Harnessing Mission Governance to Achieve National Climate Targets

1. Overview: Addressing the wicked problem of climate change mitigation

Abstract

This chapter presents a brief overview of the purpose and objectives of the report, its methodology, as well the overarching findings. It presents the challenge of climate change as a wicked problem, which requires new approaches to governance. The global efforts to mitigate climate change rely on the realisation of bold, ambitious, time bound and cross-sectoral national emissions targets, yet most countries are falling short of their commitments. To secure adequate governance for these complex and broad challenges missions should be better integrated into climate mitigation strategies.

Climate change as a super-wicked problem

Within the field of public policy, certain problems are labelled "wicked" when their solving is complicated by "enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders implicated" (Lazarus, 2009[1]). This makes them resistant to resolution through traditional linear problem-solving approaches (Rittel and Webber, 1973[2]). Scholars refer to climate change as a "super-wicked" problem (Levin et al., 2012[3]), as it has all the characteristics of "wicked" problems, plus several more.

Climate change is a collective action problem in that it requires coordinated global efforts to reduce emissions, yet individual actors may lack incentives to act alone due to the diffuse nature of both causes and impacts (Ostrom, 2010[4]). It requires the co-ordination of hundreds of states around a single goal, yet those states best positioned to contribute to emission reduction are often least affected by the effects of climate change, and thus relatively less incentivised to act. The same can be said on an intra-national level.

Climate change mitigation is also subject to the early action paradox; action that affects outcomes must occur well in advance of those outcomes, but such early action is stymied by uncertainty, low salience and obstructionism (Hale, 2024[5]). The long timescales over which climate change occurs, or even until the Paris Agreement's 2050 goals, can prevent a sense of urgency and cause climate to fall lower down the list of countries' priorities, especially in times of economic or security instability. Climate change is not only a long-term problem that goes well beyond electoral cycles, it also becomes increasingly complex to address as more time passes, since its effects increase in frequency and severity over time, with more and more economic disruption expected (Lazarus, 2009[1]). Additionally, Lazarus points to the absence of institutional frameworks with the ability to develop, implement, and maintain the laws necessary to address a problem of climate change’s tremendous spatial and temporal scope.

On a national level, the challenge of climate change also raises a paradox of multi-level governance. Because climate action is urgent, its governance can benefit from the rapidity of a top-down, "command and control" approach. However, there is also a need for bottom-up innovation and entrepreneurship, as well as buy-in and behaviour change from individuals, households, and communities. Successful climate governance approaches need to embrace this paradox, perhaps via multi-level governance structures, balancing top-down leadership and direction with bottom-up experimentation and action (Jordan et al., 2018[6]).

Most of these many challenges apply just as much to the intranational level as the international level, highlighting the significant complexity and the dauting task at hand to achieve ambitious national climate targets. A traditional, siloed approach to public sector governance may not be well-suited to the task, and this appears to be confirmed by the fact that most countries are not yet on-track to meet their objectives.

If addressing climate change requires a “rethinking of our political and governance strategies” (Hale, 2024[5]), so will no doubt implementing national climate targets. Successfully reaching such targets will likely require adopting approaches that promote a systems view, fosters experimentation, secures consistency across electoral cycles, help actors navigate uncertainties, policy interactions, dependencies and circularities, balance stakeholder needs, enable a timely response, and reinforce climate as a policy priority.

The importance of meeting national mitigation targets

Much of the discussion and literature on the challenge of climate governance has been focused on the global level, in particular the determinants of climate cooperation between states. Less attention has been paid to what happens on a national level to realise the national emissions reduction commitments on which the international climate agreements now rely on (see Chapter 2). With the 2015 Paris Agreement, and its obligation for Parties to adopt Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to reduce emissions, climate policy has become “at least as much about understanding dynamics within nations as it is understanding the interaction between nations” (Dubash, 2021[7]). This reveals an urgent need to address gaps in our understanding of how states can best organise themselves internally to address the challenge of climate change.

Indeed, while most countries have committed to various climate targets, including the NDCs, few have been able to translate these commitments into adequate outcomes. A recent report on the State of Climate Action indicates that global and national progress is off track to meet 2030 targets for 41 out of 42 assessed indicators (Boehm et al., 2023[8]). This inability to proactively address a major societal threat and deliver on committed policy goals undermines the public’s confidence in their governments, public institutions, and democratic systems.

In light of the 2023 Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement (see also Chapter 2), which highlighted both the importance of meeting existing commitments and the need for increasing the ambition of upcoming national commitments, governments are under heavy pressure to develop better approaches for how to translate climate targets into effective climate action (UN, 2024[9]).

