This chapter describes the results of an analysis of 15 countries’ recent climate council assessments as well as interviews with national and international climate policy experts. These assessments provide useful overviews on the state of play of how governments are implementing their climate targets. The analysis explores the relevance of each of the principles of mission governance presented in Chapter 3, analysing the extent to and the manner in which they are reflected in the climate council assessments, as well as the particular dynamics at play across the studied cases.
Harnessing Mission Governance to Achieve National Climate Targets
Abstract
In many countries, independent climate councils (CCs), also known as committees or commissions, play an important role in guiding climate action by providing evidence-led evaluations of their respective government’s progress towards meeting climate targets. More than 35 countries have either an established national climate council or technical advisory body (ICCN, 2024[1]). The councils’ published assessments serve to assess country progress made towards climate targets, advise national governments on delivery of pledges, and bring greater evidence-based clarity on the impact and risks of climate change. These assessments identify gaps between the goals and delivery of climate policy at different levels of government. They therefore offer a unique and holistic overview of how governments are working towards meeting their climate targets.
In this chapter, the information in the CC assessments were analysed and processed using the mission governance principles described in Table 3.1 and Figure 4.1 to identify which governance functions the respective country is or is not “activating,” and if mission-oriented methods and whole-of-government approaches are being promoted and implemented. In other words, the national climate council assessments serve as the unit of analysis to collect, map, and analyse governance gaps and challenges through the prism of the mission governance functions.
Source: OECD.
This systematic review and coding of climate council assessments provides a high-level view of how mission governance functions manifest in national climate efforts across different countries. Rather than presenting a comprehensive account or set of best practices for each mission governance principle, this exploratory analysis acknowledges the diversity of governmental approaches and contexts, recognising that implementation may vary significantly between nations.
When needed for a more contextual understanding, other reporting was sought out. Additional data was gathered through in-depth semi-structured expert interviews with public servants working in national climate councils. These interviews sought to validate and enrich preliminary findings from the CC assessments, allowing for a better understanding of the complexities of each country’s climate governance. By engaging directly with members of national climate councils, nuanced insights key for shaping effective and informed recommendations were captured.
Parallels between mission and conceptualisation of effective climate governance
It is worthwhile to note, before delving into the results of the analysis, that the mission approach has significant overlap with conceptualisation of so-called climate or green governance. There is a growing body of academic and policy efforts to capture the governance mechanisms or functions necessary to enable the green transition in particular. This stands in contrast to the mission-approach, which posits to be more all-purpose, agnostic to the domain to which a given complex societal challenge belongs. Examples of these efforts include Sridhar et al. (2022[2]), who identify nine core climate governance functions as being essential to any country’s effective climate response. These are illustrated in Figure 4.2, as adapted by Averchenkova and Chan (2023[3]).
Several climate councils included in this study have themselves developed frameworks to guide systematic assessments of progress and gaps in the government’s handling of the climate transition. France’s High Council for the Climate has developed a comprehensive analysis grid, that encapsulates various elements of governance, which it uses to assess various dimensions of the Government’s efforts in enabling effective climate efforts (see Box 4.6). The Swedish Climate Policy Council (2024[4]) assessments similarly enumerate a number of “aspects of an effective policy” which help secure “goal achievement” (as illustrated in Figure 4.3), which are used as the basis to evaluate the Government’s climate action. These aspects are Vision, Collaboration, Cost effectiveness, Long-term approach, Co-ordination, Capacity, and Acceptance.
In interviews, several policy experts describe the need for an international frame of reference for what constitutes adequate governance for climate policy, and voiced an interest in the mission governance concept for that purpose. It is worth noting that, in a clear parallel to the mission-oriented approach, the above illustrations place net zero implementation or goal achievement objectives at their core, with all elements reflecting the central overarching mission objective of realising national climate targets.
In the remainder of the chapter, the relevance and dynamics of each mission governance principle, as evidenced in the analysis of recent climate council assessments and expert interviews, is presented. The chapter ends with an overview of the analysis, summarised in Table 4.3.
Framework
The framework is the set of legal and institutional arrangements that underpin the mission. It makes the mission operational through rules, processes, and institutions. In interviews with climate councils, it was frequently cited as one of the most salient and important parts of the governance principles as it provides the foundation for all other aspects of the mission to mitigate GHG emissions as set out in the national climate targets.
National climate efforts typically excel at the framework part of mission governance principles. This is because they are increasingly underpinned by strong legal frameworks, known as "climate framework laws", which establish a clear mission objective (a net-zero target and other targets or budgets), strong rules and processes (around emissions planning, reporting, monitoring and evaluation) and independent scrutiny of compliance and progress (through climate commissions and pathways for judicial review). In this respect, the selection for this analysis of countries with national climate councils present a somewhat skewed perspective, since such bodies are themselves the product of such institutional arrangements.
The literature on climate framework laws is still developing, given the first of such laws, the United Kingdom's Climate Change Act, only came into force in 2008, while the majority were passed much later. Nevertheless, the laws have many reported benefits. First, the debate that accompanies their design and passing can help build political consensus around climate targets, and redirect focus towards the implementation of climate policies (Averchenkova, Higham and Chan, 2024[5]). This is discussed further under Political Support, below. Second, the laws can establish clear duties and responsibilities for climate action within government, elevating climate change as a ministerial priority and unlocking resources and momentum at a departmental level (UK Climate Change Committee, 2020[6]). This is examined under Mandates, below.
Furthermore, climate framework laws provide transparency and predictability on the direction of travel for climate action. Stepping stone targets or budgets and regular reporting requirements reinforce commitment to long-term targets and show consistency over time. Indeed, for the Swedish Climate Policy Council (2024[4]), the "main purpose of the climate policy framework is to provide more transparency, a long-term perspective and predictability for stakeholders". Climate framework laws also create new avenues for judicial review, which can improve legal compliance, encourage more detailed, ambitious climate plans, and increase awareness of public decision-making on climate policy (Averchenkova, Higham and Chan, 2024[5]).
Overall, research and conversations with climate councils reveal that framework laws are associated with stronger institutional arrangements for climate action, more effective climate policies, and progress on emission reductions. The UK Climate Change Committee (2020[6]), in a briefing on the Climate Change Act 2008, reports that the law has "broadly been successful in strengthening the UK response to climate change and the effectiveness of UK policy to reduce emissions" level. Interviews with climate councils revealed strong endorsement of framework laws and the momentum they unlock.
While climate framework laws have several common attributes, they also differ in interesting ways. Table outlines a range of attributes of climate framework laws and compares the specific legislation of 15 countries against these attributes. Information has been collated from desktop research and conversations with climate change commissions. Table 4.1 reveals the three most common attributes of climate framework laws. These laws:
Codify net-zero targets and, often, additional stepping stone targets or budgets;
Require regular emission reduction plans; and
Establish independent climate councils or commissions.
Based on desk research and national climate policy expert consultations, in
Notes: Column explanations:
‘Codified NDC or net-zero target’ assesses whether the law has codified the country’s NDC and/or net-zero target.
‘Additional emissions targets or budgets’ assesses whether the law has codified, or required to be set, any additional, whole-of-economy targets or budgets. ‘Sector targets or budgets’ assesses whether the law has codified, or required to be set, any sector-level targets or budgets.
‘Regular emission reduction plans’ assesses whether the law requires regular emission reduction planning. ‘Independent climate commission’ assesses whether the law establishes (or acknowledges the existence of) an independent climate commission.
‘Independent monitoring or evaluation’ assesses whether the law requires independent monitoring and evaluation to be conducted, by a climate commission or other independent party.
‘Parliamentary reporting requirements’ assesses whether the law requires the Executive or Climate Council to report regularly to Parliament (to enable Legislative scrutiny of the planning process).
‘Fiscal reports’ assesses whether the law requires any kind of fiscal reporting relevant to climate change to be published. This aspect was included to gauge whether countries had tried to align their climate planning to their long-term fiscal goals and/or national budget process. It is deliberately broad, looking for any indication of innovation in fiscal reporting in response to climate change.
‘Legislative review process’ assesses whether the law includes a requirement for it to be reviewed. This aspect was included to measure built-in reflexivity. An evaluation of ‘Partial’ is sometimes given when an aspect is not strictly required under law but still conducted, e.g., independent monitoring and evaluation by the Canadian Climate Institute, e.g., discrete fiscal reporting.
Asterisks by country names indicate that the information for that country has been validated in interviews with national experts.
Germany’s Climate Law is currently being reformed and is subject to change (Wettengel, 2024[7]).
Source: Analysis based on desk research and national climate policy expert consultations in the period June-August 2024.
All 15 countries' laws codified an NDC net-zero target in law and established (or reaffirmed) an independent climate commission. All laws bar Australia's Climate Change Act 2022 created a legal requirement of regular emission reduction reporting, although the Australian Government has also released emission reduction plans. Most laws set, or require to be set, smaller targets or budgets that break headline targets down into more manageable pieces. For example, the Danish Climate Act 2020 requires the Minister for Climate, Energy and Utilities to set a national climate target with a 10-year perspective every 5 years, while Ireland's Climate Action and Low Carbon Development (Amendment) Act (CALCDAA) 2021 requires three sequential 5-yearly carbon budgets to be in place at any one time.
The most common elements of climate framework laws are also some of the most important. Codifying NDCs or net-zero targets in law creates a clear, formal commitment to the mission objective. Requiring regular emission reduction plans elevates climate policy and encourages the reallocation of time and resources to it. The establishment of independent climate councils, discussed below, can encourage evidence-based, high-quality plans, policies and decisions.
Where climate framework laws differ is the mention of sectoral targets, the role of the climate commission, the presence of fiscal reporting requirements, and the provision for periodic legislative review. Most climate laws do not set, or require to be set, sectoral targets or budgets, but Ireland's CALCDAA is one of several exceptions. It mandates the preparation of sectoral emissions ceilings – the maximum emissions permitted in different sectors during each carbon budget period (Climate Change Advisory Council, 2023[8]). The merits of sectoral targets or budgets are examined in greater detail under Roadmap, below.
Furthermore, the requirement for fiscal reporting is an interesting aspect of some newer climate framework laws. The Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act (CNZEAA) 2021 requires the Minister of Finance to publish an annual report outlining the key measures that Federal departments and Crown corporations have taken to manage the financial risks and opportunities related to climate change. Likewise, the Swedish Climate Act Climate Act 2018 requires the Government to present a climate report in its Budget Bill each year and make sure that climate and budget policy goals work together. As the economic and fiscal risks of climate change continue to materialise, it is possible that more countries will establish formal fiscal reporting requirements in their climate frameworks.
As stated above, all of the climate framework laws analysed for this research establish (or reaffirm the existence of) an independent climate council. The International Climate Councils Network (ICCN) has grown its membership to 25 climate councils from 20 countries and the EU since its launch at COP26 in 2021 (ICCN, 2024[1]). However, the functions of these councils vary, but may include providing advice on targets or budgets, providing advice on emission reduction plans, monitoring and evaluating progress and plans, and conducting societal and sectoral engagement. Of these functions, arguably the most important is the monitoring and evaluation of progress and plans. Most, bar one, countries have specified this as a function of their independent climate council in their climate framework law. Delegating monitoring and evaluation creates an independent “check” on the mission’s strategic alignment with, and progress towards, its objective. This can encourage legal compliance, incremental improvements and capacity-building in government, as well as greater public awareness. The idea of establishing an independent institution with responsibility for monitoring progress is sound and could have wider application to non-climate missions.
A strong framework is a necessary, but not sufficient, element of mission governance. This is true of climate framework laws, which, in the absence of the necessary political will, resources and capabilities, will not drive effective emission reductions. Mexico and Chile, for example, have strong institutional arrangements around climate change mitigation. Yet climate reporting emphasises the difficulties these countries face in accessing financial, human, and technological resources to match the scale of the challenge – something that can interfere with the implementation of climate programmes and policies. France, too, established a strong climate framework through Law no. 2019-1147. However, required updates to its carbon budgets, low-carbon strategy and energy legislation under this law are behind schedule, creating ambiguity on the Government’s short- and medium-term climate objectives and plans (Haut Conseil pour le Climat, 2024[9]). Developing a strong mission framework is important. Putting it into practice through plans, actions and investment, as the reporting of climate councils attest, is even more so.
Mission frameworks must strike a balance between durability and flexibility. Durable frameworks provide a predictable direction of travel, which helps mobilise action and investment. However, frameworks must also adapt to new information and changes in circumstance that could impede or accelerate progress towards the mission objective. Flexibility is important to the Swedish Climate Policy Council (2024[4]), which has called for a cross-party working group or committee to “nurture the joint institutional framework and ensure that parliamentary parties have a forum to deliberate if and when it is time to revisit parts of the framework”. Flexibility can be difficult in a climate context because modifying climate frameworks often requires legislative amendment. Germany, New Zealand and Ireland have all successfully passed substantial amendments to their climate laws (Averchenkova, Higham and Chan, 2024[5]), but the window of opportunity for ad hoc reform is typically small and infrequent. Including a provision in climate framework laws that stipulates periodic legislative review could make it easier to adapt and evolve climate framework laws. Of the fifteen climate laws examined, only Australia's Climate Change Act 2022 and Canada's Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act have a provision of this nature.
Overall, frameworks are a core part of mission governance. They provide the legal and institutional foundation for the mission. Many countries have passed strong climate framework laws that establish clear targets, emission planning and reporting processes and independent climate commissions. Some are innovating with sectoral targets and fiscal reporting requirements. However, climate frameworks are necessary but insufficient. They cannot drive emission reductions in the absence of political will, resources, and investment. They must also be adaptive to new information and circumstances. Frameworks are an area of excellence for national climate missions, and non-climate missions could learn from this application.
Anchoring
Anchoring refers to the body or group with overall responsibility for the mission. A mission-oriented approach involves allocating leadership responsibility to a body or group with the influence, knowledge, and capacity to match the mission’s objective and scope. The body or group that fits this bill typically has, or can access through others, strong relationships with key decision-makers, a detailed understanding of the problem at hand and its solution space, and the resources needed to steer a complex, cross-departmental programme. Like Framework, Anchoring is commonly cited by climate councils as an important aspect of the mission governance principles.
As discussed in Chapter 3, mission-oriented policies have mostly been led and championed by Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) authorities. Despite aiming to address complex societal problems, these missions’ policy levers, budgets, and monitoring and evaluation have often been siloed, in what is described as the ‘STI trap’ (OECD, 2024[10]). Following an analysis of 101 mission-oriented innovation policies for reaching net-zero, the OECD concluded that one possible means of avoiding the STI trap in a climate context is to anchor missions and mission-oriented policies at higher political levels than STI authorities (OECD, 2024[10]).
