This chapter examines the international biodiversity finance landscape and highlights the dual challenge of mobilising additional resources for biodiversity and aligning existing public and private financial flows with biodiversity objectives. The chapter reviews progress in translating global commitments into national strategies and finance plans. It also maps the roles, motivations and interactions of actors across the real economy, financial sector and enabling environment. Public and private finance have complementary but distinct functions, with their respective contributions shaped by expected returns, risk tolerance, investment horizons, policy frameworks and the availability of credible, measurable and investable opportunities.
Mobilising Public and Private Finance for Biodiversity
Good Practices in Unlocking Capital for Nature
Abstract
Biodiversity – the diversity of genes, species and ecosystems – is declining at a rate unprecedented in human history. Extinction rates are estimated to be 35 times higher than the natural background rate of the past million years (Ceballos and Ehrlich, 2023[1]). Between 1970 and 2020, the average population size of vertebrates – mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish – shrank on average by 73% (WWF, 2024[2]). The scale of ecosystem degradation is equally striking: around 75% of land surfaces have been significantly altered, 66% of ocean area is experiencing increasing cumulative impacts, and over 85% of wetland area has been lost since 1700 (IPBES, 2019[3]). Since 1970, fourteen out of eighteen assessed categories of ecosystem services have declined (IPBES, 2019[3]).
These losses are not only environmental, but also pose material risks to economies, business and human well-being (IPBES, 2026[4]) (OECD, 2021[5]). Economies are embedded within nature (Dasgupta, 2021[6]); they depend on ecosystem services such as pollination, soil fertility, water purification and carbon sequestration. These services underpin key economic functions, including food security, water availability, disaster risk reduction and long-term productivity. As ecosystems deteriorate, the natural systems on which economic activity depends are progressively eroded, with potentially very large economic consequences (World Bank, 2021[7]; Van der Wilde, Hamley and Ching, 2025[8]).
Biodiversity loss is increasingly recognised as financially material (FSB, 2024[9]; Gardes-Landolfini et al., 2024[10]). Biodiversity-related risks can propagate through nature-dependent sectors and value chains, creating credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risks for financial institutions (OECD, 2023[11]). Given feedback loops and the interconnectedness of financial institutions, such risks may amplify and propagate, increasing the potential for systemic financial instability (FSB, 2024[9]). Emerging evidence suggests that some lenders are beginning to reflect borrowers’ biodiversity‑related exposures in loan pricing (Becker, Di Girolamo and Rho, 2023[12]); however, overall, nature-dependent industries and their financiers remain insufficiently prepared to identify, assess and manage nature-related financial risks (Gardes-Landolfini et al., 2024[10]).
As ecosystems approach critical thresholds, the risk of irreversible change rises. Once ecological tipping points are crossed, ecosystems may shift into alternative, degraded states that are difficult or costly to reverse, significantly undermining the effectiveness and affordability of restoration efforts (Folke et al., 2004[13]; IPBES, 2018[14]). Such regime shifts could generate abrupt and cascading impacts that extend well beyond individual ecosystems, disrupting supply chains, markets and livelihoods at regional or, in some cases, global scales (Leadley et al., 2014[15]; OECD, 2021[5]; OECD, 2022[16]). Preventing further biodiversity loss and restoring degraded ecosystems is therefore not only an environmental imperative, but also a necessary investment in economic resilience.
Addressing the biodiversity crisis will require action across multiple policy domains such as economic and land-use planning, agriculture, fisheries and infrastructure, environmental policy, trade and international co-operation. Finance plays a central and largely cross-cutting role. Adequate, predictable and well-directed financial resources are needed to ensure the effective management of protected areas, restore degraded ecosystems, support wildlife recovery and drive the transition of key sectors towards more sustainable production and consumption practices. Finance is also needed for the enabling systems that support biodiversity, including biodiversity data, monitoring and reporting systems, enforcement and compliance.
The challenge is not only the overall level of finance, but also its allocation, effectiveness and alignment with biodiversity objectives. Underinvestment in natural capital, combined with incentives that continue to reward biodiversity loss, has allowed degradation to persist despite public and private decision makers’ growing awareness of the risks of biodiversity loss. In a context of constrained public budgets and competing priorities, the scale, composition and quality of financial flows are critical determinants of whether countries can halt and reverse biodiversity loss.
The adoption of the Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) at CBD COP15 in 2022 marked a turning point for biodiversity action and finance. It set four goals for 2050 and 23 action-oriented targets for 2030, with an overall mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030 (CBD, 2022[17]). Several targets explicitly address the role of finance and economic systems, including the mobilisation of financial resources, the reform of environmentally harmful incentives and the alignment of public and private financial flows with biodiversity objectives (Box 2.1).
