OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: Belgium 2020

4. Belgium’s structure and systems

Abstract

This chapter considers whether Belgium’s institutional arrangements support its development co-operation objectives. It focuses on the system as a whole and assesses whether Belgium has the necessary capabilities in place to deliver its development co-operation effectively and to contribute to sustainable development.

The chapter looks at authority, mandate and co-ordination to assess whether responsibility for development co-operation is clearly defined. It further explores whether the system is well co-ordinated and led with clear, complementary mandates as part of a whole-of-government approach at headquarters and in partner countries and territories. Focusing on systems, the chapter further assesses whether Belgium has clear and relevant processes and mechanisms in place. Finally, it looks at capacity across Belgium’s development co-operation system – in particular whether Belgium has the necessary skills and knowledge where needed, to manage and deliver its development co-operation – and at the effectiveness of its human resources management system.

In brief

Since the 2015 peer review, Belgian development co-operation has implemented reforms to rationalise its efforts, promote synergies and increase its flexibility and impact. Institutional stability is now needed to benefit from these reforms. While defining the development co-operation strategy remains the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD), its implementation depends on partners, whose autonomy has been strengthened. Within this framework, and to take full advantage of the reforms, the DGD must act as a strategic driving force and co-ordinator. More effective Belgian aid demands a stronger whole-of-government approach, and reflection on the level of decentralisation within the administration and on the division of responsibilities between the political and administrative levels.

Belgium has strengthened its aid management systems and now has robust and flexible mechanisms. The ongoing risk management reform – based on comprehensive analysis and involving a transition from an avoidance strategy to a management strategy – is promising but has yet to be fully operationalised.

DGD staff are comitted, but they are affected by the pace and nature of the reforms and are asking for more support and more active communication. An inventory of needs and available skills, both within the DGD and from its partners, would enable the DGD to draw up an action plan to reconcile needs and resources and to become fully involved in workforce planning and forecasting. Enabel’s strategy of mobilising expertise via its own staff, experts from the various Federal Public Services (FPS) or from a pool of partners will enable it to respond flexibly to needs on the ground, which will continue to grow as the agency’s turnover increases.

Authority, mandate and co-ordination

Though responsible for development co-operation, the DGD only steers a limited share of official development assistance

The DGD of the Federal Public Service (FPS) Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Co‑operation is responsible for development co-operation. It develops strategies according to political orientations and the legal framework, grants funding and monitors the co-operation programme. Under the responsibility of the Minister for Co-operation, its main strategic orientations are approved in a biannual administration contract signed between the FPS and the Minister, which is regularly monitored (FPS Foreign Affairs, 2016[1]). The DGD shares accountability to parliament with the Office of the Special Evaluator, whose mandate is not limited to DGD-controlled actions but covers all Belgian official development assistance (ODA) (Chapter 6).

The DGD is only administratively directly responsible for 56% of the ODA budget that it grants to its implementing partners (Figure 4.1). The remaining 44% of ODA is largely out of its remit, in particular because it corresponds to disbursements and contributions to multilateral organisations under the responsibility of other FPSs (such as Finance) or that fall within the jurisdiction of the regions and communities, and is therefore independent of federal orientations and policies (4%). However, almost half of this 44% consists of Belgium's contribution to the European Commission’s ODA via the EU budget. Although this contribution is granted administratively by the FPS Finance, it is steered politically by the DGD. Furthermore, the Directorate-General’s authority was strengthened in 2016 when it gained competence for overseeing the regional banks in Africa, and also assumed joint responsibility with the FPS Finance for monitoring the World Bank. This change in the DGD’s competences strengthens its authority over the direction of multilateral ODA.

Figure 4.1. The DGD is responsible for allocating 56% of Belgian aid

Total ODA contributions through government agencies in 2018, gross disbursements as a percentage

Source: OECD (2020[2]), “Belgium”, in Development Co-operation Profiles https://doi.org/10.1787/58873fc4-en.

