Many countries are adopting strategies to decrease their carbon emissions; this includes diversifying energy sources to those that can be produced and used with low or zero carbon emissions such as hydrogen and ammonia.
Accelerating the use of hydrogen has become an important element of many national energy strategies, including the use of ammonia as an energy vector for hydrogen.
While these and other technologies are essential for decarbonisation of emissions, they involve the use of hazardous chemicals and consequently introduce new safety risks.
Effective management of these risks needs to be an integral part of the transition process.
Failure to managing these risks could lead to major accidents, significant supply chain disruption, and could fundamentally hamper efforts to achieve net zero goals.
Key chemical safety considerations for energy transition technology
The global energy transition is accelerating, and substances such as hydrogen and ammonia are central to many countries achieving their climate goals through reducing the fossil fuel component of their energy supply. The properties and hazards of hydrogen and ammonia are well understood (Table 1 and 2) and they have been traditionally and widely used in industrial settings by companies that usually have high levels of understanding and experience of industrial process safety.
Today there are widespread plans to deploy these substances at larger scale and in new locations than has previously been seen. As well as increased volumes this may also mean a presence potentially closer to population, an increased need for transport infrastructure, new challenges at transport interfaces particularly at port areas, and sites previously considered to be low risk coming into scope of legislation for more significant hazards. Additionally, market incentives and subsidies have also attracted new players to the industry who may have less knowledge and experience of managing chemical safety risks.
The push to deploy these technologies to contribute to the achievement of net zero goals may bring competing pressures – political, economic and environmental – which may lead to safety considerations being given a lower priority. This may be due to lack of awareness of the risk or of safety being seen as an obstacle to development. However, if the risks are not managed properly, the consequences of a chemical accident could be significant:
Loss of life and serious injury to workers, first responders and local populations
Environmental damage including air, water and land contamination, which may be transboundary
Economic disruption including supply chain breakdowns, reputational damage and significant monetary loss for industry and governments
Erosion of public trust and resistance to new projects
Delays in achieving climate targets
Safety must be fundamental to the success of energy transition policies and the deployment of technologies to support these policies, such as those involving hydrogen and ammonia. It is important for policy makers to be aware of the safety implications of the use of hydrogen and ammonia, and to understand the critical importance of the prevention of, preparedness for, and response to accidents involving these substances. This requires policy makers to have some knowledge of the key issues, and to know how to access and use more technical knowledge. Without early and structured coordination between public authorities responsible for energy policy and those involved in the inspection and enforcement of chemical safety there is potential for priorities to be misaligned, for projects to advance with incomplete evidence to inform siting decisions, or for projects to be delayed.
There are already examples (Box 1) of accidents involving hydrogen and ammonia that have caused significant fatalities, injuries, and damage demonstrating the potential risks that must be prioritised and addressed, in both energy policy and in chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response policies.
The rapid development of hydrogen and ammonia projects demands timely consideration of applicable regulation by both industry and public authorities. While existing safety legislation in many jurisdictions remains broadly fit for purpose, policy makers or public authorities should conduct gap analyses of relevant legislation to determine whether any action is required to adapt or amend legislation to apply to such projects. Failure to do so creates the risks of regulatory gaps that leave industry without clear requirements and heightens the risk of inconsistent safety practices especially when the pace of technological development can be faster than legislative change processes. Industry and investors must also ensure they are fully cognisant of the safety legislation that applies to their projects and ensure they have the appropriate competence and experience within the project to comply and demonstrate compliance with their obligations.
As well as considering the legislative framework, technical standardisation requires attention by both industry and public authorities. The development and adoption of internationally recognised standards is time consuming, however it is important in that it supports industry both to produce and supply components at large scale, and also gives projects clarity on what they are purchasing and using. Standardisation also promotes harmonisation across an industry and enables easier demonstration to public authorities. Moreover changes in the usage of hydrogen and ammonia produce new potential ways that accidents can happen, which requires research to understand their implications for prevention, mitigation and emergency response.
Public acceptance is critical for the success of energy transition projects, a single major accident can undermine confidence, provoke community resistance, and lead to the delay or cancelation of projects. This not only threatens the broader objectives of climate change goals but could also cause significant economic damage or disruption within a country or region.
