What are the opportunities and challenges as Sweden reforms its development co-operation model in a complex geopolitical environment? This question underpinned the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review of Sweden, conducted by Austria and Canada.
Sweden is a standard setter and global leader that has delivered positive impact through its long-term approach to development. The country is valued for its long-term support to partners and its broad ecosystem of institutions with substantial expertise, including the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Swedish Institute and Swedfund. Sweden has played a key role in strengthening sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), as well as supporting gender equality, human rights, democracy and governance. Sweden was the first country to meet the UN target of allocating 0.7% of its gross national income (GNI) as official development assistance (ODA) in 1975, and its allocation has remained consistently above this threshold since then. In 2025, Sweden provided USD 5.96 billion of ODA (preliminary data), representing 0.85% of GNI and making the country the third-most generous Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provider for its ODA/GNI ratio. However, ODA volume is set to decline in 2026 and Sweden does not have a plan to ensure that the ODA to GNI ratio remains above 0.7%, in line with international commitments.
Sweden is reshaping its development co-operation in response to a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment. In 2023, the government presented a reform agenda for Swedish development assistance with an increased emphasis on Ukraine, as well as on Swedish interests in development co-operation – notably trade interests and migration. Supporting Ukraine has been Sweden’s foreign policy priority since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Sweden’s support to Ukraine has increased impressively to 18.1% of bilateral ODA in 2025 (preliminary data), is set to increase in the coming years and involves a whole-of-government effort.
Sweden has tightened the geographic focus of its development co-operation, but this risks affecting its allocations to least developed countries and fragile contexts. Sweden phased out five bilateral strategies in 2024-2025, and six further exits have been announced for 2026 (Bolivia, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Tanzania and Zimbabwe), with an eight-month timeline for implementation. In a context of increased allocations to Ukraine, the share of ODA going to least developed countries (LDCs) and fragile contexts decreased slightly in 2024. This trend risks accelerating, following the recent cuts to bilateral strategies at a time when needs are increasing.
A growing share of ODA is delivered in partner countries through thematic and regional strategies. While this has increased Sweden’s flexibility in where and how it spends ODA, the reduced importance of bilateral strategies as a source of funding for partner countries mean that support can be less coherent and more unpredictable for partners. The benefits of engaging with new partner countries through thematic strategies will need to be balanced against the risks of a more diffuse footprint.
Sida’s steering remains complex, involving multiple government assignments and detailed appropriation letters, as well as frequent in-year revisions. The reform agenda and the 2025 ordinance that sets out Sida’s mandate and responsibilities link Sida’s strategic direction to the government’s priorities and thematic goals more closely and sharpen the focus on results. The MFA is seeking to simplify the system by reducing the number of strategies and objectives. Although Sida's reorganisation in 2024 and investment in human resources and competence development placed it in a stronger position to implement the reform agenda, continual change and frequent in-year reallocations have made this challenging, even for a professional agency with a strong reputation and technical expertise such as Sida.
Sweden has a strong learning culture with a growing political emphasis on results, learning and evidence-informed policymaking. The country produces high-quality knowledge and evidence through the Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA), a government committee mandated to independently evaluate Sweden's international development assistance, and Sida. The stronger focus on the use of results in recent appropriation letters emphasises the important role of all actors in ensuring that evidence is clearly explained and considered. This is particularly important for new priority areas such as migration.
Multilateral partnerships are increasingly defined by Sweden’s reform objectives and priority to support Ukraine. Sweden is a strong partner to the multilateral system, with core and earmarked ODA accounting for over 60% of its ODA in recent years. Sweden’s multilateral support is becoming more priority-driven, and as part of the reform agenda it is providing less core and more earmarked funding, and to fewer organisations, with a renewed focus on accountability and cost-effectiveness. Sweden’s strong multilateral partnerships and its priority-driven approach positions it to help shape a more effective and future-fit multilateral system.
Civil society remains an important partner for Sweden despite the overhaul of key elements of its strategic civil society partnerships in 2024-25. Among DAC members, Sweden has one of the highest levels of ODA channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs) at 33.2% in 2024. This is implemented through a variety of strategies, including the Strategy for Sweden’s development cooperation with civil society 2025–2029, a smaller but strategic part of Sweden’s overall support for CSOs. As a result of the reform of this strategy, a larger and more diverse set of partners now compete to access core funding over three to four years through a centralised call-for-proposals process. Efforts to increase direct partnerships with local civil society are expanding but remain challenging. Civil society organisations report that Sweden’s support to and through CSOs has become less predictable and that they are less consulted. Strengthening dialogue is particularly important given the trust deficit between the Swedish government and civil society following the somewhat abrupt changes made during the overhaul of the CSO Strategy.
Sweden has a wide range of impactful tools to support local private sector development in partner countries, but fostering stronger linkages across instruments could achieve more results. Sida plays an important role in creating an enabling environment for businesses and was one of the first development agencies to pioneer guarantees, which are key for mobilising private finance for development. With Swedfund and Sida often operating in the same countries and sectors, there are opportunities for increasing information sharing and assessing whether Sida’s instruments could help pave the way for Swedfund investments.
Sweden has an ambition to increase synergies between trade and development. Several private sector development programmes have been designed as beneficial both for local private sector development and for Swedish companies. Team Sweden – a collaboration across various actors, including Business Sweden, export credit agencies, Swedfund, and more recently Sida – has allowed Sweden to offer “packages” for infrastructure projects. It is considered one of the most advanced Team Nationals within the European Union. However, this approach risks requiring trade-offs between promoting Swedish trade interests while continuing to support the most vulnerable populations. In addition, although Sweden is a traditional leader in untying aid, it is now developing new tied aid instruments.