, 2024[10]). The basic rule is that the annual ceiling for ordinary expenditure is linked to the amount of ordinary receipts. The Confederation's net debt ratio fell from 24% in 2003, when the debt brake was introduced, to 14% in 2019 as a result of dynamic economic growth and increasing receipts. The high extraordinary expenditure to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic led to an increase in the debt ratio, bringing it to 18% in 2023. The debt brake and the rapid increase in defence spending resulted in a reduction of the budget for development co-operation in the coming years.
The Swiss economy is highly open, developed and export-oriented, with exports accounting for more than two-thirds of GDP. GDP is expected to grow by 1.3% in 2024 and 1.5% in 2025, before strengthening to 1.9% in 2026, (OECD, 2024[11]). As highlighted in Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2024 (FDFA, 2020[12]), a stable and investment-friendly business environment is key to Switzerland’s prosperity.
A majority of parliamentarians views international co-operation as a discretionary expenditure. The rising fiscal pressures have increased competition among national priorities. Domestic demands to safeguard pensions and infrastructure, and calls for an increased defence budget – justified by the current geopolitical context – are behind the budget cut to international co-operation. Debates about reallocating resources to global public goods like climate change mitigation, biodiversity protection, migration and pandemic prevention further heighten financial pressures, possibly at the expense of international co-operation’s traditional focus on poverty reduction and sustainable development (OECD, 2024[1]). With budget discussions on international co-operation occurring at the same time as those on defence and education, the international co-operation budget has been exposed to cuts. These tensions highlight the importance for international co-operation to align with broader foreign policy and economic objectives to ensure both impact and continued political support.
One common strategy for two federal departments, three responsible government units and five commitment credits
Switzerland’s international co-operation is embedded in a cascading set of national policies. In 2020, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) introduced a “cascading foreign policy strategy” to harmonise various strategic frameworks. The Foreign Policy Strategy serves as the overarching guideline (State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, 2021[13]), concretised through five geographic and four thematic strategies, including the International Cooperation Strategy (FDFA, 2020[12]). The Foreign Economic Policy Strategy under the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER) aligns with the Foreign Policy Strategy. Together, they inform the International Cooperation Strategy, which is the only FDFA strategy requiring approval from both the Federal Council and Parliament as it has budgetary implications. The 1976 law and ordinance on international co-operation provide the legal framework for the strategy (Federal Assembly of the Swiss Conferederation, 1976[14]).
Switzerland’s international co-operation operates under a unified strategy, managed by two federal departments and three responsible government units. The 2021-24 International Cooperation strategy (or IC strategy) was the first succinct cross-government strategy with clear criteria for engagement and common objectives. Its adoption was preceded by a wide public consultation process.2 Its implementation has been assessed as part of a joint accountability report (Swiss Confederation, 2024[15]). The IC strategy 2025-2028 (Federal Council, 2024[16]) was approved by parliament in December 2024. Three main governmental units share responsibility for Switzerland’s development co-operation: the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC) within the FDFA; the Peace and Human Rights Division (PHRD) within the FDFA State Secretariat; and the Economic Co-operation and Development Division of the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) within the EAER (Figure 1). While all three government units operate under a common strategy and mandate, SDC focuses on development co-operation and humanitarian assistance, SECO on economic co-operation and PHRD on peace promotion and human rights.
Source: Federal Council (2024[16]), International Cooperation Strategy 2025-28 (draft) https://www.deza.eda.admin.ch/en/the-international-cooperation-strategy-2025-28-adapts-to-an-evolving-international-context.
Every four years, parliament decides the funding allocation for these government units, offered as “commitment credits”. For the 2025-28 period, parliament has approved the following five commitment credits for a total maximum amount of CHF 11.12 billion or USD 12.57 billion3 (Figure 1): (1) humanitarian assistance credit (for SDC); (2) development co-operation credit (for SDC); (3) economic development co-operation credit (for SECO); (4) peace and human security credit (for PHRD); and (5) Ukraine and region credit (for SDC/SECO/PHRD).4 The commitment credits do not guarantee a budget, but rather set a ceiling for commitments over four years. Actual budgets are decided on an annual basis by parliament.
Switzerland’s total ODA has been on an upward trend since 2020, reaching 0.6% of gross national income (GNI) in 2023 (0.43% without in-donor refugee costs), surpassing its domestic objective of a 0.5% ODA/GNI ratio, but below international commitments to achieve 0.7%. Switzerland provided USD 5.2 billion of ODA in 2023 (Figure 2)5. This was an 8.1% increase in volume compared to 2022, mainly driven by IDRC. The total envelope for the 2025-2028 strategy (CHF 11.12 billion or USD 12.57 billion) reduces the ODA/GNI ratio to 0.41% (0.36% excluding IDRC).
Evolution of ODA volume and ODA/GNI ratio 2016-2023, and projections 2025-2028
Note: ** Annual average projection. Converted from CHF to US (million) using currently available exchange rate of 2023. GNI=gross national income; IDRC=In-donor refugee costs; ODA GE= grant equivalent. For 2016 and 2017, ODA volumes are calculated as net flows; from 2018 onwards, they are calculated on a grant equivalent basis. The ODA/GNI projections for 2025-2028 are indicative. The estimations are strongly influenced by the evolution of the in-donor refugee costs and of the gross national income, both highly volatile and unpredictable.
Source: OECD (2025[17]) Creditor Reporting System, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c; Federal Council (2024[16]), International Cooperation Strategy 2025-28 (draft).
The allocation of resources for each government unit has not changed significantly over the past decade. In 2023, SDC had by far the largest share of the budget (72%, not including IDRC), and SECO absorbs 15% of the budget (Figure 3), while PHRD gets the smallest share of the international co-operation budget6. Other offices include cantons and municipalities, the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM), the Federal Department for Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, and the Federal Office for the Environment. The budget for IDRC is managed by SEM.
Evolution of breakdown of gross bilateral ODA by agency, 2016-2023, USD million
Note: IDRC=In-donor refugee costs. The category “other” includes PHRD, cantons and municipalities, the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM), the Federal Department for Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, and the Federal Office for the Environment
Source: OECD (2025[17]) Creditor Reporting System, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c.
In 2022, SDC embarked on an institutional reform process called Fit for Purpose (F4P). The main objectives of this reorganisation are to better integrate humanitarian and development work, to strengthen thematic expertise, and to bring decision making on programmes down to the operational level as much as possible. The key changes include the merger of humanitarian and development teams into common geographic divisions, and the creation of a thematic co-operation division. The thematic division aims at influencing normative frameworks and international policies as part of global programmes,7 as well as supporting country offices (Annex D). Finally, more decision-making responsibility was given to the external network of embassies and country offices to ensure context-specific solutions, and 10 full-time equivalent posts were transferred from SDC headquarters to the external network.
SECO and PHRD have also made adjustments to increase coherence and agility. Since the 2019 peer review, SECO launched some thematic networks, such as the private sector engagement network, to bridge expertise across headquarters and external offices. The PHRD, guided by its new mediation strategy, consolidated related themes, integrating conflict mediation and dialogue promotion into a coherent approach to peace-making. Rapid Action Teams were introduced for swift mediation responses in armed conflicts, and have been deployed six times so far. The PHRD has also expanded its tools and frameworks to enhance peace process monitoring.
An interdepartmental co-ordination committee and associated interdepartmental thematic working groups foster a whole-of-government approach, aiming to promote coherence across policies. The consultative Interdepartmental Committee for International Development and Cooperation (IKEZ) brings together various departments aiming at informing and co-ordinating international co-operation policy. IKEZ is hosted and led by SDC, SECO and PHRD. In addition, there are thematic committees for the co-ordination of sectoral policies that involve international co-operation, but where international co-operation is not the main objective, such as migration, climate and health. They are chaired (or co-chaired) by the federal department in charge of the respective sectoral policies (e.g., SEM for migration).
Switzerland benefits from an advisory committee for international co-operation that includes representatives from civil society, academia and the private sector. The advisory committee provides support for developing outcome measures of international co-operation and on specific topics such as Swiss support to Ukraine. Although parliamentarians were previously part of the group, they no longer participate. While this could enhance its independence, it may be a missed opportunity to connect with the political sphere at a critical time for international co-operation. Aware of its role, the committee carefully maintains functional relations with political actors while ensuring it is not perceived as a political body. It strives to uphold public support for international co-operation and to safeguard Swiss values. Meeting at least three times a year (and a field trip), the schedule now aligns with parliamentary sessions. While setting its own priority topics, the committee also provides advice to the Federal Council.
Switzerland is valued for engaging with partners through a patient and principled approach
Switzerland’s long-term country engagement in complex areas is a strong asset. Implementing partners and partner countries alike value Switzerland for its long-term engagement and support to projects whose results are not always immediately tangible or easily measurable, but which can bring transformational change. As an example, Switzerland often works on improving economic framework conditions which are key for promoting private sector development; however, the process can be long-term and the results difficult to attribute. In Zimbabwe, Switzerland has helped revamp donor co-ordination as co-chair of the Zimbabwe Development Partners Forum and as co-lead of the dialogue with government on compensation for loss of farms.8 Both activities require long-term efforts and are helping make important progress. By supporting complex projects, Switzerland often acts as an “anchor donor”, paving the way for further donor support. For instance, in South Africa, Switzerland’s assistance to the Cities Support Programme, an initiative of the South African Government, has been critical for catalysing further donor support (Box 1). Finally, Switzerland’s long-term approach to programming, with gradual scaling-up over time, is strongly valued. In Indonesia for instance, Switzerland’s successful support to vocational training in the manufacturing sector has been replicated in other sectors, such as tourism and renewable energy. As political pressure for short-term visible results increases (Setting and using result systems for development impact), Switzerland should protect its long-term and patient approach to achieving results, as this is one of its key comparative advantages.
Through the Cities Support Programme (CSP) in South Africa, SECO helps build the capacity of local governments to become engines of economic growth. Launched in 2011, the CSP is an initiative of the South African Government to support cities for sustainable urban development, efficient public investment and an improved business enabling environment. Support is being provided across five thematic areas: financial and fiscal governance, city economic development, climate responsive infrastructure planning and investment, human settlement development and integrated transport planning and investment. The eight largest cities in South Africa generate close to 60% of national gross domestic product. Currently, 64% of the country’s population live in these cities and, according to growth projections, this will rise to 80% by 2050. Inclusive economic development and city competitiveness can only be achieved if the urbanisation process is better managed. Spatial planning needs to be improved to address the challenges of the "apartheid spatial form" of cities. Integrated planning and budgeting, an improved business enabling environment and climate resilience are all key to a sustainable urban development approach.
The complex nature of this programme meant that initially no bilateral donors were able to support it within their mandates and modalities. Many municipalities in South Africa grapple with governance, high turnover and management challenges. However, as a decentralised country itself, Switzerland strongly believes in the importance of strengthening local governments’ capacity to address economic, social, and environmental challenges. Switzerland became the first “anchor donor” to the programme, which is implemented by the World Bank and now supported by other bilateral donors.
This programme has helped build a whole-of-government approach in South Africa, both horizontally and vertically, with various ministries and municipalities working together. The programme brings together and aligns the mandates of, inter alia, the National Treasury, the ministries of Cooperative Governance, Human Settlements, Public Transport, Environmental Affairs, provincial departments, and the cities in support of the city transformation agenda. For instance, in order for municipalities to be able to make medium-term infrastructure development plans, the CSP helped pool data from various ministries (e.g. tax, employment, transport etc…), and promoted work across municipalities on issues such as water management.
The programme is adjusting and scaling up over time. Leadership turnover within municipalities is high. As an example, the Mayor of Johannesburg has changed six times in the past five years. However, thanks to a focus on middle management, the programme has increased the capacity of municipalities to improve economic conditions and infrastructure, housing and transportation planning, among others. SECO has also supported improved monitoring of the programme (Genesis, 2019[18]). Based on the results of a joint evaluation commissioned by the National Treasury, the World Bank and SECO, the programme is now moving to a third phase, which might also expand the programme to the country’s secondary cities.
Source: Interviews with Treasury, World Bank and City of Tshwane. CSP (2022[19]), Mid-Term Review of Phase II of the Cities Support Programme (CSP), https://csp.treasury.gov.za/DocumentsEvaluations/202202_CSP%20Mid-Term%20Evaluation_Executive%20Summary.pdf; Genesis (2019[18]), Monitoring Implementation of City Support Programme, Genesis, https://www.genesis-analytics.com/projects/monitoring-implementation-of-city-support-programme.
Declining ODA trends will put Switzerland’s valued development co-operation at risk. The envelope for the 2025-2028 strategy amounts to CHF 11.12 billion, which reduces the ODA/GNI ratio to 0.36%, excluding in-donor refugee costs. In a context of polycrises and slow progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals, this ratio is not in line with Switzerland’s commitments. By adopting the 2030 Agenda, Switzerland in principle recognised the long-term target of 0.7% for the ODA/GNI ratio, while parliament had called for a medium-term goal of 0.5%9 . Declining ODA trends could undermine Switzerland’s standing. While providing support to Ukraine as well as to refugees in Switzerland is important, protecting core ODA levels for Switzerland’s long-standing partners would allow Switzerland to meet its commitments and ambitions.
