[15] Abreu, D., D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti (1990), “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring”, Econometrica, Vol. 58/5, p. 1041, https://doi.org/10.2307/2938299.
[77] ACM (2023), ACM’s oversight of sustainability agreements, https://www.acm.nl/system/files/documents/Beleidsregel%20Toezicht%20ACM%20op%20duurzaamheidsafspraken%20ENG.pdf.
[54] Advocate General Rantos (2023), Opinion of Advocate General Rantos delivered on 5 October 2023. Banco BPN/BIC Português SA and Others v Autoridade da Concorrência., https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62022CC0298.
[79] AFCA (2022), Guidelines on the Application of Sec. 2 para. 1 Cartel Act to Sustainability Cooperations (Sustainability Guidelines), https://www.bwb.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/AFCA_Sustainability_Guidelines_English_final.pdf.
[17] Albæk, S., P. Møllgaard and P. Overgaard (1997), “Government‐Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 45/4, pp. 429-443, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00057.
[25] Andres, M., L. Bruttel and J. Friedrichsen (2023), “How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: A machine learning approach”, European Economic Review, Vol. 152, p. 104331, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104331.
[27] Assad, S. et al. (2024), “Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 132/3, pp. 723-771, https://doi.org/10.1086/726906.
[65] Audiencia Nacional (2025), SAN 4663/2025, ECLI:ES:AN:2025:4663, https://www.poderjudicial.es/search/sentence.jsp?reference=11512617&optimize=20251120.
[53] Autoridade da Concorrencia (2019), PRC/2012/9, https://extranet.concorrencia.pt/PesquisAdC/Page.aspx?Ref=PRC_2012_9&isEnglish=False.
[20] Awaya, Y. and V. Krishna (2020), “Information exchange in cartels”, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 51/2, pp. 421-446, https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12320.
[45] Awaya, Y. and V. Krishna (2016), “On Communication and Collusion”, American Economic Review, Vol. 106/2, pp. 285–315, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141469.
[100] Belgian Competition Authority (2025), Press Release nr 4 - 2025: The Belgian Competition Authority has accepted commitments from Belgapom in relation to the determination of the Belgapom quotation (price index for potatoes), https://www.belgiancompetition.be/en/about-us/actualities/press-release-nr-4-2025.
[59] Blanco, J., Y. Kim and K. Georgieva (2023), Banco BPN v. BIC Português and Others: Banks Caught Again In The Two Steps Between “By Object” And “By Effect”, https://www.clearyantitrustwatch.com/2023/10/banco-bpn-v-bic-portugues-and-others-banks-caught-again-in-the-two-steps-between-by-object-and-by-effect/.
[24] Byrne, D. et al. (2025), “Asymmetric Information Sharing in Oligopoly: A Natural Experiment in Retail Gasoline”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 133/7, pp. 2031-2088, https://doi.org/10.1086/734872.
[26] Calvano, E. et al. (2020), “Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion”, American Economic Review, Vol. 110/10, pp. 3267-3297, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190623.
[46] Cardona Baquero, N. and A. García de Brigard (2022), Information Exchange and Related Risks: A Jurisdictional Guide. Colombia, Concurrences, https://www.concurrences.com/en/all-books/information-exchange-and-related-risks.
[57] Carstensen, P. and A. Marschall (2023), Pooling And Exchanging Competitively Sensitive Information Among Rivals: Absolutely Illegal Not Just Unreasonable, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4725355.
[61] CAT (2021), Judgment 1344/1/12/20 Lexon (UK) Limited v Competition and Markets Authority, https://www.catribunal.org.uk/judgments/134411220-lexon-uk-limited-v-competition-and-markets-authority-judgment-2021-cat-5-25-feb.
[10] Cho, N. (2021), “The Impact of Health Information Sharing on Hospital Costs”, Healthcare, Vol. 9/7, p. 806, https://doi.org/10.3390/healthcare9070806.
[33] CJEU (2024), Case C-298/22, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 29 July 2024 – Banco BPN/BIC Português SA and Others v Autoridade da Concorrência, ECLI:EU:C:2024:638, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62022CJ0298.
[84] CJEU (2016), Case C-74/14: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 21 January 2016 — ‘Eturas’ UAB and Others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62014CA0074.
[44] CJEU (2009), Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 4 June 2009. T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit. ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62008CJ0008.
