This chapter explores how partner country governments and development partners are navigating mutual accountability in an increasingly fragmented and complex development landscape. It also assesses the transparency of development co-operation by analysing the quality of information reported to global systems and standards, whether development strategies and progress reports on implementation are made publicly available, and the extent to which parliaments can exercise effective oversight.
Making Development Co‑operation More Effective Progress Report 2026
Abstract
Mutual accountability mechanisms for development effectiveness commitments appear to be in flux, with partner country governments restructuring their institutional arrangements to better manage an evolving co-operation landscape and global context. Partner countries’ institutional capacity, and potentially political will, for mutual accountability is increasingly strained as a result. Most partner countries do not meet the criteria of having quality mutual accountability mechanisms for effective development co-operation in place. While over half of partner countries have a policy framework in place to guide development co-operation, they frequently lack specific roles and targets for diverse actors such as civil society, the private sector and providers of South-South co-operation. These gaps highlight the need for an evolution towards more inclusive frameworks that encompass a broader range of stakeholders, ensuring that all relevant actors are held accountable in delivering development outcomes.
The transparency of development co-operation at the global level remains mixed. There has been an increase among those development partners that reported to both the 2018 and 2023-26 monitoring rounds in making their development co-operation information publicly available by reporting to the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). The quality of reporting, however, is uneven. There have been no significant improvements in providing forward-looking information or ensuring timely reporting, though reported information is more comprehensive and accurate. With more than half of all development partners falling into the “needs improvement” category, targeted approaches are needed to achieve broader and more lasting improvements in the transparency of development co-operation.
Greater transparency is also needed in partner countries by both development partners and partner country governments. Less than two-thirds of development partners make their country strategies publicly available, and while almost all partner countries (43) have a national development plan or strategy in place, only 22 publish related progress reports. Parliaments receive information on development co-operation in 71% of partner countries, but primarily on request rather than systematically. And with less than half of development co-operation (41%) recorded on national budgets by partner country governments, parliaments’ ability to oversee planning and ensure accountability is limited. The limited share of development co-operation recorded on budget also reflects the modest provision of forward expenditure plans by development partners to partner countries. More predictable and transparent information on planned development co-operation is necessary for governments to integrate development co-operation resources into national budgets to facilitate parliamentary oversight.
Mutual accountability is the foundational pillar that transforms international development co-operation from a unilateral transfer of resources into an equitable partnership, by requiring both partner countries and development partners to hold each other responsible for jointly agreed commitments (OECD, 2005[1]); (OECD, 2011[2]). Accountability is inextricably linked to transparency (UN DESA, 2025[3]). The public availability of information on development co-operation is essential for fostering domestic accountability, as it equips parliaments, civil society and the public with the information necessary to monitor progress and scrutinise results, enabling a whole-of-society approach to development and ensuring that no one is left behind (UN, 2015[4]).
This chapter begins by outlining the myriad global challenges that are driving an evolving development co-operation landscape in which mutual accountability and transparency are critical for effective development co-operation. Against this backdrop, it assesses the quality of mutual accountability mechanisms (Section 5.1). Section 5.2 assesses the quality of development partner reporting to two international transparency systems and standards, while Section 5.3 examines the extent to which partner country governments and development partners ensure transparency by making development co-operation information publicly available and accessible for domestic oversight within partner countries.
The concept and practice of mutual accountability are being tested by profound structural transformations within the global development finance architecture. While historical commitments to shared responsibility and transparency remain deeply embedded in global agreements (UN, 2015[4]), the operational reality in countries appears to have fundamentally shifted. The traditional bilateral and multilateral partnerships that once underpinned accountability mechanisms are faced with a proliferation of new actors, diverse financing instruments and competing geopolitical priorities (Klingebiel and Sumner, 2025[5]). Consequently, it appears that the mechanisms originally designed to foster trust, align resources with national development strategies and advance development co-operation effectiveness are in flux. The emergence of something new, at least in terms of a recognisable pattern across partner countries, is yet to occur.
Partner countries are contending with an array of challenges – from declining ODA and project fragmentation to an increasingly diverse landscape of development actors – that limit capacity for, and the priority placed on, mutual accountability. A relative decline in ODA – either in real terms or as a proportion of gross national income (GNI) – has in some contexts inadvertently diminished or shifted the priorities of central aid management units. Historically, these specialised departments relied on the critical mass of ODA to bring development partners to the table and promote national accountability frameworks. As ODA volumes fluctuate or shrink, these units risk losing the institutional leverage necessary for co-ordination. In addition, countries approaching or undergoing graduation from least developed country (LDC) status or from ODA eligibility are prompted to reassess priorities and the allocation of resources and capacities to achieve national development objectives (UN DESA, 2024[6]). Fragmentation of interventions also presents a challenge. While there has been an increase in development partners on the one hand, on the other, the size of ODA grants has significantly decreased (UNOSSC, 2021[7]). This creates a large administrative burden for partner countries when managing a multitude of small-scale, disconnected interventions and can paralyse capacities. As such, advancing beyond mere co-ordination, which in itself can be challenging, towards more robust mutual accountability remains a struggle. A rapidly broadening development co-operation landscape that necessitates the inclusion of non-traditional actors and modalities further complicates the picture. The growing influence of South-South co-operation and increased private sector engagement requires partner countries to adapt development co-operation architecture originally designed for traditional DAC donors (UNOSSC, 2021[7]). With a shift to encompassing a wider array of financial flows and stakeholders, this can stretch existing mutual accountability mechanisms beyond their intended capacity (UN DESA, 2025[3]).