Statlink

Implementing partners’ autonomy makes managing the DGD portfolio more complex

To rationalise its efforts and increase programme flexibility, and as recommended in the previous peer review (OECD, 2015[3]), the Belgian administration is engaged in a series of reforms that have modified its internal organisation and strengthened the autonomy of its partners (Chapter 5). Internally, the DGD has created, reorganised or merged directorates to organise them around the key themes of Belgian co‑operation (Annex C).1 Externally, the role of the DGD has changed from one of strategic and technical driver to one of strategic driver and partner co-ordinator. In particular, the administration has consolidated the portfolio of non-government actors (NGAs) around common objectives (Chapter 5) and reviewed the mandate of Enabel (the implementing agency) to increase its autonomy (Box 4.1).

The DGD’s authority over its public partners is set out in the management contracts signed every five years with Enabel and BIO (Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries, its development finance institution) (Kingdom of Belgium, 2017[4]), (Kingdom of Belgium, 2018[5]). These contracts specify the missions, values, principles, strategic priorities and intervention modalities of the two institutions, while preserving their decision-making and operational independence. In this spirit of preserving independence and autonomy, the DGD sits on their respective boards of directors, but only as an observer.2

Box 4.1. Enabel’s increased mandate, autonomy and flexibility

The 2018 reform of the former Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) agency into the development agency Enabel brought three major changes:

• A broader mandate: in addition to direct bilateral co-operation, Enabel can carry out, at the request of the government, any public service mission that falls within the framework of Belgium’s international commitments and third-party mandates.

• Increased flexibility and autonomy through portfolio management rather than project management, as recommended in the 2015 peer review. Following guidance from the minister, the agency establishes country portfolios and can redirect up to 15% of a country portfolio’s overall budget across interventions, but within the agreed objectives and results framework.

• The ability to establish contracts with actors on the ground to pursue its implementation mandate. These actors may be from local civil society, multilateral organisations or the private sector in order to find the best-placed partners (“fit-for-purpose”).

The first management contract between Enabel and the federal government (Kingdom of Belgium, 2017[4]) is based on the agency’s performance requirement and the state’s commitment to provide EUR 875 million for operational costs over the five-year contract duration.1 In total, Enabel implements 13% of total Belgian official development assistance, i.e. 24% of the DGD portfolio.

Note: The list of implementing partners must be approved by the minister when the country portfolio is set out.

1. Chapter 5 of the management contract between Enabel and the federal government stipulates the rules and conditions relating to Enabel’s management capacity, performance requirement and risk management. The state commits to finance Enabel for a minimum of EUR 165 million and a maximum of EUR 185 million per year.

Source: Kingdom of Belgium (2017[4]), Royal Decree approving the first management contract between the federal government and the public limited company Enabel: the Belgian development agency.

Institutional stability will help Belgium benefit from the reforms

A period of institutional stability is now needed to enable Belgium to benefit from the reforms and for the DGD to develop management and co-ordination instruments tailored to its new role: taking a stronger strategic lead and being less involved in operations. The DGD’s ability to fulfil this role will depend on its strategic positioning and on the capacity of its staff to take ownership.

The review period has seen significant ministerial involvement in the DGD’s activity, not only through the introduction of new priorities (Chapter 2), but also in programming (next section), making the directorate’s authority over its partners less clear. As the DGD is considering updating its strategy notes, in particular to highlight its contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the themes selected will influence its readiness and capacity to act as a strategic driver vis-à-vis the government and implementing actors (Chapter 2).

However, despite ongoing efforts to exploit the knowledge produced by its implementing partners, the DGD is not yet adequately equipped to extract strategic rather than operational information, or to consolidate this information in a way that enables genuine steering, both at country and global level (Chapter 6). Institutional learning efforts (Chapter 6), the current merging of the geographical units in charge of government and non-government aid, and restructuring of the organisational chart around thematic priorities should make it possible to consolidate geographical monitoring, thematic steering and co‑ordination for field support, in keeping with a logic of coherence, responsiveness and foresight.

The comprehensive approach drives cross-government co-ordination in Brussels

Whole-of-government co-ordination mechanisms are primarily part of the “comprehensive approach” developed to address fragility issues (Chapter 7). Stemming from the 3D-LO approach,3 this approach brings together the various federal departments (Foreign Affairs, International Development, Defence, Justice and Internal Affairs) into thematic or geographic taskforces (Box 7.1). As there is no other co‑ordination structure, whole-of-government co-ordination outside of the comprehensive approach is primarily focused on advocacy issues.4 Thus, although comprehensive approach taskforces are mainly ad hoc, they could serve as an example for a more systematic whole-of-government approach to the key topics of Belgian co-operation.