Engagement criteria have driven progress, but a narrower approach to Swiss interests would be a risk
Switzerland’s International Cooperation Strategy 2021-24 identifies three criteria for engagement and four objectives, all of which have been maintained in the 2025-28 strategy. The three criteria are: Swiss added value, needs of local populations, and Swiss long-term interests. These criteria for engagement have driven a number of positive efforts, notably towards increased geographic focus and locally-led development, and provide a useful framework to assess the relevance of Swiss development co-operation. The strategy’s four objectives are:
1. Human development: Saving lives, alleviating human suffering and supporting access to high-quality basic services for the most disadvantaged.
2. (Sustainable economic development: Creating decent jobs through appropriate framework conditions, a dynamic local economy and the private sector.
3. Climate and environment: Guaranteeing environmentally-friendly development, resilient to climate change and natural disasters for the benefit of the most disadvantaged.
4. Peace and governance: Resolving conflicts, promoting peace, democracy and the rule of law, and upholding human rights.
Switzerland’s regions of focus are Asia, Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa. In priority countries, Switzerland defines four-year, publicly available country co-operation programmes, which is good practice. This ensures predictability for partner countries and implementing partners. SDC generally focuses on low-income countries, while SECO focuses on middle-income countries. Seven countries are priorities for both SDC and SECO, and for these joint country co-operation programmes are agreed.10
Building on the 2019 peer review recommendation (Annex A), Switzerland has made clear efforts to reduce its number of priority countries. The overall number of priority countries narrowed from 52 to 41 under the 2021-24 strategy, mainly driven by SDC phasing out bilateral development co-operation in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and Mongolia (Table 1). The initial intention in phasing out from LAC was to allow SDC to grow country programmes in other priority regions. The LAC exit was well planned, communicated and handled with both partner countries and staff, with a strong focus on learning and continuity (Box 2). SECO has continued to concentrate its economic development co-operation activities in 13 priority countries.11 PHRD has a maximum of 20 priority countries and adjusts the list depending on opportunities.
Following the 2019 peer review recommendation and appeals by national actors to increase the focus of Switzerland’s ODA, the Federal Council and the Swiss Parliament decided in 2020 to strategically phase out bilateral development co-operation from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). However, this decision fuelled concerns over jeopardising the progress made in the previous six decades of SDC support.
SDC planned its exit over a period of four years, in order to allow for a responsible exit in relation to staff, partner governments and other development partners. About 100 staff, both Swiss and local, were supported in the process and offered termination indemnities or transferred to other countries. Over this period, SDC tried to either ensure project continuity or orderly closing. Roughly half of projects will be continued by local organisations, around 20% were taken on by other bilateral donors or multilateral organisations, and around 30% had reached their term and were closed.
Finally, SDC engaged in an important knowledge management process, compiling lessons learnt from 60 years of co-operation in LAC. Over a period of 18 months, reflections on priorities, impact, learnings and recommendations were compiled and communication products developed to enable development partners in Latin America, as well as SDC staff in other regions, to learn from SDC’s development co-operation experience in LAC.
While all of SDC’s bilateral development co-operation activities in the region will close from 2025, the Swiss co-operation is transforming its engagement in LAC through other instruments. These include SDC’s universal humanitarian assistance combined with programmes in a limited number of countries with protracted crises, and a regional thematic co-operation focused on climate and environment, SECO’s economic co-operation, and PHRD’s support to peace processes.
Note: This practice is documented in more detail on the OECD’s Development Co-operation TIPs • Tools Insights Practices platform at www.oecd.org/development-cooperation-learning.
Source SDC (2024[20]), 60 years of successful cooperation; Best practices from Latin America and the Carribbean, https://www.sdc-regions.ch/en/capitalisation-of-experiences-lac.
Switzerland has been able to react quickly to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, with additional credits approved by parliament, but the share of bilateral ODA for least developed countries has decreased. In 2022, Switzerland adapted and scaled up existing programmes in Ukraine and provided humanitarian assistance, seeing its ODA to Ukraine increase more than five-fold over 2021 levels, to reach USD 236 million or 6% of net bilateral ODA. This came from additional credits approved by parliament as well as finances reallocated from LAC originally planned for sub-Saharan Africa. Going forward, Switzerland has committed CHF 5 billion for Ukraine from 2025 to 2036, with CHF 1.5 billion coming from the 2025-2028 international co-operation budget.12 Switzerland should ensure that support to Ukraine is additional and does not undermine valued and effective long-term engagement in partner countries, many of which are least developed. Switzerland allocated 16.9% of its gross bilateral ODA to least developed countries (LDCs) in 2023, which was less than in 2019, when LDCs accounted for 25.2%. This evolution is due to the increase of the share of bilateral ODA to IDRC and Ukraine. Reversing the declining trend in the share of ODA allocated to LDCs would allow Switzerland to keep in line with its poverty focus and UN commitments.
SDC has delegated more responsibility to its external network of Swiss representations abroad in order to align Swiss development co-operation more closely with local needs. As part of the F4P reorganisation, project approval processes in SDC have been simplified and financial authority adjusted. For instance, while newly designed projects have to be approved in headquarters, new phases of existing projects can sometimes only be approved by the head of co-operation in the external network.13 Initial feedback from Zimbabwe shows that this reform has helped Switzerland to be more agile and to adjust projects more quickly. It has also given more leeway to the embassy to prepare projects and define modalities for implementation.
However, more can be done on quality assurance, administrative and technical support to help the external network meet these new responsibilities. Initial feedback from Swiss representations is that the decentralisation has led to less uniform and potentially less coherent processes (OECD, 2024[1]). In addition, as some of the administrative workload has shifted to the external network, further administrative support on project cycle management (PCM) could be beneficial, for example through a digital PCM system. Increased access to expertise from SECO (Partnering effectively with the private sector), PHRD and SDC’s thematic division could also help the external network to plan and manage projects.
SECO’s centralised management model could be improved to enhance agility and adaptation to local needs. The example of SECO in South Africa shows that, except for a few large locally designed bilateral programmes – such as the Cities Support Programme (Box 1) – a significant share of ODA to South Africa is disbursed as part of global programmes.14 Embassies are always consulted when these programmes are designed, but sometimes not until the final preparation stage. Further efforts could be made to ensure that global programmes are adjusted to local needs. In addition, SECO’s organisational structure, centred on four sections (Trade Promotion, Macro-economic Support, Private Sector Development and Infrastructure) is not always best suited to the cross-cutting nature of projects implemented in South Africa, making it complex to adjust project components. Exploring ways to improve the strategic steering of cross-cutting projects and to increase budget flexibility across sections could help make SECO more agile.
The broad definition of the Swiss long-term interests’ is useful, but the shift to a narrower interpretation could undermine Switzerland’s standing. The IC Strategy 2021-2024 defines long-term Swiss interests broadly as a just and peaceful international order underpinned by strong multilateralism, a stable economic environment conducive to investment, a reduction in the causes of forced displacement and irregular migration, and sustainable global development. Switzerland’s long-term interests guide the choice of countries for development co-operation (e.g. the Sahel region is key for peace and migration, South Africa is a key trading partner, Morocco is a key partner on migration). However, the partially tied aid programme for Ukraine in the draft 2025-28 Strategy (with CHF 500 million allocated to the Swiss private sector, including Swiss companies) illustrates a shift to a narrower interpretation of Swiss interests which would undermine Switzerland’s impact and reputation (Partnering effectively with the private sector).
Bilateral development co-operation remains fragmented
The top 10 recipients of Switzerland’s ODA are all priority countries, but ODA allocations to these top 10 recipients are relatively low. In 2023, these countries included Ukraine, the West Bank and Gaza Strip and several fragile countries, notably in West Africa and Asia (Figure 4), but they only received 14.6% of bilateral ODA. This is below the DAC average of 24.8%, and well below the shares for DAC members which are Switzerland’s closest peers in terms of country programmable aid (CPA) volumes, such as Canada (38.5%), and Norway (35.4%).
Gross bilateral ODA across top 10 recipient countries 2023, constant USD million
Source: OECD (2025[17]) Creditor Reporting System, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c.
A significant share of Switzerland’s bilateral ODA is unallocated by country, and a significant share of CPA goes to non-priority countries15. In 2023, a large part of Swiss bilateral ODA, excluding IDRC, was unallocated by country (24.7%). While this is partially driven by Switzerland’s efforts to support global public goods, it also reduces the share of Country Programmable Aid (CPA) in bilateral ODA.16 According to Switzerland’s IC strategy, 10% of geographical commitments in the FDFA’s bilateral development co-operation can be allocated outside of priority countries to address challenges related to migration,17 to complement humanitarian assistance with development activities, or to address cross-border challenges or opportunities arising from embassies. While Switzerland has 41 priority countries, the overall number of countries receiving CPA, excluding ODA from canton and municipalities and from multilaterals, was 77 in 2023.18 In 2023, 73% of CPA, excluding multilateral channels, was allocated to priority countries (Figure 5). One measure of fragmentation – the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures the geographic concentration of CPA – ranked Switzerland 31st amongst DAC members in 2022.19 This fragmentation impacts the size of country programmes, which on average amounted to USD 10.2 million in 2022.20 In order to make the best use of available resources, and building on Switzerland’s efforts to reduce its number of priority countries, the country could explore ways to further focus its ODA on its geographic priorities.
Country programmable aid excluding multilateral channels by priority group
Source: OECD (2025[17]) Creditor Reporting System, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c.
At country level, the large number of projects managed by embassies or co-operation offices can sometimes be hard to administer21. While small projects are sometimes required in specific contexts, or where partners have limited absorption capacity, a multiplicity of small-scale projects can make it harder for Switzerland to make an impact and add value. As an example, SECO’s portfolio in South Africa includes close to 60 projects22 which cover a diverse array of sectors, geographic locations, spheres of government, and implementing partners, making management challenging.23 In addition, consistent feedback from partners highlighted their interest in Switzerland further sharing expertise in addition to financial support, for instance in areas such as vocational education or decentralisation. Focusing on fewer but larger projects could potentially help Switzerland play a more active role in shaping projects and sharing expertise.
Navigating administrative, compliance and risk mitigation processes is complex for partners. Multilateral and local partners conveyed concerns about elaborate and detailed reporting requirements. For example, Switzerland requests additional financial details that do not align with some multilaterals’ standard reporting cycles, causing administrative friction, especially in multi-donor pooled funding arrangements. In Zimbabwe, several local partners mentioned that due diligence processes were demanding. The fact that the definition of acceptable risks is unclear, can partly explain why some administrative processes take long (OECD, 2024[21]).
While the multiplicity of themes covered by Switzerland allows it to adjust to partner country needs, the role of global programmes could be clarified. As part of its 4 overarching objectives, Switzerland’s 2025-28 strategy includes 10 sub-themes, referred to as “specific objectives”.24 This range of themes could allow Switzerland to tailor its support to partner country needs. Within SDC’s newly created thematic division, the Peace, Governance and Equality section (PGE) and the Economy and Education section have a strong focus on providing advisory services to country offices and promoting knowledge management. In particular, PGE’s support to staff through thematic networks, online and face-to-face opportunities for knowledge sharing and learning journeys, is valued (Box 3). Other sections, such as Climate, DRR and Environment; Water; Migration and Forced Displacement; Health and Food, have a stronger focus on shaping international standards and implementing global programmes.25 Building more systematic links between thematic sections and country teams would be beneficial to strengthen country programmes.
Strategic multilateral support promotes effectiveness
Switzerland demonstrates leadership in fostering governance, co-ordination, and innovation within multilateral organisations. Switzerland is regarded by multilaterals as a constructive partner who advocates for pragmatic solutions to improve multilateral performance. Through active participation in governance structures, such as the Executive Boards of UN Funds and Programmes and the Executive Boards of the Multilateral Development Banks, Switzerland promotes good governance and effectiveness in its multilateral partners. Its leadership extends to resolving operational challenges between international financial institutions (IFIs) and UN agencies, particularly in fragile contexts. Until recently, Switzerland was co-chair of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. From 2025, Switzerland will also chair the OECD-DAC GovNet, and will be vice-chair of the OECD-DAC INCAF network.
Core funding and multilateral engagement are central to Switzerland’s international co-operation strategy,26 providing flexibility and operational predictability for multilateral organisations. In 2023, 55% of Swiss multilateral funding was core funding (OECD, 2023[22]), in line with the DAC average (54.3%). This approach strengthens organisational stability, enables regional earmarking and allows fund carryovers, allowing multilateral interventions to adapt to changing contexts. In 2023, UN agencies, funds and programmes received 43.6% of Swiss multilateral funding, while the World Bank received 29%. Swiss contributions are spread over 24 multilateral organisations identified as priority multilateral organisations, including five multilateral development banks and their development funds, 14 UN agencies, and 5 additional organisations.27 While this spread seems broad, it is no different from comparable DAC members (OECD, 2024[23]). Multilaterals are a go-to partner in politically constrained contexts. However, as observed in Zimbabwe, where programmes implemented by multilateral partners underperform, there is a shift to more direct co-operation with international or Zimbabwean NGO’s.
Switzerland’s “elevator approach” aims to enhance the effectiveness of Swiss multilateral support. The approach is designed to align Switzerland’s global funding strategies with its operational experiences, ensuring coherence and effectiveness. The method involves channelling insights from country-level engagement with multilateral organisations upwards to focal points in headquarters and Swiss representatives on the boards to inform funding decisions and governance participation in multilateral organisations. As it goes back down, the elevator approach can feed information and learning from strategic engagement in governing bodies back into Swiss country-level collaboration with multilaterals.