The relevance of the mission-oriented approach to climate mitigation

National climate targets tend to be ambitious, time-bound, concrete, measurable, long-term, and cross-sectoral. They are, in everything but name, mission statements (see Box 1.1).

The concept of missions has gained traction in recent years, largely due to the influential work of economist Marianna Mazzucato and particularly her book The Entrepreneurial State (2013[10]). The idea has been embraced by numerous governments, stemming from a perceived need for more effective ways to tackle broad and complex (or ‘wicked’) challenges facing society – including ageing societies, preventative healthcare, generating sustainable growth, and climate change (Mazzucato and Dibb, 2019[11]). These are often referred to as ‘grand challenges’ and codified in the UN 2030 Agenda’s Sustainable Development Goals.

Box 1.1. Key terminology associated with missions and the mission-oriented approach

Mission: A clearly defined, ambitious policy objective aimed at addressing a complex societal challenge within a specified timeframe, requiring coordinated action across multiple sectors. The term mission is commonly used to describe both the objectives as well as, by extension, the frameworks put in place to reach them.

Mission governance: Governance approach to organising and mobilising the public sector to enable cross-sectoral orchestration and co-ordination of actors, instruments, and activities towards realising mission objectives.

Mission statement: Clearly defined policy objectives to address a societal challenge within a specified timeframe, combining intent and commitment for collective action.

Mission-oriented policy (MOP): Policy framework designed to achieve mission statement and objectives by mobilising resources, coordinating stakeholders, and fostering cross-sector innovation.

Mission-oriented innovation policy (MOIP): Coordinated policy framework that leverage science, technology, and innovation to contribute to achieving specific mission objectives. MOIPs can do so in different ways and take a variety of forms. Larrue (2021[12]) distinguishes between overarching, challenge-based, thematic, and ecosystem-based mission-oriented innovation policies.

Source: Adapted from OECD OPSI (Jonason, 2023[13]).

Within the context of policymaking, a mission denotes a clearly defined overarching policy objective aimed at tackling a societal challenge within a specified timeframe. Missions are characterised by a far-reaching vision with transformative aspirations, seeking to set specific, ambitious, long-term, time-bound, and cross-sectoral objectives to address wicked societal challenges.

Notably, the term encapsulates both a resolute declaration of intent and a tangible commitment to take bold collective action to confront a complex societal issue. Since their realisation involves a range of stakeholders – often across multiple sectors and levels of government – they necessitate significant co-ordination (Jonason, 2023[13]). In practice, the term mission is commonly used to describe both the objectives (or ‘mission statement’) as well as, by extension, the frameworks put in place to reach them. Missions represent a purpose-oriented, market-shaping approach to public policy in which the public sector takes an active role in convening and co-ordinating actors and resources around complex, cross-sectoral, and cross-national issues that cannot be solved by individual actors alone.

While the scope of national climate targets might be too broad for a direct implementation of missions, the principles of mission governance are relevant in terms of securing an enabling context to take on a whole-of-government approach towards such ambitious targets. It can also help foster narrower missions to address the underlying (often sectoral) targets that NDCs often rely on and synergise mission-oriented policies (sometimes abbreviated as MOPs). When adopting a mission-oriented approach, policy interventions are crafted specifically to mobilise necessary resources and instruments, orchestrate stakeholder collaboration, and invigorate innovation across government and sectoral boundaries to meet the challenge at hand. Notably, mission-oriented policies are expected to draw from a range of policy domains, such as regulatory measures, outreach initiatives, financial incentives, research funding, or targeted investments, all orchestrated to drive progress toward the mission statement. It is, in a sense, an all-hands-on-deck approach, where the leveraged policy instruments are adapted to the challenge at hand, rather than the other way around. Mission-oriented policies have been launched and anchored at varying levels of government, from the Centre of Government (CoG) or ministry, to regions, cities, and public agencies, including platforms1. This can be also observed in the context of climate mitigation approaches across different levels of government.

While the concept of missions and mission-oriented policy has been largely constrained to Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) policy, it is increasingly being more broadly advocated as a driving governance principle, with both the increased realisation that missions need to go beyond STI instruments, and with the recent embrace of the idea of mission-driven oriented government (Box 1.2).

Box 1.2. Mission driven government

A recent development, which builds on and echoes the idea of missions as governance, has been the emergence of the idea of mission-driven government. A mission-driven government is one that adopts the accomplishment of a select few missions as a key strategic priority and driving force across the public sector. According to Nesta and the Institute for Government (2024[14]), it represents a fundamental shift in how governments operate, demanding sustained political commitment, cross-sector collaboration, and a relentless focus on delivering tangible outcomes that citizens can directly experience. Missions are by this token, “the ultimate purpose of the administration”.