Belgium has also sought to broaden co-ordination between Enabel and BIO beyond purely government bodies, with BIO systematically participating in preparatory missions for any new direct bilateral co‑operation. These efforts have led to better integration of the private sector perspective in context analyses (Chapter 5), but have not resulted in operational co-ordination. The differences in Enabel and BIO’s operating methods, alongside the autonomy of implementing actors, do not make co-ordination easy to achieve.

Enabel’s reform, and its new capacity to work directly with international organisations, also raises the question of strengthening co-ordination of the multilateral portfolio to ensure overall coherence. Since the various FPSs have not yet fully identified Enabel as being responsible for extra-budgetary funding, the flow of information between the FPSs that finance multilateral organisations and the agency is still limited.

Co-ordination in the field is stronger

Co-ordination of government co-operation in the field has been strengthened by the introduction of a “one‑roof” policy. Gradually, Enabel’s offices have been hosted by embassies – which are now present in all partner countries and territories – while maintaining their functional autonomy. This physical merger into a single team, Team Belgium, has strengthened interaction between heads of co-operation and local representatives, and facilitated the division of tasks to ensure representation and engagement with partner governments and development co-operation providers.

Enabel can now directly be mandated by other FPSs and draw on their expertise, which should help strengthen this co-ordination in the field. For example, the agency mobilises and closely co-ordinates at the operational level with the Ministry of Defence and the FPS Justice in fragile contexts (Chapter 7).

Systems

Programming is more flexible but operating procedures are yet to be stabilised

Despite the ambition to decentralise decision making to the field by strengthening Enabel’s autonomy (Box 4.1), the drafting of the agency’s first country portfolios revealed significant involvement by the central administration and the minister in the orientations chosen. Numerous exchanges took place between Enabel and the DGD and between the field and Brussels, missing the opportunity for enhanced involvement from partner countries and territories5 (Chapter 5), and resulting in significant internal co‑ordination costs. Moreover, some staff members consider the current practice of referring numerous decisions to the agency’s board of directors for approval to be sub-optimal.6 Furthermore, although embassies play an active role in providing advice and consultation, they do not have decision-making power or a budget for co-operation interventions. With Enabel’s new management contract and more decentralised work by its experts, embassies have noted a decrease in the technical support provided by the agency, particularly for sectoral policy dialogue. This could be detrimental to the effectiveness and quality of co-ordination in the field and to exchanges with partners.

The current drafting of joint guidance for embassies and the agency is an opportunity to reflect on the administration’s degree of decentralisation, and on the interactions between administration and government, between the agency and the FPS, and within the agency itself. Formalising operating procedures should make it possible to how and when to consult in the field more precisely and to reduce the administrative burden on staff who are already under stress.

Aid management processes and mechanisms are robust

Belgium has strong processes and mechanisms in place to manage its aid. Following the 2015 peer review and analyses from the Court of audits (Cour des comptes, 2015[6]), the DGD has developed an action plan to better structure its internal audit, strengthen the management and monitoring of grants (Chapter 5), and ensure high‑quality interventions. Some procedures remain administratively cumbersome, both for the administration and for its partners, and the challenge remains to improve performance without increasing workloads. Enabel, for its part, is engaged in a “Strat & Go” reform strategy to make its operations more agile, effective and efficient. Table 4.1 summarises the state of play of Belgium’s development co-operation systems.