Simultaneously, these country-level constraints are compounded by global shifts: traditional accountability architecture is increasingly undermined by crisis response funding, geopolitical pressures and the lingering disruptions of the global pandemic. The cascading effects of recent global crises have accelerated a shift toward fast-track funding modalities that inherently bypass established, country-led monitoring frameworks. An increasing proportion of global financing is now crisis-driven, directed toward rapid humanitarian response (UNCTAD, 2025[8]). While vital for immediate relief, crisis funding can often lack the long-term, cyclical planning and shared reporting structures that are fundamental to traditional development co-operation, thereby removing a significant volume of resources from the purview of mutual accountability. Concurrently, there is a concern that evolving global geopolitics has increasingly shifted development finance from a model of shared partnership to one characterised by transactional engagements: development co-operation driven primarily by diplomatic alignment and security interests, rather than poverty reduction or long-term capacity building (Klingebiel and Sumner, 2025[5]). And evidence suggests that politically motivated development co-operation can be less effective (Dreher, Eichenauer and Gehring, 2018[9]). These structural shifts are further exacerbated by the lingering institutional deterioration spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic. As noted in the 2019 Global Partnership monitoring report, changes to mutual accountability mechanisms were already underway at that time (OECD/UNDP, 2019[10]). The pandemic, with its redirected government priorities and suspension of regular, in-person co-ordination and convening of stakeholders, may have further contributed to the broader deterioration of mutual accountability mechanisms observed in countries. This evolving context, defined by overlapping systemic pressures and institutional transitions, is crucial to consider when interpreting the Global Partnership’s assessment of mutual accountability within countries.
In this evolving development landscape, few partner countries have a quality mutual accountability mechanism for effective development co-operation in place. Global Partnership monitoring assesses the quality of these mechanisms in partner countries across five mutually reinforcing and sequential elements that contribute to strong accountability: having a comprehensive policy framework for development co-operation, setting country-level targets, regularly assessing progress towards those targets, ensuring assessments are inclusive of all stakeholders, and making the results publicly available.1 Results from the 2023-26 round show that only 3 of the 44 countries assessed have at least 4 of the 5 elements of a quality mutual accountability mechanism for effective development co-operation in place (bottom row in Figure 5.1). While this suggests that mutual accountability mechanisms in partner countries remain partial in scope and lack the combination of elements needed to operate effectively, this must be understood against the backdrop of the shifts in the broader political and development co-operation landscape noted above. The three sections below assess countries’ progress on the elements listed in Figure 5.1 below: comprehensive policy frameworks (Element 1), targets for all development actors (Element 2), and joint assessments (Elements 3 to 5).
Number of countries that have in place each sequential element of a mutual accountability mechanism
Note: The Global Partnership monitoring methodology assesses the five elements in the above graph sequentially. All countries are asked whether they have a policy framework in place that recognises the roles and responsibilities of diverse stakeholders and whether country-level targets have been established to assess the performance of those actors. If the answer is no to either of these questions, the subsequent questions – on the presence of regular, and inclusive, mutual assessments to review progress against these targets and public availability of the results – are not asked. In order to have a quality mutual accountability mechanism in place, 4 of the 5 elements must be met (hence although only 2 countries met all 5 elements, 3 countries still met 4 of the 5 elements).
In most countries with a policy framework to guide development co-operation, the framework is comprehensive
More than two-thirds of partner countries (68%) have a policy framework to guide development co-operation, most of which are comprehensive. Ideally, countries need a policy framework that outlines development co-operation objectives to support mutual accountability. Such frameworks often take the form of a national development co-operation policy or may be embedded within a national development strategy. These frameworks are important because they help align the activities of governments and development partners with national priorities, improve co-ordination among stakeholders and strengthen accountability for achieving development results. Of the 44 countries reporting in the 2023-26 round, 30 reported having policy frameworks in place to guide stakeholder efforts for effective development co-operation. When assessing the quality of these frameworks, 28 countries’ policy frameworks were assessed to be comprehensive (Element 1 in Figure 5.1). Policy frameworks are considered to be comprehensive if they identify the vision and objectives for development co-operation in a partner country; the roles and responsibilities of different actors (discussed below); and the various mechanisms that will be used to support mutual accountability. It is encouraging that almost all the existing policy frameworks are considered comprehensive. However, for those few countries which still lack a comprehensive policy framework, and for the 14 that lack any policy framework, this highlights a critical gap that would need to be filled as a step towards strengthening accountability.