To support the effective implementation of the KMGBF, CBD COP15 also adopted a new Resource Mobilisation Strategy (Decision 15/7), encouraging Parties to develop national biodiversity finance plans, based on their National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs). This was followed by a revised Resource Mobilisation Strategy for the 2025-30 period, adopted at CBD COP16.2 in February 2025. The revised Strategy provides a framework to mobilise finance through a mix of public funding, private sector contributions, philanthropic resources, multilateral development banks and blended finance mechanisms (CBD, 2025[18]).
Target 14: Ensure the full integration of biodiversity and its multiple values […] progressively aligning all relevant public and private activities, fiscal and financial flows with the goals and targets of this framework.
Target 15: Take legal, administrative or policy measures to encourage and enable business, and in particular to ensure that large and transnational companies and financial institutions: (a) Regularly monitor, assess, and transparently disclose their risks, dependencies and impacts on biodiversity, including with requirements for all large as well as transnational companies and financial institutions along their operations, supply and value chains and portfolios; (b) Provide information needed to consumers to promote sustainable consumption patterns; in order to progressively reduce negative impacts on biodiversity, increase positive impacts, reduce biodiversity-related risks to business and financial institutions, and promote actions to ensure sustainable patterns of production.
Target 18: Identify by 2025, and eliminate, phase out or reform incentives, including subsidies, harmful for biodiversity, in a proportionate, just, fair, effective and equitable way, while substantially and progressively reducing them by at least $500 billion per year by 2030, starting with the most harmful incentives, and scale up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
Target 19: Substantially and progressively increase the level of financial resources from all sources in an effective, timely and easily accessible manner, including domestic, international, public and private resources, in accordance with Article 20 of the Convention, to implement national biodiversity strategies and action plans by 2030 mobilizing at least USD 200 billion per year, including by:
a. Increasing total biodiversity-related international financial resources from developed countries, including official development assistance, and from countries that voluntarily assume obligations of developed country Parties, to developing countries, in particular the least developed countries and small island developing States, as well as countries with economies in transition, to at least USD 20 billion per year by 2025, and to at least USD 30 billion per year by 2030;
b. Significantly increasing domestic resource mobilization, facilitated by the preparation and implementation of national biodiversity finance plans or similar instruments according to national needs, priorities and circumstances
c. Leveraging private finance, promoting blended finance, implementing strategies for raising new and additional resources, and encouraging the private sector to invest in biodiversity, including through impact funds and other instruments;
d. Stimulating innovative schemes such as payment for ecosystem services, green bonds, biodiversity offsets and credits, and benefit-sharing mechanisms with environmental and social safeguards;
e. Optimizing co-benefits and synergies of finance targeting the biodiversity and climate crises;
f. Enhancing the role of collective actions, including by indigenous peoples and local communities, Mother Earth centric actions and non-market-based approaches including community based natural resource management and civil society co-operation and solidarity aimed at the conservation of biodiversity;
g. Enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of resource provision and use.
Source: (CBD, 2022[17]), Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework; www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-15/cop-15-dec-04-en.pdf.
Parties to the CBD are translating international commitments under the KMGBF into concrete national targets and actions through their NBSAPs. Though revised and updated NBSAPs were due by CBD COP16 in October 2024, as of May 2026, 101 Parties (c. 51%) had submitted updated NBSAPs to the CBD. A review of selected updated NBSAPs shows that countries have adopted widely differing approaches to translating KMGBF Target 19 into national strategies, with significant variation in the level of detail provided (Table 2.1). Overall, the national level finance targets are broad and high-level, providing little insight on how governments intend to mobilise public and private finance to implement their NBSAPs effectively.
In addition to NBSAPs, various developing countries have developed national biodiversity finance plans with support from UNDP BIOFIN. As of December 2025, 39 developing countries had completed such plans with others embarking on the process. A handful of developed countries (e.g. Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) have also more recently committed to preparing such finance plans. The BIOFIN Workbook 2024 Finance for Nature provides guidance to design and implement national biodiversity finance plans (BIOFIN, 2024[19]).
Despite growing recognition of the need for action, current policies and finance flows remain insufficient to drive the transformative change required. Financial flows that harm biodiversity continue to outweigh those that support it, and recent studies estimate a biodiversity finance shortfall of hundreds of billions of dollars annually (Paulson Institute, 2025[20]) (Paulson Institute, TNC, Cornell, 2020[21]; Waldron et al, 2020[22]). With only a few years left to achieve the KMGBF mission, countries face mounting pressure to accelerate implementation and secure the financing needed for their NBSAPs.
Public finance currently accounts for most biodiversity funding (OECD, 2020[23]). Given the public good characteristics of biodiversity and ecosystem services, ensuring sufficient public spending for biodiversity will remain fundamental. However, strained public budgets and competing priorities mean that public resources alone cannot meet global biodiversity objectives. Mobilising private finance at scale is therefore essential but requires effective public policies that create the necessary incentives and enabling environment for change (Flammer, Giroux and Heal, 2025[24]; zu Ermgassen et al., 2025[25]). Biodiversity finance also cannot substitute for strong policy frameworks and well-enforced regulation, which remain fundamental to durable outcomes.