Continued attention to ensure that core contributions are closely aligned with effective implementation in countries is sensible. In Zimbabwe, the elevator approach works when Swiss programmes directly involve UN agencies. This ensures that performance is reviewed by multilateral partners working in the country, such as the World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) or United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). However, it proves more challenging to guarantee feedback on those of Switzerland’s global priority partners with which SDC has no contractual local partnership in Zimbabwe, for example the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Health Organization (WHO).
Policy coherence for development can still be improved in practice
Switzerland recognises the importance of policy coherence, but can still make progress on integrating it systematically. The 2030 Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) and its four-year action plans aim to integrate sustainable development across federal policies, but they are not co-ordinated with regular policy processes. The current SDS action plan (2024-2027) (Federal Office for Spatial Development, 2021[24]) includes measures to better analyse spillover effects of Swiss policies in partner countries. These measures are based on the existing set of MONETglobo (Federal Office of Statistics Switzerland, 2025[25]) indicators for measuring transboundary spillover effects. Mechanisms such as regulatory impact assessment (RIA) could provide insights into the transboundary impacts of Swiss regulations, but thus far the instrument has mainly been used (on average twice a year since 2007) to assess legislation on domestic issues, and from a domestic perspective (SECO, 2024[26]). The SDS, combined with sectoral policies like the IC strategy, establishes sustainable development as a core principle, but this does not result in a systematic analysis of spillovers of domestic policies on developing countries. An ad hoc inter-departmental working group, co-led by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) and the FDFA, is currently reviewing the potential and limitations for quantifying and qualifying transboundary spillovers in general, and in Switzerland in particular.
Switzerland employs a range of standardised consultation and co-ordination mechanisms to ensure cross-departmental alignment. The Federal Council promotes policy coherence through a two-stage process: (1) At the technical level, the office consultation procedure invites all federal offices to identify inconsistencies across the activities of the federal departments; and (2) at the political level, the federal councillors, members of the government and heads of the federal departments balance perspectives and interests before any decision is reached jointly. Every year more than 1 000 office consultations take place on proposals and discussion documents from the Federal Council with the aim of considering different perspectives. In addition, informal consultations at the technical level are an important part of the decision-making process. Interdepartmental committees on sectoral foreign policy, such as on migration (IMZ) and health (GAP), and thematic platforms like the PLAFICO Coordination Platform, play key roles in aligning foreign policy objectives. PLAFICO played a crucial role in preparing the Swiss position on fossil fuel investments by the multilateral development banks and in preparing the Swiss negotiation position for the climate change Conferences of the Parties (COPs). While Switzerland’s28 cross-departmental alignment is effective in building consensus, it does not always result in increased policy coherence.
Switzerland also promotes whole-of-society approaches to enhance policy coherence for development. These include roundtables and consultations with external partners, such as NGOs, academia, and the private sector. These platforms ensure that Switzerland’s development priorities are aligned with broader foreign policy and economic objectives and facilitate stakeholder input into the development and implementation of the 2030 Agenda. This inclusive approach fosters a better understanding of sustainable development and promotes collaboration across sectors.
Switzerland could increase the use of expertise from across government as a way to promote policy coherence for development. While collaboration with other government offices already exists, the 2025-28 International Cooperation Strategy now explicitly allows SDC, SECO, and PHRD to engage experts from other offices for development work within projects, potentially improving the integration of Swiss public sector expertise into development co-operation (for example on agriculture, education, and local governance). This approach could not only strengthen programme design, but could also raise awareness of development co-operation across government, creating opportunities to advance policy coherence for sustainable development.
Development co-operation staff are professional and knowledgeable, but staffing in fragile contexts remains a challenge
Swiss international co-operation staff are professional and knowledgeable, and their expertise is a critical asset. Consistent feedback from partners in Switzerland, Zimbabwe and South Africa highlighted the expertise and collaborative approach of staff working in international co-operation. There are in total around 1 880 full-time equivalents (FTE) working in international co-operation, most of whom are local staff (1 000 FTE). Of the Swiss structural staff employed in the three governmental units responsible for international co-operation, 475 FTE are in headquarters and 160 are in the external network (Table 2). Structural staff in SDC have a specific career track, with tailored training and the option to transfer to the two other career tracks within FDFA (the diplomatic and consular tracks). All structural staff in SDC are under a system of four-year rotations in Bern and in partner countries, with a maximum of two consecutive rotations in Bern,29 one rotation per partner country and two rotations outside of Bern.
Note: Switzerland does not collect disaggregated data on local staff by government unit.
Source: OECD (2024[1]) Peer Review Self-Assessment of Switzerland, https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/AR(2024)1/19/en/pdf.
Identifying trained, experienced and motivated staff for posting to fragile contexts remains a challenge for SDC, although solutions such as post-sharing have been tested. At the end of 2024, there were three open vacancies for Heads of Co-operation in fragile contexts (Addis Ababa, Ouagadougou and Bamako) which had not been filled. When SDC is unable to find staff to take on a posting in a context with humanitarian needs, it can also rely on highly specialised experts from the Swiss Humanitarian Aid (SHA) Unit. The SHA is a corps of around 550 specialists who are deployed to carry out SDC Humanitarian Aid projects, or sometimes seconded to UN agencies. It allows Switzerland to maintain a programmatic presence in complex contexts, even though these experts are not formal SDC staff. In an SDC staff survey conducted by the SDC Staff Commission, staff identified a wide range of non-financial incentives that could encourage them to work in fragile contexts, including shorter postings or rest and recuperation arrangements (SDC, 2023[27]). In addition, ensuring that a posting in a fragile context is a career boost would also help attract and retain talent in fragile contexts. The 2019 peer review recommended that Switzerland adjust its human-resource policies for staff posted in fragile contexts (Annex A). Given SDC’s focus on fragile contexts, addressing these needs is now urgent. Discussion with other DAC members within the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) could help to share good practice.
Similarly, building and nurturing thematic expertise is challenging. As thematic experts go through the rotation system (at SDC), they sometimes need to move to a different position which in not necessarily linked to their sector. Building on SDC’s new thematic division, Switzerland may want to explore how to nurture thematic expertise, for instance by making the rotation system more flexible or by promoting thematic career tracks across government units. As an example, private sector experts could be encouraged to work with both SDC and SECO.
Switzerland can further invest in retaining talent among local staff. Local staff account for a large proportion of all staff (1 000 FTE in a total staff of 1 880). They are employed in various type of functions, ranging from Deputy Head of Co-operation and National Program Officers to assistance and support staff. Both country visits by the peer review team (to South Africa and Zimbabwe) highlighted the expertise and commitment of local staff and their importance in ensuring continuity in a context of rotating structural staff. While the local staff salary is often above market levels, career progression opportunities are limited, pushing some of them to leave.30 Exploring ways for local staff to move to other SECO or SDC priority countries could help retain talent and increase knowledge sharing across Swiss development co-operation government units and countries.
Politically constrained environments often require additional national staff. In certain countries where the political or economic context is unstable, programme interventions may require regular adjustments. These contexts require a more granular understanding of local political dynamics and a greater reliance on local capacities than when co-funding large multilateral programmes focused on delivering basic services to the most vulnerable. A solid base of politically attuned staff is required to manage smaller but possibly transformative support to local actors and to preserve civic space. In addition, training for diplomatic staff on development co-operation has been reduced in recent years.31 Given the interlinkages between diplomacy and development co-operation, preserving solid training can help diplomats better understand the potential for development co-operation to support their work in all contexts.
As Switzerland adjusts its development co-operation programmes going forward, it can learn from its experience in change management processes. The phase-out from LAC was well communicated to staff and completed over four years. However, the F4P process has created stress for staff and its expected benefits were not fully understood.32 Informing, consulting and communicating with staff on major changes will be key to ensure buy-in going forward.
Overall, the particular challenges of development co-operation could be taken further into account in the management of human resources. Human resources at SDC and PHRD are managed by the Directorate for Resources of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. While this has brought coherence across various career tracks within FDFA, it has also meant limited capacity to adjust to the specificities of development co-operation. As an example, challenges in taking measures to attract staff to fragile contexts may be partially driven by SDC’s reliance on the Directorate of Resources of the FDFA to make decisions about financial and career development incentives. More generally, the SDC Staff Commission does not have a dedicated interlocutor to discuss specific development co-operation human resources challenges.33 Ensuring that the specific nature of development co-operation is taken into account in human resources management will be key for Switzerland to ensure that it has the skills it needs to deliver an effective development co-operation programme going forward.
1. Switzerland should reverse the expected decline in the ODA to GNI ratio to reach its national commitment of 0.5% by 2030 and should progressively seek to increase ODA further.
2. In order to maximise its comparative advantage, and preserve the quality of development co-operation, Switzerland should continue to engage in long-term and complex projects, with a patient approach to results that offers predictability to partners and catalyses support from other donors.
3. Building on continued and principled support to the multilateral development system, and in order to deliver on its objective of poverty reduction, Switzerland should increase the share of ODA allocated to least developed countries to bring it in line with its UN commitment; building on SDC’s approach to leave no one behind, Switzerland should ensure that poverty reduction consistently informs all programmes.
4. Switzerland’s management of human resources should take into account the specificities of development co-operation to:
a. attract and retain staff in fragile contexts by increasing flexibility in posting lengths and by providing non-financial incentives
b. nurture thematic expertise, by making the rotation system more flexible and promoting thematic career tracks across government units
c. improve career path opportunities for local staff.
Tangible improvements in the result management system could be sustained and broadened
Swiss international co-operation faces increasing domestic scrutiny and demands for accountability. The Swiss political landscape is characterised by heightened competition for public resources and demands for more accountability and value for money are intensifying. This puts particular pressure on programmes and activities that are more difficult to measure. Projects are increasingly expected to be rigorously based on scientific evidence, but this is often at odds with the limited resources available for thorough evaluations. It is also not always clear if the increased demand for accountability is about more effectiveness, or the perceived relevance of programmes, or a combination of both.
Since the last peer review (in 2019), Switzerland has continued to improve its results-based management (RBM). An institutional evaluation of SDC’s RBM system in 2017 identified a strong focus on domestic accountability but insufficient use of results for strategic learning and decision making (SDC, 2017[28]). In the same year an OECD report found challenges in implementing a results system which has a focus on accountability for aggregated outputs at corporate level, whilst maintaining a context-driven and “bottom-up” results-based management approach at country and project level (OECD, 2017[29]). Since then, important adaptations have been made to address some of the weaknesses identified and further build on the strengths. The introduction and further refinement of an increasing number of standardised indicators by SDC, SECO and PHRD has enhanced the evidence base for programme formulation and enabled the aggregation of results from various projects and programmes, linking results to the IC strategy and the SDGs (OECD, 2021[30]).
In addition to improvements in its bilateral programming, Switzerland works closely with multilateral organisations to ensure coherence and alignment with its development objectives. SDC’s F4P has positioned teams responsible for all multilaterals and NGOs in the same division, which also has the aim of pushing multilaterals to seek better results. Swiss development government units advocate for robust and harmonised results frameworks to facilitate aggregated reporting on progress and challenges, enhancing the efficiency of multilateral partnerships. Moreover, Switzerland emphasises the importance of systematic co-ordination and partnerships between MDBs and other relevant actors to reduce transaction costs.
Digital tools, such as the Results Data Management (RDM) system, represent a significant step forward. Introduced in 2022, the SDC’s RDM provides three levels of monitoring: projects, programmes/themes, and institutional. A dashboard enhances the transparency and accessibility of data. By design, the RDM does not include financial data.34 Initial feedback from staff and implementing partners has been positive. Technical backup is guaranteed, partners have been trained, and the system is perceived as flexible, combining aggregated, thematic and country-sensitive indicators (OECD, 2021[30]). The system's main benefit is enabling results aggregation across projects and programmes. The RDM also streamlines data collection, starting with data inputs to the system by implementing partners. Going forward, the RDM is expected to provide a solid basis for strategic and programmatic steering. SECO is currently looking into the adoption of a digital result reporting system. If financially feasible, continued Swiss investment in digital infrastructure, training, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) could further enhance RDM’s role in decision making and strategic learning.
The RDM system has been positively received by SDC staff and partners at country level. A solid quality control system is in place to verify data inputs into the RDM. Early technical problems have been duly resolved and there is regional and HQ support to address problems when these occur. In Zimbabwe, NGO project partners discussed the introduction of the RDM during a four-day workshop and praised the consultation and collective agreement on indicators. However, for local private sector initiatives and civil society organisations, digital data collection remains difficult. A similar workshop was organised for multilateral partners to see how indicators could be aligned. Multilaterals appreciated that indicators were negotiable and not imposed by SDC. UNESCO’s SDC-funded project is fully aligned with RDM indicators, while WFP and UNICEF programmes are not, but in all cases the system generated a positive discussion on results between SDC and their partners. So far, although partner organisations report on the RDM indicators, they do not receive the analysis of the data. There is strong interest in receiving this analysis to support discussions on the effectiveness of programmes in order to improve programme implementation.