While all 30 policy frameworks define the roles and responsibilities of bilateral and multilateral development partners, many also include guidance for civil society and the private sector (Figure 5.2), reflecting the expanding array of stakeholders involved in development co-operation. This reflects too that countries are increasingly adopting whole-of-society approaches to achieve development outcomes (Chapter 2). However, fewer countries have incorporated roles for other actors, such as providers of South-South co-operation, local governments, parliamentarians, foundations and trade unions (Figure 5.2). While some of the less-represented actors may not be as actively involved in development co-operation at country level, these gaps underscore the challenges related to the shifting development co-operation landscape discussed above and highlight the need for an evolution towards more inclusive frameworks that encompass a broader range of stakeholders, ensuring that all relevant actors are held accountable in delivering development outcomes. Many policy frameworks (24 out of the 30 reported) specify partner country preferences for the modality of support received from development partners (e.g. budget support, public sector support etc.), and almost all (28 out of 30) require development partners to report to partner country information management systems (Chapter 3).
Number of countries that have policy frameworks that recognise roles and responsibilities for development actors – by type of actor
Joint targets are established for both the government and development partners in most countries, but much less frequently for other actors
The gap in reflecting roles and responsibilities for diverse actors in development co-operation policy frameworks, as explored in Figure 5.2, is even more pronounced when it comes to setting stakeholder-specific targets for effective development co-operation. Such targets are important to track progress on fulfilling development co-operation commitments. Almost all countries with comprehensive policy frameworks have established targets for effective development co-operation for both the government and official development partners (26 out of 28 countries). However, these targets are rarely tailored to specific types of development actors, pointing to a broader lack of clarity around the targets and associated commitments for these actors. Only 12 countries have at least established specific targets for bilateral and multilateral development partners, which are vital to effectively operationalise the stakeholder roles and responsibilities outlined in the policy framework (Element 2 in Figure 5.1). When disaggregated by stakeholder, the data reveal that a smaller proportion of these 12 partner country governments have also set specific targets for other development actors: 9 of the countries have set targets for CSOs, 7 for the private sector, 6 for providers of South-South co-operation, and 5 for foundations. Results of the 2025 Development Co-operation Forum Survey2 similarly show that targets in National Development Co-operation Policies (NDCPs) are predominantly focused on national (and sectoral) government actors (89%), with limited inclusion of targets for other types of development partners (UN DESA, 2025[3]). Together with the increasing diversity of actors and modalities, this underscores the need for a more inclusive approach to target-setting that ensures all relevant stakeholders are held accountable in the implementation of jointly identified development co-operation priorities.
Regular and inclusive joint assessments to track progress are used in only four countries, and only two make them publicly available
About a third of countries with development co-operation effectiveness targets conduct joint assessments to track progress, while even fewer do so regularly or with a broad range of actors, revealing a critical gap in accountability. Regular and inclusive assessments are necessary to allow partner country governments, development partners and other actors to take stock of progress, identify areas requiring concerted effort, and engage in dialogue on targets that need collective action to deliver long-term, sustainable development. Of the 12 countries with effective development co-operation targets for diverse development actors (Element 2 in Figure 5.1), only 8 have conducted mutual assessments of progress towards those targets with official development partners over the past three years. And these assessments are typically not embedded within the government’s regular development planning and monitoring processes. This is concerning, as the lack of mutual accountability assessments undermines efforts to track progress on development co-operation targets and commitments in countries. Of the eight countries conducting mutual assessments, only four countries carry them out regularly (Element 3 in Figure 5.1), while the other four do so on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, only three of the four countries conducting regular assessments of effective development co-operation targets do so in an inclusive way, i.e. with stakeholders beyond the government and official development partners, reflecting a broader, more inclusive approach to accountability (Element 4 in Figure 5.1). While multi-stakeholder dialogue may be prioritised through other existing co-ordination mechanisms in countries, policy-driven, target-based, inclusive and transparent mutual assessments remain crucial, as they provide the evidence-based foundation needed to track development co-operation objectives. In efforts to ensure transparency, the Philippines (Box 5.1) is one of the two countries to also make the results of these inclusive assessments publicly available (Element 5 in Figure 5.1).
Box 5.1. How the Philippines builds mutual accountability into its development co-operation framework
The Philippines’ mutual accountability mechanism for development co-operation is anchored in the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2023–2028, the country’s official national development plan that guides development priorities and implementation. The PDP defines measurable indicators, interim targets and monitoring processes to ensure accountability among government agencies and development partners for shared development outcomes:
Country‑level targets: The PDP includes a structured framework, referred to as the Results Matrix, that translates the Philippines’ national development strategy into measurable indicators, baseline data and targets to track progress on development objectives. These targets apply to national government agencies, development partners and other actors implementing programmes that align with the PDP. Development partners align their country strategies or partnership frameworks with PDP targets to ensure that their co-operation supports national priorities and shared goals.