Nesta and the Institute for the Government describe three components to a mission-driven government:

1. Direction of Travel: Establish a small number of ambitious, inspiring, long-term missions, supported by targets and iterative game plans, that concentrate resources and political capital towards achieving a bold vision for change.

2. Role of Government: Instead of simply delivering services, governments must actively drive public service innovation, shape markets, and harness intelligence to support learning, testing and scaling, to ultimately achieve mission outcomes.

3. Foundations: Strong foundation, including the right structures and processes, people and culture, as well as data and technology, are essential for enabling and sustaining mission-driven work.

This idea, which has been championed as a core tenet of the new UK government’s strategy, represents an embrace of mission governance at the centre of government. It highlights a growing understanding of missions as more than policy delivery mechanisms, but rather as vehicles for new forms of governance that, given the right enabling conditions, can guide broader societal transitions.

Source: (Nesta and Institute for Government, 2024[14])

Notably, the mission-oriented approach to address COVID-19 showed the potential of co-ordinated and systemic responses to complex and urgent societal threats. Governments worldwide set clear, ambitious goals and mobilised significant resources, exemplified by the US's $18 billion Operation Warp Speed for vaccine development and the UK's "Moonshot" program for mass testing (Mazzucato and Kattel, 2020[15]). These whole-of-government initiatives fostered broad collaboration between public and private sectors, driving rapid innovation and deployment of vaccines, diagnostics, and digital contact tracing solutions.

Few outside the research and innovation policy domains discuss the relevance of a mission-oriented approach to governments’ wider climate change efforts. The effectiveness of governance put in place at a national level to achieve the desired mission-oriented outcomes of climate mitigation targets is largely neglected. Better linking the mission concept to national climate targets can serve both climate policy makers and mission practitioners.

The report intends to address this knowledge gap to provide policy makers with critical operational insights into mission-oriented governance for climate change mitigation.

This will also offer a valuable comparative foundation to develop broader cross-country lessons on missions and transformative policy, since mitigation commitments are comparable across countries (as opposed to other mission areas, where objectives differ depending on national contexts). Mission practitioners operating on smaller scope challenges also have much to learn from the governance and efforts put in place to address the truly transformative and all-encompassing wicked problem of climate change.

Purpose and scope of the report

This report seeks to assess the role of missions as an innovative governance approach to inform climate and environmental decision-making and policies, as part of the OECD Action Plan on Governing Green endorsed at the OECD Public Governance Ministerial Meeting in November 2022. It complements a wide array of work across the OECD Public Governance Directorate to outline steps countries can take within their governance arrangements to become ready for the green transition. An overview of resulting insights on institutional, policy and regulatory arrangements can be found in the policy paper “Governing Green: public governance arrangements for the green transition” (OECD, forthcoming[16]).

The report complements and builds on the 2024 OECD report Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy for Net Zero (see Chapter 3), based on a database of 101 "net zero missions" and 17 in-depth case studies to assess how mission-oriented innovation policies (MOIPs) support national greenhouse gas reduction goals compared to traditional STI policies. The report finds that while these MOIPs show clear advantages over traditional STI policy approaches in terms of fostering collective agenda-setting, cross-sectoral co-ordination, and policy integration, their scope, integration and reach are much too limited to fully realise their potential contribution to climate objectives.

Building on these insights and other OECD work in the field of mission-oriented policy, the main objective of the report is to provide a framework to help governments operationalise their climate targets by leveraging a mission-oriented approach. The analysis will ascertain:

1. To what extent are mission-oriented approaches already embedded in national climate efforts?

2. How can countries better leverage mission-oriented approaches in pursuit of their national climate targets?;

3. What can mission practitioners in other fields learn from the efforts to implement national climate targets?

Accordingly, the primary research question is whether governments are implementing a governance approach that is adequate to achieve the mission-oriented outcomes intrinsic to their national climate targets.

In terms of scope, the intended focus of the report is on the governance of climate change mitigation policy (i.e., GHG emission reduction policy) at the national level. While adaptation is developing into an integral part of climate governance, the institutional and reporting landscape for adaptation remains less mature (OECD, 2024[17]) and is unevenly covered in the climate assessments on which the reports’ analysis is based.