Table 4.2 presents the current arrangements in terms of responsibility for environmental and climate policy at the national level of OECD member countries. High-level ownership indicates that climate change is a priority to ministers and their departments, increasing engagement and resource allocation across government. High-level ownership often leads to the engagement of central department in climate efforts, with the access, influence and coordinating abilities to help mobilise action and overcome barriers. Interviews with climate councils support these findings.
Many countries have allocated responsibility to a Prime Minister, President, or their Cabinet. For example, the United Kingdom’s mitigation efforts are governed by the Cabinet Committee on Climate Change, which is chaired by the Prime Minister. Guatemala’s institutional framework places the Presidency at the helm of the National Council on Climate Change (MARN, SGCCC and PNUD, 2022[11]). In France, responsibility for coordinating climate action sits with the Prime Minister, and since 2022 operated by the General Secretariat for Ecological Planning (SGPE) as described in Box 4.3. The French HCC notes that this decision, “in addition to the high-level support and the strengthened structure of the central administration, has made it possible to coordinate climate policies more transparently with those concerning the other areas of action of the ecological transition” (Haut Conseil pour le Climat, 2024[9]).
Allocating responsibility to a Minister of Finance is also a consideration, given the substantial funding requirements of the clean energy transition. In Sweden, the Swedish Climate Policy Council (2024[4]) has indicated it is “cautiously in favour of” the Government’s proposal to give its Minister of Finance “some overall responsibility” to coordinate climate change measures with a view to ensuring that they are cost effective. However, it also recommends that the Prime Minister “lead and be responsible for prioritising and coordinating the implementation of the action plan within Government”. In either case, it recommends that the work towards meeting the national climate targets be anchored in a location that supports the alignment of climate and fiscal priorities (Swedish Climate Policy Council, 2024[4]). According to an expert interviewed, Denmark previously had a dedicated inter-ministerial climate committee, though its effectiveness was limited as key decisions ultimately required Finance Committee approval. The alignment of climate and fiscal priorities is discussed further under Process Integration below.
Within national climate efforts, responsibility to prepare emission reduction plans is typically assigned to a line ministry. In Guatemala, the Ministry for Environment and Natural Resources is the governing entity for climate issues (MARN, SGCCC and PNUD, 2022[11]). It comprises of a Vice Ministry, two directorates and several units that work directly, and engage other departments, on climate policy. Likewise, in the United Kingdom, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero leads policy for climate mitigation, and the Department for Environment and Rural Affairs leads on adaptation, except in areas of policy allocated to devolved administrations (Climate Change Committe, n.d.[12]). This is most effective where the ministry has a clear mandate to engage with other departments and access their policy levers. The mandate is reinforced by high-level political ownership of the mission, discussed above, and often via a cross-departmental board to coordinate inter-departmental input.
Most governments have benefited from an inter-departmental board or similar cross-cutting governance structure to oversee emission reduction planning, delivery, and monitoring. A strong example of this structure is Ireland’s Climate Action Delivery Board (Climate Change Advisory Council, 2023[8]). In Ireland, climate policy decisions are made by a Cabinet Committee, supported by a senior officials’ group. However, the Climate Action Delivery Board was established within the office of the Taoisearch (Prime Minister) to help clear operational hurdles impeding progress at a departmental level. In New Zealand, the Climate Change Chief Executives Board was established to co-ordinate the implementation of the first Emission Reduction Plan. The Board’s monitoring and reporting on the status of actions and strategies is a useful resource that supports the He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission’s (NZ CCC) progress evaluations and the effective delivery of the national climate effort. In the United States, President Biden established a National Climate Task Force to coordinate efforts across federal agencies and ensure that climate considerations are integrated into the policies, decisions, and operations of every sector of government. This is profiled below in Box 4.1.
While a strong anchor is important, is should not become a “single point of failure” for missions. Having a diversity of leaders and champions can help it sustain itself over political cycles. In New Zealand, while formal responsibility for national climate mitigation sits with the Government, the Climate Leaders Coalition – a group of businesses committed to climate targets and action – serves as an informal anchor for climate efforts outside of government that supports continuity of climate action at a corporate level across political cycles.
Overall, it appears that the anchoring principle of mission governance is well established in the national discourse on realising the climate mitigation targets, and that the responsibility for the mission is most often placed in a high-level body, often at the very centre of government. However, the wide-ranging nature and scale of the challenge requires continued efforts in strengthening the anchor, not least in terms of managing both effective Co-ordination and Mandates.
Coordinating climate efforts across the whole of government
Soon after entering office in 2021, President Joe Biden passed the Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad to “put[s] climate change at the centre of [the United States’] domestic, national security, and foreign policy” (The White House, 2021[13]). Taking a whole of government approach, the order requires federal agencies, from the Department of Defense to the Department of Treasury and the Department of Education, to work together to deliver on the four overarching climate objectives of the administration (The White House, n.d.[14]):
Reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 50-52% below 2005 levels in 2030
Reaching 100% carbon pollution-free electricity by 2035
Achieving a net-zero emissions economy by 2050
Delivering 40% of the benefits from federal investments in climate and clean energy to disadvantaged communities
The Executive order created the White House Office of Domestic Climate Policy (Climate Policy Office) to implement the administration’s domestic climate agenda and coordinate the all-of-government approach, as well as convene a range of interagency working groups to assist a dedicated National Climate Task Force (The White House, n.d.[15]). This Climate Task Force, which consists of some of the highest-ranking officials of the executive branch (including, amongst others, the Secretaries of the Treasury, Defense, the Interior, Transportation, and Energy) serves to coordinating efforts across federal agencies to ensure that climate considerations are integrated into the policies, decisions, and operations of every sector of the government while also creating a unified national strategy to address the complex and interconnected challenges of climate change and climate action (The White House, 2021[13]).
In 2022, the National Climate Task Force mandate was expanded to coordinating the effective implementation of the substantial energy and infrastructure provisions of the newly passed Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The IRA, with its unprecedented $369 billion investment in climate and clean energy initiatives, is “the single largest and most ambitious investment in the ability of the United States to advance clean energy, cut consumer energy costs, confront the climate crisis, promote environmental justice, and strengthen energy security” (The White House, 2022[16]).
The Task Force marks a shift in how the United States addresses climate change. It emphasises collaboration and innovation, breaking down silos that traditionally hindered comprehensive climate action, and harnesses a whole-of-government approach. It seeks to mobilise resources, including fiscal and financial, and expertise from all corners of the federal government to reduce GHG emissions, promote clean energy, and enhance climate resilience. Focusing on protecting vulnerable communities and “good-paying jobs,” the task force also seeks to ensure that climate policies are equitable and just (The White House, 2021[13]).
Mandates
Mandates refer to the allocation of responsibilities to departments and organisations involved in the mission. The mission-oriented approach champions clear mandates that establish “who does what” to reach the mission objective. By clarifying the scope of contributors’ roles and authorities, mandates establish clear ownership and accountabilities for different parts of the mission, ensuring the full participation of all contributors and mitigating the risks of duplication or gaps in the work. Mandates are especially important for national climate efforts which must find emission reductions across all sectors in the economy and involve different levels of government (this latter aspect is discussed under the Vertical Co-ordination section below). Assigning sole responsibility for climate mitigation to an environmental or energy department is unlikely to produce the broad range of policy interventions, funding and actions needed for the net-zero transition, given that department’s narrow sectoral focus and limited access to political decision-makers, policy levers and budget appropriations.
Countries have had mixed success in setting clear mandates for participation in national climate efforts. Mandates are at their strongest when codified in law and coupled with clear accountability mechanisms, such as Parliamentary reporting requirements or Budgetary sanctions. In Ireland, all Ministers must perform their functions in a manner consistent with the carbon budgets (Averchenkova, Higham and Chan, 2024[5]). Furthermore, Ministers with responsibility for a certain sector are responsible for complying with sectoral emissions ceilings and must account for their performance at an Oireachtas (Parliamentary) Committee each year (Ireland's Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, 2021[18]). Public bodies must also ensure that their decisions are consistent with climate objectives, plans and strategies, and there are additional mandates for local authorities discussed under the Vertical Co-ordination section below. In Chile, responsibility for implementing climate policies historically sat with the Ministry for the Environment, “resulting in a slow policymaking process and lack of binding commitments” (Elliott et al., 2023[19]). However, the new Climate Act has shared this burden, assigning responsibilities for implementation to 17 different government ministries. Prior to introducing this law, Chile had already established sectoral carbon budgets. Now, sectors can be held accountable through budgetary sanctions if budgets are not met (Elliott et al., 2023[19]). Recent research by the Grantham Institute found that changes to public sector mandates in climate framework laws were highlighted by interviewees as “significant channels of influence” (Averchenkova, Higham and Chan, 2024, p. 2[5]). The Institute recommended that climate framework laws include “clear mechanisms for sectoral targets or alternative ways to facilitate the integration of climate priorities into the mandates of sectoral ministries”.
Some countries have struggled to establish clear, formal mandates. The Swedish Climate Policy Council (2024[4]) has criticised the fact that Swedish government departments have not yet been given formal, standing mandates to contribute to climate mitigation efforts. It has indicated its clear support for a recent government proposal to improve the guidance that agencies receive on climate targets through their written instructions. This is expected to help departments better plan and prioritise their activities, take action on initiatives within their remit, and develop expertise and knowledge on climate change over the long term. Looking ahead, the Swedish Climate Policy Council (2024[4]) has recommended that the Government establish a standing mandate for authorities to input into climate policy action plans, supporting “broader responsibilities, long-term skills building, and gradual incorporation of lessons learned”.
Furthermore, backsliding on mandates is very much possible. Imminent reforms to Germany’s Climate Action Law are expected to weaken ministerial mandates by removing a requirement for ministers to prepare an emergency package of measures when annual sectoral emissions limits are exceeded (Wettengel, 2024[7]). These countries’ difficulties in formalising or maintaining mandates highlight the need to nurture strong, consistent political support for climate missions, addressed in Political support below.
Among the mission governance principles, Mandates work in tandem with Framework and Anchoring to provide a clear structure for the mission. Weaknesses in one area can at times be supported by another. This is sometimes the case for countries without strong, formal mandates for participation in national climate efforts. For example, New Zealand’s Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act 2019 places primary responsibility for emission reduction on the Minister for Climate Change. However, clear, top-down ownership of the first Emissions Reduction Plan by the Prime Minister and her Cabinet, and the oversight of a cross-departmental governance body, the Climate Change Chief Executives Board, helped ensure widespread participation by departments in planning and delivery. The Grantham Institute’s New Zealand interviewees indicated that the legal requirement to develop an Emissions Reduction Plan that featured sectoral policies and plans was itself a mechanism for improved co-ordination (Averchenkova, Higham and Chan, 2024[5]). On the other hand, the Institute’s German interviewees reported that despite strong mandates for departmental contributions to emission reductions in Germany, some sectors lagged behind. “Some interviewees suggested that stronger inter-agency and inter-ministerial co-ordination bodies […] could introduce new accountability levers to improve the performance of sectors that are falling behind” (Averchenkova, Higham and Chan, 2024[5]).
Clear mandates for departmental participation in national climate efforts are also a useful means of aligning climate objectives (insofar as is possible) with other political priorities, as well as capturing a diverse range of perspectives in climate planning. Chile, for example, is committed to ensuring a gender lens is incorporated in climate planning. In its Biennial Update Report to the United Nations, it stated that sectoral authorities should collaborate with agencies like the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity and the Ministry of Social Development and Family to incorporate gender-based perspectives (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, 2022[20]). Mandates then, can have a dual function – clearly outlining the contributions of key stakeholders to the mission, but also explaining how the mission objective should be reconciled with other, at times competing, political goals.
Overall, clear, formal mandates are an important part of the mission governance principles because they establish clear ownership and accountabilities for different tasks, ensuring the full participation of contributors and mitigating the risks of duplication or gaps in work. However, countries have had mixed success with this aspect of mission governance. Mandates that are codified in law and accompanied by accountability mechanisms are the “gold standard” for climate missions, but more informal mandates can sometimes be effective when reinforced with strong Framework and Anchoring in the mission’s structure. Mandates also offer an (as yet largely untapped) opportunity to provide guidance on how to reconcile mission objectives with other important political priorities.
Establishing Mission Controls to deliver on a mission-driven government agenda
The newly elected Government of the United Kingdom committed to “mission-driven” approach to government in its election manifesto. It has introduced five cross-sectoral missions, including one on clean energy. The objective of this mission is to “Make Britain a clean energy superpower to cut bills, create jobs and deliver security with cheaper, zero-carbon electricity by 2030, accelerating to net-zero” (The Labour Party, 2024[21]). In tandem, the Government has lifted a “de facto ban” on onshore wind in England (UK Government, 2024[22]), created and funded a new National Wealth Fund for green investment (HM Treasury, 2024[23])) and is establishing Great British Energy, a new publicly owned energy company “designed to drive clean energy deployment, boost energy independence, create jobs and ensure UK taxpayers, billpayers and communities reap the benefits of clean, secure, home-grown energy” (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 2024[24]).
The Government has appointed former Chief Executive of the Climate Change Committee, Chris Stark, to lead a new secretariat, Mission Control, that will support the delivery of this mission. Mission Control will be a “one-stop shop, bringing together a top team of industry experts and officials to troubleshoot, negotiate and clear the way for energy projects” (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 2024[25]). Mission Control will focus on four areas:
Setting the overall approach to delivering on the mission objective;
Monitoring the progress of UK infrastructure projects critical to the mission objective;
Serving as an “innovation centre” that facilitates expert discussion; and
Mobilising government and industry contributions to the mission.
The Government has also established an Energy Mission Board to oversee the mission, chaired by Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero Ed Miliband and attended by ministers across Government. The Board met for the first time in July 2024, and has been tasked with keeping a “laser focus across government on delivering clean, cheap energy to homes and businesses – but also on driving economic growth and creating skilled jobs right across the country” (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 2024[26]).
Roadmaps
Missions begin with an ambitious objective to address a “wicked” societal problem. Because the problems that missions aim to address lack established solutions, mission statements do not prescribe concrete pathways to reach objectives. Instead, the mission requires continuous sense-making and judgement calls. The vehicle for this sense-making is known as a roadmap. The roadmap articulates a ‘theory of change’ to achieve the mission objective, based on the best available knowledge of how planned inputs might drive outputs and outcomes. In a climate context, this means showing where and how emissions will be reduced across the economy to reach a country’s long-term climate targets, and what policies and actions will enable these reductions.