Joint assessments of progress: Mutual assessments between the national government and development partners are conducted to review progress towards development co-operation targets identified in the PDP. The assessments examine whether commitments and targets set by government and development partners are being met, using existing co-ordination mechanisms such as the ODA Portfolio Review and bilateral development partner missions that provide structured opportunities for these joint assessments.
Regular monitoring and evaluation: Government agencies, development partners and other implementing actors of development projects and programmes are required to submit performance and accomplishment reports that align with the PDP Results Matrix. Such reporting allows annual review and documentation of progress toward economic and sectoral objectives through the Philippine Development Report (PDR), which serves as the main progress report on the implementation of the national development plan.
Multistakeholder participation in accountability assessments: The accountability assessments in the Philippines engage multiple stakeholders beyond the national government, including CSOs, private sector groups, trade unions, local governments and development partners. These stakeholders participate in consultations, monitoring processes, and, in some cases, act as third-party monitors that review progress on implementation of development projects and programmes.
Public transparency of assessment results: Results from development co-operation assessments and progress reviews are publicly released, typically within months of the assessment, to enable public oversight and transparency in evaluating progress on achieving development outcomes.
Source: National Economic and Development Authority (2023[11]), Philippine Development Plan 2023–2028 (Full plan and monitoring frameworks), https://pdp.depdev.gov.ph/philippine-development-plan-2023-2028/; National Economic and Development Authority (2023[12]), Philippine Development Report 2023, https://pdp.depdev.gov.ph/pdr-2023/; National Economic and Development Authority (2023[13]). (2023), PDP 2023-2028 Results Matrices, https://sdg-space.depdev.gov.ph/depdev/matrices.
In countries facing fragility, mutual accountability might require flexible, context-specific approaches. Somalia, a country that undertook an adapted version of the monitoring exercise for fragile and conflict-affected situations,3 reported that instead of using a formal mutual assessment of effective development co-operation targets they used an informal mechanism for dialogue. The process was adapted to Somalia’s context and guided by the roles and responsibilities of actors, including those beyond the government and official development partners. Although such informal dialogue does not replace formal mutual assessments, it remains an important avenue for engaging stakeholders on mutual accountability targets. Effective dialogue mechanisms can help align efforts to achieve jointly identified development effectiveness targets where stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities are clearly defined.
Several countries that have gaps in their mutual accountability mechanism have still used mutual assessments in meaningful ways. Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Moldova host national co-operation or partnership forums where the results of mutual assessments are used to inform multistakeholder discussions, leading to the adoption of joint actions or action plans.4 This highlights how mutual assessments can drive concrete steps towards more effective development co-operation by informing existing country-level partnerships and dialogue mechanisms. Additionally, these countries used the outcomes of mutual assessments to contribute to SDG follow-up and national reporting, as well as to prepare Voluntary National Reviews presented at the UN High-Level Political Forum. Despite these encouraging uses of mutual assessments in national development processes, significant gaps remain in their inclusivity, particularly in involving a broader range of actors, and ensuring the public availability of results.
These results, together with the broader shifts at play across the development landscape, suggest that mutual accountability mechanisms are in flux. These factors appear to have led partner country governments to consider restructuring their institutional arrangements to better manage the evolving co-operation landscape. This restructuring often coincides with a noticeable decline in engagement by development partners in existing national development co-operation forums or platforms (UN DESA, 2025[3]). These structural adaptations were already affecting how the Global Partnership monitoring exercise – itself a global mutual accountability exercise for effective development co-operation – was undertaken in countries in 2018, and they appear to continue to shape how such mechanisms are implemented today (OECD/UNDP, 2019[10]). How partner countries are beginning to adapt and reconsider accountability mechanisms is explored in Part II of this report (see related reflections by Uganda on establishing a joint accountability and results framework in Chapter 7).
A growing number of development partners are making information on development co-operation publicly available. The Global Partnership monitors transparency at the global level by assessing development partners’ reporting to two global information systems and standards: the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). Box 5.2 offers more details on these systems, related standards and measurement approach. Overall, the number of development partners reporting to one or both systems has increased, with the CRS seeing a 19% increase in development partner reporting since 2018 (from 96 to 114) and the IATI seeing a 34% increase (from 58 to 78). However, of the 93 development partners that participated in the 2023-26 monitoring round (listed in Annex A), 47 reported to the IATI in 2025 (up from 45 in 2018), and 52 reported to the CRS in 2025 (up from 49 in 2018). In total, two-thirds (60) of the development partners participating in the 2023-26 round reported to at least one of the two systems in 2025. A smaller subset (39), however, report to both. This indicates the need for more consistent development partner reporting to both standards to improve the transparency of development co-operation. The following sections of this chapter examine the quality of reporting to the CRS and IATI in 2018 and 20255 for the 60 development partners that reported to at least one or both systems and that participated in the 2023-26 monitoring round.