Challenges in results-based management include scarce resources for further implementation, concerns about data protection, and the continued fragmentation of data collection systems. In sensitive contexts (e.g. Ukraine) data transparency can result in security risks for implementing partners. Currently, SDC, SECO and PHRD still have separate systems to collect data for reporting on a strategy that has joint objectives. There is still potential to align the standardised indicators from each government unit to further facilitate reporting on the joint IC strategy. For example, both SDC and SECO contribute to sustainable economic growth, market development and the creation of decent jobs, but slightly different indicators complicate results aggregation and increase the administrative burden. Interoperability between digital systems of different organisations remains a pressing issue, as individual data systems jeopardise coherent data-driven decision making. Furthermore, including qualitative results in a digital tool also remains a challenge. An integrated RDM which also includes SECO and PHRD would certainly facilitate reporting under the joint strategy.
Despite the important progress made, the results reporting systems still demand high administrative transaction costs. Stringent reporting requirements and co-funding rules place a considerable administrative burden on both SDC/SECO staff and their partners, as raised in the self-assessment and partner assessments. Administrative constraints reduce flexibility and require additional resources for grant management, which can hinder the efficiency of collaboration with partners. The Swiss results frameworks also do not always align with the results frameworks of multilateral organisations, limiting the aggregation of results.
LNOB and gender integration into programming has improved and could be pursued further
Leave no one behind (LNOB) principles are central to Switzerland’s development co-operation strategies, but require deeper integration. Switzerland has made considerable progress in embedding LNOB principles into its programming. SDC has developed overarching guidance on leaving no one behind (SDC, 2018[31]), and sees being “left behind” as closely linked to multi-dimensional poverty. Previously, SDC’s work on poverty was part of the Quality Assurance and Poverty Reduction Section. As a result of the F4P reorganisation, the LNOB role (and with it, poverty reduction) was moved into the Peace, Governance and Equality Section as a full-time policy adviser position. In 2024, the position was merged with the Advice and Coordination of the Agenda 2030 function (and reduced to 30% of an FTE). For SECO, LNOB is not an explicit objective. Across government units, additional training and awareness-raising efforts are still needed to ensure that LNOB considerations consistently inform programme and project design.
Switzerland has made significant progress on promoting gender equality through development co-operation, yet more can be done. Over 2021-2022, 71.4% of Switzerland’s bilateral allocable aid targeted gender equality and women’s empowerment, a significant increase from previous years and well above the DAC average of 42% (OECD, 2023[22]). In 2020, SECO took steps to receive more disaggregated data in its reporting framework by requiring project implementers to provide information on the type and scope of contributions for reducing gender inequality. With the help of gender disaggregated indicators and more gender-sensitive reporting, SDC and SECO are aiming to make the relevance of the gender dimension more comprehensive and visible. It will be important to ensure that this is done across all development areas, as well as via new partnerships, including with women’s rights organisations. Increased financing for gender equality could lead to stronger development outcomes.
Switzerland prioritises the prevention of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (PSEAH) and is considered amongst the better performers for its implementation of the recommendation (OECD, 2025[32]). Substantial dialogue between country offices and implementing partners is a key objective. By the end of 2023, 30 Swiss representations were PSEAH-active, an increase from 20 in 2022, and with a target of 40 by 2024. SDC has developed a detailed internal "How-to Note" to guide management and staff in handling SEAH cases within partner organisations, emphasising a survivor- and victim-centred approach. A whistleblowing platform covering SDC and SECO is operational and actively used, influencing dialogues with partner agencies, including multilateral organisations. Additionally, Switzerland remains an active member of international donor co-ordination groups, reinforcing its commitment to PSEAH principles.
Both SDC and SECO require project implementers to report on their contributions to reducing gender inequality and poverty. Digital tools such as RDM have enabled better data collection on results disaggregated by gender and LNOB outcomes. The initial investment to develop the tool was substantial, but the tool has improved the ability to track and report on how programmes impact marginalised and vulnerable groups, contributing to greater accountability and visibility of gender equality and LNOB outcomes. However, there are still gaps in understanding its full potential, and the extent to which LNOB and gender equality considerations influence programme and project design. These could be addressed through training, toolkits or stronger institutional incentives, including increased resources for these issues.
Switzerland has also improved the monitoring of disability considerations in projects. The concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to the Initial State Party Report of Switzerland 2022 recommended that Switzerland use the DAC disability marker more consistently (UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2022[33]). An analysis of the marker shows that only 3% of all Swiss development and humanitarian projects aimed to be disability inclusive in 2020, increasing to 4.8% in 2022. However, the number of projects screened with the disability marker has increased from 57% in 2020 to 100% in 2022. Also, while the inclusion of disability in programming remained at around 3%, spending on disability increased from 2.8% to 5.5% between 2020 and 2022.
Stronger evaluation systems drive more impactful development co-operation
SDC and SECO carry out thematic, institutional, country programme and project evaluations. SDC’s Evaluation and Controlling Unit sets SDC’s evaluation policy standards and manages the implementation of thematic, institutional and selected country programme evaluations. The unit currently has 2.5 FTEs for its evaluation function. In comparison, SECO, despite having a much smaller programme, has 1.2 FTE in its evaluation unit. SDC conducts 80 to 100 project evaluations, and 5 to 6 large thematic/institutional and country programme evaluations per year. Independent thematic and institutional evaluations and evaluations of co-operation programmes for regions or individual countries are commissioned by the Evaluation and Controlling Unit on behalf of SDC’s senior management. Project evaluations are managed by operational units at headquarters or in country offices. SECO conducts 25 to 30 evaluations as well as one independent thematic or strategic evaluation per year, commissioned by its independent evaluation committee.
Evaluations are used mostly for strategic learning and decision making. There is systematic follow-up of the recommendations and management responses to the thematic/institutional and country programme evaluations. For example, the 2019 evaluation of the links between humanitarian aid and development co-operation was the basis for organisational reforms in the Fit 4 Purpose process. SECO is currently preparing a new country co-operation programme for South Africa: an external review of the overall SECO country programme has been undertaken and has informed the new strategy. In Zimbabwe, a mid-term-review of the country co-operation programme is scheduled for 2025. This review will inform potential adjustments to the current and future country programme. SECO in South Africa and SDC in Zimbabwe use evaluations to steer new project phases where context or performance warrant this.
Evaluations are increasingly sophisticated, but also resource intensive. Switzerland has introduced several measures to improve its evaluation systems. SDC has revised its evaluation guidance (in May 2024) (SDC, 2024[34]); contracted technical support from the Federal Institute of Technology (ETH)35 and the University of Zurich for backstopping one or two impact evaluations per year until 2030; and introduced 8 to 10 ex-post evaluations to assess long-term sustainability of projects. High staff turnover and a 10% reduction in human resources at headquarters, however, could weaken the quality and consistency of evaluations. SECO plans to increase the number of ex-post evaluations (currently 10% of its evaluations) in the coming period. Both SDC and SECO are training staff in evaluation. PHRD has adapted its evaluation policy and in the future will more consistently evaluate its involvement in peace processes, peace programmes and diplomatic initiatives, instead of evaluating projects.
A report by the Parliamentary Control Committee of the Council of States identified strengths and some weaknesses in the evaluation system. The report assessed the measurement of development co-operation effectiveness and found that evaluation costs are adequate and that the large centrally managed evaluations are of good quality (Control Committee of the Council of States, 2023[35]). Project evaluations were found to be useful for steering new phases (or decisions to close programmes). However, the report also found that project evaluations were less useful for accountability because approaches and rigour vary too much. Three areas for further improvement were identified by the Federal Council in the IC Strategy 2025-28: (1) the quality of the data; (2) digitalisation; and (3) the communication of development outcomes. The report does not acknowledge the learning value of locally led evaluations. As SDC, SECO and PHRD work on addressing the recommendations of the Control Committee of the Council of States through a joint committee, it will be important to protect the role of evaluations for learning and decision-making. Responding to increased expectations on the quality of evaluations will require sufficient and stable human resources with evaluation expertise.
Joint evaluations involving SDC, SECO, and PHRD are still the exception as institutional differences and resource constraints make collaboration difficult. The evaluation services of SDC, SECO and PHRD work closely together and do aim for joint evaluations wherever possible and useful. However, decision making for a joint evaluation is not always feasible based on each department’s evaluation planning and resources. SDC and SECO conducted parallel evaluations on private sector engagement (PSE) and climate because their institutional needs and expectations differed, as did their focus, scope and timing. Currently, SECO and SDC are working on a joint backstopping mandate to assess the quality of evaluations and produce a biennial (internal) synthesis report. This increased collaboration is strongly encouraged and could pave the way to more joint evaluations, such as the one planned on multilateral organisations.
Switzerland can build on progress in its results-based management and evaluation to ensure its development co-operation remains relevant and impactful. The three government units could move towards a joint results data management system, capitalising on SDC’s RDM. The quality of project evaluations could become more consistent through closer guidance and training for staff. Impact evaluations could better demonstrate meaningful results that secure public and political support. Innovative practices, such as the local level opinion survey project36 in Zimbabwe, could be replicated and scaled up if successful. All this will require sufficient resources – it will therefore be crucial to maintain or increase resources to improve results management and evaluations in the coming years.
A learning culture is being nurtured, but more knowledge sharing is needed
There is strong demand for knowledge sharing and learning across the three government units, their partners and beneficiaries. Improvements in the RBM system have strengthened the institutional capacity for learning and strategic planning. In addition, initiatives such as the learning journey on working in authoritarian contexts (Box 3), including regional workshops and thematic face-to-face meetings, have promoted knowledge sharing. At SECO, the biennial National Programme Officer week fosters expertise sharing across its co-operation offices, and one-week staff exchanges in South Africa and Ghana are valued by staff. SDC also organised a National Programme Officer learning and exchange week in November 2024. In Zimbabwe, the very challenging political and economic context generates a clear demand from embassy staff, project implementers and beneficiaries for more knowledge exchange and more investment in solid context diagnostics. SDC will continue quarterly deep dives and strategic workshops in Zimbabwe to keep track of higher-level results and issues. However, the demand and need for more mutual learning cannot be met if staff time is entirely dedicated to programme management. As highlighted above (Development co-operation staff are professional and knowledgeable, but staffing in fragile contexts remains a challenge), additional human resources are needed in fragile contexts and politically constrained environments.
There are opportunities to improve knowledge management to promote learning across countries and government units. A specific missed opportunity relates to the phasing out of PHRD’s highly regarded development programme in Zimbabwe in 2023. The intervention included facilitation of dialogue between parties on the highly sensitive Gukurahundi genocide that took place between 1983 and 1987,37 and the posting of a human security adviser. No synthesis document was shared with embassy staff, and the knowledge of it resides today in one NPO and the Swiss Ambassador who was deputy head of PHRD before becoming Ambassador to Zimbabwe. The lessons from this intervention would be useful for SDC’s current work. In addition, lessons from two successful SDC programmes in Zimbabwe (the Markets and Seeds Access Project and Energy and Environment Partnership Africa Trust Fund) are not used to inform other bilateral programmes implemented by NGOs and multilaterals. In addition, enhanced knowledge exchange between SDC and SECO could further strengthen Switzerland’s development outcomes (Partnering effectively with the private sector).
Budget and time constraints risk limiting resources for greatly needed and appreciated reflection and learning. Time and resources for reflection are an easy target when budgets tighten, but sacrificing learning risks undermining the quality of co-operation. The pressure to demonstrate value for money may restrict the space to learn lessons from failures, limiting the potential for improvement and increasing the room for mistakes. Switzerland could look into experiences from other DAC members, such as the “fail test” from the Dutch Directorate General for International Cooperation, where colleagues openly share and learn from each other's failures (OECD, 2023[36]). This approach encourages transparency and continuous improvement by acknowledging and analysing unsuccessful experiences.
Switzerland can further invest in strategic communication and awareness raising
Communicating the outcomes and benefits of development co-operation is vital for securing public and political support. ETH Zürich has carried out the Swiss Panel Global Cooperation survey since 2021 (ETH Zürich, 2024[3]). This representative survey shows that the share of the Swiss population that supports increased public spending on development co-operation increased from 50% in 2021 to 58% in 2023, with another 30% in favour of maintaining the development co-operation budget at its current level. However, political backing and trust has declined, especially compared to other important domestic policy issues such as military spending and social security, and efforts to improve public understanding of Switzerland’s international co-operation have not kept pace with the challenges.
Technical language and confidentiality sometimes make it hard to communicate about Switzerland’s international co-operation. There is generally a positive perception of Switzerland’s international co-operation in partner countries. At domestic level, opinions are more diverse. In some cases, the confidentiality or sensitivity of work prevents results from being disseminated. This is the case for Swiss support to Financial Investigation Units, or PHRD’s mediation and human security advice. For SECO, the technocratic character of projects sometimes makes it hard to communicate project results to a wider public. All three government units recognise that there is no co-ordinated strategy to communicate the positive impact of Swiss development co-operation more effectively. A compelling narrative that speaks to domestic constituencies, coupled with appropriate instruments and resources, could be developed to raise awareness of the impact of Swiss support for global development.