Roadmaps are a prevalent and central component of climate mitigation policy governance. Of the fifteen countries researched as part of this report, fourteen are required by law to prepare regular emission reduction plans or low-carbon strategies, and the remaining country has undertaken discrete planning efforts. For example, Chile’s Long-Term Climate Strategy (ECLP) is a roadmap that establishes the guidelines for Chile to achieve carbon neutrality and climate resilience by 2050. It establishes carbon budgets for the period 2020-2030 and allocates this budget to sectors, establishes sectoral priorities, lays out 407 targets and concrete actions that Chile must pursue in its transition, and sets timeframes for delivery (Government of Chile, 2021[27]). The nature, comprehensiveness and credibility of countries’ climate roadmaps varies, and opportunities to strengthen roadmaps are discussed below.
Mission roadmaps, and especially emission reduction roadmaps, are by their nature imperfect and iterative documents. There is still considerable uncertainty about the net-zero transition, in particular on timeframes, sectoral contributions and the technology mix. Climate councils have picked up on gaps and imperfections in their independent reporting. For example, the Irish Climate Change Advisory Council (CCAC) critiqued Ireland’s National Climate Act Plan 2023 for leaving a large portion of the emissions reductions necessary to achieve the country’s 2030 target unallocated to any sector (Climate Change Advisory Council, 2023[8]).
Climate councils propose two main approaches for managing uncertainty in net-zero roadmaps: over-delivery and contingency planning. Aiming to over-deliver on targets creates an emission buffer that protects against policy delivery risks and external forces. Sweden’s Climate Policy Council (2024[4]) has recommended that the Swedish Government “request supporting documentation from the authorities of measures that, taken together, deliver greater emission reductions than are required to meet the targets”. Contingency planning means preparing policy adjustments that could be implemented if a country is still not on-track to meet its target in the immediate years prior, for example, the raising of fuel taxes. The UK CCC (2024[28]) has recommended that the UK Government develop “credible contingency plans to address the range of risks to meeting the UK’s emissions target”. The Danish Council on Climate Change (2024[29]), the Klimarådet, supports both options, making the case for a deliberate overshoot of emissions to address delivery risks to its 2030 target, while also advocating for the preparation of a Plan B policy mix should those risks materialise in the coming years.
Roadmaps are fundamentally long-term, strategic documents. That means they must span the lifetime of the mission, and must take a top-down perspective, first identifying the strategic levers and key sectors that will shift the dial for the mission outcome before outlining the detail of specific policies and actions. Not all countries’ climate roadmaps have achieved this ideal. For example, the German Government’s Climate Protection Programme 2023 includes around 130 climate measures but has been critiqued by the country’s Expert Council as lacking a “coherent and consistent overall concept” (Expertenrat für Klimafragen, 2023[30]). The Council found that measures were selected in a “bottom-up manner without consideration of overarching selection criteria, instead of being derived top-down on the basis of a coherent and consistent overall concept.” Denmark’s National Climate Plan takes a 10-year perspective on climate mitigation and therefore does not outline a strategic pathway to achieve its 2050 net-zero goal (Danish Council on Climate Change, 2024[29]). New Zealand’s Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment found that a “coherent policy framework was lacking” and key framing questions were not tackled upfront in the country’s first Emissions Reduction Plan (He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission, 2024[31]). Given the recency of climate framework laws, most countries are still developing their experience with emissions planning. Adopting a more strategic, long-term approach is an area for improvement for future planning.
One of the core challenges for mission roadmaps, especially climate roadmaps, is the sheer scale of the challenge at hand. Net-zero transitions require the transformation of every sector of the economy over a multi-decade time period. It is difficult to tackle this challenge without breaking it down into sub-components. Countries have found it helpful to break down long-term targets into sub-components that are time-based or sectoral.
One popular method of breaking down climate missions into sub-components is through “stepping stone” carbon targets or budgets. Of the fifteen countries examined as part of this research, almost all broke long-term targets down into interim targets with shorter time periods. For example, Germany’s Climate Act Law sets interim emission reduction targets of 65% by 2030 and 88% by 2040 compared to 1990 levels, while the UK, Ireland, New Zealand, and France all adopt three simultaneous carbon budgets. The first of the “stepping stone” targets, due in 2030, are beginning to exert real pressure on national climate efforts. For example, Australia’s Climate Change Authority (CCA) called for “stronger pursuit of emissions” in non-energy sectors to address the risks of falling short of the country’s 2030 emission reduction target through an ambitious plan to transform the energy mix from 32% to 82% renewable (Climate Change Authority, 2023[32]). Meanwhile the Canadian Climate Institute (2023[33]) recommended that the Government “identify opportunities for strengthened or additional policies to close the gap” to its 2030 target and provided some “clear candidates” for deeper emissions cuts, like heat pump incentives. Conversations with climate councils revealed widespread support for stepping-stone targets and/or carbon budget schemes, with participants remarking on the structure and momentum they provide for government departments, as well as their strong influence on political leaders. According to the World Resources Institute, “pairing a net-zero target in law with mandatory near-term carbon budgets that must be met along the way to net zero can help catalyse urgent near-term government action” (Elliott et al., 2023[19]).
However, stepping stone targets are still whole-of-economy goals, and are sometimes also considered too large and ambitious to meaningfully address. A further option is to translate targets into sectoral targets. Of the fifteen countries considered in this research, eleven have individual or multi-sector sectoral targets. For example, Mexico breaks its 2030 NDC target of a 22% reduction in emissions down into sub-targets for transport (18%), electricity (31%), residential and commercial (18%), oil and gas (14%), industry (5%), agriculture and livestock (8%) and residues (28%) (Gobierno de México, 2022[34]). Sectoral targets provide clear direction to the private sector on decarbonisation pathways, which can influence strategic and investment decisions to be more in line with climate goals. They can establish strong accountabilities and incentives for emission reduction within government, especially when accompanied by legal duties for responsible ministers to act in line with targets (e.g., Germany, Ireland) or budgetary sanctions for exceeding targets (e.g., Chile) (Elliott et al., 2024[35]). However, sectoral targets have also been criticised for being unrealistic or too restrictive. Germany, which currently imposes annual sectoral emission limits and strong legal duties on responsible ministers, is reforming its Climate Action Law to weaken the influence of sector targets and shift the focus to the national level (Wettengel, 2024[7]). The Irish Government has been unable to impose a clear emission ceiling in the Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry sector due to challenges in estimating emissions in this sector (Ireland's Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, 2021[18]). Ultimately, sectoral targets are a helpful way to break down ambitious long-term targets into clear, manageable contributions, but perfect compliance with them may not be feasible, and a willingness to flex and adapt targets in light of new information and circumstances is important.
While roadmaps are strategic documents that grapple with considerable uncertainty, they must also be as credible and detailed as is possible given the information available at the time. Climate council expectations of governments are increasing as targets draw nearer and planning functions become more mature. For example, the Canadian Climate Institute (2023[33]) praised the increased transparency of Canada’s latest Emissions Reduction Plan, but found “room for continuous improvement”, particularly through “more detailed updates on policy progress, including next steps for policy implementation and an assessment of whether a policy is on or off track”. The legal system is also exerting pressure on governments to publish credible, detailed plans. The UK’s Carbon Budget Delivery Plan was recently held unlawful by the High Court, with the Court stating it was “irrational” to conclude that proposals and policies in the plan would enable carbon budgets to be met (Royal Courts of Justice, 2024[36]). The UK CCC (2024[28]) recently concluded that only one third of the emission reductions needed for the UK’s 2030 NDC target were covered by “credible plans”. Some roadmaps’ credibility is called into question due to an overreliance on nascent technologies. For example, the French HCC (2024[9]) noted overreliance, both in national and international roadmaps, on Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).
Sectoral plans and strategies can help deliver more detailed and credible emission reduction planning, especially when also subject to the scrutiny of independent climate councils. Many countries have found value in sector-level planning. Chile’s Law 21455 requires line ministries to develop sectoral mitigation plans and update them every five years (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, 2022[20]). Guatemala has published several sectoral mitigation plans, including its National Strategy for Sustainable Bovine Livestock with Low Emissions (MARN, SGCCC and PNUD, 2022[11]).
Climate councils are pushing for full coverage of all key sectors. The Canadian Climate Institute (2023[33]) has called on the Canadian Federal Government to publish two “long-awaited” strategy documents that would address net-zero in the Buildings and Agriculture sectors, while the Netherlands Scientific Climate Council (2024[37]) recommended the Dutch Government to draw up “concrete, measurable transition plans for industry, leading to CO2-free operations by 2040” given the potential influence these plans could have on company strategies. Some countries have gone further than just drawing up sector strategies and anchored missions at the sectoral-level, with clear mission outcomes, sectoral-level governance structures and dedicated secretariats. As described in Box 4.2, the UK Government recently announced its clean energy mission, supported by a new ministerial-level Mission Board and Mission Control Sector, to decarbonise its energy sector. Whether through a strategy or mission, dedicated, sectoral level planning and action can greatly strengthen emission reduction efforts.
As above, roadmaps require continuous sense-making and should evolve in light of new information and circumstances relevant to the achievement of the mission’s objective. Climate roadmaps are guided by data on emission reductions, but this data often lags, and it can be helpful to track other indicators of progress, such as technology adoption and behavioural change. The UK CCC (2024[28]) sets a high bar for the use of indicators to inform assessments of the mission’s progress towards its objective. It tracks hundreds of indicators of real-world progress, such as technology deployment, the scale-up of supply chains, and demand-side variables. These indicators align with the CCC’s Monitoring Maps, which explain the ‘theory of change’, or relationships and interdependencies between policies, enablers, and outcomes, to decarbonise key sectors (UK CCC, 2022[38]). Other countries would benefit from greater use of key indicators to inform the ongoing adaptation of their climate roadmaps.
Overall, roadmaps are an area of the mission governance principles where national climate mitigation efforts perform well. Many countries have published clear emission reduction strategies and plans following on from their NDC commitments and climate framework laws. Roadmaps will always be imperfect, given the considerable uncertainties around the net-zero transition. However, there are some opportune areas for improvement. Roadmaps could aim to over-deliver on emissions reductions or include contingency planning to mitigate target delivery risks. Their scope should match the long-term, strategic nature of climate goals. Sufficient detail and credibility are essential to meet rising expectations and legal requirements. Breaking down ambitious goals into smaller targets and plans can provide clearer direction, strengthen accountabilities, and influence private sector contributions. Tracking varied indicators can ensure that roadmaps remain current. Above all, the challenge is to steer the mission from ambition to action, adjusting to new information, opportunities, and risks.
Political support
One of the most important characteristics of missions at the national level is sustained political support. The Apollo Program, the archetypical mission, survived three administrations led by two rival political parties, the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster and the tumultuous 1960’s to culminate in a successful moon landing under President Nixon (Lambright, 1998[39]). Sustained political support helps maintain momentum – action, funding, and knowledge-building – towards the mission’s ambitious, long-term objective. Its absence can create mixed market signals that deter investment and behavioural change, explored further in the Private investment and Market-shaping sections below. Sustained political support is particularly important for national climate efforts because net-zero targets span several decades and many political cycles.
Widespread adoption of NDC targets, as well as the increase in climate framework laws, indicate that most countries have achieved a minimum level of political support for emission reduction objectives and their underpinning governance structures. The Grantham Research Institute found that the process of developing and passing climate framework laws can help build political consensus around climate targets, protecting against “backsliding” and allowing the debate to shift focus on to implementation (Averchenkova, Higham and Chan, 2024[5]). However, as the authors caution, this “does not alone alleviate disagreement over how to meet those targets.” Implementation choices, such sub-targets, sectoral contributions, and specific policies, are more vulnerable to political change and “need to be better protected through civil society applying sustained political pressure and building broader-based support among the general public through stronger engagement and public participation processes” (Averchenkova, Higham and Chan, 2024[5]).
Changes in approach are a normal and expected feature of political cycles. No mission could expect to retain the exact same pathway or policy mix over a multi-decade period. However, many countries have experienced a high degree of volatility in their climate policy mixes due to changes in administrations. This has delayed progress on emission reductions and deter business and investor confidence. Climate councils have begun to call for a more consistent approach to climate policy. The Canadian Climate Institute (2023[33]) cited “the extent to which existing policies are maintained/strengthened by future governments” as a key risk that could keep emissions off-course from the decarbonisation pathway to 2030. Sweden’s Climate Policy Council (2024[4]) writes that “major shifts in energy policy signalled by the Government also highlight the need for a broader agreement in Parliament on the long-term direction of this area”. It notes further that it “will be difficult for stakeholders to make very large investment decisions based on policy frameworks that are decided by a few votes from a temporary majority in Parliament” (Swedish Climate Policy Council, 2024[4]). The United Kingdom Climate Change Committee (UK CCC) critiqued the former Government’s cancellation or delay of major policies, such as gas boiler phase-outs and Zero-Emissions Vehicle mandates, for impeding progress on emission reductions, and called on the new Government to “act fast” in reversing these changes (Climate Change Committe, 2024[28]).
How then, can mission practitioners nurture sustained political support at the implementation stage? This is a challenging question in a climate context, given most climate councils and government departments are politically neutral. Nevertheless, interviews with climate councils reveal four tactics that can help sustain political support. These are: industry engagement, public awareness-raising, public narrative, and just transition interventions.
One tactic to nurture political support is to leverage industry engagement to dispel stereotypes and uncover shared interests. Close engagement with fossil fuel industry players, for example, might uncover unexpected pragmatism about asset retirement that can then be passed on to political decision-makers. A step further is to establish partnerships with industry to make shared decisions on regulation in hard-to-abate sectors. The Danish Government conducted five months of negotiations with the Danish Agriculture and Food Council, Danish Society for Nature Conservation, Confederation of Danish Industry, Trade Union NNF and Danish Local Government Association on policy levers for abatement in the agriculture sector. Lawmakers are expected to soon approve a deal to charge farmers for their livestock emissions from 2030, and funnel revenues from this tax to aid with green initiatives, climate technology and production transformation (Brunton, 2024[40]).
Another tactic is to prioritise accessible, plain language reporting and invest significant time and funds into public consultation to strengthen the mandate for climate action. The goal of this outreach is to help the public understand and consider challenging choices that will need to be made in the future as part of the net-zero transition, and in doing so, help de-risk these choices for future political decision-makers.
A third tactic to nurture political support for climate action is to develop strong public narratives about the need for this action that appeal to a broad range of values. Climate policies often have a range of co-benefits, for example, energy security, health, and air quality, yet these co-benefits are often underemphasised. A clear example of appealing to a broad range of values is available in the UK’s new clean energy mission, as described in Box 4.2. This mission puts energy affordability, security, and job creation at the heart of the mission’s objective: "Make Britain a clean energy superpower to cut bills, create jobs and deliver security with cheaper, zero-carbon electricity by 2030, accelerating to net zero" (The Labour Party, 2024[21]). Inaugurating a national climate forum, the Swedish Prime Minister emphasised that the green transition is about opportunities and not sacrifice, and that it should be “a national interest – for our economy, for our climate, and increasingly for our security” (Swedish Climate Policy Council, 2024[4]). These narratives frame climate action as the vehicle to deliver on other important goals, and in doing so, appeal to a broader range of values and interests.