These two systems and standards used to assess transparency of development co-operation are recognised in the Busan Partnership agreement (Paragraph 23) (OECD, 2011[2]) for their complementary strengths: the Creditor Reporting System provides statistical information, while the International Aid Transparency Initiative offers management information:
The OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) records activity-level development co-operation flows for bilateral and multilateral development partners for statistical, accountability and monitoring purposes. It provides data on the financial flows between providers and partner countries, helping to track where and how much is spent on development activities. The CRS focuses primarily on financial data, providing insights into development assistance at a global scale. Development partners are assessed on the accuracy, timeliness and completeness of the data they report, and the overall quality of the first data submission, with regular evaluations to ensure consistency and comparability of development finance data across countries.1
The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) complements CRS statistical classifications (including the use of replicated CRS code lists and relevant identifiers) and is an open-data standard that allows bilateral and multilateral development partners to publish detailed information about their development co-operation activities. While not directly comparable to the CRS, IATI data are typically published more frequently and at a more granular level, including specific financial transaction types, organisation linkages within activities, and in some cases, results reporting at activity level. Development partners are assessed on the timeliness, comprehensiveness, and provision of forward-looking information. The overall IATI score is adjusted for a coverage ratio. IATI facilitates tracking of development outcomes, making it easier for stakeholders to follow financial flows and project impact.
The Global Partnership’s evaluation of progress in increasing transparency relies on assessments produced by the secretariats of both these systems and standards. The assessment methodology differs across systems and standards, but both methodologies are constructed around agreed dimensions of transparency (OECD, 2011[2]). Development partners’ scores for these dimensions are based on the information they provide to these systems. To facilitate interpretation of scores, the Global Partnership presents the results of the assessments using a four-tiered scale of excellent, good, fair and needs improvement.
1. The OECD CRS methodology to assess the transparency of development co-operation information was revised in 2024. The updated methodology uses the three categories from the previous methodology – timeliness, completeness, and accuracy – and adds two categories: (1) the quality of the first submission and (2) a bonus category. The Secretariat has used a mix of qualitative and quantitative indicators to further strengthen the approach, as well as weighting the quantitative results of the assessment by the number of rows in the initial submission and reporting agencies per country, both of which are indicators of the complexity of members’ reporting.
Sources: OECD CRS data explorer: https://data-explorer.oecd.org/?fs[0]=Topic%2C0%7CDevelopment%23DEV%23&pg=0&fc=Topic&bp=true&snb=90; IATI data portal: https://d-portal.iatistandard.org/ctrack.html#view=search; OECD (2011[2]), Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November - 1 December 2011, https://doi.org/10.1787/54de7baa-en;
The quality of reporting and development partner progress on strengthening the transparency of development co-operation are mixed
The overall quality of reporting to both global systems remains largely unchanged. Latest results from 2025 are similar to those from 2018, with 13% of the assessments across both the CRS and IATI rated as excellent (Figure 5.3), representing no meaningful improvement since the 2018 round. According to 2025 data, of the 60 development partners that reported to one or both assessments, 30% (18 development partners) received a score of excellent in at least one of the two assessments. Notably two development partners received a score of excellent in both assessments in 2025 – the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The WFP joins the International Labour Organization as development partners that have showed progress across both systems when compared to 2018. To highlight other good examples: the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) have shown progress in the quality of their reporting to one of the two systems, with no change in the other. Despite overall unchanged levels of transparency when comparing across years, more than half of development partners fall into the “needs improvement or not reporting” category across both systems (Figure 5.3). Combined with the low and declining share of development partners achieving excellent scores over both years, this underscores the need for targeted approaches to achieve broader and more lasting improvements in the transparency of development co-operation.
Development partners’ ratings across two transparency systems and standards – the CRS and the IATI
Note: Percentages for 2025 are based on 159 instances in which development partners are assessed in both CRS and IATI. Percentages for 2018 are based on 158 instances in which development partners are assessed in both CRS and IATI. For comparative purposes, these figures include all development partners across every score category. The four-tiered scale indicates the quality of reporting to the two transparency systems and standards. The measurement for CRS takes into account the timeliness, overall quality of the first data submission, completeness, and accuracy of reporting. The measurement for IATI takes into account the timeliness, comprehensiveness, and the availability of forward-looking activity-level budgets; the overall IATI score is then adjusted for coverage. To enable comparability between systems and across time, the final scores, derived by averaging results across these dimensions (with a maximum of 20 points for CRS and 100 points for IATI), are converted into four categories: Excellent, Good, Fair, and Needs improvement. These categories reflect increasing levels of reporting quality, with higher scores corresponding to higher-quality, more complete, and more timely reporting. As the final score is a composite measure summarising performance across multiple dimensions, these categories should be understood as indicative of relative levels of performance rather than precise, single interpretations of reporting quality.