Hydrogen Tank Explosion in Gangneung, Korea, May 2019: A devastating hydrogen storage tank explosion occurred in Gangneung, Korea in May of 2019, during which two people died and six others were injured. Located at a new-energy research centre, the explosion destroyed the centre’s 5,100 m² building and damaged the windows and structures of neighbouring buildings. This reservoir was part of a research project combining the production of electricity by photovoltaic panels and a water electrolysis process. The Supreme Court ruled that five public and private corporations responsible for the hydrogen storage tank project will have to compensate the businesses affected by the incident with over 10 billion Won (c.7.67m EUR).
Source: Ministère de la Transition écologique, France – ARIA (2020), Hydrogen for transport: feedback and incidents (Flash H2), June. Available at: https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/2020_06_flash_H2_transport.pdf (accessed 6 May 2026); FuelCellsWorks (2025), Korean Supreme Court mandates 10 billion won compensation for 2019 hydrogen explosion, FuelCellsWorks, available at: https://fuelcellsworks.com/2025/03/31/h2/korean-supreme-court-mandates-10-billion-won-compensation-for-2019-hydrogen-explosion (accessed 6 May 2026).
Explosion at a hydrogen fuelling station, Norway, June 2019: An explosion followed by a fire occurred at a hydrogen fuelling station in June 2019 in Kjørbo, Norway. Hydrogen was produced on-site by an electrolyser. A 500 m security parameter was organised around the station. The motorway and nearby roads were closed to traffic. The blast of the explosion was so strong that it caused the airbags of nearby vehicles to deploy, slightly injuring three people. The nation’s hydrogen supply was interrupted. Manufacturers of fuel-cell vehicles put deliveries of new vehicles on hold. All the operators of hydrogen fuelling stations, whether using the same technology or not, were temporarily closed while an investigation was being carried out in Europe, the United States and Korea on the reason for the accident.
Source: Ministère de la Transition Écologique, France – ARIA (2020), Hydrogen for transport: feedback and incidents (Flash H2), June. Available at: https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/2020_06_flash_H2_transport.pdf (accessed 6 May 2026).
Ammonia release, Minot, North Dakota, 2002: In this incident, five rail tank cars ruptured, resulting in the release of approximately 250 tons of anhydrous ammonia. The failure produced a large, dense ammonia cloud that remained over the city for several hours due to the cold, heavy vapour behaviour typical of ammonia releases. Emergency services instructed residents to remain indoors, close doors and windows, and—if the ammonia smell became strong—go into the bathroom, turn on the shower, and breathe through wet cloths; the water spray helped absorb ammonia from indoor air. The consequences were severe: one fatality, fourteen serious injuries, and widespread exposure-related health impacts. It remains one of the largest outdoor pressurised ammonia releases in recent history.
Source: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (2004 Derailment of Canadian Pacific Railway Freight Train 292-16 and Subsequent Release of Anhydrous Ammonia Near Minot, North Dakota, January 18, 2002, NTSB/RAR-04/01. Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR0401.pdf (accessed 6 May 2026).
Anhydrous ammonia release, Western Australia, July 2018: this accident happened in a port during the unloading of an ammonia tanker vessel. After the liquid ammonia transfer was completed, operators began purging the loading arm and pipework using ammonia gas supplied from the ship’s storage tank headspace. During this process, an operator partially closed a line valve, unintentionally triggering the plant’s emergency shut down system. The emergency shut down caused a rapid pressure increase and hydraulic hammer in the loading arm. The resulting force exceeded the capacity of the quick connect/disconnect coupler, which was not fully tightened, causing it to decouple from the ship’s flange. This led to a sudden, uncontrolled release of ammonia gas. Ammonia continued to escape until the ship’s crew manually activated the ship’s emergency shut down system. The total release was estimated at 1,200 kg over 24 seconds. Five workers at the jetty required medical assessment, but all were released the same day.
Source: WorkSafe Western Australia (2019), Dangerous Goods Safety Significant Incident, Ammonia release during ship unloading, Report No. 01-19, March 2019. Available at: https://www.worksafe.wa.gov.au/system/files/documents/2024-12/DGS_SIR_0119.pdf (accessed 6 May 2026).
Ammonia release, Oklahoma, November 2025: this accident occurred when a tanker carrying anhydrous ammonia began to leak whilst parked overnight at a hotel car park. The leak created a toxic plume that limited access of emergency services to the areas. Forty-five people were hospitalised and fourteen first responders were injured. Initial inquiries indicated the cause to be a possible mechanical failure of a valve or seal.