A fourth, and critical element to secure stable support, is to clearly address concerns about equity and fairness in the net-zero transition. Some countries have integrated these concerns into their policy frameworks. For example, South Africa adopted the country’s first national Just Transition Framework, which sets out a vision for a just transition, alongside principles and actions to guide it. It has detailed four key strategies to assist vulnerable workers and groups to deal with the impacts of climate change and climate change policies, including making technological adjustments, developing new economic opportunities in affected local economics, pursuing labour market policies that assist workers to find new jobs, and providing social protection to improve resilience and give communities and workers time to find new opportunities (Patel, 2021[41]). France’s HCC has chosen to include in its climate policy evaluation framework a criterion that evaluates the extent to which “the strategy and its implementation takes into account the socio-economic impacts of measures on households and businesses, ensures their sustainability, and prioritises socially just and redistributive measures” (Haut Conseil pour le Climat, 2024[9]). Several countries have also created new institutions charged with supporting a just transition. Ireland established a Just Transition Commission in 2024, an independent body with research, advisory and social engagement functions (Climate Change Advisory Council, 2023[8]). The Australian Government has recently announced that it will legislate a national Net Zero Economic Authority, to facilitate investment in new industries and jobs, support affected workers, advise on policy and deliver, and engage communities (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, n.d.[42]).
Nurturing political support is a difficult, yet critically important aspect of mission governance. Many countries have achieved a minimum level of support for targets and climate framework laws, but most are experiencing challenges in maintaining political support for a consistent policy mix. Climate policy makers and councils are pursuing different tactics – industry engagement, public awareness-raising, public narrative and just transition interventions – to build and maintain political support in this area.
Societal engagement
In the mission-oriented approach, public participation and societal engagement plays a key role to mobilise whole-of-society action. Communicating and engaging with citizens and key stakeholders can help secure political support and acceptance for reforms as well as help drive market changes. Though some missions might take a more passive approach to stakeholder engagement (i.e. assessing interests and priorities), a more proactive role can ensure the success of the mission. By consulting and engaging individuals and communities in objective-setting and roadmap design, missions can secure the public’s acceptance for change. In essence, stakeholder engagement centres on “winning hearts and minds.”
Globally, the importance of societal engagement in the net-zero transition is widely acknowledged. In addition to securing acceptance for change, societal engagement ensures fairness, equity, innovation, behavioural changes, accountability, and transparency in green transitions. Countries' societal engagement efforts show varying stages of development. Some climate councils report that public engagement on climate issues is nascent, requiring significant improvements in co-ordination and outreach. In contrast, countries like Denmark and Chile have climate councils that describe high public awareness of climate change and strong support for government-led climate action.
Indeed, in drafting climate action plan and national strategies, governments acknowledge societal engagement as necessary to creating widely beneficial decisions. This has been echoed in several key international agreements, including the Paris Agreement (2015), which calls for cooperation on enhancing public participation and awareness, the Escazu Agreement (2018) on environmental matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Aarhus Convention (1998) on access to environmental information and participation, and the Rio Convention (1992) which established early principles for public engagement.
For example, in Ireland, the Government prioritised societal engagement in its 2021 and 2023 national climate plans (Climate Change Advisory Council, 2023[8]). In 2022, the Irish National Dialogue on Climate Action, the main platform for public and stakeholder input, held several events to increase public-national exchanges and climate action. In particular, the government held “Climate Conversations" with 4,300 participants, National Climate Stakeholder Forum events with 300 participants, a National Youth Assembly on Climate with 40 young people, and the Environmental Protection Agency's study on climate attitudes, which found that 96% of Irish people agree climate change is happening (Climate Change Advisory Council, 2023[8]).
Still, while many countries have made strides in consulting and engaging the public through various activities and initiatives, analysis suggests that there is room for growth, especially in developing a dedicated strategy for societal engagement. An overall strategic approach and coordinated work programme can help accelerate these efforts. When building and operationalising a societal engagement strategy, countries should ensure the participation of all stakeholders – from industries and the private sector to regions, municipalities, trade unions, and civil society. Governments should also develop a narrative around climate action that can drive societal engagement and ensure long-term public support.
Dedicated engagement strategies for underrepresented or at-risk groups are also often highlighted, including Indigenous communities as well as gender-based or youth-focused efforts. In Australia, the bulk of new energy generation and transmission infrastructure will need to be deployed in regional areas and the First Nations estate. The Australian CCA (2023[32]), therefore, emphasises the importance of “best-practice consultation and benefit-sharing with First Nations Australians” on this rollout and recommends the upcoming First Nations Clean Energy Strategy consider this important topic. In Mexico, in line with their feminist foreign and national policy, the government developed a National Action Plan for Gender and Climate Change to ensure the participation and consideration of women in climate actions and policies. Ensuring the deliberate and active participation of underrepresented populations, like women and Indigenous communities, is crucial as they are "important agents of change and decision-makers" on climate-related issues (Government of Mexico, 2022[43]).
One useful lever for societal engagement is the national curriculum. Some countries are exploring mandating environmental sustainability education in their national curriculum to increase awareness of climate change. Central America Caribbean nations who have increasingly experienced the devastating impacts of climate change have been some of the first to mandate environmental sustainability education. Guatemala, for example, passed the National Policy on Environmental Education in 2017 that requires environmental education throughout all levels of public education (MARN, SGCCC and PNUD, 2022[11]). Integrating a comprehensive, scientifically based environmental sustainability education in national curricula can ensure that current and future generations are informed about what the climate transition has achieved and optimistic about the positive impact of climate action. Equally critical is ensuring public access to environmental information, which enables informed participation and accountability. Some countries have developed frameworks for environmental data transparency, while others encourage citizen participation in collecting local climate data to support evidence-based policymaking.
Other countries are experimenting with forms of participatory democracy, such as deliberative approaches which have become increasingly prevalent (OECD, forthcoming[44]). In France, for example, a Citizens’ Convention on Climate (Convention citoyenne pour le climat, held in 2019-2020) brought together 150 citizens to deliberate on climate-related issues over a period of six months (OECD, 2023[45]). The citizens, representing the diversity of the French population, were selected using a civic lottery method, with 3% of members being youth. The Convention was an opportunity for citizens to partake in the decision-making processes by provide policy recommendations to guide its government’s approach to climate change and reduce the countries GHG emissions by at least 40% by 2030. The Convention also enable a social justice perspective in addressing climate change. By the end of the Convention, citizens presented to the government a list of 149 measures. Similarly, the UK's Climate Assembly also allowed a group of randomly selected diverse citizens to make recommendations to the government on climate policies that reflect the views and concerns of the wider public. Deliberation as a vehicle for increasing societal engagement ensures that a diverse range of communities are included in policy making and decision-making processes. Their inclusion can also enhance acceptance of those policies as well as trust and accountability between the government and the public. As discussed in Chapter 2, the success of climate missions relies heavily on long-term targets and policies that span electoral cycles. Sustained societal engagement can ensure that politicians and policy makers continue delivering on such targets.
Prioritising a just transition can also help strengthen the public mandate for climate action. Increasingly, countries are appealing to a broader range of values not only related to climate but also job security, energy security, economic growth and diversification, and community well-being. In South Africa, Ireland, and Australia, for example, this appeal has taken shape of a Just Transition, which involves the equal prioritisation of poverty eradication, educational access, decent, green jobs, and securing a safe environment for future generations in the fight against climate change (Patel, 2021[41]). Shifting the narrative around climate action can provide impetus for building stronger engagement and accelerating climate action.
Finding the right balance between meaningful societal engagement and speedy policymaking and implementation can be challenging. Creating public forums or citizen-led recommendation groups are time-intensive and can increase the need for resources and capacity. However, there are opportunities to use policy evaluation and impact assessment processes as tools for public engagement via continuous feedback mechanisms, accessible communication across various platforms, and integration of stakeholders from the beginning of policy evaluation or impact assessments. Within the EU, Article 11 of the Governance Regulation, which mandates multi-level governance processes in energy and climate policymaking, could be strengthened through tougher compliance checks (Institute for European Energy and Climate Policy, 2023[46]). Non-EU countries can draw lessons from such a mechanism and adapt it to their national contexts for more collaborative decision-making. Finally, governments should build quality assurances in their societal engagement processes to avoid the risk of tokenism. A long-term advisory public group can also serve to reduce tokenism while providing governments with a readily available gauge of public sentiment.
Overall, securing societal engagement is crucial to setting the long-term and consistent strategic orientation of climate missions. Public support for climate action has been proven to accelerate the green transition and the achievement of climate goals. Societal engagement alone, though critical, is not sufficient. Reflexivity is also required. In other words, governments must visibly incorporate perspectives and feedback into the policy development cycle to build upon or ameliorate existing climate policies. It is not enough to engage the public and conduct monitoring and evaluation on climate actions. Rather, countries should respond to the weaknesses, gaps, and challenges identified so that individuals and government bodies are empowered to continue acting towards their country's climate targets.
Insights from behavioural science can significantly enhance the design and implementation of societal engagement in mission-oriented approaches. By uncovering the factors that drive societal engagement and support for climate missions, a behavioural perspective allows governments to gain a deeper understanding of the motivations behind individual actions and the barriers that may hinder public support for sustainability initiatives. Addressing these barriers facilitates the development of more inclusive engagement strategies that resonate with a wider audience and foster genuine commitment to climate action (OECD, forthcoming[47]).
Regularly assessing public attitudes and behaviours toward sustainability facilitates adaptive policymaking that responds to evolving needs, thereby reinforcing public trust and alignment with climate goals. This behaviourally informed approach not only enhances the effectiveness of societal engagement in climate missions but also builds long-term public support essential for advancing the net-zero transition. By leveraging behavioural insights, governments can reduce barriers to participation, motivate societal involvement, and develop policies that are more inclusive, responsive, and closely aligned with the specific missions at hand (OECD, forthcoming[47]). It is essential to design and test interventions that incorporate behavioural insights and citizen feedback to ensure that decision-making is inclusive and supports the successful execution of climate missions over the long term.
Horizontal co-ordination
Missions are characterised by a high degree of horizontal co-ordination. For government-led missions, this means coordinating government departments’ policies, resources, and actions to ensure they are aligned with the mission objective. Horizontal co-ordination is integral to missions because it supports an integrated policy approach, minimises duplication and gaps in the work programme, and captures synergies from available funds and resources. Climate missions rely on a high degree of horizontal co-ordination given their broad policy mixes, varied actors, and significant resourcing requirements.
The mission objective(s), as well as the Framework, Mandates and Roadmap elements of the mission principles, have a strong influence on the degree of horizontal co-ordination in a given mission. Mandates establish clear roles and responsibilities for key actors in the mission, helping realise their fuller participation in the mission work programme. Yet even in the absence of strong, formal mandates, the combination of a strong mission objective(s) and clear roadmap can galvanise actors to self-organise within the mission. France’s HCC (2024[9]) noted “in the absence of a clear, shared direction, there is a risk of a gap between the initiatives of the various players and public action.” Furthermore, elements of the mission’s framework, in particular coordinating mechanisms such as cross-ministerial or cross-departmental governance bodies, can strengthen the buy-in, information exchange and contributions of different departments to the mission.
The extent of horizontal co-ordination in climate missions is difficult to evaluate. Qualitative coding of climate reports from 15 countries’ climate councils and/or United Nations reports typically reveals only select mentions of challenges with fragmentation, coordinating departments or facilitating communication (e.g., in reports from South Africa, Guatemala, and Costa Rica). Most reports do not directly address the topic. However, many reports refer to an outcome of poor horizontal co-ordination: policy misalignment. For example, Germany’s Expert Council found the German Government is maintaining several measures the counteract its climate goals, such as “climate-damaging subsidies, energy tax concessions, and other transport-sector concessions” (Expertenrat für Klimafragen, 2023[30]). The Dutch Scientific Climate Council has called on the Netherlands Government to develop a strategy for the phase-out of activities inconsistent with the country’s climate objectives (Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad, 2024[48]). Poor alignment between climate and other policies might be indicative of a lack of information-sharing, weak departmental consultation/engagement processes, or a lack of understanding of the climate implications of policy design choices in non-environmental sectors. France’s HCC (2024[9]) raised the need for policies “to be coherent and coordinated horizontally between sectors and policy areas” and lauded the 2022 introduction of a high-level General Secretariat for Ecological Planning (SGPE) described in Box 4.3.
Given the pace and scale of national climate missions, one barrier to horizontal co-ordination could be difficulties in keeping abreast of the large number of planning and policy changes happening at any one time. Sweden’s Climate Policy Council alluded to this challenge, stating that “relevant authorities and other stakeholders, sometimes including the Government Offices, find it difficult to keep track of all completed and ongoing inquiries and initiatives in climate policy” which “risks leading to duplicate or overlapping assignments and thus diminishing knowledge acquisition and increasing costs for the state and taxpayers” (Swedish Climate Policy Council, 2024[4]). In Guatemala, several directorates and units coordinate to obtain information and prepare reports, but the government recognises that additional alliances for informational exchange must be secured (MARN, SGCCC and PNUD, 2022[11]). Digital tools are a useful solution to this challenge. For example, a recent report by the Swedish Agency for Public Management proposed that the online tool Panorama, operated jointly by the Swedish Climate Policy Council and Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, be “developed as a knowledge base of government studies, strategies and other completed and ongoing initiatives” (Swedish Climate Policy Council, 2024[4]). Another option might be to reorganise climate plans around systemic issues rather than just sectors. France, for example, has organised its climate mitigation efforts around 22 “areas of ecological transition” which include “better preservation and development of our ecosystems”, “better production”, “better food”, and “better consumption”. This systemic approach makes it possible to bring together policy problems that were previously dealt with in a more siloed fashion.
Overall, horizontal co-ordination is a challenging, if underreported, aspect of the mission governance principles framework for climate missions. The extent of horizontal co-ordination is at least somewhat dependent on a strong mission objective and the Framework, Mandates and Roadmap elements, but can be bolstered through tactics such as interministerial committees and taskforces, digital tools and policy re-categorisation.
High level anchoring of the government’s green transition efforts to ensure co-ordination and alignment
The General Secretariat for Ecological Planning (Secrétariat général à la planification écologique, SGPE), established in July 2022, illustrates how countries can enhance cross-government co-ordination and strengthen state capacity by establishing a central dedicated body to oversee the green transition. Placed directly under the Prime Minister, the SGPE is responsible for developing, implementing, and monitoring France's ecological planning strategy across ministries and policy areas.