Both mobilising additional finance for biodiversity (“financing green”) and aligning existing financial flows with biodiversity objectives (“greening finance”) are essential and mutually reinforcing. These concepts, however, are distinct. Alignment does not always imply mobilisation: for example, measures such as divestment from companies linked to deforestation or the removal of harmful subsidies can redirect existing flows away from damaging activities without necessarily mobilising new biodiversity finance. Conversely, mobilisation does not always ensure alignment; for example, poorly implemented biodiversity offsets or nature-based carbon credits may mobilise resources yet still result in misaligned financial flows and ultimately net biodiversity loss. Certain measures can achieve both objectives. For instance, reforming harmful subsidies and reallocating part of the savings to biodiversity-positive activities reflects both alignment and mobilisation.
In practice, mobilisation and alignment cannot be pursued in isolation. Mobilising additional finance will be insufficient if other parts of the financial system continue to fund activities that drive biodiversity loss. While global estimates of harmful versus beneficial flows are complex and inevitably vary, they consistently indicate that current financial flows and incentives for activities harmful to biodiversity far exceed those promoting its conservation, sustainable use and restoration. Equally, aligning finance with biodiversity goals will not suffice unless new sources of capital are leveraged. Progress will therefore require a dual strategy of mobilising (Target 19) and aligning (Targets 14 and 18). This will involve co-ordinated action across governments, financial institutions, corporates, communities and civil society, supported by robust policy signals and coherent regulatory frameworks. Although this report focuses primarily on finance mobilisation, alignment is inevitably part of the discussion because many enabling conditions – such as clear policy, robust metrics, disclosure and MRV systems – support both goals.
Biodiversity finance involves a diverse set of actors operating across two interconnected spheres: the real economy and the financial sector (Figure 2.1). Cutting across these are a range of enabling actors that are critical to supporting the mobilisation and allocation of biodiversity finance.
2.6.1. Real economy
The real economy includes sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, tourism and infrastructure, which depend on biodiversity and ecosystem services for production, but are also major drivers of biodiversity loss through land‑use change, pollution and over‑exploitation. The real economy is where most biodiversity pressures arise and where policy, management and finance decisions translate most directly into biodiversity outcomes. Within the real economy, business dependencies and impacts on biodiversity give rise to physical risks, transition risks and broader systemic risks. Physical risks arise when the degradation of ecosystem services affects production, revenues or asset values, for example through declining pollination, water scarcity or soil degradation. Transition risks arise from policy, regulatory, market and liability developments associated with efforts to halt biodiversity loss, such as restrictions on land conversion, deforestation-linked commodities or pollution. Systemic risks are linked to broader ecological and economic instability (IPBES, 2026[4]). Risks depend on a company or sector’s exposure and vulnerability: exposure reflects the extent to which activities and value chains depend on nature, while vulnerability captures their sensitivity to nature-related change and their capacity to adapt. Risks are therefore amplified where high exposure coincides with high vulnerability.
At the same time, improved biodiversity performance can create opportunities, including cost savings through more efficient resources use, enhanced resilience, access to new markets and the development of nature-based products and services (IPBES, 2026[4]). New business opportunities may also emerge as companies develop technologies, data services and advisory solutions that enable other businesses to reduce biodiversity impacts, manage dependencies and comply with evolving policy and market requirements (OECD, 2025[26]).
Public actors within the real economy – including national and sub‑national governments, public utilities and co-operatives – play a central role through land‑use planning, public infrastructure provision, protected‑area management and the delivery of biodiversity‑related public goods. Private real‑economy actors, such as corporates, landholders, non‑governmental organisations and indigenous and local communities, implement biodiversity‑relevant activities on the ground and are responsible for converting biodiversity objectives into operational projects. Together, the decisions of public and private real‑economy actors shape both the risk-return profile of economic activity and the pipeline of potential investment opportunities, thereby generating demand for finance to support changes in practices, restoration initiatives and nature‑based activities.
2.6.2. Financial sector
The financial sector allocates capital to the real economy through a range of channels, including investment, lending, insurance and risk‑transfer mechanisms. Financial actors – such as finance ministries, multilateral development banks and funds, as well as commercial banks, institutional investors, insurers, philanthropic foundations and high‑net‑worth individuals – provide capital through instruments including grants, loans, bonds, equity, guarantees and insurance. While financial institutions typically do not manage natural assets directly, they influence real‑economy behaviour by allocating capital, pricing risk, setting conditions for access to finance and responding to policy, regulatory and market signals.