Source: ABC News (2025), Dozens hospitalized after ammonia leaks from tanker truck in Oklahoma hotel parking lot. Available at: https://abcnews.com/US/dozens-hospitalized-after-ammonia-leaks-tanker-truck-oklahoma/story?id=127501094 (accessed 6 May 2026).
The hazards posed by hydrogen, ammonia and many other substances and technologies involved in the energy transition are not new or unique, consequently many of the solutions reflect fundamental principles of chemical accident prevention and management addressed in the OECD Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness and Response - Third Edition.
What can be new or unusual is the pace at which technologies emerge, the use of the substances or processes in new contexts or at greatly expanded scale, and the potential introduction of new or less experienced actors to the sector. All of these factors should lead to a consideration of the hazards, risks, and how they are managed.
The example in Figure 1 show what ammonia or hydrogen supply chains may look like and where chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response regulatory frameworks may be relevant. Safety must be embedded throughout the lifecycle of these projects with timelines that realistically reflect time, cost and technical requirements. The critical considerations highlighted below indicate where established principles of chemical safety need to be adapted to specific situations.
Early engagement between public different authorities and with industry is essential to assess competence and embed safe-by-design principles. Networks of expertise and strong communication channels are needed so stakeholders understand the safety implications and policy makers can integrate these considerations into energy strategies. Policy makers should be able to incorporate the safety challenges into policies and empower solutions.
Source: Presentation by Dr Mark Scanlon, Energy Institute at the Third Hydrogen Fuel Risks Webinar organised by the EC-Joint Research Centre and OECD on 08 October 2024.
Embedding Safety from Project Conception to Operation - Investors and operators should be aware of chemical accident risk, and ensure it is considered at every stage of a project, from initial design and siting decisions through construction, operation, maintenance and eventual decommissioning. This means building safety into resource, costs and timeline projections, and integrating prevention, preparedness, response and follow-up measures into permitting processes and oversight frameworks. This also means consideration of how the hazard is transferred and transformed along the usage chain and the different hazard scenarios created. This should have appropriate oversight from public authorities.
Robust Regulatory Frameworks – Public authorities should review, and where necessary update or amend, regulatory frameworks to ensure they are appropriate to hydrogen and ammonia hazards. This should include appropriate and coherent land use planning policies, appropriate permitting requirements, frameworks for inspection and emergency preparedness requirements. Operators and investors should ensure that they are familiar with all regulatory frameworks that may apply to their projects.
Robust Risk Management at Transport Interfaces including Ports – Transport interfaces can host large numbers of different activities including transport and storage activities, fuel bunkering, oil refining, chemical manufacture, passenger transport and marina operations which may impact the potential accident scenarios for a hydrogen or ammonia project. Public authorities should review, and where necessary update or amend regulatory frameworks, land use planning policies, permitting processes, inspection procedures, and emergency response planning to ensure they are appropriate to hydrogen and ammonia hazards.
Communicate Risks Transparently and Engage Communities in Decision Making - Public authorities should establish frameworks to ensure that communities are proactively informed about the safety risks associated with hydrogen and ammonia technologies and projects and provide clear guidance on what to do in case of an accident. Public authorities should also establish frameworks to ensure that community engagement is embedded in key decision-making processes such as siting and permitting to build trust and promote acceptance of new technologies.
Establish Knowledge-Sharing and Training Mechanisms – Safe deployment of hydrogen and ammonia technologies requires strong cooperation between public authorities and industry. This should include systematic identification of competency gaps and development of means to address them. continuous knowledge exchange throughout the supply chain will help maintain high safety standards and build confidence in new technologies.
Systematically Apply Lessons Learned from Past Accidents – Public authorities and industry should establish mechanisms to capture, share and implement lessons from past accidents and near misses—both within hydrogen and ammonia sectors and from other industries with similar risk profiles. This includes using existing accident databases, analysing causes and failures, and translating findings into practical change.
This document is based on presentations and discussion at a joint EU-OECD webinar series on hydrogen fuel risks and risks from ammonia as an energy carrier held from 2023 to 2025. The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), in collaboration with OECD, organised this webinar series for regulators, industry and other stakeholders to facilitate exchange on the main challenges linked to hydrogen and ammonia risks, in light of the rapid escalation of projects that are, or will be in future, submitted for review and approval by public authorities. The presentations and reports from these events are available on the OECD website.
Contact
Marie-Ange Baucher (marie-ange.baucher@oecd.org)
Eeva Leinala (eeva.leinala@oecd.org)