The SGPE's role encompasses coordinating national strategies, translating them into ministerial action plans, evaluating policies, ensuring policy coherence, and preparing responses to the High Council on Climate. The SGPE plays a key role in enabling horizontal co-ordination. By working across ministries, the secretariat aligns environmental objectives with other policy areas, coordinates efforts to avoid duplication, and identifies gaps in climate action.
With a team of around 20 people, the SGPE oversees 22 projects related to the ecological transition across 6 themes (moving, housing, eating, producing, consuming, preserving our ecosystems). Notably, the role of the SGPE’s role goes beyond climate policy, which represents both a strength in taking a systemic view on the green transition, and a challenge in terms of a broadened scope and complexity.
The creation of the SGPE occurs amidst a complex landscape of climate governance processes in France, including the development of the French Energy-Climate Strategy, sectoral decarbonisation roadmaps, and various national plans and strategies. The SGPE therefore plays a crucial role in co-ordinating and streamlining these various ecological transition policies.
Vertical co-ordination
Another important element of mission-oriented governance is vertical coordination. This describes the extent to which mission objectives harmonise and interact at different levels of government, which could be international, supranational, national, state/regional, and local, depending on the mission’s scope. Vertical co-ordination is a challenging but essential consideration for climate missions because, as establishing in Chapter 2, limiting average temperature rise is global collective action problem that demands a high degree of alignment and contribution from local, state/regional, national, and supranational actors. As France’s HCC (2024[9]) states, the “alignment of targets and the convergence of trajectories at the various territorial, national and European levels […] remain essential conditions for achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement.”
Significant progress has been made on vertical co-ordination at the international-national and supranational-national levels of climate change. As covered in Chapter 2, following the Paris Agreement, hundreds of countries have adopted NDC targets, with many formalising these targets at a domestic level through laws, pledges, and policies. However, the first Global Stocktake found that full implementation of existing NDCs will be insufficient to achieve the Paris Agreement 1.5°C target, indicating that stronger alignment is needed between national and international climate goals. Furthermore, the European Union has taken significant strides to align national decarbonisation efforts with its supranational-level NDC target, in particular through its Emissions Trading Scheme(s) and Effort Sharing Regulation, which together price emissions in many industries and set binding annual emission reduction targets for member states in non-priced sectors. The Scientific Climate Council of the Netherlands remarked that the “close connection between national climate policy and European guidelines is resulting in effective climate policy”, pointing to EU targets and policy instruments such as the ETS and Eco-Design Directive as particularly effective for driving national-level mitigation (Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad, 2024[37]). As with international-national co-ordination, there is still ongoing room for improvement, with the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (2024[50]) calling out instances of slow or insufficient updates to National Energy and Climate Plans and calling on member states to “fully and swiftly implement the Fit for 55 package” in its latest report.
However, vertical co-ordination remains a major challenge between national, state/regional, and local levels. Four drivers of this challenge are: a lack of clear roles and responsibilities, capability gaps, funding gaps, and political misalignment. First, a lack of clarity on roles and the division of responsibilities can create ambiguities on the role of state/regional/local government and stall progress. For example, New Zealand local government submitters in a recent New Zealand Climate Change Commission (NZ CCC) consultation asked for more clarity on their role in the net-zero transition. The NZ CCC echoed this message when it recommended that the Government “align and coordinate institutional and regulatory outcomes within and between government” to support the implementation of New Zealand’s second Emissions Reduction Plan (He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission, 2024[31]). Climate framework laws are a useful tool to establish role clarity. In Ireland, the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development (Amendment) Act requires each local authority to prepare a climate action plan, which must be consistent with the most recent National Climate Action Plan and National Adaptation Framework. Statutory guidelines provide guidance to local authorities on the preparation of these plans (Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, 2024[51]). In Chile, the new Climate Act has decentralised net-zero implementation, formally assigning responsibilities not just to government ministries, but also to regional and municipal authorities (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, 2022[20]). It also established 16 new Regional Climate Change Committees and empowered municipal governments to consider climate change as part of their mandates (Elliott et al., 2024[35]). Legal requirements and formal guidance can make more explicit the intended role of local and state/regional players in the net-zero transition, motivating participants and enabling the more strategic allocation of time and resources.
However, role clarification alone is not sufficient where local, state, or regional authorities lack the funding and resources to fully participate in national climate efforts. In South Africa for example, local governments’ contributions to climate action are hampered by financial constraints. The Presidential Climate Commission (PCC) notes that the financial model for local government is already “inherently unsustainable” and finds that “with additional climate-related responsibilities, local governments are under increased pressure to provide services that do not have a budget allocation – a provision that is not stipulated in the Climate Change Bill” (Presidential Climate Commission, 2024[52]). When asking for more clarity on their role in the net-zero transition, New Zealand local government submitters also asked for access to funding and legislative tools consistent with this role (He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission, 2024[31]). Placing additional responsibilities and asks on local and state/regional governments that are financially constrained, without commensurate changes to budgets and/or funding tools, is unlikely to drive real progress on emission reductions at lower levels of government. Potential solutions include new appropriations in national budgets, new funding, and financing tools for lower levels of government, or more generally, stronger integration of higher-level budget decisions with lower-level climate plans. In Ireland, the legal requirement for local climate action plans was accompanied by new Government funding for a Climate Action Coordinator and Climate Action Officer in each local action authority. These roles have responsibility for the design, delivery, and monitoring of local climate action plans (Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, 2024[51]).
Similar to funding challenges, some local, state, or regional authorities lack capabilities needed to participate in climate planning, policy design and delivery. The South African PCC (2024[52]) states, “Local governments often lack technical expertise and skills, including softer skills that enable them to build relationships and partnerships within government, the private sector, and the broader community.” This trend likely applies to lower levels of government in a range of countries. Capacity building, then, is a critical enabler of good vertical co-ordination. In Ireland, the Government funded four Climate Action Regional Offices as a “local authority shared service in recognition of the need to build capacity within the local government sector to respond and adapt to climate change” (Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, 2024[51]). It also funded a Local Authority Climate Action Training Programme 2021-2023, which educated local authority staff and elected members on climate change and the role of local authorities in leading action. The programme delivered 27,000 training places to 22,500 local authority staff and elected members by the end of 2023 (Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, 2024[51]). Secretariat support and training programmes are good examples of capacity-building initiatives at lower levels of government.
A final driver of the vertical co-ordination challenge is a lack of political alignment between different levels of government. This was a strong theme in interviews with climate commissions. A lack of political alignment shows up in different ways, for example, a lack of climate targets, or inertia on climate action. In Canada, for example, three quarters of emissions come from provinces and territories without their own legislated 2030 emission reduction targets. According to the Canadian Climate Institute (2023[33]), “The lack of alignment among governments makes rapid, cost-effective climate action more difficult.” Australia is another country that must navigate political differences to coordinate climate action at different levels of government. Its Climate Change Authority (2023[32]) proposed a new national-state agreement(s) on climate change mitigation, adaptation and the net-zero transition, which would “provide a framework for cooperation on the response to climate change, including principles and actions on a range of matters where consistent and/or coordinated action is in the national interest.” Formal frameworks that outline shared principles and guardrails for a working relationship on climate action have potential to support strengthened co-ordination between stakeholders of different political backgrounds. Another potential tool for stronger alignment is local, state, and regional stakeholder engagement. In 2024, France launched regional "Conférences des Parties" (COPs) in each of its administrative regions. These regional COPs, inspired by the international Conference of Parties under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, are intended to increase the engagement of citizens and businesses in local climate initiatives, and have the potential to strengthen bottom-up support for regional action on climate change.
Altogether, vertical coordination is a difficult yet important aspect of mission-oriented governance. Strong progress has been made to align national commitments with international and supranational targets and goals, albeit there is still room for improvement. Yet aligning national level climate targets with state/regional and local priorities is still a real challenge, driven by issues around role clarity, funding, capabilities and political differences. An international scan of countries’ approaches reveals inspiring examples of initiatives – such as legal frameworks, Regional COPs, shared secretariats, and nationally-funded roles – that could benefit from wider application.
Mobilisation
Mobilising key elements of the relevant ecosystem of actors and creating coalition that champions and rallies around the mission is a central idea of mission implementation. Leveraging networks of actors (industry, civil society, regions, etc) can help in the conception, design, and implementation of policy. In other words, mobilising the private sector, but also communities and civil society, to share ownership of the mission can help missions deliver on their objectives. Mobilisation also plays a role in establishing legitimacy of policies and strong commitments to those policies and mission objectives.
Ecosystem mobilisation is a nascent feature of national climate change programs. It has been primarily limited to stakeholder consultation on climate plans – a feature this report would describe as societal engagement – with only limited focus on engaging households, communities, and businesses in the actual delivery of plans and actions.
However, a few climate councils emphasise the importance and potential of such mobilisation. The involvement of diverse actors ensures that the socio-economic constraints and opportunities that can influence certain decisions are understood, and that consultation and collaboration processes are transparent and well-detailed. Ecosystem mobilisation can also help in understanding the climate transition from a systems perspective, with the government fulfilling the critical role of facilitator and providing platforms for collaboration and co-ordination. The Swedish Climate Policy Council (2024[4]) notes that collaboration is not only an imperative but also a strategy to address the complexity and challenges of the climate transition; “this is a form of network governance and aims to stimulate commitment and cooperation among different civil and public organisations." Broadening collaboration in the design and implementation of climate policy can increase acceptance and engagement by involving not just the business community but also municipalities, regions, and civil society organizations.
In some countries, households, communities, and businesses are calling for the Government to better enable their participation in the net-zero transition. For example, in New Zealand, a major theme of the CCC’s recent consultation was better enabling societal contributions to net- zero. Submitters called for “government action to make it more possible for people to participate in and contribute to emissions reduction efforts, for example through effective funding mechanisms and national campaigns to support behavioural change” (He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission, 2024[31]). Local government submitters asked for greater clarity on the role of local government in the transition, and access to funding and legislative tools commensurate with this role.
There are some bright spots in the emerging practice of ecosystem mobilisation that provide inspiration and models for countries to adopt. Guatemala, in their climate framework, has established units with the objective of mobilising and strengthening Indigenous peoples’ and women’s participation (MARN, SGCCC and PNUD, 2022[11]). There are also several mechanisms, mostly in the form of Working Groups, to engage public and private entities to strengthen adaptation and mitigation actions and support institutions working towards such actions. In Sweden, the government established the Fossil Free Sweden Committee in 2015 to accelerate the decarbonisation of key industries (see Box 4.4). In several countries, the preparation of climate or sector-specific reports is also seen as a participatory process so multisectoral participation platforms and technical tables have been created. Such mobilisations also have the added benefit of enhancing transparency horizontally and vertically across government, allowing the public greater clarity on climate actions.
In the run-up to the 2015 UN climate conference in Paris, the Swedish Government launched the Fossil Free Sweden committee, building upon a long-standing tradition of public-private collaboration. This committee works hand-in-hand with over 500 companies, municipalities, regions and other organisations to pinpoint obstacles and opportunities in accelerating the decarbonisation of key industries. This forms the basis of industry-specific roadmaps for fossil-free competitiveness to help achieve the country’s climate targets. The explicit goal of the initiative is to build a strong industrial sector and to create more jobs and export opportunities by going fossil free. To date, 22 business sectors have produced roadmaps, encompassing both commitments and policy proposals, that identify sector-specific opportunities, obstacles and proposals. The roadmaps encompass both short-term and long-term targets for each sector, often framed in mission-oriented terms. For instance, the heavy transport automotive industry aims to produce 50% electric trucks by 2030.
The sectors with roadmaps include aggregates, agriculture, automotive (heavy transport and passenger cars), aviation, cement, concrete, construction and civil engineering, digitalisation consultancy, electricity, fast-moving consumer goods, food retail, forestry, gas, heating, heavy road haulage, maritime, mining and minerals, petroleum and biofuel, recycling, ski resorts, and steel.
The initiative is managed by an office led by a national coordinator. This office works on implementing the roadmaps and developing strategies to accelerate the transition. The platform allows industries to present decarbonisation plans to the Government, enabling companies to take responsibility for their emission reduction strategies.
In the words of the Swedish Climate Policy Council, “this is a clear and high-profile example of stakeholder collaboration that demonstrates the potential of the business sector in climate work”, showcasing that “stakeholder collaboration is not only about consultations during the policy design phase but [that it] can also be a tool for implementation and delivery of policy targets” (Swedish Climate Policy Council, 2024[4]).
The Fossil Free Sweden roadmaps have contributed to the development of landmark industrial transition projects. These include HYBRIT, which aims to use hydrogen instead of coal in steelmaking, potentially reducing Sweden's CO2 emissions by 10%, and the cement industry's Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) initiative.
This model of public-private collaboration on industry roadmaps is being disseminated internationally through LeadIT, the Leadership Group for Industry Transition. LeadIT was initiated by the Indian and Swedish governments at the 2019 UN Secretary General's Climate Action Summit, with support from the World Economic Forum.
The Swedish Climate Policy Council notes in 2024 assessment that the Government's latest action plan does not specify how the work of Fossil Free Sweden will continue after its formal mandate ends in 2024, or how the business sector's commitments will be monitored or how broader stakeholder collaboration will be maintained.
Ecosystem mobilisation also depends on the capacity of communities and organisations to participate in the mission. The Dutch Scientific Climate Council recognises this, acknowledging that implementation of the Netherlands’ climate plan requires continued investment in the implementation capacity of governments, citizens, and companies (Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad, 2024[37]). In New Zealand, the Climate Change Commission (2024[31]) has recently recommended the Government transfer resources via the National Budget to Māori, the Indigenous Population, to enable Māori-led emission reduction efforts in line with Māori assessments and priorities. It further recommends that the Government ensure Māori are empowered to lead “the weaving of mātauranga Māori (Indigenous knowledge) into policy design, development, and implementation at central and local government levels” (He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission, 2024[31]). Making space for relevant stakeholders to participate in the delivery of the mission is a great first step, however, ensuring that capacity to participate (via mobility, access internet connection, resources, knowledge, among others) is equally important for mobilising collective action.
The inclusion of the private sector and industry is equally important in ecosystem mobilisation. However, it is not uncommon to see their involvement driven by questions of self-interest and investment capabilities. In driving ecosystem mobilisation, it will be important for governments to balance the competing priorities of all stakeholders who either drive policy or are impacted by it. The Swedish Climate Policy Council (2024[4]) highlights the importance of collaboration to navigate these conflicting interests, emphasising the need for courageous leadership that challenges traditional governance processes. Such leadership must balance support, efficiency, and change to ensure that the climate transition is both effective and legitimate, even when societal goals and interests are at odds.