Table 4.1. Analysis of Belgium’s development co-operation systems

	Yes	In progress	Comment
Clear and transparent processes and procedures in place to make decisions on:
Policies (Chapter 2)	●		● Efforts to frame the strategy (strategy notes, whole-of-government co-ordination), but the coexistence of two strategic frameworks increases the number of priorities.
Programming (Chapter 4)	●		▲Predictable, flexible and multi-year funding. Decentralisation of Enabel’s decision-making processes, shift to portfolio management and focus on results and evaluation (Chapter 6). ● Evolution towards adaptive intervention management still to be implemented. Country strategies do not cover all financing channels (Chapters 2, 4 and 5).
Partnerships (Chapters 2 and 5)	●		▲ Strong recognition of development actors’ mandate. Clarity of partnership criteria. Participation in the governance structures of multilateral organisations.
Systems to ensure the quality of development co-operation, including:
Audit (Chapter 4)	●		●Satisfactory internal and external audit (DGD action plan in progress), but systems remain cumbersome. Systematic use of financial audits (NGAs, Enabel and partners) with ongoing concerns to improve processes.
Cross-cutting themes (Chapter 2)		●	▲Systematic “gender” intervention in new Enabel portfolios and gender dimension included in other activities. ● “Gender” strategy note developed in 2016 but human and financial resources limit its influence. The environment has become a major focus, but is not always reflected in interventions. The goal of leaving no one behind is not supported by clear programmatic orientations (Chapters 2 and 7).
Systems to implement policies and commitments in a fair and efficient way:
Procurement, contracting and agreement-making	●		▲Rules and procedures specified in royal decrees apply to the various financing channels. Efforts to select the most suitable partners (“fit-for-purpose”) and guidance to assess Enabel’s partners. ● Procedure for calls for projects lacks a legal framework and presents enhanced risks.
Adequate systems and processes in place to assess and adapt to risks, including:
Strategic, programmatic, security and reputational risks	●		▲Robust risk management systems at the portfolio level with guidelines (risk level, impact, approval). Fragility Resilience Assessment Management Exercise (FRAME) instrument to reflect the specificities of fragile contexts (Box 7.2). ●Approach that moves from risk aversion to controlled risk acceptance but lacks mitigation actions and regular and systematic monitoring to make it operational. New reputational risks to be managed with the growth of Enabel’s third-party mandates.
Corruption		●	▲ Multi-actor Integrity Charter. Enabel reference guide on tackling fraud and corruption. DGD grant management reviewed to improve integrity risk management (Box 4.2). Inclusion of the concept of politically exposed persons in partner analysis. ● Management of risks of corruption at the programme level to be strengthened (identification and mitigation) and developed beyond financial risks.
Protective measures		●	▲Adoption of an Integrity Charter and guidance for managing complaint mechanisms and protection of whistle-blowers and concerned individuals (Box 4.2). ● Systems and associated training courses are being deployed.
Systems and processes to promote innovation and adaptation:
Innovation		●	●Innovation efforts (SDG Frontier Fund and humanitarian impact bonds), but these are ad hoc and isolated and do not allow for scaling up within the DGD. ●Enabel recently engaged in a “Strat & Go” reform process to identify and develop innovative practices.

Note: The columns indicate whether the systems meet the indicator described in Chapter 4 of the DAC Peer Review Reference Guide (OECD, 2019[7]), and whether progress has been made since Belgium’s 2015 peer review. The green triangles denote good practice; the orange circles indicate areas where progress has been made, but more could be done.

Source: OECD Secretariat on the basis of documentation and information provided by the Belgian government.

Risk management and financial and moral integrity are at the heart of the Belgian agenda (Box 4.2). The Belgian administration has evolved from a risk-averse approach to a more comprehensive, proactive and multidimensional approach that aims to identify and manage the risks associated with achieving development outcomes rather than avoiding the risks altogether. This change goes hand in hand with the focus on fragile contexts and local private sector development.

Box 4.2. A comprehensive and proactive approach to integrity risk management

In 2018, the DGD, Enabel, BIO and 89 civil society organisations signed an Integrity Charter ((n.a.), 2018[8]). This document, which marks an important step in Belgian co-operation’s integrity risk management, has resulted in a joint action plan to adopt the preventive and corrective measures needed to manage integrity risks, both financial and moral.

Under the aegis of the DGD, two guides have been developed to support partners in strengthening their integrity systems: the Guide to Managing Integrity Complaints (Deloitte, 2019[9]), and the Integrity Analysis Process Related to Implementing Partners (Deloitte, 2019[10]). These guides provide detailed and practical advice. For example, the analysis guide identifies various red flags and approval and risk mitigation processes.

The ongoing development of formal whistle-blowing and investigation mechanisms, as well as training and awareness-raising sessions – both in Brussels and the field – will enable Belgium to consolidate these efforts.