Source: Percentages are authors’ calculations based on assessments provided by the OECD CRS and IATI Secretariats.
Despite only modest progress in reporting to the CRS, some development partners show improvements. The quality of development partner reporting to the CRS is evaluated against the dimensions of timeliness, overall quality of the first data submission, completeness and accuracy of the information reported. Of the 47 development partners with comparable data that reported to the CRS in 2018 and 2025 and that also participated in the 2018 and 2023-26 monitoring rounds, 51% have shown progress in the quality of their reporting, 34% have declined, and 15% report no change. This moderate progress is driven by an increase in the share of development partners that have moved from “needing improvement” to receiving “good” or “fair” scores, while the number of partners receiving “excellent” scores has decreased, from 23% to 18% (Figure 5.4). While it is encouraging to see progress against these dimensions of transparency in the information reported to the CRS, there remains room for improvement in ensuring that more development partners achieve consistent, high-quality reporting.
Assessment of reporting to the OECD Creditor Reporting System
Note: For comparative purposes, these figures include all development partners that reported to the CRS in 2018 and 2025, across every score category. The four-tiered scale indicates the quality of reporting to the two transparency systems and standards. The measurement for CRS takes into account the timeliness, overall quality of the first data submission, completeness, and accuracy of reporting to CRS. To enable comparability between systems and across time, the final scores, derived by averaging results across these dimensions (with a maximum of 20 points for CRS), are converted into four categories: Excellent, Good, Fair, and Needs improvement. These categories reflect increasing levels of reporting quality, with higher scores corresponding to higher-quality, more complete, and more timely reporting. As the final score is a composite measure summarising performance across multiple dimensions, these categories should be understood as indicative of relative levels of performance rather than precise, single interpretations of reporting quality.
Source: Percentages are authors’ calculations based on assessments provided by the OECD CRS Secretariat.
While the number of development partners reporting to the IATI has increased, there is an overall decline in the quality of reporting. The quality of development partner reporting to the IATI is evaluated against the dimensions of timeliness, forward-looking and comprehensiveness of the information reported on development co-operation flows, as well as the coverage of reporting to the IATI.6 Of the 38 development partners with comparable data that reported to the IATI between 2018 and 2025 and that participated in the 2018 and 2023-26 monitoring rounds, only 21% have made progress, while 29% are in decline. No change is recorded for half (50%) of these development partners. The increase in the share of development partners in decline over those making progress is reflected in the 10% increase of development partners identified as needing improvements in their reporting to the IATI when compared with 2018. Overall shares of development partners receiving excellent, good and fair scores have all declined marginally when compared to 2018 (Figure 5.5). Development partners must prioritise improving the quality of reported information to ensure transparency and sustainable outcomes, a shift that is necessary to complement the growing commitment shown by the 34% overall increase in development partners’ reporting to the IATI.
Assessment of reporting to the International Aid Transparency Initiative
Note: For comparative purposes, these figures include all development partners that reported to the IATI in 2018 and 2025, across every score category. The four-tiered scale indicates the quality of reporting to the two transparency systems and standards. The measurement for IATI takes into account the timeliness, comprehensiveness, and the availability of forward-looking activity-level budgets; the overall IATI score is then adjusted for coverage. To enable comparability between systems and across time, the final scores, derived by averaging results across these dimensions (with a maximum of 100 points for IATI), are converted into four categories: Excellent, Good, Fair, and Needs improvement. These categories reflect increasing levels of reporting quality, with higher scores corresponding to higher-quality, more complete, and more timely reporting. As the final score is a composite measure summarising performance across multiple dimensions, these categories should be understood as indicative of relative levels of performance rather than precise, single interpretations of reporting quality.
Source: Percentages are authors’ calculations based on assessments provided by the IATI Secretariat.
Forward-looking information and timely reporting fall short, while development co-operation information is more comprehensive and accurate
The comprehensiveness and accuracy of information reported on development co-operation has improved overall, but this progress is tempered by declines for some development partners. Of the three dimensions assessed under the IATI (comprehensiveness, timeliness and forward-looking) the most notable progress has been made on the comprehensiveness of information reported. Between the 2018 and 2023-26 rounds, 53% of development partners have increased the comprehensiveness of information published to the IATI. However, comprehensiveness has declined for 38% of development partners and remains unchanged for 9%. Similarly, for CRS reporting 39% of development partners report more complete information since the 2018 round, while 28% report less complete information, with no changes reported for 33% of development partners. When it comes to the accuracy of the information reported to the CRS, 44% of development partners report an improvement in accuracy since 2018, 33% report a decline while 23% reported no change. The improvement is largely driven by DAC members, with 61% of DAC members showing progress since 2018 on accurate reporting to the CRS.