Risks and opportunities that arise in the real economy can transfer to the financial sector. Biodiversity‑related business risks may materialise for financial actors as higher credit risk, asset impairment, increased insurance losses, market volatility or liquidity pressures. Conversely, business‑level opportunities linked to biodiversity conservation, restoration and sustainable use can translate into investment opportunities, new revenue streams and more resilient portfolios, particularly where revenues are credible, risks are managed and policy frameworks are supportive.
Engagement by financial actors in biodiversity‑related activities depends on several enabling conditions, including risk-return expectations, regulatory clarity, data availability and the existence of credible, investable project pipelines. These conditions vary across financial actors and instruments and determine how, where and at what scale biodiversity finance is mobilised. Differences in investment horizon, risk tolerance and return requirements further shape which forms of capital can engage with which biodiversity‑related activities.
2.6.3. Enabling actors
A range of enabling actors play a critical role in underpinning and bridging the real economy and the financial sector. On the real economy side, environment and sectoral ministries, land-use planning authorities, and monitoring, reporting and verification institutions are essential for identifying priorities, reducing information asymmetries, lowering transaction costs and transforming biodiversity objectives into investable opportunities. On the financial side, regulators and supervisors, standard-setting and disclosure bodies, credit rating agencies, and accreditation, assurance and verification bodies help establish a credible enabling environment by clarifying expectations, improving comparability and reducing the risk of greenwashing and misreporting.
Several international frameworks and initiatives are shaping practice in this space. For example: the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD) is developing disclosure standards for nature-related risks and opportunities; the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) is advancing supervisory guidance on nature-related financial risks; the Nature Positive Initiative is establishing the scientific and measurement foundations for defining and tracking progress toward nature positive outcomes; the Science Based Targets Network (SBTN) provides a framework for companies to set science-based targets for nature; and relevant International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards are establishing technical benchmarks for biodiversity measurement and management.
Note: DFIs = development finance institutions. HNWI = high net worth individuals. IPLCs = Indigenous Peoples and local communities. SMEs = Small and medium-sized enterprises.
2.6.4. Complementary but distinct roles
Public and private actors play complementary but distinct roles in financing biodiversity. Public finance is indispensable for activities that deliver biodiversity primarily as a public good and typically lack direct private financial returns, such as protected‑area management, species conservation and biodiversity monitoring. Public actors also shape market conditions through regulation, land‑use planning, fiscal instruments and targeted financial support. Private capital plays a critical role in complementing public resources and scale biodiversity action, particularly by supporting the adoption of more sustainable business models, technologies and practices.
Incentives and engagement differ across private actors and along the investment spectrum. Investors respond primarily to risk-return considerations and regulatory signals, while corporates focus on landscapes linked to their operations or supply chains (Fabre, 2025[27]; Löfqvist and Ghazoul, 2019[28]). Corporate biodiversity investments are often driven by the need to enhance supply chain resilience and sustainability, manage operational, regulatory and reputational risks, and meet net-emission-reduction commitments (Löfqvist and Ghazoul, 2019[28]; Löfqvist, Garrett and Ghazoul, 2023[29]; zu Ermgassen et al., 2025[25]). While risk considerations remain the dominant driver, interest is growing in biodiversity-related investment opportunities.
Risk-return expectations and investment horizons vary across actors and instruments, shaping which forms of capital can be mobilised (Table 2.2). Activities such as protected area management typically offer no or little direct financial return and rely on public budgets, multilateral funds or philanthropy. Many other interventions, such as habitat restoration and agroforestry pilots, currently deliver below-market financial returns while delivering substantial environmental and social benefits, including public good benefits. These models can attract impact investors and concessional official development finance, particularly where risks are mitigated through guarantees, blended finance or other forms of catalytic public support. A further segment of biodiversity finance can achieve market-rate financial returns under appropriate policy and market conditions. Examples include certified sustainable commodities (e.g. forestry and fisheries) with explicit biodiversity objectives and well-established environmental markets such as the US Wetland Mitigation Banking scheme (OECD, 2025[26]).
Much of the current biodiversity finance pipeline is driven by impact investors, development finance institutions and other actors able to operate with higher risk tolerance or accept below-market financial returns, often through blended or concessional financing structures. While many biodiversity-related investments have time horizons that are compatible with those of institutional investors and offer opportunities for portfolio diversification and increased resilience to nature-related risks, broader participation by these actors depends on several factors. These include market maturity, policy stability, the availability of sufficiently scalable and investable opportunities, predictable revenue streams, liquidity, and robust and credible frameworks for measuring biodiversity outcomes. As a result, institutional investor engagement in biodiversity finance remains at an early stage.
Source: Authors, adapted from (OECD, 2023[30]), Scaling Up Adaptation Finance in Developing Countries: Challenges and Opportunities for International Providers, https://doi.org/10.1787/b0878862-en.
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