Funding for development awareness and communication strategies has decreased. SDC’s budget for promoting development awareness, which includes domestic communication, has fallen from USD 12.4 million in 2019 to USD 2.6 million in 2023 (OECD, 2023[22]). While there is a general downward trend across DAC members, the Swiss reduction (from 0.48% of total ODA in 2019 to 0.07% in 2023) is more severe than for other DAC members.38 SDC’s public communication function is now shared with the FDFA General Secretariat, where it has to compete with other foreign policy objectives. SDC manages social media channels, the website and internal communication and the FDFA General Secretariat issues official press releases. The 2020 NGO campaign for Responsible Business Conduct legislation antagonised politicians and triggered a sharp debate on the difference between advocacy and political work. NGOs had always been prohibited from using SDC funds for political work, but the polemic around the referendum resulted in an FDFA decision to no longer fund educational and awareness-raising work by NGOs in Switzerland (Reality of Aid, 2021[37]).39 Switzerland could reconsider the benefits of the OECD’s Development Communicators Network to facilitate access to innovative practices developed by other DAC members (OECD, 2024[38]).
There is unexploited potential to improve communication and awareness raising. SDC has started building a network of communicators, including in HQ and the external network, and could diversify the channels used to get messages out. Success stories are underused in public discourse, and include SDC’s contributions to water management in the MENA region, which reduced regional tensions and fostered dialogue; and SECO’s contribution to avoid a water shortage in Cape Town.40 A greater focus on themes that speak to people (climate, employment) could be explored. Engaging churches, businesses, and other influential stakeholders could help build a stronger voice for international co-operation. Communication could not only be based on data, but could also include emotions and stories that captivate public interest. The “human factor” tends to get lost in the focus on evidence. External stakeholders could be provided with more tailored information, not only focusing on results, but also the “human factor”. A strategic effort that lives up to Switzerland’s international standing is a challenge to be taken on.
5. To enhance results management and learning, Switzerland should harmonise the use of the digital Results Data Management platform across SDC, SECO, and PHRD; continue with joint evaluations where relevant; and strengthen the use of evaluation findings in the work of thematic sections, internal networks, learning journeys and regional meetings.
6. To improve public and political support for its international co-operation, Switzerland should take a more strategic approach to communication, developing a compelling narrative that highlights Switzerland’s international reputation, the domestic benefits of development co-operation, and Swiss contributions to sustainable development and global stability.
Switzerland’s long-term support to fragile contexts is greatly valued
Switzerland's international co-operation strategy acknowledges that the instability of international relations is leading to a world that is “less global, less influenced by the West and less democratic” (FDFA, 2024[2]). Switzerland considers that international co-operation has a role in responding to these challenges. It also recognises that it is in Switzerland’s interest to support peace and stability efforts as long as possible in countries experiencing crises.
A strong conceptual body of work drives Switzerland’s engagement in fragile or autocratic contexts. Drawing on its technical expertise, dense network, and regular evaluations, SDC has developed several notes to guide the response to autocratisation in partner countries (SDC, 2024[39]) (Box 3). In addition, SDC’s ambitious F4P process aims to increase the coherence and complementarity of Switzerland's various instruments in fragile or crisis contexts. This makes Switzerland one of the DAC members to have most significantly integrated the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus approach into its operational model.
In 2023, Switzerland restarted its allocation increase to the most fragile contexts. The increase comes after a drop in 2022, that was also marked by a consistent allocation to Ukraine (Figure 6). ODA to Ukraine grew from USD 45 million in 2021, to USD 236 million in 2022 after Russia’s war of aggression began and decreased to 161 million in 2023. While this reflects good reactivity to a new political priority, the support was not fully in addition to ODA to other fragile contexts.
Note: Ukraine is not listed amongst the most fragile contexts in the OECD fragility framework, see https://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/overview/0/.
Source: OECD (2025[17]) Creditor Reporting System, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c.
The ability to stay engaged meaningfully in complex environments is a critical asset
Switzerland is seen as a genuine development partner, and not a political threat, in the most difficult political contexts. Switzerland proposes a very practical approach to its international co-operation. It strives to sustain a dialogue with the national authorities in a way that is not seen as patronising or a political danger, even to autocratic regimes. This fosters a sufficient climate of trust to give Switzerland the ability to raise sensitive issues with the government, and to some extent to protect its local partners where civic space has shrunk. For example, in Zimbabwe, a civil society organisation (CSO) representative explained to the review team how he was only able to organise a public event because it was supported by SDC.
Switzerland's peace and mediation capacity is solid. Switzerland’s ability to bring together parties to a conflict is recognised, and it can deploy its large mediation network in conflict situations through its Peace and Human Rights Division (PHRD), which is part of the State Secretariat of the FDFA. The scope of PHRD action is broad, and its engagement can be amplified in contexts where Switzerland has also invested significant development resources, such as in Nepal and Mozambique. Switzerland also maintains an Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding (SEP) that highlights the country’s expertise and visibility in peacebuilding (FDFA, 2024[40]).
The perception of Swiss neutrality is an important asset for its mediation capacity. Switzerland's declared neutrality and the fact that it did not have any colonies bolster its credibility as an honest broker in the peace processes it engages in via PHRD. Neutrality does not mean a lack of values, however, and Swiss international co-operation is decidedly guided by DAC principles such as democracy, rule of law, peace, human rights, gender equality, freedom and leaving no one behind (OECD, 2023[41]). For Switzerland, upholding these principles should not necessarily lead to political confrontation, but they are an asset for a political dialogue. Consequently, Switzerland views its growing civilian support for Ukraine as compatible with its reputation as a bridge-builder. Support to Ukraine is a key priority in its Foreign Policy Strategy (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2024[42]). However, that emphasis puts Switzerland in a position where its “co-operative neutrality” (Federal Council, 2022[43]) needs to be carefully explained, especially as it reopens a recurring debate within Swiss society.
The options available to stay engaged during crises depend on how partnerships were built previously and on the flexibility to adjust the programmes. Switzerland takes pride in being a reliable partner. One aspect of reliability is to remain engaged in countries during times of political misalignment, and as long as a partnership remains possible. Swiss engagement in times of political estrangement much depends on context knowledge, in-country presence, the nature of the programmes, and the partnerships established before the crisis. Being a decentralised country itself, Switzerland will generally have built partnerships at the subnational level, and these local networks and contacts have proven critical when the central government is not the primary entry point for development programming. Flexibility to shift to other partners or adapt programmes and modalities in line with what is needed and feasible remains key to make the best of these partnerships. For example, the SDC programme in Burkina Faso, where SDC has been present since 1974, showcases how a sustained long-term approach, combined with support to decentralisation, can lead to a de facto locally led approach (OECD, 2024[21]).
In 2023, 25 of SDC’s 35 priority countries were considered autocratic. Globally, two out of three people in the world live in non-democratic regimes, or in countries experiencing a democratic backslide. Switzerland favours staying engaged in such contexts, and adapts its programmes to the changing context, because of its mandate to leave no one behind, but also because it sees it as a more efficient approach than withdrawing and re-entering a country later. However, this approach comes with dilemmas and trade-offs. How can SDC continue to work in a country without legitimising an illegitimate government that oppresses their people? What programmatic adaptations and shifts are required?
In order to better adjust its engagement in authoritarian contexts, SDC embarked on a two-year learning journey (2021-2023). This included a conceptual reflection on governance in authoritarian contexts, research pieces on authoritarian developmental states, authoritarianism and fragility and gender, as well as working aid, which synthesised concrete lessons from five SDC countries that faced democratic backsliding (Serbia, Tanzania, Nicaragua, Burundi, and Myanmar). The process responded to a growing demand form Swiss representations abroad, and the approach actively involved staff in the external network, including through region-specific exchanges.
Based on this learning, SDC has prepared guidance (Swiss Development Agency, 2023[44]) to help SDC external network staff to prepare their response to rising authoritarianism. It includes key questions and options based on the type and speed of democratic backsliding (e.g. gradual vs. rapid autocratisation) to help staff define tailor-made responses. Some of the key findings are as follows:
In situations of creeping democratic backslide, SDC offices generally opt for incremental adaptations of their programme: partnerships with the government are reviewed, but SDC continues technical interventions or engagements with government counterparts at a local level. In parallel, SDC starts to diversify its portfolio of partners, working more with CSOs, international organisations and independent media.
In situations of steep democratic backslide, SDC often freezes programmes, particularly those delivered through the government, but increases work with CSOs and the private sector.
In situations of democratic collapse, SDC offices stop working with the government altogether. Programmes are shifted away from government to CSOs and the UN, particularly enhancing humanitarian aid.
These notes were discussed internally in virtual meetings of the SDC Governance Network and in regional workshops. The learning journey gives Switzerland a leading role in sharing knowledge and expertise, especially since it is now a co-lead of both INCAF and GovNet networks within the DAC. Through these networks, Switzerland also steers reflection with other DAC members.
Source: SDC (2024[39]), Peace, Governance and Equality thematic networks, available at www.sdc-pge.ch/en.
The humanitarian response is being modernised, and F4P can yield even more results
Switzerland is a predictable and reliable humanitarian donor. It increased its humanitarian aid from USD 342.6 million in 2018 to USD 582.7 million in 2023, keeping the humanitarian share of its ODA above 13%, and increasing to close to 16% in 2023 (OECD, 2025[17]). Switzerland has decided to extend its humanitarian effort to up to 25% of its overall portfolio by 2028. This increase was decided in the new strategy, partly to avoid successive requests to parliament for supplementary budget whenever a new crisis flares up, and partly to protect a generally less contentious budget than the development one. This percentage would give Switzerland the highest fixed percentage of humanitarian ODA among DAC members, based on 2022 rates.41 This increased budget, managed by joint humanitarian-development geographical desks, can also refine Switzerland’s approach to crisis response.
Switzerland is more than a humanitarian donor – it is also a direct humanitarian actor and advocate. Switzerland takes pride in being the custodian of the Geneva Conventions, which gives more strength to its humanitarian diplomacy. Switzerland uses this important and defining legacy to push specific agenda such as protection of humanitarian and UN personnel, coinciding with the 75th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions (FDFA, 2024[45]). It also builds upon a pool of expertise in the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit in supporting international responses (SDC, 2024[46]). Expert staff are sent to emergencies or protracted crisis contexts to implement activities directly, are seconded to multilateral organisations, or are deployed to manage humanitarian offices or support embassies and co-operation offices for a specific time. In addition, PHRD’s section on humanitarian diplomacy brings to a political level those humanitarian issues that can only be solved politically, such as humanitarian access, de-mining, etc. (FDFA, 2024[47]). These direct humanitarian actions give Switzerland much expertise and credibility, notably when it discusses humanitarian policies and standards with duty-bearers and with its multilateral partners through its “elevator approach” (Strategic multilateral support promotes effectiveness).
SDC’s ambitious reform is driven by coherence and complementarity. In 2019, a political decision guided SDC to reorganise its structure. This initiative culminated in 2022 with the F4P process (One common strategy for two federal departments, three responsible government units and five commitment credits). One objective of the process was to enhance the coherence of SDC’s programmes across the HDP nexus. A notable result of this reorganisation was that SDC's humanitarian and development units were consolidated into single geographical desks. Humanitarian and development specialists are now collaborating on joint analysis and programming, including dialogue with multilateral partners who are also increasingly working across the blurred lines between humanitarian and development support, emergency and long-term operations. While this was technically possible before, the reform makes it also easier to respond to crises with a “Swiss offer”. The process is partial, however: though humanitarian and development desks are now joined up, budget lines remain separate, which certainly limits the scope of the process and the logic of the reorganisation, and in reality, silos somewhat remain. At a time when the development budget is more at risk than the broadly accepted humanitarian one, preserving an extended humanitarian budget was seen as more important than risking a cut to a joint budget. This pragmatism balances desired policy outcomes with the political realities driving budget allocations.
The reform aims to shift the organisational culture and allow a modernised crisis response model to emerge. The F4P process is allowing for longer-term planning of humanitarian funds and greater complementarity in response to protracted crises. With the HDP nexus approach now a clear pillar of Switzerland’s international co-operation, and with a bigger humanitarian budget, the elements are now in place to extend the remit of humanitarian assistance beyond the classical cluster-based humanitarian system. Switzerland can engage in broader crisis response, supporting sectors and basic services that are not traditional humanitarian activities, but that remain key to people affected by decade-long crises (OECD, 2019[48]; Cliffe et al., 2023[49]).
A political and conflict-sensitive analysis of Switzerland’s international co-operation portfolio is needed in all settings, not only in contexts already in crisis. Across Switzerland’s foreign policy and development system, fragility often refers to crises, conflict or political estrangement. However, fragility is not related only to conflict. Many of Switzerland’s partner countries are economically or politically stable, yet they display important features of fragility. As Switzerland seeks new development partnerships based on economic co-operation, a political approach is needed that links diplomacy and development to identify power dynamics and crisis risks, as well as important aspects of resilience building and stabilisation.
Swiss risk assessment is solid for fragile contexts but could be updated. The Monitoring System for Development-Related Changes (MERV) is SDC’s tool to assess risks and analyse context across different sectors. The MERV is a mandatory process that can be repeated depending on the nature of the risks identified. It is a useful tool that has stood the test of time; it was last updated in 2013. However, it is used unevenly across contexts and sometimes lacks any impact of the analysis on the course of operations. There is scope for the MERV to integrate some of the conceptual progresses induced by the F4P process, for example on long-term programming and impact assessment. Doing so would promote its systematic use across SDC’s portfolio.