Nurturing and building capacity for ecosystem mobilisation, though nascent, is critical to ensuring a whole-of-society approach. Though many countries are still experimenting with forms and methods of mobilisation, preliminary insights from such countries provide a starting point for other countries seeking to harness ecosystem mobilisation a means to not only build a mission's strategic orientation but also accelerate on delivering climate and sector-specific targets.
Broad policy mix
Missions address systemic challenges, where a single policy instrument or approach is rarely sufficient. Indeed, the literature on missions pays particular attention to the ‘STI-trap’ – the risk of a siloed approach to governance limiting access to the range of policy instruments needed to achieve the objective. Mission-oriented governance, therefore, is governance that is unconstrained by departmental siloes and enables access to broad policy mixes made up of various policy instruments from different policy areas that complement and enhance one another. National climate efforts have also moved away from singular solutions (e.g., carbon pricing) or policy areas (e.g., energy) towards a conversation about more varied and holistic interventions that touch upon every sector of society.
National climate efforts have historically focused on pricing as the single (or one of only several) lever for emission reductions. Pricing is a highly appealing intervention from an economic and fiscal perspective. Emissions Trading Schemes and carbon taxes are considered a highly efficient intervention because they incentivise abatement in the lowest cost sectors of the economy. Furthermore, depending on design, these tools can raise significant revenue for the government. Thus, many countries have adopted a form of carbon pricing, and the World Bank is supporting 30 further countries to develop and implement carbon pricing instruments under its Partnership for Market Implementation programme (Partnership for Market Implementation, n.d.[54]).
However, national climate efforts have also realised that carbon pricing is not a silver bullet solution for whole-of-economy emission reductions. They often do not have comprehensive coverage of the economy, often leaving out key sectors such as Agriculture. They typically do not address issues such as carbon leakage, although the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, offers a potential solution to leakage that may be expanded in the EU and adopted in other jurisdictions.
In a study of 1500 climate policies implemented between 1998 and 2022 compiled by the OECD, (Stechemesser et al., 2024[55]) find that a mere 63 measures markedly reduced emissions. They conclude that climate policies, even price-based instruments such as tax or price incentives which fare relatively well in isolation, appear most effective as part of well-designed combinations of complementary policy instruments.
Furthermore, market failures such as information asymmetry and principal-agent problems and structural factors, such as public infrastructure decisions, planning regimes and the cost of capital, can inhibit price signals or efficient responses to them. Complimentary (non-pricing) policies that address abatement in non-priced sectors, market failures and structure enablers of the net-zero transition are therefore an essential part of the climate mission policy mix. All countries have recognised this dynamic and are pushing for broad climate policy mixes. For example, the New Zealand CCC advocates for the rapid introduction of agricultural emissions pricing (a sector not covered by the country’s ETS), but in tandem with “advisory and extension services” for farmers and a streamlining of review and approval processes for new technologies to reduce biogenic methane ( (He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission, 2024[31]).
National climate efforts have also historically focused on interventions in the Energy sector. Energy decarbonisation is often a critical first step for climate missions, with its relatively lower marginal cost of abatement and role as an enabler of further emissions reductions through electrification. In South Africa, energy decarbonisation remains a substantial challenge, with energy provider Eskom’s recent announcement that it will delay the closing of key coal mines set to put the country further off track in its green transition (Presidential Climate Commission, 2024[52]). Australia, too, is pursuing a substantial decarbonisation of its electricity grid in order to achieve its 2030 target, aiming to shift from 32% to 82% renewable sources by the end of the decade (Climate Change Authority, 2023[32]). However, many countries have made substantial progress on energy decarbonisation and must now ramp-up efforts in other sectors of the economy as they pursue their climate goals. For example, in the UK, over half of the emission reduction in the first three carbon budgets (since 2008) was in the Energy sector, coming primarily from the phase-out of coal and roll-out of renewables. But over three quarters of the emission reductions from the next three carbon budgets are expected to come from other sectors, particularly Transport, Buildings, Agriculture and Land. This necessitates a strategic shift in focus to policies that enable electrification (e.g., heat pumps, electric vehicles) and carbon absorption (e.g., tree planting, peatland restoration). All in all, achieving ambitious net-zero goals requires policy interventions in all key sectors of the economy.
A broad policy mix also enables a holistic response to the adaptation, justice, and fairness aspects of net-zero transitions. While national climate efforts have historically focused on policies that reduce emissions, many are now pursuing a package of interventions that integrate and align to enhance resilience to climate change effects and support a just transition for those that disproportionately bear the costs of the transition. Costa Rica, for example, has developed extensive climate change policies across key sectors like Transport, Agriculture and Energy, including the National Biodiversity Policy and National Policy for Adaptation to Climate Change 2018-2030, Carbon Neutrality 2.0 Country Program and National REDD+ Strategy (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, 2019[56]). In Sweden, the SCPC (2024[4]) has recommended integrating “tighter climate policy instruments with targeted redistribution policies to distribute the benefits and costs of the transition and concrete policies for its realisation”. It states this could be achieved by modifying climate policy instruments, or supplementing them with labour, redistribution and/or regional focused policies. By supporting a more holistic response, a broad policy mix ensures that the mission, and its policies and actions, are sustainable in the long-term.
Finally, a broad policy mix can address the critical enablers of success for the mission. Climate missions are dependent on enablers such as societal awareness, behavioural change, technological development access to finance, governance, and capabilities, among others. Climate missions will not succeed without policy interventions that influence these enablers. France’s HCC (2024[9]) recognises this, recommending a suite of policies aimed at addressing key enablers, such as the regulation of advertising to ensure it does not promote carbon-intensive consumption, skills development in all sectors, and guaranteeing funding streams for public and active transport infrastructure. On skills development in particular, the HCC (2024[9]) states “the transversal lever of training emerges in several sectors… as a prerequisite for the incorporation of decarbonisation issues through new practices or activities. In the absence of structured sectors and sufficient training, there is limited capacity to implement decarbonisation and carbon storage actions”. Skills development is discussed further under Capabilities below, while those enablers that are also Government processes (such as public funding, procurement, planning and consenting) are addressed under Process Integration.
Overall, mission-oriented governance advocates for a broad policy mix to address the complex, systemic challenge that the mission is engaged with. National climate efforts are in the process of broadening their policy approaches beyond pricing levers, the Energy sector, and climate mitigation, to include a wider variety of instruments, all sectors, and measures that address adaptation, justice and fairness elements of the net-zero transition, as well as underlying enablers like societal awareness and skills development. However, as the policy mix broadens, the need for Horizontal Co-ordination increases, to ensure that policies are reinforcing and enhancing one another.
Process integration
Missions address complex societal challenges that lack readily available solutions. Doing so requires systems thinking, a set of analytical skills used to identify and understand systems, predict their behaviours, and consider how to modify them to produce effects (Arnold and Wade, 2015[57]). Government processes, such as budgeting, procurement, and planning, have a significant influence on systems – from housing and urban development to food production and consumption. Successful missions – especially those with a national-level objective, proactively integrate their objective within these processes to influence systemic change. For example, climate missions might advocate for climate-friendly procurement, budget or planning decisions. Amongst the mission governance principles, this is referred to as Process Integration. National climate efforts are only at early stages in their development of this aspect of mission-oriented governance.
One of the most important government processes for climate missions is planning and consenting. Planning and consenting decisions influence emissions directly, for example, through agreeing to provide a permit for renewable energy generation or grid expansions, refusing to renew a permit for fossil fuel generation, or protecting land with carbon sinks from other uses through zoning decisions. They also influence emissions in directly, for example, by determining the level of housing density allowed near public or active transport links. Many climate councils have reported that out-of-date planning systems are hampering progress on net-zero transitions. The UK CCC (2024[28]) called the UK planning system “out-of-date and inconsistent with the level of ambition to deliver Net Zero” and has called for major reform. Australia’s CCA (2023[32]) critiqued “too slow” approval processes for renewable energy infrastructure, noting it takes 3-5 years and 2-3 years respectively for wind and solar farms to be developed. Ireland’s Climate Change Advisory Council (2023[8]) recommended that the country’s new National Planning Framework better reflect climate considerations, and called for urgent action to reform resource planning, licensing, and regulatory systems across all levels of government to enable far greater investment in renewable infrastructure. Interviews with climate councils confirm that there is increasing attention on planning and consenting systems and the extent to which these systems enable land and infrastructure choices in line with climate goals. National climate efforts should consider whether amendments or reforms to these systems to integrate climate considerations could accelerate progress towards NDC targets.
Another important government process is budgeting. Transitioning to a clean energy system requires substantial funding, some of which will be public. However, climate goals are often not well-integrated into fiscal goals, processes, and decision-making. Some countries have taken initial steps towards integration. For example, the Swedish Climate Act Climate Act 2018 requires the Government to present a climate report in its Budget Bill each year and make sure that climate and budget policy goals work together. New Zealand established the Climate Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in 2021, a (now disestablished) ring-fenced fund for climate initiatives, distinct from main Budget allowances, funded by proceeds from the country’s Emissions Trading Scheme (Te Tai Ōhangai The Treasury New Zealand, 2024[58]) (Gibson, 2024[59]). South Africa’s National Treasury collaborated with the World Bank to conduct climate budget tagging pilots to track adaptation and mitigation finance flows, with a goal of integrating climate concerns into annual planning and budgeting (Keen, Lorimer and Vincent, 2022[60]). Its newly established Climate Change Response Fund also seeks to coordinate private and public finance for adaptation and mitigation at the national level (Presidential Climate Commission, 2024[52]).
Despite these positive examples, there is still much room to improve. Climate framework laws typically specify substantial emission reduction planning and reporting requirements, sometimes at multiple levels of government. Yet the timing of these processes does not always align with national and local budget cycle(s), meaning policies that could help reduce emissions but lack funding commitments risk not being included. Furthermore, all stages of the budget process could better integrate climate considerations, by, for example, requiring departments to submit evidence of the emissions and climate resilience impacts of their funding bids, including climate as a criterion for funding decisions, and establishing reporting requirements to Parliament on the climate consequences of national budgets. The Swedish Climate Policy Council (2024[4]) echoes this perspective, recommending the government “include the climate perspective in the ongoing review of the fiscal policy framework, including the fiscal effects of various pathways in the climate transition.” National climate efforts should consider whether changes to fiscal goals, processes and decision-making to integrate climate considerations could accelerate progress towards NDC targets.
A further important government process is procurement. Government procurement decisions can have a substantial impact on markets, influencing the demand and supply of low-carbon goods and technologies through contractual requirements. However, procurement is a rarely mentioned process in climate council reporting. One exception is in Denmark, where the Klimaradet has considered the role of procurement in influencing low-carbon food consumption (Danish Council on Climate Change, 2024[29]). It states “the public sector can contribute to normalising climate-friendly diets among the Danish population by setting goals for public kitchens to serve climate-friendly food. This goal should be supported through the training to public kitchen staff and through public-private partnerships.” Another example, New Zealand’s Carbon Neutral Government Programme, requires public sector departments to become carbon-neutral by 2025 through phasing out coal-fired boilers, optimising car fleet size and purchasing low-carbon vehicles, and achieving a minimum energy efficiency rating in office buildings (He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission, 2024[31]).The influence of this programme would increase further if the carbon-neutral requirement was extended to departments’ downstream emissions, such as the public housing stock. By integrating climate considerations into procurement guidelines and government contracts, national climate efforts can help spark behavioural change and support the scaling up of markets for low-carbon goods and technologies. Yet this lever is largely untapped to date. National climate efforts should consider advocating for changes to procurement systems that support climate-conscious choices and markets.
Process integration is difficult to achieve without overall policy coherence, that is, the alignment of climate and other important policy goals at the highest political levels (see further in OECD (2020[61])). Policy coherence ensures that the machinery of government is not working against itself to pursue conflicting policy goals. Several countries are grappling with how to square climate goals with other important objectives. For example, the Swedish Government has noted in its action plan that climate considerations “should permeate policy to enable all of society to participate in the climate transition”, noting that this requires the “integration of climate policy work into all relevant areas of expenditure and that climate goals and the endeavour to achieve them should be part of the Government’s various processes”. It points to immigration policy as one area where climate considerations should inform decision-making, to support access to the broad range of skills that will be needed for the net-zero transition. For France, the alignment of tourism and climate goals can support progress towards both. As the HCC states, “France’s ambition to become the world’s leading tourist destination needs to be integrated into strategies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate change, by transforming the sector to systematically promote sustainable tourism, reducing the ecological footprint including land use, and investing in sustainable tourism infrastructures and strategies” (Haut Conseil pour le Climat, 2024[9]). These examples show how overall policy coherence – the strategic alignment of policy goals and management of their potential conflicts – is the starting point for the integration of processes necessary to support the mission’s success.
Overall, process integration enables the mission to create systemic change by influencing key government levers like planning, budgeting, and procurement. More fundamentally, it helps elevate climate change as a policy goal and reconcile it with other important objectives. National climate efforts are only at early stages in their development of this aspect of mission-oriented governance. National climate efforts should consider process integration as within-scope and seek to proactively integrate climate considerations into processes where possible.
Innovation and experimentation
Innovation and experimentation are core tenets of the mission-oriented approach. Missions themselves represent an innovative approach to public sector governance. Furthermore, in their efforts to address grand societal challenges, they often directly introduce new policies, process improvements or products and services (OECD OPSI, 2021[62]). Finally, many existing missions have taken the form of, or been initiated by, mission-oriented innovation policies (MOIPs), which aim to mobilise innovation in wider society through policy interventions that support different stages of the innovation cycle, such as research, demonstration and market deployment, as well as mix supply-push and demand-pull instruments (Larrue, 2021[63]).
Innovation also plays a central role in combating climate change. According to IEA (2020[64]) projections, approximately 35% of the cumulative CO2 emissions reductions needed to achieve net-zero emissions by 2070 rely on technologies that are currently at the prototype or demonstration phase. These technologies will require further research and development, as well as technical improvements, to become available at scale. Additionally, about 40% of the cumulative emissions reductions depend on technologies that have not yet been commercially deployed in mass-market applications (IEA, 2020[64]). Such technology scaling and deployment will most likely require significant policy experimentation.