[99] CJEU (2006), Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 23 November 2006 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) - Case C-238/05 - Asnef-Equifax, ECLI:EU:C:2006:734, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62005CJ0238&qid=1777396124925.
[31] CMA (2026), Agentic AI and consumers, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/agentic-ai-and-consumers/agentic-ai-and-consumers.
[74] CMA (2023), Environmental sustainability agreements, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-environmental-sustainability-agreements.
[70] CMA (2023), Guidance on the application of the Chapter I prohibition in the Competition Act 1998 to horizontal agreements, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/64dba33bc8dee400127f1d25/Horizontal_Guidance_FINAL.pdf.
[60] CMA (2020), Decision of the Competition and Markets Authority: Nortriptyline Tablets Information Exchange (Case 50507.2), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5ef469bcd3bf7f7142efc039/Information_Exchange_Decision.pdf.
[69] Competition Bureau Canada (2021), Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, https://competition-bureau.canada.ca/en/how-we-foster-competition/education-and-outreach/competitor-collaboration-guidelines.
[16] Connor, J. (2024), “Price-fixing overcharges: revised 4th edition”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4906907.
[4] Diamond, D. and R. Verrecchia (1991), “Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 46/4, pp. 1325-1359, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x.
[95] DOJ (2026), Justice Department Requires Agri Stats to End Exchange of Competitively Sensitive Information Among Nation’s Largest Meat Processors that Suppressed Competition and Increased Prices for Decades, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-agri-stats-end-exchange-competitively-sensitive-information.
[56] DOJ (2026), Statement of Interest in re: Frozen Potato Products Antitrust Litigation, https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1429466/dl?inline.
[86] DOJ (2025), Justice Department Requires RealPage to End the Sharing of Competitively Sensitive Information and Alignment of Pricing Among Competitors, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-realpage-end-sharing-competitively-sensitive-information-and.
[85] DOJ (2025), United States of America et al. v. RealPage, Inc. et al., Proposed Final Judgment, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1419406/dl.
[34] DOJ (2024), Statement of Defense submitted in Re Pork Antitrust Litigation, https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1371806/dl.
[55] DOJ (2023), Complaint in U.S. v. Agri Stats, Inc., https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-v-agri-stats-inc.
[93] DOJ (2023), Justice Department Withdraws Outdated Enforcement Policy Statements, press release, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-withdraws-outdated-enforcement-policy-statements.
[3] Dranove, D. and G. Jin (2010), “Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 48/4, pp. 935-963, https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.48.4.935.
[101] European Commission (2025), Press Release: Commission fines car manufacturers and association €458 million over technical cooperation and information exchange., https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_25_881/IP_25_881_EN.pdf.
[47] European Commission (2023), Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023XC0721(01).
[71] European Commission (2023), Questions and Answers on adoption of the new Horizontal Block Exemption Regulations and Horizontal Guidelines, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/da/qanda_23_3014.
[91] European Commission (2011), EU 2010 Horizontal Guidelines (one-year rule of thumb), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52011XC0114%2804%29.
[82] Ezrachi, A. and M. Stucke (2016), Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
[102] Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (2025), The Supreme Administrative Court imposed a fine of 6.56 million euros on the Finnish Real Estate Management Federation and real estate management companies for a competition restriction aimed at raising prices, https://www.kkv.fi/en/current/press-releases/the-supreme-administrative-court-imposed-a-fine-of-6-56-million-euros-on-the-finnish-real-estate-management-federation-and-real-estate-management-companies-for-a-competition-restriction-aimed-at-raisi/.
[43] García, C. (2025), El intercambio de información entre competidores en la nueva LFCE de México: alcance, retos y riesgos en un entorno digitalizado, https://centrocompetencia.com/el-intercambio-de-informacion-entre-competidores-en-la-nueva-lfce-de-mexico/.
[38] Geradin, D. (2022), Key Challenges when Approaching Information Exchange, Concurrences, https://www.concurrences.com/en/all-books/information-exchange-and-related-risks.
[66] Gómez-Acebo & Pombo (2025), La Audiencia Nacional refuerza las exigencias probatorias en las infracciones “por efectos”: anulación de la resolución de la CNMC en el caso Tabacos, https://ga-p.com/publicaciones/la-audiencia-nacional-refuerza-las-exigencias-probatorias-en-las-infracciones-por-efectos-anulacion-de-la-resolucion-de-la-cnmc-en-el-caso-tabacos/.
[14] Green, E. and R. Porter (1984), “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information”, Econometrica, Vol. 52/1, p. 87, https://doi.org/10.2307/1911462.