Concerted action is needed to improve the timeliness of information reported across both systems. Both the CRS and the IATI systems saw a decline in the timeliness of information reported between the 2018 and 2023-26 rounds.7 A larger share of development partners record a decline (38%) or no change in timely reporting (also 38%) than those making progress (24%) in IATI reporting. Similarly, for the CRS, 42% of development partners are experiencing a decline in the timeliness of their reporting, while only 30% have made progress, and no change is reported for 28% of development partners. These patterns should be interpreted with caution, as comparability across reporting periods may be affected by methodological factors. When examining trends across development partner types for each assessment, multilateral development partners have shown improvement in the timeliness of their reporting to the CRS (36% making progress versus 29% in decline). This progress is largely driven by UN entities, with 38% making progress compared to 13% in decline.
An equal share of development partners (29%) have either made progress or experienced a decline in providing forward-looking information on development co-operation flows, according to IATI reporting. However, a larger share of development partners (42%) reported no change. The lack of improvement is largely attributed to the fact that the lowest scores across the three IATI reporting dimensions pertain to the provision of forward-looking information, which is in decline across most development partner types. This has resulted in the least progress in this area, a trend also observed in the 2016 and 2018 progress reports. These findings reinforce the issue of development partners' limited provision of forward-looking expenditure plans to partner countries, as explored in Chapter 4. This ongoing shortfall in providing forward-looking information on development co-operation funds can hinder partner countries' ability to effectively plan and budget for development activities. Development partners’ agreement to improve such provision of development co-operation information to partner country governments is explored in Part II of this report (see related reflections by Sierra Leone’s development partners in Chapter 7).
Less than two-thirds of development partners make their country strategies publicly available. When development partners make their country strategies publicly accessible this strengthens transparency and can facilitate effective planning at country level. Chapter 3 has discussed how development partners report information on their development co-operation using partner country information management systems. This section assesses the degree to which development partners are transparent about their country strategies. Across the 93 development partners participating in the 2023-26 round, 85% report having in place a country strategy or partnership framework to guide their development co-operation across the 44 partner countries. Of these, 63% of development partners make these country strategies publicly available. Multilateral development partners are more likely than bilateral partners to make their country strategies publicly available (68% versus 57%) (Figure 5.6). Among multilateral partners, multilateral development banks (MDBs) are particularly proactive, with 79% publishing their strategies online. Among bilateral development partners, DAC members are more forthcoming than other bilateral partners, with 71% members making their country strategies publicly accessible. While it is encouraging that most types of development partners make their country strategies publicly available to some extent, gaps remain between the number of partners that have strategies and those that make them accessible.
Proportion of development partners that make their country strategies publicly available by type of partner
Most partner countries make their national development plans publicly available, but far fewer publish related progress reports – transparency of both is essential for accountability at country level. Almost all partner countries participating in the 2023-26 round reported having a national development plan or strategy in place (43 out of the 44 countries) (also discussed in Chapter 3). Of these partner countries, most (39) publish their national development plans or strategies online, whereas 34 countries also produce a progress report, or reports, on related implementation, with 22 also making the results of the progress reports publicly available. Among countries that make their development plans and progress reports publicly accessible, all but one consult a diverse range of population groups to a high extent during the preparation of their national development plans or strategies. Public availability of these documents provides an entry point for civil society and other actors to advocate for inclusive representation of vulnerable and marginalised groups, with the aim of reducing the risk of these groups being left behind in the development planning process (see further information on leaving no one behind in Chapter 2). Transparent, country-led development planning is particularly important in contexts of fragility and crisis, where scarce resources that need to go a long way benefit from transparent information on the availability and use of these resources. As may be anticipated, however, in countries facing extreme fragility, the availability of publicly accessible information on national development plans and progress reports is lower than in other countries (75% of countries versus 91%). This reflects the complexities of governance and political environments in fragile contexts, which can constrict transparency and the public availability of information. Among the countries facing extreme fragility, only 40% publish progress reports on national development plans or strategies, highlighting further limitations on transparency and accountability in such settings.
Parliaments largely receive information on development co-operation, but on request, and low budget recording limits oversight and accountability
Parliaments largely receive information on development co-operation, but primarily on request rather than systematically. Regular reporting to parliaments facilitates domestic accountability, enabling legislative oversight, promoting transparency and strengthening country ownership of development efforts across multiple levels of governance (Inter-Parliamentary Union/UNDP, 2020[14]). In the 2023-26 round, more than two-thirds of partner country governments (71%) report providing information on development co-operation resources to parliament. However, this provision is not consistent: fewer than half of countries (41%) supply information only in response to parliamentary requests, whereas 23% provide systematic updates once a year or less, and only 18% report twice or more per year.
Parliamentary scrutiny of development co-operation resources is limited by the low share recorded on partner country budgets. On average, less than half of development co-operation (41%) is recorded on national budgets by partner country governments. As a result, more than half of development co-operation resources are not captured in national budgets, limiting the ability of parliaments to effectively exercise their oversight, planning and accountability functions. This constrains the role of parliaments in guiding national development priorities and ensuring that development efforts respond to the needs of all segments of the population (Inter-Parliamentary Union/UNDP, 2020[14]). The limited share of development co-operation recorded on budget is also a reflection of the moderate provision of forward expenditure plans by development partners to partner countries. Predictable and transparent information on planned development co-operation is vital for governments to integrate development co-operation resources into national budgets and planning processes, as discussed in Chapter 4. Partner countries’ consensus to improve such provision of information on development co-operation resources for parliamentary scrutiny is explored in Part II of this report (see related reflections by Zambia in Chapter 7).