Curiously, there is only brief mention of innovation or experimentation in climate councils’ independent reporting on national climate efforts. The UK CCC (2024[28]) reported “insufficient progress in support of innovation” and called for an evidence-based roadmap of policies for net-zero and further support for climate start-ups. France’s HCC (2024[9]) noted “innovative financing mechanisms” announced in the country’s draft third national low-carbon strategy. One exception is the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC), which makes significant reference to Research & Development and innovation in its reporting (ESABCC, 2024[50]). Yet by and large, innovation and experimentation do not emerge as key themes in climate council reports. This finding was reinforced in interviews with climate councils, with most unable to point to major policy, process or product and service innovations introduced as part of national climate efforts.
This is somewhat surprising, as many countries have established substantial research and development funding schemes that are related to climate change. For example, Horizon Europe, the EU’s key funding programme for research and innovation, has an indicative funding amount of EUR 93.5 billion over the period 2021-2027 (European Comission, n.d.[65]). It is organised into 5 EU Missions, at least four of which relate to climate (see Box 3.1). However, there do not appear to be any formal governance links between the Horizon Europe Missions and the European Commission’s supra-national climate programme. Furthermore, few of the covered climate council reports directly mention the Horizon Europe missions nor evaluate the extent to which they contribute to the national overall targets. There appears to be a disconnect between large-scale R&D funding programmes and climate governance arrangements, even though choices about the size and focus of R&D funding are highly relevant to the net-zero transition. Perhaps extending the mission-oriented approach beyond its traditional application in the STI sector to cover higher-level, whole-of-economy climate efforts could help bridge the gap between R&D and innovation programmes and climate goals and encourage more innovation and experimentation towards the latter.
Overall, innovation and experimentation are core to the mission-oriented approach. However, they are only briefly mentioned in independent climate council reports on national climate efforts, surprising given the existence of large R&D funding schemes with climate links.
Reflexivity
Missions seek to reach an objective to which the pathway to realisation is unknown. They do so through a continuous process of reflexivity. Reflexivity combines trial-by-error, iteration, learning by doing, deep reflection and continuous adaptation as new information and circumstances come to light. It is an essential component of climate missions, given the limited timeframe to deliver on climate targets, ever-expanding scientific knowledge base, and considerable remaining areas of uncertainty around the net-zero transition (e.g., technology mix). As the Swedish Climate Policy Council (2024[4]) states, “Developments in the world around us, new knowledge and changing conditions mean that climate policy needs to be simultaneously innovative and flexible to achieve the set targets in a sustainable and cost-effective way”. True reflexivity combines regular monitoring, ex ante evaluation and ongoing societal consultation with regular sessions for reflection and review, processes that translate lessons learnt into rapid policy adjustments, and reporting and transparency requirements. For the Dutch Scientific Climate Council, it means “adaptive management”, or “using an adjustable plan with multiple alternative solutions and pathways, experimenting, monitoring and cyclical revision of policy based on lessons learnt and new insights” (Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad, 2024[37]). Reflexivity is a core part of mission-oriented governance; however, it also demands a significant investment in resources and capabilities.
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) provide the foundation for reflexivity in mission-oriented governance. High-quality M&E systems provide rapid information about the mission’s historical and forecast progress towards its objectives, as well as information about assumptions, dependencies and risks that the mission must adapt to stay on-course. The UK CCC’s Mitigation Monitoring Framework provides an excellent example of high-quality M&E in a climate context. The framework has a range of M&E outputs that track sectoral progress on decarbonisation, including sector monitoring maps (which show the interdependencies between policies, enablers and outcomes in each sector), hundreds of indicators, policy scorecards, quantitative emission assessments, a list of data gaps, recommendations to government departments on next-steps, and a report on progress made against next steps in former reports (UK CCC, 2022[38]). While the extent of M&E varies across countries, all appreciate the importance of M&E to climate missions and are working on improving their frameworks and processes. For example, Costa Rica is testing out a National Climate Change Metric System (SINAMECC) to measure the country’s implementation and compliance processes (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, 2019[56]). Guatemala has continuously adapted its climate change monitoring and reporting systems by integrating feedback and learning from international commitments and national policies (MARN, SGCCC and PNUD, 2022[11]). Germany’s Expert Council has called for “systematic monitoring beyond the implementation controlling mentioned in the programme” to verify that target emission reductions are being achieved (Expertenrat für Klimafragen, 2023[30]). Denmark’s Klimarådet has called for an urgent review of a carbon dioxide tax on industry emissions to ensure that it achieves its expected emission reductions, a step it said would “strengthen monitoring and evaluation” (Danish Council on Climate Change, 2024[29]). Overall, developing strong M&E frameworks and processes is a critical first step to building greater reflexivity into national climate efforts. The UK CCC’s Mitigation Monitoring Framework offers an excellent template.
Another way to promote reflexivity is to ensure that signals about the real-life impacts of regulation and policy implementation are quickly detected and analysed. Any regulation or policy – no matter how well intended and how broadly consulted - may have unintended impacts on people or businesses. It is therefore critical to create complaints mechanisms or other channels that are free and non-adversarial to enable those negatively impacted can easily access. This can take the chape of complaints mechanisms, administrative justice procedures or ombuds institutes, which provide people and businesses with an avenue to raise concerns, seek redress, and resolve disputes related to the impact of environmental policies and regulations. This ensure that injustices can be quickly remedied, this providing critical guardrails and contribute to just transitions, in line with the OECD’s approach to access to justice and people-centred justice systems (OECD, 2023[66]). By offering an impartial platform for complaints, these systems help prevent the escalation of conflicts that might arise and help build trust between stakeholders by providing a neutral ground where grievances are heard and addressed, fostering a sense of inclusion and fairness throughout the green transition process. The cases raised through such procedures provide valuable information to support reflexivity.
Once critical information has been received, it must be reflected on and then translated into rapid, meaningful adjustments to policies and projects. This is especially crucial in a climate context, because of the limited timeframe to deliver on climate targets, but also, as the New Zealand Climate Change Commission (2024[31]) identifies, because small delays in climate policy can have compounding effects on emissions reductions, due to implementation lags such as the gradual retirement of existing assets, slow consenting, planning and building processes, and the growth and absorption rate of new forests. However, there is evidence that countries are struggling to implement climate policies on-time and at-pace, let alone amendments and modifications to them. Climate commissions from Canada, the UK, Germany, South Africa and New Zealand have all identified slow implementation as an important risk factor to achieving climate targets in their independent reports. The German Expert Council noted a “striking discrepancy in the implementation status and concreteness” of measures contained in the country’s 2023 Climate Protection Programme, while the leading recommendation of the Canadian Climate Institute (2023[33]) in its latest Progress Report was to “rapidly implement developing and announced policies.” It is clear that national climate efforts need to significantly speed up climate policy design and implementation cycles, as well as incorporate systems rapid review and adjustment once implementation has occurred.
Resourcing and capability gaps can constrain countries’ abilities to build reflexivity into their climate plans. In Latin America, several countries’ plans and policies call for a feedback mechanism to inform on progress. But the capacity and resources to deliver on this are lacking. For example, Guatemala has revised and aligned its National Action Plan on Climate Change, and Monitoring Verification and Reporting System, with Sustainable Development Goals and national public policies. However, it recognises the need to implement continuous improvements in processes, and notes that one of the main constraints is the generation of an information base for decision-making.
Overall, reflexivity enables the mission to adapt to new information and circumstances in order to remain on-track to realise its objective. Reflexivity requires high quality monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and ongoing consultation, dedicated spaces for reflecting and learning, and processes that translate learnings into rapid, meaningful policy adjustments. National climate efforts face challenges in strengthening M&E processes and speeding up policy design and delivery cycles.
Capabilities
The successful implementation of mission-oriented climate policy hinges critically on the public sector's abilities, skills, and expertise. This encompasses both general competencies like project management, co-ordination, and systems thinking, as well as domain-specific knowledge essential for tasks such as effective procurement. As Hale emphasises, overall state capacity is a crucial enabling condition for climate governance, requiring government institutions to provide the "human and material resources to deliver complex and technical functions" (Hale, 2024[67]).
Capability development, both within the public sector and broader society, is a prerequisite for the successful implementation of most principles of mission governance. This includes the ability to formulate robust roadmaps, incorporate experimentation and reflexivity into government processes, design comprehensive policy mixes, calibrate broad portfolios of activities, and enable meaningful stakeholder mobilisation.
Overall, capabilities are emphasised unevenly across of the analysed national climate council assessments. While most mention it in passing, a handful of the climate councils specifically highlight the need for the public sector, and the broader society, to develop necessary skills and resources. This point was echoed in several of the expert interviews. This includes technical expertise (such as in CDR technology), but also extends to softer skills that enable relationship building and partnerships across government, private sector, and communities.
The Swedish Climate Policy Council (2024[4]) in particular underscores the need for comprehensive capacity building in both the public sector and in wider society. It advocates for strengthened public administration capacity to continuously develop, implement, and evaluate national and European climate policy, emphasising that “state organisation and resources need to be designed and dimensioned to match the task.” This extends beyond STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), emphasising the importance of multifaceted skills development across the public administration and the commercial sector. The Swedish CC also recognizes the need to support regions and municipalities, particularly smaller ones facing rapid industrial transitions, in acquiring the necessary expertise to support residents and businesses in the green transition.
France's approach to capacity building in the public sector is aimed specifically at ensuring successful climate policy integration. In its report, the French High Council on Climate places significant emphasis on training and building capabilities in the public sector to ensure effective integration of climate considerations across all policy areas, particularly in policy and legal drafting processes (Haut Conseil pour le Climat, 2024[9]). In 2022, France launched an educational program on the challenges of the ecological and climate transition, tailored for senior civil servants. This initiative aims to instil awareness that climate issues are relevant to all aspects of government work. France's approach also extends beyond the public sector, recognising the need for climate literacy across various professions. The HCC (2024[9]) calls for the entire public sector and its leaders to set a positive example in climate mitigation, both in terms of objectives and implementation. Several national climate assessments, including those from Guatemala, Mexico, South Africa, and Chile, identify the strengthening of institutional capacity as a prerequisite for successfully implementing climate plans. This is particularly crucial for developing the technical expertise needed to effectively execute monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) mechanisms.
A study examining New Zealand, Germany, and Ireland found that climate legislation has led to increased dedicated staffing across government departments (Averchenkova, Higham and Chan, 2024[5]). This expansion is driven by both legal pressure and enhanced justification for budget allocations. However, despite these increased resources, many governments report persistent challenges in building sustainable capacity to implement climate action effectively. Government officials across all three countries describe a lack of specialised skills needed for complex climate assessments.
Ireland's 2024 Climate Action Plan, recognising this challenge, calls for a review to assess the civil service's capacity and capability to address climate change (Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, 2024, p. 125[68]). Countries lacking such comprehensive climate legislation appear to face even greater challenges in securing funding for capacity-building initiatives.
The need for technical expertise extends beyond government institutions to the broader workforce. New Zealand's assessment, for instance, identifies a shortage of skilled professionals such as design engineers, electricians, boilermakers, and fitters/turners as a significant barrier to implementing industrial emissions reduction projects at the required scale and pace (He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission, 2024[31]).
These findings underscore the importance of comprehensive capacity-building strategies that address both public sector capabilities and wider workforce skills to effectively implement climate action plans.
Public funding
The mission-oriented approach requires allocating sufficient public funding to the mission’s activities and policies, as well as on reallocating funding away from activities that undermine or counteract the mission. Missions typically rely on public "seed funding" for overhead and co-ordination expenses as well as strategic projects, with the aim of de-risking and leveraging private investment for scaling up initiatives.
The OECD estimates the global financing needed to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement at USD 5 trillion per year until 2030 (OECD, n.d.[69]). Inevitably, some part of this financing will have to come from public coffers. However, given the scale of the climate challenge, public funds must be deployed strategically to manage risks and leverage opportunities, with an eye towards maximising impact and crowding-in private investments.
The analysis of climate assessments suggests that many countries, especially developing ones, face challenges in carving out sufficient funding for their efforts towards meeting climate mitigation targets. Crucially, this includes aforementioned challenges to secure internal capacity to monitor and coordinate government policy at a national level. Costa Rica’s assessment, for instance, highlights the lack of a specific budget to support a permanent government team or secretariat to ensure systematised climate reporting (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, 2019[56]). Others, such as in the case of South Africa and Chile, raise the difficulty of effective allocation of adequate funds to municipal and city governments’ climate initiatives.
Multiple CCs also highlight relatively small strategic projects – such as securing tools to effectively visualise undertaken climate policies and facilitate information sharing between government agencies – that would deliver outsized effects in advancing climate action yet remain unfunded. This underscores potential benefits of the mission approach of earmarking public funds for strategic co-ordination activities to deliver on the mission, to enhance the effectiveness of climate mitigation efforts.
Several CCs, including Sweden’s Climate Policy Council, underscore the importance of targeted support for Research and Development. It notes that “one way to ensure credible long-term climate policy targets is to support the development of new technologies at an early stage” which can lead to “new alliances” and motivate private investment in fossil-free solutions (Swedish Climate Policy Council, 2024[4]).
Yet, when it comes to climate mitigation efforts, such co-ordination or R&D expenses are eclipsed by investments needed for more structural emission reduction measures. These appear to require a broadened view of public funding.
Innovative approaches to climate finance are being explored to address funding gaps. In the case of Portugal’s Novo Pacte Verde, the mission approach (see Box 4.5) is being leveraged to mobilise and align funding from a variety of national and European sources around six ecological and climate commitments.
More broadly, the OECD Paris Collaborative on Green Budgeting, is working to design new tools to assess and drive improvements in the alignment of national expenditure and revenue processes with climate and other environmental goals (Blazey and Lelong, 2022[70]).
While governments have long deployed dedicated funds or ‘satellite accounts’ in relation to the environment, some countries, such as Finland, are attempting to integrate net-zero considerations into budget allocations (Institure for Government, 2020[71]). Several CCs call for integrating climate considerations into overall government budget processes and fiscal policy, since doing otherwise risks creating further barriers to achieving climate goals.
New Zealand's Climate Change Commission (2024[31]) calls for an alignment of all government funding decisions with emissions reduction and adaptation goals. It notes that “nearly every funding decision the Government makes with respect to infrastructure and economic policy, will have an impact – positive or negative – on emissions and resilience to respond to climate change”. It stresses that fiscal decisions need to “carefully and consistently consider the potential impact on both emissions reduction and adaptation” since they are otherwise “likely to create unintended roadblocks to the achievement of the Government’s climate-related goals.”
Yet, an overreliance on fiscal policy can strain government resources, as noted by the German Expert Council's critique of Germany's 2023 Climate Action Programme. The assessment draws attention to other policy instruments that would require less expenditure, or in some cases generate revenue, such as the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, levies and surcharges, taxes and energy charges, and emissions pricing, all of which are either briefly or not mentioned at all in the Government’s Programme (Expertenrat für Klimafragen, 2023[30]).