Co-ordination, dialogue and networking should be valued and incentivised as much as managing programmes. In challenging contexts, development issues such as human rights, gender equality and resilience building are highly sensitive and can escalate quickly. For both expatriate and national staff in embassies, making an impact requires political understanding, networking skills, and the ability to build trust and influence. These skills are equally as important as those required for project cycle management, and if the F4P is to influence the corporate culture of SDC, these less tangible and measurable aspects of staff time will need to be valued more and given greater recognition (Engagement criteria have driven progress, but a narrower approach to Swiss interests would be a risk). For example, as demonstrated in Zimbabwe, an effective combination of aid, diplomacy and co-ordination raises Switzerland's profile in the international community and enables it to influence the political dialogue more effectively.
Greater institutional clarity will enhance work on development, peace and stability
PHRD uses a highly flexible model of engagement (Box 4). Deliberately small and agile, PHRD’s role is to seize opportunities to open peace processes and conduct mediation. To support this objective and its humanitarian diplomacy, PHRD also implements or funds limited development programmes that have clear peace objectives. As seen in Zimbabwe, these programmes with local CSOs are locally identified and managed, notably in countries hosting a Human Security advisor. In Zimbabwe, SDC is building its peace and governance portfolio based on PHRD’s former interventions. SDC also benefits from the trust and reputation established by PHRD’s work, and vice versa.
As for many DAC members, the peace element of an HDP nexus approach remains more complex to integrate. Within SDC, a thematic Peace, Governance and Equality (PGE) section has been created. Since its creation and following the directorate’s recommendation of the HDP Nexus Learning Journey (2021) to clarify how SDC contributes to peace, PGE established a peace mapping that identified 118 ongoing SDC programmes that contribute to peace. These programmes are initiated by the co-operation offices, and PGE has an advisory role on conflict-sensitivity, creating knowledge and visibility around this theme. Through its networks, PGE is also the knowledge centre for issues like peace, human rights and culture, governance, gender equality and social inclusion (Box 4) (SDC, 2024[50]). PHRD, on the other hand, is a competence centre for the promotion of peace, human rights, and democracy, operating directly with conflict parties. While their mandates and activities are distinct, there is scope to shore up links between the two entities. Current work in PGE on the different aspects of peace across the HDP Nexus provide a fertile ground to reinforce these links further in order to strengthen Swiss impact on international peace, development and security.
Embassies could be better supported on peace issues. Switzerland can learn, for example, from PHRD’s withdrawal from Zimbabwe in order to create an institutional knowledge resource on peace. When PHRD withdrew from Zimbabwe, SDC consolidated most of PHRD’s previous partnerships with local partners, which is good practice. However, development and peace approaches to networking and programming are fundamentally different, and a backstopping function at PHRD or PGE could usefully support embassies who must deal with complex political issues without stand-alone resources to do so.
PHRD represents a unique asset for Switzerland, and is also a unique peace instrument amongst DAC members. Its mandate is to support peace processes and create the space for mediation and peace-related actions. As such, PHRD serves as a direct operator rather than a donor. It also works on important aspects of peace and reconciliation that can have a complex political dimension, such as dealing with the past or working on missing persons. Its humanitarian diplomacy component brings political attention to issues such as humanitarian access. PHRD’s expertise is acknowledged and in demand in peace and mediation communities, and while its financial portfolio is not large, it has had proven impact in several contexts, increasing Switzerland’s influence in that domain.
Deliberately opportunistic, PHRD’s business model is successful in that it is based on credible diplomacy, administrative agility and a strong network. For its operations to remain relevant, it must keep its structure relatively small. It has used SDC’s reorganisation as an opportunity to work more effectively across the foreign affairs system through an HDP nexus approach. For example, PHRD typically builds on SDC’s long-term presence in a country to assess the conflict environment and opportunities for peace processes and then starts building its own network. Conversely, SDC will strive to build on PHRD’s legacy when it leaves a country.
PHRD’s relatively limited capacity and budget force it to regularly evaluate its ability to deliver on Switzerland’s priorities. For example, it recently withdrew from Zimbabwe and South Sudan, not due to important peace and stability issues in these countries, but after an assessment that found that supporting processes in Sudan and Chad instead would be more important to Switzerland’s interests.
As for all peace and conflict prevention actors, measuring success is difficult when the use of resources for uncertain results is questioned. When the outcome – peace – is so complex in nature and dependent on so many factors, there cannot be a direct causal link between the resources invested by one actor and a positive output. Aware of this challenge, PHRD uses markers of its influence on peace processes more than quantifiable indicators, as these are more suitable for projects (FDFA, 2024[47]).
7. In order to improve its approach to fragility and towards peace objectives, Switzerland should:
a. apply a fragility analysis to all contexts, not just those in crisis
b. offer staff incentives to dedicate time to developing partnerships and deepening political understanding
Private sector support and collaboration is positive, but greater coherence would enhance impact
Private sector development (PSD) and private sector engagement (PSE) are clear priorities for Switzerland’s development co-operation. Private sector development42 includes all activities contributing to strengthening the private sector in partner countries, while private sector engagement refers specifically to activities that aim to engage the private sector (including the Swiss private sector) to achieve development results.43 ODA allocations for PSD have remained broadly stable in volume, and amounted to roughly USD 200 million in 2022 (Figure 7) (OECD, 2025[17]). While the volume is limited compared to overall Swiss ODA, this is a key priority for Switzerland, and to which both SDC and SECO contribute. Indeed, one of Switzerland’s four 2025-28 international co-operation objectives is “Sustainable economic development: Creating decent jobs through appropriate framework conditions, a vibrant local economy and the private sector” (FDFA, 2020[12]). In addition, the 2025-28 strategy identifies PSE among the implementation modalities and defines it as “cooperation of IC [international co-operation] with the private sector in implementing various development objectives” (FDFA, 2020[12]).44 In 2022, Switzerland mobilised USD 50 million from the private sector through simple co-financing and shares in collective investment vehicles (OECD, 2025[17]).
ODA volume associated with private sector development (2016-2023)
Source: OECD (2025[17]) Creditor Reporting System, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c.
The mandate of SECO’s economic development co-operation is to promote economic growth and sustainable prosperity in its partner countries, primarily middle-income countries. To achieve this goal, SECO focuses on three areas of work: the private sector, public institutions, and urban development and infrastructure. It mainly provides technical assistance and grants through eight business lines.45 Specifically, in the area of private sector development, SECO supports the creation of reliable economic framework conditions and initiatives that facilitate access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); vocational training programmes tailored to the needs of the labour market; and develops innovative financing solutions in collaboration with private actors to mobilise private capital in its partner countries (Box 5). SECO also offers debt and equity investments through two instruments: the Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging Markets (SIFEM), which is Switzerland’s development finance institution (below), and the SECO Start-up Fund.
SDC’s involvement with the private sector is more recent, but has been growing over the past few years, and is more focused on low-income countries. SDC adopted a General Guidance on the Private Sector in 2021 (FDFA, 2021[51]), and has published an SDC handbook on private sector engagement (FDFA, 2021[52]), both of which provide clarity on the rationale and modalities of co-operation with the private sector. SDC has also ramped up efforts to increase its private sector expertise with the Competence Center for Private Sector Engagement, now part of the newly created Economy and Education Section within the new thematic division, and which has been given additional resources. For SDC, private sector involvement in sustainable development focuses on the following four areas of activity: (1) economic policy frameworks (e.g. promoting the rule of law, as well as best practices in responsible business conduct); (2) promoting local companies in priority countries (e.g. vocational training and skills development, and grants for SMEs, notably in agriculture and tourism); (3) collaboration with the private sector, including Switzerland-based;46 and (4) sustainable public procurement.
Switzerland’s support to improving economic framework conditions is highly valued by partners. This is an area where results take time to materialise but help both local and international companies to thrive. While such activities are not counted in the OECD’s measurement of mobilisation, they can play a critical role in increasing private flows to middle and low-income countries.
Based on its own model of dual education, combining classroom instruction and on-the-job training, Switzerland actively supports vocational training in partner countries in a way that addresses the needs of the private sector. Technical assistance to SMEs and support to skills development are often managed “hand in hand” to help build the skills needed in the labour market. For instance, in South Africa, SECO supports businesses in the green economy and, in parallel, supports vocational education and training that is responsive to the skills requirements of the just transition. Technical and vocational education and training (TVET) is a priority for SDC’s private sector engagement. In Kosovo for instance, SDC has connected employers and jobseekers through online and offline job mediation services, including career guidance and skills training, which has contributed to reducing unemployment and driving economic growth.
Both SDC and SECO have long experience of supporting micro-entrepreneurs and SMEs. As an example, the Markets and Seeds Access Project in Zimbabwe has played a key role in helping smallholder farmers get access to the skills, inputs and market access they need to improve their sales and income. In South Africa, SECO has helped township entrepreneurs improve their skills to boost their sales.
Switzerland has piloted several results-based financing initiatives, an innovative technique that helps ensure that the private sector has incentives to deliver social outcomes. As an example, SDC provided financing to an energy company in Kenya in a way that encouraged outreach to underserved customers and brought in additional private investors to scale up the business model further. Switzerland also plays a role in supporting wider adoption of results-based financing at the global level through the Outcomes Accelerator, an initiative founded by SECO, FCDO, UBS Optimus Foundation and the Outcomes Finance Alliance. However, a 2024 review of results-based financing showed that in spite of positive results, take-up of this approach is still limited, and could be further institutionalised (Instiglio, 2024[53]).
Through the SDG Impact Finance Initiative (SIFI), Switzerland is mobilising Swiss private resources, along with other donors, to achieve development objectives. SECO and SDC launched the SIFI in 2021, which is a partnership between the Swiss Government and the UBS Optimus Foundation. It has three overarching objectives: supporting the design and development of innovative financial solutions, scaling and mainstreaming impact investment solutions, and improving framework conditions. While SIFI’s mobilisation target, to unlock up to USD 1 billion in private capital by 2030, will be hard to realise (of the USD 100 million targeted funds, SIFI had USD 35 million committed funds in 2024), the initiative has created positive engagement with the Swiss private sector and has also catalysed investments from Luxembourg. SIFI has supported innovative business models, such as Chancen in South Africa, where students repay their students loans when and if their resources allow for it.
Source: Interviews with SDC, SECO and SIFI; SIFI’s website, www.sdgimpactfinance.org; Instiglio (2024[53]), RBF Experience Review.
The Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging Markets (SIFEM) is a relatively young, small development finance institution (DFI) with an innovative management model. Formally established in 2011 under the leadership of SECO, SIFEM manages total assets of roughly USD 700 million, and over 2021-22 it disbursed on average USD 82 million. It is relatively small compared to other DAC members’ DFIs. Its objective is to promote long-term, sustainable and broad-based economic growth in developing and emerging countries by providing financial support through financial intermediaries to commercially viable SMEs. It mainly provides equity financing to investment fund structures (64% of disbursements) followed by loans (36%). SIFEM is therefore by and large a fund of funds structure. By providing financing to early-stage investment funds in emerging markets,47 SIFEM aims at mobilising private resources in partner countries and promoting the development of local investment funds. In order to increase the exposure in least developed countries (LDCs), in 2021 SDC established a first-loss guarantee scheme which can be made available to SIFEM’s high-risk investments.48 SIFEM is the only DFI within the DAC which is managed by a private fund manager,49 something that is valued by investees. Beyond financial support, SIFEM also provides technical assistance to its investees so that final beneficiaries can, for example, make progress on governance standards. SIFEM’s investment guidelines include the concept of additionality,50 which is checked ex ante. SIFEM collaborates with other development finance institutions on common standards and transactions.51 However, it can make further progress on transparency, as it came third-last among the 21 DFIs assessed in the 2023 DFI transparency index (Publish What You Fund, 2023[54]).52
Note: Average disbursements in 2022-23 if not indicated otherwise. For BUILD Fund and PIDG (Private Infrastructure Development Group), amounts reflect total commitments from donors, and not Switzerland contributions exclusively. ABC = Agriculture Business Capital.
Source: Authors, based on OECD (2025[17]), Creditor Reporting System, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c, PIDG website www.pidg.org/ and UNDCF (2022[55]), “US$60+ million in commitments for UN-affiliated impact investment vehicle announced at the Finance for Development Forum”, https://www.uncdf.org/article/7668/us60-million-in-commitments-for-un-affiliated-impact-investment-vehicle-announced-at-the-finance-for-development-forum.
SDC and SECO have increased co-ordination and collaboration since the 2019 peer review. SECO and SDC operate under the common 2021-24 international co-operation strategy, prepare a joint accountability report, and have joint country programmes in their seven shared priority countries. SECO and SDC also have joint geographic steering committees, as well as two joint thematic committees on evaluations and on multilaterals.53 They have also worked on common initiatives such as SIFI.
However, further sharing of expertise, lessons learned, and joint evaluations for thematic areas that both SDC and SECO are covering would be beneficial to maximise Switzerland’s impact. SECO and SDC sometimes operate in different countries but on similar themes – such as economic framework conditions, skills development, or SME support (Figure 8). These projects often operate in silos with limited opportunities for knowledge exchange and mutual learning. SDC’s thematic networks are open to SECO staff, and are good ways to promote knowledge sharing, but awareness and participation by SECO staff are limited and SECO has its own networks, such as the private sector engagement network. Joint evaluations of shared themes or instruments could be beneficial. As an example, Switzerland recently undertook two parallel evaluations of private sector engagement:54 one for SDC and one for SECO, which was a missed opportunity to improve Switzerland’s engagement as a whole (see Stronger evaluation systems drive more impactful development co-operation).