[28] Harrington, J. (2026), “Hub‐and‐Spoke Collusion With a Third‐Party Pricing Algorithm”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70017.
[22] Harrington, J. (2022), “The Anticompetitiveness of a Private Information Exchange of Prices”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 85, p. 102793, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102793.
[21] Harrington, J. and L. Ye (2019), “Collusion through Coordination of Announcements”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 67/2, pp. 209-241, https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12199.
[78] HCC (2021), Sustainable Development Sandbox, https://sandbox.epant.gr/en/.
[29] Hunold, M. and T. Werner (2025), “Algorithmic price recommendations and collusion: Experimental evidence”, Experimental Economics, Vol. 28/2, pp. 298-316, https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2025.9.
[58] Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2024), “Restrictions by object under Article 101(1) TFEU: From dark art to administrable framework”, Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 43, pp. 224–260, https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/yeae010.
[49] Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) (2010), Cease and Desist Orders and Surcharge Payment Orders against Manufacturers of Shutters (Tentative Translation), https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2010/jun/individual-000019.html.
[75] Jenny, F. (2026), “Competition and environmental sustainability: Lessons from the European debate”, Concurrences Law Review, Vol. 3, pp. 1-13, https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-3-2026/recueil-d-articles/competition-and-environmental-sustainability-lessons-from-the-european-debate.
[37] Khoo, K. and J. Soh (2020), “The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law”, American Business Law Journal, Vol. 57/1, pp. 45-111.
[35] Klein, T. and B. Neurohr (2023), “Should Private Exchanges of List Price Information Be Presumed to Be Anticompetitive?”, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Vol. 23/1-2, pp. 33-57, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-023-00395-1.
[13] Kühn, K. and X. Vives (1994), Information Exchanges Among Firms and their Impact on Competition, https://blog.iese.edu/xvives/files/2011/09/Information-Exchanges-and-their-Impact-on-Competition.pdf.
[41] Lee, S. (2026), Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2025 – Korea, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6526718.
[39] Marosi, Z. and M. Soares (2022), Information Exchange and Related Risks: A Jurisdictional Guide, Concurrences, https://www.concurrences.com/en/all-books/information-exchange-and-related-risks.
[50] MLex (2023), Japanese shutter makers Sanwa, Toyo, Bunka lost antitrust appeals to annul cartel sanctions, https://www.mlex.com/mlex/articles/2239399/japanese-shutter-makers-sanwa-toyo-bunka-lost-antitrust-appeals-to-annul-cartel-sanctions.
[18] Motta, M. (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press., https://danielmorochoruiz.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/massimo_motta_competition_policy_theory_and_prabookfi-org.pdf.
[67] Nieto, A. and C. Pascual (2026), Efectos de un intercambio de información, ojo con el contrafactual, https://centrocompetencia.com/efectos-de-un-intercambio-de-informacion-ojo-con-el-contrafactual/.
[64] Norwegian Competition Authority (2025), Press release: Norwegian Competition Authority decision fully upheld in the price hunter case, https://www.concurrences.com/docrestreint.api/pdf/norwegian_competition_authority_decision_fully_upheld_in_the_price_hunter_case.pdf.
[62] Norwegian Competition Authority (2024), Coop, Norgesgruppen and Rema fined 4.9 billion NOK, https://konkurransetilsynet.no/coop-norgesgruppen-and-rema-fined-4-9-billion-nok/?lang=en.
[42] Núñez Melgoza, J. (2025), Intercambio de información: nueva regulación de competencia, https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/opinion/intercambio-informacion-nueva-regulacion-competencia-20250810-772139.html.
[32] OECD (2026), “The agentic AI landscape and its conceptual foundations”, OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers, No. 56, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/396cf758-en.
[89] OECD (2025), Algorithmic pricing and competition in G7 jurisdictions: Emerging trends and responses, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f36dacf8-en.
[96] OECD (2025), OECD Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (2025 Update), OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/cbe05a56-en.
[30] OECD (2024), Competition Policy in Digital Markets: The Combined Effect of Ex Ante and Ex Post Instruments in G7 Jurisdictions, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/80552a33-en.
[63] OECD (2024), Global Forum on Competition, Competition in the Food Supply Chain – Contribution from Norway, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2024)31/en/pdf.
[88] OECD (2023), “Algorithmic Competition”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 296, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/cb3b2075-en.