This approach forms part of the implementation of the OECD Recommendation of the Council for Development Co-operation Actors on Managing the Risk of Corruption (OECD, 2016[11]). It also anticipates and addresses the principles underlying the DAC Recommendation on Ending Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance (OECD, 2019[12]).

Source: Deloitte (2019[9]), Guide to Managing Integrity Complaints; Deloitte (2019[10]), Integrity Analysis Process Related to Implementing Partners.

Capabilities throughout the system

Belgian co-operation staff are committed but in need of support

Human resources management remains a major challenge for the DGD; the 2015 peer review recommendation remains valid (OECD, 2015[3]). Despite pressure on FPS staff as a whole (and in particular the DGD up until 2016), high staff turnover and the general tightening of budgetary resources in the Belgian civil service, the DGD has managed to stabilise its staff numbers over the last three years thanks to mechanisms of exchanges of officials, internal mobility and secondment. However, the humanitarian team has been downsized while funding has increased significantly, which, combined with high staff turnover, increases fiduciary and reputational risks. In addition, development co-operation positions in the embassy network have been drastically reduced – from 54 in 2014 to 28 in 2020 – yet embassies must now actively participate in monitoring priority multilateral partners (Chapter 2).

Moreover, successive reforms, carried out with little consultation, have contributed to a loss of momentum and reference points for staff in their new roles. Thus, the DGD in general and the humanitarian team in particular is facing a high turnover rate and long-term absences, especially due to increased stress.7 Combined with the integration of former international co-operation attachés into a single career, this rotation complicates knowledge management. In this context, restoring staff motivation would make it possible to stabilise the teams and take advantage of the opportunities offered by the reform, in particular by introducing a proactive policy to prevent psychosocial risks and a collective definition of the DGD’s new functions. Greater staff mobility between the humanitarian and development sectors would diversify the pool of expertise in the humanitarian field and reduce the burden within the team.

The DGD needs to clarify its expertise requirements in light of recent changes

The reforms mean that the DGD must reflect on the type of expertise it needs to prepare strategic guidelines and monitor Belgian co-operation policy. Staff must be able to engage in financial bodies, have an overview of new complex issues and draw on technical expertise from autonomous partners. This will allow them to develop or provide an informed opinion on programming or development strategies, while playing a role in co-ordination and dialogue with implementing partners in Belgium or in the field.

An inventory of needs and available skills, both within the administration, Enabel and BIO, would enable the DGD to draw up an action plan to reconcile needs and resources and to become fully involved in workforce planning and forecasting. This plan could include the means and modalities for investing in staff training, an adapted recruitment policy, reinforced mobility and secondment arrangements – whether intra‑departmental or with other co-operation actors – and a knowledge management strategy to reduce the loss of institutional memory and to systematise learning (Chapter 6). A joint analysis with Belgian development co-operation’s key implementing partners would maximise the relevance of these efforts.

Enabel has access to a large pool of experts

In line with its decentralisation policy, Enabel has 184 employees at headquarters and 1 302 staff in the field. For the first time in 20 years, the recent reform has provided its staff with a legal system that allows human resources procedures between headquarters and the field to be harmonised. Enabel’s human resources management is rooted in the principles of diversity; a strong local presence; accountability; sustained self-evaluation efforts; and improved forward planning including short, medium and long-term visions. In these efforts, Enabel must ensure that it promotes the expertise and professional development of its staff, some of whom are facing great pressure and uncertainty in a context of rapid budget growth and shifts in the expertise required to meet Belgian co-operation priorities. The identification and implementation of the “Strat & Go” reform, which aims to outline Enabel’s ten-year strategy, is an opportunity to address these issues and strengthen change management support for teams. This process may gain relevance if it is conducted jointly with the DGD and informed by the considerations and challenges it faces in terms of human resources and expertise.

Enabel has a broad understanding of expertise. To respond flexibly to field requirements, it proactively and inclusively mobilises its own staff and experts from the various FPSs or from the pool of experts available through its 62 partners and independent consultants. However, in its constant effort to improve, Enabel is reflecting on how to better match sources of expertise, the mobilisation modalities available and its needs. Enabel’s stated objective is to increase the representation of women among the expatriates and technical experts mobilised during interventions (women currently account for 23% and 27% of these actors respectively). This objective is part of a broader strategy to develop a more inclusive human resources policy, particularly in management positions, also taking into account age and nationality, among others.