As opposed to prior OECD work on mission-oriented innovation policies for net zero (see Chapter 3), the focus here is not primarily on mission-oriented policies or programmes, but rather on the governance put in place to implement and reach country-wide climate change mitigation targets. It thus approaches the subject of climate mitigation missions from a complementary top-down perspective, starting from the whole-of-society mission statement that are the NDCs and other such climate targets.

The report is also not focusing on the global climate governance, which sets the frame for the setting of national targets (as covered briefly in Chapter 2), or the negotiation process through which the targets are set, but rather on the operationalisation and implementation of these objectives, which largely takes place on a national level.

Methodology

The analysis employs a comparative policy analysis methodology, using recent national climate council assessments reports¹¹ as the unit of analysis to map and understand national climate mitigation efforts through the prism of mission governance.

Climate councils (CCs) are institutionalised advisory bodies typically composed of experts from various fields such as climate science, economics, and policy. These councils are established to provide independent, evidence-based advice to governments on climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, often with the aim of informing long-term policy decisions and facilitating the transition to a low-carbon economy. A key function of many climate councils is the production of comprehensive climate assessment reports, which examine whether countries are on track to meet their climate target, identify gaps between the goals and delivery of climate policy at different levels of government, and recommend policy actions.

In this report, assessments from 15 different countries’ CCs were processed through a structured analysis grid based on the mission governance framework (see Chapter 3), to identify which elements of mission governance the respective country are or are not “activating”, and if a mission-oriented approach could be beneficial to respond to remaining challenges. The mission governance framework, based on a set of purpose-oriented governance principles related to the structure, resources, orientation, co-ordination and execution of missions. The framework is the result of action research within the frame of the OECD Mission Action Lab and has been developed in partnership with policy makers, notably in a series of workshops with mission practitioners at different levels of government as part of the Horizon Europe-funded project "Missions Implementation". It also expands on the OECD Public Governance directorate’s work on the Governing Green agenda, including on climate policy at the Centre of Government.

The selection of countries included in the analysis were based on the availability and scope of recent assessments, as well as an effort to have representation of countries from across OECD member states. The 15 countries that were included in the analysis are members of the International Climate Councils Network (ICCN), whose Secretariat helped provide an overarching perspective to the analysis.

Limitations might arise from this approach. First, the climate council model, which originated in the United Kingdom, is more prevalent in European and English-speaking countries, which limits the geographical focus, as well as in countries with relative degree of political consensus on climate action, resulting in what Dubash (2021[7]) describes as strategic (as opposed to opportunistic, unstable, or unstable sectoral) climate institutions. Second, the assessments reports differ from country to country, with inconsistent presentation of data and outcomes due to a lack of standardised metrics and disparate resources. Some climate councils have a more explicit focus on underlying factors (including governance) whilst others are more narrowly focused on assessing policy outcomes. Yet, taken the together, the assessments reports provide a varied and broad view of the state of play and challenges of climate governance at the national level. Furthermore, this work can help bridge this gap by providing a common reference for fit-for-purpose governance as part of governments broader efforts to mitigate climate change. This explorative methodology recognises that countries are at different stages of their efforts to operationalise their climate targets, and in their familiarity with mission-oriented approaches.

Additional data was gathered through in-depth structured interviews with national climate experts from 10 national climate councils as well as two international bodies (see Table 1 of Annex A) that helped validate, nuance, and deepen the results of the analysis. Requests for interviews were made to all 15 of the national climate councils whose assessments were included in the analysis.

References

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[27] MARN, SGCCC and PNUD (2022), Primer informe bienal de actualización de Guatemala, https://www.marn.gob.gt/viceministro-de-recursos-naturales-y-cambio-climatico/direccion-decambio-climatico/.

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Annex 1.A. Climate assessments and interviews included in the analysis

Annex Figure 1.A.1. List of climate assessments and interviews included in the analysis