There are opportunities to create links across Switzerland’s instruments, notably between technical assistance and investments. In Nepal, SDC’s capacity-building work to make small businesses bankable was complemented by SIFEM’s loans to two commercial banks lending to SMEs. These commercial banks were made aware of the list of SMEs that were supported by SDC, and some of these SMEs received financing. However, in most cases embassies do not work closely with projects supported by Swiss instruments such as SIFI or SIFEM, and are sometimes not aware of them. Building on the positive experience in Nepal, Switzerland could make further efforts to link its various instruments. Using existing country co-operation programmes to include SIFEM’s objectives and SIFI’s activities, as well as other multilateral investment funds supported by Switzerland,55 could help increase linkages across instruments. As an example, Finland’s country strategies systematically include Finland’s DFI’s contribution. Similarly, Belgium has piloted orientation notes to leverage knowledge from engagement with multilaterals to feed into bilateral programmes. As a first step, Switzerland could create opportunities for dialogue across its partners. For instance, in South Africa, SECO’s support to municipalities to prepare bankable water infrastructure projects could potentially be of interest to fund managers supported by SIFEM. Similarly, SIFI’s investments in innovative business models could help pave the way for SIFEM’s investments in more mature companies. Creating such opportunities for dialogue could help articulate the links across instruments and identify areas for complementarity. Such an approach could help ensure that Switzerland makes the best of its various instruments.
There is scope for greater coherence when engaging with multilateral partners on private sector development. The fact that some multilateral partners are required to partner either with SDC or with SECO can limit their effectiveness with regards to earmarked funding. Switzerland, as a shareholder of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and represented by the Swiss Federal Councillor and Head of the EAER (which oversees SECO), encourages IFC to invest more in LDCs. SECO itself, however, being one of the major donors to the IFC, focuses its bilateral funding on its 13 priority countries, which are not LDCs. Similarly, SDC is in charge of collaboration with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which makes it challenging for IFAD to access SECO’s private sector expertise.56 More flexibility between SECO and SDC when engaging with multilaterals could increase multilateral effectiveness and Swiss added value within these multilateral institutions (see Strategic multilateral support promotes effectiveness).
Finally, there are opportunities for greater knowledge sharing on investment funds. Switzerland supports a variety of investment funds in collaboration with other donors, which is a positive way to pool expertise and resources. As an example, through SECO, Switzerland is one of the founding members of PIDG, an infrastructure development and finance organisation funded by seven governments and the IFC. In addition, through SDC, Switzerland has been a leading donor in the creation of the Agri-Business Capital, which invests in smallholder farmers and rural SMEs in developing countries. SDC also represents Switzerland in the BUILD Fund, managed by the UN Capital Development Fund (UNDCF), and funded by several development partners57 to finance small and medium-sized businesses in LDCs to help achieve the SDGs. Increasing knowledge sharing across SDC and SECO on these various funds could help increase Switzerland’s effectiveness.
Switzerland currently leads the way on untying aid but the upcoming partially tied-aid programme in Ukraine puts this at risk
Switzerland currently leads the way on untying aid. Based on ODA covered by the Recommendation on Untying,58 Switzerland reported 100% of its aid as untied in 2022, similar to previous years, which is well above the 89% DAC average. Looking at all bilateral ODA beyond the coverage of the Recommendation, Switzerland reported 97.3% as untied, compared to 79.9% for the DAC as a group. However, Switzerland has one tied aid programme: the SECO Start-up fund. It is a relatively small programme,59 providing loans for start-up business projects by Swiss-domiciled enterprises operating in emerging economies. SECO may want to explore how this fund could do more to benefit local companies in its priority countries. Keeping ODA untied is key to ensuring value for money for development co-operation, promote recipient country ownership, and maintain Switzerland’s reputation as a principled donor.
Switzerland is proactive in ensuring that its domestic companies benefit from multilateral and Swiss development co-operation procurement opportunities, but without tying ODA. Both SECO and SDC provide information to Swiss companies on procurement opportunities from multilateral organisations supported by Switzerland. In South Africa, collaboration between the SECO development co-operation team and the Swiss business hub (Switzerland’s export promotion team) allows Swiss companies to be informed of upcoming procurement opportunities. This collaboration also helps the development co-operation team gather feedback on key bottlenecks faced by Swiss companies, which can then feed into SECO’s support to South African growth.
Some of Switzerland’s development co-operation programmes are linked to Swiss economic interests, but managed in a way that delivers impact in partner countries. SECO’s flagship Swiss Import Promotion Programme (SIPPO) aims at bridging the last mile between exporters in partner countries and importers in Switzerland and the EU by strengthening the capacity of local business support organisations such as chambers of commerce, business associations and trade promotion service providers. This support is focused on 13 priority countries, and in 6 sectors relevant to Swiss companies.60 As an example, in South Africa, SIPPO helps local businesses in the essential oils sector develop export strategies and integrate into global supply chains. This support helps these companies increase their sales and is also beneficial to the Swiss pharmaceutical and cosmetics industry which have access to a broader array of suppliers. Similarly, Swiss companies sometimes support Switzerland’s vocational education programmes, which on the one hand improve young people’s employability and income in partner countries, while also helping Swiss companies improve access to skilled workers. For example, Geberit – a Swiss sanitary technology company – and SDC co-finance a collaboration to improve the quality of vocational education and training for plumbers in Ukraine.
However, the upcoming partially tied aid programme in Ukraine puts Switzerland’s development impact and standing at risk. Out of the CHF 1.5 billion earmarked for Ukraine in the 2025-28 IC Strategy, CHF 500 million will be made available to involve the private sector, especially Swiss companies. While Swiss companies may have a comparative advantage in some sectors, evidence has shown that tied ODA can increase project costs by as much as 15-30% (Clay, 2009[56]). Untying ODA, on the other hand, frees up the recipient to procure goods and services from virtually any country, thus avoiding unnecessary costs. In particular, the Federal Council plans to involve Swiss companies in preparatory studies for reconstruction projects in Ukraine. By tying these upstream feasibility studies to Swiss companies, Switzerland could informally tie downstream construction contracts, for example by having a bias towards Swiss technologies and know-how. In order to select the most effective options in its development co-operation, Switzerland should ensure that its upcoming programme in Ukraine is untied.
Policy coherence on trade and illicit financial flows has improved, but benefits for partner countries are hard to establish
Switzerland actively fosters policy coherence in sustainable trade through free trade agreements and multistakeholder platforms. A prime example is the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states and Indonesia, signed in 2018, which includes sustainability provisions for palm oil trade, addressing concerns about labour rights, environmental protection and corporate social responsibility (EFTA, 2018[57]). The approach aims to balance economic growth with social well-being. However, this has yet to result in increased imports of sustainable palm oil from Indonesia to Switzerland, despite complementary capacity building of farmer associations by SECO. The sustainability clauses put high compliance burdens on producers and there is no guaranteed import of sustainable palm oil by Swiss companies. Since the agreement was signed only one tank (21 tonnes) of sustainable palm oil has reached Switzerland from Indonesia, mainly because importers already have established suppliers, notably in the Salomon islands and Côte d’Ivoire (World Integrated Trade Solutions, n.d.[58]). Switzerland is now striving to introduce more systematic sustainability impact assessments when negotiating free trade agreements, such as between EFTA and Thailand or with MERCOSUR. At the World Trade Organization (WTO), Switzerland was part of a compact plurilateral group of countries promoting the adoption of an Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS), aiming to use trade policy instruments related to environmental goods and services, fossil fuel subsidies or voluntary ecolabels to support the transition to low-emission, climate-resilient and sustainable economies.
Multistakeholder platforms strive to make value chains sustainable for products emblematic of Switzerland's economy. SECO has supported initiatives that include the Better Gold Initiative (BGI), the Swiss Platform for Sustainable Cocoa (SWISSCO), and the Swiss Sustainable Coffee Platform (SSCP), with the aim to improve transparency and sustainability in supply chains by encouraging responsible sourcing practices. These initiatives bring together private sector actors, government units, and civil society organisations to foster collaboration and align business practices with social and environmental standards. The Better Gold Initiative focuses on promoting responsible sourcing and improving conditions for miners, notably in Colombia and Peru, with 18 tonnes of sustainable gold imported since 2013. SWISSCO, meanwhile, has established a 2022 baseline for its interventions that will allow it to monitor achievements through a mid-term review in 2025 and final report in 2030 (SWISSCO, 2022[59]). The platforms value the credibility brought by their association with SECO, as well as Swiss diplomatic support. However, challenges include demanding reporting requirements and SECO/SDC staff rotations, which occasionally disrupt continuity. While multistakeholder platforms are a promising model for aligning economic activities with sustainable development, close monitoring of the benefits for partner countries is encouraged.
Switzerland faces challenges in balancing competing priorities within its policy framework. As a consensus-driven system, Swiss policymaking prioritises balance, but clashes of interests are unavoidable. For instance, during WTO negotiations, Switzerland, along with countries like the United Kingdom and Norway, opposed the proposed waiver of intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines. This stance was influenced by concerns over the potential impact on pharmaceutical innovation and the protection of existing patents. Switzerland's position reflects the broader debate over safeguarding intellectual property to encourage pharmaceutical innovation while addressing global health needs during the pandemic (Green, 2022[60]). An ad hoc inter-departmental working group, co-led by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) and the FDFA, is currently reviewing the potential and limitation for quantifying and qualifying the transboundary effects (spillovers) of Switzerland’s policies on its partner countries.
Switzerland’s commitment to responsible business conduct (RBC) has materialised through adherence to international instruments, the adoption of relevant national action plans and strategies, the development of legislation, and the establishment of dedicated government entities. Switzerland is an adherent to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct (OECD, 2023[61]), and it implements the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) through National Action Plans for Business and Human Rights (NAPs). The 2024-2027 NAP contains a measure for the government to systematically provide information on the UNGPs to companies that take part in trade missions. Switzerland’s 2030 Sustainable Development Strategy also includes RBC. Moreover, Switzerland recently modified its Code of Obligations and enacted an Ordinance to regulate due diligence and reporting obligations in relation to conflict minerals and child labour. At the institutional level, as an adherent to the OECD MNE Guidelines, Switzerland established a National Contact Point for Responsible Business Conduct (NCP). The NCP, hosted by SECO, promotes RBC within government and to a variety of stakeholders. It also leads the RBC intergovernmental group, which meets three or four times a year to co-ordinate relevant entities of the federal administration on ongoing RBC issues. Additionally, the Swiss NCP is one of the most active in its role as a non-judicial grievance mechanism, having handled over 30 cases related to alleged non-observance of the OECD MNE Guidelines.
Switzerland has taken significant steps to address illicit financial flows (IFF) from developing countries to Switzerland, but challenges remain. The Federal Council’s 2016 report on IFF outlined actions needed, such as enhancing transparency in commodities trading and improving access to financial services in developing countries (Federal Council, 2016[62]). However, limited regulatory oversight in commodities trading – particularly in transit trading – and gaps in anti-money laundering frameworks, continue to slow asset restitution practices (ICLG, 2024[63]) (Public Eye, 2024[64]). Although Switzerland has made progress, further co-ordination is needed. The Directorate of International Law leads on asset recovery and co-operation with partner countries, SDC supports organisations such as StAR and ICAR, SECO collaborates with Financial Intelligence Units, and NCP issues regulations, but all these initiatives tend to operate in silos, limiting synergies. Enhanced integration of these approaches could provide a clearer assessment of Switzerland’s policy impact on partner countries when it comes to illicit financial flows.
Switzerland’s global leadership in commodities trading has attracted scrutiny, especially regarding financial transparency. Risks emerge at various stages of the commodity trading process, including buyer selection, opaque sales negotiations, and non-transparent revenue transfers, all of which can facilitate bribery, corruption and fund diversion. Swiss firms have primarily relied on voluntary measures to address these risks, though recent legal cases, including bribery charges, have cast doubt on their effectiveness. Resistance from industry stakeholders has slowed progress in implementing OECD-recommended anti-bribery reforms, which include stronger penalties and whistleblower protections. Despite these barriers, initiatives like SECO's promotion of responsible business practices aim to balance economic priorities with social and environmental accountability. The work of Alliance Sud highlights the need for transparency over debts contracted with Swiss banks and traders by developing nations, reinforcing the urgent need for Switzerland to improve transparency on loans provided by Swiss banks and commodity traders (Alliance Sud, 2024[65]). Furthermore, a 2024 study revealed that over half of Swiss companies operating abroad encounter demands for bribes, with a significant proportion succumbing, exposing vulnerabilities in Switzerland's anti-bribery mechanisms (Transparency International Suisse, 2024[66]). More effective mechanisms can be put in place and, once in place, made operational.
8. To increase the impact of its partnerships with the private sector, Switzerland should continue to increase coordination between SECO and SDC on common themes (e.g. enabling environment, skills and SME development) based on comparative advantages and better articulate linkages with SIFI, SIFEM and investment funds.
9. Recognising Switzerland’s strong track record on untying, in order to ensure the value for money of its programmes, and in line with the DAC Recommendation on Untying of Official Development Assistance, Switzerland should seek to keep its ODA untied, including for the Ukraine country programme.