An important factor in mission governance, in order to use public funds efficiently, also lie in reallocating funding away from policies that undermine or counteract the mission. Many climate councils advocate for shifting funds from carbon-intensive activities, such as fossil fuel plants and private vehicle transportation. Going back to the German case, the Expert Council (Expertenrat für Klimafragen, 2023[30]) draws attention to policies that receive public funding but counteract climate goals, such as "climate damaging subsidies, energy tax concessions, and other transport sector concessions." It suggests that the Government's emission reduction plan acknowledges the need for such reforms but lacks concrete detail on how this will be implemented. In a similar vein, the Netherland’s Council points to high-carbon investments and subsidies, calling for a government strategy for “a just and effective conversion and, where necessary, phasing out of activities that do not fit into a climate-neutral and climate-resilient future” (Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad, 2024[48]).
Finance ministers from over 90 countries have acknowledged the need to integrate climate considerations into broader macroeconomic and fiscal policy, as well as public financial management and financial regulation, by signing on to the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action. Its 'Helsinki Principles', a set of six aspirational principles, promote fiscal policy and the use of public finance to support national climate action and the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions. It calls for efforts to “take climate change into account in macroeconomic policy, fiscal planning, budgeting, public investment management, and procurement practices”; but also, to mobilise private sources of climate finance and work towards effective carbon pricing.
Leveraging missions to align and mobilise environmental investments
Portugal’s Novo Pacte Verde, the New Green Pact, is a long-term investment plan for the country’s green transition. Mandated through an administrative act (No. 3926/2023), it aims to identify key investment areas to address Portugal’s climate and ecological emergencies while ensuring adequate infrastructure, strengthening education, creating green jobs, promoting territorial cohesion, and enhancing natural capital.
Taking inspiration from the Horizon Europe’s five EU Missions, the New Green Pact adopts a mission-oriented approach. It takes advantage of existing institutions, namely, the Interdisciplinary Taskforce for the New Green Pact, to act as a Missions Forum. The act also establishes a dedicated Mission Unit composed of representatives of Portugal’s Ministries, academia, and associations. This Unit consists of a managing body, an inter-ministerial working group, and a public participation structure. The managing body, comprising the General Secretariat for the Environment and the Environmental Fund, coordinates activities and supports policy formulation. The inter-ministerial group defines the missions, while the public participation structure organises consultations. The General Secretariat for the Environment, subordinate to the Ministry for the Environment and Climate Action, supports policy formulation, planning, funding management, and provides technical support to government officials.
The Mission Unit, launched in March 2023, is tasked with identifying priority areas for investment and corresponding policy targets, as well as corresponding plans for their achievement. To ensure sustainable societal engagement and political support, the Mission Unit held citizen participatory consultations across the country’s 23 intermunicipal communities. Through this broad interdisciplinary and intergenerational participatory process, the Mission Unit identified six priority areas, and corresponding missions. These are: quality of life with nature; active and empowered citizens for the green and just transition; water pact; collective, active and shared mobility accessible to all; green energy for everyone; and people and territories safe and adapted to climate change. Each of the six missions are linked to a corresponding national commitment, such as to guarantee the use of public transport and active mobility in 55% of trips by 2030.
Each mission’s investment plan is designed to leverage a variety of funding sources, both national and European. These include the Recovery and Resilience Plan (PRR), the Portugal 2030 Partnership Agreement, Portugal’s Environmental Fund, the Common Agricultural Policy Strategic Plan (PEPAC), as well as dedicated government funding allocated for the New Green Pact. The Mission Unit seeks to aggregate these resources, ensure complementarity and coherence between policies, support regional participation, and monitors implementation.
Private investment
Solely relying on public funding is generally insufficient for the level of ambition of missions. Mission governance therefore emphasises the importance of attracting private capital to contribute to its objectives, recognising that such investments will occur only when there is a business case for profitability. For this purpose, governments must deploy policies that incentivises and directs private sector investment towards mission accomplishment and discourage investments that may counteract such progress.
Substantial private sector investment is undoubtedly crucial for achieving national climate mitigation ambitions. The CC assessments invariably emphasise the need for directing large investment flows towards fossil-free solutions, and often call for deepened private sector involvement in efforts towards meeting the target.
Several CCs stress the crucial importance of enduring political support for climate targets, backed up with clear, credible, and consistent government actions and messaging. Such consistent and clear expectation-setting is particularly important to ensure investor confidence to direct investments flows towards climate-friendly technologies and infrastructure. Sweden’s SCPC (2024[4]), for instance, highlights the foundational task of policy “to find ways to increase credibility and create the right expectations about the profitability of fossil-free investments.”
This is evident in the United Kingdom, where the Government expressed a commitment to climate targets, but cancelled, delayed, and provided exemptions from important climate policies – including the exemption of 20% of households from the phase-out of fossil fuel boilers and a five-year delay of end-of-sales date for Internal Combustion Engine vehicles. According to the UK Climate Change Committee (2024[28]), this confused consumers and created inconsistent market signals that deterred investment.
Similarly, New Zealand’s Climate Change Commission (2024[31]) asks the Government to provide greater clarity on the relative roles of gross emission reductions and carbon dioxide removals in the net-zero transition. It writes that clearer signalling would provide businesses, communities, and local government with a “clear and stable path”, that increases their confidence and enables informed decision-making on investments in low-emissions technologies, and choices and plans consistent with the government’s decarbonisation pathway.
France's High Council on Climate further stresses the importance of establishing transparent and predictable rules for stranded assets, including objectives and timetables, and engaging with relevant industries on their implications, to minimise risks and resistance to the transition (Haut Conseil pour le Climat, 2024[9]).
Several climate councils also touch upon the role of involving the private sector in objective setting for their sectors. South Africa’s PCC (2024[52]), for instance, notes that “the private sector enhances public efforts by providing insights, experiences, and resources […] as well as including climate risks in their corporate planning and implementing measures to protect their assets and operations.” An example of co-ownership in sector-based objective-setting, allowing industry to align corporate strategies with national goals, is the Fossil Free Sweden roadmap initiative described in Box 4.4. Such engagement can also help government identify barriers and levers hindering investment, amongst which France’s HCC highlights employment changes, training needs, infrastructure, and supply chains, but also administrative burdens or sector-specific market dynamics (Haut Conseil pour le Climat, 2024[9]).
Potentially, the mission concept can help bridge the public-private divide, with similarities to the private sector (and in particular the technology sector) use of the Objectives and Key Results (OKRs) methodology in goal setting and management (Doerr, 2021[75]).
Finally, the CC assessments highlight a variety of targeted policy interventions that governments can deploy to unlock private sector investments, such as in carbon-free energy. Supporting early-stage technology development helps create future market expectations that motivate further investment. Contractual mechanisms such as the UK’s Contracts for Difference, designed to provide the private sector with price or revenue certainty, also help incentivise investments in renewable energy projects. Further afield, the US Inflation Reduction Act has provided a blueprint for wide-spanning tax relief and loan guarantees for clean energy investments. These wide-spanning policies seek to influence market dynamics to level the playing field for clean technologies and encourage the green transition.
As described in the next section, Market-shaping tools play a significant role in internalising costs and creating economic incentives for businesses and consumers to reduce their carbon footprint. This approach not only encourages emission reductions but also stimulates innovation in clean technologies.
France’s High Council for the Climate’s assessment grid, with criteria and sub-criterions, presents an insightful example of the climate councils’ often broad view of the economic policy needs related to GHG emission reduction efforts. Below are the HCC’s criteria for Economic Policy and Instruments, which are part of a broader set of criteria for effective public action, themselves inspired by the UK CCC.
Criteria for Economic Policy and Instruments:
Public financing coupled with price signals and other incentives encouraging private investments is credible.
Sub-criterion: Effectiveness and Coherence
Do the instruments provide a clear vision of the long-term trajectory? Is the continuity of action ensured?
Does the set of instruments impose too heavy an administrative burden on the actors?
Does the set of instruments allow for emission reductions in accordance with SNBC objectives?
Sub-criterion: Price Signal
Do price signals (taxes, subsidies, tax credits, quotas, bonus-malus) allow for emission reductions (effectiveness)?
Is the impact on households and businesses controlled?
Are the measures put in place efficient?
Are subsidies and tax credits easily accessible?
Are potential carbon leaks controlled?
Sub-criterion: Regulation and Standards
Do standards allow for emission reduction?
Is the administrative burden sustainable?
Is the adaptive capacity, especially of modest actors, taken into account and supported?
Sub-criterion: Public Investment
Do sector or business contracts allow for emission reductions?
Is the impact (increase in carbon footprint) of trade agreements controlled?
Market-shaping
Accomplishing missions generally involve going beyond market fixing and finding ways to shape both supply and demand to steer markets towards intended outcomes. Markets don't always naturally align with broader societal objectives and thus require intervention to ensure create favourable conditions for developing and scaling up solutions. Mission governance involves enabling such deliberate efforts to create, stimulate, influence or redirect markets to help solve societal challenges and deliver societal value (Mazzucato, 2023[76]).
Climate councils are advocating for a range of demand-shaping policies to influence consumer behaviour and market dynamics across sectors and domains. These include measures such as imposing taxes on high carbon footprint foods, as proposed in Denmark, and implementing fuel efficiency standards, as recommended in Australia. These policies aim to create a "demand-pull" for green transition technologies and more sustainable consumption patterns.
Human behaviour plays a pivotal role in the green transition, with missions designed to achieve this transformation relying on significant behaviour change. Individuals contribute to the green transition in multiple roles: as consumers who influence demand for sustainable products, as users interacting with eco-friendly infrastructure, and as citizens supporting policies and countering misinformation. To meet these diverse needs, governments strive not only to shift attitudes and behaviours to reduce carbon emissions but also to build public support that reshapes market dynamics on both the supply and demand sides (Moore et al., 2021[77]). The Netherlands' Scientific Climate Council emphasises that the government plays a crucial role in removing barriers, responding to intrinsic motivations, and incentivising sustainable behaviour (Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad, 2024[37]). Ireland’s Climate Change Advisory Council (Climate Change Advisory Council, 2023[8]) promotes securing better access to smart metering data to help consumers better control their energy use, motivating commuters to opt for public transport and active travel through advantageous commuter tickets, cycle to work schemes, and parking levies, as well as public education campaigns and incentives for businesses and households to address food waste and food packaging waste. This approach reflects a broader trend where governments are increasingly leveraging behavioural science to shape demand-side policies. By understanding and influencing the choices of consumers, users, and citizens, governments can design policies that foster pro-environmental behaviours, curb unsustainable consumption, and promote the widespread adoption of sustainable goods, services, and technologies—an essential component in advancing the green transition (OECD, forthcoming[47]).
A variety of taxation and pricing policy, such as the package of tax incentives and subsidies described in Guatemala’s update report, are seen as a tool to incentivise climate-friendly behaviour, though challenges exist in harmonising taxes across different sectors (MARN, SGCCC and PNUD, 2022[11]). In their study of 1500 climate policies implemented between 1998 and 2022 compiled by the OECD, Stechemesser et al. (2024[55]) highlight the unique effectiveness of price-based instruments, such as a carbon pricing or energy taxes. In fact, it is the one approach that appears effective when implemented in isolation, without being complemented by other policies, especially in industry sectors dominated by highly profitable companies (Stechemesser et al., 2024[55]).
Carbon pricing schemes are powerful tools to shape markets and internalise environmental costs, helping incentivise emissions reductions across sectors while providing flexibility for businesses to find cost-effective solutions. Additionally, well-designed carbon pricing mechanisms can help create markets for carbon sequestration and capture technologies. The Australian CCA (2023[32]), for instance, argues that “the government could help build a market for currently high-cost engineered forms of sequestration by incentivising net-zero and carbon capture-derived products in compliance markets and Commonwealth procurement policies.”
Several CCs also highlight the purchasing power of public institutions as a lever to create demand for more sustainable products and services. As part of a call for a strategy to be developed to promote climate-friendly behaviour across consumption groups, the Danish Council on Climate Change (2024[29]) recommends the use of procurement, such as by serving climate-friendly food in public kitchens, alongside pricing measures. The French High Council on Climate (2024[9]) also suggests making state aid conditional on the adoption of low-carbon practices. This approach ties government support, such as aid to start-ups, to commitments or actions that align with climate goals.
While less prevalent in the assessments, the CCs also call for a use of supply side policies to shape the capacity and output of suppliers and businesses. An example of such supply-side policies is the United Kingdom's Zero-Emission Vehicle mandate. This policy requires that 80% of new cars and 70% of new vans must be zero-emissions by 2030, increasing to 100% for both by 2035 (UK Department for Transport, 2024[78]). Such mandates directly shape the market by setting clear targets for manufacturers and suppliers.
Regulations are another important lever for market shaping, that CCs encourage wider and effective use of across sectors. For instance, the Australian Climate Change Authority (2023[32]) advocates for the introduction of a Fuel Efficiency Standard, which would gradually shape the market for passenger vehicles by phasing out emissions-intensive cars. France’s Haut Conseil pour le Climat (2024[9]) highlight that regulations, standards, and benchmarks have shown success in several sectors (e.g. construction) but need to be further developed and enforced in others (e.g. agriculture).
In the EU, national-level market shaping efforts can be challenging due to the common market. The Swedish Climate Council therefore advocates for EU-level action to develop the EU Emissions Trading Systems (ETS) to achieve EU-wide climate neutrality.
To provide an illustrative overview, Table 4.3 presents preliminary insights drawn from the climate council assessments regarding the dynamics of each mission governance principle and their apparent reflection in national climate mitigation efforts. The suggested adoption levels should be interpreted as directional rather than definitive, indicating where principles appear to be: (1) 'Established' – acknowledged and elaborated features of climate mitigation efforts, even if continued developments may be needed; (2) 'Identified gaps' – recognised as important but with clear implementation challenges; or (3) 'Underexplored' – receiving relatively little attention in the assessments, potentially representing untapped potential levers for meeting climate targets. These categorisations are based on aggregate interpretations of the climate council assessments and are intended to spark discussion rather than serve as conclusive findings.
Based on the analysed climate council assessments and expert interviews.
Note: The labels in the column “Adoption level” represents the perceived aggregated degree to which each mission governance principle is reflected in the climate mitigation efforts as described in the analysed climate council assessments. "Established" indicates principles that are well acknowledged and elaborated features amongst the countries’ climate efforts, even if continued improvements and developments may be necessary. "Identified gap" suggests areas where importance is recognised by the climate councils, but implementation falls short, highlighting the need for strengthening. "Underexplored" implies principles that receive relatively little attention in the climate council assessments, potentially representing untapped potential governance levers in the efforts to meet climate mitigation targets.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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