Country / body	Climate council	Assessment report	Publishing year	Expert interview
Australia	Climate Change Authority (CCA)	2023 Annual Progress Report (Climate Change Authority, 2023[18])	2023	No
Canada	Canadian Climate Institute	Independent Assessment of Canada's 2023 Emissions Reduction Plan: A Progress Report (Canadian Climate Institute, 2023[19])	2023	Yes
Chile*	Comité Científico de Cambio Climático (Scientific Committee on Climate Change)	5th Biennial Update Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, 2022[20]) Summary of 5th Biennial Update Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Ministry of the Environment, 2022[21])	2022	Yes
Costa Rica*	Consejo Científico de Cambio Climático (Scientific Council on Climate Change)	Costa Rica. Biennial update report (BUR). BUR 2. (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, 2019[22])	2019	No
Denmark	Klimarådet (Danish Council on Climate Change, DCCC)	Status Outlook 2024 (Danish Council on Climate Change, 2024[23])	2024	Yes
European Union	European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC)	Assessment Report 2024. Towards EU climate neutrality: progress, policy gaps and opportunities (ESABCC, 2024[24])	N/A	Yes
France	Haut Conseil pour le Climat (High Council for the Climate, HCC)	Rapport annuel 2024 « Tenir le cap de la décarbonation, protéger la population » (Haut Conseil pour le Climat, 2024[25])	2024	Yes
Germany	Expertenrat für Klimafragen (Expert Council on Climate Issues)	Statement on the draft Climate Action Programme 2023 (Expertenrat für Klimafragen, 2023[26])	2023	No
Guatemala*	Consejo Nacional de Cambio Climático (National Council on Climate Change)	Primer informe bienal de actualización de Guatemala (MARN, SGCCC and PNUD, 2022[27])	2023	No
Ireland	An Chomhairle Chomhairleach um Athrú Aeráide (Climate Change Advisory Council, CCAC)	Annual Review 2023 (Climate Change Advisory Council, 2023[28])	2023	Yes
International	Secretariat of the International Climate Council Network (ICCN)	N/A	N/A	Yes
Mexico*	Consejo Consultivo de Cambio Climático (Mexico Climate Change Advisory Council)	México: Tercer Informe Bienal de Actualización ante la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (BUR 3) (Gobierno de México, 2022[29])	2022	No
The Netherlands	Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad(Netherlands Scientific Climate Council)	Advisory Report on the National Climate Plan 2025-2035 (Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad, 2024[30]) Summary of Advisory Report on the National Climate Plan (Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad, 2024[31])	2024	No
New Zealand	He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission (NZ CCC)	2023 Advice on the direction of policy for the Government’s second emissions reduction plan (He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission, 2023[32])	2023	Yes
South Africa	Presidential Climate Commission (PCC)	Presidential Climate Commission Annual Review. 2023-2024 (Presidential Climate Commission, 2024[33])	2024	No
Sweden	Klimatpolitiska Rådet (Swedish Climate Policy Council, SCPC)	2024 Report of the Swedish Climate Policy Council (Swedish Climate Policy Council, 2024[34])	2024	Yes
United Kingdom	Climate Change Committee (UK CCC)	Progress in reducing emissions 2024 Report to Parliament (Climate Change Committe, 2024[35])	2024	Yes

Note: The 15 national climate councils selected in the report are members of the International Climate Councils Network (ICCN). In cases where national climate council assessment reports were not publicly available or older than two years, the bi-annual update reports to the UNFCCC were included in the analysis instead, in the interest of using up to date information. These cases are marked with asterisks (*).

• ‘Fiscal reports’ assesses whether the law requires any kind of fiscal reporting relevant to climate change to be published. This aspect was included to gauge whether countries had tried to align their climate planning to their long-term fiscal goals and/or national budget process. It is deliberately broad, looking for any indication of innovation in fiscal reporting in response to climate change.

• ‘Legislative review process’ assesses whether the law includes a requirement for it to be reviewed. This aspect was included to measure built-in reflexivity. An evaluation of ‘Partial’ is sometimes given when an aspect is not strictly required under law but still conducted, e.g., independent monitoring and evaluation by the Canadian Climate Institute, e.g., discrete fiscal reporting.

Note: Germany’s Climate Law is currently being reformed and is subject to change (Wettengel, 2024[36]). The Canadian Climate Institute is a policy research organisation and registered charity that provides analysis, economic modelling and research on clean economic growth, the net-zero transition and climate change resilience. Canada also has the Net-Zero Advisory Body (NZAB) that also provides independent advice on Canada’s five-yearly emission reduction targets and emission reduction plans.

Sources: Analysis based on desk research and national climate policy expert consultations in the period June-August 2024.

Note

← 1.  It is worth noting that many mission-oriented innovation policies are in practice not “oriented” towards accomplishing a specific pre-defined mission, but rather towards supporting a mission-driven approach to innovation policy more broadly. In these cases (such as for the Horizon Europe missions or the Netherlands’ Top Sectors policy) the policy frameworks precede and establish a process for defining specific mission initiatives, rather than the other way around. These MOIPs often materialise as programmes administered by government agencies, which call for and fund various mission platforms. These mission platforms bring together diverse stakeholders (often with an emphasis on research and industry) to collectively develop and negotiate a common mission statement as well as a strategic agenda that set out a pathway for its achievement.