10. To increase policy coherence, Switzerland should strengthen consideration of transboundary impacts in the consultation and co-ordination mechanisms established under the umbrella of the 2030 Sustainable Development Strategy, such as reducing risks in commodity trading and addressing illicit financial flows.
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← 1. The debt brake is a mechanism for managing federal expenditure. It is designed to prevent chronic deficits and thereby an increase in debt. For a full description of the mechanism, see https://www.efd.admin.ch/en/the-debt-brake.
← 2. The 2017-2021 Dispatch on Switzerland’s development co-operation was a longer document but also included the same four strategic objectives.
← 3. This is the planned envelope that has been approved for 2025-28. In late December, Parliament made cuts of CHF 110 million to the 2025 budget and CHF 321 million to the 2026–28 financial plan for bilateral and multilateral development cooperation. The cuts do not affect humanitarian aid, peace promotion or support for Ukraine.
← 4. The 2021-24 period included a credit for economic development co-operation with the countries of Eastern Europe; this expired at the end of 2024 and was integrated into bilateral development co-operation.
← 5. Due to Switzerland’s late submission of 2023 ODA figures to the OECD, only 2022 ODA statistics were used in report sent to Switzerland for fact-checking. Most figures have been updated in this version. Alongside with its yearly DAC and CRS data submissions, Switzerland started reporting to the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development framework since the first data publication.
← 6. In 2022, PHRD accounted for 2% of the budget.
← 7. Switzerland’s global programmes seek to address global challenges like migration, climate change, water, food security and health. The programmes seek to test innovative solutions that can shape policies.
← 8. After independence (1980), there was a voluntary land acquisition system. In 2000, the government tried to make that compulsory through a constitutional amendment but that was rejected in a referendum. This triggered a movement of violent land seizures, including of farmland owned by foreigners protected under Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements. In 2018, the government agreed to compensations worth USD 3.4 billion. Switzerland is co-leading a dialogue to agree with the government on actual payment of the compensations.
← 9. In October 1970 the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution that included the goal that “Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development assistance […] and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7% of its gross national product […] by the middle of the Decade.” Switzerland – not a member of the United Nations until 2002 – did not adopt the target.
← 10. For instance, there are joint SDC-SECO country co-operation programmes in Ukraine, Albania and Serbia, as well as joint SDC-SECO-SEM programmes in Tunisia and Egypt.
← 11. From 2025 to 2028, Morocco will become a new priority country and economic development co-operation will phase out of Colombia in order to transition to bilateral economic relations.
← 12. Of the CHF 11.12 billion budget for the IC Strategy 2025-2028, 13% will be allocated to Ukraine. If the final budget is lower than what was proposed, the allocation for Ukraine is still likely to stand, meaning the country would receive a higher share of the budget.
← 13. The levels of mandatory operational committees (Opcom) have been reduced: Opcom 1 (chaired by a head of international co-operation in the external network or a head of section at head office), and Opcom 2 (rotationally chaired by a member of the directorate at head office). New project phases only have to be validated by Opcom 1.
← 14. SECO’s global programmes include for instance the Global Quality and Standards Programme with UNIDO, and the Global Financial Infrastructure Programme with the IFC. SECO has established a table called "levels of engagement" where the embassies rate their portfolio by impact and by workload, i.e. time spent to manage the respective programme.
← 15. Country Programmable Aid (CPA) is the portion of aid that donors programme at country or regional level. CPA for bilateral donors is defined through exclusions, by subtracting from total gross bilateral official development assistance (ODA), all activities that are inherently unpredictable by nature (humanitarian aid and debt relief); or entail no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs and scholarships, promotion of development awareness, costs related to research and refugees in donor countries, core funding to NGOs, ODA equity investments, and aid which is not allocable by country).
← 16. In 2022, country programmable aid was 33.5% of Switzerland’s gross bilateral ODA, compared to the DAC country average of 42%.
← 17. For non-priority countries within the four priority regions, flexible funds can be engaged by the SDC in countries presenting challenges and opportunities related to Switzerland’s migration policy, for a maximum amount of CHF 60 million (2021-24). These projects are recommended by SEM, discussed within the Structure for International Cooperation on Migration (ICM) and implemented by SDC. The role of Swiss IC is to harness the benefits as well as addressing the challenges of migration and forced displacement.
← 18. This number excludes ODA provided by cantons and municipalities as well as ODA channelled through multilaterals, but includes Swiss contributions for developing countries that have a representation in UN institutions in Geneva. Because of the specifics in Switzerland’s reporting to the OECD/DAC, particularly in the use of a multiple purpose coding methodology, it is possible that not all humanitarian aid is excluded in the calculation of CPA. The number of countries receiving CPA including cantons and municipalities but excluding multilateral channels is 109.
← 19. This contrast with other DAC members may be partially explained by the following factors: (i) as it is not part of the EU, Switzerland engages with more partner countries in its development co-operation; (ii) each government unit has priority countries, leading to a total of 41 priority countries; (iii) Switzerland operates outside of priority countries as part of global programmes and flexible funds.
← 20. In 2022, in 13 of its priority countries, Switzerland was not among the top 10 donors: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Zambia.
← 21. In 2023, the average project size for Switzerland was USD 581 000 (disbursements) or USD 1.3 million (commitments).
← 22. The project list sent ahead of the country visit to South Africa included 58 projects.
← 23. This fragmentation challenge has been identified in SECO’s country programme evaluation and is being addressed as part of the preparation of the new country programme.
← 24. The specific objectives are migration, health, local small and medium enterprises (SMEs), public institutions, fighting hunger, water, energy transition, strengthening democratic institutions, participation rights and gender equality, rule of law and separation of powers.
← 25. Positive examples of links with country teams include the food systems section’s role in defining the food portfolio in Zimbabwe and Zambia, as well as the health section in reorientating the health portfolio in Zimbabwe and Zambia.
← 26. There is no recent strategy document on multilateral co-operation but partnerships and allocations are explained in Annex 5 of the IC Strategy 2021-2024.
← 27. Switzerland’s priority UN organisations are: UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNWOMEN, UNHCR, UNWFP, UNRWA, UNOCHA, UNDCO, WHO, UNAIDS, UN Peacebuilding Fund and UNHROHC.
← 28. Since 2012, the Federal Office for the Environment, SDC, the SECO, the Federal Finance Administration and the FDFA have been collaborating through a joint platform on funding international co-operation on environmental issues. This platform deals with both the mechanisms for funding environmental conventions and with bilateral and multilateral co-operation related to the environment.
← 29. In Bern, structural staff may stay for more than two rounds, but this can harm their career progression.
← 30. A local staff position within the Swiss development co-operation system can also serve as a springboard for further career development within the national system.
← 31. Training for political diplomats on development co-operation has been reduced from seven to two days.
← 32. The 2023 SDC staff survey indicates that 63% of staff consider that their colleagues are stressed or very stressed and that 46% of staff consider that F4P has not improved SDC’s work.
← 33. At country level, the double reporting line to SDC and to the FDFA Directorate for Resources also makes decision making more difficult. For example, in Zimbabwe, programme staff see the need for more risk-taking, while financial management wants to contain risk as much as possible. Such trade offs or tensions prove harder to manage when there are parallel reporting lines.
← 34. Large bilateral and multilaterals have integrated systems, others do not. It is hard to couple a performance and results system to off-the-shelf financial-only systems that often pre-date the digital results system. However, common identifiers (e.g. project numbers) can still allow for integrated analysis and processing of information.
← 35. ETH is a public research university in Zürich, focusing primarily on science, technology, engineering and mathematics.
← 36. The local-level opinion survey will interview 1 000 citizens over a period of four years to document how Swiss projects have contributed to changes in the quality of their life.
← 37. The Gukurahundi was a series of mass killings and genocide in Zimbabwe which were committed from 1983 until the Unity Accord in 1987. After independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had two parties, ZANU and ZAPU that each had an army. Various raids by Mugabe’s ‘Fifth Brigade’ (ZANU) resulted in the killing of up to 20 000 ZAPU soldiers and civilian supporters. The Unity Accord in 1987 created one single party (ZANU-PF) and one army, but the healing process is still ongoing.
← 38. Sweden has a similar share going to the promotion of development awareness in 2019 (0.47% of total ODA), but it was cut less drastically (0.28% of total ODA in 2022).
← 39. In 2020, the Responsible Business referendum sparked significant debate in Switzerland, showcasing civil society's influence through a coalition of NGOs, church groups, and volunteers despite its ultimate defeat in a cantonal vote. However, this activism prompted backlash from conservative politicians, who questioned the tax-exempt status of politically active NGOs and pushed for limits on their roles in political and educational advocacy.
← 40. In 2018, Cape Town, with a population of 4 million, was the first major city in the world that was literally running out of water. The so-called dry-run was narrowly avoided through a complex mix of practical and policy measures, among others supported by SECO.
← 41. In 2022, the average share of humanitarian ODA for the DAC was 12.95% after a 15.54% peak in 2021. In 2022, DAC members with the highest share of humanitarian ODA were Lithuania (35.30%, representing a stand-alone peak due to humanitarian support to Ukraine), the US (23.39%), Luxembourg (22.02%) and Denmark (21.43%).
← 42. Activities carried out by governments and development organisations with the objective of promoting an enabling environment for the private sector in partner countries. Private sector development refers to the substantive nature of particular development activities (i.e. the sector targeted by development intervention). Activities include the creation of an adequate policy environment, addressing market imperfections (e.g. value chain development) and firm-level interventions (e.g. capacity building, access to finance and markets).
← 43. The definition is deliberately broad in order to capture all modalities. Given that the term applies to how development co-operation occurs, private sector engagement can occur in any sector or area (e.g. health, education private sector development, renewable energy, governance, etc.). Through private sector engagement, the private sector and other participants can benefit from each other’s assets, connections, creativity or expertise to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.
← 44. The 2025-28 strategy indicates that the private sector is needed to mobilise sufficient resources, expertise and innovation to implement the 2030 Agenda. Partnerships with the private sector are implemented in two ways: (1) through financial or investment instruments that allow the private sector to be mobilised for development purposes or to mitigate financial risks in the event of market failure; and (2) through joint projects and multi-stakeholder initiatives in areas in which Switzerland has extensive experience and significant market shares, and which involve relevant private sector actors.
← 45. These are: growth-promoting economic policy, rules-based trade system, innovation-friendly business environment, urban development and infrastructure services, access to financing, integration in value chains, corporate social responsibility, and market-oriented skills.
← 46. Health is the sector with the highest volume of SDC funds engaged in partnerships with the private sector, accounting for almost 44% of SDC funds in PSE. The main driver are large multi-stakeholder initiatives that pool public and private funding, such as the Global Fund to fight HIV, Tuberculosis and malaria
← 47. SIFEM aims at targeting 50% of its investments to new investment funds.
← 48. For the upcoming IC period (2025-28) it is envisaged to establish a concessional financing window, managed by SIFEM, which seeks to provide catalytic financing and concessional financing in high-risk investments, mostly in LDCs, with a particular focus on food security and financial inclusion.
← 49. The fund manager is ResponsAbility. Since its inception in 2003, ResponsAbility has become a leading impact asset manager specialising in private market investments in financial inclusion, climate finance and sustainable food.
← 50. “SIFEM provides financing which without public sector support would not be available from private, local, or international financial markets”, https://sifem.ch.
← 51. SIFEM is part of the Association of European Development Finance Institutions. Since 2014, it has also been a signatory of IFC’s Master Cooperation Agreement, which streamlines lending procedures for joint investments to ease financing to private companies in emerging markets. Since then, SIFEM has co-invested in several projects alongside IFC, and adopted the Operating Principles for Impact Management in 2019.
← 52. The low score is due to the fact that SIFEM does not disclose a bulk download export of investment data and does not publish to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) Standard. Also, it did not score for any project-level indicators in the four components, other than in Core Information. SIFEM's website was redesigned in 2024 to publish more project-level information and make it available for download. Due to SIFEM’s indirect model of investment, some project level details are not possible to share due to data protection, unavailable data and resources.
← 53. With regard to the private sector, SDC – in collaboration with SECO – completed the Herakles project, which clarifies and defines the legal and financial requirements to be fulfilled for conducting PSEs. This paved the way to further scale PSE in SDC, including via a dedicated investment credit with a particular focus on first loss engagements in structured funds.
← 54. These evaluations recommended a clearer strategy, closer co-ordination and a stronger focus on sustainability.
← 55. Such as BUILD or Agriculture Business Capital (ABC).
← 56. For both the World Bank Group and IFAD there is a shared governance responsibility and positions are jointly agreed. For the World Bank Group: Governor (EAER), Vice Governor (FDFA), for IFAD: Governor (SDC), Vice Governor (SECO).
← 57. Over USD 60 million has been committed from six member states and development institutions representing Canada, the United States, Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden and the Nordic states through the Nordic Development Fund to the BUILD Fund, a blended impact investment vehicle, as well as its associated technical assistance facility.
← 58. Countries covered by the recommendation are least developed countries (LDCs), heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), other low-income countries and IDA-only countries and territories. The recommendation only applies to specific sectors, and excludes scholarships and free-standing technical co‑operation, among others.
← 59. In 2023, SECO’s start-up fund had an active portfolio of 23 loans totalling CHF 8 million.
← 60. The six sectors are fish and seafood, processed foods, natural ingredients, technical wood, value added textiles and sustainable tourism.