References
[9] Dreher, A., V. Eichenauer and K. Gehring (2018), “Geopolitics, aid, and growth: The impact of UN security council membership on the effectiveness of aid”, World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 32/2, pp. 268-286, https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhw037.
[14] Inter-Parliamentary Union/UNDP (2020), Guidelines for Enhancing the Engagement and Contribution of Parliaments to Effective Development Cooperation, Inter-Parliamentary Union/UNDP, https://www.undp.org/publications/guidelines-enhancing-engagement-and-contribution-parliaments-effective-development-cooperation.
[5] Klingebiel, S. and A. Sumner (2025), “Four futures for a global development cooperation system in flux: policy at the intersection of geopolitics, norm contestation and institutional shift”, German Institute of Development and Sustainability Policy Brief 11, https://doi.org/10.23661/ipb11.2025.
[13] National and Economic Development Authority (2023), PDP 2023-2028 Results Matrices, National and Economic Development Authority, https://sdg-space.depdev.gov.ph/depdev/matrices.
[12] National and Economic Development Authority (2023), Philippine Development Report 2023, National and Economic Development Authority, https://pdp.depdev.gov.ph/pdr-2023/.
[11] National Economic and Development Authority (2023), Philippine Development Plan 2023–2028, https://pdp.depdev.gov.ph/philippine-development-plan-2023-2028/.
[2] OECD (2011), Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November - 1 December 2011, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/54de7baa-en.
[1] OECD (2005), Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264098084-en.
[10] OECD/UNDP (2019), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2019 Progress Report, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/26f2638f-en.
[4] UN (2015), Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, United Nations, https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda.
[3] UN DESA (2025), 2025 Development Cooperation Forum Survey Study. Time to Change: Realigning International Development Cooperation with Developing Countries’ Needs and Priorities amid Rising Global Pressures, https://financing.desa.un.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025%20DCF%20Survey%20Study.pdf.
[6] UN DESA (2024), Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2024: Financing for development cooperation at a crossroads, https://doi.org/10.18356/9789213588635.
[8] UNCTAD (2025), Aid at the Crossroads: Trends in official development assistance, https://unctad.org/publication/aid-crossroads-trends-official-development-assistance.
[7] UNOSSC (2021), South-South Ideas: South-South Cooperation Finance for Mobilization of the Private Sector to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, https://southsouth-galaxy.org/publications/south-south-ideas-south-south-cooperation-finance-for-mobilization-of-the-private-sector-to-achieve-the-sustainable-development-goals/.
← 1. The 2023-26 round has strengthened the assessment of quality mutual accountability mechanisms by using a robust methodology that reflects the interdependent nature of the elements comprising these mechanisms. The reformed methodology now assesses elements sequentially: the existence of a policy framework that recognises the roles and responsibilities of diverse stakeholders; the establishment of country-level targets to assess the performance of those actors; the regular conduct of mutual assessments to review progress against these targets; the inclusiveness of these assessments beyond government and official development partners; and the timely public availability of their results. This approach underscores that assessing the quality of mutual accountability for effectiveness commitments requires country-level targets in order to assess the other related elements, as mutual accountability depends on these elements functioning together rather than in isolation.
← 2. The Development Co-operation Forum (DCF) survey is a biennial exercise conducted since 2009 that enables governments to self-assess the effectiveness of their development co-operation, with anonymous responses encouraging frank and open feedback. Its findings provide actionable insights for countries and their partners to adapt policies, systems and processes, while also contributing aggregated evidence to inform global discussions at DCF high-level meetings.
← 3. Countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations had the opportunity to undertake an adapted version of the 2023-26 monitoring round. In addition to the standard methodology, countries undertaking the fragility adapted questionnaire were asked several additional questions on whether a national co-operation forum has recently taken place, whether a mutual assessment informed dialogue at the forum, and whether the mutual assessment resulted in the adoption of joint actions/an action plan. See the standard and fragility adapted monitoring questionnaire for further detail.
← 4. While Kenya and the Philippines have all or most of the elements of a mutual accountability mechanism in place, they also use their mutual assessments to inform similar country level processes.
← 5. Assessment of reporting to the IATI and CRS uses the reference years 2018 and 2025.
← 6. The coverage is based on the total disbursements and expenditure reported to IATI as a proportion of the most recent total disbursements (ODA and other official flows) reported to the CRS.
← 7. The IATI standard assesses timeliness based on frequency and time lags in data updates, whereas CRS assessments are structured around an annual reporting cycle.