[76] OECD (2021), “Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 266, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2616c43c-en.
[73] OECD (2021), “Sustainability and Competition”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 262, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/18e2061c-en.
[11] OECD (2020), “OECD competition policy responses to COVID-19”, OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5c47af5a-en.
[94] OECD (2019), Competition Assessment Toolkit: Principles. Version 4.0 (Volume I), OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5f9fa6ca-en.
[97] OECD (2019), “Hub-and-Spoke Arrangements”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 237, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/393ab686-en.
[87] OECD (2017), “Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 206, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/258dcb14-en.
[83] OECD (2015), “Competition Enforcement in Oligopolistic Markets”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 172, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/45ff9189-en.
[98] OECD (2012), “Unilateral Disclosure of Information with Anticompetitive Effects: Key findings, summary and notes”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 127, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/10a2ad51-en.
[80] OECD (2011), Competition Issues in Trade Associations, OECD Secretariat Background Note, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/LACF(2011)4/en/pdf.
[2] OECD (2011), “Information Exchanges between Competitors under Competition Law”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 115, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/327f7dd3-en.
[36] Padilla, J. and B. Sarmento (2018), Another look at the competitive assessment of information exchanges amongst competitors in EU Competition Law, https://www.concorrencia.pt/sites/default/files/imported-magazines/CR_35_Bernardo_Sarmento_%26_Jorge_Padilla.pdf.
[8] Pindyck, R. (2009), Sunk Costs and Risk-Based Barriers to Entry, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, https://doi.org/10.3386/w14755.
[7] Raith, M. (1996), “A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 71/1, pp. 260-288, https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0117.
[72] Schneider, G. (2025), “ESG Data and EU Competition Enforcement: From ‘Green’ to ’Digital’ Antitrust in Sustainable Markets”, European Business Law Review, Vol. 36/3, pp. 449-494, https://doi.org/10.54648/eulr2025028.
[6] Shapiro, C. (1986), “Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 53/3, p. 433, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297638.
[40] Shin, S., B. Kim and H. Choi (2026), Heightened cartel enforcement risk in Korea: Key Developments and implications, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7a5b52e8-a699-43a0-a85c-e3e8b74a85a6.
[23] Spector, D. (2022), “Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion”, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 60/2, pp. 193-216, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-021-09851-w.
[12] Stigler, G. (1964), “A Theory of Oligopoly”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72/1, pp. 44-61, https://doi.org/10.1086/258853.
[48] Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio (2016), RESOLUCIÓN 54403 DE 18 DE AGOSTO DE 2016 CUADERNOS, https://sedeelectronica.sic.gov.co/transparencia/normativa/resolucion-54403-de-18-de-agosto-de-2016-cuadernos.
[19] Thomadsen, R. and K. Rhee (2007), “Costly Collusion in Differentiated Industries”, Marketing Science, Vol. 26/5, pp. 660-665, https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1060.0255.
[68] Turkish Competition Authority (2013), Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/22520.
[52] Tween, D., J. Eichlin and A. Latham (2024), Eerie Exchanges? US Antitrust Agencies Renew Focus on Information Exchange Practices, https://www.linklaters.com/insights/blogs/linkingcompetition/2024/october/eerie-exchanges_us-antitrust-agencies-renew-focus-on-information-exchange-practices.
[1] UNCTAD (2011), Guidelines on information exchange between competitors, https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/ccpb_SCF_InfoSharing_en.pdf.
[92] US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (1996), Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, https://www.justice.gov/atr/statements-antitrust-enforcement-policy-health-care.
[9] Van Dijk, R., T. Jenkinson and V. Pham (2024), “Assessing information exchange among competitors in financial services markets”, Competition Law Journal, Vol. 23/2, pp. 121-126, https://doi.org/10.4337/clj.2024.02.05.
[5] Vives, X. (1984), “Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 34/1, pp. 71-94, https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90162-5.
[81] Waller, S. (2018), Trade Associations, Information Exchange, and Cartels, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3147229.
[51] Whiddington, C. and M. Scassini (2025), When Does Information Exchange Cross the Line into Anti-Competitive Conduct?, https://www.steptoe.com/en/news-publications/stepahead-antitrust-and-competition-insights/when-does-information-exchange-cross-the-line-into-anti-competitive-conduct.html.
[90] Yong, B. and W. Ziwen (eds.) (2025), Unrestricted Enforcement Risk on Information Exchange and Unilateral Disclosure under EU Competition Law?, Concurrences.