References

[8] (n.a.) (2018), Charte d’intégrité, https://cdn.webdoos.io/vliruos/884cf91fea25f6a8e2a4ed982bc9220b.pdf.

[6] Cour des comptes (2015), ’Evaluation du contrôle interne de la DGD du SPF Affaires étrangères“ [in French], Cour des comptes, Brussels, https://www.ccrek.be/docs/2015_30_EvalControleInterneDGD.pdf.

[9] Deloitte (2019), “Guide pour la gestion des plaintes liées aux atteintes à l’intégrité” [Guide to Managing Integrity Complaints], Deloitte, Brussels.

[10] Deloitte (2019), “Processus d’analyse de l’intégrité lié aux partenaires de mise en œuvre” [Integrity Analysis Process Related to Implementing Partners], Deloitte, Brussels.

[1] FPS Foreign Affairs (2016), “Contrat d’administration relatif au fonctionnement du service public fédéral Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au développement 2016-18” [in French], Kingdom of Belgium, Brussels, https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/2016-2018_contrat_administration.pdf.

[5] Kingdom of Belgium (2018), Arrêté royal portant approbation du deuxième contrat de gestion entre l’État belge et la société anonyme de droit public “Société belge d’investissement pour les pays en développement” (BIO SA) [in French], http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/mopdf/2019/01/02_1.pdf#Page4.

[4] Kingdom of Belgium (2017), Arrêté royal portant approbation du premier contrat de gestion entre l’Etat fédéral et la société anonyme de droit public à finalité sociale Enabel, Agence belge de développement [in French], http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/mopdf/2017/12/22_1.pdf#Page19.

[2] OECD (2020), “Belgium”, in Development Co-operation Profiles, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2dcf1367-en.

[7] OECD (2019), DAC Peer Review Reference Guide, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/DAC-peer-review-reference-guide.pdf.

[12] OECD (2019), DAC Recommendation on Ending Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC(2019)31/FINAL&docLanguage=En.

[11] OECD (2016), OECD Recommendation of the Council for Development Co-operation Actors on Managing the Risk of Corruption, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecd-recommendation-for-development-cooperation-actors-on-managing-risks-of-corruption.htm.

[3] OECD (2015), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Belgium 2015, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264239906-en.

Notes

← 1.  Changes to the organisational chart were structured around the key themes of Belgian co-operation, namely: Climate and Environment (MD8); Migration (D0); Humanitarian Aid and Transition (D5); Results (D0.1); Private Sector Development (D2.4); and, more recently, bringing together the monitoring of Governmental and Non-governmental Co-operation (D-GEO).

← 2.  BIO’s Board of Directors comprises ten independent directors, one observer (the DGD Director-General) and two government commissioners, one appointed by the Minister for Development Co-operation, the other by the Budget Minister. Enabel’s Board of Directors is composed of 12 members appointed by the Council of Ministers based on their knowledge of international co-operation or management. They have a renewable term of four years. The DGD Director-General is a member but does not have voting rights.

← 3.  Diplomacy, defence, development, law and order

← 4.  The merger of the DGD’s climate division and multilateral division, and strong dialogue with Belgium’s FPS Public Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment, makes it easier to determine positioning in international forums.

← 5.  For government co-operation, country strategies and intervention portfolios are approved at the ministerial level. The same applies to applications for accreditation and grants for non-government co‑operation.

← 6.  Third-party mandates are approved by the minister’s notice of no objection if they are not on the list of priority countries and territories; otherwise they are approved by Enabel’s Board of Directors. Country agencies can reallocate 15% of the budget within country portfolios without seeking approval from the board of directors. Mobilisation of the 10% reserve is systematically decided by the board of directors.

← 7.  Over the 2015-20 period, 12.7% of DGD staff members were absent for periods of a few weeks to several months on medical grounds. The increased pressure on the humanitarian team is due in part to a combination of reduced staffing, budget increases and emergency time pressures.